Total Altruism in Levinas's Ethics of The Welcome

Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc
"Total Altruism" in Levinas's "Ethics of the Welcome"

Author(s): M. Jamie Ferreira
Source: The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Fall, 2001), pp. 443-470
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"TOTALALTRUISM"IN LEVINAS'S
"ETHICS OF THE WELCOME"
M. Jamie Ferreira
ABSTRACT
Levinas's ethics of other-centeredservice has been criticized at the theo-
retical level for failing to offer a conception of moral agency adequate to
ground its imperative and at the practical level for encouraging self-
hatred. Levinas's explicit resistance to the incorporationof the phrase "as
yourself" in the Judaeo-Christian love command might seem to validate
the critics' complaints. The author argues, on the contrary,that Levinas
does offer a strong and compellingconceptionof moral agency and that his
ethics, properly understood, does not entail self-abnegation. Levinas's
attempt to counter excessive and manipulative self-concern and self-
inflation by insisting on the dependent and situational position of the self
has been wrongly overinterpreted as an abandonment of the self and its
just claims. The author seeks to establish a more balanced understanding
by focusing attention on the "ethics of welcome,"on Levinas's distinctive
conception of passivity, and on the role of "the third" in all human
relations.
KEYWORDS: agency,altruism, equality,justice, Levinas, Ricoeur
CALVIN SCHRAG NOTES, IN The Self after Postmodernity,that "one of the

recurring ironies of postmodernity ... is the impassioned call for em-
powerment alongside requiems eulogizing the passing of the subject as
speaker, author, actor- and pretty much in every sense conceivable"
(Schrag 1997, 61). Schrag suggests that the influential character of the
requiems, whether formulated in terms of the death of the author, the
deconstructionof the subject, the displacement of the ego, or the dissolu-
tion of self-identity, forces us to re-examine notions of self, ego, and
subject. He draws on the resources of Paul Ricoeur's similar project in
Oneself as Another, where Ricoeur proposes a hermeneutic of the self
in response to "the vertigo of the disintegration of the self pursued mer-
cilessly by Nietzschean deconstruction";Ricoeur's question, in the end,
is: "Mustone not, in orderto make oneself open, available, belong to one-
self in a certain sense?" (Ricoeur 1992, 19, 138). Even more recently,
Oliver Davies has argued that an ethics of compassion presupposes a
self-possessed self: "Self-dispossessive virtue entails a prior state of
JRE 29.3:443-70. © 2001 Journalof ReligiousEthics, Inc.
444 Journal of Religious Ethics
self-possession if compassion is knowingly to put oneself at risk for the

sake of the other"(Davies 2001, 8).
Those committed to this effort to recover or reconstruct a sense of a
self adequate to support love or compassionhave in some cases targeted
the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, suggesting that by emphasizing "sub-
stitution" of self, "total altruism," and the self as "hostage,"he fails to
maintain a sense of self sufficient for responsible agency or the dialectics
of relation. Davies, for example, claims that Levinas'spicture of how "the
'hostage'self suffers 'the violence of alterity' in 'oppression,'persecution,7
'martyrdom'and 'obsession'"precludesthe "self-presenceand self-posses-
sion" necessary to ethical responsibility (Davies 2001, 188, 31). He
argues that "concreteand realized acts of compassion . . . are not enabled
'through the condition of being hostage'"(Davies 2001, 189). An earlier
and more wide-rangingcritique of Levinas's ethics is found in Oneselfas
Another.While admitting a deep "debt"to Levinas, Ricoeur nonetheless
suggests that Levinas's ethics implies the "substitutionof self-hatred for
self-esteem"or, at the very least, ignores or precludes "solicitude,as the
mutual exchange of self- esteems" (Ricoeur 1992, 168, 221).
Ricoeur's understanding of the ethical relation is that I must hold you
in esteem "as I hold myself in esteem," and he describes his own work as
a "phenomenologyof 'you too' and of 'as myself" (Ricoeur 1992, 193).
The "as myself" expresses the "reflexivestructure"of self-esteem: "self-
esteem [is] understood as a reflexive moment of the wish for the 'good
life'"(Ricoeur 1992, 192). Ricoeur'sview is that the reflexivity of the "as
myself" guarantees the self - through "self-esteem"- within the ethical
relation to another. Other thinkers have similarly argued that the ele-
ment of "asyourself" in the classical love commandmentguarantees the
self in the relation. S0ren Kierkegaard,for example, has argued that the
"as yourself" of the love commandment both implies the legitimacy of
self-love and puts legitimate limits on self-sacrifice in response to the
command.1They are the same limits that Kierkegaard says are implied
in the need for both a You and an I in the love relationship: he argues
that the little phrase "as yourself" requires that fulfillment of the
commandment to love the other requires genuine love of self, and he
confirms this need when he claims that an independent whole self is a
sine qua non of love, for "without a you and an /, there is no love"
(Kierkegaard 1847/1995, 266). Kierkegaard reminds us in no uncertain
terms that "ifthe commandmentis properlyunderstood it also says the
opposite: Youshall love yourself in the right way. Therefore if anyone is
unwilling to learn from Christianity to love himself in the right way, he
cannot love the neighbor either" (Kierkegaard 1847/1995, 22). In other
1For more on this, see Ferreira 2001, 31-36, 129-36.
TotalAltruism 445
words, Kierkegaard,too, affirms the importance of maintaining the self

(the "I")while in relation, and he connects maintaining the self with the
reflexive "as yourself" within the love commandment.
Unlike Ricoeurand Kierkegaard,Levinas explicitly distances himself
from the phrase "as yourself,"which is found in both Jewish and Chris-
tian versions of the love commandment:"Youshall love your neighbor as
yourself" (Lev. 19:18; Matthew 22:39; Mark 12:31; Galatians 5:14);2he
highlights, by contrast, "the priority of the other" (Levinas 1975c, 90).
This might suggest that he is indeed vulnerable to the criticism that his
ethics lacks a sufficient sense of self. My aim, however,is to suggest that
despite this distancing move, there are resources within Levinas's
thought for an appreciationof the reflexive movement implied in the "as
myself" proposed by Ricoeur or the "as yourself" of the love command-
ment. I will reconsider Levinas's view of the relevance and role of the
self in ethical relation, and I will argue that his ethics supports an active
and maintained ethical self, which, despite his emphasis on
"dissymmetry"in face-to-face relation, accounts for his affirmations of
both equality and justice. In particular, I will argue that Levinas's con-
tinued designation of his ethics as an "ethics of the welcome"(Levinas
1986a, 151) requires the continued relevance of his early notion of the
self as "host"(Levinas 1961). The language of "hostage"that comes in
between (Levinas 1974) is not a shift away from his earlier language of
hospitality; it is an elaboration of it. If we are to do justice to his ethics,
we must remember that he construes the self through the dual ascrip-
tion of "host"and "hostage"- the two notions are to be held in tension as
correctives to each other. Levinas's later writing does not substitute the
notion of hostage for that of host or the notion of violence for that of wel-
come; the "total altruism" of which he speaks is affirmed in the same
breath as "hospitality."If we want to see what is at stake for Levinas in
his challenge to the "as yourself" of the love commandment, we need
first to examine his stand on its other dimensions: as a commandmentto
love the neighbor. Since Levinas expresses some ambivalence about
these three elements, it is important to begin by documentingjust how
all three elements figure in his account.
1. Love and Responsibility

Levinas equates "the neighbor"with "the responsibility to the other"
(1974, 47, 100; 1975a, 142).3The term "proximityof the neighbor"means
2 The Hebrew linguistic structure that I consider later does not account for Levinas's
resistance.
3 Throughoutthe remainder of the article, citations of the works of Levinas will give
only the year of publication and the page number;citations of all other works will give
for him "theresponsibility of the ego for an other, the impossibility of let-
ting the other alone faced with the mystery of death" (1984b, 167). In
"Ethics as First Philosophy,"Levinas details how "the Other becomes
my neighbor precisely through the way the face summons me, calls for
me, begs for me, and in so doing recalls my responsibility, and calls me
into question"(1984a, 83). Levinas occasionallyhesitates about whether
the term "neighbor"is the best to use- sometimes because it seems to
obscure the fact of difference (1962, 27) and sometimes because it may
have lost its legitimate shock value in coming to be taken for granted
("Perhapsbecause of current moral maxims in which the word neighbor
occurs, we have ceased to be surprised by all that is involved in proxim-
ity and approach"[1974, 5]). Nevertheless, he persists in using it from
his earliest to his latest writings: "Itis as a neighborthat a human being
is accessible- as a face";"in this call to responsibility of the ego by the
face which summons it, which demands it and claims it, the other
(autrui) is the neighbor"(1951, 8; 1984b, 167).
Levinas, especially in his later years, speaks of "love of one's neigh-
bor,"which he defines as "lovewithout Eros, charity, love in which the
ethical aspect dominates the passionate aspect, love without concupis-
cence"(1982b, 103). However,most of the time Levinas uses the idiom of
"responsibilityfor"the neighbor, rather than that of love. He learned
early on, he says, to "distrustthe compromisedword 'love,'"choosing in-
stead to speak of "the responsibility for the Other, being-for-the-other"
(1982a, 52). Repeatedly he distances himself from the term "love,"which
he considers "worn-out and debased," preferring instead "the harsh
name for what we call love of one's neighbor"- namely, "responsibility
for my neighbor"(1982b, 103). In sum, Levinas has what he calls "a
grave view of Agape in terms of responsibility for the other" (1982b,
113).
Levinas's preference for the term "responsibility"is an understand-
able one. The word "love"fails to announce strongly enough that "I am
ordered toward the face of the other,"who "commands"me (1974, 11,
emphasis added), that my response is his "right,"and that "the right of
the human"has the very strong connotation of "commandment"(1984b,
167, emphasis added). Still, despite his "grave"or "harsh"view of love as
responsibility for the other, Levinas does, time and again, use the word
"love,"even within those essays where he uses also the stronger lan-
guage of obligation (1984b, 169; 1975a, 140). However,he does this only
with the understanding that "thereis something severe in this love; this
love is commanded"(1982b, 108). In one of his later interviews, he is
author, date, and page, with the exception of sec. 3.1 in which the author assumed in the
citations should in all cases be Ricoeur.Italics in quotations may be assumed to have ap-
peared in the original unless otherwise noted.
TotalAltruism 447
particularly eloquent about love: he claims that the "idea of the face is
the idea of gratuitous love" and suggests that faith is "believing that
love without reward is valuable"; he goes so far as to say that "that
which I call responsibility is a love, because love is the only attitude
where there is encounter with the unique"(1986b, 176, 177, 174). In this
same interview, Levinas explicitly refers to "the commandmentof a gra-
tuitous act" like love; he observes that "commanding love signifies
recognizing the value of love in itself" and that "Godis a commandment
to love . . . the one who says that one must love the other" (1986b,
176-77).
There is some value in refusing to reduce the language of relation to
the language of responsibility- after all, responsibility can be fulfilled
grudgingly,hatefully. Perhaps this sad truth accounts for the extremely
negative reaction readers often have to Levinas's notion of the self as
"hostage"in responsibility (1974, 11, 59); this phrase seems to describe
a very unloving situation, putting us at odds with the neighbor- a
relation that we would normally condemn. But Levinas makes it clear
early on that "the other is not a being we encounter that menaces us or
wants to lay hold of us" (1948, 87),4just as he acknowledges later that
the responsibility of which he speaks "is not a cold juridical require-
ment" (1986c, 186). Responsibility is, rather, "all the gravity of the love
of one's fellowman- of love without concupiscence"- and it is accom-
plished "through all the modalities of giving" (1986c, 186). Levinas's
reversion to the term "love"may be due, then, to his sense that "giving"
calls to mind love rather than mere (juridical)responsibility
2. Reflexivity in the Love Commandment

Let us turn now to Levinas's response to the additional element
of the love commandment- the "as yourself." In the course of a formal
set of questions put to him, Levinas had been asked the following:
"Cannotmoral experience be translated as an experience of the other as
identical to oneself? . . . [an experience that] correspondsto the impera-
tive . . . 'Love your neighbor as yourself" (1975c, 90). His response is
particularly intriguing for what it tells us about his sense of ethical self-
hood. He says that he is "perplexed"by the biblical text (and he implies
that the translators should have been more perplexed). He asks, "What
does 'as yourself signify?" He imagines Martin Buber and Franz
Rosenzweig saying to each other "Does not 'as yourself mean that one
4 He writes, "I was extremely interested in Sartre's phenomenologicalanalysis of the

'other,'though I always regretted that he interpreted it as a threat and a degradation"
(1981, 53).
loves oneself most?"And he interprets their rejection of that translation

as the reason for their alternative translation, "Loveyour neighbor, he
is like you."Levinas, however, is not satisfied with that and proposes an
alternative reading that is grounded in the hermeneutical principle
that it is only when the "entirety of the Bible becomes the context of the
verse that the verse resounds with all its meaning"(1975c, 90). He con-
cludes that the Bible as a whole "always"posits the "priority of the
other in relation to me," and so he resists the "as yourself" in favor of
the "priorityof the other"(1975c, 91).
2.1 Levinas's suspicion of the "asyourself
Presumably Levinas has reservations about the way in which "as

yourself" implies a kind of equality that seems to put limits on my
responsibility for the other. He may also feel a need to reject "as your-
self" because it permits a dilution of responsibility. If I am taught to
think of the other as my equal, I am likely to think of the other as some-
one who is commandedto regard me as I regard her. Thus, the equality
implied by the "as yourself" allows us to put the spotlight on the other's
responsibility- she, too, is commandedto love her neighbor- and, thus,
to begin to compare and calculate obligations. It promotes the kind of
"bookkeeping"arrangement that Levinas equates with "reciprocity"and
criticizes (1974, 124-25). Thus, his rejection of the "as yourself" seems
to serve two different functions: First, it deflects attention from the self,
as when he retorts that the other's obligation to me is "his affair,"not
mine (1975c, 93; 1982a, 98; 1981, 63). Second, it focuses attention on the
self by forestalling our escapist tendencies to shift attention to the
other's obligation. In this context, as in many others, Levinas's concern
is to express the distinctiveness of the ethical relation; his object is to
clarify the ethical relation between us, not to develop an ontological
picture of our relation.
There are, in principle, several ways in which a notion of reflexivity
("asmyself" or "as yourself") might be justified. One is formal, a matter
of simple consistency: if no one is to be excluded from my love, I cannot
arbitrarily exclude myself. Other ways are more substantive. One could
argue that it is part of my duty to others that I maintain myself, in order
to be able to support others, to have something to give. A variation of
this theme is (as Immanuel Kant suggests) that proper concern for the
self prevents the temptation to transgress our duties to others. 5 In a
5 Kant suggests that "tosecure one'sown happiness is at least indirectlya duty,for dis-
content with one's conditionunder pressure from many cares and amid unsatisfied wants
could easily become a great temptation to transgress duties"(Kant 1785/1959, 15).
TotalAltruism 449
different vein, one could argue that if love's proper object is "the good"
(as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas think), then one must love the good in
oneself as much as the good in others.6Another version of this theme is
that reverence for God'screation or God'sgifts entails reverence for one's
self.
What is at stake for Levinas, we saw, was avoiding the danger of the
addition "asyourself"- the danger that it emphasizes equality in such a
way as to foster a comparative "bookkeeping"attitude, an emphasis on
what the other also owes. Levinas's fear of affirming self-love seems to
blind him to these other meanings of the "as yourself." Deliberately
deemphasizing the "as yourself" is Levinas's way of trying to turn us
away from ourselves toward the other, but ironically, the effort to focus
only on the self's responsibility can, despite its good intentions, return
the spotlight to the self. That is, the effort to prevent our obsession with
assessing the other's obligation carries with it the threat of taking our
attention away from the other altogether, by enshrining another kind of
self-centeredness in making the self supreme in its agency of loving.
2.2 Kierkegaard'scontrasting interpretation

This potential weakness in Levinas's account is revealed by compari-
son with Kierkegaard's contrasting understanding of the love
commandment,developedin Worksof Love. Kierkegaardis willing to in-
sist on this potentially dangerous addition to the love commandment
because he values the distinctive richness of the New Testament'svarious
formulations of the commandment, one of which is: "Anew command-
ment I give you, that you love one another:that as I have loved you, you
also love one another"(John 13:34).Acknowledgingthat "asyourself"can
also mean "asyou yourself are loved by God,"Kierkegaardtakes seriously
the two variants of the commandment's"asyourself":(a) as (you ought to
love) yourself and (b) as yourself (you have been loved). For Kierkegaard,
the "as yourself" puts me and the other "underGod,"and reminds me
that there are two of us of equal status under God, two who are com-
manded,but it also reminds me that I have been loved. That is, it reminds
me that the author of my being, the one who commands me, is also the
source of love in me. I can love only because I am loved- I cannot love of
my own resources,on my own initiative, so to speak. When the command-
ment is interpreted "self-lessly"in terms solely of "the priority of the
other,"we lose the reminder that our ability to love arises because we
6 For example, Aristotle brings out the ambiguity in the phrase "loverof self" and ex-
"
plains the "natureof true self-love,"affirmingthat "thegoodman should be a lover of self
(Aristotle 1954, ix.8). Accountsthat emphasize self-respectand self-esteem would fall into
this category.
ourselves have been loved, supported, and encouraged- with the para-
doxical result that this "selfless" interpretation ends up placing an
importanceon the sovereign self that would not otherwise be attributed
to it. The "as yourself,"as Kierkegaardconstrues it, reminds me both of
my createdness and of the gift of love to me, and thus it takes me out of
myself, renderingmy response to the other less subjective.
In Kierkegaard'sview, the "as yourself" functions as a reminder of
God'senabling gift of love, and this paradoxicallyreminds me about my-
self precisely in order to focus my attention on the other. While Levinas
is right to fear the translation "as yourself" because the language of
equality (whether in the form of "theneighbor is worthy as I am worthy"
or "the neighboris commandedas I am commanded")is open to the dan-
ger of calculation and comparisonand can be interpreted in such a way
as to set limits on our responsibility, insofar as he abandons the "as
yourself," he loses an important dimension of the love command- the
insistence that our ability to fulfill the commandrests on God'sgracious
gift of love and not our own independent powers. Thus, it seems that
Levinas's strategy for taking the emphasis away from the self actually,
and ironically, lifts up the self by denying its dependency on God and
leaving me, in the end, "on my own." My very love becomes a self-
centered achievement.
It is worth noting at this point that despite Levinas's reference to the
difficulty of the translation of the love commandment,his reluctance to
affirm the "asyourself"is not a function of the original Hebrew formula-
tion: V'ahavta re'echa c'mocha. The Hebrew linguistic structure of the
love commandment reads "Youwill loveyour neighbor- as you [im-
plied verb clause]."That is, it does not place "neighbor"as direct object.7
It seems plausible to see this structure as allowing an emphasis on
equality: you will love, and your neighbor like you (will love); you will
both love; you (both equally) will love; you, as equals, will love. The He-
brew,then, can support the suggestion that the "asyourself"is meant to
remind us that we are both commandedto love and that we are both cre-
ated by or in love, and thus enabled to love.
3. Levinas's Conception of Ethical Agency

As I noted as the outset of this article, it has been argued that the
deconstructive attack on a Cartesian model of selfhood puts in jeopardy
the very notion of an agent who can act ethically (freely, responsibly).
Levinas's attempt to subordinate ontology to ethics has been subject to
this same critique, for it has seemed to some to deprive his ethics of a
sense of selfhood sufficient to ground responsible agency and ethical
7 1 am grateful to Peter Ochs for his suggestions about this formulation.
TotalAltruism 451
relation. Davies's recent attempt to "build a performative language of

self-realization as compassionate and joyful personhood . . . [and gener-
ate a conceptionof] a self who is exuberantly self-possessing in her own
existence, foundationally reciprocal, and inhabiting a space which is
co-gifted by and with the other"implicitly criticizes an ethics that talks
of the self as a hostage (Davies 2001, 8, 10). This carries on the impulse I
noted earlier in Ricoeur's critique of Levinas, so let us now return to
Ricoeur'sanalysis since he develops the criticism more explicitly and in
more detail.
3.1 Ricoeur'scritique of Levinas

Ricoeur holds that Levinas fails to do justice to the importance of
self-esteem, and he attributes this failure to the way in which Levinas's
"entire philosophy rests on the initiative of the other in the inter-
subjective relation" (Ricoeur 1992, 188). Ricoeur concludes that "in
reality, this initiative establishes no relation at all, to the extent that the
other represents absolute exteriority with respect to an ego defined by
the conditionof separation"(1992, 188-89). The one-sidedness of the ini-
tiative, which explains why Levinas calls the relation "dissymmetrical,"
is, for Ricoeur,the source of the failure to have a self in a "dialectically
complementary"ethical relation with an other (1992, 340). Accordingto
Ricoeur,Levinas's view of the other in Otherwisethan Being is of a "per-
secutor"who "has to storm the defenses of a separate T" (1992, 190).
This "hyperboleof separation renders unthinkable . . . the distinction
between self and I, and the formation of a concept of selfhood defined
by its openness and its capacity for discovery" (1992, 339). That is,
Levinas's attempt to respect the alterity of the other involves an abso-
lute separation and a dissymmetry that render impossible an ethical
self- with the result "that the self, not distinguished from the I, is not
taken in the sense of the self-designation of a subject of discourse, ac-
tion, narrative, or ethical commitment"(1992, 335).
Ricoeur wants an appreciation of the agent's initiative and self-
esteem, and these take the form, for Ricoeur,of the agent's "benevolent
spontaneity"as well as a "movementof recognition"by the other (1992,
190). But this cannot just be a reversal of Levinas's position. Ricoeur
wants to find a middle ground between what he calls "twoextremes":on
the one hand, there is the "the summons to responsibility,where the ini-
tiative comes from the other"and, on the other hand, there is "sympathy
for the suffering other, where the initiative comes from the loving self"
(1992, 192). If these are in fact "extremes,"then presumably Ricoeur
does not mean to opt simply for the latter position, which would just re-
place one initiative with the other; rather, the middle ground must be
one in which esteem of the other is reciprocallyrelated to, and based on,
esteem of oneself. Seeing "oneself as another"is, more precisely, seeing

the fundamental equivalence between "the esteem of the other as a one-
self and the esteem of oneself as an other"(1992, 194).
This notion of self-esteem is not found in Levinas's work, Ricoeursug-
gests, because Levinas does not work with a distinction between two
senses of sameness or identity- namely, between idem and ipse, or be-
tween ego and self. Levinas's work, he claims, is "directed against a
conception of the identity of the Same . . . but at a level of radicality
where the distinction I proposebetween two sorts of identity, that of ipse
and that of idem, cannot be taken into account"(1992, 335). In sum,
Ricoeur wants to reject Levinas's "unilateral" view in favor of a
"two-prongedconception of otherness . . . , one that does justice in turn
to the primacy of self-esteem and also to the primacy of the convocation
to justice coming from the other"(1992, 331). Presumably, only an ade-
quate notion of ipse can account for a double source of initiative, one that
appreciates the radicality of the demand placed on the agent by the
other and, at the same time, allows "the self-designation of a subject of
discourse, action, narrative, or ethical commitment"(1992, 335). And
presumably,an ethics of "substitution"and "hostage"cannot support the
latter designation of an ethical self. David Ford recently summarized
Ricoeur's critique of Levinas as follows: Levinas "failsto distinguish the
'self from the %'and he therefore ends up with a dissymmetry between
self and other which amounts to a lack of relation and to the sterility of
interiority. ... In Levinas there is no return from the other to self-
affirmation in the mode of self-esteem and conviction"(Ford 1999, 95).
It is clear that any ethics must provide for the notion of a responsible
agent- a maintained self who can act freely and self-consciously and be
held responsible for such action. Given the challenge that we earlier saw
Levinas pose toward the "as yourself" of the love command, we need to
ask whether his notions of "substitution"and "hostage"symbolize ex-
actly that lack of a sense of self with which he is charged. I will argue
that there is embeddedin Levinas's ethics a significant notion of ethical
agency, which in fact is congruent with and illuminates his positions on
hospitality, equality, and justice.
3.2 Confirmationof the nonimperialistic I
Clearly,Levinas would never speak as Ricoeurdoes about self-esteem

nor as Kierkegaard does about love of self. Instead, he describes our
activity in being responsible to the other as "substitution"- substituting
oneself for another, as a "hostage"does. He suggests even that we are
summoned by the initiative of the other to the extent of being "perse-
cuted" (1974, 126-28, 111). He elaborates this in terms of "the self
TotalAltruism 453
emptying itself of itself," "forgetfulof itself," "divesting itself, emptying

itself of its own being"(1974, 111, 117). Such descriptions must be taken
seriously, and when they are, we find ourselves wondering whether a
kenotic (self-emptying) ethics can do justice to ethical selfhood and re-
sponsible agency. It may seem that a hostage is not free enough to be a
responsible agent or to experience self-esteem; it may seem that substi-
tution of the self for the other involves a total loss of self.
There are numerous places in his writings, however, where Levinas
qualifies the meaning of "self-emptying,""hostage,"and "substitution"
in such a way that an active responsible agent remains in place in rela-
tion. It is important first to note where this occurs and then to account
for the co-existence of these affirmations of agency with the more radical
affirmation of self-emptying and self-forgetfulness.
The notion of self-emptying is qualified when Levinas assumes that
the I must maintain its integrity in relation, that "it reaches the apogee
of its existence as an J when everything in the Other concerns it":"the
fullness of power in which the sovereignty of the / maintains itself ex-
tends to the Other, not in order to conquer it, but to support it" (1975b,
74). Moreover,he says explicitly that the self is not destroyed by being
put in question by the other, but is rather engaged in a certain "tension":
"instead of destroying the /, the putting in question binds it to the Other
in an incomparable, unique manner" that constitutes an "election,"a
"promotionto a privileged place on which all this not me depends"
(1975b, 73). He uses the term "total altruism"to speak of the responsi-
bility that "ridsthe / of its imperialism and egotism . . . [and] confirms
the / in its ipseity, in its central place within being, as a supporter of the
universe" (1975b, 73-74). For Levinas, ridding the I of its imperialism
does not eliminate ipseity, but confirms it: "total altruism"is said to be
compatible with a confirmed self. (This, by the way, suggests that
Levinas does not fail to appreciate the distinction between idem and ipse
that Ricoeur proposes.)
Levinas also makes clear that the "depositionof the sovereign F to
which he repeatedly refers (1982a, 52, 101) does not deprive me of
a locus of agency.The substitution at issue is "my"substitution. He says
forthrightly in Otherwise than Being: "My substitution- it is as my
own that substitution for the neighboris produced.... It is in me- in me
and not in another, in me and not in an individuation of the concept
Ego- that communication opens" (1974, 126). And he continues: "In
substitution my being that belongs to me and not to another is undone,
and it is through this substitution that I am not 'another,'but me"(1974,
127).8 "Substitution,"which is the heart of responsibility, is "not an
8 Given Levinas's understanding of activity and passivity, this nevertheless does not
make substitution an "act"(1974, 117).
alienation, because the other in the same is my substitution for the

other through responsibility, for which, I am summoned as someone ir-
replaceable. I exist through the other and for the other, but without this
being alienation: I am inspired" (1974, 114). In sum, Levinas assumes
"the unjustifiable identity of ipseity [which] is expressed in terms such
as ego, I, oneself,"even though he takes his work to be that of construing
such ipseity in terms of "the soul, sensibility, vulnerability, maternity
and materiality, which describe responsibility for others"(1974, 106).
But could it be that Levinas merely wants to say the right thing,
while his own commitments undermine precisely that kind of mainte-
nance and confirmation of self? In what follows I want to highlight the
Levinasian commitments that support his claims that the agent is both
affirmed and maintained.
3.3 The "ethicsof the welcome"

First, the underlying commitment of the Levinasian model can best
be formulated: I am commanded to give- and there is always more to
give. The claim that there is no end to giving is made repeatedly in
Levinas's writings: there is an infinite debt to the other; I am "infinitely
responsible"(1996, 18); and I can never say "quits"(1982a, 105-6). This
commitment contains in itself the principle that maintains a responsible
self in the relation. Levinas recognizes that I must have a self in orderto
have something to give. In other words, Levinas does justice to the need
for continued agency precisely because in his ethics the counterweight
to GIVING ALL is ALWAYSGIVING.
Levinas's trope for continued giving is found in his first major work,
Totality and Infinity, where subjectivity is construed in terms of "wel-
coming the Other, as hospitality" for "the subject is a host" (1961, 27,
299).9 He writes there that "the idea of infinity in consciousness is an
overflowingof a consciousness whose incarnation offers new powers . . .
powers of welcome, of gift, of full hands, of hospitality" (1961, 205). In
other words, although Levinas refuses to affirm love of self explicitly, he
does nevertheless presuppose a self sufficient for responsible agency and
dialectical relation when he construes the self as "host."His repeated
references to "hospitality" support a view of active and maintained
agency- the sense in which I am to be "host"to the other affirms my
selfness. The condition of my hosting the other is not simple loss; as he
acknowledges later in Otherwise than Being, "dispossession"is "not
nothingness" (1974, 109).
9 "Celivre presentera la subjectivitycommeaccueillantAutrui, commehospitalite";"le

sujet est un hote"(1961 [Frenchoriginal], 12, 334).
TotalAltruism 455
In the first one hundred and fifty pages of Totalityand Infinity alone,
"welcome"or "welcoming"are used over twenty times, and they continue
to be used up to and in the chapter entitled "Conclusions"(1961, 299).
Levinas also describes the self's response to the other in terms of
"generosity"(1961, 50, 75), and he repeatedly speaks of "hospitality,"
reminding us of the graciousness with which responsibility should be
fulfilled. The emphasis on welcoming the other is not left behind; it
informs all his later writings and explicitly appears in the way he con-
tinues to speak of "greeting"the other (1982a, 88), in "the ethics of the
welcome"(1986a, 151), as well as in the way he ties "hospitality"to the
extreme sacrifice of "giving to the other the bread from one's mouth"
(1974, 79).10In other words, the word "welcome"is used long after the
term "hostage"has been introduced (1974).
I suggest that Levinas's notion of "hostage"(otage)is not properlyun-
derstood if it is considered in isolation from his earlier use of the notion
of "host"(hdte).The positive connotation of the word "hostage"is appar-
ent in the claim that "it is through the condition of being hostage that
there can be in the world pity, compassion, pardon, and proximity"
(1974, 117). "Host"and "hostage"are mutually correcting tropes for re-
sponsibility- a point that is made better in the English term "(host)age"
than the French. When Levinas is appealing to the notions of host and
welcome in Totalityand Infinity (1961), he is elsewhere describing what
he calls "total altruism"(1962, 18). To put it in another perspective, his
call for "total altruism" is made at the same time that he claims that
"the welcoming of the face is peaceable from the first, for it answers to
the unquenching Desire for Infinity"(1961, 150). Moreover,at this same
time he also speaks of the command of the other in terms of gentleness:
"TheOther reveals himself in his alterity, not in a shock negating the I,
but as the primordial phenomenon of gentleness" (1961, 151). The call
for "totalaltruism"is compatiblewith responsibility construed as hospi-
tality and graciousness. Furthermore,Levinas at one point decides that
the grammar of the self goes "beyondaltruism and egoism"(1974, 117).
3.4 Finding oneself by losing oneself

All the talk of persecution and violence, which fuels much of the criti-
cism of Levinas's ethics, needs to be seen against the background of
Levinas's own sense of the positive dimension of the ethical self. He
highlights this, when, looking back on his earlier writing, he concludes
that in "in my essays, the dis-quieting of the Same by the Other is the
10This refers to his earlier comment:"Togive, to be-for-another,despite oneself, but in

interrupting the for-oneself,is to take the bread out of one's own mouth, to nourish the
hunger of another with one'sown fasting"(1974, 56).
Desire that shall be a searching, a questioning, an awaiting: patience

and length of time, and the very mode of surplus, of superabundance"
(1975c, 81). This conclusion equates the "disquietingof the Same by the
Other"with "Desire"as "superabundance" - that is, it uses the trope of
superabundanceto explain what is elsewhere called violence or persecu-
tion by the Other. Ford has recently pointed out the early language of
"joy"(1961, 211, 242) and the late language of the "exorbitantoverflowof
the caress" (1974, 184), and he has attempted to enrich a Levinasian
ethics by developing what he sees as these "hints of joy"(Ford 1999, 74)
into an ethics of joyful obligation. I appreciate Ford'ssensitivity to these
aspects of Levinas's work. What I am here suggesting is that they are
more than mere hints; they are full-fledged commitments.
Levinas's account of the shattering of the self in the face of the other
refers to "breakingup the limits of identity, breaking up the principle of
being in me,"but he goes on to explain that this means "the impossibil-
ity to come back from all things and concern oneself only with oneself"
(1974, 114). The rejection of concerning oneself "onlywith oneself" does
not commit Levinas to the loss of self so feared by critics.
The self that cannot concern itself "only with itself" is the absolved
self. When Levinas asserts that "the self is absolved of itself" (1974,
115), we should note that this is not the language of annihilation. If one
thinks of the absolution one gains with confession or expiation, one can
construe the absolved self as the self at one with itself.11In fact, Levinas
early on discerns in "pardon""asurplus of happiness, the strange happi-
ness of reconciliation"(1961, 283). With absolution, the self is unified.
The self loses itself, but thereby gains itself. This latter understanding
is stated explicitly by Levinas: "this responsibility against my will ... is
the very fact of finding oneself while losing oneself (1974, II).12
This biblical theme is important to Levinas- we find it repeated pre-
cisely in the context of his denial that ethics is a "depersonalizing
exigency"(1981, 62). He explains, "I am defined as a subjectivity, as a
singular person, as an T, precisely because I am exposed to the other. . . .
I become a responsible or ethical T to the extent that I agree to depose or
dethrone myself - to abdicate my position of centrality- in favour of the
vulnerable other. As the Bible says: 'He who loses his soul gains if"
(1981, 62-63, emphasis added). One could say that in responsibility the
self forgets itself, but it is not forgotten. This is a paradoxicalcondition,
to be sure, but Levinas highlights precisely this paradox: "Whatis at
stake for the self, in its being, is not to be" (1974, 117). Unfortunately,
some critics seem to hear only the latter part of Levinas'smessage.
11GordonSteffey deserves thanks for bringing this dimension of "absolution"to my

attention.
12Interestingly,Levinas at times speaks of the economicego'slosing and findingitself.
TotalAltruism 457
Levinas'sreferencein "Godand Philosophy" to the "shudderof incar-

nationthroughwhichgiving takes on meaning"and"handswhichgive"
(1975a,144)is elaboratedin his responseto Buberthat sayingThouto
the Other(the Du Sagen) "operatesimmediatelyand alreadythrough
my body(includingmy givinghands),that it thereforepresupposesmy
body(as lived body),things (as objectsof enjoyment),and the Other's
hunger, that the Sagen is thus embodied"(1975b, 38). As Adriaan
Peperzakrightlysummarizes:
From Levinas'sperspective, the satisfaction of human needs is necessarily
associated with the fulfillment of our obligations because I cannot serve
the Other concretely without offering the Other a meal, safety, a house,
work, education, and sympathy.Being-foris being a body,having hands as
well as a heart: it is building a home in which warmth and meals are avail-
able, and so on. I cannot be for-the-Other if I do not enjoy the world
[Peperzak 1997, 200].
Contraryto what Ricoeurthinks, Levinas, it seems, can agree with

Ricoeurthat we wouldbe "unableto hear the injunctioncomingfrom
the other"if we detestedourselves(Ricoeur1992, 189).In otherwords,
the rationale noted earlier for an affirmation of proper self-love
(namely,that it is partof ourdutyto othersthat we maintainourselves
in orderto be ableto supportothers)is preciselyoneto whichLevinasis
committed.
It is true that the notionof "host"implies the correlativenotionof
"guest,"but the way in whichthe "guest"or needyone takes the initia-
tive doesnot precludethe responsibleagencyof the host. It is a mistake
to think that becauseanothertakes the initiative,I am not responsible
for my giving.WhenLevinasclaimsthat "theself is absolvedof itself,"
he asks, "Isthis freedom?" onlyto answerimmediatelythat "Itis a dif-
ferent freedom from that of an initiative"(1974, 115).Thisway of being
"withouta choice"onlyseemslike "violence," he says, if we forgetthat it
is a freedomthat precedesthe dichotomyof the "freedomnon-freedom
couple"(1974, 116).
Levinas'sattackis directedat whathe sees as an excessiveemphasis
on the autonomyand independenceof the self. His emphasison the
initiativeofthe otheris a rhetoricallynecessarystrategyto counterthis.
(Incidentally,Levinas'ssense of the inadequacyof notionsof an autono-
mous, isolated self should mitigate concern about the "fault"of
"separation" so deploredby Ricoeur.)Howeverstrongthe initiative of
the otheris, even whenit is a command,I remainthe self whoresponds
to the other,with a freedomthat is, as Levinassays, differentfromthe
freedomof an initiative- but a responsiblefreedomnonetheless.
458 Journalof ReligiousEthics
3.5 Rethinkingpassivity
Theresponseof a "host"is not a simplereaction.A reactionis distinct
from a knowingresponsibleresponse.We can talk of the tropic "re-
sponse"of a plantto light,but suchmovementis not a genuineresponse
- it is merelyan automaticreaction,muchlike the constrictionof the
cell membranewhentouchedby the scientist'sprobe.Theseareparadig-
maticpassivereactions,but the host is not passivein this way.Levinas
acknowledgesthis when he explains that "the term welcomeof the
Otherexpressesa simultaneityof activity and passivitywhich places
the relationwith the otheroutsideof the dichotomiesvalid for things:
the a prioriandthe a posteriori,activityandpassivity"(1961,89). Even
whenconsideringthe way in which"thereis a commandment in the ap-
pearanceof the face, as if a master spoketo me,"Levinasemphasizes
responsibleagency,for "as a 'first person,'I am he who finds the re-
sourcesto respondto the call"(1982a,88-89). Therecouldbe no clearer
statementof the responsibleethical agencyrecommendedin Levinas's
ethics,andthis is just whatonewouldexpect,giventhe concern,whichI
have documented,that ipseity,the oneself,is bothmaintainedand con-
firmedin the relationship.
Just as Levinas'suse of "freedom" and "choice" variesfromstandard
use becausehe discardsthe standardassumptionthat links freedom
with unconstrainedchoice,initiative,and control,so his use of "passiv-
ity"must be understoodto be beyondor independentof ourtraditional
contrasts.His earlyappreciationof the way in whichwelcomingis out-
side the traditionaldichotomybetween active and passive is carried
throughin his frequentuse of "passivity" in Otherwisethan Being.His
use of the termthereis distinctivein two ways:
First, the state to whichhe appliesthe term "passivity" is actuallya
state that is priorto the behaviorsthat, in standardusage,we differen-
tiate as activeand passive.Thus,when he writes that "thesubjectivity
of a subjectis vulnerability,exposureto affection,sensibility,a passivity
morepassivestill than any passivity"(1974,50),the phrase"apassivity
morepassive still than any passivity"is used to great rhetoricaleffect,
but he goes on to admitthat he is not using the term "passivity" in its
ordinarymeaning.He explainsthis by sayingthat "subjectivity no lon-
ger belongsto the orderwherethe alternativeof activityand passivity
retainsits meaning"(1974, 118).The discussionsof "recurrence," "self,"
and"substitution," in chapter4 clarifythe attributionof passivity.Sub-
stitution,he says, "isnot an act"becauseit is on the "hitherside of the
act-passivityalternative"(1974, 117).Again,our standardcontrastbe-
tween active and passiveis not relevantin this case, for in the case of
responsibility"activityand passivity coincide"(1974, 115); thus, he
writes that "theself as an expiationis priorto activityand passivity"
(1974, 116).
TotalAltruism 459
Second, he invokes the notion of passivity to highlight the grounding

of responsible action in the situation into which we are thrown and the
complex nexus of feelings that that situation awakens in us. To claim
that the self is "passive"is to claim that the self's response is executed
in "passion"- the "infinite passion of responsibility" (1974, 113, 117,
128). It is, however, a mistake to think of "passions"as merely pas-
sive- things that simply happen to us (like sneezes).
The fear that a Levinasian ethics is too passive (does not have a re-
sponsible "agent")can thus be mitigated by acknowledgingthe admitted
peculiarity in Levinas's usage of the term. Moreover,as I noted earlier,
one can insist on the initiative of the other without thereby suggesting
that the one who receives the initiative does nothing. This is evident in
the way that even Ricoeur,who criticizes Levinas's ethics as too passive,
uses the same language of a summoned self that Levinas uses, and
writes that "a capacity for giving in return [is] freed by the other's very
initiative" (Ricoeur 1992, 189). Unless we are out simply to find fault
with a given account, we need not assume that the simple reference to
the other's initiative implies a nonresponsible passivity.
3.6 Summary
All of these reminders suggest that Levinas can accommodate the
role of responsible active self, the maintenance of self in ethical rela-
tion. They support the conclusion that in the end Levinas can answer
yes to Ricoeur's question: "Mustone not, in order to make oneself open,
available, belong to oneself in a certain sense?"(Ricoeur 1992, 138). For
Levinas, one must belong to oneself sufficiently to be a host, to welcome
the other, to substitute oneself. In other words, what some see as a re-
ductio ad absurdum of his position- namely, that there can be no
absolute self-emptying because the self is the one emptying itself- is
not in fact emblematic of weakness or self-contradiction in his argu-
ment; it is, from his point of view, the very point of his argument. It is
the insight into the liberating and authenticating power of sacrifice and
self-forgetfulness that funds all his statements, which I have docu-
mented, affirming selfhood and agency.
Levinas's designation of his ethics as "the ethics of the welcome"thus
leaves room for the "yourself" of the "as yourself." Still, it might be
objectedthat Levinas cannot in principle accommodatean acknowledg-
ment of the "asyourself"because of his position on the asymmetry of the
relation, and the inequality implied in asymmetry. In some ethics, the
responsibility for the other is clearly based on the theological claim that
we are all equal before God:our ethical equality is a function of our onto-
logical equality as creatures. Since Levinas is known for challenging our
classical emphasis on equality, we need to ask whether the belonging to
oneself in that certain sense that Levinas's notion of ipseity affirms al-
lows the kind of equality that is implied in the "as yourself."
4. Equality in Levinas: Implicit Reflexivity

It is well known that Levinas asserts a "dissymmetry"or "asymme-
try" in the self's relation to the other that is "the very basis of ethics"
(1981, 67): "Theethical rapport with the face is asymmetrical in that it
subordinates my existence to the other";"in ethics, the other's right to
exist has primacy over my own";"my duty to respond to the other sus-
pends my natural right to survival"(1981, 60). Whenever the relation is
between two, one must love the neighbor more than the self, and one
must see the neighbor as more needy than oneself. Levinas's repeated
appeal to metaphors of "height"and "master,"affirmingthat the other is
"higher"than me, indicate that self and neighbor are not equal when
one is talking about the immediate claim of responsibility or love. The
question that remains is whether Levinas's emphasis on asymmetry
precludes the possibility that in some sense I am, nevertheless, equal to
the other.
4.1 A double asymmetry

First, it should be noted that when he speaks of "dissymmetry"or
"asymmetry,"Levinas is highlighting an ethical orientation or attitude
rather than making an ontological claim. On the one hand, the empha-
sis on the "height"of the other is intended to prevent me from exercising
my responsibility "as pity"for the other (1975b, 74). On the other hand,
he is describing the ethical relation from the inside, where I am- and
from that perspective I am not allowed to "demandfrom the other as
much as I do from myself" (1981, 67). The illustration that precedes this
conclusionreveals his motivation:"IfI say that Virtue is its own reward'
I can only say so for myself; as soon as I make this a standard for the
other I exploit him, for what I am then saying is: be virtuous towards
me- work for me, love me, serve me, etc.- but don't expect anything
from me in return"(1981, 67). This is an example of the perspective from
which I do not consider myself equal to the other. Apart from this rela-
tional perspective, which affirms inequality in order to humble the self
and prevent self-willed exploitation, Levinas would probably be per-
fectly willing to accede to Ricoeur's assertion (which expresses the
grounds of humility by adversion to the human condition)that "equality
is reestablished . . . through the shared admission of fragility and, fi-
nally, of mortality"(Ricoeur 1992, 192).
Some commentators have so focused on Levinas's claims about the
"height"of the other that they have neglected to appreciate the fact that
TotalAltruism 461
Levinas affirms that the other is both higher and lower at the same
time- higher in the sense that the other "commands"me, and lower in
the sense that the other is "destitute,"dependent on me for I have "the
resources to respond"to his call (1982a, 89). He writes: "the other is the
richest and the poorest of beings: the richest, at an ethical level, in that
it always comes before me, its right-to-bepreceding mine; the poorest, at
an ontological or political level, in that without me it can do nothing"
(1981, 63). "The Other,"he insists, "is always, qua Other, the poor and
destitute one while at the same time being my lord . . . the relation is
thus essentially dissymmetrical"(1975b, 38). Although this dual status
of height and humility (1961, 200) might seem just to reverse the asym-
metry, or to provide a double form of asymmetry, the fact that Levinas
holds both dimensions in place at the same time suggests that his view
of "height"does not carry in its train what is normally meant by ontolog-
ical inequality. Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that Levinas would
want to engage the agenda of ontology in order to assert an ontological
inequality.13
4.2 Levinas's affirmation of equality

The double asymmetry also accounts for the way in which Levinas
does explicitly speak of me and the other as equals. Early on, in fact, as I
shall soon illustrate, he seems to have felt perfectly comfortablespeak-
ing about me and the neighbor as equals.
Ricoeur seems to think that his own distinctive contribution is to
require that "eachprotagonist holds two roles, being both agent and pa-
tient" (Ricoeur 1992, 330). Ricoeur sees himself differing from Levinas
when he explains that in the face of the one who suffers,
initiative, precisely in terms of being-able-to-act, seems to belong exclu-
sively to the self who gives his sympathy,his compassion. . . . Confronting
this charity, this benevolence, the other appears to be reduced to the sole
condition of receiving. In a sense this is actually the case. And it is in this
manner that suffering-with gives itself, in a first approximation,as the op-
posite of the assignment of responsibility by the voice of the other [Ricoeur
1992, 190].
But Levinas's account of the other as "lower"as well as "higher"allows
for the other to be, as Ricoeur requires, "bothagent and patient." More-
over, Levinas's early reference to "sympathy"is carried through in the
image of the other as "poorest."It is because of her distress, her need,
13On the other hand, he speaks at times of ethics as "moreontologicalthan ontology"

and merely rejects an ethics "laidon the top of ontology"(1975c, 90).
that the other awakens in me sympathy, and this seems in perfect agree-
ment with Ricoeur'sown representation of the mutuality of equals:
In true sympathy, the self, whose power of acting is at the start greater
than that of its other,finds itself affectedby all the suffering other offersto
it in return. For from the suffering other there comes a giving that is no
longer drawn from the power of acting and existing but precisely from
weakness itself. This is perhaps the supreme test of solicitude, when un-
equal power finds compensation in an authentic reciprocityin exchange,
which, in the hour of agony,finds refuge in the shared whisper of voices or
the feeble embrace of clasped hands [Ricoeur1992, 191].
If this is what Ricoeur requires for "authentic reciprocityin exchange,"
then surely Levinas's double asymmetry can accommodatethat. Levinas
would not deny the "feelings that are revealed in the self by the other's
suffering, as well as by the moral injunction coming from the other,
feelings spontaneously directed toward others" (Ricoeur 1992, 191-
92). Levinas would, no doubt, question the precise import of the word
"spontaneous,"but he would nonetheless concur in the idea of a "phe-
nomenology of the self affected by the other than self" (Ricoeur 1992,
331). This receiving role of the self is implied in Levinas's much-ne-
glected claim that "my ethical relation of love for the other stems from
the fact that the self cannot survive by itself alone, cannot find meaning
within its own being-in-the-world, within the ontology of sameness"
(Levinas 1981, 60). Levinas here reveals a dimension of "need"of the
other that exposes an important sense in which the other is not simply
an intruder or commanderand the self is not simply the one who gives
without receiving.14This passage in Levinas is not an aberrant slip of the
pen- it is implied in his repeated claim that the self loses its life in order
to gain it.
The problem with dissymmetry, according to Ricoeur,is that "taken
literally, a dissymmetry left uncompensated would break off the ex-
change of giving and receiving and would exclude any instruction by the
face within the field of solicitude"(Ricoeur1992, 189). I have been trying
to show that Levinas, too, appreciates this problem, and that Ricoeur's
formulation of the answer is one that Levinas can accept- namely, that
"a capacity for giving in return [is] freed by the other's very initiative"
(Ricoeur 1992, 189). Moreover,Levinas's affirmation of a transformed
ipseity, an ethical self - his claim that "in this sense the self is goodness
to the point of substitution" (1974, 118)- is informed by the same in-
sight that leads Ricoeur to observe that a self can respond to another
only if the self acknowledges itself, because its "resourcesof goodness"
14In other words, Levinas agrees with Ricoeurthat "we need friends"(Ricoeur 1992,
192).
TotalAltruism 463
are available only for "a being who does not detest itself to the point of
being unable to hear the injunction coming from the other" (Ricoeur
1992, 189). Levinas knows that self-hatred would incapacitate a host,
precluding generous hospitality. We must somehow be there enough to
"hearthe injunction coming from the other,"but not there in the sense of
a self fully constituted ("alreadyposited and fully identified")and con-
tingently waiting for the demand of the other (1974, 115). Levinas's
image of the self as the sound whose echo precedes it (1974, 103, 111) is
meant to affirm both the self and the need of the self for the other.
The equality or implicit self-esteem that Levinas affirms is found in
Totality and Infinity, where he appeals to "equality"frequently and
without apology:he sees in religion "the surplus possible in a society of
equals, that of glorious humility, responsibility, and sacrifice, which are
the conditionfor equality itself" (1961, 64). He writes that "thepoorone,
the stranger, presents himself as an equal,"adding that "inthe welcom-
ing of the face (which is already my responsibility in his regard, and
where accordingly he approaches me from a dimension of height and
dominates me), equality is founded"(1961, 213, 214). In sum, "I am I
and chosen one, but where can I be chosen, if not from among other cho-
sen ones, among equals?" (1961, 279). Otherwise than Being makes
explicit the sense in which I am equal: "Thanks to God'I am another for
the others," referring to the "reciprocal[reciproque]relationship [that]
binds me to the other man in the trace of transcendence"(1974, 158).
Thus, both early and late major works reveal that Levinas does not ex-
clude appeals to equality and reciprocity.
It is worth looking more closely at the context of Levinas's claim that
"the poor one, the stranger, presents himself as an equal."The passage
in full is as follows:
The poor one, the stranger, presents himself as an equal. His equality
within this essential poverty consists in referring to the third party, thus
present at the encounter, whom in the midst of his destitution the Other
already serves. He comes tojoin me. But he joins me to himself for service;
he commands me as a Master. This command can concern me only inas-
much as I am master myself;consequentlythis command commands me to
command [1961, 213, emphasis added].
Not only does the stranger present himself as an equal to me, but I am,
in a sense, equal to him. The final sentence shows the way in which, for
Levinas, the self is confirmed as master in relation to the command of
the other. I cannot give to the other what the other needs unless I belong
to myself in a certain sense; I remain, in a certain sense, the one com-
manding. The self retains responsibility precisely because the
commandment "orders me in my own voice. The command is stated
through the mouth of him it commands"(1982a, 110). The exteriority of
the infinite becomes interior; it is not imposed heteronomously. This

shows that Levinas's response to what he sees as the excessive emphasis
on individual autonomy is more nuanced than the mere substitution of
heteronomy.
Tosummarize, Levinas, early and late in his career affirms "equality,"
and he does not posit an ontological inequality. Both these factors pro-
vide support for my claim that the "asyourself" is not incompatiblewith
his ethics. Still further support for this claim can be found in Levinas's
understanding of the way in which equality is played out injustice.
5. Justice in Levinas: Implicit Reflexivity

It is (I hope) a commonplaceby now that Levinas's account does not
preclude the possibility of justice: it does not preclude us from perform-
ing our function as civil magistrates and judges, nor from supporting
those who perform those functions. In his later writings, it becomes
clearer that, for Levinas, talk of equality is what marks the realm ofjus-
tice, a realm in which the original asymmetry is suspended: "Whatever
be the ways that lead to the superstructure of society, in justice the
dissymmetry that holds me at odds with regard to the other will find
again law, autonomy, equality (1974, 127, emphasis added). Levinas
suggests that the question of justice arises whenever there is more than
just you and me: "The fact that the other, my neighbor, is also a third
with respect to another, who is also a neighbor, is the birth of thought,
consciousness, justice and philosophy"(1974, 128). That is, he ties the
notion of justice to what he calls "the third"- the one who is other to the
other. Ethical dilemmas arise because "the third party is other than the
neighbor but also another neighbor, and also a neighbor of the other"
(1984b, 168). In the face of the "third,"I am led to ask, "Whatam I to do?
What have they already done to one another? Who passes before the
other in my responsibility?"(1984b, 168). Indeed, "to the extravagant
generosity of the for-the-otheris superimposeda reasonable order,ancil-
lary or angelic, of justice through knowledge"(1984b, 169). He reminds
us that "myresistance begins when the harm [someone] does me is done
to a third party who is also my neighbor.It is the third party who is the
source of justice, and thereby of justified repression; it is the violence
suffered by the third party that justifies stopping the violence of the
other with violence" (1975c, 83). Justice, according to Levinas, is the
domain in which comparisonand calculation become relevant: the realm
ofjustice is where we have to try to do what we cannot do- namely, com-
pare incomparables(1974, 16), for the neighbor is "bothcomparableand
incomparable"(1974, 158).
There is no doubt, then, that for Levinas, I am responsible for guaran-
teeing justice for others. But can I claim justice for myself? In other
TotalAltruism 465
words, does "total altruism" mean that I cannot put limits on self-
sacrifice- the kind of limits that the "as myself" or the "as yourself"
legitimates?
5.1 Tworealms?
In Ethics and Infinity, Levinas decisively contrasts the situation with
respect to himself ("me!")and with respect to his "closerelations"or his
"people":they are "alreadythe others, and for them, I demand justice"
(1982a, 99). The implication is that he cannot demand justice for him-
self. This also seems to be the implication of his claim that "ifthere was
only the other facing me, I would say to the very end: I owe him every-
thing" (1975c, 83). But if this means that I cannot claim justice for
myself, then the selfhood of the subject is once more put in jeopardy be-
cause there would be no legitimate limits on my self-sacrifice.
However, Levinas does sometimes seem to allow the demand for jus-
tice for oneself. "Tobe sure," he says, "myresponsibility for all can and
has to manifest itself also in limiting itself. The ego can, in the name of
this unlimited responsibility,be called upon to concernitself also with it-
self" (1974, 128). The "concernfor justice, for oneself" is circumscribed
within the concern for justice for all (1974, 128). Even though in the do-
main of justice there is "weighing, thought, objedification," and thus a
"betrayal"of the "absoluteasymmetry"of substitution, "a new relation-
ship" arises: "it is only thanks to God that, as a subject incomparable
with the other, I am approached as an other by the others, that is, Tor
myself.'Thanks to God'I am another for the others"(1974, 158). That is,
justice is "a terrain common to me and the others where I am counted
among them"(1974, 160). This means that Levinas does not want to de-
value concern for the self, but how can he justify this if he posits a
separate realm of justice?
The threat to concern for self is raised insofar as Levinas posits a
realm in which what Ricoeur calls the "mutuality of self-esteems" is in-
appropriate.He seems to posit two separate realms when he writes that
"the word 'justice'is in effect much more in its place, there, where equity
is necessary and not my 'subordination'to the other. If equity is neces-
sary, we must have comparison and equality: equality between those
that cannot be compared"(1975c, 82, emphasis added). That is, he
seems to differentiate between a realm where I am subordinated to the
other, in altruism (love your neighbor), and a realm in which equity is
necessary, in justice (as yourself). This implies that although the I can
be taken care of in the realm of justice, it is excluded from attention in
the domain of relation with the other in which I have a responsibility for
the other "such that I keep nothing for myself" (1975a, 145). That is,
Levinas seems to break up the unity of the love commandmentin a way
that threatens the all-encompassing relevance of the "as yourself." It

looks as if the "asyourself" is allowed to operate only in the realm ofjus-
tice and is held to be totally inapplicable to the realm of altruism.
5.2 Justice as a limit to self-sacrifice

Yet it must be noted that Levinas qualifies his position in a crucial
way, a way that repeats the suggestion of a quantitative spectrum of re-
sponsibility implied in the phrase "much more"in the passage quoted
above. He writes:
And consequently,the word 'justice'applies much more to the relationship
with the third party than to the relationship with the other. But in reality,
the relationship with another is never uniquely the relationship with the
other:from this moment on, the third is represented in the other; that is,
in the very appearance of the other the third already regards me [1975c,
82, emphasis added].
In this passage he qualifies the contrast between the two realms in two
ways: first, by repeating that it is a question of degree ("muchmore")
and, more importantly, by acknowledging that "in reality" no relation-
ship can be so utterly isolated and abstracted from context as to exclude
the relevance or influence of "the third."
Thus, although Levinas sometimes uses a conceptual contrast be-
tween personal responsibility and justice, he recognizes that in daily life
the situation is more complex. His admission that it is impossible to
speak of a situation in which there are only two, since the third always
influences both me and the other, means that the claim of justice for
oneself (and hence, limits on self-sacrifice) is an integral part of this
complex context in which all moral responses are made. Hence he can
write: "If I am alone with the other, I owe him everything; but there is
someone else" (1982a, 90, emphasis added). Moreover, when he puts
forth his most radical formulations of our responsibility for another, he
nonetheless goes on to caution that these "are extreme formulas which
must not be detached from their context. In the concrete, many other
considerationsintervene and requirejustice even for me"(1982a, 99, em-
phasis added).
We can conclude that Levinas does not require a stark contrast be-
tween a pure realm of personal responsibility and a pure realm of
justice. If there is no such contrast, I cannot be expected to allow unlim-
ited sacrifice of myself; a concern for "justice,for oneself" seems to be a
legitimate concern because there are never just two. This may explain
why at times he even speaks interchangeably of love and justice; for
example, he writes that in the "ethical or biblical perspective" the
"interhuman relationship" is considered "as a theme of justice and
TotalAltruism 467
concern for the other as other, as a theme of love and desire"(1981, 56).
Although Levinas might seem to deny the relevance of justice in the
one-on-one relationship, his admission that there never is a case in
which the third is not involved reestablishes a single realm, which could
be called either the realm of love or justice. In other words, Levinas has
effectively maintained the unity of the love commandment,and the con-
stant relevance of the "as yourself."
Do the implications of this acknowledgmentof justice and equality do
away with the subordinationthat is so central to Levinas's account?Has
the attempt to keep an ethical self in relation excluded the importanceof
the way in which the self is the summoned self? How can we keep the
counterweight of infinite responsibility in the face of justice's limits
on self-sacrifice?The only way to respond to this potential objection is
to say that Levinas maintains his view ofjustice in tension with his view
of infinite responsibility; his appreciation of justice does not come as a
shift away from an earlier position. The affirmation of "infinite"respon-
sibility continues to be made even while Levinas puts limits on the
self-sacrifice expected of us: he ends the interview in Ethics and Infinity
by claiming: "Inno way do I want to teach that suicide follows from the
love of the neighbor and the truly human life. I mean to say that a truly
human life cannot remain life satis-fied in its equality to being, a life of
quietude, that it is awakened by the other" (1982a, 121-22). In other
words, "infinite"responsibility does not mean that absolutely no limit is
put on what is demanded of us- it does not require suicide. In fact,
Levinas repeatedly points to instances in which genuine sacrifice is
being made or could be made- even the little "Afteryou, sir" can be an
example of genuine sacrifice (1974, 117; 1982a, 99; 1981, 68) and an
illustration of the "everydayness"of his ethics (1974, 141). Infinite re-
sponsibility does mean, however, that we can never say we are finished
with our responsibility.Our sacrifice for the other may be genuine, with-
out being suicide, but there is never an end to the demand for sacrifice.
There will always be another who needs me or another need to which I
can minister, so I can never say "Quits."
6. Conclusion
All of this suggests that there are resources in Levinas's ethics for af-
firming a self sufficient to ground responsible ethical agency and to
maintain ongoing relationship. The self is never simply emptied or anni-
hilated; the self is, in some sense, equal to the other and can, when there
is a third (and in reality, there always is), claim justice for itself. Levinas
allows for limiting the sacrifice of ourselves insofar as we need to be
there to help the others (since undue sacrifice of self would militate
against fulfilling our responsibility for the others), but he also wants to
allow justice for ourselves to limit the sacrifice of ourselves.
It is worth returning now to re-examine the way in which Levinas

takes exception to the "asyourself" of the love commandment.He begins
by questioning the phrase "moralexperience"because, he says, it "sup-
poses a subject who is there" (1975c, 90). This looks like the looming
shadow of precisely the subjectless ethics he is often said to exemplify,
but he explains that by "asubject who is there"he means a subject "who,
first of all is and who, at a certain moment has a moral experience,
whereas it is in the way in which he is there, in which he lives, that
there is this ethics" (1975c, 90). This rules out only the notion of a sub-
ject who exists prior to a moral context; it does not deny the notion of a
moral subject. Such a subject is assumed in the alternate translations of
the love commandmentthat Levinas proposes. He says that in the con-
text of the whole Bible, the commandment should be read as follows:
"'Loveyour neighbor;this work is like yourself; 'love your neighbor;he
is yourself; 'it is this love of the neighbor which is yourself" (1975c, 90).
These are striking phrases, almost shocking in their radicality. The
work of loving is your self - the self is the one who loves. These formula-
tions function implicitly as the "as yourself" ("asmyself,""oneselfas an
other,""an other as oneself"), and in the light of all we have seen of
Levinas's affirmation of the self, they suggest not a rejection so much as
a reinterpretation of the "as yourself."
I suggest that Levinas anticipated Schrag'srecognitionthat "jettison-
ing" a "classical substance-theory of the self and the modern
epistemological or foundational construal of self as transparent mind . . .
does not entail a jettisoning of every sense of self" (Schrag 1997, 9).15
Levinas rejects not only what he regards as a simplistic Hegelian notion
of the ego as an "equalitywith itself," or an "identity,"but also the com-
mon understanding of an "egoalready posited and fully identified"prior
to forgetting itself (1974, 115). Nevertheless, he still affirms that "Iam a
self in the identifying recurrencein which I find myself cast back to the
hither side of my point of departure"- that is, "recurrencebecomes iden-
tity in breaking up the limits of identity,"challenging "the intolerable
rest" that is characteristic of a being's "definition"(1974, 115, 114). For
this reason, I think it is just right to say, as Peperzak does, that for
Levinas, "seeing myself as equal to all Others, presupposes a specific ex-
perience that differs profoundlyfrom the egoistic experience belonging
to the order of economy.. . . then I am also for me, but in a radically other
sense than that of economic delight" (Peperzak 1997, 128).16Levinas's
claim that the deposition of the subject is to be conceived in terms of
15See Schrag 1997, 14n., 100, 144, for expressions of sympathy or agreement with
Levinas.
16When self-possessionis occasionallyconstruedas thematization (1974, 100), it is be-
cause the initial self-centeredipseity must be transformed.
TotalAltruism 469
"the de-substantiation of the subject, its de-reification"(1974, 127) is his

preface to the emergence of the responsible and maintained self, the self
with heart and hands to give to the other.
REFERENCES
Aristotle
1954 NichomacheanEthics. Translated by David Ross. The WorldClas-
sics. London:OxfordUniversity Press.
Bernasconi, Robert, and David Wood,eds.
1988 The ProvocationofLevinas, Rethinking the Other.WarwickStudies
in Philosophyand Literature. Londonand New York:Routledge.
Davies, Oliver
2001 A Theologyof Compassion:Metaphysics of Differenceand the Re-
newal of Tradition. Vol. 1. London:SCM Press.
Ferreira, M. Jamie
2001 Love's Grateful Striving: A Commentaryon Kierkegaard's"Works
of Love."New York:OxfordUniversity Press.
Ford, David
1999 Self and Salvation: Being Transformed. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Kant, Immanuel
1959 Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. 1785. Translated by
Lewis White Beck. New York:Bobbs-Merrill,Co.
Kierkegaard,S0ren
1995 Worksof Love. 1847. Vol. 16 of Kierkegaard'sWritings.Edited and
translated by HowardV. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press.
Levinas, Emmanuel
1948 Time and the Other. Translated by RichardA. Cohen. Pittsburgh,
Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1987.
1951 "Is OntologyFundamental?"See Levinas 1996, 1-10.
1961 Totaliteet infini: essai sur Vexteriorite.La Haye: M. Nijhoff. Trans-
lated by Alphonso Lingis under the title Totality and Infinity
(Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1969). Page
references are to the English translation unless otherwise noted.
1962 "Transcendenceand Height."See Levinas 1996, 11-31.
1963 "Kierkegaard:Existence and Ethics."See Levinas 1975b, 66-74.
1974 Otherwisethan Being: or, BeyondEssence. Translated by Alphonso
Lingis. Dordrecht,Netherlands: Kluwer, 1991.
1975a "Godand Philosophy."See Levinas 1996, 129-48.
1975b Proper Names. Translated by Michael B. Smith. Stanford, Calif:
Stanford University Press, 1996.
1975c "Questionsand Answers."See Levinas 1998b, 79-99.
1981 "Dialogue."In Dialogues with ContemporaryContinentalThinkers,

edited by Richard Kearney, 47-70. Manchester, U.K: Manchester
University Press, 1984.
1982a Ethics and Infinity. Ten interviews conducted by Philippe Nemo,
recordedand broadcast by Radio France-Culturein February and
March 1981. Translated by Richard A. Cohen. Pittsburgh, Pa.:
Duquesne University Press, 1985.
1982b "Philosophy,Justice, and Love."See Levinas 1998a, 103-21.
1984a "Ethics as First Philosophy."Translated by Sean Hand and Mi-
chael Temple. See Levinas 1989, 75-87.
1984b "Peaceand Proximity."See Levinas 1996, 161-69.
1986a "Dialogue:Self-Consciousnessand the Proximity of the Neighbor."
See Levinas 1998b, 137-51.
1986b "TheParadox of Morality:An Interview with Emmanuel Levinas."
Conducted by Tamra Wright, Peter Hughes, and Alison Ainley.
Translated by Andrew Benjamin and Tamra Wright. See Berna-
sconi and Wood 1988, 168-80.
1986c "The Philosophical Determination of the Idea of Culture." See
Levinas 1998a, 179-87.
1989 The Levinas Reader. Edited by Sean Hand. Oxford:Blackwell.
1996 Basic Philosophical Writings. Edited and translated by Adriaan
Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi. Bloomington,
Ind.: Indiana University Press.
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Smith and Barbara Harshav. New York: Columbia University
Press.
1998b Of God Who Comes to Mind. Translated by Bettina Bergo. Stan-
ford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Peperzak, Adriaan Theodoor
1997 Beyond:The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. Northwestern Uni-
versity Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy.
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Ricoeur,Paul
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versity of ChicagoPress.
Schrag, Calvin O.
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Press.

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Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc

"Total Altruism" in Levinas's "Ethics of the Welcome"

CALVIN SCHRAG NOTES, IN The Self after Postmodernity,that "one of the

JRE 29.3:443-70. © 2001 Journalof ReligiousEthics, Inc.

self-possession if compassion is knowingly to put oneself at risk for the

1For more on this, see Ferreira 2001, 31-36, 129-36.

words, Kierkegaard,too, affirms the importance of maintaining the self

1. Love and Responsibility

2. Reflexivity in the Love Commandment

4 He writes, "I was extremely interested in Sartre's phenomenologicalanalysis of the

loves oneself most?"And he interprets their rejection of that translation

2.1 Levinas's suspicion of the "asyourself

Presumably Levinas has reservations about the way in which "as

2.2 Kierkegaard'scontrasting interpretation

3. Levinas's Conception of Ethical Agency

7 1 am grateful to Peter Ochs for his suggestions about this formulation.

relation. Davies's recent attempt to "build a performative language of

3.1 Ricoeur'scritique of Levinas

esteem of oneself. Seeing "oneself as another"is, more precisely, seeing

3.2 Confirmationof the nonimperialistic I

Clearly,Levinas would never speak as Ricoeurdoes about self-esteem

emptying itself of itself," "forgetfulof itself," "divesting itself, emptying

alienation, because the other in the same is my substitution for the

3.3 The "ethicsof the welcome"

9 "Celivre presentera la subjectivitycommeaccueillantAutrui, commehospitalite";"le

3.4 Finding oneself by losing oneself

10This refers to his earlier comment:"Togive, to be-for-another,despite oneself, but in

Desire that shall be a searching, a questioning, an awaiting: patience

11GordonSteffey deserves thanks for bringing this dimension of "absolution"to my

Levinas'sreferencein "Godand Philosophy" to the "shudderof incar-

Contraryto what Ricoeurthinks, Levinas, it seems, can agree with

Second, he invokes the notion of passivity to highlight the grounding

4. Equality in Levinas: Implicit Reflexivity

4.1 A double asymmetry

4.2 Levinas's affirmation of equality

13On the other hand, he speaks at times of ethics as "moreontologicalthan ontology"

the infinite becomes interior; it is not imposed heteronomously. This

5. Justice in Levinas: Implicit Reflexivity

that threatens the all-encompassing relevance of the "as yourself." It

5.2 Justice as a limit to self-sacrifice

It is worth returning now to re-examine the way in which Levinas

"the de-substantiation of the subject, its de-reification"(1974, 127) is his

1981 "Dialogue."In Dialogues with ContemporaryContinentalThinkers,

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