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Family decision making and coalition patterns

Article  in  European Journal of Marketing · October 2000

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Family decision making and Family decision

making
coalition patterns
Christina Kwai-Choi Lee and Brett A. Collins
Department of Marketing, University of Auckland, New Zealand 1181
Keywords Decision making, Family life, Conflict resolution, Coalitions, Children,
Received July 1998
Consumer behaviour
Revised February 1999
Abstract Although conflict resolution in family decision-making processes has been a key topic Accepted June 1999
in consumer behaviour research, very few studies have considered the impact of children on
decision outcomes. Observation is used in this study to determine the relative influence of family
members and the dominant decision-making strategies that are used. Observational data are
derived from videotaped recordings of family interactions during a simulated decision-making
situation. The paper begins with an overview of the decision-making strategies used during the
conflict resolution stage, discusses how the formation of coalitions influences the decision, and
considers the role of gender and gender composition of children in family decision making. This is
followed by the results, which indicate how these factors influence the family decision-making
process for nuclear families with two adolescent children.

Introduction
Marketers are interested in understanding the consumer behaviour of the
family because it is considered the most important decision making and
consumption unit (Assael, 1998). It is estimated that the spending power of
adolescents today is significantly greater than for any previous group, with
their disposable income being between US$82.1 billion and US$108 billion a
year. Furthermore, if account is taken of the influence adolescents have on
family purchase decisions, ranging from consumer electronics to holidays,
education, housing and groceries, the expenditure they influence is in excess of
US$300 billion per year (Kelly, 1998). Researchers and practitioners are
interested in conflict, and conflict resolution in the family decision-making
process because of its impact upon the outcome of the purchase decision.
Although there are studies available in the consumer behaviour literature
regarding conflict resolution in the family decision-making process (Davis,
1976; Corfman and Lehmann, 1987; Spiro, 1983; Qualls and Jaffe, 1992), children
have rarely been considered in these studies. On the other hand, theorists in
family systems (Minuchin, 1985) and developmental psychology (Sameroff,
1983) argue that children should be included as part of the unit of analysis.
Furthermore, depending on the method used to collect research data, there is
argument about which conflict resolution strategies predominate during family
decision making. For example, research based on self-report data notes that
coalition formation and persuasive tactics are rarely used, but a problem-
solving approach is most frequently used (Belch et al., 1980). In contrast,
research based on observational methods suggests that coalitions provide a European Journal of Marketing,
Vol. 34 No. 9/10, 2000, pp. 1181-1198.
common tactic for resolving decision-making conflict (Vuchinich et al., 1988). # MCB University Press, 0309-0566
European The objective of this study is to identify dominant decision strategies used in
Journal of the family decision-making process, and to determine whether observed
Marketing coalition patterns are related to gender and position of the children (i.e. whether
34,9/10 the child is the youngest or the eldest) in the family decision-making unit. The
data used to examine this process were collected using videotaped family
interactions.
1182 The next section contains a literature review of family decision-making
strategies, which are defined as the type of process the family uses to come to a
joint decision. Influence tactics are defined as the specific ways of
implementing a decision strategy. The effect that the children's gender
composition has on family decision making is also discussed. Following a
description of the research method, the results are discussed.

Literature review
Conflict and conflict resolution in family decision making
Although serious conflict in family purchase decisions are rare, some form of
family conflict is highly probable, because forming a joint preference requires a
combining of individual preferences of family members.
Sheth (1974) has argued that conflict between family members results from
the existence of different cognitive structures, which may include different
purchase motives (goals) and evaluative beliefs (perceptions about
alternatives). Depending on the cause of the conflict, family members attempt
to resolve it by using different decision strategies. These, according to Sheth,
can be classified as problem solving, persuasion, bargaining and politics. Davis
(1976) used two models to describe decision strategies, the consensual model
which encompasses Sheth's idea of problem solving, and accommodation
which encompasses persuasion, bargaining and politics.
Two other consumer behaviour researchers (Spiro, 1983; Qualls and Jaffe,
1992) have used conceptual models to describe conflict resolution strategies
used in family decision-making processes. There seems to be some consensus
among these four authors about the strategies used to resolve conflict. Entries
in Table I show the different conceptual models developed by these authors,
providing their labels for each category of decision-making strategy and tactic
used. Labelled strategies have been aligned across each author's category
listing, and each item associated with a single term in the right-hand column.
Alignment of categories from previous research in this way enables us to
integrate the previous conceptual models into a single table, and show where
they overlap, plus their similarities.
Consider the strategy summarised as ``experience'', which directly influences
the decision outcome. Problem solving as a conflict resolution strategy is
frequently used, and employs the expertise or experience of members in the
decision-making unit. This process usually entails more information search
prior to evaluating purchase decision alternatives, as well as the seeking of
Qualls and Summer
Family decision
Jaffe (1992) Spiro (1983) Sheth (1974) Davis (1976) terma making
Strategy Strategy Strategy Tactic Strategy Tactic Strategy

Compromise, Expert Problem _ Problem Expert Experience

competition solving solving Better solution

± Legitimate ± ±
Multiple purchase
Role structure Specialist Legitimate
1183
Controller
Avoidance- Reward/ Politics Coercion ± Shopping together Coalition
withdrawal referent coalitions Coercion
Coalitions
Capitulation Emotional Persuasion ± Persuasion Irresponsible critic Emotion
Feminine intuition
Bargaining Bargaining Bargaining ± Bargaining Next purchase Bargaining
Concession Impulse purchase
Procrastinator
- Impression ± ± ± ± ± Table I.
management An integration of
conceptual models of
Notes: a Categories of decision-making strategy tested in this study, which are defined in decision-making
Table II strategies and tactics

support from credible sources outside the family. Family discussion focuses
upon facts and the choice is based on a consensus between members (Davis,
1976).
Consider the strategy summarised as ``legitimate'', which notes the
importance of role stereotypes in influencing a decision outcome. Here, role
structures appear to be used to legitimise the use of power. For example, a
mother may use her established role to point out that she is the one who deals
with the provision of food, and therefore should dominate such a decision. More
generally, the legitimate strategy involves a controller, or specialist, taking
charge during the decision-making process, in a stereotypical manner.
The strategy summarised as ``coalition'' considers the importance of two or
more members of the family unit who collude in order to influence the outcome
of a particular decision. Coalition is associated with political strategies and the
use of coercion. Sheth (1974) suggested that using politics is rare and only
occurs when the family disagrees, not only on the buying motives, but also on
fundamental issues such as lifestyle. Politics may also involve the formation of
coalitions and sub-groups in an attempt to isolate any member with whom
there is conflict.
The remaining two types of family decision strategies used to achieve
accommodation (Davis, 1976) are persuasion and bargaining. The strategy
summarised as ``Emotion'' considers the situation where a member tries to
persuade or dominate others by using emotive appeals, crying, pouting and
other non-verbal techniques to gain influence over the decision outcome.
Persuasion (Sheth, 1974) seems to embrace emotive forms of gaining influence
European such as nagging, or using personal criticism. Methods used (influence tactics)
Journal of that are associated with persuasion include criticism and intuition. Note that
Marketing while there is greater interaction between members, there is no attempt to seek
more information.
34,9/10 The strategy labelled as ``bargaining'' is about trade-offs, where one member
attempts to gain influence in a family decision-making process by exchanging
1184 value somewhere else. Members explicitly acknowledge that conflict exists,
and the concepts of distributive justice and fairness are invoked. Bargaining
influence tactics used include waiting for the next purchase, impulse
purchasing and procrastination (Davis, 1976).
Perfect alignment of the strategy labels across the four conceptual models
was not possible, with the intent being to show their similarities. Impression
management (Spiro, 1983) had no natural counterpart, but we consider this
decision-making strategy to be a form of persuasion that could be aligned with
the term ``emotion''.

Empirical findings in family decision making

Survey researchers (Sheth and Cosmos, 1975; Belch et al., 1980) have noted the
coalition strategy is rare, but Vuchinich et al. (1988), using an observational
method, assert that more than 50 per cent of family decisions are resolved
through the formation of coalitions. In fact the results of Belch et al. (1980)
indicated there was very little disagreement among family members, but there
was some variation across product class. Disagreement seemed highest for
vacations and automobiles, which was probably due to high involvement of
consumers with these products. The ``experience'' strategy associated with
problem solving tactics including information search, family discussion, and
delegation to the most knowledgeable member, were most often used across all
products (i.e. vacation, appliance, furniture). An exception was found with
breakfast cereal, where the exertion of authority was used. Their results
showed that the bargaining tactic of promising future considerations, and
delaying of the decision, were rarely used across all product categories. The use
of a coalition between two or more family members was also relatively low.
A possible reason for finding such a low level of disagreement among the
family members, and the low incidence of emotion, coalition and bargaining
strategies, could be due to the socially desirable response factor (Olson and
Rabunsky, 1972). Respondents may be reluctant to report a high level of
conflict during the family decision-making process, and the use of the terms
``persuasion'', ``politics'' and ``bargaining'' because of their negative
connotations. In fact Belch et al. (1980) noted this same problem when
considering the empirical work of Sheth and Cosmas (1975) who found
bargaining and politicking (coalition) strategies rarely being mentioned as
conflict resolution tactics. Belch et al. (1980) admitted this problem due to the
social desirability factor and pointed to the need for other methods of study.
Other conflicting results in the literature concern which family members
form a coalition, and whom they collude against. Scanzoni and Szinovacz (1980)
found that children tend to be coalition members used by one parent against Family decision
the other, but this is counter to another finding (Vuchinich et al., 1988), which making
suggests that a parent is more likely to side with the other parent than with the
children. These conflicting results could be due to the different independent
variables used; Scanzoni and Szinovacz (1980) based their research on decision
making for family vacations, while Vuchinich et al. (1988) observed routine
family conflicts over dinner. 1185
Strategies used to influence a decision outcome do tend to vary in response
to similar variables that affect influence patterns. Spiro (1983) looked at how
couples accommodated each other when making joint decisions in the purchase
of major consumer durables, and examined various demographic and socio-
economic variables, in order to determine their effect on the type of influence
strategy used. She suggested that couples used a mixture of influence
strategies depending on the product, situation and family involved. The
importance the findings due to Spiro, is in that they first suggests that, families
can be categorised according to the type of decision-making strategy used, and
secondly, that the type of decision strategy used may be related in some way to
the demographic characteristics of the family unit.
Spiro (1983) found that families from different social classes, with different
sex-role orientations, and at different stages of the family life cycle, use
different mixes of influence strategies. If a family can be categorised on the
basis of the dominant conflict resolution strategy used during the decision-
making process, which Spiro (1983) asserts is achievable, it seems reasonable
that the relative influence of family members (i.e. the influence structure) will
be related to the dominant strategy. Thus, we have the first proposition:
P1: Influence structures will be related to the dominant decision strategy
utilised by the family.

Coalition as a family decision strategy

When more than two family members are in conflict during the purchase
decision process, third parties may form alliances to aid one side against the
other. The formation of such alliances or coalitions not only adds a new
dimension to the study of family conflict, but they are also of particular interest
in understanding processes by which outcomes, such as group decisions, are
reached (Iacobucci and Hopkins, 1992).
When two or more family members have convergent interests, coalitions
may be formed to secure their interest (Sprey, 1969). A coalition may deal with
an individual family member or another group of family members (Scanzoni
and Szinovacz, 1980). This form of power associated with conflict resolution
during the decision-making process is called the majority rule (Pearson, 1989).
Under this strategy, ``weaker'' members unite to counter the influence of a
``stronger'' family member, and to achieve goals they might otherwise never
obtain by acting as an individual. Filiatrault and Ritchie (1980) noted that
children might attempt to exert influence by acting in coalition with a sibling or
parent.
European Vuchinich et al. (1988) used video recordings of 52 families, made while they
Journal of were at dinner, to study the formation of alliances and the corresponding
Marketing outcome, when an additional family member enters a dyadic conflict. Their
prediction of alliances being common was supported. However, contrary to
34,9/10 earlier research by Bonacich et al. (1985), these alliances were not necessarily
formed within the same age generation. Further, their results show an equal
1186 likelihood of children either siding with and against parents, or with and
against other children. Parents rarely sided against each other, and were seen
as more likely to side with the other parent than with a child.

Gender of children and family purchase decisions

Sociological literature on the involvement of fathers and mothers in parenting
sons and daughters, offers some guidance regarding the effects of gender and
gender composition on the formation of parent-children coalitions. Fathers
have more parental involvement with sons, as opposed to daughters (Harris,
1998; Morgan et al., 1988). Having a son draws a father into an active parenting
role. Once involved, the norm that children should be treated equally means
that daughters may receive more contact with the father when they have a
brother, than in the case when they have no brother. The crucial variable in
studying family differences is not the gender of the child, but gender
composition of the children (Harris and Morgan, 1991). Recent studies have
shown the importance of considering gender composition (Morgan et al., 1988;
Powell and Steelman, 1989). Fathers assume more active roles in families with
one or more boys, and are least involved in families with all female children.
The position occupied by the children (i.e. whether the child is the eldest or the
youngest in the family) can also affect levels of paternal participation; children
occupying the first and second position benefit from less dilution of parental
energies because they are part of a smaller family.
There is little research reported in the marketing literature, which is
concerned with the gender of children and their consequent influence on
purchase decisions. Moschis and Mitchell (1986) found that a female adolescent,
(probably due to the early learning of sex roles), was more likely than a male
adolescent to request products, make product-related decisions and purchase
the products. Atkin (1978) also found that female children were slightly more
successful than male children in persuading their parents to make purchase
decisions.
The findings from prior research suggest that female children have more
influence than male children, but only Moschis and Mitchell (1986) have
addressed the influence gender has on purchasing decisions. The potential for
children to influence the family decision-making process is of considerable
interest to marketing practitioners, making it worthy of further examination.
Thus, we put forward a second proposition:
P2: Female children will have more influence in the family decision-making
process than male children.
The same-sex identification process expounded by psychoanalysts may also Family decision
provide some clues to the question of gender-related coalitions between parents making
and children. This theory suggests that mothers and daughters will be more
similar in their orientations than mothers and sons, suggesting that parents are
more responsive to same-sex children (see Acock and Bengston, 1978;
Baumrind, 1971; Margolin and Patterson, 1975; Noller, 1980). In their research
on the personal relationships of adolescents with their parents, Furman and 1187
Buhrmester (1992) found that boys perceived their relationship with the father
as more supportive than the girls did. Beatty and Talpade (1994) both predicted
and found a higher level of agreement, in the perception of influence between
mothers and daughters, than between mothers and sons. This evidence
suggests the formation of an alliance between a parent and child of the same
sex might play a significant role in influencing the outcome of family decision
making. This leads us to put forward a third proposition:
P3: The pattern of differences in the structure of family member influence
will be related to identifiable coalitions between parent/child dyads.

Research method
Data collection
Data were collected from videotaped observations of family interactions,
conducted in the respondent families' own homes. A total of 89 families were
selected from a pool of participants of European descent, drawn from four high
schools around the Auckland area in New Zealand. All respondent families
were nuclear families with two adolescent children whose ages were between
12 and 19. There was an almost equal split between the number of male and
female children within the sample. In 46 cases the eldest child was female,
while in 43 cases the youngest child was female. Similarly, in 43 cases the
eldest child was male, while in 46 cases the youngest child was male.
The family interactions were triggered by a simulated family decision-
making process, in which each family was offered the chance to win $150 to
spend at a family restaurant. In the interaction situation the scenario presented
was that the family had already won the prize money, and they were then
required to determine the family's choice of five favoured venues.
Two researchers were involved in the data collection process. After the
initial introductions upon arrival, one researcher attended to setting up the
video camera (a relatively small camera to minimise intrusion), whilst the other
researcher spoke with the family to distract attention from the camera. The
camera was set up in a corner of the room at some distance away from where
the family was seated, which was usually around the dining table. Other
measures to minimise intrusion by the camera included not mentioning when it
was turned on, getting all family members to fill in two lengthy questionnaires
before beginning the interaction phase, and by not having anyone behind the
camera, or in the room, during the family interaction. The first questionnaire
measured their interest in eating out as a family, while the second
questionnaire measured commitment to their role stereotype, which was used
European to indicate whether the family has a traditional or contemporary style. The
Journal of family's demographic details were recorded after the videotaped interaction
Marketing was complete.
34,9/10 A test was conducted with a random sample of 25 respondent families to
determine the realism of the scenario situation presented. A three-item, five-
point Likert scale produced a mean of 1.96, which represents agreement that
1188 the situation was realistic (Cronbach's alpha = 0.79).

Content analysis of recorded videotapes

The amount of influence each member had in the decision-making process was
assessed using a content analysis of the videotape recordings. Within each
family the relative influence of individuals and the dominant decision
strategies used were judged by noting the verbal and non-verbal
communication of the group members.
Determination of the relative influence an individual had was made using a
coding sheet that consists of seven items. These items on the coding sheet are
body attitude, facial expression, voice pitch, voice loudness, the amount of time
each member spends talking, the number of times a member mutually gazed at
another member, and the number of suggestions accepted. All the items used to
indicate attempts by an individual to dominate or influence others in a group
were extracted from the literature (Ekman, 1982; Harper, 1985; Kenkel, 1963;
Zivin, 1975).
The observed influence score of each member is a relative score, which was
judged using the observed influence scale (Lee and Marshall, 1998). Three
trained and independent judges were used to determine the extent to which
each family member attempts to influence other members during the
interaction process, using subjective judgements of their body attitude, facial
expression, voice pitch and voice loudness. These influence judgements are
made for each member relative to the rest of the group. Judgements are made
using a seven-point scale, where 1 = extremely not influential, and 7 =
extremely influential.
The other three items were determined by counting; that is, counting the
number of times each member gazes at another while speaking, using a
stopwatch to time how long each one spoke, and counting the number of
suggestions made by each member that were accepted by the group. These
counts were later converted to a proportion relative to the total number of
gazes, or total amount of time spent in the interaction phase. Judgements which
are based upon a seven-point scale, were converted to a 100-point scale that
allowed items in the scale to be combined more easily, using a base of 100. An
indication of relative influence was obtained by taking an average of these
items. The final item in the coding sheet notes the number of suggestions made
by each member, which were accepted by the group, to provide an indication of
their contribution to the outcome of the decision-making process. Therefore,
given a total of five suggestions, if the father made three of these suggestions, Family decision
and the eldest child made two, the father's contribution to the outcome would making
be 60/100, and that of the eldest child, 40/100.
The interjudge reliability among the three judges was found to be high, with
correlations of between 0.71 (for the subjective judgements) and 0.98 (for the
more objective judgements). A Cronbach's alpha for the six items of 0.90 was
achieved, reflecting strong internal consistency. 1189
Coding the decision stages
The influence of the four family members was observed over three distinct
stages in the decision-making process: configuration, negotiation and outcome.
Each stage was analysed using the judgement procedure described above.
``Configuration'' describes that stage in the decision-making process where
family members gear themselves up for the decision situation, and decide on
the ``rules of the game''. This corresponds to Bales and Strodtbeck's (1951)
description of a decision phase they labelled as the orientation phase. Thus
configuration was deemed to have taken place if discussion had occurred that
was determinant of the way the decision was made.
``Negotiation'' describes that stage in the decision-making process where
family members evaluate the alternatives suggested, putting arguments for
and against the various choices. Negotiation can involve using a variety of
decision strategies such as experience, legitimate, emotion, coalition or
bargaining.
``Outcome'', the final stage in the decision-making process, represents the
number of suggestions each member successfully made to the group.

Coding the decision strategies

The dominant family decision-making strategy was judged after viewing the
family interactions on tape. Several categories from Table I were not
considered because their use involves only one individual and not the rest of
the group. Hence, if one member ``withdraws'' or ``capitulates'', there will still be
a dominant decision paradigm within the family, even though the member does
not participate in it. Similarly, it is not possible to determine ``impression
management'' from an observational viewpoint, as it is only the individual
concerned who knows the truth of their own statement.
A clear definition of each decision strategy to be coded through observation
is presented in Table II.
Five categories were used in the coding process. The definition of expert
influence is clear, as it suggests influence stemming from experience.
Persuasion, on the other hand, is described by Davies (1976) as coalitions and
other coercive tactics, whilst Sheth (1974) describes coalitions as a form of
politicking. In the light of the apparent prevalence of coalitions (Vuchinich et
al., 1988), it seems reasonable to split coalitions from the persuasion category.
Persuasion is then seen to consist of emotive appeals, nagging and other non-
verbal techniques (Spiro, 1983) and forms the decision strategy we term
European Family decision-
Journal of making strategy Definition
Marketing
Experience Using experience and knowledge as a source of information that will
34,9/10 influence the outcome of the decision
Legitimate Emphasising a role stereotype in order to obtain influence. For example, a
1190 mother may assume or point out that she is the one who deals with the
provision of food and therefore should dominate this decision. This
approach might also involve a controller or specialist taking charge in a
stereotypical manner
Coalition Two or more members of the family decision-making unit collude in order
to obtain a particular outcome
Emotion A member of the decision-making unit tries to persuade or dominate
others by using emotive appeals, crying, pouting and other non-verbal
Table II. techniques in order to achieve influence
Definitions used in Bargaining Giving in on this occasion in return for getting their way on some other
judging the dominant occasion. This strategy does not have to be explicit; a father for instance,
family decision-making could write down a child's choice and then note his own without any
strategies reference to the group

emotion. Bargaining, which involves trading off power in the present decision
for a greater say in the next, features in the typologies of all four studies
reported. Legitimate influence also features in most categorisations; Spiro
(1983) explains that influence can be legitimised through emphasising
stereotypical family roles.
Three trained judges viewed 30 tapes, and one judge viewed all 89 tapes, in
order to judge the dominant decision strategy used. The agreement of the three
judges were compared to determine the reliability of the judgement technique.
For the 30 cases, the proportion of interjudge agreements was 0.86, which gave
a PRL reliability measure of 0.99 (Rust and Cooil, 1994). In light of the high
agreement between the judges, all 89 judgements of the main judge were
accepted into the database.

Results
Dominant decision-making strategies
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to test the effects of the
dominant decision strategies used, and members' influence score, over the three
stages of the decision process. Results obtained showed that the dominant
decision-making strategy adopted by a family seems to have greater impact
upon the influence score of the children than on the influence score of the
parents (elder child, F = 1.79, p < 0.05; younger child, F = 1.5, p = 0.12; children
together, F = 2.54, p < 0.05). Further analysis, which is summarised in Table
III, revealed that the emotion decision-making strategy had most impact upon
the influence scores of children, particularly during the configuration and
negotiation stages of the decision-making process. Consider the mean influence
scores shown in Table III for the following configuration: elder child, mean
influence score = 16.81, although influence under bargaining was higher with a Family decision
mean score of 23.00; younger child, mean influence score = 25.51; both children, making
mean influence score = 19.66. Similarly, considering the negotiation stage, we
can see that decision-making strategy had considerable impact upon a child's
influence score; elder child, mean influence score = 25.32; younger child, mean
influence score = 22.36, both children, mean influence score = 23.83. Although
causality cannot be determined here statistically, we conjecture that it is the 1191
child's use of emotive appeal to gain influence that leads to their having a
dominant impact on the family decision-making strategy.
To summarise, decision strategies do not seem to have any statistically
observable significance when we consider the influence structures of parents,
but they certainly play quite an important role when we consider the influence
of children during the configuration and negotiation stages of the decision-
making process. Although the statistics do not reflect the thought, it is also true
by definition that if a child gains or loses influence, then either a sibling or a
parent must also show a corresponding, compensatory gain or loss. In other
words, an artefact of basing the relative influence score on a 100-point scale is
to make gains or losses of influence a zero sum game. The results obtained here
provide support for acceptance of P1; the relative influence exerted by different
family members is related to the dominant decision-making strategy adopted
by the family.

Coalition patterns and the decision-making process

MANOVA was again used to ascertain the significance of children's gender for
the influence scores of family members, and to identify coalition patterns.
Fathers' influence scores varied with the gender of the eldest and the youngest
child (F = 3.05, p < 0.05), while the impact of gender of the eldest and youngest
child upon a mother's influence score approaches significance (F = 1.97, p =
0.12). The father's influence was significantly different from that of other
members during the configuration stage (F = 5.33, p < 0.05), and outcome stage

Sibling status Eldest child Youngest child Both children

Stage of decision process A B C A B C A B C

F 2.187 3.075 0.382 3.488 0.566 0.968 4.057 4.357 0.617

Probability 0.077 0.020 0.821 0.011 0.688 0.435 0.005 0.003 0.652 Table III.
Strategy Mean influence scores
Experience 13.90 22.66 26.67 9.45 20.33 19.63 11.68 21.50 23.15 as a function of a
Legitimate 11.68 20.73 28.44 9.33 20.78 21.87 10.50 20.76 25.16 family's dominant
Emotion 16.81 25.31 27.62 25.51 22.36 20.95 19.66 23.83 24.29 decision strategy, by
Coalition 10.84 21.58 30.91 14.82 21.46 27.27 12.83 21.52 29.09 relative sibling age,
Bargaining 23.00 21.29 20.00 14.47 22.71 34.28 18.73 22.00 27.14 over the three stages of
the decision-making
Notes: A = Configuration; B = Negotiation; C = Outcome progress
European (F = 4.64, p < 0.05) of the decision-making process. On the other hand, the
Journal of mother's influence was significantly different during the negotiation stage (F =
Marketing 2.82, p < 0.10) and the outcome stage (F = 4.64. p < 0.05).
Although there were no significant effects upon the younger child's
34,9/10 influence, there is a significant result for the elder child, where the main effect,
gender of the elder child, gives a result of F = 6.24, with p < 0.001. Further
1192 univariate tests show negotiation as the major contributor to this main effect (F
= 13.56, p < 0.001), with the other two stages being insignificant. The mean
influence score for female eldest children during the negotiation stage is higher
at 24.18 than for male eldest children at 20.47. T-tests show a significant
difference between the eldest female and male children's influence during the
negotiation stage (t = 3.68, p < 0.001), and also show a significant difference
between youngest female and male children's influence during the negotiation
stage (t = 2.19, p < 0.05). Thus, for this particular sample, the gender of the
children, particularly the elder children, is of significance to the influence score
of family members. It is not yet clear from the above analysis whether it makes
a difference to the influence patterns when the gender of both children is
considered. To clarify this issue, a further variable, termed gender mix, was
created.
There are only four possible variations of gender mix within two-children
families; families with two daughters, families with two sons, and then families
with either an elder daughter and a younger son, or an elder son and a younger
daughter. In order to establish whether or not influence patterns do relate to the
gender mix, MANOVA was performed for configuration, negotiation and
outcome by gender mix for each member. The results indicate that the
influence of family members (except for the younger child) does vary in
response to the gender mix of the children (father, F = 2.85, p < 0.05; mother,
F = 1.86, p = 0.05; elder child, F = 2.17, p < 0.05).
The results of the univariate analysis for each of the family members to
determine the major contributors of the multivariate significance are contained
in the following discussion, with these results being summarised in Table IV.

The evidence for coalitions between mothers and sons

Mothers' influence at the negotiation and outcome stages varied significantly (p
< 0.05 and p = 0.054, respectively) over the gender mixes (Table IV). Although
she is stronger than all other members of the family during the negotiation
stage regardless of the gender mix, she is strongest when both her children are
male, with a mean score of 33.80, compared to father (mean influence score =
25.77) or the elder child (mean score = 20.70). She is also strong when her first
child is a male and her second a female. Not only do mothers have more
influence when they have two sons during the negotiation stage, they also have
more power in the actual decision result (outcome) when they have two sons
(mean score = 31.67), rather than when they have an elder daughter and a
younger son (mean score = 18.40). Mothers who have an elder son and a
younger daughter are also stronger in the outcome stage (mean influence score
= 27.90) than mothers who have an elder daughter and a younger son (mean Family decision
score = 18.40). The results of this study support the existence of coalitions making
between mothers and their elder sons.

The evidence for collusion between mothers and two daughters

The mother-son, father-daughter pattern observed changes when parents have
two daughters. In this circumstance, the father has less influence during 1193
configuration (mean = 21.21) than when he has an elder son and a younger
daughter (mean = 24.79). However, when the father has only an elder daughter
and younger son, instead of two daughters, his influence score for outcome
increases (mean = 34.40). Conversely, mothers in two-girl families have more
decision power (see the outcome stage with a mean of 31.75) than when there is
an elder daughter and younger son in the family (mean influence score = 18.40).
It appears that the three females within a family act together to gain more
influence over the decision-making process than can be achieved by three
males acting together.

The evidence for father-daughter coalitions

The father's influence varied significantly during the configuration and
outcome stages of the decision-making process. When a father has an elder
daughter (mean influence score = 31.94), rather than an elder son (mean score =
24.79) or two sons (mean score = 17.77), they seem to work together during the
configuration stage. Similarly, fathers have more influence on the outcome
when their eldest child is a girl (mean = 34.40). Thus, the pattern observed
between mothers and sons is matched by an apparent coalition between fathers
and elder daughters.

The evidence for influential elder daughters

It was noted earlier that daughters are generally more influential than sons,
and the gender of elder children appeared to have more significance to the

Mother Father Eldest child

Role decision process A B C A B C A B C

F 0.306 3.309 2.654 2.567 1.519 5.459 0.109 4.751 1.134

Probability 0.821 0.024 0.054 0.060 0.216 0.002 0.995 0.004 0.340
Gender mix
Eldest is female and
youngest female 23.76 29.32 31.75 21.21 23.72 19.05 14.44 24.80 20.95
Eldest is male and Table IV.
youngest male 27.44 33.80 31.67 17.77 25.77 15.33 15.00 20.70 30.00 Mean influence scores
Eldest if female and as a function of role in
youngest male 22.22 29.49 18.40 31.94 26.51 34.40 13.14 23.56 28.80 the family, stage in the
Eldest is male and family decision-making
youngest female 24.54 29.82 27.90 24.79 27.12 17.75 14.16 20.24 30.00 process, and gender
composition of the
Notes: A = Configuration; B = Negotiation; C = Outcome children
European influence structure of the family than younger children. The analysis of gender
Journal of mix contained in Table IV further clarifies this situation. The result of the
Marketing univariate analysis shows the elder daughters exhibiting more influence than
their male counterparts during the negotiation stage.
34,9/10
Summary of the coalitions indicated by gender mix analysis
1194 Overall several coalitions have emerged. In particular, fathers and daughters
appear to work together, especially elder daughters. However, this coalition is
weakened when there are two daughters in the family, as the daughters seem to
side with their mother against the only male in the family. The other side of the
coin is that mother and sons seem to work best together, particularly when
there are two sons in the family. There is also evidence that this coalition is
strong where it is a son who is the eldest child. It seems to be the elder
daughters who are the key players in this family interaction, thus P2 is
accepted; female children have more influence in family decisions than male
children. There is certainly enough evidence here to accept P3; influence
coalitions do exist within families, and they are linked to demographic factors.

Discussion and conclusion

The results of this study reinforce the importance of including children in
family decision-making research. Although the dominant decision strategy had
no significant effects on the influence of the parents, effects were significant for
either the eldest child, or when both children were considered together.
Proposition 1 stated that influence structures will be related to the dominant
decision strategy utilised by the key players in the family interaction. This is
partially supported as it was found that children tend to have more influence
when the dominant decision paradigm is emotive.
It was suggested in our earlier discussion that this could be due to causality
running the other way, and that children may use emotional strategies in order
to gain influence. Contrary to the literature about the formation of coalitions as
a conflict resolution strategy, no significant coalition patterns were identified
through using an observation-based methodology in this study. However,
statistical evidence highlighted the prevalence of coalitions as a method of
gaining influence. P2 and P3 provided a clear picture of children's influence
and coalition patterns. P2 was accepted because the overall influence of female
children was stronger than that of male children. This influence pattern was
examined further with P3, which noted that the pattern of significant
differences in family member influence would be related to identifiable
coalitions between parent/child dyads. The complex picture which emerges
supports the proposition that fathers and elder daughters, and mothers and
sons work together to gain influence. Although it cannot be stated from the
analysis conducted here whether parents were using children or children were
using their parents to gain influence, the judges' observations of the tapes point
to both scenarios being equally plausible.
 The power of the eldest daughters was clearly displayed in the statistical Family decision
evidence. Usually this power was exerted on its own or the father's behalf, making
except in the situation where there were two daughters in the family, in which
case the females clubbed together to accord the mother greater influence.
Where this influence (and the attempt to gain and exert influence) comes from,
cannot be determined on the basis of the research presented here.
1195
Implications for marketing practitioners
In line with the studies by Atkin (1978), and Moschis and Mitchell (1986), our
results suggest that female children have a strong influence in family purchase
decisions. Children are important members of the family decision-making unit,
and have significant influence, both in how the decision process is conducted,
and in determining what is to be purchased. This has fundamental implications
for practitioners.
Family units are an important unit of analysis for marketing practitioners
because well-planned and well-executed marketing strategies often fail because
the marketers have an incomplete understanding of buyer psychology and
processes (Bonoma, 1984). Effective marketing requires knowledge of how
products are purchased, and what sources of influence individual family
members apply to the decision process. Understanding choice and influence
processes provides marketing managers with the opportunity to shape brand
choice and consumer behaviour.
Despite the prevalent assumption in marketing communication programs of
conventional two-parent families, single-parent families are one of the fastest
growing family types (Jarvis, 1997). There appears to be less reliance on
husband dominated decision making, and increased reliance on shared
decisions within the family. Consequently the nature of decision influence is
unable to be assumed as homogeneous across consumer markets, and ignoring
this limits the effectiveness of marketing programs involving family purchases.
In order to increase the effectiveness of promotional campaigns, marketers
must examine the relative influence of family members at each stage of the
decision-making process, for each product category under consideration. It is
suggested that segmentation of some family markets on the basis of the type of
household structure and demographics may also be useful. Further, during the
development of promotional campaigns, marketers may wish to direct
messages regarding decision making to family members who dominate
particular stages of the decision process. Other considerations may well be
important; for example, females may be perceived as more acceptable and more
effective at delivering voice-overs in radio and television commercials.
Research of the type undertaken here, that tests and draws together earlier
work, is necessarily formative, and at this stage is limited in its generalisability
to other products and situations. However, the results do suggest issues that
marketing practitioners should consider when developing marketing
programmes, especially if the product or service involves a family decision,
such as groceries or restaurants.
European Future research
Journal of This study provides a preliminary indication that conflict resolution strategies,
Marketing and coalition patterns in family decision making, can be identified using
observational data collection techniques.
34,9/10
Two limitations of the research require discussion. First, the scope of the
research is limited to one service category, restaurants, and to one type of
1196 family structure, nuclear families with two adolescents. Although it was
important to control for this when designing the study, it restricts the
generalisability of results. Therefore there is a need to extend this piece of
research to include other products or services and to other family structures.
A second limitation involves the determination of a family's decision
strategies used in the decision-making process. The present study judged the
dominant strategy used by the whole family; this limits the study by not being
able to clearly identify the decision strategy used by the dominant influencer in
the family group. Future research should consider determining, through
observation, the dominant decision strategies used by each family member and
relate this to the amount of influence exerted by each member in the decision-
making process.
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