Infante v Aran Builders
FACTS:
NOVEMBER 16 1994 – RTC of Makati rendered a judgment in
favor of Aran Builders (respondent) ordering the petitioner,
Infante, to execute deed of sale in favor of the former and do
other acts.
After 7 years…
JUNE 6 2001 – Aran Builders (respondent) filed an action for
revival of judgment before the RTC of Muninlupa presided over
by Judge Perello (private respondent) against Adelaida Infante
(petitioner) docketed as Civil Case No. 01-164.
Infante (petitioner) filed a motion to dismiss the action for revival
of judgment on the grounds that the Muntinlupa RTC has no
jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and that venue was
improperly laid. Private respondent opposed the motion.
RTC of Muntinlupa: Denied Motion to Dismiss.
Admittedly, the Decision was rendered by the Makati Regional
Trial Court, but it must be emphasized that at that time there was
still no Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City, then under the
territorial jurisdiction of the Makati Courts, so that cases from
this City were tried and heard at Makati City. With the creation
of the Regional Trial Courts of Muntinlupa City, matters
involving properties located in this City, and cases
involving Muntinlupa City residents were all ordered to be
litigated before these Courts.
The case at bar is a revival of a judgment which declared the
plaintiff as the owner of a parcel of land located
in Muntinlupa City. It is this judgment which is sought to be
enforced thru this action which necessarily involves the interest,
possession, title, and ownership of the parcel of land located
in Muntinlupa city and adjudged to Plaintiff. It goes without
saying that the complaint should be filed in the latter City
where the property is located, as there are now Regional
Trial Courts hereat.
CA: Ruled in favor of herein private respondent. Since the
judgment sought to be revived was rendered in an action
involving title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, the action for revival of judgment is then an
action in rem which should be filed with the Regional Trial Court
of the place where the real property is located. (RTC OF
MUNTINLUPA)
Petitioner insists that the action for revival of judgment is an
action in personam; therefore, the complaint should be filed with
the RTC of the place where either petitioner or private
respondent resides. Petitioner then concludes that the filing of
the action for revival of judgment with the RTC
of Muntinlupa City, the place where the disputed property is
located, should be dismissed on the ground of improper venue.
Private respondent is of the opinion that the judgment it is
seeking to revive involves interest over real property. As such,
the present action for revival is a real action, and venue was
properly laid with the court of the place where the realty is
located.
ISSUE: where is the proper venue of the present action for
revival of judgment? (ISSUE IN THE CASE)
- RTC OF MUNTINLUPA SINCE IT IS A REAL ACTION
WON RTC OF MUNTINLUPA MAY ISSUE A WRIT OF
EXECUTION OF A DECISION RENDERED BY RTC OF
MAKATI OF AN ACTION IN REM CONSIDERING THAT AT
THE TIME THE DECISION WAS MADE MUTINLUPA (PLACE
WHERE THE PROPERTY IS LOCATED) HAD NO RTC
(sariling interpretation ko lang to guys)
Yes because The present case for revival of judgment being a
real action, the complaint should indeed be filed with the
Regional Trial Court of the place where the realty is located.
HELD:
The present case for revival of judgment being a real action, the
complaint should indeed be filed with the Regional Trial Court of
the place where the realty is located.
Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides:
Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each
branch. - The Supreme Court shall define the territory over
which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its
authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be
the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of
determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or
actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as determining the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts over which the said branch may exercise
appellate jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be
exercised with a view to making the courts readily accessible to
the people of the different parts of the region and making the
attendance of litigants and witnesses as inexpensive as
possible. (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing, it is quite clear that a branch of the
Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority only over a
particular territory defined by the Supreme
Court. Originally, Muntinlupa City was under the territorial
jurisdiction of the Makati Courts. However, Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 7154, entitled An Act to Amend Section
Fourteen of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, Otherwise Known As
The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981, took effect on
September 4, 1991.Said law provided for the creation of a
branch of the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa. Thus, it is now
the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City which has territorial
jurisdiction or authority to validly issue orders and processes
concerning real property within Muntinlupa City.
Thus, there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by
the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 when it
denied petitioner's motion to dismiss; and the CA did not commit
any error in affirming the same.
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that after the lapse of five (5) years from entry of
judgment and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a final and executory judgment or order may be
enforced by action. The Rule does not specify in which
court the action for revival of judgment should be filed.
x x x an action upon a judgment must be brought either in the
same court where said judgment was rendered or in the place
where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other place
designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in
general. (Emphasis supplied)
It emphasized that other provisions in the rules of procedure
which fix the venue of actions in general must be considered.
The allegations in the complaint for revival of judgment
determine whether it is a real action or a personal action.
The complaint for revival of judgment alleges that a final
and executory judgment has ordered herein petitioner to
execute a deed of sale over a parcel of land in
Ayala Alabang Subdivision in favor of herein private respondent;
pay all pertinent taxes in connection with said sale; register the
deed of sale with the Registry of Deeds and deliver to Ayala
Corporation the certificate of title issued in the name of private
respondent. The same judgment ordered private respondent to
pay petitioner the sum of P321,918.25 upon petitioner's
compliance with the aforementioned order. It is further alleged
that petitioner refused to comply with her judgment obligations
despite private respondent's repeated requests and demands,
and that the latter was compelled to file the action for revival of
judgment. Private respondent then prayed that the judgment be
revived and a writ of execution be issued to enforce said
judgment.
The previous judgment has conclusively declared private
respondent's right to have the title over the disputed property
conveyed to it. It is, therefore, undeniable that private
respondent has an established interest over the lot in
question; and to protect such right or interest, private
respondent brought suit to revive the previous judgment. The
sole reason for the present action to revive is the enforcement
of private respondent's adjudged rights over a piece of
realty. Verily, the action falls under the category of a real
action, for it affects private respondent's interest over real
property.
Gan v Reyes
FACTS:
Bernadette S. Pondevida on behalf of her minor daughter
(private respondent) instituted a complaint against petitioner
for support with prayer for support pendente lite.
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action. He argued that since
Francheska's certificate of birth indicated her father as
"UNKNOWN," there was no legal or factual basis for the claim
of support. His motion, however, was denied by the trial court.
Petitioner failed to file his answer within the reglementary period.
Private respondent moved that petitioner be declared in default,
which motion was granted. Hence, the court received the
evidence of private respondent ex parte.
RTC: The claim of filiation and support was adequately proved,
the trial court Ordered petitioner to recognize private respondent
Francheska Joy S. Pondevida as his illegitimate child and
support her with P20,000.00 every month to be paid on or before
the 15th of each month starting 15 April 2000.
Likewise petitioner was ordered to pay Francheska Joy S.
Pondevida the accumulated arrears of P20,000.00 per month
from the day she was born, P50,000.00 as attorney's fees
and P25,000.00 for expenses of litigation, plus P20,000.00 on
or before the 15th of every month from 15 May 2000 as
alimony pendente lite should he desire to pursue further
remedies against private respondent.
Private respondent moved for execution of the judgment of
support, which the trial court granted by issuing a writ of
execution, citing as reason therefor private respondent's
immediate need for schooling. Pursuant to the writ, the sheriff
levied upon a motor vehicle, a Honda City, registered in the
name of "A.B. Leasing & Fin. Corp., Leased to: G & G Trading,"
and found within the premises of petitioner's warehouse in
Caloocan City.
Meanwhile, petitioner appealed the Judgment to the Court of
Appeals.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of
discretion to the trial court for ordering the immediate execution
of the judgment.
Petitioner averred that the writ of execution was issued despite
the absence of a good reason for immediate enforcement.
Petitioner insisted that as the judgment sought to be executed
did not yet attain finality there should be an exceptional reason
to warrant its execution. He further alleged that the writ
proceeded from an order of default and a judgment rendered by
the trial court in complete disregard of his "highly meritorious
defense." Finally, petitioner impugned the validity of the writ as
he argued that it was issued without notice to him. Petitioner
stressed the fact that he received copy of the motion for
immediate execution two (2) weeks after its scheduled hearing.
CA: Sec. 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
judgments for support are immediately executory and
cannot be stayed by an appeal.
Second, substantial justice must give way over technicalities,
thus the CA did away with the lack of notice to petitioner.
Lastly, petitioner's justification for belatedly filing his
answer, i.e., miscommunication with his lawyer, was
disregarded since it fell short of the statutory requirements of
"fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence."
ISSUE: WON EXECUTION OF THE RTC DECISION
REGARDING THE SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT PENDING
APPEAL WAS PROPER (YES)
WON THERE WAS A NEED FOR NOTIFY PETITIONER ON
THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRITE OF EXECUTION.(NO)
HELD:
1.) Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that,
unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for
support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an
appeal. This is an exception to the general rule which provides
that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment
and that advance executions will only be allowed if there are
urgent reasons therefor. The aforesaid provision peremptorily classes and schools and take up numerous subjects all at once
calls for immediate execution of all judgments for support and to make up for the years they missed in school, due to non-
makes no distinction between those which are the subject of an payment of the funds when needed.
appeal and those which are not. To consider then petitioner's
argument that there should be good reasons for the advance
execution of a judgment would violate the clear and explicit
language of the rule mandating immediate execution.

Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words of a legal provision

we should make no further explanation. Absoluta sententia
expositore non indiget. Indeed, the interpretation which
petitioner attempts to foist upon us would only lead to absurdity,
its acceptance negating the plain meaning of the provision
subject of the petition.

2.) We are unable to accept such a plea for enough has been
done by petitioner to delay the execution of the writ. As the
records show, in partial fulfillment of the writ of execution
petitioner surrendered a sedan which apparently was not his as
it was later ordered released to a third party who laid claim over
the levied vehicle. Also, petitioner filed before the Court of
Appeals a Motion for Leave to Deposit in Court Support
Pendente Lite promising to deposit the amount due as support
every 15th of the month, but to date has not deposited any
amount in complete disavowal of his undertaking. He was not
even deterred from appealing before us and needlessly taking
up our time and energy by posing legal questions that can be
characterized, at best, as flimsy and trivial. We are thus not
prepared to abrogate the writ of execution issued in favor of
private respondent for substantial justice would be better served
if petitioner be precluded from interposing another barrier to the
immediate execution of the support judgment.

We are not intimating that in every case the right to notice of

hearing can be disregarded. That is not so. It appears in this
case that there has been too much temporizing in the
execution of the writ which must not be allowed to thwart
the constitutional mandate for speedy disposition of cases.
As has been said, a technicality should be an aid to justice
and not its great hindrance and chief enemy. Truly, if the
writ of execution would be voided on this ground alone,
then procedural rules which were primarily drafted to
protect parties in the realm of constitutional guarantees
would acquire a new sanctity at the expense of equity and
justice.

In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always
the paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in
view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice
to refuse him support until the decision of the trial court attains
finality while time continues to slip away. An excerpt from the
early case of De Leon v. Soriano is relevant, thus:

The money and property adjudged for support and education

should and must be given presently and without delay because
if it had to wait the final judgment, the children may in the
meantime have suffered because of lack of food or have missed
and lost years in school because of lack of funds. One cannot
delay the payment of such funds for support and education for
the reason that if paid long afterwards, however much the
accumulated amount, its payment cannot cure the evil and
repair the damage caused. The children with such belated
payment for support and education cannot act as gluttons and
eat voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to make up for the
years of hunger and starvation. Neither may they enrol in several