Professional Documents
Culture Documents
rie~i7!(()i,s)les.c a.c the uaees n/the Paul Rednu mel. the f rnier Assi )ei
States will be the target of Ames fr )m its predecessor. the tire constant target of jealoetsies.
the SVRR that resentments, ri~a Iries. mid cliti I
large-scale foreign It. in 1991. It ~ as a
ran CIA officer I lar( )ld Jan les lenges to its vcononiic wellbeing.
espionage. securin. and in the
~~dcIiolson against its from I 99t to leadership
world. lhis inevitably that
9~ 19%.
handling
It was
FBI
the S\R R
special
t tat was
tIre target
Bush School of ( overoflient and mini or Energy significantly sent between die NK\l)
messages
Public Service at Iexa~. A~S~M increased security at its national center in \Iuscow arid the clanele.s
~ niversitv. laboratories last year iii response to tine radros of the , ariotis cells in
81
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these messages. Above all, I felt methodically attacked every one of could ever have imagined. I would
privileged to have been given such my conclusions. Didnt 1 know the like to offer 5( ane personal obser
an opportunity. raffic was a deception? Hadnt it vations in the form of The len
occurred to methat Leopold lrep G ndments of Counterintelli
)lllma
Building on an earlier study of the per. the leader of the Role Kapelle,
I have chosen the form of
gence.
Rote Kape/le by the Cl Staff, I com was a German double? lie went
conimanthne,il.c because I believe
pleted a draft several months later on and on, getting further and fur
the basic rules of Cl aie immutable
that incorporated the new mate ther out.
Headquarters Building. 1 was first go anywhere near Ci again. I did cerned that the principles I
ushered into an outer office, where not keep that vow. In my over c( nsider fundamental to effective
Angletons aides briefed me on seas assignments with the Agency, I
Cl are not being followed as care
how to conduct myself. Then I found myself drawn toward Soviet
fully and consistently as they
went alone into the inner sanctum. Ci operations. Nothing seemed to
should be.
quicken my pulse more, and I was
The room was (lark, the curtains delighted when I was called back
ilo,se commandments were not
were drawn, and there was just one to I leadquarters in 1989 to join the
later heard that Angleton had eye (GIG) as Ted Prices deputy. When taintop. and I make no claim that
trouble and that the light hurt his led moved upstairs in early 1991 to they art inspired or even dehni
eves. but I was convinced the real become the Associate Deputy tivt. Tliey are simply the
reason for the semidarkness was to Director for Operations. I was culmination, for what they are
add his mystique.
to it certainly named chief of the Center.
worth, of my experience. They are
worked on me~
intended primarily for my felk)\v
Today, many years after that initial
I nervously briefed practitu )ners in Cl today. but also
Angleton on my disagreeable encounter with CI, I
study. and he listened without find it hard believe that it is for an~ younger officers in the
to actu
interrupting, just nodding from time ally my picture on the wall of the Intelligence CommLinity (IC) who
to time. When I finished. he GIG conference room at CIA might someday want to join us.
82
CI Commandments
fail. \Vc cannot hunker down in a other rec( )gnitic ~n. lhie truth is that
wrong.
cleknsive 1w)de and sv ut for things CI officers p pular. llmev
are not
to happen.
ing far t( )O
1 believe
niuch money
we are
( )fl
spend
fences.
~9 are not
walk in.
always welconie when they
11mev usually bring bad
safes. alarms and other purely news. Ilie) are easy marks to criti
defensive measures to protect our cize when things go wrong. Their
secrets. lhat is mu h ~w we have matter what it takes, we hirse to successes are their failures. If they
been liLirt in recent veiirs. Spies have penetrations. catch a spy. the are roasted for
have hurt us. ( )iir CI nindset having taken so long. If they are
should I )e relentlessly )ffensive. We should operate aggressively not catching anyone. why not?
We need to go after oi r Cl against the nontraditu)nal as well as What have they done with all that
adversaries. the traditional adversaries. I ios~ money they spent on Ci? it is no-
ations are essential to .in~ Ci called friendly countries to con For much of my career, many of
program. hut not the 1redictahle. vince us that the old intelligence our best pec )ple ~iV tided becoming
hackne~ ed kind we have so often adage is correct: there are friendly Ct specialists. (:1 was not presti
pursued. We need to push our nations. hut no friendly intelli giolis. It had a bad reputation. It
I )right and imaginative people to gence services. If we suspect f~r was not fast track. It did not lead
produce clever new scenarios for whatever reason that the opera to promotions or good assign
controlled operations. and we need tives of a foreign intelligence ments. Angleton left a distasteful
more of them. the oj )position ser service, friend or foe. are operating legacy that for years discredited the
vices should be kept onstantly off . against us, we sI iould test them. CI profession. Ted Price did more
operatlo ins the~ hel eve the~ initi cific target. and send it by them. If tate CI as a respected professional
ated from the I )egi nning. \Vhen time they take it. we have learned some discipline.
req uiremnents. ninthis operaizth. and thing we needed to kno~~ .
and we
pers~ ma I ity objectives of the T)A ha~ e an Operation. if the) reject it. Nevertheless, that battle is still not
operati( in have been a chieved. we as true friends should, we have completely won. Xe have to do
should in a greater flu rnber of cases learned something. to). In either more to get our CI people pro
pitch the opposit i( in cisc officer. If es ent. becali5e we are testing a moted. recognized. and respected
only one out of 10 or 20 of these friend. plausible deniahil itv has to so that our best young officers will
recruitnients takes, it is worth it. he strictly preserved. Fvery for.. be attractecl to follow us into what
And CI professionals. of course. eign service is a potential we know is a noble professh in and
should not rely exclu~.ively on their no in traditional adversary: no ser where the nerd is so great.
o\~ n efforts. lhcv should con vice should get a lifetime pass front
stantlyprod their lit ~llNl ~i of fensis e Cl operations.
who knos~ ssiio he om she is No ing degrees throctgh mt the ICthat pr( gram w )~t 11) 1 )f the name has t
83
CI Commandments
ing
street. it is worse
For years, we virtually conceded failures in most cases are well doc as we go ak)ng. We have tried to
the streets of the worlds capitals. umented. but the lessons~ ~~re lost if do it on tile cheap.
including the major espionage cen our officers do not read the Ci
ters, to the KGB. the GRU. and the literature. Generally speaking. operators make
East European services because we bad analysts. We are different
either did not know how to do it or I find it inconceivable that any Cl kinds of people. Operators are
we were not willing to pay tile could his actors. doers. movers and shakers;
practitioner today ply or
it.
often on short noticeundetect Sltadrin? Are they familiar with
able surveillance has to cover it, Aspillaga and tile Cuban DA deba Irtie analysts are different. They
identify the participants. and obtain cle? I lave they examined our love it. lliev arc more cerebral,
evidence. mistakes in the Ames and 1-loward patient, and sedentary. lhey find
cases? At-c they staying current things we could not. They write
Ibis capability is expensiveselec with recent releases like The I )etter.
tion, training, vehicles, photo gear. Mi! ru/thin Archiie and The
video, radios, safe apartments, Haii iied Wood? A lot of (:1 programs in the past
observation posts. and on and on have tried to make operators dou
but, if we do not have it, we will I believe it is ble as their own analysts. As a
an indispensable part
he a second-rate CI service and will of the formation of any American result, in the United States, Cl anal
not break the major cases. vsis historically has been the
CI officerand certainly a profes
weakest part of the business. Pro
sional obligationto study the CI
fessional CI analysts have been
failures of the past, to reflect on
The Fourth Commandment: tinderval ued and underappreciated.
them, and to make sure they are
Know Your History
not repeated. A good (21 program will recruit and
I am discouraged when I talk
very train true analysts in sizable num
The many CI courses being offered
to young Cl officers today to find bers, I do not think it would be
now are a positive step, hut there
how little they know about the his excessive as a nile of thumb in a
ple have gone wrong and made history, usually on their own time agencies come anywhere close to
84
CI Commandments
have gotten the message and circumstances, that the only wa~ to cialists, case officers, technical
nity
do it istogether. We should not let experts, and DA specialists. Each
have incorporated trained analysts
into their operations. bi it others personalities, or jeak)usies, or turf area requires its specialized
own
battles get in the way of our com training curriculum. It takes a long
have not. Across the hoard, we still
mon mission. Our colleagues in time to develop Cl specialists, and
have serious shortfalls in good.
our sister services are as dedicated. that means a sustained investment
solid Cl analysis.
professional, hardworking, and in CI training. We are getting bet
patriotic as we are, and they ter. but we are not there yet.
Occasionally in my caraer. I
their operations
mon sense to operations. hut is Case officers want
encountered instances of sarcasm
instead highly specialized
a way of to be bona lide, Senior operations
or outright bad mouthing of other
seeing things and analyzing them. managers do not want to believe
I. IS Government agenc:es by my CI has to he learned. that their operations are controlled
officers. That kind of attitude and the opposition.
or penetrated by
cynicism infected our junior offic I do notknow how many times in There is a natural human tendency
ers and got in the way of my career I have heard. No, we do on the part of both case officers
cooperation. These c mments not really need a separate Cl sec and senior operations managers to
often were intended t flaunt our tion. ~ are all Cl officers: well do resist otttside CI
scrutiny. lhev
supposed superiority by demean our own CI. That is a recipe for believe that they are practicing
ing the capabilities of the other compromise and failure. good CI themselves and do not
organizations. I dealt with these welcome being second-guessed or
situations by telling the officers to There are no substitutes for profes told how to run their operations by
knock it off, and 1 would encour sional CI officers, and only so-called CI specialists who aie not
85
CI Commandments
mascot for US
ti()ns. I have seen far more should be the pit bull. side CI for its CI specialists. Ihev
examples of this in my Cl career sh iukl go spend two or three years
than I care to remember. with lie operators or with the other
t
crats running sensitive CS dangerous to your health. f~il into the nether world of profes
Government programs have too sr()nal CI: the school of
often tended to minimize Cl threats I do not believe anyone should doublethink, the us-against-them
and to resist professional Cl inter make an entire, uninterrupted mindset. the nothing-iswhat-it
vention. CI officers, in their view, career of CI. We all who work in seems syndrome. or the wilderness
stir up problems and overreact to CI have seen it: the old Cl hand of mirrors.
impossible to measure, hut their the arcane and twisted world of CI The Tenth Commandment:
whistle blowing when problems are without falling prey eventually to Never Give Up
uncovered generate tremendous creeping pa (listort ion. warp
ma n( )ia
heat. It is not surprising that the~ ing, and overzealoiisness in ones TI ie tenth and last commandment is
are often viewed as a net nuisance. thinking. It is precisely these traits the most important. What if the
that led to some of the worst C! Ames mole hunters had quit after
When necessary. a CI service has to disasters in our history. Angleton eight years instead of going into the
impose itself on the organizations and his coterie sadly succUmbed. ninth? \Xhrat if, in my own experi
and groups it is assigned to pro with devastating results. Others in ence, we had discontinued a
tect. A Cl professional ~~ho is the CIA and elsewhere have as certain surveillance operation after
locked out or invited in only when well. lhe danger is always there. five months instead of continuing
it is convenient to the host cannot into the sixth? CI history is full of
through him by going to higher offering me the position as Ted terintell igence Activity is doing the
management. And ckcument all lrices deputy in the new Counter same. The name of the game in CI
instances of denied access, lack of intelligence Center. I discussed it is persistence. CI officers who are
cooperation. or other obstruction to with her that evening at home. I Icr not patient need not tppjy There
carrying out your Cl mission. If response, I thought. was right on is no statute of limitations for espio
as it likely will in that kind of situa t( )o long. Nv ( )ur o\vn nact iofl. Iraitors
tion. you in Cl will take the blame. should know that they will never
Not Stay Too Long flowthrough. ~sonCI officers read not 1 )ng ago of their arrest in
Cl is a hazardous profession. There rotational tours. I also believe it is Reserve col( )nel for alleged espio
slioLild be warning signs on the iniperative that a g(x)d CI service nage against the United States
86
CI Commandments
niany years earlier. Th.~y obvi In Conclusion even the priorities. What we
87