31 SCRA 1 – Legal Ethics – Duty to Respect Judicial Authorities –
Contempt of Court
In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L.
Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and
Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F.
Meads
In 1968, the Supreme Court promulgated a unanimous decision (24
SCRA 491; G.R. No. L-27072) which was not favorable
to MacArthur International Minerals Co. The latter’s lawyer, Atty.
Vicente Santiago then filed a motion for reconsideration.
Eventually, a third motion for reconsideration was submitted by
him where the following paragraph was stated:
6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial
authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in
all matters that come before them, and that no matter what the
circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the
Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally
incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or
pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial
sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the recent
absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion to
hold himself in contempt of court — seemingly totally oblivious or
uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved —
and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in
judging a criminal case against an accused who is also his
correspondent in two other cases. What is the explanation for such
mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious
deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our
government officials are just amoral?
Scattered in his motion were other statements where he attacked
the 1968 decision of the Supreme Court as false, erroneous, and
illegal.
In another motion, Atty. Santiago sought the inhibition of two
Justices: Justice Fred Castro, because allegedly, he is the brother of
the vice president of the opposing party. And Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion because immediately after the 1968 decision, his son
was appointed to a significant position in the government. (Here
Atty. Santiago implied that the justices were not fair and that their
decision was influenced).
In his defense, Atty. Santiago said that he originally deleted the
above paragraph and was only included due to inadvertence. But
that any rate, he averred that the language he used was necessary to
defend his client.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Vicente Santiago is guilty of
contempt.
HELD: Yes. Lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound
servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many
suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients’
success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must
be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. Thus, Santiago’s
defense is not tenable.
A lawyer must avoid language that tend to create an atmosphere of
distrust, of disbelief in the judicial system. A lawyer’s duties to the
Court have become common place. Really, there could hardly be
any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof.
Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms,
spells out one such duty: ‘To observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts of justice and judicial officers.’
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of
the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance.
Atty. Santiago was fined for his infractions.
31 SCRA 562 – Legal Ethics – A Lawyer’s Right to Criticize the
Courts
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a
civil case. They lost in said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion
for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said motion
but he failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of said
motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but the
Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court
with regard to the motion for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen
filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court which
outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution.
This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions
as unconstitutional. He then filed before the Supreme Court a
petition to surrender his lawyer’s certificate of title as he claimed
that it is useless to continue practicing his profession when
members of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for
justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.
He further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client was
made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why and that he
became “one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy.” He also stated “that justice as administered by the
present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb.”
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen’s petition
as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to ctually surrender his
certificate. Almacen did not surrender his lawyer’s certificate
though as he now argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked
that he may be permitted “to give reasons and cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him . . . in an open and
public hearing.” He said he preferred this considering that the
Supreme Court is “the complainant, prosecutor and Judge.”
Almacen was however unapologetic.
ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute
resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court cannot accept
every case or write full opinion for every petition they reject
otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry out
its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to
decide “only those cases which present questions whose
resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular
facts and parties involved.” It should be remembered that a petition
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of
right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to
fully explain the court’s denial. For one thing, the facts and the law
are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.
On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court
regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a
lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has the right
to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate
channels the acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to
criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner,
and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has
always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal
condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran
lawyer, he should have known that a motion for reconsideration
which failed to notify the opposing party of the time and place of
trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by the
court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his
client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely.
Legal Ethics – Lawyer’s Negligence
Atty. Clemente Soriano entered his appearance in the
case People’s Homesite vs Mencias and Tiburcio et al. He sought
to represent Marcelino Tiburcio. The odd thing is that, when he
entered his appearance before the Supreme Court, the case has
long been decided by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court then
directed Atty. Soriano to show cause why he should not be
subjected to disciplinary actions.
Atty. Soriano, in his defense, stated that he merely relied on the
assurance made by one Atty. Dalangpan who assured him that the
case is still pending with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Soriano should be suspended.
HELD: No. But he is severely censured. The only reason why he’s
not suspended is that he exhibited candor before the Supreme
Court in acknowledging his mistake. He has been negligent in his
duty and this violates his duty to be diligent on his responsibility to
his client. He should have checked with the former lawyer of
Tiburcio as to the status of the case. If not, he could have simply
checked with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court instead of
relying upon the assurances of Atty. Dalangpan (who even denied
before the Supreme Court that he made such assurances).

G.R. No. 3593 March 23, 1907
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff, vs. C.W. NEY and JUAN
GARCIA BOSQUE, defendants.
Attorney-General Araneta for plaintiff.
C.W. Ney for defendants.
TRACEY, J.:
This proceeding is to punish the defendants for
contempt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the year 1902 this court decided that the defendant, J. Garcia
Bosque, was not entitled to admission to practice law in the
Philippine Islands, upon the ground that after the change of
sovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish subject and as such
was not qualified for admission to the bar.
In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with the defendant Ney,
a practicing attorney, to carry on business together, sending out a
circular signed "Ney & Bosque," stating that they had established
an office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the
Islands and that Bosque would devote himself especially to
consultation and office work relating to Spanish law.
Since that time the defendant Bosque has not personally appeared
in the courts, and with one exception, occuring through an
inadvertance, papers from the office were signed not with the firm
name alone nor with any designation of the firm as attorneys, but
with the words "Ney & Bosque - C.W. Ney, abogado." On two
occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the other on September 15,
1906, this court refused to consider petitions so singed with the
names of the defendants and the practice being repeated, on the
2nd day of October, 1906, ordered the papers sent to the Attorney-
General to take appropriate action thereon, and he thereupon
instituted this proceeding. The defendants disclaim any intentional
contempt, and defend their acts as being within the law. Section
102 of the Code of Civil procedure, providing that every pleading
must be subscribed by the party or his attorney, does not permit,
and by implication prohibits, a subscription of the names of any
other persons, whether agents or otherwise; therefore a signature
containing the name of one neither a party nor an attorney was not
a compliance with this section, nor was it aided by the too obvious
subterfuge of the addition of the individual name of a licensed
attorney. The illegality in this instance was aggravated by the fact
that one of the agents so named was a person residing in these
Islands to whom this court had expressly denied admission to the
bar. The papers in question were irregular and were properly
rejected. We refuse to recognize as a practice any signature of
names appended to pleadings or other papers in an action other
than those specified in the statute. A signature by agents amounts
to a signing by non-qualified attorneys, the office of attorney being
originally one of agency. ( In re Cooper, 22 N.Y., 67.) We do not,
however, mean to discountenance the use of a suitable firm
designation by partners, all of whom have been duly admitted to
practice.
It is to be noted that we are not now considering an application for
the suspension or removal of the defendant Ney from his office as
attorney. The defendant Bosque, not being an officer of the court,
could not be proceeded against in that way, and probably for that
reason the Attorney-General instituted this form of proceeding.
Should either of these defendants be thus punished for contempt?
Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt as
follows:
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,
judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court
or judge;chanrobles virtual law library
2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his
official duties or in his official transactions.
Where the law defines contempt, the power of the courts is
restricted to punishment for acts so defined. ( Ex parteRobinson,
86 U.S., 505.)chanrobles virtual law library
As to the first subdivision of this section, no direct order or
command of this court has been disobeyed or resisted by the
defendant Ney. The only order that the defendant Bosque can have
disobeyed is the one denying him the right to practice law. This
order, however, was directly binding upon him, notwithstanding
proceedings taken for its review, and any hope on his part of
ultimately reversing it furnished no excuse for its violation. Even
had he been entitled under the statute to practice law without any
license from the court and without an application to it, yet its order
made on his own petition. A mandate of the court, while in force,
must be obeyed. The irregular signature to papers, though affixed
by his associate, had his authorization and constitutes a substantial
attempt to engage in practice. Moreover the firm circular in setting
forth the establishment of an office for the general practice of law
in all the courts of the Islands, amounted to an assertion of his right
and purpose, not effectively qualified by the addition that he would
devote himself to consultation and office work relating to Spanish
law. Spanish law plays an important part in the equipment of a
lawyer in the Archipelago, standing on a different footing from the
law of other foreign countries, in regard to which a skilled person
might as a calling, advise without practicing law. The fact stated
on the circular that he was a Spanish lawyer did not amount to a
disclaimer of his professional character in the Islands. Independent
of statutory provisions, a foreigner is not by reason of his status
disqualified from practicing law. One of the most eminent
American advocates was an alien barrister admitted to the bar after
a contest in the court of New York State. ( In re Thomas Addis
Emmett, 2 Cain's Cases, 386.) Consequently the conduct of the
defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order made in a
proceeding to which he was a party.
Under the second subdivision of the section cited, Bosque is
obviously not answerable, inasmuch as he was not an officer of the
court. On the other hand, under this subdivision, the defendant
Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct amounted to
misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it did. In the offense of
Bosque in holding himself out as a general practitioner Ney
participated, and for the improper signature of the pleadings he
was chiefly and personally responsible. It is impossible to say that
the signature itself was a violation of the law, and yet hold guiltless
the man who repeatedly wrote it. Moreover we regret to add that
his persistent and rash disregard of the rulings of the court has not
commended him to our indulgence, while the offensive character
of certain papers recently filed by him forbids us from presuming
on the hope of his voluntarily conforming to the customary
standard of members of the bar.
The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is fined in
the sum of 200 pesos, to be paid into the office of the clerk of this
court within ten days, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.
RULE 9.01
RODRIGO TAPAY vs. ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO
A.C. No. 9604, March 20, 2013, 674 SCRA 1
FACTS: A complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of
public document and graft and corrupt practices was filed against
Tapay before the Office of the Ombudsman by a certain
Divinagracia. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented
Divinagracia since he had to meet him yet in person and his
signature appearing in the complaint against Tapay was signed by
his secretary in his law office.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Bancolo violated Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of
the Code of Professional responsibility.
HELD: YES. With Atty. Bancolo’s admission that the complaint
he filed against Tapay before the Office of the Ombudsman was
signed in his name by a secretary of his law office is clearly a
violation of Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides in Canon 9 that “A Lawyer Shall Not, Directly or
Indirectly, Assist in the Unauthorized Practice of Law” and Rule
9.01 which states that “a lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may
be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.”
The lawyer’s duty to prevent or at the very least not to assist in the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and
policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to
those individual found only qualified in education and character.
The permissive right conferred in the law is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain
proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is
to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice of law
and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a
pleading.
ALAWI VS ALAUYA
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sale representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partner
Co., Ltd. of Davao City. Ashari Alauya is the incumber executive
of clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for
the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units
belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa
& Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC). Not long afterwards, or more precisely on
December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of
Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the
company.
Ruling:
1. As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has
already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a
Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may
only practice law before Shari'a courts. The title of "attorney" is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the
study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have
been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are
authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
2. WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is
hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that
any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977
JOSE GUBALLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA, RICARDO G.
CARLOS and DOMINGO FORTEZA, JR., respondents.
SANTOS, J:
In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction, petitioner
seeks to set aside the Order of respondent Judge dated July 12,
1977, denying his Petition for Relief from Judgment and allowing
a writ of execution to issue in Civil Case No. 680-V of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan.
The factual antecedents may be recited as follows:
Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was
involved, on October 1, 1971, in an accident resulting to injuries
sustained by private respondent Domingo Forteza Jr. As a
consequence thereof, a complaint for damages was filed by Forteza
against petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
(Branch VIII), docketed as Civil Case No. 680-V. An Answer
thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo W. Vida Jr., of
the law firm of Vida Enriquez, Mercado & Associates. 1
Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial
conference on April 6, 1972, despite due notice, petitioner was
treated as in default and private respondent was allowed to present
his evidence ex parte. A decision was thereafter rendered by the
trial court in favor of private respondent Forteza Jr. A Motion for
Reconsideration was then filed by petitioner seeking the lifting of
the order of default, the reopening of the case for the presentation
of his evidence and the setting aside of the decision. Said Motion
for Reconsideration was signed by Ponciano Mercado, another
member of the law firm. The same was denied by the lower Court
and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the
following alleged errors, to wit:
a. That the Hon. Court erred in denying defendant Jose Guballa
his day in Court by declaring him in default, it being contrary to
applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter;
b. That this Hon. Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide
the case;
c. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff, more particularly
award of moral damages is contrary to law; and
d. Defendant has valid, legal and justiciable defenses.2
The appealed case was handled by Atty. Benjamin Bautista, an
associate of the same law firm. The decision appealed from was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52610R.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, through a
different counsel, Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos II. However the same
was denied and the decision became final on June 29, 1977 and
was then remanded to the lower Court, presided by respondent
Judge for execution. 3
A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by private respondent
with the lower Court which was granted by respondent Judge. 4
On July 6, 1977, petitioner, through Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos 11,
filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging his discovery
that Irineo W. Vida Jr., who prepared his Answer to the Complaint
is not a member of the Philippine Bar and that consequently, his
rights had not been adequately protected and his properties are in
danger of being confiscated and/or levied upon without due
process of law. 5
In an Order dated July 12, 1977, respondent Judge denied the
Petition and directed the issuance of a writ of execution for the
reasons that said Petition is ". . a clear case of dilatory tactic on the
part of counsel for defendant-appellant ..." herein petitioner, and,
that the grounds relied upon ". . . could have been ventilated in the
appeal before the Court of Appeals ... " 6
On July 19, 1977, respondent Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Carlos,
acting upon the writ of execution, issued by respondent Judge,
levied on three motor vehicles, of petitioner for the satisfaction of
the judgment. 7
Hence the instant Petition.
Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to
frustrate a dilatory maneuver is well-taken; and this Petition must
be denied for lack of merit. The alleged fact that the person who
represented petitioner at the initial stage of the litigation, i.e., the
filing of an Answer and the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be
not a member of the Bar 8 did not amount to a denial of petitioner's
day in court. It should be noted that in the subsequent stages of the
proceedings, after the rendition of the judgment by default,
petitioner was duly represented by bona fide members of the Bar in
seeking a reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and
jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal and justifiable
defenses. In other words, petitioner's rights had been amply
protected in the proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as
he was subsequently assisted by counsel. Moreover, petitioner
himself was at fault as the order of treatment as in default was
predicated, not only on the alleged counsel's failure to attend the
pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, but likewise on his own
failure to attend the same, without justifiable reason. To allow this
petition due course is to countenance further delay in a proceeding
which has already taken well over six years to resolve,
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for certiorari with
Preliminary Injunction is hereby dismissed. The law firm "Vida,
Enriquez, Mercado & Associates" of 209 Sampaguita Bldg.,
Cubao, Quezon City, is hereby ordered to explain, within ten (10)
days from notice this Resolution, why Irineo W. Vida Jr. was
permitted to sign the Answer in Civil Case No. 680-V of CFI,
Bulacan, when he is not a member of the Bar.
Five J Taxi and Armamiento vs. NLRC Case Digest
Five J Taxi and/or Juan Armamiento vs. NLRC
235 SCRA 556
Facts: Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto
Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers and, as such,
they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside
from the daily boundary of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or
P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay
P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to
answer for any deficiency in their boundary, for every actual
working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by
the petitioners, he already failed to report for work for unknown
reasons. Petitioners learned that he was working for Mine of Gold
Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of
petitioners on September 1983, he was held up by his armed
passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He
was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to this home
province to recuperate.
given to the same clean condition when he took it out, and as
claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case),
complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to shoulder
the expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to
the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this
practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver
as illegal deduction in the context of the law."
Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of
the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be noted that there
was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi
units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the
Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty is
a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.

In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi

driver under the same terms and conditions as when he was first
employed, but his working schedule was made on an alternative
basis where he drove only every other day. However, on several
occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule. On
September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his boundary of
P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in
Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests
of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused.
Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for Bulaklak
Company.

Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the

reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein
petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits
as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the
repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice
adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair
of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his
deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part,
claimed that his termination from employment was effected when
he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.

On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with

the manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations
Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal
deductions.

Issue: Whether or not the deductions made were illegal and if

illegal, considered a prohibition regarding wages.

Ruling: The Court declares that the deposits made amounts to the
prohibition provided by law. The deposits made were illegal and the
respondents must be refunded.

Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:

Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall require his

worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made for
the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or
equipment supplied by the employer, except when the employer is
engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the practice
of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable
as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and
regulations.

It can be deduced that the said article provides the rule on deposits
for loss or damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied by the
employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit deposits to
defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the
remittance of his boundary.

On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to
say in his decision: "Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is
no dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour
of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has