GENDER:

An Ethnomethodological Approach

SUZANNE J. KESSLER

WENDY McKENNA

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

Chicago & London
 To Our Parents

Esther Luttan Balsam and Sidney Balsam

and

Emanuel Goldenberg
T h e U niversity of C hicago Press, C hicago 60637
T he U niversity of C hicago Press, Ltd., L ondon and to the Memory of
© 1978 by John W iley & Sons, Inci.
A ll rights reserved. P u b lish ed 1978 Mollie Ruben Goldenberg
U niversity of C hicago Press edition'1985
P rin ted in th e U nited States of A m erica
01 00 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 5 6 7 8 9 10

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Kessler, S u z a n n e J., 1946-
G ender: a n ethnom eth o d o lo g ical approach.
R eprint. O riginally p u b lish ed : N ew Y o rk : Wiley, C197B.
B ibliography: p.
In c lu d e s indexes.
1. Sex role. 2. A ttrib u tio n (Social psychology)
3. Sex change. 4. E thnom ethodology. 1. M cK enna, Wendy,
1945- . 11. Title.
HQ1075.K47 1985 305.3 84-28139
ISBN 0-226-43206-8 (paper)
 PREFACE

It is self evident that man seeks to justify (explain metaphysically) or

mythologize only those natural phenomena whose irreducible character he
refuses to concede. Hence, the fact that mankind has always mythologized
—most recently in scientific jargon—the existence of two sexes, is prima
facie evidence that he refuses to accept this as an irreducible fact*. whose
understanding can only be impeded by the assumption that it is something
to be “explained,” i.e., to be justified metaphysically in the form of “Just
So Stories” for college graduates. [Devereux, 1967, p. 178. Italics in
original.]

Many people would agree with Devereux that the sexes do not
need to be explained and that, in fact, trying to explain the existence
of two sexes can get in the way of understanding. However, to take
the sexes for granted, to treat the existence of two sexes as an irre­
ducible fact, obscures each individual’s responsibility for creating the
world in which she/he lives. Our refusal to concede the “irreducible
character” of “natural phenomena,” rather than leading us to a “Just
So Story,” has resulted in an alternative theoretical framework which
will give the reader a new way to understand the existence of two
sexes. What does it mean to say that the existence of two sexes is an
“ irreducible fact” ? In this book we will show that this “ irreducible
fact” is a product of social interaction in everyday life and that gen­
der in everyday life provides the basis for all scientific work on
gender and sex.
Our theoretical position is that gender is a social construction, that
a world of two “ sexes” is a result of the socially shared, taken-for-
granted methods which members use to construct reality. This posi­
tion is grounded in the ethnomethodological perspective (explained
more fully in Chapter 1) which asserts that the “irreducible facts”
in which members of a group believe are given their sense of objec­
tivity and reality through the course of social interaction. Our posi­
tion is contained in the book as a totality, rather than in our treatment
of any particular topic. We believe that the book, as a whole, will

vii
viii Preface
m ake that p ersp ective m eaningful to readers. H ow ever, for those w ho
do not find them selves com patible w ith p henom enologically based
theories, this book can be read as a set o f questions about gender
w h ic h are am enable to traditional scientific m ethodologies.
Over the last 70 years there has accumulated a large body of
research and theory on gender, dealing with such issues as how
children develop a sense of themselves as either female or male, how
they learn to generalize these labels to others, and how they are
socialized to behave in accordance with the gender to which they
have been assigned. However, regardless of the importance given to
social factors, it has been generally taken for granted that fu n d a ­
m en tally gender is a consequence of a biological blueprint.
R ecently, an increasing num ber of studies h ave provided evidence
that in atyp ical cases, w here biological factors conflict w ith social
and p sych ological ones (e.g., transsexualism ], these influences over­
ride b iology in determ ining gender iden tity and influencing gender
role. It appears that the relative contributions of social/p sych ological
and biological factors are sim ilar in typ ical cases as w ell. E ven for
those w ho do treat gender as largely social, how ever, the question of
h o w people are classified as m ale and fem ale in the first place is not
asked.
In our society, the decision that one m akes as to w hether som eone
is a w om an or a man is p robably n ecessary, and is certainly crucial
fo r all future interactions and fo r giving m eaning to the other per­
so n ’s behavior. For the m ost part, cla ssifyin g people as w om en or
m en is a decep tively easy procedure. For this reason, all theoretical
and em pirical w ork in the area o f gender has taken this process for
granted. O ccasionally, h ow ever, w e do see people w hose gender is
not obvious (e.g., teenagers in “ u n isex" clothes). It is then that w e
begin to consciously lo o k fo r gender cues as to w h at they “ really "
are. W hat do these cues consist of? In asking people h ow th ey tell
m en from wom en, their answ er alm ost a lw a ys includes "gen itals.”
But, since in initial interactions genitals are rarely available for
inspection, this clearly is not the evidence actually used (except by
doctors or mid w ives assigning gender at birth).
In thinking about those non obvious cases w here gender cannot be
taken fo r granted, it becom es possible to see that there is an ongoing
process, certain procedures to fo llo w (e.g., look for “ m ale" cues)
w h ich result in a decision about the p erso n ’s gender. From our per­
spective, w h at happens in exception al cases is m erely an exam ple of
w h a t also happens in nonexceptional cases, a conclusion that fo llo w s
from the ethnom ethodologist’s decision not to treat gender as an
Preface ix
"irred ucible fa ct.” The process b y w h ich one classifies another as
fem ale or m ale w e have called the “ gender attribution p rocess.”
The general objective of this book is to review previous scientific
work on gender, to demonstrate how scientific treatment of gender
is grounded in the everyday gender attribution process, and to pre­
sent some findings on gender attribution in everyday life. Our re­
search, which we report in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, is not meant to
“prove" anything. The use of statistical tests to determine the sig­
nificance of data and to prove hypotheses is grounded in a belief that
data reflects an objective reality, independent of m embers’ methods
for constructing that reality. In the ethnomethodological tradition,
we offer our findings as demonstrations of the points we are talking
about, suggesting that given our basic assum ptions, there are new
w ays to collect and interpret information on what it meaifls to be
female or male.
For those concerned w ith th eory and research on gender, the
process o f gender attribution has im portant im plications. A t a time
w hen social scientists are beginning to reconsider their m odels of
m ale and fem ale functioning, it is crucial that attention be devoted
to answ ering questions about the social uses o f the term s “ m ale” and
“ fem ale” and w h at they reflect about the b ases o f traditional m odels
as w ell as the m ore recent ones being developed.
Subjects in all research on hum an b eh avior are either fem ales or
m ales. For a p sych ologist to ask the question, “ H ow are girls differ­
ent from b o ys?” overlooks the fa ct that in order to ask the question,
she or he m ust already kn ow w h a t girls and b oys are. B efore w e can
ask questions about gender differences, sim ilarities, and develop ­
ment, gender m ust be attributed. U ntil now , the process o f gender
attribution has been taken fo r granted b y m ost natural and social
scientists, but scientists w ould not be able to talk about differences
in the first place unless they kn ew h ow to cla ssify the incum bents of
the tw o categories w h ich they are com paring. A n d w e w ill n ever be
able to say h ow this is done by m aking m ore and m ore detailed lists
of differentiating factors (e.g., m ales are more com petitive, fem ales
admit to a w id er range o f feelings), becau se in order to m ake these
lists w e must have already differentiated.
W e are not in any w a y taking issue w ith the adequacy or inade­
quacy o f this b ody o f research. W e do not exp ect social scientists to
refrain from any further research on gender differences until w e have
explicated the gender attribution process for them. Nor are w e saying
that social scientists do not kn ow h ow to attribute gender or have
neglected to do so. On the contrary, gender as it is constructed
X Preface
b y psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and biologists, is
grounded in the every d a y gender attribution process. W hat w e are
saying is that w e can sh o w h o w it is that th ey can do w hat they are
doing. This w ill be the w o rk o f our book.
In addition, there are some specific issues o f im portance to both
lay-persons and social scientists w hich, w hile not a m ajor focu s of
this book, are related to it. One is the im plications o f the trend tow ard
m ore overlapping gender roles. Does the gender attribution process
g ive any clues as to w hether blurring the distinctions b etw een male
and fem ale roles w ill h ave consequences fo r the individual or soci­
ety? W e w ill deal w ith this issue in detail in the last chapter.
A n o th er issue in w h ich an increasing am ount of popular and sci­
entific interest has bebn sh ow n over the last 10 years is transsexu ­
alism. The existence o f a group o f people w ho w an t their p h ysical
characteristics changed so that these m ay be congruent w ith the
gender they believe them selves to be, has raised critical questions
about w h a t a man or a w om an really is. T ranssexualism suggests
that being a (social) fem ale or a (social) m ale is not dependent on
one’s original p h ysica l structure. N or is it dependent on perform ing
specific gender role behaviors, as indicated b y recent review s o f re­
search w h ich conclude that there are fe w " s e x ” differences in be­
havior. W hat then is being a fem ale or m ale dependent on? W e have
learned a great deal from transsexuals about w h a t is im portant in
gender attribution, since "p assin g” as a m ale or a fem ale is a con­
stant concern fo r them. The specifics o f w h a t w e h ave learned from
transsexuals are dealt w ith in C hapter 5. On a practical level, trans­
sexuals w h o are concerned w ith learning w h a t they can, and in some
cases m ust, do in order to be taken b y others as m en or w om en
m ight find this m aterial useful.
A n o v e rv ie w of the b ook w ill give the reader an idea o f those
areas on w h ich w e have chosen to focus.
C hapter 1, The prim acy o f gender attrib u tio n , introduces our
fram ew ork fo r talking about gender. W e offer definitions of gender-
related terms, and discuss w h y gender attribution is prim ary to an
understanding o f w h at it m eans to be a w om an or a man.
C hapter 2, Cross-cultural p ersp ectives on gender, focu ses on the
im plications of the lack o f u niversal criteria fo r distinguishing m ales
from fem ales. The discussion is centered on the institution o f the
"b erd ach e” in other cultures and w h a t that suggests about the social
construction of gender.
Preface xi
Chapter 3, B io lo g y an d gen d er, review s the norm al developm ent o f
fem ales and m ales from conception, and discusses the contribution
_ of specific biological factors to the devolpm ent o f the com ponents
of gender. This is follow ed b y an analysis of the relationship b etw een
b iology and gender as a social construction, dem onstrating that it is
the latter w h ich provides the foundation for the form er.
Chapter 4, D ev elo p m en tal a sp e c ts o f gen d er, is a critique and re­
vie w o f w h at p sychoanalytic, social learning, and cogn itive-develop ­
m ental theories h ave asserted about the developm ent of gender
iden tity and gender role. Our ow n research on gender attribution by
children is reported in the context o f a discussion o f the develop ­
m ent o f gender attribution p rocesses as children learn the “ rules”
(methods) fo r seeing a w orld of tw o genders.
Chapter 5, G ender construction in e v e ry d a y life : T ra n ssd k u a lism ,
dem onstrates that m embers o f a group produce, in concrete situa­
tions, a sense o f gender as ob jective fa ct through an exam ination o f
our ow n, as w ell as others’, in terview s w ith transsexuals, since
transsexuals offer the richest source of inform ation on gender as a
social construction. The A p p e n d ix is a detailed illustration o f one
particular tran ssexu al’s construction of gender. W e have excerpted
m aterial from letters she sent us during the period o f her transition
from m ale to fem ale. F ollow in g the letters w e com m ent on those
featu res of her experience that correspond to points w e m ake in
Chapter 5.
The book concludes w ith C hapter 6, T o w a rd a th eo ry o f gen der.
Here w e present the results o f a study on the relative contribution o f
p h ysical gender characteristics to gender attribution, and offer a
schem a for understanding w h at it m eans to be fem ale or male. W e
argue that the constitutive b elief that there are tw o genders not only
produces the idea o f gender role, but also creates a sense that there
is a p h ysical dichotom y. W e conclude w ith the im plications fo r sci­
ence and everyd ay life o f seeing gender as a social construction.
Suzanne J. K essler
W en d y M cK enna
B ronxviJJe, New York
P u r c h a s e , N ew Y o rk
O c to b e r, 1977
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The ideas presented in this b ook began to take shape in our last
years o f graduate school and w ere d evelop ed m ore fu lly w hen, at
the State U n iversity o f N ew York, Colldge at Purchase, w e taught a
course on the p sych ology o f gender. W e w an t to thank the ^students
in that class fo r serving as sounding boards fo r our ideas, providing
im portant feedback, and collectin g som e initial data.
A lth ou gh they m ay not all be aw are o f h ow m uch th ey contributed
to our intellectual com m itm ent to ethnom ethodology, there are four
individuals to w hom w e are esp ecia lly indebted: P eter M cHugh,
S tan ley Milgram , H arold Garfinkel, and L in dsey Churchill.
Readers o f drafts o f chapters, including S y b il Barten, Florence
Denm ark, M ary E dw ards, N ancy Foner, P eter Sw erd loff, and some
anonym ous review ers, m ade u sefu l com m ents. H ow ard Ehrlichm an,
w h o offered valuable criticism s o f the entire m anuscript, as w e ll as
consistent encouragem ent, has our respect and affection.
M ary Honan, M olly Peter, Lori Schreiner, Jesse Solom on, D ebbie
W inston, and K ath y G unst con scien tiou sly collected the data re­
ported in Chapters 4 and 6, and D arcie B o yd sk illfu lly drew the over­
lays. Lauren W ood typed the final m anuscript q u ickly and carefully.
The research reported in C hapters 4, 5, and 6 w as p artially sup­
ported b y Facu lty R esearch G rant # 3 3 - 7 1 1 0 - A from the State
U n iversity of N ew Y o rk R esearch Foundation.
Charles Ihlenfeld, June Reinisch, N aom i Smith, and Z elda Supplee
kind ly provided us w ith introductions to som e of the transsexuals
w e interview ed. The transsexuals cannot, o f course, be nam ed, but
w e acknow led ge their generous cooperation, esp ecia lly Rachel, our
friend, w ho consented to have h er letters and com m ents appear in the
A ppen dix.
W e w an t to thank Rose and H erbert Rubin and H arold and Bonnie
K lue for providing hospitable environm ents that m inim ized the pain
of w riting the final m anuscript.
Bill M cK enna has a unique place in these acknow ledgm ents. N ot
only did he provide frequent insights into phenom onology, but he

xiii
xiv Acknowledgments
r:
n ever ceased b elievin g that, even though w e w ere “ o n ly ” p sych o lo ­
gists, w e could m ake a contribution to the study o f gender.
This book is truly! a collaboration. The order of authorship is
alphabetical, and w ere it npt for the constraints of linear reality, the
authors w ou ld be listed and in d exed circularly. A n y attem pt to
determ ine w h ich parts o f the book should be attributed to w h ich
author w ou ld be futile. CONTENTS
S. J. K.
W . M cK. Chapter 1 The Prim acy o f G ender A ttribution, 1

Chapter 2 Cross-Cultural P erspectives on G ender, 21

Chapter 3 B iology and G ender, 42

Chapter 4 D evelopm ent A sp ects o f Gender, 81

Chapter 5 G ender Construction in E veryd ay Life:

Transsexualism , 112

Chapter 6 T ow ard a Theory o f Gender, 142

Appendix Letters from Rachel, 171

Bibliography, 217

Author Index, 227

Subject Index, 231

GENDER
 1 ________________________________
INTRODUCTION:
THE PRIMACY OF
GENDER ATTRIBUTION

A s w e go about our daily lives, w e assum e that every ^human

being is either a m ale or a fem ale. W e m ake this assum ption for
everyo n e w h o ever lived and fo r every futu re hum an being. M ost
people w ou ld admit that the cultural trappings o f m ales and fem ales
h ave varied over place and time, but th at n evertheless, there is
som ething essen tially m ale and som ething essen tially fem ale. It is a
fa c t that som eone is a m an or a w om an, ju st as it is a fa c t that the
resu lt o f a coin toss is either heads or tails, and w e can easily decide
the case by looking. O f course, the coin m ay be w o rn and w e m ay
h av e to insp ect it v e ry closely. A n alogou sly, a person m ay not clearly
be one gender or the other. But ju st as w e assum e that w e can de­
term ine “h ead s” or "ta ils” b y detailed insp ection (rather than con­
cluding that the coin has no heads or tails), w e assum e that w e can
do the sam e w ith a person’s gender. N ot even w ith biologically
"m ix e d ” individuals do w e conclude that th ey are neither fem ale nor
m ale. B iologists m ay assert that a herm aphrodite’s gender is not
clear, but in every d a y life ultim ately som e criteria can (and w ill) be
found b y w h ich each one is placed in one o f tw o m utu ally exclu sive
gender categories along w ith everyon e else. E ven the biologist w ould
say that herm aphrodites are a com bination o f the tw o existin g cate­
gories, rather than a third gender category.
If w e ask b y w h a t criteria a person m ight c la s s ify som eone as
being either m ale or fem ale, the an sw ers appear to be so self-evident
as to m ake the question trivial. But consider a list o f item s that
differentiate fem ales from m ales. There are none that always and
without exception are true o f only one gender. No beh avioral char­
acteristic (e.g., crying or p h ysica l aggression) is a lw a ys present or
n ever present fo r one gender. N either can p h ysical ch aracteristics—
either visib le (e.g., beards), u nexp osed (e.g., genitals), or norm ally
2 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
unexam ined (e.g., gonads)— a lw a ys differentiate the genders. A c c o rd ­
ing to W eb ster’s dictionary (1973), m ales are those w ho beget young
b y perform ing the fertilization function in generation, and fem ales
are those w h o bear the young. A lth ou gh this distinction m ay be u se­
fu l fo r strictly b iological considerations it is o f little value in e very ­
d ay encounters. The item "sperm -producer” m ay only appear on lists
that describe men, but m en are not a lw a ys sperm -producers, and, in
fact, not all sperm -producers are men. A m ale-to-fem ale transsexual,
prior to surgery, can be so cia lly a w om an, though still potentially
(or actually) capable o f sperm atogenesis.
Substitute any item fo r “ sperm -producer,” and the statem ent w ill
still be true. Penises, vaginas, beards, breasts, and so on in any com ­
b ination are not con clu sive evidence fo r categorizing som eone as
either a m an or a w om an in every d a y life. P reoperative transsexuals
can be men w ith vaginas or w om en w ith penises, and, o f course, the
bearded la d y is still a lady.
W e could m ake p ro bab ility statem ents lik e m ost people w ith
beards are men, or m ost p eople w ith breasts, high voices, vaginas,
and long fingernails are w om en, but w h en w e m eet som eone, the
“ d ecisio n ” 1 that w e m ake as to w h eth er that person is a m an or a
w om an is not stated in terms o f probabilities. T h e y are either one
or the other, zero or 100 percent. W e m ay m od ify our decision (“ He
is an effem inate m an” ), but w e do not u su ally q u a lify it ("M aybe he
is a m an” ). If w e should h ave to q u a lify it, then w e seek further
inform ation until the qualification is no longer necessary.
For exam ple, w e m ight look clo sely at the p erson’s cheeks for
signs o f beard stubble, or w e m ight even ask som eone if they kn ow
the gender o f the person in question. W e m ake a g e n d e r attrib u tio n ,2
that is w e decide w h eth er som eone is m ale or fem ale, every time
w e see a n ew person. The w a y w e decide has seem ed so obvious
that the process has been virtu ally ignored in th eory and research.
W ith the exception o f tw o suggestive w orks, one b y G arfinkel (1967)
and one b y B ird w h istell (1970), no one has o vertly raised the p os­
sib ility that gender attribution is m ore than a sim ple inspection
p rocess. In contrast, w e assert that not on ly is gender attribution
fa r from a sim ple inspection process, but gender attrib u tio n fo rm s
the fo u n d a tio n fo r u n d e rsta n d in g o th er com ponents o f gen der, such
as gender role (behaving lik e a fem ale or m ale) and gender identity
(feeling like a fem ale or male).
T h is p ersp ective form s the core o f our book. In this chapter w e
la y the groundw ork for this p ersp ective b y detailing the existence,
im portance, and prim acy o f the gender attribution process to both
Introduction: The Primacy of Gender Attribution 3
scien ce and ev e ry d a y life, and b y raising questions about the in evita ­
b ility o f the gender dich o to m y . O ur final goal is not only to dem on­
strate that gender attribution is prim ary, but to delineate, as m uch
as possible, both the n ecessary conditions fo r presenting oneself
as fem ale or m ale and the n ecessary rules fo r m aking sense out of
such a presentation. Both o f these are cru cial in deciding a p erson’s
gender. W e argue that the question o f w h a t it m eans to be a m ale
or a fem ale is m erely another w a y o f asking h o w one d e cid e s
w h eth er another is m ale or fem ale.
G ender v e ry clearly pervades e v e ry d a y life. N ot only can gender
be attributed to m ost things ,3 but there are certain ob jects (i.e., p eo­
ple) to w h ich gender apparently m ust b e; attributed. T h e im m ediate
concern w ith doing this w hen w e m eet an am biguous person illu s­
trates the p ervasive, taken-for-granted character o f the Render
attribution process. O ver and over again, transsexu als w h o w ere in
the process o f changing from one gender to the other, em phasized
h o w u n easy people seem ed to be interactin g w ith them, until some
sort o f decision had been m ade about w h eth er th ey w ere m ale or
fem ale— a decision that w as often reached b y asking them, "W h at
are y o u ? ” C ontrary to our exp ectation s w h en w e began researching
gender, there does not seem to be a prohibition against asking cer­
tain people w h a t gender th ey are, esp ecia lly i f it is done in a joking
m anner. H ow ever, those w ho w ere asked reported feelin g em bar­
rassed and uncom fortable, indicating that som ething had gone w ron g
w ith the interaction, that a “ vio latio n ” o f unstated rules had oc­
curred (Garfinkel, 1967).
A m biguous cases m ake the dichotom ous nature o f the gender at­
tribution process extrem ely salient. In our culture, a person is eith er
m ale or fem ale. The gender dichotom y raises m any questions. If
Leslie is not male, is Leslie then n ecessarily fem ale? Do w e decide
w h a t som eone is, or w h at th ey are not? T h is suggests that an analysis
o f “ conditions o f failu re” (see W ittgenstein, 1953) m ight be appropri­
ate in describing the gender attribution p rocess. In other w ords, it
m ay be that a “ fem ale” attribution is m ade w h en it is im possible to
see the other person as a male, and vice versa. W hether attributions
are m ade on the basis o f the presen ce or the absen ce o f cues is
som ething w e pursue.
The essential question w e are asking is: H ow is a social reality
w h ere there are tw o, and only tw o, genders con structed ?4 Is the
p rocess the sam e fo r everyone, regardless of the p erson 's reason for
m aking the attribution? Th at is, does the biologist (for example) in
m aking a gender attribution do the sam e thing w h en in the laboratory
4 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
as at a party? W hile it is im portant to understand scientific criteria
fo r telling m ales from fem ales, fo r the m ost part w e w ill analyze
gender attribution from the point o f v ie w o f the “ n a ive” person, that
is, all o f us w h en w e are using our com m on sense understandings
o f e ve ry d a y life. E ven scien tists m ust ultim ately re ly on their ow n
com m on sense kn ow ledge. In fact, . . any scientific understanding
o f hum an action . . . m ust begin w ith and be built upon an under­
standing of the e ve ry d a y life of the m em bers perform ing those
actio n s” (Douglas, 1970, p. 11).
O ur w arrant fo r asking the question: H ow is a reality constructed
w h ere there are tw o genders? com es from the th eoretical assum p­
tions underlying the ethnom ethodological approach. W e can only
p resen t the b riefest sum m ary o f these assum ptions here, and
in doing so w e em phasize those that are m ost relevan t to our
particular interests in this book. [Readers are referred to M ehan
and W ood (1975) fo r a com prehensive treatm ent of ethnom ethod-
ology.)
In our every d a y lives and, fo r m ost o f us, in our p rofession al lives,
w e proceed on the basis o f certain "unquestionable axiom s" about
the w o rld w h ich M ehan and W ood (1975) call "incorrigible proposi­
tion s” and others (e.g., Garfinkel, 1967) call the “ natural attitude.”
T h e m ost b asic incorrigible proposition is the b elief that the w orld
exists independently o f our presence, and that objects h ave an inde­
pendent reality and a constant identity. For exam ple, suppose yo u
lo o k out y o u r w in d o w and see a rose in the garden, but w h en you
go out to p ick it, you cannot find it. Y o u do n ot assum e that there
w as a rose but n ow it has disappeared, nor do you assum e that the
rose turned into som ething else. Y o u keep lookin g until you either
find the rose or figure out w h at conditions existed to m ake you think
there w as a rose. Perhaps it w as the configuration o f shadow s, or
yo u m ight notice a butterfly w h ich you m istook fo r a rose. B y inter­
preting the results o f you r search in this w a y , yo u thereby v e rify
the reality and constancy of objects lik e roses and butterflies, and
valid ate that they exist indepen dently o f you r interaction w ith
them.
N ot only the rose itself, but all its ch aracteristics (color, fragrance,
etc.) h ave this factu al status. A n d w h a t is true o f roses is also true
o f people. In the natural attitude, there is reality and constancy to
qualities lik e race, age, social class, and, o f course, gender, w hich
e x ist independently of any particular exam ple o f the quality. It is a
fa c t that there are tw o genders; each person is a m ere exam ple of
one o f them; and the task o f the scien tist is to describe, as accu rately
Introduction: The Primacy of Gender Attribution 5
as possible, the constant characteristics that define m ale and fem ale,
fo r all people and fo r all time. This is reality in W estern society.
- B y holding these b eliefs as incorrigible propositions, w e vie w
other w a y s o f seeing the w orld, other sets o f b eliefs about w h at
reality is, as "in correct,” "prim itive,” or “ m isinform ed.” W e know ,
fo r a fact, that people do not turn into birds, and i f a Y aqu i sham an
thinks that th ey do (Castanada, 1968), he is w rong. His b e lie f prob­
a b ly stem s from “ distorted” p erceptions w h ich occur under the
influence o f drugs. The sham an thinks that som e plants carry the
p ow er to m ake him into a bird. A cco rd in g to W estern reality, the
real truth is that the plants are hallucenogenic and cause a p h ysio­
logical reaction w h ich results in a distorted p erception o f the w orld.
Ethnom ethodologists challenge this interpretation o f the sham an’s
behavior, not b y asserting that w e are w ron g in seeing his actions in
this w ay, but rather b y contending that the sham an's interpretation
is as real for him as ours is for us. Indeed, both realities are created
in the sam e w a y — through m ethodical (i.e., orderly, system atic,
and thus recoverable), interactional w o rk w h ich creates and sustains
w h a tever reality one is living, be it that o f the sham an, the “man
in the street,” the biologist, or any other reality one could name.
In order to see the w orld as the ethnom ethodologist does, it is
n ecessary to ask the follow in g questions: Suppose that w e treat our
b e lie f in constancy and independent existen ces as just that, beliefs.
T h en suppose that, for the purpose o f discovering w h at happens,
w e tem porarily suspend our b elief in these propositions. H ow does
the w o rld lo o k then? This technique, kn ow n as “ bracketin g,” is a
m ethod suggested b y phenom enologists (e.g., H usserl, 1931). If w e
b racket the natural attitude, the constancy and independent e x ­
istence o f objects disappears, and w e are le ft only w ith particular,
concrete situations.
From this perspective w e can then assert that, som ehow , in each
situation, a sense o f "ob jective fa c ts " w h ich transcend the situation
is produced. Thus w e have grounds for asking the ethnom ethodo­
logical question: W hat are the m ethodological w a y s b y w hich m em ­
bers o f a group produce, in each particular situation, this sense of
external, constant, objective facts w h ich h ave their ow n indepen­
dent existences, not contingent on any concrete interaction? A p ­
plied to our interests in this book, the question becom es: H ow , in
an y interaction, is a sense o f the reality o f a w orld o f tw o, and
only tw o, genders constructed? H ow do w e “ do” gender attributions?
T h at is, w h a t kinds of rules do w e apply to w h at kinds o f displays,
such that in every concrete instance w e produce a sense that there
6 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
are only m en and w om en, and that this is an ob jective fact, not
dependent on the p articular instance.
G ender attribution is a com plex, in teractive p rocess in volvin g the
person m aking the attribution and the person she/he is m aking the
attribution about. (This distinction betw een attributor and other
should not obscure the fa ct that in m ost interactions participants
are sim ultaneously being both.) The p rocess results in the “ ob viou s”
fa ct o f the other being either m ale or fem ale. O n the one hand, the
other person presents her or h im self in such a w a y as to co n vey the
proper cues to the person m aking the attribution. The presentation,
h o w ever, cannot be reduced to concrete item s that one m ight list as
differentiating w om en from men. M ost o f the cues people assum e
p la y a role in the attribution process are really post hoc construc­
tions. One transsexual w e talked w ith put it w e ll w h en h e5 said,
“ G ender is an anchor, and once people decide w h a t you are they
interpret everyth in g you do in light o f th at.”
T h e second facto r in the interaction are the rules (methods) that
the person doing the attributing uses fo r assessing these cues. These
rules are not as sim ple as learned probabilities, such as people w ith
beards are u su ally men. T h ey are rules that construct fo r us a w orld
o f tw o genders, such that to say, “ I k n ew he w a s a m an because he
had a b eard ” m akes sense in the first place. In other w ords, “ b e­
cause he had a b eard" is understood as a reason because o f our
m ethods fo r constructing “ m ale" and “ fem a le” . In another reality,
“ I k n e w he w as a man becau se he carried a b o w and a rrow ” m ight
be m ore sensible (see C hapter 2). Part o f being a socialized m em ber
o f a group is kn ow in g the rules fo r givin g acceptable evidence fo r
categorizing. In our culture, p h ysical evidence is the m ost acceptable
reason. G ivin g a reason is not the same, though, as m aking the cate­
gorization in the first place. W e w ill argue that the fa ct o f seeing
tw o p h ysical genders is as m uch o f a so cia lly constructed dichotom y
as everyth in g else.
M uch o f our w o rk in this b ook consists o f exam ining the treat­
m ent o f gender in the social and biological scien ces, in light o f our
p ersp ective that the reality o f gender is a social construction. Be­
cause o f the confusion in term inology w h ich pervades the literature
on gender and gender differences, w e m ust define certain terms,
w hich , w h ile overlapping in m an y w ay s w ith previous definitions,
are not necessarily identical to them. W here appropriate w e indicate
h o w our m eanings differ from those o f others. One o f the m ajor d if­
feren ces is that our definitions are m utu ally exclu sive and conse­
quently narrow er than those in current usage.
Introduction: The Primacy of Gender Attribution 7
G ENDER A N D SEX
The term “ gender” has traditionally been used to designate
p sych ological, social, and cultural aspects o f m aleness and fem ale­
ness. Stoller (1968), for exam ple, defines gender as “ the am ount of
m asculinity or fem ininity found in a p erson ” (p. 9). " S e x ” generally
designates the biological com ponents o f m aleness and fem aleness.
G iven this perspective, there are tw o sexes, m ale and fem ale, and,
correspondingly, tw o genders, m asculine and fem inine.
W e w ill use gender, rather than sex, even w h en referring to those
aspects o f being a w om an (girl) or m an (boy) that h ave traditionally
been v iew ed as biological. This w ill serve to em phasize our position
that the elem ent o f social construction is prim ary in all aspects of
being fem ale or male, p articularly w h en the term w e usefc seems
a w k w ard (e.g., gender chrom osom es). The w ord “ s e x ” w ill be used
on ly fo r references to reprod uctive and love-m akin g activities and,
at times, in reference to purely p h ysical ch aracteristics w h en exp li­
cating the position o f som eone else w h o uses this w ord.
The cultural/biological distinction trad ition ally associated w ith
the usage o f gender versus sex is a tech nical one, applicable to
scien tists in the laboratory and som e textbooks, but little else. G en­
der is a w ord w hich , until very recently, w as rarely u sed b y people
in every d a y life, and even in tech nical w ritings the tw o terms are
often used interchangeably and confusingly. For exam ple, in a
study reporting the treatm ent o f young boys w h o exh ibit fem inine
behavior, the authors use “ cross-gender b eh avior" and “ sex-role
deviation " to describe the sam e phenom enon (Rekers and Lovaas,
1974). A n oth er illustration o f the lack o f rigor in the use o f terms
is from Rosenberg and Sutton-Sm ith (1972): "B y se x w e m ean the
gender (male or fem ale) w ith w h ich the child is b orn ” (p. 1). If
“ gender” and " s e x ” mean different things, then th ey ought not to
be used interchangeably; if th ey m ean the sam e thing, then the
cultural/biological distinction m ay be open to question.
This b rief discussion o f term inology is im portant fo r w h a t it
reveals about the underlying w a y s o f constructing our ideas of
gender/sex. A lth ou gh some social scien tists are questioning the
concepts of m asculinity and fem ininity as m utually exclu sive (e.g.,
Bern, 1974), gender, as the cultural exp ression o f all that is fem inine
or m asculine in a person, is still treated as dichotom ous. It m ay be
easier tod ay to see that particular individ uals h ave both m asculine
and fem inine features, but w e still generally treat gender as dichoto­
m ous and m ost certainly treat sex that w ay . E ven those w ho study
8 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
b io logically "m ix e d ” persons (e.g., som eone born w ith X Y chrom o­
som es and a vagina) p refer to treat those persons as special cases of
dichotom ous sex. "T h ere are, w ith fe w exception s, tw o sexes, m ale
and fem ale,” states S to ller (1968, p. 9), and although his and others’
w o rk is to a large extent based on these " fe w exception s,” he does
not consider sex to be overlapping in the w a y gender m ay be.
Gender Assignment
r iden tity can be relatively independent o f the gender attributions
G ender assignm ent is a special case o f gender attribution w h ich
occurs only once— at birth. The cues fo r this special case are quite
clear. The person m aking the assignm ent (doctor, m idw ife, etc.)
inspects the genitals, categorizes them as vagin a or penis, and an­
nounces the gender on th e basis o f that inspection. V agina m eans
the neonate is assigned the gender lab el “ girl,” and penis m eans the
neonate is assigned the gender label “ b o y .” O thers h ave a right to
ch e ck the assignm ent if they w ish, but, again, genitals are all that
is lo oked at. In cases w here the genitals are am biguous, assignm ent
is w ithh eld until other criteria are inspected. In our culture, these
consist o f the various biological com ponents o f gender discussed
in C hapter 3. If there has been a “ m istake,” a reassignm ent can be,
and often is, m ade. H ow ever, since reassignm ent in vo lves so m uch
m ore than mere genital inspection, and, in fact, the "p roper”
p h ysica l genitals m ay not be there, "reassignm en t” is a m isleading
term. Reassignm ent could im ply that the ch ild had been one gender
and is n o w the other, w hen actu ally the child is seen b y everyone
as h aving been the “ n e w ” gender all along. "G en d er reconstruc­
tion ” w ou ld be a better term, since the ch ild ’s history, as short as
it m ay h ave been, m ust now be reinterpreted. F or exam ple, w hat
w a s originally seen as an em pty scrotum m ight later be seen as
a lw a ys having been m isform ed labia. T h is suggests that "gender
assignm ent” and “ gender construction” m ay be synonom ous.
Gender Identity i y o u rse lf to b e?” or "H ow are yo u categorized b y oth ers?” The reason
G ender iden tity refers to an ind ivid u al’s o w n feelin g o f w hether she
or he is a w om an or a man, or a girl or a boy. In essence gender
iden tity is self-attribution o f gender. R ules fo r self-attribution are
not n ecessarily the samp as rules fo r attributing gender to others,
although it is as n ecessary to m ake a definite self-attribution as it
is to m ake unqualified gender attributions about others. One young
Introduction: The Primacy of Gender Attribution g
m an w h o lived as a fem ale for three years did not h ave a fem ale
gender identity. E ven though su ccessfu l at passing, he finally could
-n o t tolerate the conflict betw een his m ale gender identity and the
fem ale gender attributions w h ich w ere con sisten tly m ade to him.
It w as n ecessary to m ake a choice, and he decided to be a m ale. To
him this m eant not only livin g as a m ale in the eyes o f others, but
thinking o f him self as a m ale w ithou t an y doubts. T h is exam ple not
only points out the difficulty of tryin g to m aintain a self-im age w ith ­
out a clear gender identity, but it also sh ow s h o w on e’s gender
m ade b y others.
The only w a y to ascertain som eone’s gender id en tity is to ask her/
him. C linicians m ay believe th ey can "get at” som eone’s gender
iden tity b y the use o f p rojective tests, but th ey are p robab ly m easur­
ing gender-role identity (see below ). O f course, the person m ight lie
and not reveal her/his true gender identity, but there is no other
m ethod of getting the answ er besides asking. A n oth er problem w ith
a sk in g is that the question, "A re you a boy/m an or a girl/w om an?”
determ ines the nature o f the answ er. T h e question im p licitly as­
sum es that the respondent is either one or the other and there is no
other category. E ven if a less leadin g w a y o f asking the question
could be form ulated [and all questions, to som e extent, structure
the desired answ er (Churchill, 1969)], w e still m ay not get accurate
answ ers, either because the respondent kn ow s that “ I don’t k n o w ”
or "N eith er” or “ B oth” are not accep table an sw ers or because she/
he kn ow s that the answ er m ust be congruent w ith the evidence (e.g.,
p h ysica l characteristics) presented to the person w h o is asking. In
any event, gender identity is w h a t the person feels she/he is, regard­
less o f the gender attribution other people w ou ld m ake about her/
him, and regardless of the va lid ity o f our techniques fo r determ ining
gender identity. To claim that you r gender is w h a t you feel you rself
to be ignores the fa ct that people alm ost alw a ys attribute gender
w ith ou t asking one another. T h e equating o f gender and gender
identity is understandable, h ow ever, since the question, “A re you
m ale or fem ale?” can either be interpreted as, "W h a t do you feel
w h y m ost people do not have difficulty interpreting the question is
that in the com m on-sense w orld there is no reason to distinguish
gender identity from gender attribution. There is just gender.
The developm ent o f a gender identity appears to occur during a
critical period. That is, there is a period o f time in the young ch ild ’s
life before w h ich she or he is too youn g to h ave a gender identity,
and after w h ich w h a tever gender identity has develop ed cannot be
10 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
changed. There is only one reported case o f a non psychotic person
not developing either a m ale or fem ale gender iden tity during child­
hood (Stoller, 1968), and even this case is not a clear one. M ost of
the evidence fo r the developm ent o f a gender identity during a
critical period com es from cases w here the initial assignm ent w as
deem ed in error and an attem pt w as m ade to “ correct” it b y reas­
signing the child and m aking the n ecessary p h ysica l changes. A lm ost
all attem pts o f this sort m ade after the age o f about three are unsuc­
cessful, in the sense that the individ ual either retains her/his original
gender identity or becom es extrem ely con fused and am bivalent.
W hen the child is able to develop a n e w gender identity to go along
w ith the reassignm ent, p rofession als conclude that the earlier gender
identity had not been firm ly entrenched. This circularity is a rather
obvious exam ple o f the operation o f incorrigible propositions. G iven
a b e lie f in the perm anence o f gender id en tity after a critical period,
the inability to reassign a child in som e cases and the ability to do
so in others serves as p ro of o f the “ truth” o f the invarian ce of gen­
der identity. E ven though em phasis on a critical period m akes the
acquisition o f a gender identity seem lik e an all-or-nothing event
there is a developm ental process in vo lved in learning that you are
either a girl or a boy, w h at it m eans to be one or the other, and that
this is a perm anent aspect of your life.
Instead o f thinking in terms o f “ critical p eriod s,” a term that
suggests innate biological m echanism s, it is p ossible to discuss gen­
der identity from a different perspective. It m ay be that gender can
be su ccessfu lly reassigned up to the point w h en the child incorpor­
ates the rules w h ich construct gender, specifically, the “ fa c t” that
gender is unchangeable (see Chapter 4).
G ender identity should not be confused w ith the sim ilar-sounding
concept o f gender-role identity. This is often referred to in the
literature as “ sex-role id en tity” (e.g., R osenberg and Sutton-Sm ith,
1972). G ender-role identity refers to h o w m uch a person approves
o f and participates in feelings and behaviors, w h ich are seen as
“ appropriate” fo r his/her gender. M oney and Ehrhardt (1972) have
included gender-role identity as a part o f gender identity, b y defin­
ing the latter as “ the persistence o f one’s in d ivid u ality as a male,
fem ale, or am bivalent . . . esp ecially as it is exp erien ced in self-
awareness and beh avior . . .” (p. 4, italics ours). H ow you think you
should beh ave and h o w you experien ce y o u r beh avior as fem ale or
m ale are related to w h a t gender you feel y o u rse lf to be, but they
ought to be recognized as separate issues. Failing to separate the
Introduction: The Primacy of Gender Attribution H
tw o concepts leads m any scien tists (like M on ey and Ehrhardt) to
conclude that som eone w ith atyp ical feelin gs about h o w their male-
-n e s s or fem alen ess should be exp ressed in b eh avior has a gender
identity problem . This could lead one to assert that the lessening
rigidity in gender beh aviors w ill result in a large num ber o f persons
w h o do not kn ow w hether th ey are m ale or fem ale. There is no
evidence to support that assertion, although gender iden tity and
gender-role identity m ight influence one another in various w ays.
For exam ple, given rigid expectations, a b o y could think that because
he does not lik e "b o y things” and does lik e “ girl th ings" he m ight be
a girl (Green, 1974). A s exp ectation s becom e m ore flexible, such
gender identity conflicts m ay be less lik e ly to occur.
Gender Role
A role, as the concept is used in sociology, is a set o f prescriptions
and proscriptions for behavior— expectation s about w h at behaviors
are appropriate fo r a person holding a particular position w ith in a
p articular social context. A gender role, then, is a set o f expectations
about w h at behaviors are appropriate fo r people o f one gender.
People can be categorized as role occupants either through their ow n
efforts (“ a ch ieved ” roles, such as doctor, m other, student) or on the
basis o f attributes over w h ich th ey are seen to have no control
(“ ascrib ed ” roles, such as Black, infant, Italian). O b viou sly, gender
roles in our society are treated as ascribed roles.
A cco rd in g to the traditional persp ective, som eone is “ born in to”
the category "m ale” or “ fem ale," and b y virtu e o f her or his birth
becom es obligated to perform the m ale or fem ale role. In other
w ords, one is expected to b eh ave in accordance w ith the prescrip ­
tions and proscriptions for one’s gender. M ost w riters agree w ith
this definition, although they som etim es call it "s e x ro le ” (e.g.,
Yorburg, 1974), th ereby em phasizing the ascribed nature o f the role.®
The obligatory nature o f gender roles is so firm that w hen diction­
aries attem pt to define w om an and man, th ey often do so b y listing
gender role behaviors. (“ M an: one p ossessin g a high degree of . . .
courage, strength, and vig o r” W ebster’s, 1973, p. 889). E ven Stoller,
w ho is so aw are o f the am biguities surrounding gender, cites, as
p roof that an X O chrom osom e in divid ual is as natural a w om an as
any X X w om an, the fa ct that she likes to cook and sew (1968, p. 21).
G ender roles h ave m any com ponents, including interests, activi-
12 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
ties, dress, skills, and sexu al partner choice. For each of these com ­
ponents, there are clear, and different, expectation s fo r those w ho
o ccu p y the m ale role aind the fem ale role (cf. Y orburg, 1974). B e­
cause these role expectations are so p ervasive, it is not n ecessary to
list ex a ctly w h a t th ey arje.
A s w ith other roles, sanctions against violatin g various pre- and
proscriptions vary. In fact, the sanctions, rather than the exp ecta­
tions, m ay be w h a t is changing in contem porary society. W om en
are still expected, in general, to w an t a hom e and fam ily, but d evi­
ance from that expectation is n o w m ore perm issible. On the other
hand, m en still cannot w ear skirts, if th ey w an t to be taken seriously.
A stereotype is a set o f beliefs about the ch aracteristics o f the
occupants o f a role, not necessarily based on fact or personal exp eri­
ence, but applied to each role occupant regardless of particular
circum stances. In addition, stereotypes are con ceived o f as having
an evalu ative com ponent. That is, th e y are not m erely descriptive
o f exp ected behaviors, but these expected b eh aviors are evaluated
as good, bad, desirable, and so on. For exam ple, the stereotyped
fem ale role in our so ciety consists o f such low -valu ed behaviors and
traits as p a ssivity and helplessn ess and such high-valued ones as
"v e r y ta ctfu l” (Broverm an et al., 1972). In this book w e are not
particularly concerned w ith stereotypes, p er se, because, b y defini­
tion, stereotypes are not assum ed to be “ o b je ctive ” in the w a y gen­
der role, in w h ich stereotypes are grounded, is seen to be.
B ecau se gender is an ascribed role, certain gender role exp ecta­
tions are seen as being an exp ression o f the biological (i.e., un­
changeable) foundations o f gender. Som e w riters (e.g., Hutt, 1972)
h ave given m ost gender differences a b iological basis, w h ile others
(e.g., M acco b y and Jacklin, 1974) h ave lim ited their ascriptions to
exp ectation s such as aggressiveness, even though there is still sci­
entific debate about w h eth er these b eh aviors in hum ans have a
prim arily biological foundation. T h eories o f gender role develop ­
m ent (i.e., h o w childrep learn the proper b eh avior associated w ith
their gender) va ry in tfie em phasis w h ich th ey place on biological
and environm ental factors. A ll the m ajor theories, h ow ever, m ake
the assum ption that dichotom ous roles are a natural (and hence
proper) expression o f the dichotom ous nature, o f gender. This as­
sum ption is being increasingly reexam ined, but the grounds for
questioning existing diq|iotomous gender roles do not question the
existence o f tw o genders. It is only b y questioning dichotom ous
criteria fo r gender attributions that the dichotom ous nature o f gen­
der, itself, becom es problem atic.
Introduction: The Primacy of Gender Attribution 13
THE PRIMACY OF
GENDER ATTRIBUTION
H aving provided definitions of gender assignm ent, gender iden­
tity, and gender role, w e n ow explore h o w these com ponents form
the foundation fo r some gender-based categories w h ich our society
has for describing people: transsexu al/nontranssexual; transvestite/
n ontransvestite; hom osexual/heterosexual. W h a t w e dem onstrate
through this discussion is that kn ow in g som eone’s gender assign­
ment, identity, or role, or kn ow in g that th ey belong in one o f the
gender-based categories, or even kn ow in g all of this w ill give a great
deal o f inform ation about a person but w ill n ot inform the person’s
gender because there w ill never be sufficient inform ation fo r a
definite gender attribution to be m ade. H ow ever, once a gender attri­
bution has been m ade, the m eaning o f gender-related inform ation for
an y p articular individual can be interpreted.
Transsexual
“ Transsexualism is the conviction in a b iologically norm al person
o f being a m em ber of the opposite sex. This b elief is these days
accom panied b y requests fo r surgical and endocrinological proce­
dures that change anatom ical appearance to that o f the opposite
se x ” (Stoller, 1968, pp. 89-90). B y opposite sex, Stoller m eans oppo­
site from that w h ich one w as assigned. (Note h o w the use o f the
w o rd "o p p o site” serves to underscore the dichotom ous sense of
gender.)
If you kn ow that an individ ual’s gender iden tity and gender as­
signm ent conflict then you kn ow that the person is a transsexual.
This certainly gives you im portant inform ation about som eone, but
it does not tell you w hether he/she is fem ale or male. W e are not
asking about biological criteria fo r being m ale or fem ale, nor are w e
concerned w ith value judgm ents about “ re al” m en and “ real"
w om en. O ur interest is in the e ve ry d a y process o f gender attribu­
tion, a process that even m em bers of the m edical team engage in
w hen evaluating transsexuals according to m edical criteria (see
Chapter 5). E ven w hen transsexuals are in transitional stages, they
still receive definite gender attributions. For exam ple, genetic m ales
at the initial stages o f estrogen treatm ent m ay lo o k like “ fem inine”
men, and at som e later stage m ay look lik e “ m asculin e” women. No
m atter w h at stage of “ transform ation” transsexu als w e h ave met
w ere in, in each and every case it has been possible, necessary, and
re la tive ly easy fo r us to m ake a gender attribution.
14 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
Introduction: The Primacy of Gender Attribution 15
O nce a gender attribution has been m ade the “ transsexu al" label
dressed. In everyd ay life w e rarely if ever, h ave an y kn ow ledge of
becom es clarified. For exam ple, if you attribute “ m an” to a person
anoth er’s gender identity or gender assignm ent. T h e fa ct that the
w h o is a m ale (assignment) to fem ale (identity) transsexual, you
attribution com es first, suggests that neither kn ow in g h o w people
kn o w that he has not begun to “ p a ss” 7 or is not “ passing” w ell. On
dress, nor their gender identity, n or their gender assignm ent is
the other hand, if yo u m ake the gender attribution “ fem ale” to this
n ecessary in order to m ake a gender attribution.
person, you kn ow that she is credible as a w om an in every w ay.
G en der attribution g iv e s m eaning to the gender-based category.
Heterosexual/Homosexual
Transvestite People are classified as h eterosexu al or h om osexu al on the basis of
their gender and the gender of their sexu al partner(s). W hen the
C lin ically, a transvestite is som eone w h o se gender identity cor­
partner’s gender is the sam e as the in d iv id u a l’s, then the person is
responds to her/his assignm ent, but w ho obtains erotic pleasure b y
categorized as hom osexual. W hen the partn er’s gender is other than
dressing (“ dress” includes hairstyle and accessories) as the other
the in divid ual’s, then the label “h etero sex u a l” is applied.® (Thg label
gender. O n ly w hen the gender o f the in d ivid u al’s dress is in conflict
“ lesb ian ” is dependent on a definite prior gender attribution, i.e.,
w ith both assignm ent and identity is that in divid ual labeled "tran s­
that both partners are fem ale.) T h is hom osexual/heterosexual dis­
vestite.” 8 (We recognize that the fem ale/m ale dichotom ization of
tinction is as forced as the others, since clea rly there are degrees of
dress is forced becau se it ignores the fact that som e individuals dress
p referen ce in sexual partner choice.
androgynously and that m ost transvestites cross-dress only on occa­
This gender-based categorization m akes the prim acy o f gender
sion.)
attribution particularly salient. K n ow in g that som eone is hom o­
Th ere is som e question as to w h eth er “ tran svestite,” in the pre­
sexual or heterosexu al tells yo u som ething about the person, but it
ceding sense, is an appropriate category fo r an individual w ith a
does not tell you if th ey are m ale or fem ale. In fact, attaching one
fem ale assignm ent and a fem ale identity w ho dresses as a male,
o f these gender-based labels to som eone first o f all depends on the
since there is no evidence that dressing in m ale clothing (e.g., jock ey
gender attributions m ade about both partners (e.g., that one is m ale
shorts) is erotic fo r som eone w ith a fem ale identity. N evertheless,
and the other is fem ale). T h e gender attribution determ ines the
there are w om en w ho dress as the m ale gender role dictates. Th ere­
lab el "h om osexu al” or "h etero sexu al” but the lab el itself does not
fore, w e w ill talk about “ cross-dressing,” a m ore neutral term w h ich
lead to a gender attribution.
does not im ply eroticism .
K n ow in g that som eone is a cross-dresser does not tell you if they
are a w om an or a man. K now ing that th ey are a w om an or a man, Feminine/Masculine
on the other hand, allow s you to m ake an interpretation o f their
W e h ave discussed h ow the w a y one dresses and the inferences
cross-dressing. The clinical usage o f “ tran svestite” contrasts w ith
m ade regarding the m otivation to dress in a p articular w ay , w hom
the e ve ry d a y usage o f the term. A transvestite, fo r m ost people, is
one chooses as a sexual partner, and w h eth er on e’s id en tity is in
som eone w h o is know n to be one gender but w ho dresses as the
accord w ith one’s gender assignm ent, determ ine w h eth er one is
other, fo r exam ple, a man w ho w ears fem ale clothes. Som e trans­
p laced in a particular gender-based category w ith its ow n name,
vestites are called “ drag queens.” S uch individuals are often
etiology, and prognosis. O ne’s interests, activities', and personality
assum ed to be m im icking the m em bers o f the other gender or trying
traits, on the other hand, do not h ave this status. A lth ou gh people
to be lik e them rather than responding to a fetish (see N ew ton,
rarely exh ibit only m ale or only fem ale interests, and so on, an
1972). This m ay be esp ecially true in regard to fem ales w ho cross-
in divid ual w ho has predom inantly m ale interests, as defined b y the
dress. T h e term “ b utch ” im plies im itation rather than eroticism .
p articular culture, is “ m asculine,” and an individ ual w ith predom ­
People categorize a person as a transvestite based on the gender
in an tly fem ale interests is “fem inine.” (“E ffem inate” describes men
attribution they have m ade about that person and their conclusion
w ho caricature stereotyp ical fem inine behavior. O b viously, in
that this gender attribution conflicts w ith the w a y the person is
order to use this adjective, a gender attribution m ust already have
16 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
been made.) Interests, activities, and p erson ality traits give no in for­
m ation about the type of gender attribution that w ou ld be m ade, but
kn ow in g the p erso n ’s gender w o u ld give m eaning to their "m asculin­
ity ” or “ fem ininity.”
Th ere are no separate nouns in the English language to refer to
p eople w ith stereo typ ical m ale or fem ale interests. The slang terms
"p a n sy ” or “ bulldykeV refer m ore to exp ressive style, in conjunc­
tion w ith choosing a sexu al partner of the sam e gender, than they do
to interests, activitii s and p erson ality traits. T h e fa ct that w e have
nouns fo r style but onjy ad jectives fo r interests is im portant, because
style m ay be a cue fo r gender attribution, w hereas interests m ay not.
CONCLUSION
K now ing the relationship among the gender com ponents is, as
w e h ave show n, not sufficient fo r m aking a gender attribution.
W h at is the gender o f a m asculine, hom osexual, transsexual w ho
cross-dresses? N ot even h aving concrete inform ation about these
com ponents is sufficient. C onsider the fo llo w in g : (1) Lee w as
assigned the gender “ m ale” at birth. (2) Ronnie has a fem ale gender
identity. (3) Chris w ears fem ale clothing and hair styles. (4) Sandy
chooses m en as sexual partners. (5) Leslie has fem inine interests
and engages in fem inine activities. Do an y o f these pieces of in for­
m ation tell you w h eth er Lee, Ronnie, Chris, Sandy, or Leslie are
m en or w om en? For exam ple, Lee m ight be a man, or, on the other
hand, Lee could h ave had one of the syndrom es to be discussed in
C hapter 3 and h ave been born w ith an enlarged clitoris that w as
m istaken fo r a penis. If this w ere discovered early enough, a “ reas­
signm ent” could have been m ade and Lee m ight be a w om an. Or,
L ee m ight be a postoperative transsexual, and therefore a w om an
in ju st about any sense o f the w ord.
This sam e type o f exercise could be done fo r the rest o f the
exam ples. It b e c o m e s d e a r that no one piece o f inform ation about
a com ponent o f gender is sufficient fo r m aking a gender attribution.
N ot on ly are w e npj able to m ake gender attributions from only
one piece of inform ation, but the kn ow ledge itself is relatively
m eaningless w ithou t fy prior gender attribution. For exam ple, if you
a lready kn ow Sandy i,s a man, the fact that San dy chooses m en as
sexual partners co n veys v e r y different inform ation than it does if
y o u k n o w that Sandy i f a w om an.
E ven inform ation about all the com ponents is insufficient. Is a
Introduction: The Primacy of Gender Attribution 17
person w ith a m ale gender assignm ent, a fem ale gender identity,
m ale interests, m ale sexual partners, and fem ale clothing, a m ale or
a fem ale?
There is no w a y to answ er this question in the absence o f con­
crete interaction w ith the individual described. No am ount of
d escrip tive inform ation w e could give yo u about the person w ould
a llo w yo u to attribute gender w ith absolute certainty, short o f our
m aking the attribution fo r you. Inform ation about secondary gen­
der characteristics m ight enable yo u to m ake a m ore educated guess
than kn ow ledge about gender com ponents or gender-based cate­
gories alone. Y o u m ight be right m ost o f the tim e in guessing that a
fem inine heterosexu al w ith facial hair, a deep voice, and broad
shoulders w as som eone to w hom you w ou ld m ake a “ m ale” gender
attribution w ere you to interact w ith the person. H ow ever, the per­
son could turn out to be a w om an, and you r tentative gender attri­
bution w ould ju st be a guess. G ender attributions are not guesses.
In our e ve ry d a y w orld people are either m ale or fem ale, not prob­
ab ly one or the other.
E ven kn ow ledge about w h at m any consider the ultim ate criteria
fo r telling w om an from men, nam ely genitals, is not the answ er.
A ttribu tions are alm ost alw a ys m ade in the absence o f inform ation
about genitals, and m ost people do not change their gender attri­
butions even if they discover that som eone does not h ave the "ap pro­
p riate” genitals. On occasion, friends o f ours h ave interacted w ith
persons w hom th ey later acciden tally d iscovered w ere preoperative
transsexuals. In other w ords, th ey found out that som eone about
w hom th ey had m ade a gender attribution did not h ave the “ right”
genitals. In no case did they change their gender attribution in light
o f this know ledge, although there m ay h ave been changes in other
attributions m ade about the person. S econ dary gender character­
istics and genitals are im portant cues, but th ey are n ever sufficient
fo r m aking a gender attribution. W hether som eone is a m an or a
w om an is determ ined in the course of interacting. H ow this is done
is one of the concerns o f the final chapters.
T he prim acy o f gender attribution becom es obviou s w hen w e
recognize that assignm ent and identity can be seen as special cases
o f attribution, and, even m ore im portantly, that in order to m ean­
in g fu lly interpret som eone’s assignm ent, identity, and role, and
the relationship am ong them, one m ust first attribute gender. Iden­
tity, role, and assignm ent are not the sam e as attribution, but they
can only be interpreted w hen placed in con text b y the gender attri­
bution process.
18 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
Th e gender attribution process is the m ethod b y w h ich w e con­
struct our w o rld of tw o genders. A s w e m entioned earlier, a defin­
ing feature o f reality construction is to see our w orld as being the
only possible one. O ne w a y to investigate the p ossib ility o f other
w o rld s is to see h o w gender is con ceived o f in other cultures. A
re v ie w o f the anthropological literature can raise im portant ques­
tions about the gender attribution process, and this is the w o rk of
the n ext chapter.
NOTES
1. The use of the term “ decision" does not necessarily imply that people
consciously deliberate or choose, nor that they could verbalize the
“ decision”-making process. The term is used in the ethnomethodological
sense (see Zimmerman and West, 1975) to refer to the rule-guided, socially
shared activity of gender attribution, the character of which is explicated
as the theme of this book develops. In no w ay do we mean to suggest
that people have any trouble making these decisions, nor are we
suggesting that unless they became aware of how they are
deciding they might be making mistakes.
2. We have chosen to use the word “attribution" because it implies an
active process, based on information received, and involving implicit
rules for assigning characteristics. Our theory of gender attribution should
not be confused with attribution theory in social psychology (e.g., Jones,
Kanouse, Kelley, Nisbett, Valins, and Weiner, 1971). In the first place,
attribution theory has been developed within a positivist framework and
does not concern itself with the deep structure of social interaction. It is
concerned with the conditions under which people assign motives, traits,
characteristics, etc. to others on the basis of limited information which
they have about the other. Attribution theory has not been concerned with
the gender attribution process, although gender, itself, has been studied
as a determining factor in explaining behavior. For example, Deaux and
Enswiller (1973) found that a woman’s success was attributed to luck,
while a man’s success was more likely to be attributed to his skill. In
discovering what different motives and traits are attributed to males and
females who behave in the same way, we can learn about the circumstances
under which gender is used as an explanatory factor, In these cases,
though, the question of "How do you know if the person is male or female
in the first place?” is still glossed. “Gloss” is used here in a technical,
ethnomethodological sense (see Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970). To gloss is to
let the meaning of something become clear as the process of interaction
proceeds, without explicitly stating (and without being able to state) what
Introduction: The Primacy of Gender Attribution 19
it is that is meant. Glosses are pervasive in science as well as everyday
life. Our purpose is to explicate one gloss in particular—saying that
someone is female or male.
3. People readily categorize as “male" or “female” such things as colors
and numbers, as indicated, for example, in a study carried out by Diane
Gertz, a student at the State University of New York, College at Purchase.
Whether there is agreement about the proper gender of "25” is interesting,
but of more importance in this context is the fact that all of her thirty
subjects gave a gender label to “25" and thaf many were able to
support their “attribution” with “good” reasons.
4. Our use of the terms “construction" and “social construction" reflects
our theoretical position that the sense of an objective world is
accomplished by persons engaged in concrete day-to-day activities. (See
the discussion which follows in the text.) This accomplishment or ^
construction is social because those engaged in the activity are members;
that is, they share a common method for producing the sense of
objective facts like gender. We are indebted to Garfinkel (1967) for our
position. However, we make no claim to be faithful to
Garfinkel’s particular intentions.
5. Throughout this book, the gender pronoun we use for an informant
(whether the informant is a professional, an “everyday” person, a
transsexual, or anything else) refers to the attribution that we
made in interacting with the person.
6. Recently, several sociologists (Thorne, 1976; Lopata, 1976) have
questioned the whole concept of gender “role."; Since a person's gender
affects expectations about all behaviors in many different role settings
(e.g., “ a female doctor” versus "a male doctor”), gender may be too
pervasive and permanent to be considered a role and may be better thought
of as a status or an identity. We continue to use “gender role” for the sake
of clarity, but we agree with;the preceding criticism of the concept
and mean “role” in its broadest sense.
7. The term “passing” cotnmonly refers to being taken for something
one is really not. For example, a Black person who is light-skinned might
attempt to be taken for a white person. In this sense she/he is passing as
white. Our usage, on the ofher hand, carries no implication that a person is
really not what she/he appears to be (see Garfinkel, 1967 and Chapter 5).
In the sense that we mean passing, everyone is passing, i.e., doing
something in order to be taken as she/he intends.
8. If there is any question as to what the individual’s gender identity
“really” is, the term transvestite cannot be applied. Only if an assigned
male considers himself to be a male is his cross-dressing as a woman
considered clinically to be transvestism. On the other hand, transsexuals
who dress in accordance with their assignment, but other than their
identity, may consider themselves to be cross-dressers but would not be
20 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
considered so by naive persons. There are at least two reasons w hy
transsexuals may not havp begun to dress in accordance with their gender
identity. They may not have enough of the secondary gender characteristics
that correspond to their gender identity to pass; there may be economic
reasons such as continuing to hold a job that is dependent on their being
seen as the gender that was originally assigned. It would be inappropriate
2 _________________
to clinically refer to the cross-dressing transsexual as a transvestite, since CROSS-CULTURAL
he/she does not cross-dress for erotic reasons. There have been no
reports of transsexuals w^o, after living in their new gender, return to PERSPECTIVES ON GENDER
their original w ay of dressing for erotic reasons.
9. A transsexual who i|;not yet living in accord with her/his gender
identity and is forced by circumstances, or chooses, to relate sexually to an Imagine a fam ily that has several daughters but no sons. The
individual whose gender category is the same as the transsexual's gender fath er needs a son to help hunt fo r the fam ily, since in this society
identity, may be considered heterosexual by others. The transsexual
fem ales do not hunt. Finally, another child is born, but it is p o t h e r
would consider that relationship to be homosexual.
daughter. B ecause o f their need for a hunter, the parents decide to
m ake the child a son. W hen the child is five years old they tie the
dried ovaries o f a bear to the ch ild ’s inner b elt in order to prevent
the child from ever conceiving. T h e child is dressed as a boy, taught
m ale skills, and even tually develops great strength and becom es an
excellen t hunter.
Imagine another fam ily in w h ich there is a son. The child show s
an interest in fem ale tasks and shuns m ale tasks, so the parents
decide to test him. T h ey put their son in a sm all enclosure w ith a
b o w and arrow and some b asket w eavin g m aterial. Then th ey set
fire to the enclosure and w atch to see w h at he grabs as he runs out.
The child grabs the .basketry m aterial and from that point in time
the child becom es their daughter.
T h ese events are described in anthropological reports as having
occurred about 100 years ago among various A m erican Indian socie­
ties (Honigmann, 1954; C raw ley, 1960; Hill, 1938).
The stories raise m any questions. W hat does it m ean that the
first child w as made the son and the second child becam e a daughter?
If it m eans nothing m ore than m ade like a son or treated like a
daughter, then the events described becom e less "e x o tic .” E ven in
our culture w e kn ow that there are children w ho are treated like
other gender— cross-dressed, given other-gender nam es, perhaps in
unusual cases even referred to as the other gender. But unless the
parents are psychotic, th ey k n o w that b y treating the child as though
she/he w ere the other gender, th ey h ave not turned their child into
the other gender. In our society that w ou ld n ecessitate an alteration
of the genitals.
W h at if, h ow ever, the tw o cases presented p reviou sly are exam-

21
 22 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
pies, as fa r as the Indians w ere concerned, o f transform ing the
child into the other (or even a third) gender. W hat w ould that m ean
about those so cieties’ concept o f gender? W hat criteria w ou ld need
to be m et in order fo r us to decide that, fo r the m em bers o f these
cultural groups, it w as not just a m atter o f cross-gender role be­
havior?
C ross-cultural findings can be easily incorporated into the p osi­
tivist fram ew ork. There are tw o genders (male and fem ale) w ith no
overlap, and tw o gender roles (m asculine and fem inine) w ith some
degree o f overlap. There are even some individuals in certain (maybe
all) cultures w ho perform all o f the other gender’s role behaviors.
The p o sitivist interpretation o f the in troductory exam ples is that
the children w ere perform ing the other gender’s role behaviors. This
p ersp ective is illustrated b y statem ents like, “ In M adagascar there
are certain boys w ho liv e lik e w om en” (W esterm arck, 1917, p. 461).
K roeber (1940) w rites, “ . . . born a m ale he becam e a wom an, so­
cia lly ," indicating, w ith the w ord “ so c ia lly ,” that the person w as
only treated as a wom an.
In contrast, consider the p ossib ility that the children had becom e
the other gender. This w ould m ean that m em bers o f one gender
category m ay becom e m em bers o f another gender category through
certain practices that m ay seem invalid to us, and that there m ay
indeed be m ore than tw o gender categories fo r som e cultures. Our
purpose in this chapter is not to prove, in a p ositivist sense, that this
is true. Rather, w e sh ow that b y view in g gender as a social construc­
tion, it is possible to see descriptions o f other cultures as evidence
fo r alternative but equally real conceptions o f w h a t it m eans to be a
w om an or a man.
Just as transsexualism in our society is inform ative because it
raises the p o ssib ility that gender is an accom plishm ent, studying
gender categories in other cultures also m akes gender problem atic,
that is, uncovers our taken-for-granted b e lie f in the fa cticity o f gen­
der w h ich prevents us from seeing gender as a social accom plish­
ment. A cross-cultural com parison can sh o w that it is possible to
construct the w orld in m any w ays. The kinds o f questions that
arise from studying gender in other cultures w ou ld be less lik ely to
arise if w e focu sed only on our ow n society, for m em bership in
a culture blinds us to the constructed nature o f that culture’s reality.
E dgerton’s (1964) analysis o f in tersexu ality am ong the P otok of
E ast A fric a illustrates the difference b etw een the kind o f questions
w e are interested in asking and those ty p ic a lly raised in anthropo­
Croas-Cultural Perspectives on Gender 23
logical w ork. E dgerton’s aim w as to d isco ver h o w in tersexu ality (the
condition of having both m ale and fem ale genitals, som etim es re-
Jerred to as herm aphroditism ) is responded to in a so ciety w here
econom ic, social, and scientific concerns are different from W estern
culture’s. He takes it fo r granted that the assum ption o f only tw o
biological sexes, men and w om en, is universal. He cites the cases of
tw o individuals, each born w ith m ale and fem ale genitals. Both
w ere stigm atized but one individual assum ed m ore o f a fem ale role
and the other m ore o f a m ale role. E dgerton does not discuss h ow
it w as decided w hich gender role should be assum ed. W e can
speculate that it w as either the relative sizes and clarity o f the m ale
or fem ale genitals, or the fam ilial need fo r a daughter or son. W h at­
ever the initial reason, it seem s clear from E dgerton’s description
that there w ere individuals in P otok so ciety w h o w ere categbrized
as neither m ale nor fem ale. This is the kind o f suggestive data that
forces us to consider w hether gender is as ob jective a reality as w e
norm ally treat it. Granted, intersexed individuals are exceptions in
a w orld w here m ost people are “ b iologically norm al,” but it is b y
stud ying h o w exceptions are accom m odated that w e can best under­
stand the non exceptional cases. Edgerton does this b y relating the
treatm ent o f these individuals to the econom ic and social concerns
o f the culture. In contrast, w e are asking (1) Is there evidence that
the ind ivid u al’s m aleness or fem aleness is decided irresp ective o f
b iological considerations? and (2) Is there evidence that these indi­
vidu als w ere seen as neither m ale nor fem ale but rather as m embers
o f a third gender category? If either are true, then the Potok con­
struction o f gender differs from W estern so c ie ty ’s.
M artin and V oorhies (1975) asked sim ila r questions about gender
categorization in other cultures, and concluded that certain societies
recogn ize m ore than tw o “ gender statu ses” and m ay recogn ize more
than tw o categories o f “p h ysical sex ." In addition, “ gender statuses”
are not necessarily assigned on the basis o f genitals. (By “ gender
status,” M artin and V oorh ies appear to m ean w h a t w e h ave been
calling “ gender role.” ) Their w o rk p rovides additional evidence for
our interpretation o f the literature. H ow ever, th ey do not offer an
analysis o f h o w their conclusions relate to concepts o f gender in
W estern cultures.
The questions w e are asking differ from those ty p ica lly raised b y
cross-cultural studies o f gender role. W h at do w e k n o w if w e have
evidence that in cultures other than ours w om en and m en m ay per­
form gender roles that are different from our ow n? M ead (1935,
24 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Gender 25
1961] has m ade perhaps the largest contribution to the cross-cultural
aboriginal N orth A m erica w ho received social sanction to becom e a
study o f gender roles, specifically in support of the argument that
gender other than that to w h ich th ey w ere originally assigned.
individuals are born w ith the potential to develop w h atever gender
- M uch o f the early literature on the berdache is descriptions o f the
role the so ciety dictates. A lth ough som e people m ay still argue for
berdache role (cf. Skinner, 1924). M ost of the current analyses o f
innate gender roles (e.g., Hutt, 1972), cultural rela tivity has b y and
the berdache phenom enon focu s on the fu n ction o f the berdache
large been accepted, and is n o w an orthodox position. M ead (1935)
institution in various kinds o f societies (cf. Forgey, 1975). A lth ou gh
observed that am ong the M undugum or both m ales and fem ales are
the term berdache is tech n ically reserved fo r m em bers o f A m erican
exp ected to b eh ave in w h a t w e think of as stereotyp ically m asculine
Indian societies, berdache-like people h ave been found in A laska,
w a y s — aggressive and nonem otional. In contrast, the A rap esh e x ­
Siberia, Central and South A sia, O ceania, A ustralia, Sudan, and the
p ect both m ales and fem ales to b eh ave in w h a t w e think of as
A m azon region. M ost berdache w ere reported to be m ales w h o b e­
stereo typ ically fem inine w ay s— co-operative and m aternal. M ead’s
cam e fem ales,1 but instances o f fem ales w ho becam e m ales have
third com parison tribe w a s the T cham buli w h o se gender-roles are
been cited (e.g., Borgoras, 1907).
the reverse o f ours— m en are regarded as inh erently delicate and
In researchin g the ethnographic literature, one cannot help but
em otional and w om en as active and m anagerial.
notice the la c k o f consistency in terms and definitions used in de­
W e are not concerned w ith providing an exh au stive re v iew of
scribing the berdache. Both K arlen (1971) and R osenberg and Sutton-
the literature on cross-cultural gender role behaviors. (R eview s and
Sm ith (1972) treat "b erdach e” and "tra n svestite” synonym ously.
analyses are provided b y Yorburg, 1974; R osenburg and Sutton-Sm ith,
"B rav ery is a determ ining point am ong the Plains Indians, and thus
1974; D ’A ndrade, 1966; M illet, 1970.) W e are touching on this litera­
a tim id m ale m ay be assigned the role o f the tran svestite.” (Rosen­
ture prim arily to point out that M ead’s w o rk and the w o rk of others
berg and Sutton-Sm ith, 1972, p. 71). "T ra n sve stite” and "hom o­
illustrates that men and w om en can engage in behaviors that are
sex u a l” are used interchangeably b y D evereu x (1937) to describe the
different from ours and still be men and wom en.
M oh ave berdache and by H assrick (1964) to describe the Sioux
W h a t w e are asking is: W hat does “ still be m en and w om en”
“ W in kte,” or berdache. Other ethnographers discuss berdache and
m ean? Im plicit in this is the idea that doing gender-specific tasks
herm aphrodites as though th ey w ere essen tially the same, even
is not the sam e as being a gender. A ll of the gender-role research
though the groups they are discussing (e.g., the N avaho, Hill, 1935)
rests on the assum ption that there are tw o genders. It does not ques­
m ake a distinction. A lth ou gh some berdache w ere hom osexual, and
tion that dichotom y, tell us w h a t the criteria are fo r gender cate­
some h om osexuals w ere transvestic, and som e transvestites w ere
g o ry m em bership, or tell us w h eth er one can (and h o w one does)
herm aphroditic, to treat these gender-based categories as identical
tran sfer from one category to another. W h at w ou ld w e accept as
is to obsure crucial distinctions. N ot all berdache w ere hom osexual;
evidence that gender fo r a p articular group o f people w as not
not all cross-dressed; and there is no evidence that the berdache
dichotom ous, that instead it w as trichotom ous, or that it w as fluid,
w ere b iologically am biguous. (It is p robab ly im portant in terms of
or that as a classification it had no m eaning?
our p ersp ective that m any ethnographers assum ed that there w as a
p h ysiological com ponent to the berdache phenom enon.)
F o rgey’s (1975) and A ngelino and Sh edd’s (1955) analyses are
THE BERDACHE notable in their recognition o f the com p lexity o f the berdache phe­
nom enon. A ngelino and Shedd state that b efore such questions as
In order to gather evidence bearing on these questions, w e focu s
“ A re there certain types of social organizations w h ich are correlated
on reports about a special category o f p eople— the berdache. The
w ith the presence or absence o f berdach e?” (p. 121) can be an­
children in our introductory illustrations w ere berdache. A ccord in g
sw ered, there m ust be general agreem ent on w h a t the berdache
to the traditional, p ositivistic perspective, the berdache w ere those
w ere. T h ey trace the w ord "b erd ach e” from its original usage by
people in aboriginal North A m erica w h o receiv ed social sanction to
French explorers to describe p assive hom osexual N orth A m erican
assum e the gender role opposite to that w h ich they w ere originally
Indians, to its even tfu l usage as synonym ous w ith transvestism and
assigned. A ccord in g to our perspective, th ey w ere those people in
effem inancy among the Indians. W e do not k n o w w hether the first
 26 Gender: An Etbnomethodological Approach
exp lorers to use the term berdache w ere m istaken in their appraisal
o f these p eople or w h eth er they recogn ized the lim itation o f their
translation, but had no other w o rd that seem ed appropriate.
T h e term “ berdach e” is said to be "d erived from the French w ord
‘b ardash,’ w h ich d erived from the Italian term ‘b erdascia,’ w h ich
d erived from the A rab ic ‘bardaji,’ w h ich derived from the Persian
‘barah ,’ ” (Forgey, 1975, p. 2). Barah m eant "sla ve, kept-boy or m ale
prostitu te.” The original m eaning em phasized h om osexu ality and
prostitution, but this m eaning w as altered in A m erica b y the addi­
tional consideration o f cross-dressing.
A n gelin o and Shedd (1955) differentiate the berdache from (1) the
herm aphrodite w ho se status has a p h ysiological root and w h o is
often considered to b elon g to a special category from birth (Edger-
ton, 1964), (2) the h om osexual w ho does not n ecessarily cross-dress,
(3) the transvestite w ho does not n ecessarily take on the social role
of the other gender, and (4) the in divid ual w ho has a slight interest
in activities o f the other gender. Th ese distinctions are useful, but
A n gelin o and Shedd’s solution to the problem o f definition is in ade­
quate. B y defining the berdache as “ an in divid ual o f a definite p h ysi­
ological sex (male or fem ale) w ho assum es the role and status of the
opposite sex, and w ho is v ie w e d b y the com m unity as being o f one
sex p h ysio lo g ically but as having assum ed the role and status of the
opposite s e x ” (p. 125), A ngelino and Shedd h ave differentiated the
b erdache from other gender-based categories, but h ave provided
no an sw er to the question: W hat gender w ere the berdache?
A s far as w e can tell, the berdache, lik e the transsexuals in our
society, w ere “ b iologically norm al” but u nderw ent some type o f
gender transform ation. It is sp ecifically b ecau se o f this that m em ­
bers o f both categories are o f such interest. H eim an and Cao V an
L§ (1975) differentiate the berdache from the transsexual in con­
tem porary Vietnam . T h ey conclude that the b erdache w as a clearly
defined role, w h ile transsexual is not. In som e societies (e.g., Siber­
ian Chuckee), the berdache role w as institutionalized. There w as a
cerem onial role w ith prescribed p rivileges and responsibilities;
there w as n early alw ays a person to fill this role, and it w as con­
sidered a high status position. O ther societies (e.g., Zuni) did not
institution alize the “ role-reversal,” but did provide an acceptable
role fo r individuals w ho had “ gender-identity problem s." Berdache
in these societies w ere m ore lik e ly to be lo w status and treated w ith
toleration. T h e contem porary transsexual, on the other hand, does
not h ave a visib le role; she/he m erges into the general culture as
Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Gender 27
indistinguishable from “ norm als” (except fo r som e celeb rity excep ­
tions).
H eim an and Cao V an L6’s an alysis is interesting, but it m ay say
m ore about the differences b etw een societies than the differences
b etw een berdache and transsexuals. U sing som e com m on criteria for
defining a transsexual (e.g., a gender id en tity different from the gen­
der assignm ent, childhood m em ories o f h aving been seen as the
“ w ro n g ” gender, a long h istory o f cross-dressing, a preference fo r
nonhom osexual partners, an abhorence o f th eir o w n genitals), there
is alm ost no data o f this kind on the berdache, and therefore, it
w ou ld be prem ature either to equate or d efin itively differentiate the
tw o groups. Granted, the role a so ciety p rovid es an individual
gives som e clue as to w h at that in divid ual “re a lly is,” but is only
p art o f the evidence.
A s w e discuss in C hapter 5, the tran sse xu al phenom enon does not
underm ine the dichotom y o f gender; it rein forces it. The berdache,
in contrast, m ay not have been considered a sp ecial typ e o f man or
w om an (one w h o had crossed over categories) but rather a third
type o f person. T h e w ord “ tran ssexu al” can either be used as a noun
to refer to an y person w h o se gender id en tity conflicts w ith her/his
gender assignm ent, or it can be u sed as an adjective, fo r exam ple,
“ transsexu al m ale” w ith the em phasis either on the fa ct that (a) the
transsexual w ho is being referred to is o f the m ale-to-fem ale type,
or (b) the m ale w h o is being referred to has a p articular kind o f h is­
tory— that o f a fem ale.
T h e term “ b erdache,” how ever, is used as a noun and not to
m od ify a p erson’s m aleness or fem aleness. T h is suggests that it is
treated b y ethnographers (and perhaps b y the cultures w here b er­
dache w ere found) as a distinct category. It is as though once persons
w ere revealed to be a berdache, th ey w ere then considered to be
outside the m ale/fem ale fram ew ork. T ran ssexu alism is a term im p ly­
ing transition from one state to another., B erdache m ay not h ave had
that m eaning.
D escriptions o f the berdache institution h ave been used to support
a num ber o f different argum ents. K arlen (1971) review ed the m aterial
in order to sh o w h o w som e societies institution alized various form s
o f h om osexuality; Benjam in (1966) cites berdache data to point out
that transsexualism has existed in other cultures. W e are taking some
of the sam e data and using it to exp lore the p o ssib ility that gender
is not constituted in u niversal w ay s. B efore m aking an analysis o f the
berdache phenom enon in light o f our interest, w e w ill sum m arize
 28 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Gender 29
som e ethnographic reports about berdache. E ven though there have
that w a s not synonym ous w ith either the m ale or fem ale gender
been so m any varyin g (and seem ingly inconsistent) reports about
role. “ C uriously enough, it w as said that som e w om en becam e
the berdache, m ost w riters state their findings as though the particu­
~ ’h w am e’ (berdache) after having borne a ch ild ” (p. 508). M artin and
lar berdache th ey encountered w ere p erfect exam ples o f som e gener­
V oorh ies (1975) provide convincing evidence that there w as a ber­
a lly agreed upon category called “ berdach e,” This is clearly not so.
dache gender role separate from the traditional m asculine and
Som e berdache w ere ex clu siv e ly "h om osexu al,” (that is, their
fem inine ones in the berdache cultures. G iven the existence of a
sexu al activities w ere w ith people w ho had the same genitals as
third gender role, this opens the p o ssib ility of a third gender cate­
th ey did), w h ile some w ere only o ccasion ally so, and others not at
gory, separate from m ale and fem ale.
all. O f course, the term hom osexual only m akes sense here if w e
It is possible to understand m ore about the berdache gender
assum e that the berdache w ere only acting lik e the other gender. If
phenom enon b y looking at the attitudes o f the people tow ard the
w e assum e that berdache becam e the other gender, or w ere m embers
berdache. A ttitu d es tow ard the berdache apparently varied. The
o f a third category, then w h at m ay have seem ed hom osexual to the
Zuni seem ed to tolerate the berdache, but regarded them w ith some
ethnographer, w ould actually be h eterosexu al and vice versa. The
em barrassm ent (Bennedict, 1934; Parsons, 1916; Stevenson, 1901);
categorizing o f berdache as hom osexual or h eterosexu al b y ethnog­
the A m h ara pitied them (Karlen, 1971); the M oh ave accepted them
raphers does not im ply that the berdach e’s culture considered this
but joked behind their backs (Devereux, 1937); the A leu ts consid­
distinction m eaningful.
ered it fortunate to have one in the home (C raw ley, 1960); the
Som e berdache perform ed the n ew gender role com pletely, inclu d­
C h o cto w despised them (Karlen, 1971); the S iou x held am bivalent
ing cross-dressing, m annerism s, w o rk tasks, and obeyance of gender-
attitudes tow ard them— respect, fear, and disdain (Hassrich, 1964);
specific taboos, w hile some perform ed only aspects o f it. Parsons
the C heyenne held them in high esteem (Hoebel, 1960); the Chuck-
(1916) describes a six-year old that she saw : He (Parson’s attribu­
hee w ere afraid of them (Bogoras, 1907). N ot only is there variation
tion) w as dressed like a. b o y in trousers and a shirt, but the shirt
b etw een cultures, but reports o f treatm ent o f the berdache w ithin a
w as longer than the o th fr b oys' and not tu cked into his trousers.
culture v a ry from w riter to w riter and also from individ ual berdache
He w o re a bead necklace, that w as not w orn b y either b oys or girls
to individual berdache. A fte r review in g all the ethnographies, it is
and had delicate features, uncharacteristic of either gender. His hair
tem pting to conclude that treatm ent o f an y particular berdache
w as cut like the other h o y s’, but he used verb al expressions that
varied w ith the specific personality ch aracteristics o f that berdache.
the girls used. He p layed V it h girls.
C ultural attitudes can be traced, in part, to the culture’s theory
Reichard (1928) reports hearing about one adult berdache w ho
o f w h y som eone becam e a berdache and are reflected, in part, in the
did w o m en ’s w ork, spoke w ith a w om an’s voice, had a beard and
rights and privilages accorded to the berdache. A society that b e­
w o re m en’s clothing; and another berdache w h o perform ed fem ale
lieved that an individual w as selected b y a herm aphrodite god to
tasks, attended w o m en ’s dances, w o re m ale attire and spoke like a becom e a berdache (e.g., B ellacoola people, M cllw raith , 1948) w ould
man. O ne of D evereu x’s (1937) inform ants describes a berdache w ho
look m ore fa v o ra b ly (or at least w ith greater awe) on that individual
w a s dressed like a wom an, but w as m arried to other wom en.
than a society w h ich assum ed that the beh avior w as a m atter of
W hat conclusions are w e to draw from these reports? W e do not choice (e.g., Zuni people, Parsons, 1916) or w as congenital (e.g.,
h ave enough evidence to say that the b erdache adopted only those C ro w people, Denig, 1961). Th ese ethnotheories had consequence
aspects of the gender role w h ich their p articular society deem ed in the obligations o f the berdache to the society: Som e w ere healers,
im portant. In order to talk sen sibly about w h a t determ ined h o w storytellers to w ar parties, go-betw eens in lo ve affairs; some seem
m uch o f the gender role the berdache adopted, w e need to kn ow
to h ave been nonexceptional m em bers o f the society.
w h a t the established gender roles consisted of. Since anthropologists
used their ow n culture’s gender role dichotom y as criteria for eva l­
uating the berdache, it is often difficult to interpret their reports. For Problems of Interpretation
exam ple, D evereu x’s (T937) b e lie f in rigidly dichotom ized gender
W e h ave been careful to q u a lify m uch o f the description o f the
role categories kept him from m aking sense out o f a berdache role
berdache b y deliberately using phrases such as “ seem to be,” or
30 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Gender 31
“ w ere apparently considered." The nature of the data on w h ich our
w ith one. H ill is cited w id e ly in review s o f the berdache am ong the
conclusions are based is in m any w ay s suspect and in need o f exam ­
N avaho. This particular problem m akes it difficult to assess the
ination. In fact, some o f the problem s inherent in collecting and
representativeness o f any one incident ahd sim ilarly m akes it easy
interpreting the data m ay lim it h o w m uch w e can really kn ow
to see w h y there m ay be so little concensus in discussin g the ber­
about gender construction in other cultures. dache.
Som e problem s are com m on to any anthropological investigation:
(4) W e h ave no w a y o f assessing the exten t to w h ich the image
m aking contact w ith reliable inform ants; learning to differentiate
o f the b erdache given to the ethnographer b y the villagers w as in­
serious reports from jokes, m yths, and lies; and getting people to
fluenced b y the villa g er’s asum ptions about the ethnographer’s atti­
discuss personal aspects o f their lives. (See Pelto, 1970, for a com ­
tudes. Lurie (1953) suggests that the W innebago people w ere relu c­
plete discussion o f m ethodological issues in anthropology.)
tant to discuss their berdache h on estly w ith w h ite m en because the
O ther problem s are specific to the study o f the berdache and m ake
W innebago could tell that the w h ite m en regarded the institution
any findings difficult to interpret.
negatively. R eluctance could stem not only from em barrassm ent at
revealin g beh avior that w as being judged b y outsiders as immoral,
(1) M uch o f the data w as collected b y m issionaries and explorers
but also from b eliefs in the sacredness o f the institution and an
w h o w ere not com m itted to o b jective scientific procedures. W ester-
unw illingness to share this aspect o f the culture. If w e take these
m ark's (1917) re vie w o f the berdache (com plete through 1908) is
possibilities seriously, then there are som e problem s in interpreta­
referen ced b y m any contem porary w riters, but is com prised alm ost
tion. H ow do w e interpret the culture’s real attitude tow ard the ber­
entirely o f reports b y nonanthropologists. It should not be assum ed
dache? S p ecifically w e m ust account fo r som e reports that find the
that anthropologists h ave alw ays been su ccessfu l in achieving
b erdache to be held in disdain. A n d h o w do w e account for reports
valu e-free reports, but at least th ey are in tellectu ally com m itted to
that find the berdache to be a “ gender-role d isorder” ? If the inform ­
ach ieving them and (more recently) are exam ining the difficulty/
ants sensed that the ethnographer considered h om osexu ality and
im p ossibility o f this task.
cross-dressing sinful, then they m ay h ave presented their attitude
(2) Since the berdache w ere in existence prim arily in the nine­
tow ard the berdache as corresponding to the ethnographer’s. If the
teenth century, those w ho w rote about them in this century m ay only
inform ants sensed that the ethnographer considered nondichotom ous
h ave m et one or tw o m em bers of this dying institution, or m ore
gender as nonsensical, then they m ay h ave presented their definition
lik ely, m ay only h ave heard about them from other tribal m embers
o f the berdache phenom enon as corresponding to the ethnographer’s
w h o m ight not have had firsthand contact w ith them. Reichard definition.
(1928) states that several berdache w ere m entioned in the geneolo-
(5) A n thropologists as positivists collect data about other cultures
gies, but she never saw one. She then proceeds to describe them.
and then interpret it b y reference to their ow n organizing concepts.
The developm ent o f interest in gender issues in the m iddle o f the
In terms o f gender, they kn ow there are tw o genders w ith different
tw entieth century has resulted in the publication of some review s gender roles and th ey lo o k to see h o w these gender roles are filled in
o f the literature on the berdache. So, fo r exam ple, w e have Karlen, another culture. “ The task o f anthropology is to chart the range of
a w riter in 1971, sum m arizing and interpreting the w o rk of anthro­
hum an variation, both biological and cultural, and to discover the
p ologist D evereux, w ho, in 1937, reported a biography o f a “lesbian
factors m aking for and controlling this v a ria b ility " (Kluckhohn,
tran svestite” w h ich he (Devereux) constructed based on retro­ 1948, p. 88). The anthropologists’ interest has not been to
sp ective reports b y m em bers o f the M ohave com m unity, m ost of question the u n iversality o f their organizing concepts, but rather to
w hom never kn ew this berdache. ap ply them to n ew data.2 T h e anthropologists are interpreters o f
(3) B ecause there w ere not a large num ber o f berdache and
even ts: “ The villager does this; the villager says that; thus the v il­
because o f the problem o f secondhand reporting w e just discussed,
lager m eans . . . ” W e read these accounts aild m ust then either accept
m any of the generalizations about the b erdache institution are based or reject the. interpretation of the accounts. In addition, according to
on on ly a handful of cases. Hill (1943), fo r exam ple, gives hearsay
the ethnom ethodological perspective, the anthropologists have not
evidence about five berdache and recounts his ow n acquaintance
only constructed the interpretations for the reader, but they have
32 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
also constructed the accounts. Th at is, even before the anthropolo­
gists construct interpretations based on inform ants’ accounts, they
h ave m ethodologically structured the inform ants’ b eh avior to trans­
form it into a sensible (for the anthropologists] account.
For exam ple, O pler, an anthropologist, asked a m em ber o f the
U te Indians o f Colorado w hether or not any m em bers o f that society
indulged in h om osexu ality (Opler, 1965). O p ler says that the ques­
tion yield ed amusement, disbelief, and counterquestioning on
A m erican urban culture, and he concludes th at the Ute found that
a ridiculous question and that h om osexu ality is not p racticed among
adult Ute. W hat w e m ust ask ourselves is not only w h eth er the con­
clusion fo llo w s (i.e., that h om osexuality is not practiced b y the Ute)
but w h eth er in fact, the description "y ield ed amusement, disbelief,
. . .” is an ob jective report or an interpretation/coding o f behaviors
such as positioned m outh in w h a t looked like our smiles, gave out
noises that sounded lik e our laughter, opened eyes w id e as w e do
w h en w e seem not tqfibelieve som ething, and phrased the kind o f
sentences that w e do When w e w an t to kn ow something. The data,
then, are sounds from ’the m outh o f an individ ual. T h e interpretation
that fo llo w s is that the sound m eant laughter, the laughter m eant
am usem ent, and the am usem ent m eant "n o .” Th ere are tw o prob­
lem s here: w hether the anthropologist’s report is an accurate ob jec­
tive description o f w h a t w as really happening according to posi-
tivistic criteria, and W hether the report is a reasonable reconstruc­
tion o f w h a t the U te Were doing according to ethnom ethodological
criteria. A lth ou gh these are problem s com m on to any anthropologi­
cal issue, in studying the b erdache the problem is com pounded
becau se o f the string o f constructions. U sing our earlier exam ple of
secondhand reporting, w e see that K arlen ’s conclusions are a recon­
struction o f D evereu x’s reconstruction o f tribal m em bers’ recon­
structions.
Problems of Gender Attribution
L et us suppose that some Europeans com e to an early tw entieth-
century Indian village fo r the first time. T h ey have no idea that there
are such people as berdache in this village. H ow w ou ld th ey find
out? O ne p o ssib ility is that an inform ant w ou ld say: "W e h ave som e­
one here w h o w as born a m ale, but w ho is liv in g as a fem ale.” E ven
if the inform ant said: “ W e h ave som eone here w ho w as born a
male, but w h o has becom e a fem a le,” this m ay h av e been inter-
Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Gender 33
preted as "livin g as.” A noth er p ossib ility is that the observers notice
som eone w h o seem s to belong to one gender b u t looks lik e or is seen
doing the tasks o f the other gender. Sverdrup (1938) described a
“ w ell-dressed w om an . . . w ho looked so different from the other
w om en that w e noticed her at once. She w a s u n u su ally tall w ith a
thin Indian fa ce . . . She had to cut h er w h isk ers and . . . occasion ­
a lly h er v o ice w a s v e ry deep" (p. 125). O ur point is that com ing to a
village w ith the concept o f tw o genders, the observer sees tw o
genders and understands the berdache phenom enon in those terms.
The observers look fo r signs that fit their ow n criteria fo r the gen­
ders. Bogaras (1907) w rites that a person w a s dressed like a wom an,
b u t h ad a stubby b la ck beard; "there could b e no m isunderstanding
about the sex to w hich he really belon ged” (p. 450). W est ,(1967)
notes th at “ th ey [the berdache] h av e a pretence to fem in in ity” (p.
19). One problem w ith alm ost all ethnographic reports is that the
ethnographer fails to state h o w she/he cam e to kn ow that a par­
ticular person w as a berdache. W hat is clear is that the anthropolo­
gist in variab ly made a gender attribution (either m ale or female)
and assum ed th at the tribe had done so also. W e could assum e that
the pronoun that the anthropologists use to describe the berdache
reflects the gender attribution that th ey m ake. If so, then w e must
conclude that m ost anthropologists considered the berdache to be
really the gender that w as assigned at birth, since th ey generally
referred to the berdache w ith the pronoun o f their gender assign­
m ent. (Sverdrup’s preceding description is an exception to that gen­
eral finding.)
A lth ou gh D evereu x ’s (1937) M oh ave inform ants often refer to
berdache w ho w ere assigned m ale and becam e fem ale as “ sh e,”
D evereu x is carefu l to show his "o b je c tiv ity ” b y p lacin g the fem ale
pronoun in italics or quotation m arks. The sam e is true o f his p res­
entation o f m asculine pronouns. Rather than seeing the inform ant’s
ch oice o f pronoun as inform ative o f the b erdach e’s gender, D ever­
eu x instead sa w it as evidence of “ the h ighly institution alized char­
acter o f this cultural com plex” (p. 511).
If the anthropologists’ use o f pronouns is a direct translation from
the culture, then these pronouns w ou ld be signs o f the gender attri­
butions m ade b y the culture m em bers. H ow ever, it is not alw ays
ea sy to tell w h at gender attribution the m em bers h ave made. Zuni
people, in pointing to a berdache, explained to an anthropologist
that "sh e is a m an.” T h e anthropologist concluded that this w as "c e r­
tain ly m isleading to one not fam iliar w ith Indian th ought” (Steven­
son, 1901, p. 37). Presum ably, one fam iliar w ith Indian thought
34 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
w o u ld k n o w w hether the “ sh e” w as the defining gender label or the
“m an" w as.
T h e difficu lty'in differentiating the gender attribution of the ber-
dache as m ade by the anthropologist from that m ade b y tribal m em ­
bers is illustrated in the fo llo w in g anthropological report: A lon g­
time tribal friend o f Stevenson (an anthropologist) had died. “ So
carefu lly w as his sex concealed that fo r years the w riter b elieved
him to be a w o m an ” (Stevenson, 1901, p. 310, em phasis ours). S teven ­
son had regarded h e r friend as a wom an, since the friend w as alw ays
referred to as she. E ven after Stevenson “ found ou t,” she could not
think o f her as a man. From this report w e see that even though
S teven so n ’s initial gender attribution w as so strong as to be alm ost
im pervious to change, she b elieved that the frien d w as really a man
w ho su cce ssfu lly passed as a w om an. T h e difficulty she had in
changing the initial gender attribution in no w a y caused her to
question the va lid ity o f the second attribution. But w e do not kn ow
w h eth er the tribal m em bers had thought o f the friend a s :
1. A w om an w ho had been assigned as a fem ale and had alw ays
been a w om an (i.e., they, too, w ere “ fo o le d ” b y her passing).
2. A w om an w ho had been assigned as a male, but w ho had
transferred to the fem ale gender and w as accepted as such
(som ew hat analogous to the transsexual).
3. A man w ho w as pretending to be (or thought he w as) a w om an;
th ey hum ored him or sh ow ed respect for him b y referring to
him as a she.
4. A berdache w ho w as not classifiable in term s o f m ale or fem ale.
If w e assum e that the pronouns used to address a person cor­
respond to the gender the person is considered to be, then evidence
points to the berdache having been considered b y their society as
belonging to the gender they "ad o p ted ” not the one they w ere as­
signed at birth. H ill (1935) states that he w a s told that polite persons
alw a ys call the berdache b y the kinship term s used for a w om an o f
their relationship and age to the speaker, and that m ost uncles or
nep h ew s call her “ m other." There are m an y other accounts of ber­
dache w h o se initial gender assignm ent w as “ m ale” being referred
to as fem ale (e.g., Sverdrup, 1938; Parsons, 1916). A n alternative
interpretation is that the people w ere hum oring3 or honoring the
berdache b y using the pronouns that the berdache w anted
used.
T o further com plicate the analysis, there is not alw ays a corre­
Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Gender 35
spondence b etw een the pronouns used to address individ uals and
the pronouns used to refer to them. A p articular herm aphrodite,
w hom Edgerton (1964) observed, w as u su ally referred to as a w om an
but w as addressed as “ sererr” w h ich m eans “ m ale and fem ale yet
neither m ale nor fem ale.” This is analogous, according to Edgerton,
to our concep t o f neuter and w as a perjorative w hen addressed to a
“ norm al” person. His analogy is, w e think, a forced one, since the
translation clearly goes beyond our concept o f neuter. “ N euter”
m eans no gender and w e assign this only to nonhum an objects. The
translation o f "sererr” im plies a concept fo r w h ich w e h ave no term.
T h is introduces the seem ingly insurm ount ible problem o f concept
translation through language translation
B ecause w e do not have berdache in our society, w e h ave no
English w ord fo r them other than “ b erdach e.” W e h ave alreacfy dis­
cussed h ow some w riters have substituted the term s transvestite,
hom osexual, or herm aphrodite for berdache, and w e h ave explained
the confusion resulting from their doing so. Som e ethnographers,
rather than assigning one of the gender-based lab els to the berdache,
h ave tried to solve the labelin g problem b y giving a literal transla­
tion to the tribal culture's label fo r the berdache. E xam ples o f these
translations are: “ m en -w om en ” (Parsons, 1916; L ow ie, 1935), “ pre­
tend to be ‘nadle’ (herm aphrodite)” (Hill, 1935), “ h om osexual o f the
ridge p o o l” (refers to being in the house doing fem ale chores) (Kar­
len, 1971), “ soft m an” (Bogarus, 1907), “ sim ilar to w om an ” (Bo-
garus, 1907), “h a lf m an -h alf w om an ” (Hoebel, .1960), “ neu ter”
(Denig, 1961), “hum an it” (M uensterberger, 1965), "not m an -not
w om an ” (Craw ley, 1960). O cca sio n a lly the berdache is referred to
w ith the sam e term that the so ciety uses fo r referring to other types
o f people, fo r exam ple, “ co w a rd s" (Karlen, 1971), "sterile p eop le"
(Karlen, 1971), “ circum cised” (C raw ley, 1960). C learly, a num ber of
these terms (e.g., “ h alf m an -h alf w om an ” ) could be seen as indi­
cating the presence o f other gender realities.
Th at there m ay not alw ays be agreem ent am ong tribal members
as to w h a t their name fo r the berdache means, is illustrated b y
Lurie’s (1953) interview s w ith the W innebago. T h eir w o rd “ sian ge”
w a s vario u sly interpreted fo r her as m eaning " a no good," “ a
eunuch,” or an “ unm anly m an.” C learly, each person w h o provided
Lurie w ith a definition held a different conception o f the berdache.
A n y translation is dependent, in part, on the m eanings fo r the
person in terview ed and on the interpretation o f the tra n sla tes In
tryin g to com e to terms w ith other cu ltu res’ concepts o f gender, it
m akes a difference w hether the people thought o f the berdache as
36 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
neither m ale nor fem ale, h alf m ale and h alf fem ale, or definitely m ale
or definitely fem ale but w ith some ch aracteristics o f the other. The
answ er m ay lie in the language of the people, but if anthropologists
interpret that language according to their ow n concepts, then the
language analysis is in evitab ly lim ited. If anthropologists held the
notion of tw o and only tw o genders, th ey w ould h ave to translate
the culture's term fo r berdache according to that organizing prin­
ciple. In other w ords, the berdache w o u ld have to be some variation
o f a man or a w om an. The w o rd chosen fo r translation necessarily
structures our thinking about the berdache. D avenport, an anthro­
p ologist w ho liv ed am ong the M alanesians, asked them if there w ere
m en in the tribe w h o enjoyed m en but did no^ enjoy w om en (1965].
T h e y could not understand his question since, as D avenport e x ­
plained, th ey have no concept, and consequen tly no w ord, fo r exclu ­
sive hom osexuality. To m ake our ow n an alysis o f their perplexity:
If there w ere an individual in that so ciety w ith a penis w h o desired
m en and not w om en, that individual m ight not be considered to be
a man. The confusion w ith D avenport’s question m ay h ave been
becau se there w ere no e x clu siv e ly h om osexual m ales and y e t there
m ay have been individuals w ith penises w h o enjoyed other individ­
uals w ith penises. Sim ilarly, because w e do not have berdache liv ­
ing in our society, w e m ay not be able to understand the m eaning of
the nam es used to describe them in the w a y that m em bers o f the
culture understood them.
CONCLUSIONS
W hat are w e to conclude from this? W e h ave show n h o w an­
thropologists as nonm em bers m ay not k n o w the m eaning o f events
in other everyd ay w orlds, and hence use their ow n construction of
gender to construct gender in other societies. W ithin this serious
lim itation, w e n o w attem pt to construct evidence about the status of
the gender com ponents in other cultures, using the anthropologists’
accounts as our resource.
Gender Assignment
A ssign in g people at birth to categories based on som e concept of
gender appears to be universal and, as far as w e know , is alw ays
through a genital inspection. This is even true of the intersexed
Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Gender 37
individual. W hile in our society in tersexu ality is u su ally resolved
b y choosing the gender (male or fem ale) that the genitals m ost
qlearly approxim ate or b y consulting other b iological criteria, in
societies, such as Potok, w ithou t access to surgical procedures or
b iological "fa c ts ” the intersexed child seem s to be assigned neither
a m ale nor a fem ale gender, but a third gender— “ in tersexed .” The
fa c t that the Potok seem not to be confused about the gender o f an
intersexed child at birth, and that for them the child is neither
fem ale nor male, suggests the p ossib ility of a third gender category.
A v a ila b le data on the berdache do not inform this issue, since
individuals did not becom e berdache until childhood, w e ll after
th ey had been assigned a definite m ale or fem ale gender.
W e m ake all statem ents about cross-cultural gender assignm ent
w ith caution. G iven the fact that anthropological accounts aite p ro­
duced b y persons w ho take gender and gender assignm ent for
granted, w e can not kn ow if there exist particular cultures w h ich do
not do this.
j
Gender Identity
This is the m ost difficult o f the constructs to valid ate fo r a number
o f reasons. There are no visible signs o f gender identity and it m ust
be inferred from such evidence as self-referen ts. In addition, the
concept o f gender identity is a rela tively recent one and conse­
quen tly w as not used b y any of the ethnographers w ho studied the
berdache directly.
W h at w e can conclude from the accounts is that the herdache
did not have to argue that their gender identity w as discordent w ith
their gender assignm ent or that th ey k n ew th ey w ere the “ w ron g”
gender all along. W e do not kn ow w hether th ey claim ed to have felt
them selves to be berdache all along or w h eth er th ey fe lt clearly m ale
or fem ale at one point in time and then later fe lt clea rly berdache.
Presum ably if w e asked all people w h o ever lived w h at their
gender identity w as, they might be able to respond to that question
w ith a gender-related answ er. There is no reason to believe, h o w ­
ever, that the answ er w ould in evitab ly be “ m ale” or “ fem ale.” It
m ight me “ m an -w om an ” or "in tersexed ." There has n ever been a
report of a culture w ith no gender categories. To say that gender
iden tity is universal is p robably true in the sense that all people
k n o w w h a t category th ey belong to, but m ay be incorrect if w e m ean
kn ow in g w hether th ey are m ale or fem ale.
38 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
Gender Role
It is obvious that even if the m ale/fem ale dichotom y is universal,
h o w one is supposed to behave as a m em ber o f one of these cate­
gories has varied. Not only has m ale/fem ale gender role varied, but
the role behavior that som eone m ust engage in in order to be seen
as a berdache has varied from society to society. A ccep tin g the
n on un iversality o f gender role does not necessitate a radical rein­
terpretation o f gender. A s w e suggested earlier, it can be incorpor­
ated quite easily w ithin a traditional p ositivist fram ew ork. W hat
w e suggest in the n ext section, though, does require a fundam entally
different perspective fo r understanding gender role.
Gender Attribution
W e cannot say that in all cultures people h ave alw ays attributed
gender according to the m ale/fem ale dichotom y, although it is clear
that all ethnographers h ave taken that fo r granted.
Based on som e o f the evidence w e h av e cited in this chapter, w e
propose that there is a strong probab ility that in some nonindustrial
cultures gender role is seen as the basis o f gender attribution just as
in our culture genitals are seen as the basis. In som e cultures, as far
as m em bers w ere concerned, the invariant criteria fo r being seen as
m ale or fem ale (i.e., attributing a m ale or a fem ale gender to som e­
one) w as the role one perform ed. Thus, a person w ith a vagin a w ho
perform ed tasks that persons w ith penises w ere assigned at birth
(e.g., going to war) w ould be co gn itively grouped w ith those persons
w ith penises and seen to be o f the sam e gender. The genital w ould
h ave no im portance in the gender attribution.
For exam ple, the N avaho Indians of the nineteenth century w ere
addressed b y m ale or fem ale kinship term s according to the type
o f clothing they w ore (Reichard, 1928). O n the Peleu Islands “ the
m an dressed as a w om an w as regarded and treated as a w om an”
(C raw ley, 1960). D evereu x (1967) reports that tribal m embers som e­
tim es made the “ w ron g" gender attribution to fieldw orkers because
o f the fieldw orkers’ dress and behavior. For exam ple, unless C ath­
olic m issionaries grew beards, they w ou ld often be seen as w om en
becau se o f their robes. P ositivists see the person and the treatm ent
o f the person as necessarily separate phenom enon. T h ey w ould see
these as cases o f persons being regarded and treated in terms o f their
dress, irrespective o f their gender (w hich is a b iological fact for the
Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Gender 39
p ositivist). W e, on the other hand, m aintain that a p erson ’s gender
is w h a t they are regarded and treated as, that is, the gender o f som e­
one is the sam e as the gender attribution w h ich is m ade about them.
G ender is, in the first place, a social fact.
In the cases just cited, the p erson ’s gender corresponds to his/
h er dress; in other cases (e.g., contem porary A m erica) a person’s
gender m ight correspond to h is/her genitals. In both cases the cor­
responding factors (dress or genitals) are not the sam e as the gender,
but rather are essential signs that others use to support gender
attributions. T h ey are equally real signs. W h at is interesting is that
w h ile m em bers o f our culture can see that dress is not essential, and
that people w h o think that are “ w ro n g ” /"p rim itive” /“ m isinform ed,”
th ey h ave difficulty seeing that this is eq ually true o f genitals.
A lth ou gh genitals w ere not the defining featu re o f gender,^ they
w ere im portant insignia in the sam e w a y dress is fo r us. C huckee
sham en w h o w ere transform ed from m en into w om en w ere “ said to
acquire the organs o f a w om an in tim e’’ (Bogoras, 1907). T h e M ohave
b erdache reportedly dem anded that people call their penis a clitoris,
their testicles “ labia m ajora,” and their anus "v a g in a ” (Devereux,
1937), In describing the p eop le’s attitude tow ard a particular ber­
dache, D evereu x quotes their jeer, "the H w am e is proud now ! She
thinks perhaps she got a penis” 4 (p. 524). Karlen, w ho draw s m ost
o f his conclusions from D evereu x’s data, p rovid es us w ith a clear
statem ent o f the W estern v ie w of gender and interpretations o f the
berdache. “ The sex-role reversal has a social reality to everyone
(the M ohave). But th ey joked at tim es about the real hidden genitals,
w h ich hadn't changed along w ith the ro le” (Karlen, 1971, p. 470). In
his view , the “ real” genitals define the “ real” gender. A lth ou gh these
societies m ay have recognized that the b erdach e’s genitals w ere
discordent w ith the berdach e’s role, there is no evidence that the
genitals w ere in any w a y m ore real than the role in defining gender.
The jokes m ight be sim ilar to our jo kes about fem ale im personators,
but in reverse. W e joke about their clothes, kn ow in g th ey are
“ r e a lly ” men. The M oh ave m ay h ave joked about the berdach e’s
penises, kn ow in g that they w ere “ re a lly ” berdache.
Th ere is no m ention of the berdache (unlike to d ay’s transsexuals)
w an ting to, or needing to, or trying to change their genitals in order
to be seen as the appropriate gender; and there is no reason to b e­
liev e that if surgery had been availab le th ey w ou ld h ave requested
it. The cerem ony that m arked the b erdach e’s m ovem ent from one
gender to another included being given the clothing o f the other
40 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Gender 41
gender to w ear. The final stage in a tran ssexu al’s treatm ent is genital NOTES
reconstruction. In both cases, the persons receive, in a culturally
1. We generally refer to the berdache as "becoming the other gender"
institution alized m anner, the essential insignia of their “ n e w ” gen­ rather than “ assuming the other gender role,” because from our perspective,
der. T h ese signs are essential in the sense that w ithou t them the that appears to be a more accurate description of their treatment by
gender transform ation cannot be taken seriously. N either the cere­ members of their own culture. It is also possible that in some cultures the
m ony nor the operation is seen as causing the transform ation (in berdache became a third gender. In either case, "became" is the
fact, in the case o f transsexuals, there is no transform ation [see appropriate verb.
C hapter 5]). 2. This would particularly be true of the earlier anthropologists. More
N ot only w ere the genitals no m ore real than the role, but the recently, anthropologists (e.g., Dimen-Schein, 1977) have begun to consider
genitals could apparently be ignored as a nondefining feature, w hile how they apply their concepts to other cultures. Our primary data on the
the role could not. T o say "R obin is a m an” m ay be equivalent in berdache were provided, however, by anthropologists prior
som e societies to "R obin is a hunter,” just as it is seen to be to this contemporary consideration.
equivalent in our so ciety to “ Robin has a penis" or “ Robin has a Y 3. In our culture, examples of this include referring to a male-to-female
chrom osom e.” W e suggested in the p recedin g G ender Identity sec­ transsexual as “ she" even if the speaker does not believe in transseAialism
tion that w e should not E xpect that the answ ers to “ W hat are y o u ?” or does not believe that the person is a transsexual. Male homosexuals
w o u ld necessarily be ,‘'m ale” or "fem a le.” It m ight be "m an - in certain subcultures jestingly refer to one another as “she” with
w om an.” It m ight also "be "h un ter” or "sto ry teller” or "p otter.” full awareness that they are all male (Newton, 1972).
W h at w e consider a coj&elate o f gender m ay be seen b y others as 4. Although female-to-male berdache were said to use dildoes, this
its defining feature. Sim ilarly, w h at w e consider the defining feature was acknowledged as a mechanical device in order to satisfy their
o f gender m ay be seen others as m erely a correlate. partners; it does not appear that it was considered a real phallus by
anyone, including the berdache.
T o accept as evidenc(|rof som eone’s gender w h eth er a child grabs
a b o w and arrow or bafeket m aterial as he/sh e runs outside o f a
burning enclosure, is nd less legitim ate than accepting as evidence
w h eth er a child has a ptenis or vagina or X Y or X X chrom osom es.
It w ou ld be w ron g to sajy that if only the "p rim itive” cultures kn ew
about b io lo gy they w ou ld define m ale and fem ale in the correct w a y
(i.e., our w ay], since as w e argue in C hapter 3, people do not make
gender attributions on the basis of kn ow in g about biological criteria.
The w a y s in w h ich a group constructs gender, in turn, determ ine
the correlates cited fo r evidence o f gender. For other groups to share
our e ve ry d a y reasons (i.e., biology) fo r attributing gender it w ould
be n ecessary for them to share our construction of the w orld. It is
this construction that results in our seeing our w a y as right, not any
absolute standard. Being m em bers o f a certain sociocultural group,
and having to rely on secondhand reports, w e are not in the position
to describe h o w people: in other cultures m ake/m ade gender attri­
butions. W e have, h ow ever, sh ow n h o w it is possible that the w a y
w e construct gender is not n ecessarily u niversal over time and place.
W e liv e in a w orld o f tw o biological genders. But that m ay not be
the only w orld.
 Biology and Gender 43

has already occurred than it is to see present facts as part o f a

process w h ich w ill continue to change in the future. In everyd ay

3 ________ -life, our tendency is to v ie w w h at w e k n o w n o w as the final truth,

and to forget that the truth undergoes constant change as n ew sci­
BIOLOGY entific discoveries are made. For exam ple, w e n ow k n o w that m any
diseases are caused b y m icroorganism s rather than m oral w eakness.
AND GENDER W e can see h ow a theory o f disease b ased on the latter cause w ould
lead to v e ry different types o f research and treatm ent than w h a t w e
h ave now . H ow ever, because o f the w a y realities are constructed,
because o f the “ incorrigible p roposition s” w h ich w e hold (see
A s in e very scientific discipline, the biological sciences m ake
C hapter 1), w e say that earlier theories w ere “ w ro n g " for various
certain assum ptions about the nature o f reality. B iology,1 h ow ever,
reasons, and that w e now kn ow the “ true fa c ts ” about disease.
has a unique role. B iological factors tend to be seen as the m ost
W hat w e tend to forget is that this is a continuing process. N ew
b asic and prim ary of causes. The em phasis on biological versus
discoveries, technologies, and interpretations fo rce biologists to
environm ental causation has changed over time, at least partly
change some o f their basic assum ptions (although p robab ly not all
because “ bio logical" has been interpreted as synonym ous fo r “ un­
o f their “incorrigible propositions” ) and, as a result, there w ill con­
ch an geable” and “ natural” (in a religious or m oral sense). Social
tinue to be changes in the “ fa c ts ” (see, e.g., Kuhn, 1970; Toulm in,
historians h ave dem onstrated h o w biological explanations have
1961).
been used b y both scientists and interpreters o f scien ce-to ju stify
One o f the m ost im portant contem porary exam ples o f the points
the continued exploitation o f certain groups. For example,__if_the
w e h ave been m aking is the concern w ith the scientific definition of
scarcity o f w om en in positions o f p o w er is seen as “ b io lo g ica lly ”
death. This is esp ecially relevan t to our study o f gender, because
caused, then, depending on h ow this type o f causation is interpreted,
until v e ry recen tly life and death w ere seen as clearly dichotom ous.
it m ight be concluded that nothing can (or should) be done about it
A n individual w as either one or the other, and there w as little de­
(Ehrenreich and English, 1973). The reaction o f som e scientists to
bate about w h ich state a person w as in. A s tech nology and instru­
this use o f b iology has been to search fo r environm ental explana­
m entation becam e m ore and m ore refined, h ow ever, the presence or
tions fo r the sam e behaviors. If w e v ie w scien ce as a w a y o f con­
absence o f certain criteria fo r life becam e less clear. W as a person
structing the w orld, then the question: Is gender totally biological
w h o se heart continued to beat only b ecau se she/he w a s attached to a
or to ta lly environm ental? can be seen in a n ew w ay. A s O unstead
respirator dead or alive? The need for “ liv e ” organs for organ
and T a y lo r (1972) state, that is like asking if a coin is “ really ” heads
transplants brought this question to the fore. A new , dichotom ous,
or tails. G ender is at once to tally environm ental and totally b io ­
criterion w as needed for m aking a “ death attribution.” Since b io­
logical. In other w ords, depending on the m ethods and assum ptions
logists had com e to see the brain, rather than the heart, as the
that are applied to w h a tever is being observed, gender is w h a tever
source of life functions, and since a w a y of m aking brain function
w e m ake o f it. In seeing the biological scien ces as the foundation
visible had been developed (EEG's), exam ining the indicators o f brain
for all behaviors, w e tend to o verlook the fa c t that this is only one
activity seem ed to be a w a y of answ ering the question o f w hether
o f an infinite num ber o f w ay s o f seeing the w orld. This does not
som eone w as still alive. H ow ever, except for totally flat recordings,
m ean, o f course, that reality should or should not be constructed in
w h ich are not common, E EG ’s are not y et dichotom ous criteria. T h ey
this w ay ; it only m eans that it is im portant to be aw are that it is
still m ust be interpreted by people.
constructed.
A n excellen t illustration o f h o w the “ sign s” o f life and death
In seeing biological facts as dictating the range o f hum an p ossi­
receive their m eaning only through their connection to m ore basic
bilities, another point is also often overlooked, w hich is that b io­
assum ptions, is a study reported in The N ew Y ork Times (Rens-
logical facts change w ith time. It is easier to see the change that
berger, 1976). Dr. A drian U pton connected a blob o f jello to an
EEG m achine set up in a hospital w ard. The recordings, according
42
44 Gender; A n Ethnomethodological Approach
to U pton, could h ave been interpreted as show ing signs of life. "The
neurologist said that sim ilar electrical artifacts interfering w ith a real
EEG test could confuse doctors into b elievin g that a person’s brain
w a s still livin g w hile, in fact, it m ight be as lifele ss as a blob o f
Jello" (p. 50). Life canqot be defined m erely b y a recording on a
p iece o f paper. A t the v e ry least, the o b ject from w h ich the record­
ing w a s taken m ust be one to w hich a “ life attribution” could be
m ade. L ife is not defined b y E EG ’s but b y b asic assum ptions about
w h a t life is in the first place.
Legal actions h ave brought the question o f the scientific definition
o f death into the public arena fo r debate, and it is becom ing clearer
that some group or groups, p robably p h ysicians, are going to have to
decide w h a t death is. T h e criteria m ay be scientific and they m ay
be dichotom ous (e.g., the presence or absence o f a certain type of
brain rhythm fo r a certain length o f time), but that decision w ill show
h o w the life/d eath dichotom y, and determ inations regarding specific
individuals, are so cia lly constructed. F inally, it is even conceivable
that evidence acceptable to scientists about w h a t happens after
“ death ,” m ay one d ay bring the w h o le life/d eath dichotom y itse lf
into question.
O ur argum ent in this |»ook is that w h a t w e h av e been saying about
the life/d eath dichotom y is as true o f the m ale/fem ale dichotom y.
Just as the EEG is one criterion fo r death, and ju st as E EG ’s are
taken as a sign o f life only w hen m ore b asic assum ptions are met,
w e w ill see h o w various biological criteria m a y be taken as a sign
o f gender only in certain circum stances. W e begin b y presenting the
biolo gical facts about gender and w h a t th e y suggest about the
bio lo gical foundations o f gender identity, role, and attribution,
w ith in a biological fram ew ork. This is fo llo w e d b y a critical analysis
of biologists' view s of gender as th ey reflect the process of a socially
constructed gender dichotom y.
BIOLOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS
OF GENDER2
For the biologist, both the concept o f gender3 and the gender of
a particular individual is grounded in reproductive processes. A ll
livin g organism s reproduce them selves, and there are tw o w ays by
w h ich this can be done. Som e plants and anim als reproduce through
a process o f fission; part of the organism breaks off from the
Biology and Gender 45
original, form ing a new individual. A m oebae reproduce this w ay , as
do straw berries, among others. In this typ e o f reproduction, kn ow n
*as asexual reproduction, the genetic m aterial o f the n ew individual
is identical to that o f the original organism .
T h e second typ e o f reproduction occu rs w h e n a n e w individual
is form ed from genetic m aterial contributed b y tw o separate mem­
bers of the species. This process, sexual reproduction, has the advan­
tage o f allow in g fo r greater variab ility and evolution am ong the
m em bers o f the species. In order for the tw o sets o f genetic m aterial
to fuse and form a n ew individual, there m ust be a w a y fo r the cell
containing one set o f genetic m aterial to reach and m erge w ith the
cell containing the other set. There m ust also be provision for the
nourishm ent o f the developing structure until it has becom e a viable
organism . T h ese functions are accom plished b y one reproductive
Cell having the potential to provide nourishm ent (the egg cell), and
the other reproductive cell (the sperm cell) h aving the potential to
reach and penetrate the cell w all o f the first cell.4
In biological term inology, individuals w ho produce sperm cells
are classified as "m ale” and individuals w ho produce egg cells are
classified as "fem ale.” H ow are egg and sperm cell carriers designed
to prom ote the success of this type o f reproduction? H ow does this
p rocess of reproduction result in n ew individuals w h o carry either
sperm or egg cells, b u t n ot both?5
The answ ers to these questions com e from the stu d y o f biological
factors in the norm al developm ent of fem ales (egg cell carriers) and
m ales (sperm cell carriers). T h e w a y s in w h ich fem ales and m ales
function to prom ote the success o f sexual reproduction depends on
the species. For plants, and som e animals, sexual reproduction is
m erely a m atter o f the random com bination o f a sperm cell and an
egg cell. For exam ple, a fem ale sea urchin m ay deposit a large num ­
ber o f eggs in the surrounding w ater w h ich m ay or m ay not be
fertilized b y sperm cells ejaculated b y a m ale sea urchin in th e im ­
m ediate environm ent.
H ow ever, in other species, including homo sapiens, the process of
selective com binations takes over, T h e m ale and fem ale select one
another as individuals for the purpose o f engaging in at least one
reproductive act. Selection m akes it m ore lik e ly that in any given
case the reprod uctive cells w ill merge, and, thus, a m uch sm aller
num ber o f egg cells needs to be produced. S election necessitates
that sperm and egg cell carriers be able to distinguish one another
as such, and also b e able to distinguish the other as being different
from all m embers o f the sam e reprod uctive category. Thus some
 46 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
type o f gender dim orphism is n ecessary from a biological p ersp ec­
tive. N evertheless, “ (e)ven granted dim orphism , sexual reproduc­
tion does not require a particular form for either sex, nor that the
sexes should be clearly recognizable b etw een species. N or need the
dim orphism be perm anent throughout the life span. Nor indeed need
the beh aviors w h ich bring the gam etes [sperm and egg cells] to­
gether necessarily be perm anent or sim ilar w ithin classes or sp ecies”
(Ounstead and Taylor, 1972, p. 243). In other w ord s, w h at has to be
dim orphic is not so obvious. 1 o f clarity, each type o f abnorm ality is d iscussed as it relates to par­
It is at this point in the discussion o f the reprod uctive process that
biologists and those w h o interpret their w o rk often m ake assum p­
tions that m ay not be w arranted, often construct dichotom ies that
m ay not exist. For exam ple, O unstead and T aylor, the authors w e
h ave just quoted, go on to state, "F or m an,0 success in sexual repro­
duction requires . . . suitable beh avior fo r the sex in training fo r the
adult role . . . (and) suitable secondary se x ch aracteristics" (Ounstead
and Taylor, 1972, p. 243, em phasis ours). W h y these should be
required, and w hat “ su itab le” m eans, is le ft unstated. Perhaps the
authors assum e that w e all know ; and perhaps w e do on som e level.
Th at is, w e are able to tell if another person is fem ale or male, and
m ost o f us present ourselves as m em bers o f our biological gender
(i.e., as egg or sperm cell carriers).
H ow ever, the m eanings of the term s “ m ale” and “ fem ale" in
every d a y life, and in m uch biological w riting, are quite different
from the purely reproductive sense, esp ecia lly w hen hum an beings
are the subject o f the w riting. Fem ales and m ales m ust distinguish
each other fo r the purpose o f reproduction, but (a) not all people
can, or w ish to, reproduce; (b) n ew technologies, such as artificial
insem ination and em bryo transplants, m ay change m ethods of
hum an reproduction; and (c) it is difficult to see h o w certain “ suit­
able b eh avio rs" (e.g., being cooperative vs. being com petitive) are
n ecessary in order fo r people to tell fem ales from m ales. N everth e­
less, despite the fa ct that the biological stud y o f gender often goes
fa r beyond its foundations, it should be rem em bered that the foun­
dation o f biological studies o f gender is in the process o f repro­
duction.
The second question w e posed w as h ow sexual reproduction
results in n ew individuals w ho are either sperm or egg cell carriers,
but n o rb o th . To answ er this w e present a b rie f rev iew o f biological
factors in norm al hum an gender developm ent, w h ich is follow ed
b y a discussion of the contribution o f b iological factors to gender
identity, role, and attribution. In m aking this assessm ent, one o f
Biology and Gender 47
the m ost im portant sources o f the inform ation w e h av e com es from
the study o f individuals w ho are born w ith various gender-related
biological abnorm alities. Since fo r ethical reasons scientists cannot
study such factors as the effects o f prenatal horm ones on hum an
beh avior b y controlling horm ones during p renatal life, the only
inform ation w e have about these effects in hum an beings is from
those w h o w ere exposed, either in ad verten tly or becau se of other
abnorm alities, to abnorm al levels o f prenatal horm ones. F or the sake
ticular b iological factors.
THE BIOLOGICAL *
DEVELOPMENT OF
FEMALES AND MALES
In hum an beings, the basic genetic coding is carried on 23 pairs
o f chrom osom es. E very cell in the hum an b od y contains these 46
chrom osom es except fo r the reprod uctive cells w hich , after they
are fu lly mature, contain h alf o f the n ecessary genetic m aterial,
that is, 23 chrom osom es. The tw enty-th ird p air o f chrom osom es are
kn ow n as the “ se x " chrom osom es, b ecau se th ey determ ine w hat
typ e of reproductive cell the m ature individ ual w ill produce. N or­
m ally, the tw enty-third chrom osom e of the egg cell is fa irly large and
shaped like the letter “X ” . The tw enty-third chrom osom e o f the
sperm cell m ay be either “ X ” shaped, or sm aller and shaped more
lik e the letter “ Y ". W hen a sperm cell su ccessfu lly penetrates an
egg cell, and the 23 chrom osom es from each reprod uctive cell pair
to form the nucleus o f the cell w h ich w ill develop into the fetus, the
result is one o f tw o possible com binations fo r the tw enty-th ird pair
— either X X or X Y. Since reproductive cells w ill contain only one
o f the in divid ual’s tw o gender chrom osom es, X X individuals w ill
only produce reproductive cells w ith X chrom osom es w h ile X Y
individ uals w ill produce some reprod uctive cells w ith X chrom o­
som es and others w ith Y chrom osom es.
Th e gender chrom osom es begin to affect the developm ent o f the
em bryo about six w eeks after conception. A t that time, the genetic
coding on the Y chrom osom e, if there is one, causes the medulla,
or inner layer, o f the gonads (glands w h ich have developed in the
abdom inal cavity) to develop into testes w hich, at puberty, w ill
produce sperm. If there is a second X chrom osom e, rather than a
Y , the cortex, or outer layer, o f the gonads develop (som etimes as
48 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
Biology and Gender 49
late as tw elv e w eeks after conception) into ovaries w h ich contain
produce greater amounts of androgens rela tive to the am ount of
all the egg cells w h ich w ill be released, beginning at puberty. Thus,
estrogen and progresterone (thus androgen is the "m ale” hormone).
the developm ent o f the gonads is d irectly influenced b y the gender
T h ese horm ones are also produced by the cortex o f the adrenal
chrom osom es.7 glands in both genders, in about equal proportions.
Soon after the testes h ave developed, at about eight w eeks, they
A s is the case w ith prenatal horm ones, the p h ysica l effects of
begin to produce a horm one, androgen, and a second substance,
pubertal horm ones are clear. A ndrogens facilitate the developm ent
w h o se nature is not know n, w h ich is referred to as M ullerian inhibit­
and grow th o f bones and m uscles, affect the laryn x so that it en­
ing substance. During jthe third fetal m onth (8-12 w eeks), the andro­
larges (deepening the voice and resulting in an "ad am ’s apple” ),
gens cause a set of ducts, the W olffian, to develop into sem inal
cause h air to g row on the face and body, enlarge the genitals, set
vesicles, ejacu latory ducts, and the vas deferens, w hile the M uller­
off the process that leads to sperm production and ejaculatory
ian inhibiting substances causes a second set o f ducts, the M ullerian,
cap acity, increase libido, and lead to the grow th o f p ub ic and
to atrophy. In the absence o f androgen and M ullerian inhibiting sub­
a x illa ry hair. M any o f these effects occur in both genders, esp ecially
stance, as w hen the gonads h ave becom e ovaries, the W olffian ducts
the last tw o. Estrogens cause breasts to develop, facilitate fatty
degenerate and the M hllerian ducts develop into fallopian tubes, a
deposits (especially around the hips and buttocks), decrease the
uterus, and the upper vagina. In the adult, only vestiges rem ain o f the
serum cholesterol level, slow dow n grow th of bones, and begin the
ducts and layers o f the gonads w h ich did not develop prenatally.
process o f ovu lation and m enstruation. B eyon d the p h ysica l effects,
O ther effects that androgens secreted b y the feta l testes m ay
h ow ever, it is im portant to kn ow w hat, if any, are the p sych ological
h ave are not to tally Understood. It is kn ow n that they affect the
and b eh avioral effects of pubertal horm ones. A s in the case o f p re­
genitals o f the fetus, uo that in the third m onth o f-fe ta l life, the
natal horm ones, this is an extrem ely difficult question to answ er
genital tubercle develops into a penis, the urethral folds close, and
and w ill be tem porarily postponed. A ssessin g the effects o f various
the lab ialscro tal sw ellin gs fu se to form the scrotum into w h ich the
biological factors on gender identity, role, and attribution can best
testes descend from the abdom en sh ortly before birth. It is also
be done b y taking these factors one at a time and review in g the
kn ow n that in the absence o f androgens, the tubercle develop s into
relevan t scientific literature on their contribution to th e com ponents
a clitoris, the folds into labia m inorae, and the sw ellin gs into labia o f gender.
m ajorae. B y about 16 w eeks, then, the developm ent o f the fetu s
into a potential sperm producer is com plete, and b y about 20 w eeks
the developm ent o f the fetus into a potential egg producer is com ­ Chromosomes and Gender
plete, at least in term s o f the p h ysical apparatus (both internal and
external) n ecessary to accom plish the in d iv id u a l’s rep rod uctive role.
Chrom osom es and G ender Identity. M ost people h ave either X X or
O ther possible effects o f the presence or absence of prenatal andro­
X Y chrom osom es. H ow ever, a significant num ber o f possible com ­
gens are ju st beginning to b e explored, particularly fo r hum an beings.
binations ex ist.8 In fact, alm ost e v e ry com bination o f gender chrom o­
W e deal w ith this in later sections.
som es has been found in hum an beings, w ith one exception. It
A t birth, and until the beginning o f puberty, the child produces
appears that there m ust be at least one X chrom osom e in order for
low , steady, levels of both androgens and estrogens. W hen puberty
a fetus to be viable. This is p robab ly because vital genes are carried
begins (triggered b y som e unknow n m echanism , perhaps a critical
on the X chrom osom e, w hile the sm aller Y chrom osom e carries a
bod y w eigh t [Frisch and M cA rthur, 1974]), the hypothalam us stim u­
m inim al am ount of genetic coding.
lates the p itu itary gland to p roduce large am ounts o f follicle stim ­
A ll the scientific evidence indicates that chrom osom es h ave little
ulating horm one (FSH). FSH stim ulates the gonads to begin p ro­
or no d irect effect on w h eth er persons fe e l that th ey are fem ale or
duction o f m uch higher le v e ls o f horm ones than had been produced
m ale. One o f the m ost com pelling exam ples o f this are people w ith
in childhood. A ndrogens and estrogens are produced b y both testes
com plete androgen insensitivity. This is a genetic (but not gender
and ovaries, but the ovaries produce m ore estrogen and progesterone
chrom osom e linked) inability of the cells in the b od y to respond to
than androgen (thus estrogen is the "fe m a le ” hormone) and the testes
androgens. B ecause the fetus cannot respond to prenatal androgens
 50 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
secreted b y the fetal testes in an X Y fetus, persons w ith total andro­
gen insensitivity develop norm al fem ale genitals and are assigned
the gender "fe m a le ” at birth. A t puberty, the testes produce enough
estrogen to "fem in ize” the body, and the condition is only d isco v­
ered w hen failure to m enstruate m otivates a m edical consultation.
There has been no report o f affected individuals developing an y­
thing other than norm al fem ale gender identities.
A n o th er exam ple is transsexualism . A m ale-to-fem ale transsexual,
fo r exam ple, has X Y chrom osom es but a fem ale gender identity. A
third exam ple is studies o f individuals w ith gender chrom osom e
abnorm alities. People w ith only one gender chrom osom e or w ith
extra chrom osom es m ay be affected in various w ay s (e.g., ability to
reproduce, developm ent o f secondary gender characteristics at
puberty, retardation), but none o f the evidence indicates that they
develop anything other than typical gender identities. T h eir gender
identities are based on their gender assignm ents at birth (cf. M oney
and Ehrhardt, 1972).
Chrom osom es and G ender Role. Th ere is no evidence linking gender
chrom osom es to any specific behavior. H ow ever, there are tw o
h ypotheses about the relationship betw een gender chrom osom es and
gender differences in general. The L yon h yp oth esis (Lyon, 1962) states
that in fem ales one o f the tw o X chrom osom es in each cell becom es
in active early in fetal life. This process protects genetic fem ales
from m any recessive gender-linked disorders. For exam ple, hem o­
philia is a disorder carried b y a gene on the X chrom osom e. W hen
only one o f the tw o X chrom osom es carries this gene, not all cells in
the p erson ’s body w ill contain this chrom osom e as the active one.
Both X chrom osom es m ust h ave the hem ophilia gene in order fo r the
disease to express itse lf in the X X individual. Since this w ould
o ccur v e ry rarely, the second X chrom osom e in effect “ p rotects”
the individual from the disease. W hen there is only one X chrom o­
some, h ow ever, as in the case o f gen etically norm al males, there is
no "p rotection ” from the hem ophilia gene, and all m ales w ith this
gene on the X chrom osom e w ill h ave the disease. Thus, there is a
m uch higher incidence of X-linked (som etim es referred to as “ sex-
linked") diseases in chrom osom al m ales than in chrom osom al fe ­
m ales. H ow ever, in terms of the e ve ry d a y m eaning o f gender role,
suscep tibility to, or incidence of, disease is u su ally not included as
a component.
The second hypothesis about gender chrom osom es and gender
differences has been postulated b y O unstead and Taylor, (1972). T h ey
Biology and Gender 51
assert that the Y chrom osom e causes slow er developm ent in those
w h o h ave one, w h ich enables such in divid uals (i.e., m ales) to gain
m ore from each developm ental stage. T h eir analogy is to a stair­
case, w here the boy spends m ore tim e than the girl on each step.
She gets to the top sooner, but he gets m ore inform ation from each
step, so that his developm ent occurs in m ore depth. T h is effect of
the Y chrom osom e could be either advantageous, as O unstead and
T a y lo r assert is the case w ith such traits as spatial ability, or it
could be deliterious, as w h en there is m ore tim e to “ transcribe”
inform ation from a m utant (e.g., hem ophiliac) X chrom osom e. This
hypothesis, according to them, can account fo r m an y gender d if­
feren ces in behavior. O unstead and T a y lo r’s h yp oth esis has not yet
found a w id e degree o f acceptance in this country. It still does not
an sw er questions about the extent (if any) o f the genetic contribu­
tion to gender roles, nor does it explain causal m echanism s (if any)
in genetic contributions to specific com ponents o f gender role, such
as aptitudes or preferences.
G ender chrom osom es do not appear to d irectly affect the specifics
o f gender role. Studies o f individuals w ith chrom osom e abnorm ali­
ties (M oney and Ehrhardt, 1972), indicate that X X X individuals are
not more “ fem inine” (on traditional m easures of fem ininity) than
X X individuals, nor are XO individuals less “ fem inine.” X X Y p er­
sons are not less “ m asculine” in their interests and b eh aviors than
X Y persons, nor are X Y Y individuals m ore so. O f course, physical
abnorm alities associated w ith genetic abnorm alities m ay affect
oth ers’ treatm ent and thus influence the affected in d ivid u al’s b e­
havior. For exam ple, som e X Y Y persons m ay be taller than average
and be treated as m ore “ m anly,” or som e X X Y individuals m ay be
retarded in pubertal developm ent and thus be treated b y others as
youn ger than their chronological age. Such treatm ent, h ow ever, is
not a direct effect o f chrom osom es on b ehavior. Rather it is an effect
o f chrom osom es on physique; treatm ent differences based on
ph ysiqu e are social, not genetic. Th ere is no evidence that chrom o­
som es them selves h ave any direct effect on gender role.
Chrom osom es and G ender Attribution. W e doubt that anyone w ould
argue that chrom osom es are relevan t criteria b y w h ich w e decide
w h eth er som eone is fem ale or m ale in every d a y life. W e u su ally are
not even p ositive about w h at our ow n chrom osom es are, m uch less
som eone else’s. In fact, m any people w ho m ake gender attributions
w ith no trouble w hatsoever, h ave never even heard of X and Y
chrom osom es. For biologists, h ow ever, chrom osom es are an impor-
52 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
tant criteria fo r attributing gender. If there is at least one Y chrom o­
som e the individ ual is male, and if there are no Y chrom osom es the
individ ual is fem ale. This is, in fact, the m ost basic biological criterion
fo r attributing gender, and is also the m ost clearly dichotom ous.
There is no question, genetically, w h eth er an individ ual is fem ale or
m ale. A n d yet even this dichotom y is not alw a ys so clear. There do
e x ist individuals w ho are genetic m osaics. For exam ple, they m ay
h ave som e cells w ith X O chrom osom es and other cells w ith X X Y
chrom osom es. W hat is their genetic gender? A s in the case o f the
scientific definition of. death and life, such exam ples m ake obvious
that attribution of gehder, even in science, is som etim es a m atter
o f m aking a decision.
There is also one e te r y d a y situation w here chrom osom es are the
ultim ate criteria fo r m aking gender attributions. In athletic com pe­
titions, particularly international gam es, the criteria are the b iolo­
g ists’— an individual w ith a Y chrom osom e m ay not p lay in the
w o m en ’s games. It is interesting to rev ie w the history of gender
attribution in sports, fo r it illum inates h o w gender dichotom ies are
constructed and h o w im portant it is in m odern society that the di­
chotom y not be challenged and that it be supported b y scientific facts.
In ancient G reece's O lym pic gam es, w om en w ere barred from
com petition. The ancient G reeks coped w ith the potential problem
o f fem ale participants b y having athletes com pete unclothed. That
this w as an adequate “ test” o f gender is indicated b y the fact that
w h en a w om an w as discovered “p assin g” as a m ale trainer in 404
B.C. [wom en w ere also barred from w atch in g the games), trainers
w ere th ereafter required to be naked also. Since then, how ever,
there has been little concern w ith d iscoverin g w h eth er m ale p artici­
pants are “ real” m ales. The reason given is that “ there is little or no
advantage [for w om en to com pete as m en]” (Hanley, 1976), since
the superior strength of men m akes them generally better than
w om en in m any athletic activities. In fact, there are no recorded
cases o f m ale com petitors w ho w ere later "u nm asked” as having
been w om en.9
The presum ed superior strength and ab ility o f men w ould, h o w ­
ever, give them an unfair advantage over w om en, w ere they to com ­
p ete in w om en’s games. It is not im portant if this assertion is sup­
ported b y actual gender differences, nor, i f it is, w hether the reasons
fo r the differences in athletic a b ility are b iological or environm ental.
G iven the acceptance d f differences as a “ fa c t,” once w om en began
to com pete in the modern O lym pics and other international com peti­
tions, the question o f m aking "c o rre ct” gender attributions w as
Biology and Gender 53
raised, esp ecially after it becam e know n that som e fem ale athletes
had turned out to be men.
- H ow , then, could the governing com m ittees o f the com petitions
insure that the w om en w ere really w om en? C learly, given past
experience, every d a y gender attribution p rocesses w ere not enough.
It w ou ld be too easy for a com petitor to “ p a ss.” T h u s prior to 196810
each country w as required to provide certification o f the genuine­
ness of their fem ale athletes’ genders. C harges w ere m ade, though,
that some of these certificates w ere fraudulent, and that som e com ­
peting countries w ere not being truthful, or ob jective, in their certi­
fication procedures’,
Th e result w as that, beginning in 1968, a p h ysica l exam ination
w as required o f each fem ale athlete, w h ich w a s carried out b y an
international, unbiased m edical team at the site o f the com petition.
In effect, this w as reinstituting w h at the G reeks had done, and,
indeed, some “ w om en” w ith d rew from com petition b efore the
exam ination. This “ test,” too, w as even tu ally challenged. It w as
alleged that p h ysical characteristics w ere not enough evidence on
w h ich to m ake an absolutely certain attribution. It m ay h ave been
fe lt that the availab ility of surgical and horm onal procedures to
m ake a “ m ale” b od y look like a “ fem ale” one, invalid ated a p h ysical
exam ination.
A t this point, the em phasis seem s to h ave turned from insuring
that there w as no unfair com petition to finding an u nfailingly
dichotom ous definition o f “ fem ale.” The m ost clearly dichotom ous
criterion fo r attributing gender is the b iologists’ criterion o f gender
chrom osom es. Therefore, in 1972, the “ sex chrom osom e” test for
determ ining if an athlete is “ re a lly ” a w om an w as instituted.
The lining o f the cheek is scraped, and the cells are stained and
m icroscop ically exam ined for Barr bodies. T h e num ber of Barr
bodies in a cell (probably the nuclei of the inactivated X chrom o­
somes) is one less than the num ber o f X chrom osom es in the cell.
For exam ple, if the chrom osom es are XX, there w ou ld be one Barr
body. No Barr bodies w ould m ean either X O or at least one Y. If
there are less than 10 percent Barr bodies, then further testing is
done to determ ine the exact gender chrom osom e m akeup. The cri­
terion is dichotom ous— any Y chrom osom es and the person is de­
clared not female and ineligible to com pete in the w om en ’s games.
(The person is not declared to be a male, and w e w on d er w h at w ould
happen if an individual, after "fa ilin g ” the test, insisted on entering
the m en’s com petition, even if she had breasts and a vagina.)
O nly one case o f "fa ilin g ” the test has been publicized. Eva
54 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
K lo bu kow ska, w ho passed the p h ysical exam ination in 1964, and
w o n several m edals in the w om en’s gam es at the 1964 O lym pics,
“ fa ile d ” the chrom osom e test at the 1967 European T ra ck and Field
com petitions. It is lik e ly that she had som e X O cells and some X X Y
cells. She w as declared ineligible to com pete as a fem ale, and her
O lym pic m edals w ere declared invalid. She had entered the games
as a wom an, and despite the decree o f the International A m ateur
A th le tic Federation that she is not, she continues to live, in her
ow n eyes and others’, as a wom an. The actions of the IA A F under­
score the fact that the biologists’ criteria fo r gender becom e non­
sensical w hen, in an attem pt to be “ fa ir,” th ey are applied to
every d a y life.
There continue to be incidents w hich, w hile not as drastic as the
case o f E va K lo bu kow ska, illustrate the relationship betw een b io­
logical criteria fo r gender and social criteria fo r gender, and h o w the
form er can be constructed to support the latter. In countries w here
not as m uch value is placed on p h ysical “ fem in in ity” as in the
U nited States, and w here athletes are able to devote m ost o f their
time, from early childhood, to inten sive training in their sport, the
bodies and m ovem ents of fem ale athletes often appear “ m asculine”
from an A m erican point o f view . In 1976, at the sum m er O lym pics,
the A m erican w om en’s swim m ing team w as b a d ly beaten, fo r the
first time, b y the East Germ an w om en’s sw im team. One w a y for
som e m em bers of the A m erican team (not ju st the swim m ers) to
exp lain this loss, w as to m ake com m ents w hich, b y im plication,
cast doubt on the “ real" fem aleness o f the East Germ an fem ale
atheletes [e.g., “ If th ey turn around, the only w a y you can tell it's
a w om an is b y their b u st” (Amdur, 1976)]. O f course, the East
Germ an w om en had to pass the “ sex test” in order to com pete, but
if enough influential com petitors begin to feel that chrom osom es
are no longer an appropriate criteria to avoid “ unfair com petition,”
then there w ill be an attem pt to include other “ b iologically v a lid ”
criteria into procedures for deciding w ho is “ rea lly ” a w om an. The
original reason fo r instituting "s e x te sts” w as to elim inate “ un­
natu rally” strong “ w om en .” N o w it is becom ing increasingly clear
that strength is not gender dichotom ous. T h is does not elim inate the
possib ility that som eday there m ight be a test to decide h ow m uch
m uscle a “ real” w om an is allo w ed to have, and anything m ore
w ou ld m ean she either w as not a w om an or she had been taking
“ m ale” horm ones.
A final exam ple is the case o f Renee Richards, w ho, as Richard
Biology and Gender 55
Raskind, com peted in, and won, several m en’s tennis tournam ents.
A s a postop erative transsexual, Dr. R ichards attem pted to com pete
in w om en's tennis. A s a result, the W om en ’s Tennis A ssociation
requested that chrom osom e “ sex tests” be instituted fo r fem ale
p layers. It m ust be a chrom osom e test, because Dr. Richards (and
others like her) w ould “ p ass" a p h ysica l exam ination but undoubt­
ed ly “ fa il” a chrom osom e test, since she has X Y chrom osom es.
W h y has there been such concern w ith elim inating her from playing
w om en ’s tennis? The A sso cia tio n ’s contention is that m en h ave an
u nfair advantage over w om en because o f their strength. (Thus, in
their eyes, she is still a man.) H ow ever, she w eigh s m uch less than
she did w hen she played as Dr. Raskind, and the fa c t that she now
produces less androgen and has m ore circulating estrogen, p robably
m eans that she has little, if any, “ unfair ad van tage” in strength. The
problem is not so m uch "u n fairn ess,” but lies m ore in Dr. R ich ards’
challenge to the reality o f the gender dichotom y. T o m aintain the
dichotom y there has to be p roof that she did not change genders,
and her chrom osom es are that “ p ro o f” — no m atter h o w im possible
it m ight be to see her as anything but a w om an in e ve ry other w a y
and in any possible circum stance.
A s m ore is discovered about genetics, and n ew techniques are
develop ed for exam ining the structure o f chrom osom es, it is lik ely
that chrom osom es w ill be “ d isco vered ” to be less dichotom ous than
th ey are n o w thought to be (Stoller, 1974). A s a result, “ m ore e x a ct”
criteria w ill be “ discovered ” fo r attributing chrom osom al gender.
T h e “ ultim ate” criteria for determ ining gender w ill continue to
change as the scien tists’ facts change. N everth eless, it is doubtful
that the incorrigible proposition that there are tw o genders w ill
change, and this, in itself, w ill help determ ine w h a t the “ fa c ts,” fo r
scien tists as w e ll as athletes, w ill be.
Internal Reproductive Organs and Gender
G ender Identity. The presence or absence o f gonads and internal
reprod uctive structures (e.g., uterus, sperm ducts) has little effect on
gender identity. A lth ou gh the norm al developm ent o f these struc­
tures is interfered w ith in several clinical syndrom es (including
T u rn er’s (XO) syndrom e, and som e form s o f herm aphroditism ),
there is no evidence that the gender iden tity o f affected persons is
influenced (M oney and Ehrhardt, 1972). T h e absence o f these organs,
56 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
in fact, m ay not be d iscovered until signs o f puberty fa il to appear,
m otivating a visit to a physician. B y this time, h ow ever, the child
has developed a secure, stable gender identity.
It is also possible fo r individuals to develop a gender identity in
conflict w ith the b iological gender o f their internal reproductive
organs. This occurs in transsexualism , and in cases o f com plete
androgen insen sitivity w here, as described earlier, an X Y fetus
develop s testes and other “ m ale” internal reproductive organs, but
is insensitive to the effects o f androgens, and has a vagina and
clitoris. Such individuals develop a norm al fem ale gender identity.
G ender Role. The same syndrom es discussed p revio u sly provide
evidence that, excep t in sofar as they enable individuals to differ­
entially participate in the reproductive process, gonads and internal
organs p er se do not affect h o w som eone dresses, expresses her/
him self, or otherw ise exhibits interests and beh aviors “ appropriate”
to her/his gender (M oiiey and Ehrhardt, 1972). H ow ever, since repro­
duction and gender are m utu ally dependent in biology, those w ho
cannot reproduce cannot perform their (biologically defined) gender
role. G ender role in every d a y life and the social scien ces ob viou sly
includes m uch m ore than reproductive behavior. H ow ever, m uch of
the w ritin g on the negative effects o f blurred gender roles (cf.
W in ick, 1968) can be traced b ack to this b asic biological principle.
G ender Attribution. A lth ou gh internal organs are im portant bio­
logical criteria fo r the attribution of gender (the individual w ho can
produce and ejaculate sperm is male, the individual w h o can produce
an egg and nourish a fetus is fem ale), in every d a y life it is obvious
that w e do not decide w h eth er som eone is fem ale or m ale b y
determ ining w hether th ey h ave ovaries or testes, a uterus or sperm
ducts. W e assume, once w e m ake a gender attribution, that a person
has the appropriate internal organs, but should w e find out that they
do not (e.g., w e m ight discover that som eone has had a h ysterec­
tomy), w e do not change our attribution. E ven if w e discover that
som eone has the “ w ro n g" internal organs (e.g., if w e find out that a
m ale friend has a uterus), once w e h ave m ade an attribution, w e
w ill see the organs as being a m istake o f som e sort, not the attribu­
tion as having been m istaken. A ttributions, once made, are extrem ely
resistant to change, and inform ation about the person is fitted to
the attribution, rather than vice versa. W e discuss this in m ore detail
in C hapter 5.
C hronologically, the next step in the sequence of biological factors
Biology and Gender 57
in the developm ent o f gender is the presence or absence o f prenatal
horom ones. H ow ever, for the sake o f clarity, that discussion w ill be
- postponed and com bined w ith a discussion on the effects of pubertal
horm ones and gender.
External Reproductive Organs and Gender
External Reproductive Organs and G ender Identity. The possession
o f a vagina, labia, and clitoris, or a penis and scrotum is neither a
n ecessary nor sufficient condition fo r develop ing a fem ale or male
gender identity, respectively. A lth ou gh m ost p eople w ith penises
h ave m ale gender identities, and m ost people w ith clitorises have
fem ale gender identities, there are im portant exceptions. Preoperative
transsexu als h ave the "w ron g" genitals fo r their gender identity
(and, indeed, that is w h y they seek surgery). C hildren w ho are born
w ith am biguous genitals, not y et “ corrected ” surgically, alm ost
alw ays develop unam biguous gender identities, as do children and
adults w ith uncorrectable genital defects, like m icropenises (Money
and Ehrhardt, 1972). A lthough genitals are a crucial aspect o f our
construction o f gender, it is not in terms o f the direct role w h ich they
p lay in the developm ent and m aintenance of gender identity. Rather,
as w e shall see, th ey serve as a sign o f gender.
External R eproductive Organs and G ender Role. Freud notw ith ­
standing, the possession of a particular set o f genitals is not a direct
causal facto r in h o w m asculine or fem inine o n e’s interests and be­
h aviors are. Nor do one’s genitals n ecessarily determ ine one’s choice
o f a sexual partner. W e decide on a potential sexual partner on the
basis o f a gender attribution, not a genital inspection. E ven though
one definition o f h eterosexu ality is sexual activities w ith a partner
w h o se genitals are different from one's ow n, a h eterosexu al person
w h o has a vagina, fo r exam ple, does not look fo r a person w ho has
a penis. “ S h e” looks fo r a “ h e,” assum ing that w h en a “ h e ” is found,
and sexual contact takes place, the (assumed) penis w ill actually be
there.
W e are not saying that on e’s genitals have no effect on behavior.
It is quite possible that having a vagina and clitoris m ay lead to very
different experiences in life than having a penis. C ertainly those w ho
h ave vaginas and w ho m enstruate h ave experiences that those w ho
h ave penises and w ho ejaculate cannot have, and vice versa. On the
other hand, one's w hole b ody affects the experiences one has. Height,
58 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
Biology and Gender 59
w eight, skin color, and p h ysica l attractiven ess [see, e.g., W aters &
is often m ade on biological grounds only, rather than b y considering
D enm ark, 1974) are also crucial factors in h o w one is treated and
the fa ct that the individual w ill not be liv in g in a b iological fram e-
in the w a y one experien ces the w orld. W e m aintain that w h atever
“ w ork. In nonam biguous cases, h ow ever, extern al reproductive
the effects of having a particular set of genitals are on one’s life
organs are crucial fo r gender assignm ent.
experiences, they do not necessarily lead to any particular gender
E xcep t fo r the m om ent o f gender assignm ent, genitals p lay little
role behaviors. H aving a scrotum and penis does not m ake a per­
role in gender attribution. This is largely because in our society
son strong and aggressive, nor does having labia and a clitoris
genitals are alm ost alw ays concealed. W e expect, fo r exam ple, that
m ake a person w eak and passive, or vice versa. E ven those w ho
all men have penises under their clothes, but w e cannot see them.
stress biological factors in gender differences no longer claim that
The actual p h ysical genitals p lay little role in gender attribution. The
genitals are the causal factor. Prenatal horom ones, o f w h ich genitals
role o f the expected genitals, h ow ever, is im portant, and is discussed
are a correlate, are asserted to be the cause of such differences, as
at the end o f this chapter and in C hapter 6.
w e w ill explain in the section on horm ones and gender role.

Genitals and Gender Attribution. The relationship betw een this b io­ Hormones and Gender *■
lo gical facto r and this com ponent o f gender is u nequivocal in at least
T o d ay fe w biologists w ould argue that rep rod uctive organs or
one instance. Penises and vaginas are the criteria b y w h ich gender
chrom osom es per se affect gender iden tity or gender role. (Gender
is assigned at birth. Penis m eans ‘‘m ale” and lab ia and vagina means
attribution is not o f interest in the literature.) In eve ry d a y life, some
“ fem ale,” and that, excep t in the m ost am biguous cases, is all that is
persons m ight state that some o f these factors are crucial to being
n ecessary to determ ine the neon ate’s gender. There is some question
a w om an or a man (e.g., "y o u ’re not a ‘real’ m an if y o u ’re sterile” ),
as to w h eth er the form ula is really labia and vagina = fem ale, or
but their statem ents w ould be considered n aive from a scientific
w h eth er it is instead no penis = fem ale, since at birth there is no
point o f view . Hormones, h ow ever, are another m atter. W hile non­
search (i.e., internal exam ination) for a vagin a or clitoris. (We report
scientists tend to ignore horm ones becau se th ey are not visible, and
additional evidence for this form ula in the last chapter.)
horm onal m echanism s are com plex and difficult to understand, there
On the other hand, and despite the fa c t that plastic surgeons can­
are va st amounts o f time and m oney being spent on research to
not y e t create a fu lly functional penis w h ere there is none, in
determ ine the effects o f the gonadal horm ones in both hum an and
am biguous cases the m edical profession has h istorically tended to
nonhum an animals. W hat is kn ow n and w h a t questions are still un­
assign the gender "m ale” w hen the infan t w as capable of functioning
answ ered? A re the effects o f prenatal horm ones different from the
as a m ale in the reproductive sense (i.e., w hen there w ere function­
effects of the horm ones secreted once the individ ual reaches puberty?
ing testes), regardless o f the adequacy of the penis (Money and
B efore discussing specific research that relates to these questions,
Ehrhardt, 1972). This practice suggests that the biological, reprod uc­
w e w an t to m ake certain general criticism s of, and com m ents about,
tive, definition of gender is, in circum scribed cases, the prim ary
the num erous studies on the relationship b etw een gender horm ones
basis on w hich gender attributions are m ade. For exam ple, in a case
and the com ponents o f gender, p articu larly gender role.
w here a m other am putated the penis of her 15-m onth-old son, the
In the first place, m any o f the studies’, p articularly those using
m edical team made the decision to keep him “ m ale,” despite the fact
hum an beings as subjects, are correlational. Th at is, various levels
that he no longer had a penis (W estm an and Zarw ell, 1975). The
o f horm ones are found to be associated w ith various types and
m edical basis of this decision seem s to h ave been that reassigning
levels o f behavior. Frequently, h ow ever, the direction o f the rela­
him as fem ale, and perform ing the n ecessary surgery, w ould have
tionship is assum ed to be “ horm ones cause b eh avio r” despite the
n ecessitated castration and thus rendered this individual sterile. A
fa c t that “b eh avior causes horm ones” is in m any cases as plausible.
fertile m ale w ithou t a penis w as seen as p referable to a sterile fe ­
This is true in studies of h om osexu ality, aggression, intelligence,
m ale w ith a vagina.11
a ctiv ity level, spatial ability, and a m yriad o f other behaviors w h ich
In am biguous or difficult cases such as the one just described,
have been said to be influenced b y the level o f gonadal hormones.
criteria other than genitals are exam ined, and the ultim ate decision
It could be, for exam ple, that high androgen levels cause aggressive
 60 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach Biology and Gender 61
behavior, but alternatively, high levels o f aggressive behavior could
encouraged, or not discouraged, “ m asculine” p lay behavior, w hich
lead to higher amounts o f androgen production. In fact, Rose et al.
m ay be related to scores on certain tests o f intelligence (Sherman,
(1972} found support fo r this in colonies o f rhesus m onkeys. W hen
1967). H ow m any o f these parents reported m ore “ m asculine” be­
a m ore aggressive m onkey w as introduced into the colony, thus
h avior in their daughters at least partly becau se th ey had an idea
changing the dom inance hierarchy, the levels of androgens secreted
that that w as w h at the researcher w as lookin g for? E ven in cases
b y the other m onkeys, w ho w ere n o w fo rced to be less aggressive,
w here norm al horm onal levels are presum ed to affect beh avior (e.g.,
decreased. the prem enstrual syndrom e— see below ), one facto r that is often over­
W e are not asserting,,that the direction is alw a ys "b eh avior leads
looked is that people are aw are o f some biological cycles and expect
to horm ones.” Both directions m ay be correct in different cases, but
these cycles to have certain effects on behavior. T h ese expectations
too often the explanation em phasizes the cau sal factor o f horm ones
m ay be an im portant factor in h ow beh avior is interpreted as w ell
rather than behavior. C orrelations can also be due to the influence of
as in w h a t behaviors actually occur.
a third factor, associated w ith both gonadal horm ones and behavior.
One o f the m ajor advantages o f animal studies is that these types
For exam ple, V ande l^ ie le points out that in the adrenogenital
of “ b ias” can be elim inated, and controlled experim ents that^would
syndrom e (a condition tjhat results in the overproduction o f prenatal
be unethical using humans can be conducted. On the other hand,
adrenal androgen), m any horm ones and horm onal relationships are
there are difficulties in generalizing from the results o f research
out o f balance, not just androgens (Friedman et al., 1974). To assume
on anim als to hum an beings. The m ajority o f studies w ith rats, mice,
that “ tom boyishn ess” or higher intelligence in affected girls is due to
and guinea pigs take as their dependent variable adult sexual and
abnorm ally high levels o f prenatal androgen as som e have done
reproductive behavior. Other “ gender” differences that h ave been
(e.g., M on ey and Ehrhardt, 1972) m ay be unw arranted.
studied include a ctivity level and structural differences in the brain
B esides unexamined, horm onal relationships, other biological
(Reinisch, 1974). Those w ho study anim al b eh avior are aw are of
facto rs m ay p lay a part in such a correlation. If intelligence is certain difficulties in the interpretation of their studies. For exam ple,
gen etically linked, then there is the p o ssib ility o f selective sampling. the effects o f horm ones m ay be indirect. H orm ones change body
T h e m ore intelligent parents m ay bring their daughters for treatm ent
structures w h ich change behavior. A ndrogens adm inistered to fe ­
and/or m ay be more lik ely to agree to participate in scientific studies.
m ale anim als greatly enlarge the size of the clitoris. This m orpho­
T h eir daughters, then, w ou ld tend to have above average intelligence logical change rather than direct horm onal effects m ay be the critical
scores also. (O f course selective sam pling could be a factor even if
facto r in the increase in m ounting and thrusting beh avior seen in
the genetic com ponent in intelligence is minimal.) such anim als (M oney and Ehrhardt, 1972).
A second problem is that the nature o f the tw o groups from
In addition, animal sexual beh avior is not gender role behavior.
w h ich the bulk of data com es present difficulties in interpreting the
E ven if w e accept traditional definitions o f gender role, these defini­
research on horm ones and behavior. T h e tw o groups are: persons
tions clearly go beyond the instinctual responses o f animals. To
w ith various sorts o f clinical syndrom es, and animals. A factor often
com pare lordosis and m ounting w ith the range o f hum an sexual
overlooked in studying the form er group is the effects of know ledge activities and relationships is absurd. T o w h a t are w e to compare
o f the abnorm ality on the behavior o f the individ ual and those close
lordosis? A naked w om an lyin g on h er b ack w ith her legs open? Is
to the individual. The role that this aw areness m ight h ave on the
the w earing o f lip stick really analogous to the “ sex sw e llin g ” of
results o f the studies has tended to be dow np layed, despite the large prim ates, as some have im plied (Morris, 1967)? Should w e compare
b ody of literature on dem and ch aracteristics and experim enter
estrous cycles (where the fem ale animal exh ibits clear p h ysical signs
effects, w h ich seem s p articu larly relevan t here-(cf. Rosenthal, 1966; o f sexual arousal at the time o f ovulation) to hum an m enstrual
Orne, 1962). For exam ple, if there is a relationship betw een prenatal cycles (where there are no clear signs of arousal, w here the timing
exposure to androgens, and intelligence (M oney and Lew is, 1966), is not during fertile periods, and around w h ich a com plex social
h o w m uch of the relationship is due to at least some o f the parents m ythology has developed)? W hat is the subhum an analog o f the
kn ow in g that their daughters w ere p ren atally exposed to higher alleged social sensitivity and illogical thought p rocesses o f w om en
than norm al levels o f "m ale” horm ones? Such parents m ight have or of the alleged insensitive, logical b eh avior o f m en? Traditionally,
 62 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
Biology and Gender 63
scien tists h ave dealt w ith this problem b y conceiving o f human
m ore im portantly,’ the w ays in w h ich gender is constructed n eces­
beh avior as more fluid and m ore under environm ental control. N ev­
sitates that any interpretation of anim al “ s e x ” b eh avior applied to
ertheless, they m aintain that the basics o f all behavior, the biological
hum an beings transform s “ sex" into “ gender.”
foundations, can be understood through the study of animal b e­
It is not our intention to present an exh au stive re v iew o f gender
havior.
horm ones and behavior. M any excellen t review s exist, including
It is notew orth y that even the rigid dichotom ization o f animal
M oney and Ehrhardt (1972); Friedman, et al. (1974), and Reinisch
sexual b eh avior is beginning to be questioned b y some biologists
(1974, 1977). Rather, w e w ill briefly sum m arize the research as it
(Goy and G oldfoot, 1975). This n ew assertion is that the dichotom y
relates to the com ponents o f gender, and as it illustrates the social
is not absolute. A nim als of both genders in all species exh ibit both
construction of gender by biology.
types o f sexual behaviors. It is the ratio of b eh aviors w h ich varies
w ith in genders, betw een genders, and b etw een species. Such “n e w ”
Prenatal H orm ones and Gender Identity. Since w e cannot ascertain
findings illustrate the social construction o f science. A re animals
w h eth er anim als think of them selves as fem ale or m ale, evidence for
getting m ore androgynous? It seem s m ore lik ely that, as society in
any relationship betw een prenatal horm ones and gender identity
general constructs n ew w a y s o f seeing the w orld, scientists are
m ust com e from research on hum an beings. There are tw o questions
looking for, and therefore finding, “ n e w ” behaviors in their animals.
w e can ask: W hen X X fetuses are exposed p renatally to high levels
Facts depend on w h at the scien tist brings w ith her/him self to the
o f androgen are th ey m ore lik ely to develop m ale gender identities?
lab. (See H erschberger, 1970, Chapter 2, for an excellen t illustration
W hen X Y fetuses are exposed prenatally to lo w levels o f androgen
o f this in regard to prim ate studies.)
are th ey m ore lik ely to develop fem ale gender identities?12
If w e think about each of the three com ponents o f gender, the
The answ ers to these tw o questions appear to be "n o ,” although
relevan ce o f animal studies to understanding gender in humans
the evidence is not based on a large num ber o f cases, and all o f these
becom es ve ry tenuous. Rats and other anim als do not have gender
cases in volve clinical syndrom es. The evidence fo r the answ er to
roles or gender identities. In fact, anim als do not h ave genders at
the first question com es m ainly from the study of genetic fem ales
all— m erely sexes.
w ith the adrenogenital syndrom e or progestin induced herm aphro­
A n o th er w a y o f stating this is that w h en a person sees an animal
ditism. A lth ou gh the individuals w ere exposed to abnorm ally high
and m akes a gender attribution on the basis of other than strictly
levels o f prenatal androgens, the gender identities that developed
biological criteria (like genitals or coloring, w hich, not coinci­
w ere a function o f gender assignm ents at birth (M oney and Ehr­
dentally, is know n as “ sexin g” an animal), and uses instead criteria
hardt, 1972; Lev-Ran, 1974).
like behavior, size, or softness, the person is said to be anthropo­
E vidence for the effects o f lo w levels o f prenatal androgens on
m orphizing. For som e people, cats are “ sh e” and dogs are “h e ”
the gender identity o f genetic m ales com es from studying those
becau se the anim als are perceived as h aving gender stereotyped
born w ith partial androgen in sen sitivity (M oney and Ogunro, 1974).
ch aracteristics; but m ost people are w e ll aw are o f the anthropo­
In this syndrom e there is some sen sitivity to the effects o f prenatal
m orphizing th ey do about anim als’ “ genders.” One of the rules for
androgens, so that the genitals are m ore “ m ale” than “ fem ale” at
differentiating b etw een human and nonhum an animals is that
birth. The gender identities o f these boys w ere, as in the case o f the
hum ans are said to h ave self-consciousness and an aw areness of
genetic fem ales, a function o f gender assignm ents at birth. In other
the p ast and future, as w ell as the present. W ith ou t these attributes,
w ords, horm ones affect the genitals w h ich affect gender assignm ent
it is senseless to talk o f som ething “h avin g ” an identity or “p la y­
w h ich affects gender identity. A s yet w e h ave little kn ow ledge about
in g" a role, and thus senseless to attribute a gender to them. If ani­
the effects o f variations in prenatal horm onal levels that h ave not
m als do not have genders, then h ow far can w e extrapolate from
affected reproductive organs hut w h ich might, nevertheless, affect
anim al research to the study of gender in hum ans? The argument
the com ponents o f gender. R esearch in p rogress12 m ay help answ er
that animal biologists study anim als’ sex, a purely biological con­
this question.
cept, and not gender, a social concept, does not solve the problem.
The answ ers could h ave im portant im plications. For exam ple,
N ot only are the tw o terms used syn on ym ou sly (see Chapter 1), but,
m any scien tists are concerned w ith w h eth er prenatal horm ones are
64 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
an im portant facto r in the etiology of transsexualism . M oney and
Brennan (1968) have h y p othesized that there m ay be a “gender
iden tity center” lo cated in the hypothalam us and lim bic system of
the brain. P au ly (1968) h yp oth esizes that the location of this “ cen­
ter” is the tem poral lobes. In any case, the h ypoth esized m echanism
is that prenatal androgens, during critical periods o f feta l life, organ­
ize specific brain structures so that the individ ual is predisposed to
develo p a gender id en tity as m ale. In the absen ce o f androgens, the
h yp oth esized brain structure develops in a “ fem a le” direction. This
is the sam e m echanism b y w h ich the reprod uctive structures de­
velop. •*'.
H ypoth esizin g h u m fh gender differences in brain structures is
based on research on; the effects of prenatal horm ones on animal
brains. T h is research has sh ow n that there are structural and chem i­
cal differences, depending on the le v e l o f prenatal androgens
(Reinisch, 1974). For exam ple, in fem ale rats, early exposure to
androgens affects the hypothalam us, resulting at puberty in a fa il­
ure o f ovarian horm ones to be released cy clica lly . H ow generaliz-
able is this and other findings to hum an beings?
In hum an fem ales w h o se andrenogenital syndrom es are untreated,
not only is there exposure to high levels of prenatal androgens, but
there continues to be secretion o f steady high levels o f androgen.
A s a result, cyclica l release o f gonadal horm ones (estrogen and
progesterone) is suppressed, and there are no m enstrual cycles. If
the prenatal androgens h ave affected brain structures, then one
w ou ld exp ect that there could never be norm al m enstrual cycles.
H ow ever, once these w om en are treated fo r the syndrom e, the
norm al fem ale pattern of cyclic hypothalam ic function is restored
(Lev-Ran, 1974). The restoration is independent o f the m orphology
o f the w om an’s body. E ven if she has a penile urethra (i.e., urinates
through a “ penis” ), she w ill even tually begin to m enstruate through
this structure.
There are several possible explanations fo r this, and other, d if­
feren ces b etw een rats and w om en (or men). Som e do not challenge
the biological fram ew ork. For exam ple, the adrenogenital syndrom e
m ay begin after the Critical period fo r the developm ent o f brain
structures. Thus there is no reason w h y norm al h ypothalam ic
functioning and norm al m enstrual cycles should not occur once
treatm ent is instituted. A noth er p ossible explanation com es from a
fram ew o rk that sees biology as only one w a y o f constructing the
w orld. If concepts o f gender id en tity and gender role are social
constructions, then their origins should be sought in rules fo r seeing
Biology and Gender 65
the w o rld rather than in brain structures. T h e first typ e o f exp lan a­
tion w ill even tu ally be supported or discarded through m ore research
and experim entation. T h e second, h ow ever, can b e answ ered only
through a totally different paradigm, the one w e are presenting in
th is book.
Pubertal H orm ones and G ender Identity. B y the time a person
reaches puberty, her/his gender identity has already been estab­
lished. T h e effects o f pubertal horm ones, nam ely the developm ent
o f secondary gender characteristics and the developm ent of sexual
interest in others (probably due to androgen in both genders), is to
reinforce gender identity, to reassure the person that she/he is
“ re a lly ” a fem ale or a male, as indicated b y the p h ysica l sigps. In
cases w here developm ent at puberty is contrary to w h a t is expected
(e.g., developm ent o f breasts in a m ale or appearance o f a beard in
a fem ale), the effect is not to m ake the individual feel that she or he
is the other gender. Unless there is som e prior h istory o f gender
identity problem s, the individual and her/his fam ily react w ith con­
cern about w h at is w rong and seek m edical help and advice about
“ correcting” the problem. The fa c t that treatm ent is “ co rrective”
indicates that the gender is Seen as already h aving b een there long
b efore puberty, regardless o f w h a t the p h ysica l signs at puberty
turn out to be. There is no intrinsic reason w h y this is so— it is
m erely the w a y in w h ich w e construct gender. W e could conceive of
an alternate construction w here gender did not exist until puberty
and then w as attributed solely on the basis o f the developm ent o f
secon dary gender ch aracteristics.14
Prenatal H orm ones and G ender Role. E ver since the d iscovery of
“m ale” and “fem a le” horm ones at the beginning o f the tw entieth
century, the gender horm ones have been claim ed to be the biological
facto r w h ich accounts fo r the “ o b vio u s” b eh avioral differences
betw een fem ales and males. Supposedly, androgens contribute to
m aking a person aggressive, strong, outer-directed, achievem ent
oriented, sexual; estrogens m ake a person w eak, passive, maternal,
and asexual. T h is is really an u n fair oversim plification o f m ost
serious, contem porary scientific w riting. H ow ever, such oversim pli­
fications often appear in popular treatm ents o f “ sex differences”
(e.g., Lang, 1973) as w e ll as in earlier scientific w o rk s (e.g., Frank,
1929).15
The sam e m echanism presum ably responsible fo r the effects of
p renatal horm ones on gender identity is h yp oth esized fo r the devel-
 66 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
Biology and Gender 67
opm ent of gender role. Brain structures are influenced b y prenatal
underlying the cyclica l release o f ovarian horm ones w ere d isco v­
androgens, such that thresholds fo r certain behaviors later in life
ered, the prem enstrual and m enstrual parts of the m enstrual cycle
are affected (M oney and Ehrhardt, 1972]. For exam ple, prenatal
were seen as the “ dangerous” times, because these w ere the periods
exposure to a particular level o f androgen at a particular critical
w h en the levels o f the "fem a le” horm ones w ere at their low est.
period m ay predispose an individual to be sexu ally attracted to
R ecently, the supposed lab ility o f w om en has been attributed not
w om en at puberty, although ultim ate sexu al partner choice is a fu n c­
to horm ones p er se, but rather to the “ raging horm onal influences,”
tion of m any other factors (M oney and Ehrhardt, 1972). A gain, there
the “ d rastic” changes in levels o f estrogen and progesterone w h ich
is little that biologists are absolutely sure about in the relationship
occur during each m enstrual cycle. Scientific effort has been devoted
b etw een horm ones and beh avior in hum an beings. The types o f b e­
to understanding the com plex horm onal fee d b ack loops that cause
h aviors that are m ost studied in term s o f possible prenatal horm onal
ovulation and m enstruation, and to finding bioch em ical causes for
antecedents include aggression, sexual partner choice, and intel­
the changes in affect and perform ance associated w ith the m enstrual
lectu al and cognitive abilities (see the review s cited on p. 63 for
cycle (cf. Dalton, 1964). There has been a search fo r other factors,
specific studies).
such as enzym es, related to horm onal levels, w h ich m ight account
not ju st fo r cyclica l changes in fem ale behavior, but also fo r the
Pubertal Horm ones and G ender Role. T h e effects w h ich androgen
differences betw een the beh avior of w om en and the beh avior of
and estrogen secreted at puberty h ave on b eh avior are not totally
m en (Broverm an et ah, 1968). This research takes it fo r granted that
clear either. M oney and Ehrhardt (1972), am ong others, assert that,
there are tw o genders, that there are differences betw een them, and
as w ith animals, the effects o f pubertal horm ones depend on w h at
that the cause o f these differences can be found in biology. It is also
happened, horm onally, during the prenatal period. Few , if any, b e­
taken fo r granted that fem ales are affected b y the changes in the
haviors, w ith the possible exception o f sexual arousal, h ave been
le ve l of their ovarian hormones.
sh ow n to be caused b y pubertal horm ones. T h e extent to w h ich
W ith fe w exceptions (e.g., H ollingw orth, 1914), it w as not until
pubertal horm ones contribute to beh avioral differences, even if they
this decade that serious investigation o f w h eth er or not there really
do p la y som e role, has not been dem onstrated to be ve ry large and
w ere affect and perform ance changes associated w ith the m enstrual
a great deal m ore research is needed.
cycle began to be carried out. In brief, recent studies indicate that
U nlike prenatally, w hen estrogens are b elieved not to h ave an
although w om en report affect and b eh avioral changes during their
effect on the fetus, pubertal estrogens are thought b y some (e.g.,
m enstrual cycles, w hen affect is m easured on a d aily basis through­
B ardw ick, 1971) to have a significant effect on fem ale behavior. It is
out the cycle, or when perform ance is tested, there is little evidence
p art of the folklore of our culture that a m enstruating w om an is
to support the w om en ’s (and scientists') assertions, esp ecia lly w ith
good fo r nothing, and, perhaps, even dangerous. She is thought to
regard to perform ance (McKenna, 1974).
be irritable, m oody, unreliable, anxious, unpredictable, irrational,
T he m ost current research has been devoted to discovering h ow
and difficult to live w ith. These b eliefs h ave been part o f our culture
beliefs and expectations about the m enstrual cycle and behavior
fo r m uch longer than the time period in w h ich scientists h ave kn ow n
can affect both self-report o f b eh avior and oth ers’ perceptions of
about endocrinological functioning (cf. W eideger, 1976). Thus, it
w om en 's behavior during the m enstrual cycle (Koeske and K oeske,
seem ed logical, w hen estrogen and progesterone w ere discovered, to
1975; K oeske, 1975; Paige, 1973). T h ese studies sh ow that, although
search for biological explanations o f these em otional changes b y
there is little evidence that cyclica l changes in horm one levels have
attributing them to the effects of “ fem ale” horm ones on behavior,
a strong influence on behavior, kn ow led ge o f these changes (e.g.,
B efore the d isco very of these horm ones, physicians claim ed that
being aw are that one is prem enstrual) m ay h ave a significant effect.
fem ale beh avioral “ problem s” lik e h yp ersexu a lity and aggressive­
W h atever the effect of c y c lic ity per se, it is becom ing clearer that
ness could be cured by the rem oval o f the “ fem ale” organ, including,
there are m any types o f p h ysiological cycles, in both w om en and
at times, the clitoris (cf. Barker-Benfield, 1972). Then, w ith the
men, m any o f w h ich m ight affect behavior, and m ost o f w h ich are
d isco very o f the gender horm ones, the particular causal substance
not gender specific (cf. Parlee, 1976).
w as thought to have been located. F inally, w hen the m echanism s
 in the Development of Gender and the Components of Gender
Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach

gender a ssig n m en t
68

and/or grow ing

E v id en ce*

if d e lib e ra te ly
W hat can account fo r the fa c t that the direction o f research on

searching fo r
tra n sse x u a ls

tra n sse x u a ls
tra n sse x u a ls
tra n sse x u a ls

tra n sse x u a ls

p ro c e d u re s;
Gender Attribution in
the m enstrual cycle and behavior has been changing to include

facial h a ir
m ore "so c ia l” factors? O ne of the m ost im portant reasons is that as

Everyday Life
w a y s o f seeing gender change (especially w a y s of seeing the role of
wom en), it becom es “ o b vio u s” that certain factors, w h ich in the past
h ave been ignored, should be investigated.

rarely th e re a fte r

certain cues are

Relationship

indirectly, if
Yes, at time
Prenatal H orm ones and G ender A ttribution. The relationship b e­

ch ild h o o d ;
assignm ent

emphasized
for sp o rts
no, except

and early
of gender
tw een prenatal horrhones and the gender attribution process is

no
no

no
indirect, at best. Since the le ve l of prenatal androgens is responsible
fo r the developm ent qf the genitals into a penis and scrotum or (by
its absence) into a clitoris and labia, it is in d irectly responsible for

d ifferen c es” (e.g.,

developm ent may
relationship y e t
the singular cue on w h ich gender assignm ent is based. Prenatal h or­

playing ten n is)

be minor factor
d em o n stra te d ]

in certain “sex
gender-linked
Evidence*

specific ro le
diseases (no
m ones in and o f them selves p la y no role in gender attribution.

transsexuals
sy n d ro m e

sy n d ro m e

effects on
ev idence

muscular
Pubertal H orm ones and G ender A ttribution. Pubertal horm ones also

Gender Role
p lay an indirect role in gender attribution.’ That is, secondary gender

no conclusive
characteristics like beards and breasts, w h ich m ay be cues for attrib­

Turner's
Turner's
but
uting gender, develop as a result of the gender horm ones secreted at

Relationship

unlikely
puberty. The horm ones them selves, though, are not crucial to the

unknown
possible
attribution process. Beards, breasts and other gender characteristics

no
can be bought in a store.

Biological Factors

possible
no

no

adrenogenital
BIOLOGY AND GENDER

males at birth
transsexuals
insensitivity
Evidence*

assigned as
syndrom e,
syndrome

syndrome
syndrome
androgen

evidence
A sum m ary o f the relationship b etw een biological factors in the

Gender Identity
developm ent of gender and the com ponents o f gender can be found

no conclusive
in T able 3.1. There are tw o significant points to be noted in an in ­

between

T u rn e r’s
Turner's
spection of the table: (1) W hat is kn ow n about the contribution of
b io lo gy to gender com ponents varies w id ely, depending on the factor

Relationship
and the com ponent. W ithin a p o sitivist fram ew ork, there are still

no
no

no
3.1 Relationship
im portant unansw ered questions about the relationship b etw een

(* Examples only)
b io lo gy and gender. (2) The w a y s in w h ich biologists tell fem ales

~
possible
from m ales is ve ry different from the gender attribution process

no
no
for D e t e r m in in g
w h ich occurs in everyd ay life. N everth eless (and this is not obvious
B io lo g ists’

Chromosomes

reproductive

reproductive
Gender
from the table), b iologists’ criteria fo r gender are grounded in e ve ry ­ Criteria

hormones

hormones
External

Pubertal
Prenatal
d ay gender attributions.

Internal
Gonads

o rg an s

organs
Table

In the rem ainder of this chapter w e first present an o verv iew and
critique o f biology and gender from a p ositivist p ersp ective and
then conclude w ith a discussion o f gender and b iology as a social

®
construction.
70 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
Biology and Gender from a Positivist Perspective
R esearch clearly indicates that there are no causal links b etw een
gender identity or gender role and gonads, internal reproductive
organs, or genitals. The relationship b etw een gender role and pu­
bertal horm ones or genetic factors is still ve ry m uch open to ques­
tion. A relationship b etw een prenatal horm ones and gender identity
and gender role, probab ly m ediated b y the effect o f prenatal h or­
m ones on brain structures, is one that has received the m ost support
in the scientific com m unity.
In 1955, M oney, Ham pson, and H am pson published an article
based on studies o f m atched pairs o f herm aphrodites, discordant
only in the gender w h ich they w ere assigned and reared (e.g., one
m em ber o f a pair w ith identical gender chrom osom es and equally
"m ascu lin ized ” genitals w as assigned and raised as a girl and devel­
oped a fem ale gender identity and role; the other w a s assigned and
raised as a b o y and developed a m ale gender identity and role). The
authors o f this article asserted that there w as com plete p sych osex-
ual neutrality at birth, that is, no predisposition to develop a par­
ticular gender identity. A lth ough M oney no longer holds a totally
environm ental position on the question o f gender identity (Money
and Ehrhardt, 1972), he continues to b elieve that w h a tever predis­
positions tow ard a particular gender identity exist due to prenatal
horm onal influences can be overcom e before the age of 3 or 4.
Critics o f the theory o f basic p sych o sexu a l neutrality offer various
argum ents against it: (1) The num ber of individuals w ith biological
gender abnorm alities is extrem ely sm all relative to norm al cases.
This is true, but the num ber of “ experim ental” subjects (e.g., rats
prenatally exposed to androgens in a lab) is alw ays "rela tively
sm all." N evertheless, results o f such studies are taken very seriously
b y scientists. (2) The norm al process m ight not be the same as the
abnorm al process. This m ay be, but the answ er aw aits further re­
search. (3) The third criticism is based on the assum ption that geni­
tal appearance is h ighly correlated w ith “ m asculinization" or “ fem ­
in ization " o f brain centers. If the genitals h ave been “m asculinized”
b y prenatal exposure to androgens, or “ fem in ized ” b y the absence of
prenatal androgens, then the brain has p robab ly been sim ilarly
affected. T h e gender identity that even tu ally develops is due then
to the influence o f brain structures. The gender assignm ent-gender
identity relationship is m erely correlational. This criticism is the
w eak est of the three since as Lev-R an (1974) has pointed out, the
m atched pairs o f herm aphrodites studied b y M oney, Hampson, and
Biology and Gender 71
H am pson (1955) w ere identical genitally, gonadally, and genetically
(in term s o f their gender chrom osom es). This w ou ld indicate that
the m embers o f a pair w ere exposed to v e ry sim ilar, if not identical,
levels o f prenatal androgens. N everth eless, the m em bers o f the pairs
w ere assigned “ opposite” genders and develop ed gender identities
in accordance w ith their assignm ents.
T h ese three criticism s of the th eory o f p sych o sexu a l neutrality
at birth com e directly from a biological fram ew ork w ith ou t ch al­
lenging any basic assum ptions about gender. Further biological re­
search w ill indicate their validity.
T h e scientific evidence seems to point to prenatal horm onal influ­
ences w h ich exert an effect rela tively ea sily overcom e b y assignm ent
and rearing. If a b o y w ith partial androgen insen sitivity, w h o has
been exp osed to m inim al amounts o f prenatal androgens, has to
overcom e difficulties that other boys do not h ave to face (e.g., that
he m ay not be able to function in the m ale role during intercourse
becau se o f a m icropenis), he n evertheless does learn and develop a
m ale gender iden tity (Money and O rgunro, 1974). E ven today, w ith
the p ossib ility o f requesting reassignm ent fo llo w in g surgical and
horm onal treatment, m ost people do not ch oose reassignm ent, indi­
cating that th ey p robably do not feel "m isassigned .” This contra­
dicts the v ie w o f some scientists (cf. Zugar, 1975) w h o see these
people as being forced to fit into a m old against w h ich their biology
dictates.
Prenatal horm ones (which som etim es seem to be the deus ex
machina o f the 1970s) m ay also be im portant in the developm ent of
gender role. W e have already discussed in detail our criticism s of
the research. It is clear that it is, and w ill continue to be, difficult
to assess the contribution o f biological factors to gender role b e­
h aviors. This is partly because the concept of gender role in volves
so m any behaviors, and each of the b eh aviors is so varied in its
exp ression and in the em phasis placed on its appropriateness for
one gender or the other.
F ew scien tists w ould m aintain that biological factors determ ine
w h a t typ e of clothes a person w ears, but other b eh aviors are not
so clearly socially determ ined. Is there, as M on ey and Ehrhardt
(1972) h ave suggested, a prenatal organization o f brain functioning
w h ich later results in greater sexual arousal to visu a l m aterial in
those exposed to higher prenatal androgen levels? Is this h yp oth e­
sized “ sex d ifferen ce” a critical part o f gender role? H ow w ou ld such
a m echanism w ork? W hat are the im plications? W h at is the rela­
tionship betw een actual differences in the w ay s w om en and men
72 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
Biology and Gender 73
b eh ave and the differential expectations w h ich w e h ave fo r their
o f view , the " y e s ” appears because o f the visib ility o f genitals and
b eh avior (i.e., our concepts o f gender role)? If the questions that
secondary gender characteristics and the role th ey p lay in the
can be raised about one specific response to one specific stimulus
■gender attribution process. It is con ceivab le, though, th at i f the
are so com plex, it is e a sy to see h o w com plicated the issu es are
concept of gender attribution becam e integrated into p ositivist ap­
w h en the beh aviors are even m ore general (e.g., aggression, em o­
p roaches to gender, there m ight even tu ally b e a search fo r b iological
tionality).
m echanism s w h ich contribute to presenting on self in order to be
A n y serious research on biological contributions to gender differ­
taken as fem ale or m ale and perhaps fo r m echanism s im portant in
ences in b eh avior m ust first establish b eyon d doubt th at there are
k n ow in g h o w to interpret these presentations— a biological radar
actual beh avioral differences. R ecent review s of the literature on
system .
" s e x differences” (e.g., M acco b y and Jacklin, 1974] have concluded
Such research could include a search fo r brain structures, affected
that there are re la tively fe w reliable differences. This conclusion
b y lev els o f prenatal hormones, w h ich result in a tend ency to m ove
should help m ake researchers m ore careful and less lik ely to take
and present on eself in a certain w ay, or w h ich resu lt in a greater
differences fo r granted.16
ability to learn certain w a y s o f acting, speaking, and so or^ rather
M uch o f our critique o f research on the m enstrual cycle and b e­
than others. There m ight be an exam ination o f the role o f phero-
h a v io r can b e applied to studies o f the effects o f gender horm ones
m ones (cf. M cC lintock, 1971) in the gender attribution process. Per­
on gender role beh avior in general. Intragender differences in b e ­
haps w e kn ow (in a biological sense) w h ich gender som eone is by
h a v io r are, fo r the m ost part, as variab le as intergender differences,
ou r reaction to chem icals transm itted through odor. C ertainly these
and horm one levels m(ay or m ay not p la y a role in the variab ility of
are all answ erable questions w h ich can be pursued through scientific
behavior. (See M accob y and Jacklin, 1974; Lew is, 1975). E ven i f
inquiry.
horm ones are important, h ow ever, dichotom izing both the horm ones
and the behaviors as gender-specific is not dictated b y the data, but
rather b y our construction of the w orld. Biology and Gender as a Social Construction
W e b elieve that the m ost fru itfu l direction fo r research to take
The question o f h o w prenatal and/or pubertal horm ones influence
w o u ld be to investigate b iological factors separate from the gender
gender role behaviors (“ sex differences”) does not call into question
categories in w h ich th e y have been placed. Biologists could then
either the existence o f tw o genders or w hether, indeed, there are
stu d y h o w different levels o f the fa cto r affect behavior. an y differences.
Com parisons b etw een persons w h o are m atched on all im portant
There is no a priori reason for attributing gender to horm ones, the
bio lo gical factors excep t fo r the le ve l o f a particular horm one they
individuals being studied, or the beh aviors that result, in order to ask
produce, to see if there are differences in certain behaviors, w ould
questions about the effects of prenatal horm ones on the brain and
m ean concentrating on intragender com parisons, since intergender
behavior. Just as w e m ight ask questions about the effects o f insulin
com parisons are confounded b y other b iological factors lik e chrom o­
on the brain and behavior, so w e m ight ask about the effects of
som es and genitals. E fforts should be directed a w a y from studying
androgen (or estrogen) on the brain— an yon e’s brain. T h e reason
b iological factors in "s e x differences" and tow ard studying biological
research is not based on this question is that even scientists are
facto rs in behavioral differences. R elevan t to this type o f research
constrained b y livin g in a w o rld o f o n ly tw o genders.
is the question of the relationship am ong the com ponents of gender.
The d isco very o f the "sex horm ones” in the nineteenth century
If, fo r exam ple, prenatal horm ones are a factor in the developm ent
w as, at first, thought to be the end o f the search fo r the biological
o f gender identity, does this im ply that th ey are a factor in either
criteria that differentiated the genders. W hen it becam e clear that
gender role or gender attribution? It is clear that the com ponents are
m ales and fem ales alike produce estrogen, androgen, and proges­
related, but are the factors w h ich contribute to the com ponents
terone, the presence or absence o f horm ones could no longer be
n ecessarily related?
used as criteria to attribute gender, although the relative propor­
R eferring to T ab le 3.1, the only colum n in w hich w e h ave p laced
tion o f horm ones w as still considered to be a viab le test for the
a definite “ y e s ” is in the gender attribution column. From our point
degree o f "m aleness” or "fem a len ess” o f an individual. H ow ever,
74 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
Biology and Gender 75
as m ore is discovered about hum an endocrinology, the idea of
A lth ou gh the scientists w e h ave ju st quoted take a strong b io ­
“ m ale" versus "fem a le" horm ones has becom e som ew hat question­
lo gical determ inist position on gender, w e are n ot arguing for or
able (cf. D w orkin, 1974). Som e o f w h at w e n ow kn ow about the
•against biological contributions to gender differences or sim ilarities.
gender horm ones m akes it clear that talk about "horm one dim orph­
It is sim ply that these statem ents m ake overt w h at lies behind all
ism " is a construction. In the first place, the three gender h or­
scientific w o rk on gender, even the w o rk o f those w ho argue for
m ones, estrogen, androgen, and progesterone, are chem ically v e ry
m inim al biological differences. T h is is the b e lie f in tw o genders.
sim ilar and often difficult to m easure. For exam ple, a urine specim en
One side o f the determ inist fen ce states that estrogens account for
cannot be “ sex-typ ed" on the basis o f a horm one assay (Botella
fem ale variab ility, and lack of certain skills, and that androgens
LIusia, 1973). Secondly, not only are all three horm ones produced
accou nt fo r m ale intelligence, and aggressiven ess (cf. Hutt, 1972),
b y both genders, but, at times, th ey are produced in com parable
w h ile the other side argues that w h a tev er differences exist are due
amounts. V ande W iele m akes the point that, excep t fo r the time
to environm ental factors (cf. O akley, 1972), and that the only real
around ovulation, m ales and fem ales p roduce the sam e am ount of
b iological differences are that w om en m enstruate, gestate, and
progesterone and to call progesterone a "fe m a le ” horm one is m is­
lactate, w hile men im pregnate. O ur point is that neither side^of the
leading (Friedman et al., 1974). Finally, estrogenic substances, if
argum ent calls into question the fa ct th at there are fem ales and
adm inistered during pregnancy, can, under certain circum stances,
m ales, even if the differences betw een them are minim al. B y w hat
"m ascu lin ize" a fetus (M oney and Ehrhardt, 1972).
criteria, then, do th ey determ ine if som eone is fem ale or m ale?
If horm ones do not alw ays (or even alm ost never) differentiate
The answ er is; in the same w a y everyon e else does. A lthough
w om en from men, then w h at does? T h e confirm ation o f the existence
scien tists h ave devised lists o f biological criteria w h ich differentiate
of “ sex chrom osom es" in the early part of the tw entieth century w as
w om en from m en (chromosom es, gonads, etc.), th ey a lw a ys begin
a second im portant d isco very in the search fo r the factor w hich
b y being able to tell fem ales from m ales in the first place, w ithout
defined “ fem ale” and “ m ale." A s w e stated earlier, chrom osom e
an y inform ation about these criteria. A lth ou gh it seem s as if the
com position is not alw ays clearly dichotom ous, but it still seem s to
b iological facts h ave an existence independent o f gender labels (i.e.,
be the best criterion at the moment. No m atter w h at the criteria,
there are X Y chrom osom es, etc., and all these together are labeled
though, and no m atter h o w contradictory or confusing the results
"m ale sex"), the process is actu ally the reverse. C oncepts of gender
o f research h ave been, at no tim e h ave biologists challenged the
lead to the d iscovery o f "differentiating fa c ts.” For exam ple, in order
basic incorrigible proposition w h ich th ey hold, not as biologists but
to kn ow if w om en and men differ in brain structures, w e w ould
as m em bers o f every d a y society, that there are tw o genders. No
need to get a group o f w om en and a group o f men, label the brains
m atter h o w m uch scientific kn ow ledge is increased, the fa c t of tw o
according to the don or’s gender, and then exam ine the brains for
genders is not challenged, and there continues to b e a search fo r
differences. T h e w a y the original group w o u ld be gotten w ou ld be
dichotom ous differentiating criteria.
through the everyd ay gender attribution process. The scientists
In 1932, Lillie, a biologist, w ro te that “ there is no such biological
w ould not ask fo r X X brains from the m orgue; th ey w ould ask for
entity as sex. W hat exists in nature is a dim orphism w ithin species
brains from fem ale corpses. The biologists' activities are grounded
into m ale and fem ale individuals, w h ich differ w ith respect to con­
in the everyd ay gender attribution process.
trasting characters. . . . Sex . . . is m erely a nam e fo r our total im pres­
T h e concept o f gender identity is an excellen t exam ple of the
sion o f the differences" (Lillie, 1932, p. 3). In 1959, a psych ologist
social construction o f gender and h o w it grounds biological facts.
w rote: “ Persons do not exist; there are only m ale persons and fe ­
One of the criticism s o f the th eory o f p sych o sexu a l neutrality is that
m ale persons . . . b iologically, so cio lo gically, and p sych o lo g ica lly ”
asking people about their gender identity necessitates a definite
(Colley, 1959). In 1972, this statem ent w as term ed “ p ersp icacious”
answ er in our society. "H ow m any . . , patients in a freer society
b y a British p sych ologist (Hutt, 1972). W hat these three scientists
w o u ld question their im posed sex, esp ecia lly if not reinforced in
m ake clear through their statem ents is that the prim ary fact is the
their given sex b y surgery and horm ones?" (Zuger, 1975, p. 580).
existence o f tw o genders. This fact is not to be challenged b y any
This criticism is w orth exam ining in som e detail. Zuger, him self, in
data, but rather all data is to be fitted into this fram ew ork.
m aking this criticism does not challenge the concept o f gender
76 Gender: An Ethnomefhodological Approach
identity. Presum ably he b elieves that everyone has a gender identity
w h ich is larg ely b iologically determ ined. It is not clear w hether the
“ rein forcem en t” he refers to is lim ited to b iological factors. T h at is,
is the reinforcem ent only biological, in the sense that horm onal treat­
m ent affects gender identity, or is it social, in the sense that the
individual know s, fo r exam ple, that som eone w ith a vagina and an
in sen sitivity to androgens can be nothing but a (social) wom an,
despite such p erson’s doubts about w h eth er that is really w h at they
are?
It is true that the only w a y to determ ine gender identity is to ask,
and, as w e stated in C hapter 1, the answ ers are in part determ ined
b y the questions. H ow ever, in a society w here gender is constructed
differently (see Chapter 2), gender identity m ight no longer be a u se­
fu l concept. Its usefulness fo r b iology is that it supports the dich o­
tom y o f gender. G ender identity rem ains the one psych obiological
concept w h ich is fixed and dichotom ous.
Biology and the Process of Gender Attribution
T he only p h ysical characteristics that can p la y a role in gender
attribution in every d a y life are those that are visible. Hormones,
chrom osom es, internal^reproductive organs, and, fo r adults, genitals
are unim portant in the process o f cla ssifyin g som eone as fem ale or
m ale in every d a y life. ffhis is obvious, but it is w orth taking note of
because o f its im plications. In the first place, if w e (socially) define
a p erso n ’s gender as that gender w h ich others attribute to them,
then m ost biological criteria are irrelevant. A Women, for exam ple,
in a social sense, is not the one w h o produces egg cells. Rather, once
a person attributes “ w om an” that person also attributes the ability
to produce egg cells to the individual. W h eth er or not any particular
w om an actually has the cap acity to con ceive and gestate is not
im portant. It is assum ed that she can u nless proven otherw ise, in
w h ich case, if a "go o d ” reason is given, the “ w om an” attribution is
not called into question. (W e discuss “ g o o d ” reasons further in
C hapters 4 and 5.) The b io lo gists’ criteria are neither a n ecessary
nor sufficient condition for being fem ale or m ale in everyd ay life.
The ultim ate biological criterion for defining gender is the indi­
vid u a l’s role in reproduction, w hich is dependent on w hether or not
there is at least one Y chrom osom e. Th ese criteria are abstractions,
not m em bers’ m ethods fo r attributing gender. A ll hum an beings, no
m atter w h a t their degree of scientific sophistication, attribute gen­
der. Children attribute gender (see C hapter 4) long before they learn
Biology and Gender 77
about even the m ost simple biological criteria fo r being m ale or
fem ale.
- N evertheless, the role o f b iology in the gender attribution process
is to provide "sign s” for us. Signs are not gender, but they serve as
“ good reason s” for our attributions in a w orld w here biological
fa c ts are seen as the ultim ate reasons. G enitals are the sole criteria
fo r attribution at the time of gender assignm ent. A fte r that point, if
people are asked fo r their reasons for m aking an attribution the
answ ers are m ost often in terms o f p h ysical characteristics. These
answ ers are seen as good reasons (e.g., “ He had a beard, so I kn ew
he w as a m an” ), but the signs that w e use as good reasons are not
n ecessarily universal, as w e h ave seen in C hapter 2. T h e use of
p h ysical signs indicates h ow m uch o f our construction o f gender is
grounded in the b elief that b iological criteria are the ultim ate
criteria.
G ender is not the Only constructed classification that is grounded
in biology. The fam ily is another. In our so ciety the defining criterion
fo r being a relative is either m arriage into a fam ily or the biological
linkage o f “ blood.” Schneider (1968) has show n h o w "rela tiv es” are
defined in A m erican culture on the basis o f these criteria; but the
criteria are not universal. W e construct the closest links b etw een p eo­
ple in term s o f h o w m uch "b lo o d ” (i.e., b iological inheritance) they
share, so that siblings are seen as m ore clo se ly related than cousins;
in other cultures, other criteria are im portant, so that m other’s
brother m ay be seen as a m uch closer relative than fath er’s brother.
In our society they w ould be eq ually related.
T he process of gender attribution, like the concept o f “ relation,”
m ay be universal, but the grounds given fo r m aking a certain classi­
fication are not.ir T h ey depend on the various “ incorrigible proposi­
tion s” defining various realities. In our culture, p h ysica l and b io­
logical reality is the ultim ate reality, and b iological facts give
grounds for and support the fa cticity o f tw o genders. A t the same
tim e b iology itself is grounded in, and gets its support from , the
b asic assum ption that there are only tw o genders.
In this chapter w e have sum m arized w h a t scientific research has
discovered about w hat it means to be m ale or fem ale and h ow
people get to be one or the other. W e h ave discussed h ow b iologists’
gender attributions are based on abstractions but grounded in the
e ve ry d a y gender attribution process. If w e accept the rules that con­
stitute b iology as a form of life, then there is m uch of interest to
help us understand gender and pointing to directions that further
research should take. If w e v ie w b iology as a construction, then w e
78 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
can see h o w a study o f the gender attribution process is basic to an
understanding o f h o w it is that biologists can study gender in the
first place.
NOTES
1. Our use of “biology” and "biologists" includes all the biological
sciences and those whose work is within those sciences. This would
include physiology, endocrinology, genetics, etc.
2. For a more detailed discussion of reproductive processes and
human gender development, see Beck et al., 1973.
3. Biologists almost always use the word “sex” rather than "gender,”
leaving the latter term to refer to social aspects of being male or female.
However, there is confusion in the use of the two terms (see Chapter 1).
4. In some species (e.g., honeybees) the egg cell is capable of developing
by itself, without a sperm cell, into a new individual. This is known as
parthenogenesis, and is considered to be an asexual means of
reproduction.
5. Certain species, particularly the Australian wrasse, a coral reef fish,
exhibit what is known as “sequential hermaphroditism.” In such species,
egg cell carriers may become sperm cell carriers under certain conditions.
In addition, there are organisms that have the capacity to produce
both types of reproductive cells (e.g., earthworms).
6. We assume that they mean to include woman, too.
7. Recent research (Wachtel et al., 1976) indicates that the development
of testes is due to a single gene on the Y chromosome. Occasionally, this
gene transfers to an X chromosome in gamete formation and the
individual develops into an XX male, with testes and other "male” organs.
8. Frequent genetic abnormalities include XXX, XO or Turner's
syndrome, XXY or Klinefelter’s syndrome, and XYY. The different
abnormalities vary in the extent to which individuals are affected by them.
XXX individuals usually have no known concommitant abnormality,
whereas individuals with severe cases of Turner's and Klinefelter’s
syndromes often have severe abnormalities, such as mental retardation.
Based on data from Ounstead and Taylor (1972) and Walzer and Gerard
(1975), about 15 of 5000 births involve an abnormality of the gender
chromosomes. This is about twice the rate of Trisomy-21 (Down’s
syndrome), which is 7.4 per 5000 births (Walzer and Gerard, 1975).
Although the incidence of each abnormality is fairly low, taken
together chromosome abnormalities are not as rare as most people think.
9. This lack of concern reflects not only an interest in fairness, but also
Biology and Gender 79
the cultural orientation that there is something less "wrong,” in any
circumstance, with women passing as men, or engaging in "male” activities,
than vice versa. We guess that if a man did turn out to be a woman, she
would be banned from the competition and her medals would be taken
away, but that tests for male athletes would not be instituted. If nothing
else, it might be too embarrassing for men to adtnit that
they have to “watch out” for female competitors.
10. The dates in the text refer to the Olympics. The International
Amateur Athletic Federation instituted physical examinations in 1966
and chromosome tests in 1967.
11. Fortunately, decisions such as this one are relatively rare. A reading
of the presentation of the case leads one to conclude that the
major concern of the staff was avoiding legal suits.
12. Although it is true that estrogens, in dosages thousands of tim'fes the
normal level for pregnancy, can “masculinize” animal fetuses (Reinisch,
1974), this condition does not occur in human beings or animals, outside
the laboratory. Mammalian fetuses under normal circumstances appear to
be relatively immune to the effects of estrogen, probably to insure that
the fetus is protected from the high levels of estrogen circulating
in the mother’s blood during pregnancy (Sherfey, 1972).
13. C. Jacklin, personal communication, December 6,1976.
14. Initial reports describing a group of individuals living in the
Dominican Republic seemed to indicate that this has occurred in certain
cultures. These people, called Guevedoces (“balls at twelve”) by the
villagers, are born with ambiguous genitals, raised as girls, but at puberty
develop masculinized secondary gender characteristics. According to the
original report (Imperato-McGinley et al., 1974), at this point they are able
to change their genders and develop an “unequivocal male psychosexual
orientation" (p. 1213). The report challenges some basic “facts"
about gender.
Money (1975) and Sagarin (1975) have asserted that the parents of
these children, and other villagers, knew about or suspected the later
virilization. Consequently they defined the genitals as a penis from birth
and did not rear their children as girls. Perhaps they reared them like
girls, but with the expectation that at puberty they would become males.
It is impossible to know how accurate the initial report was, although
there is no reason not to believe that the villagers constructed gender in the
w ay described. A t this point, of course, future treatment of Guevedoces
will be influenced by the villagers’ contact with “■science." The counter
arguments are important, however, because they indicate not only an
alternative description of how the villagers might have constructed gender,
but they also indicate how scientists interpret data to support their facts
which, in turn, support the socially shared construction of a
world of two invariable genders.
80 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
15. The explanation of these oversimplifications, from the point of view
of traditional positivism, is that these authors were either unaware of
the “true” facts and/or they did not have enough information to interpret
the facts "correctly.” From our point of view, "oversimplification" is the
wrong word. The "facts” known to earlier scientists were as true or false
as the present facts. To say that they were wrong is to misunderstand
the nature of science (see Kuhn, 1970). As for popularized treatments of
science, what we asserted in Chapter 2 about how early anthropologists'
accounts of gender “among the natives” were constructions of
constructions is also relevant here. Most scientists, at least sometimes,
are aware of how tentative, conditional, and open to question their
findings are. The publication of findings filters out some of this
tentativeness, and the reading of publications by those whose concerns
are different from the scientists' often leads to statements of clear-cut
truths which, if traced back to their source, are not really that clear.
A good example of how Scientific and popular treatments of the same
subject matter differ radically in their presentations is a comparison
between Money and Ehrhardt (1972) and the popular version of
this book (Money and Tucker, 1975).
16. It is interesting th&t researchers should now be “discovering”
that there are few “ sex differences” in behavior. How much of this
discovery is a result of changing ways of seeing gender?
17. Among the Nuer plople, a father is "the person in whose name
cattle bridewealth is giveh for the mother. Thus, a woman can be married
to another woman, and he husband to the wife and father of her children,
despite the fact that she is not the inseminator” (Rubin, 1975, p. 169).
This implies not only a different construction of “relation” but,
perhaps, a different construction of gender.
4 _____________
DEVELOPMENTAL
ASPECTS OF GENDER
Jesse (six years old) w as asked to d raw a picture o f a b oy and a
picture o f a girl. W hen questioned b y an in terview er: “ W h at m akes
her a girl?” , he answ ered, “B ecause there is a sun and girls go out
on sunny d a y s.” "W h at m akes this other draw ing a picture o f a
b o y ?” “ B ecause I colored it and the m an is out tonight. He has to
w o rk at night. The moon and he is ou tsid e.”
Loren (4V2 years old) explained that his d raw in g o f a boy differed
from his draw ing o f a girl "b ecau se it (the boy) has no long hair;
cause the eyes are different they are rounder; because he is bigger
than a girl. She (the girl) has long hair; and she has little curlies in
her hair; and she has ears; and because she is sm aller.”
Jesse and Loren can also answ er the question: “ A re yo u a girl or
a b o y ? ” accurately. T h ey kn ow that they are boys. A child o f Loren’s
age, how ever, m ay not be sure w hether he w ill be a m an or a w om an
w h en he grow s up, w hile Jesse’s peers kn ow th ey w ill be men if they
are n o w boys. Both Jesse and Loren can list m any differences b e ­
tw een boys and girls (boys are rougher, girls w ear dresses) and
w ere w e to observe their choice o f toys, ask about their preferred
activities, and study some o f their behaviors, w e w ou ld probab ly
conclude that there are definite differences betw een them and their
fem ale peers, differences m ore evident am ong the six y ear olds than
the fou r y ear olds.
If w e thought o f children as nothing but little adults, p h ysica lly
w eak er and less experienced but essen tially m iniature replicas, w e
m ight be forced to conclude that Jesse and Loren w ere m entally
defective, or, at least, in tellectu ally slow . N ot only are som e o f their
answ ers to questions about their pictures peculiar, but the reasons
they give do not correspond to the actual pictures th ey drew. Jesse’s
picture o f a b oy also has a sun in it; Loren’s girl has round eyes
and his b oy has ears too. (See Figures 4.1-4.4.)
O f course, in the tw entieth century w e do not consider children
61
 82 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
to be m iniature adults. W e accept the reality o f developm ent from
child into adult as a process of transform ations through stages, each
m oving closer and closer to m ature b eh avior and thought processes.
W e do not exp ect young children to be rational and responsible, and
these expectations are reflected in law , in childrearing practices, and
in the scientific study o f human developm ent. (See. DeM ause, 1975,
fo r an h istorical review o f the concept o f “ childhood.” ) Children do
not experience the w orld the w a y adults do. T h e y differ from adults
not m erely in terms o f having less experien ce and kn ow in g less, but
also in terms of the w a y the conceptualize reality, including the
reality o f gender.
W hat accounts fo r the developm ent o f gender role beh avior as
children grow tow ards adulthood? H o w do children learn they are
either boys or girls? Is there a learning process in being able to
accu rately tell girls from b o ys and w om en from men?
U nless w e assum e that the com ponents o f gender are com pletely
b iological and m erely unfold in the course o f m aturation, it is
n ecessary to seek environm ental factors w hich , at least, interact
Developmental Aspects of Gender 83
w ith b iological factors and lead to the acquisition o f gender identity,
gender role, and gender attribution processes. This has been, and
continues to be, the task of p sych ology, p articularly developm ental
p sych ology. A s a p o sitivist science, lik e biology, p sych o lo g y accepts
the reality o f gender and its com ponents, p articu larly gender identity
and gender role. The “ fa c t” o f m ascu lin ity and fem ininity (adher­
ence to a particular gender role) is as real and ob jective for p sych o l­
ogy as horm ones are fo r biology, and is th eoretically as am enable
to m easurem ent, quantification, and study. E ven the current interest
in androgyny (e.g., Bern, 1978) is grounded in the assum ption that
there are real m asculine and fem inine traits w hich can be com bined
(cf. R ebecca et al., 1976).
There are three main theoretical persp ectives in the study of
hum an p sych ological developm ent: psych oan alytic, social learning,
and cognitive developm ental. In this chapter w e present a general
o v erv ie w o f the three theories and discuss their contributions to an
understanding o f the developm ent o f gender identity, role, and attri­
bution. W e do not intend this to be an exh au stive critique o f the
84 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
theories.1 W e evaluate, from a traditional perspective, w h at the
theories assert about h o w children learn there are tw o genders, h ow
th ey learn w h at their ow n gender is, h ow th ey learn w h at gender
others are, and h o w th ey learn the b eh aviors “ appropriate” to their
gender. H ow ever, as w ith our discussion o f biology, our main inter­
est is in presenting p sych o lo gy as a w a y o f seeing gender.
PSYCHOANALYTIC
THEORY
Freud did not w rite about "gender role,” “ gender identity,” or
"gender attribution.” He w rote about “ Som e p sych ical consequences
o f the anatom ical distinctions betw een the s e x e s” (Freud, 1925). His
th eory is grounded in the prem ise that people are born w ith one of
tw o possible anatomies, and he spent a large portion o f his intel­
lectu al life investigating h o w these tw o anatom ically distinct groups
develop different kinds of m ental liv es and have different kinds of
experiences. There w as no question that these p sych ica l and b e ­
h avioral differences existed. The question w as “ w h y ? ”
Developmental Aspects of Gender 85
Figure 4.4 Loren's drawing of a girl.
A cco rd in g to Freud, around the age o f five, children becom e aw are
that th ey either possess a penis or do not possess a penis. This rec­
ognition leads them to develop a particular fan tasy in volvin g their
genitals (or lack of) and their parents. O ut o f that fan tasy com es a
resolution o f feelings about the genitals and the parents. This reso­
lution entails identifyin g w ith one of the parents and, consequently,
internalizing the values o f that parent, and even tu ally exhibiting the
sam e behaviors as that parent. Since the paren ts’ beh aviors are (pre­
sum ably) gender-typed, the ch ild ’s w ill be also.
The recognition that one has or does not h ave a particular set of
genitals is, for Freud, tantam ount to reco gn izin g that one is a par­
ticular gender. "I have a p en is” m eans “ I am a b o y ” and "I do not
h ave a p enis” m eans “ I am a girl." In this system gender identity is
genital identity. If the child fails to accept the reality o f her/his
genitals (or lack of), then the child has not accepted that she/he is
fem ale or male. Freud saw gender identity as so in trin sically tied to
genitals that he did not even consider it n ecessary to provide the
theoretical underpinnings o f that connection. N or does he explain
86 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
h o w children learn to see genitals as the dichotom izing feature by
w h ich they distinguish all people and categorize them selves. W hy
not size, or hair length, or other m ore public differences?
R ecent research draw s Freud’s equation o f genital discovery and
gender identity into question. There are children w ho h ave m ale
gender identities even though th ey do not h ave penises and children
w h o have fem ale gender identities even though they do have penises
(M oney and Ehrhardt, 1972). W e do not k n o w h ow Freud w ould
h ave dealt w ith evidence from these cases. C hildren appear to have
fixed gender identities b y age three (M oney and Ehrhardt, 1972),
earlier than Freud asserted, and before th ey sh ow aw areness of
genital and/or anatom ical gender differences (Kohlberg, 1966). H ow
w ou ld Freud have explained the fa ct that blind children develop
stable gender identities with no apparent difficulty and share cul­
tural ideas about gender (Person, 1974), even though th ey cannot see
genital differences? M ost o f the evidence indicates that aw areness
o f genital differences is not param ount in the developm ent of gen­
der identity,
Freud b elieved that the recognition that one has a penis or does
not h ave a penis w as not sufficient fo r behaving in a w a y that is
appropriate for people w ho h ave penises or do not h ave penises.
U nconscious and sem iconscious fan tasy is the process that links
gender identity to gender role. W hen children w ith penises m as­
turbate, they im agine that adults h ave negative feelings about their
m asturbation, esp ecially the m asturbatory fan tasies they have about
their m others, w h o are their first lo ve objects. T h ey perceive their
fath ers as rivals fo r their m other's affections and consequently
resent their fathers and w ou ld lik e to get rid of them. T h ey imagine
that their fathers w ou ld be angered b y these feelings and w ould
retaliate in kind w ith aggression. Specifically, the children fantasize
that their fathers w ill castrate them. Since the children iden tify w ith
their genitals, this w ou ld essentially m ean total destruction. The
fan tasy o f castration is given some support w h en the children w ith
penises notice children w ithout penises and think that those chil­
dren m ust have been castrated.
C astration an xiety is unbearable and the only w a y to resolve it
is to relinquish, through repression, all desires fo r the m other and
to id en tify w ith the father. In p sych o an alytic terms, “ object ch oice”
(w anting someone) is replaced b y “ object id en tity” (wanting to he
like someone). By identifying w ith their fath ers they obtain their
m others vicariou sly. Through identification th ey assum e the values
and role behaviors of their fathers. A lth ou gh the children w ith
Developmental Aspects of Gender 87
penises resolve their castration an xiety b y iden tifyin g w ith their
fathers, there is typ ically some identification w ith both parents,
since their first identification has been w ith their m others. The
am ount of identification w ith each parent, and consequen tly the
am ount o f m ale or fem ale gender role b eh avior the children display,
is, in part, dependent on the relative strength o f their m asculine and
fem inine constitutional m akeup, a fa cto r that Freud did n ot exp li­
cate in great detail. N evertheless, b y virtue o f h avin g a penis, an
a ctive sexual organ, the children w h o su ccessfu lly resolve their
O edipal desires and castration an xiety w ill develop gender role
beh aviors that are characterized b y activity.
C hildren w ithou t penises® undergo a different set o f fan tasy
experiences. A t around the age of five th ey becom e aw are o f the fact
that th ey do not h ave penises. P resum ably this com es from lee in g
children w ith penises and m aking com parisons. The clitoris, w h ich
had been the focu s o f sexual feelin g until this point, and w h ich had
been valu ed for the erotic pleasure it produced, becom es devalued
and is n o w view ed as an inadequate penis. M asturbatory a ctiv ity is
relinquished. A ccord in g to Freud (1925), penises are valued b y
children w ho lack them because penises are ". . . strikingly visible
and o f large proportions, at once recognize(d) as the superior
counterpart of their ow n small and inconspicuous organ . . .” (p.
252).
The m others, w h o had been valued fo r the needs th ey satisfied,
n o w becom e devalued because they, too, la c k penises and because
th ey are blam ed for the children’s deficiency. The children m ay b e­
liev e that they had penises but lo st them as a form o f punishm ent.
B ecause the fathers have penises, they take on greater value and
becom e the children’s object choice.
The children w ithou t penises, then, are in the sam e position vis-
a-vis their fathers as the children w ith penises are vis-4-vis their
m others. The children w ithout penises m ust relinquish their fathers
and iden tify w ith their mothers. Through identification w ith their
m others, they incorporate ideal fem ale valu es and the appropriate
role behaviors fo r the fem ale gender. T h ey com e to accept their
vaginas, rather than their clitorises, as their true genital. A lth ough
children w ithou t penises are also constitution ally bisexual, and w ill
id en tify to som e extent w ith both parents, b y virtue o f having
vaginas, p assive sexual organs, those children w h o su ccessfu lly
resolve their O edipal desires w ill develop gender role behaviors
that are characterized b y p assivity.
B ecau se there is no strong m otivation to resolve their O edipal
88 Gender: An Ethnome.thodological Approach
Developmental Aspects of Gender 89
conflict (analogous to ; castration an xiety in the children w ith pen-
sexuals people w ho, because o f an u n resolved O edipal conflict,
ises), these conflicts are never fu lly resolved. This results in a num ­
w ould not accept their ow n genitals and consequen tly their own
ber o f unfortunate consequences. T h e y w ill have w eak er consciences
“ gender. Transsexualism w ould h ave been seen as an extrem e form
and w ill n ev er fu lly give up their desire to h ave penises, although
o f h om osexuality, w ith a m asochistic com ponent, accom panied by
there w ill be som e w a y s that that desire can be sym b olically fu l­
such severe guilt feelings that the individ ual could not accept the
filled (e.g., giving birth to sons).
hom osexuality.
In T ab le 4.1, the developm ent o f gender role, according to p sy­
Freud’s developm ental theory has been criticized fo r several rea­
ch oan alytic theory, is sh ow n arising out of the initial recognition of
sons besides his equation o f genital aw areness w ith gender identity.
one's ow n genitals. Ft^i’ Freud, the study o f gender w as essentially
It does not take into account the fa c t that in non-W estern cultures
the study o f gender rbles. The problem w a s not h o w children learn
children w ith different genitals m ay not perform v e ry different role
that there exist tw o genders, or even h ow they learn that they are a
b eh aviors or m ay exhibit role b eh aviors that are the reverse o f our
p articular gender, but rather (in contem porary terms) h ow do ch il­
ow n culture's (Mead, 1935). In addition, the fan tasy that Freud de­
dren develop the appropriate gender role— h o w and w h y do b o ys
scribed m ay be inappropriate in cultures w here the ch ild ’s fgth er is
becom e m asculine and girls becom e fem inine? In the norm al course
not the authority figure (M alinowski, 1932).
of developm ent, a child w ou ld kn ow w h a t genital she or he had,
The th eory is also based on a b iological assum ption, accurate
w o u ld develop the appropriate fan tasy, and w ou ld incorporate the
w h en Freud w as w riting but n o w kn ow n to be false, that fetuses
values and behaviors appropriate to her/his gender.
w ere “ constitution ally b isexu al,” that is, that they had the potential
It should be clear that gender attribution w as not an issue for
fo r developing into either gender; one potential w a s expressed, w hile
Freud. A lth o u gh there is no doubt that, for him, gender equaled
the other w as suppressed. The contem porary facts are that fetuses
genitals, he did not see gender attribution as problem atic. A n y intra­
d evelop in a "fem a le” direction unless som ething (e.g., prenatal
p sych ic conflict had to be b etw een gender identity and gender role,
androgens) is added. This know ledge, com bined w ith the b elief that
rather than gender identity and gender attribution. It is difficult to
b oys h ave to change their identification from their m others to their
incorporate, w ithin an orthodox p sych oan alytic fram ew ork, persons
fathers, w hile girls do not h ave to m ake an y changes, is used to sup­
w ith penises, seen as; m ale b y others, w ho conceive of them selves
port the contention (contrary to Freud's) that gender developm ent
as really being fem ale, unless this is seen as p sych osis or other
is m ore difficult for boys than fo r girls (Person, 1974). (Freud con­
severe pathology. Presum ably, Freud w ou ld h ave considered trans-
centrated on the idea that b oys w ere the ones w ho did not h ave to
change the gender o f their love object.)
Table 4.1 Theories of Gender Development A n additional criticism o f Freudian th eory is that gender d evel­
Freudian opm ent does not end w ith the resolution o f the O edipal phase.
psychoanalytic: own awareness —» fantasy —» identification —> gender role Children continue to learn gender roles throughout childhood, and
of genitals p readolescence and adolescence are im portant stages in learning
(implicit : gender m asculine and fem inine b eh avior (M accoby and Jacklin, 1974).
identity) P sych oan alysts w ho came after Freud8 varied in the extent to
identification (modeling) w h ich th ey supported his view s about gender developm ent. Regard­
Social i less o f h ow fa r th ey deviate from the Freudian m odel, th ey remain
learning: others’ awarehpss —> differential —> gender -> gender identity convin ced o f the sequence: genital aw areness leads to fan tasy leads
of genitals 1 reinforcement role to identification leads to gender role (e.g., Person, 1974). The m odifi­
cations they m ade lie in the fo llo w in g areas:
Cognitive
develop­
mental: others’ aware- labeling -» gender -» gender -> identification 1. The nature o f genital aw areness and the role it p lays in gender
ness of genitals identity role identity
2. The particulars o f the O edipal fan tasy
90 Gender; An Ethnomethodological Approach
3. The role o f the social environm ent
4. The age at w h ich gender identity and gender role developm ent
takes place
H orn ey’s [1926] explication o f the developm ent of gender role
fo cu ses on girls and em phasizes quite different aspects of the nature
of genital aw areness and the content o f the ch ild ’s u nconscious fan ­
tasy. A cco rd in g to H orney, those children born w ith ou t penises do
not so m uch experience the lack o f a penis as their defining feature,
but rather th ey experien ce the presen ce o f their vaginas. T h ey
recognize that th ey h ave vaginas and at no point do these children
reject their clitorises as inadequate. T h e y are part of their genitals.
A n x ie ty centers around their vaginas, because th ey cannot be in­
spected and because the children fear the vaginas w ill not be large
enough to receive their fath ers’ (fantasized) penises. Children w ith
penises m ay be envied because it is assum ed that they are allow ed to
m asturbate, since they hold their penises w h en urinating. In norm al
developm ent, h ow ever, this en vy disappears w h en the children w ith
vagin as realize their role in the birth process. There are children w ith
vagin as w ho continue to en vy penises and den y their genitals (and
hence their gender), but according to H orney, this is not part of
the norm al course o f developm ent. In sum, she did not see penis
en vy as playin g the im portant role in developm ent that Freud
claim ed.
H orney also discusses h o w the fan tasy o f som e children w ith
vagin as o f w an ting a penis is rein forced b y a society that values
people w ith penises m ore than people w ith vaginas. The penis, then,
becom es sym bolic o f greater p ow er and choice. The incorporation
o f sociocultural influences has becom e an integral part o f con­
tem porary p sych oan alytic theory. U nlike Freud, m ost p sych o ­
analysts no longer see the ch ild ’s fan tasy as occurring w ithin a
vacuum .
Som e contem porary form ulations o f p sych o an alytic theory (e.g.,
Stoller, 1975) dem onstrate a recognition of the com plexities o f gen­
der developm ent. G ender identity is not dependent on aw areness
o f on e’s genitals, hut depends on pregenital identification w ith the
m other (for girls) and pregenital separation from the m other (for
boys). Identification w ith the m other is seen as prim ary fo r all ch il­
dren, and the developm ent o f gender role is also seen as beginning
before genital aw areness, as a result o f the p aren ts’ labeling o f and
interaction w ith the child. W hat is h yp o th esized as arising out of
Developmental Aspects of Gender 91
genital aw areness and fan tasy are the specifics o f gender role, par­
ticu larly such traits as aggressiveness, and dependence/indepen-
-d e n c e (Person, 1974). Even these specifics, h ow ever, are seen as
grounded in a society w here m ales h ave certain p rerogatives w h ich
fem ales do not and vice versa.
S O C IA L LEA R N IN G
TH E O R Y
P sych oan alytic theory postulates a m echanism (identification
w ith the parent having the sam e genitals) to exp lain w h y children
learn “ appropriate" gender role behaviors, but the theory does not
explain h ow the m echanism w orks. Identification is definea as the
im itation and incorporation o f com plex valu es and b eh aviors w ith ­
out specific external pressures to do this. E vidence for identification
com es from studies o f p aren t-ch ild sim ilarities in values and b e ­
haviors, but such sim ilarity can be due to factors besides identifi­
cation (Bronfenbrenner, 1958). T h ese factors include direct teaching
b y the parent in appropriate behaviors, pressure b y other people and
institutions to behave in certain w ay s, and genetic factors shared
b y the parent and child.
W ith the developm ent o f theories o f learning in the 1940s and
1950s, psych ologists dissatisfied w ith the la c k o f em phasis on “ h o w ”
in p sych oan alytic theory began to apply principles o f learning
th eory to explain h o w identification and other p sych o an alytic pro­
cesses can occur. Eventually, a separate p ersp ective developed,
called social learning theory.
S ocial learning theory, w h ile retaining the idea that processes
sim ilar to identification are im portant in the developm ent o f gender
com ponents, does not retain the b asic th eoretical postulates of
psych oan alysis. Its m ajor assum ption, as stated b y M ischel (1966),
is that the acquisition and perform ance o f gender-typed behaviors
“ can be described b y the sam e learning principles used to analyze
any other aspect o f an in divid ual’s -behavior” (p. 56). G ender-typed
beh aviors are defined as b eh aviors that h ave different consequences
depending on the gender o f the person exh ibiting the behavior. The
learning principles include “ discrim ination, generalization . . . ob­
servational learning . . . the pattern o f rew ard, nonrew ard, and pun­
ishm ent under specific contingencies, (and) the principles o f direct
and vicarious conditioning” (p. 57). T h e em phasis in social learning
92 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
th eory is on observable, antecedent events, rather than on inferred
in trapsychic processes, like O edipal fan tasy. The m ost com plete
form ulation of social learning theory as it relates to the developm ent
o f gender iden tity and role is b y M isch el (1966; 1970).
In brief, the th eory states that through observation children learn
b eh aviors associated w ith both parents. T h ey learn these behaviors
w ithou t any direct reinforcem ent because they see their parents as
p ow erful, effective, and as having control over rew ards. (This, ac­
cording to social learning theory, is the process o f identification.)
For exam ple, by w atch in g their m other put on lip stick and perfum e
and observing their fath er tell her that she looks nice, both sons
and daughters learn h o w to “ dress up.” H ow ever, w hen the children
actually perform the behaviors they h ave learned, th ey are dif­
feren tially reinforced. The daughter m ay be rew arded for “ acting
cu te,” w hile the son miay be disapprovingly told "B o ys don’t w ear
lip stick .” ■ the developm ent o f gender identity. A daughter m ay or m ay not
E ventually, through differential reinforcem ent from parents, teach­
ers, peers, and others, children begin to kn ow w h a t th ey can and
cannot do. T h ey b egin 1 to anticipate the consequences o f various
behaviors, and they begin to value gender “ appropriate” behaviors
becau se they are rew arded and to devalue gender "inappropriate”
beh aviors because th e y : are punished or ignored. The child learns
the lab el ("b o y ” or "g irl” ) appropriate to the rew arded behaviors,
and learns to apply that label to her/him self. Through generalization,
the child learns to value that label, since it stands fo r valued b e­
h aviors, and to see the label as an im portant part o f her/his self-
concept. G ender identity, according to social learning theory, is just
another name for this self-label. T h e m ale child thinks: “ I w ant
rew ards. I am rew arded fo r doing b o y things. T herefore, I w an t to
be a b o y ” (Kohlberg, 1966, p. 89). Social learning th eory m akes no
assum ptions about the age at w h ich any o f these processes take
p lace; it only states tliat this is the sequence in w h ich the develop ­
m ent of gender role and gender iden tity occur.
Social learning th eory does not concern itse lf w ith the question
o f gender attribution. There are tw o genders, and presum ably ch il­
dren com e to learn about p h ysical gender differences in the same
w a y that they learn anything else. It is taken fo r granted b y social
learning theorists that gender lab els are applied to people on the basis
o f o b jective criteria. There is not a great deal of em phasis on “ ideas”
about gender (and h o w these m ight develop) since one o f the th eory’s
b asic assum ptions is that although the acquisition o f gender-typed
Developmental Aspects of Gender 93
b eh avior m ay be regulated b y cogn itive p rocesses, the actual per­
form ance o f these behaviors depends on rein forcem en t histories.
-T ab le 4.1 sum m arizes the developm ent o f gender iden tity and role,
accordingly to social learning theory.
Social learning theory em phasizes the im portance o f differential
reinforcem ent, but M accoby and Jacklin (1974) claim that, for the
m ost part, young children are not treated d ifferently b y their parents
on the basis o f gender. If there is differential treatm ent, it is lim ited
to the parents providing gender-typed cloth es and toys, p articularly
for boys. O thers (e.g., Block, 1978) h ave disagreed w ith M accoby
and Jacklin, asserting that there is considerable differential treat­
m ent in early childhood.
E ven if it is true that differential treatm ent is not strong enough
to account for gender differences in behavior, M isch el’s statem ent of
social learning theory could still be u sefu l as a w a y o f describing
w ear lip stick w hen she gets older, but she does learn (because the
lab el is differentially applied) that she is a girl and that girls are
expected to behave, in at least certain w ays, differently from boys.
The specifics o f gender role beh avior m ay not be w e ll accounted for
b y social learning theory but, according to M ischel, there is not
m uch to account fo r— there are v e ry fe w stable and consistent “ sex
d ifferen ces” in behavior. W hether Or not a person even tually e x ­
hibits a particular gender-typed beh avior can be predicted only
from a study o f past and present reinforcem ent contingencies and
environm ental stimuli. Th ese factors are different for each in divid­
ual. Thus, it is not surprising that there are fe w consistent “ sex
d ifferen ces” in behavior, or conflicting evidence about differential
reinforcem ent fo r specific b eh aviors.4
E vidence from G reen’s (1974) study o f transsexual adults and
children w ith atyp ical gender identities provides som e support for
social learning theory. W h ile G reen feels that genetic and prenatal
horm onal factors p robably contribute to the etiology o f transsexual­
ism, he has concluded that a specific social situation is comm on to
the early childhoods o f young b o y s 5 referred to him because of
effem inate beh avior and to the reco llected childhoods of m any adult
m ale-to-fem ale transsexuals.
A cco rd in g to Green, these boys, either because th ey are encour­
aged b y their parents or because o f constitutional factors, are at­
tracted from an early age to bright colors, interesting textures, and
sh in y objects. Fem inine clothing and je w elry h ave these qualities,
94 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
and, often beginning at age tw o or three, the b oys begin to dress up
"lik e lad ies" and start to exh ibit "effem in ate” m annerism s, lik e lisps
and m incing w alks. T h e p ow er o f this “ m asquerade" is heightened
because m any of these b o ys are uncom m only “ b eautifu l.” Their
cross-dressing is u su ally encouraged, or at least not discouraged, b y
their parents. In addition, these b o ys do not p la y w ith other boys,
either because no m ale peers are availab le or because th ey p refer
the com pany and less aggressive activities o f girls. T h e fath er
feels that b y not liking “ b o y ” things his son is rejecting him, and
he becom es p sych o lo gically absent from the ch ild ’s w orld. B y the
tim e these boys go to school, th ey do not relate w e ll to other boys
and are often teased fo r being "sissies.” E ven tu ally the child
begins to verbalize, at le a st to him self, that h e w an ts to be a girl,
that he really feels like a girl. He m ay, w h en he gets old enough,
lab el him self a transsexual and request gender reassignm ent
procedures.
Th e m ost critical facto r in the developm ent o f a fem ale gender
identity in these boys, according to Green, is that there is no dis­
couragem ent o f fem inine beh avior b y the adults w h o are raising the
child. The parents do not realize that b y failin g to discourage this
[particularly the cross-dressing), and b y not a ctiv ely encouraging
“ b o y ” behavior, they are aiding him in his developing preference for a
fem ale gender role and a fem ale gender identity. G reen suggests that
the reasoning o f these children is as fo llo w s: B ecause I do not like
" b o y ” things, and because I do like “ girl” things, then I m ust really
not be a boy. If I am not a boy, I h ave to be som ething, so I m ust
be a girl. This reasoning is reinforced b y the ch ild ’s peers w ho tease
him and call him “ sissy " and “ girl," and tell him such facts as “ B oys
don’t p la y w ith dolls.” The ch ild’s reasoning is, in effect, a restate­
m ent o f the principles o f social learning: “ I like girl things, so I m ust
be (or w an t to be) a girl.” 8
Part of G reen’s treatm ent of these children is to encourage them
to do “ b o y ” things (e.g., cam ping w ith their fathers), and to teach
them that (1) not all “ b o y " things are aggressive, unpleasant (for
them) activities, and (2) some “ girl” things, lik e coloring, can be done
b y boys. In other w ords, he encourages them to redefine their p refer­
ences from “ I like girl things” to “ I lik e b o y things.”
G reen m ay be criticized for being sexist in his treatm ent program
b y encouraging differentiated gender roles. W e do not think that the
criticism is totally w arranted, since G reen is v e ry clear in his asser­
tion that he is not trying to turn these b oys into “ superm en,” nor is
Developmental Aspects of Gender 95
he trying to m aintain rigid stereotyp es.7 In fact, G reen im plies that
if gender stereotypes could becom e less rigid, there w o u ld probably
"be fe w e r “p retran ssexu al” children, since there w ou ld be fe w e r
nonoverlapping "b o y s” things and “ g irl” things. In a w orld w here
gender is constructed so that the dichotom y is inflexible and d ev i­
ance from roles has negative consequences, esp ecially fo r m ales,
p roviding treatm ent for these b oys can p reven t m uch o f the pain
that they w ould suffer until th ey becam e old enough to request
reassignm ent surgery. On the other hand, accepting that these ch il­
dren need treatm ent confirms the status quo and perpetuates, no
m atter h o w hum anistically, the gender dichotom y.
A s w e explain in the next section, there is som e question about
w h eth er changing cultural ideas about gender roles can really have
an im pact on the w a y children think about gender. O ne o f the
criticism s o f social learning th eory is that it does not take into ac­
count evidence that children’s perceptions o f the w o rld are different
from adults', and that these perceptions influence the children’s
gender identity and gender role behaviors. A ll children share “ b i­
za rre” ideas about gender, ideas that w ou ld not be predicted from
kn ow in g their reinforcem ent histories. The n ext th eory w e discuss,
cogn itive developm ental theory, sp ecifically deals w ith children’s
ideas about gender.
A cco rd in g to that theory, from a youn g ch ild ’s p ersp ective a b oy
can becom e a girl b y changing his clothing and m annerism s. B oys
lik e the ones G reen treats may, w hen th ey are young, actu ally b elieve
that th ey are changing genders w hen th ey cross-dress. T h ey m ay
also b elieve that if they do “g irl” things th ey are girls— not just
b ecau se their parents h ave encouraged them to act like girls, but
because, given the w a y children construct gender, “ acting lik e ” is
the sam e as “ being” a girl.
These b oys do not just exhibit stereotyped “ fem inine” behavior
lik e w an ting to p la y w ith dolls, but they also try to m ove, talk, and
dress “ lik e ” adult fem ales. T h ey sh ow signs o f trying to learn w h at it
takes to “ p a ss” as a fem ale, the sam e types o f things adult trans­
sexu als w an t to learn. T h e y m ay be tryin g to construct a n ew gen­
der attribution for those around them, rather than ju st show ing a
preference fo r cross-gender role behaviors. O ur analysis o f chil­
dren’s ideas o f gender (which w e discuss in the last section o f this
chapter) suggests that successfu l treatm ent o f these children m ust
include an aw areness o f the children's rules fo r constructing
gender.
90 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
COGNITIVE
DEVELOPMENTAL
THEORY
In contrast to p sych o an alytic and social learning theory, cogni­
tive developm ental th eory (Kohlberg, 1966) em phasizes the ch ild’s
active role in structuring the w orld, according to the ch ild ’s level of
cogn itive developm ent. The theory, based on the w o rk o f Piaget,
begins w ith the assum ption that the ch ild ’s reality is q ualitatively
different from adults’ reality. T h e w a y the child sees the w orld
changes in discrete stages until, as a youn g adult, the individ ual has
an “ accurate" v ie w o f reality. (From our perspective, children de­
velo p until th ey share the sam e rules for constructing the w o rld as
all other adults. "A c c u r a c y " is a so cia lly constructed concept.)
B efore the age o f five to seven, children do not h ave the concept
o f conservation o f p h ysical properties (Piaget, 1952). A d u lts kn ow
th at a given am ount o f w ate r poured from a short, w id e glass into a
narrow , tall glass rem ains the sam e am ount o f w ater. Children w ho
h ave not developed the concept o f conservation b elieve that the
am ount o f w a te r changes w hen the shape o f the container changes.
T h ey can give reasons to support this b elief (e.g., “ It’s taller, so
th ere’s m ore w ate r” ).p G iven W estern, scientific constructions of
reality, both their b e lie f and their reason are “ w ron g.” T h ey h ave
not y e t learned the adult rules fo r reality construction. In Piaget’s
conceptualization, children are not ignorant, nor h ave they been
taught incorrectly; rather, there is a q u alitative difference b etw een
the structure o f children’s and adults’ thinking.
W e h ave divided K oh lberg’s w o rk on gender into tw o parts. One
is the stud y o f h o w children’s ideas about gender undergo orderly
transform ations. W e discuss this w o rk in the last section of this
chapter, T h e other part o f K oh lb erg’s w o rk is a th eory o f gender
developm ent w h ich can be com pared w ith the tw o theories w e h ave
already presented.
K ohlberg asserts that gender is a p h ysica l category based on
anatom y, and until children h ave the concept o f conservation despite
transform ations, th ey do not have perm anent gender identities.
U ntil th ey understand that, ju st as the am ount o f w ater does not
change w hen poured from one container to another, gender does not
change w hen, for exam ple, som eone w h o p lays w ith trucks starts
p layin g w ith dolls, th ey cannot develo p a gender identity.
B y the time th ey are three years old children can label them ­
selves accu rately (e.g., “ I am a girl” ). T h e y learn this from hearing
Developmental Aspects of Gender 97
others label them, and often can lab el others accurately, but they
do not yet kn ow that (1) a p erson ’s gender n ever changes, (2)
everyone has a gender, and (3) gender differences are ph ysical/
anatom ical ones. B y the time children are age five or six, they
develop the concept o f conservation, including the idea th at a p er­
son ’s gender is invariant. N ot only does the six y ear old k n o w she
is a girl, but she kn ow s that she w ill a lw a ys be a girl. O nly at that
point, according to K ohlberg, does it m ake sense to ta lk about the
child h avin g a gender identity.
O nce children develop stable gender identities, th ey begin to
p refer gender-typed activities and objects. This is because children
valu e and w ish to be like things that th ey p erceive as sim ilar to
them selves. A s K ohlberg states it, their thinking is: I am a^boy.
Therefore I like boy things. Therefore doing b oy things is rew ard ­
ing (p. 89).
A s th ey develop perm anent gender identities, boys begin to
id en tify w ith their fathers because th ey com e to understand that not
on ly are th ey sim ilar to other boys, but th ey are also sim ilar to men,
o f w h ich their fath er is an exam ple. Thus, th ey w an t to be like their
fathers.
Girls, b y the age o f five or six, k n o w th ey are girls; they like girl
things, and w an t to be like their m others. H ow ever, girls are not
as “ ty p ed ” in their p references or identifications as boys, because
th ey id en tify w ith their fathers as w ell as their m others. In the real­
ity o f the you n g child, “ m ale” is equated w ith “ b ig ” and synonym ous
w ith "m ore p o w erfu l.” Consequently, both b oys and girls are lik ely
to identify, to some extent, w ith their fathers and m ale things in
general. T ab le 4.1 sum m arizes the developm ent o f gender identity
and role according to cognitive developm ental theory.
K oh lberg presents arguments fo r w h y cognitive developm ental
th eory explains the developm ent o f gender id en tity and role better
than p sych oan alytic or social learning theory. A s w e h ave discussed,
p sych o an alytic th eory m aintains th at gender identity d evelop s from
genital aw areness. H ow ever, K ohlberg has found that children do
n ot h ave clear ideas about genital differences until after th ey have
develop ed a gender identity. In addition, p sych oan alytic theory
asserts that appropriate role behaviors are a result o f identification
w ith the sam e gender parent. R esearch (Kohlberg, 1966) indicates
that children are already "sex-typ ed " in their b eh avior at an age
(four years) w hen, according to p sych oan alytic theory, both boys
and girls are identified w ith their m others. Finally, K ohlberg claim s
that social learning theory cannot account for w h y children have
98 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
such “ unusual" ideas about gender, nor can it account fo r atypical
form s o f sexual or gender role behaviors, lik e hom osexuality, de­
spite pressures tow ard s typ icality. M ore im portantly, it cannot ac­
count fo r universal sim ilarities in ch ildren’s concepts and behaviors
despite different fam ilial and sociocultural backgrounds.
There are several criticism s that h ave been m ade o f cognitive
developm ental theory. One criticism is that being able to label a
person "m ale” or “ fem ale,” and/or being able to articulate reasons
fo r a label, is not synonym ous w ith being able to m ake certain dis­
tinctions. A p sych o an alyst m ight argue that even if five years olds
do not say that men and w om en are different because th ey have
different genitals, th ey m ay still know , on some level, about genital
differences. A second criticism , as M accob y and Jacklin (1974) have
pointed out, is that it is not n ecessary fo r the child to h ave the con­
cept o f gender invarian ce in order fo r self-socialization into gender
roles to begin. Three y ear olds h ave clear gender-typed preferences,
fo r exam ple, in toys, and it is im possible to discount the effects of
this self-socialization on future behavior. Thirdly, cognitive d evel­
opm ental theory cannot account fo r individual differences in the
adoption of gender role behaviors w ith ou t recourse to concepts like
“ reinforcem ent.” In general, the theory tends to ignore individual
differences. N evertheless, there is little argum ent w ith K oh lb erg’s
general contention that a ch ild’s understanding of “ b o y ” and “ girl”
and the roles associated w ith these labels are different from adults’
understanding, and that that understanding influences the ch ild ’s
b eh avior and treatm ent o f others.
O f the three theories, cognitive developm ental is the only one
concerned w ith the problem o f the developm ent o f gender attribu­
tion processes. A t least in terms of labeling, K ohlberg has been inter­
ested in the age at w h ich children can correctly label others “ m ale"
and "fem a le” and the reasons they give fo r assigning labels. Im plicit
in cognitive developm ental theory, h ow ever, is the assum ption that
the reasons people give fo r assigning labels are the reasons they
use, an assertion that w e question.
A s w e describe in m ore detail in the last section o f this chapter,
children often give p h ysical gender role characteristics like hair
length and dress, as reasons fo r m aking gender attributions, w hile
adults give prim ary and secondary p h ysical gender characteristics
like genitals and breasts as reasons. A cco rd in g to Kohlberg, the'se
different reasons indicate a sh ift from seeing gender as a variable '•
category (anyone could be a w om an if the w a y you kn ow som eone
is a w om an is b y hair length) to seeing gender as invariant (one’s
Developmental Aspects of Gender 99
genitals and secondary gender ch aracteristics do not change). K ohl­
berg at least indicates an interest in the idea o f gender attribution,
although he does not see it as prim ary, nor as a social construction.
A cco rd in g to cognitive developm ental theory, there are tw o genders,
in varian tly dichotom ized, w h ich can be labeled on the basis o f real,
obvious, factual, objective p h ysical characteristics, and that is w hat
everyone does— adults and children alike— but only adults kn ow
h o w they do it.
COMPARING THE
THEORIES
*
A n inspection of Table 4.1 clarifies som e of the differences
am ong the three m ajor p sych ological theories o f gender develop ­
ment. The theories vary in their assum ptions about (1) w hether
gender identity precedes or develop s from gender role, (2) the age
at w h ich these gender com ponents develop, and (3) the w a y s in
w h ich parents, through identification and/or reinforcem ent, affect
the developm ent o f gender iden tity and gender role.
Besides these differences, there are sim ilarities am ong the theories.
A lth ou gh th ey all im ply that genitals are the criteria fo r gender attri­
bution, telling fem ales from m ales is not a concern. T h is is because
for each theory, and fo r the p sych ologists and p sych oan alysts w ho
w o rk w ithin their fram ew orks, there is no question about the ob jec­
tive fa cticity o f gender. G ender is as real as height and w eigh t and
it can be ob jectively m easured and studied w ith ou t insurm ountable
problem s. In addition, gender iden tity and gender role and the
processes that lead to their developm ent, lik e identification and
reinforcem ent, are ob jective facts. It is assum ed that m en and w om en
are b eh aviorally and p sych ologically different, and the causes o f
these differences can be found in developm ental processes. The incor­
rigible proposition that there are tw o genders, leads to the assum p­
tion that there m ust be some expression o f this dichotom y, even if
the differences are not as exten sive as form erly b elieved , and that
there is a set of p sych ological factors leading to an orderly, under­
standable developm ent o f gender differences, including gender
identity.
Besides their acceptance o f the fa c tic ity of gender, the theories,
and the research stem m ing from them, are sim ilar in their em phasis
on m ale developm ent. The theories' treatm ent o f both norm al and
abnorm al developm ent concentrates on b o ys and tends to offer m ore
100 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
satisfactory and com plete explanations of m ale than of fem ale d ev e l­
opm ent— even in the eyes o f the theorists (see Kohlberg, 1966;
Freud, 1925; Stoller, 1975; H eilbrun, 1973).
A lth o u gh Freud (1925) claim ed that m ale developm ent is sm oother
and less precarious than fem ale developm ent, the evidence (e.g., the
higher incidence o f “ gender disorders” like transvestism , trans­
sexualism , paraphelias, am ong men) indicates that m ale developm ent
is m ore precarious and m ore sensitive to environm ental influences.
Thus, in this case, it m ight be easier to find m ore orderly relation­
ships betw een environm ental factors (e.g., parental treatment) and
gender role developm ent in boys. G irls’ developm ent m ay occur
m ore independently of external influences. This explanation takes
it fo r granted that scientific research and th eory is objective and
unbiased— a mere uncovering o f w h a t is already there.
O n the other hand, som e explanations fo r the concentration on
m ale developm ent taljce into account the fa c t that p sych ological
theories and data are pot independent o f the interests of the people
doing the science. Such “ accu sation s” o f b ias in th eory and research
h ave com e from a num ber o f sources. H o m ey (1926), for exam ple,
sh ow s h o w Freud’s theory o f gender developm ent directly parallels
little b o y s ’ ideas about gender.8 The fa c t that m ainly men h ave
created the theories and collected the data m ay help account for
w h y there has been an femphasis on m ale developm ent and a relative
in ab ility to understand h o w girls develop. There are several possible
reasons: (1) M en are m ore interested in things lik e them selves; (2)
M en v ie w m ale developm ent as the norm and try to relate fem ale
developm ent to that norm w h en the developm ental processes m ay
be to tally different; (3) Men, h aving b een boys, m ight be able to
understand aspects o f the developm ent o f b oys that they cannot in
girls.
Th ese criticism s regarding m asculine bias share, w ith the theories
being criticized, a b elief in the fa c tic ity of gender. The im plication
o f the criticism s is that, w ere the androcentric bias rem oved from
p sych ology, the "tru e” facts about gender could then be discovered.
These facts, h ow ever, w ould be no m ore or less “ true” than the
facts w e n ow have. T h ey w ou ld sim ply be grounded in different
incorrigible propositions.
Th ere are at least three theories offered to account for the d evel­
opm ent o f gender. W hich one is correct? This question is not one
that can be answ ered. A ll the theories can point to em pirical data
supporting their assum ptions and/or contradicting the assum ptions
o f other theories. U ltim ately, there is no w a y to determ ine the truth
Developmental Aspects of Gender 101
o f theoretical form ulations (Kuhn, 1970). T h eories are w ay s o f see­
in g the world and once one accepts the paradigm o f a theoretical
orientation, events becom e interpreted in light of that orientation.
T heories m ay be m ore or less useful, m ore or less aesth etically p leas­
ing, m ore or less "in vogu e,” but their claim to truth is, in some
sense, a m atter o f faith in their basic assum ptions. P sychological
theories o f gender developm ent are sp ecial exam ples, because tliey
are scientific and, thus, more exp licit in stating their b asic assum p­
tions, o f the general phenom enon o f the social construction o f gen­
der. A ll assum ptions about gender, w h eth er scientific or not, are
grounded in the incorrigible propositions w h ich w e hold about real­
ity. This last statement, is, o f course, a statem ent o f our theoretical
form ulation.
CHILDREN’S ID E A S
OF GENDER
There is no disagreem ent in the p sych ological literature that
children’s ideas about gender differ from adults’. It is the explana­
tion fo r the difference w h ich varies. P sych oan alysts ground the d if­
feren ce in unconscious fantasies and infan tile (primary) thought
processes. Social learning theorists are not concerned w ith exp lain­
ing the difference. C ognitive developm ental theorists explain it as
an exam ple of children’s cognitive im m aturity. W e are interested
in ch ildren’s ideas o f gender in term s o f w h at th ey can tell us about
the social construction o f gender. W e differ w ith cogn itive develop ­
m ental theorists in that w e see adult concepts o f gender as another
stage in reality construction, rather than as the final accurate per­
ception o f reality.
In the rem ainder of this chapter w e attem pt to sh ow h o w the
social construction o f reality can be seen as a developm ental process,
in terms o f changes in the incorrigible propositions about gender
w h ich individuals hold. W e do this through presenting data that w e
h ave collected as w ell as b y reinterpreting data from K ohlberg and
others.
Concepts o f Gender Identity. By the age o f three, a child can answ er
the question: “ A re you a girl or a b o y ?” accu rately and consistently.
W hat does being a b oy or a girl m ean to the child? A t that age, ac­
cording to Kohlberg (1966), it m eans no m ore than being named
S a lly instead o f Susan. It is a characteristic o f the child, but not
102 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
n ecessarily invariant, and not n ecessarily a category into w hich
e ve ry hum an being can be placed.
A cco rd in g to Kohlberg, gender invarian ce develops around age
five or six at the sam e tim e the child understands conservation in
general. A ccord in g to the p o sitivist p ersp ective this is the point at
w h ich the child understands the o b jective fa ct that certain trans­
form ations do not change the p h ysical ch aracteristics of an object.
W e take this to be the point w hen the child begins to share adult
rules fo r gender construction and reality construction. A t this point
gender identity is ‘‘fixed ” and reassignm ents are no longer possible,
not because the child has suddenly grasped the fa cticity o f her/his
gender, but because the child has incorporated into her/his reality
a m ethod fo r seeing the “ fa c t" that one’s gender is unchangeable.
It m akes no sense to talk about a person h aving a “ gender id en tity"
until that person constructs gender as an invarian t characteristic of
her/his self. W e do not talk about, fo r exam ple, people having “ hair
length” identities. In fact, gender is one o f the fe w hum an character­
istics that are constructed as to tally invarian t from birth. It is for
this reason that virtu ally no attention has been paid to factors in
the m aintenance of gender identity. U nlike other self concepts (e.g.,
self-esteem ), gender iden tity is seen as n ever varyin g once it is
established.
C oncepts o f Gender Role. By the time they are three, children show
preferences fo r gender-typed toys and activities and have begun to
differentiate "b o y " things from “ girl” things. T h eir preferences,
h ow ever, are not y e t strongly dichotom ized, and the reasons given
fo r a particular p reference are egocentric. (“ Do boys like trucks or
do lls?” "T ru ck s." “ W h y ?” “ B ecause I lik e tru ck s.” ) C haracteristics
o f the child are attributed to all sim ilar persons. A three y ear old
nam ed “ K ate” w ho liked trucks m ight b elieve that all “ K ates" like
trucks.
B y age six, there is a re la tively high degree o f gender typin g in
expressed preferences. This does not m ean that the ch ild’s ow n
b eh avior is necessarily ve ry stereotyped. The child does believe,
how ever, that gender-typed activities are as inflexible, diochoto-
m ized, and unarbitrary as adults b elieve p h ysical gender character­
istics are (Kohlberg and Ullian, 1974). M en are doctors and wom en
are nurses; this is just a statem ent o f the facts. Children w ill say
this despite the fact that their ow n m others m ight be doctors or their
ow n doctors fem ale. Their doing this is not ve ry different from
adults, w h o say that men h ave n arrow er hips than wom en, even
Developmental Aspects of Gender 103
though the person m aking such a statem ent m ay b elieve that “ fa c t”
(e.g., b y being a man w ith w id e hips); it is* still seen as a statem ent
o f ob jective truth.
B y early adolescence, children begin to understand that roles are
not im peratives the w a y p h ysical and anatom ical attributes are, and
also understand that role differences inclu de p sych ological (e.g.,
em otional) as w e ll as behavioral com ponents (Kohlberg and Ullian,
1974). In other w ords, th ey can construe! reality as w e ll as any
adult.
Development of Gender Attribution
5 ‘
"C o rrect and stable gender identification depends on the ch ild ’s
ab ility to cla ssify a p h ysical object— the b o d y .” (Kohlberg, 1966, p.
94). “ G ender identification,” as K ohlberg uses the term, is the final
step in a process o f deciding w hether, through the course o f an inter­
action, the sense o f "m ale” or “ fem ale” has been created.
In a recent study o f gender identification, Thom pson (1975) in v es­
tigated the developm ent o f gender concepts, including the age at
w h ich children learn to apply gender labels to pictures and paper
doll figures. Three y ear olds are con siderab ly b etter than tw o year
olds in attributing the “ correct” gender to th em selves and others,
but one-fourth o f the three year olds still m ade errors. It is not until
children are ab o u t.five or six that th ey assign gender labels w ith
100 percent a ccu racy (i.e., in total agreem ent w ith adults) (Kohlberg,
1966). E ven then, w hen they are asked, “ H ow do yo u kn ow that it
is a w om an (man)?” , their reasons are often “ w ron g."
W e began this chapter w ith tw o ch ildren’s reason s fo r w h y their
draw ings depicted a fem ale or male. T h ose exam ples w ere selected
from a study w e conducted on gender attribution in ch ildrn’s d ra w ­
ings. W e w ere interested in capturing the p rocess o f gender attribu­
tion, in getting as close to the construction of gender as possible,
w ith ou t lim iting ourselves to gender identification as other research ­
ers had done. W e w anted to see children producing gender cues and
w an ted to understand the relationship b etw een these cues and ch il­
dren’s p o st-hoc constructions through an analysis o f the reasons
they, and others, gave for attributing gender to their pictures.
In order to do this w e asked p resch ool (age 3Y2- 4V2), kinder­
garten (age 5-6), and third-grade (age 8-9) children9 to draw tw o
pictures, one of a girl or w om an and the other o f a b o y or man, and
to tell us w h at m ade their picture a picture o f a girl (boy). One
m onth later, each child w as sh ow n pictures draw n b y children at
104 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
all three age levels. Included in the group o f draw ings w ere the tw o
draw ings the child had done a m onth earlier. E ach child w as asked
to id en tify the gender o f the figure in each draw ing, and to tell w h y
that gender w as assigned. The draw ings w ere also show n to adults
w h o w ere asked the sem e questions.10
The principal questions w e had w ere about the relationship be­
tw een age group and the a ccu racy o f gender attribution, (1) W ere
the participants m ore accurate in attributing gender to draw ings
produced b y older children than those produced b y younger chil­
dren? (2) W ere older children m ore accurate in attributing gender to
their ow n draw ings, bne m onth later, than youn ger children? (3)
D id participants’ ab ility to attribute gender correctly increase w ith
the age o f the participant?
For questions 1 and 2 w e found that there w as a simple increase
in a ccu racy w ith age. Participants in all groups w ere more accurate
in attributing gender to draw ings, the older the child w ho had p ro­
duced the drawing, and w ere m ore lik e ly to respond “ don't k n o w ”
to draw ings, the youn ger the child w ho had produced the drawing.
O nly third-graders w ere able to id en tify the gender o f their ow n
draw ings w ith 100 percent accuracy. A b o u t one-third o f the pre­
schoolers and kindergarteners either erred in attributing gender to
the pictures th ey had drawn, or could not assign a gender label, the
second time they saw the draw ings.
The findings fo r question 3, h ow ever, w ere m ore com plicated.
O lder children and adults w ere not better at m aking gender attribu­
tions to all draw ings. Rather, expertise at attributing gender d e­
pended on w h ich group o f participants w as judging w h ich group of
pictures. Preschoolers got 13 percent m ore o f the preschool draw ­
ings correct than any other group; kindergarten and preschool ch il­
dren attributed the correct gender to 16 percent m ore o f the kinder­
garten draw ings than the third-grade or adult participants; and
third-grade and kindergarten children got 12 percent m ore o f the
third-grade draw ings correct than did the preschoolers or adults.
T h is finding is quite intriguing. It suggests that w h atever cues
p reschoolers are using, those cues are shared, at least to som e extent,
b y children o f the seme age, but are n ot shared b y others. The
sam e can be said about kindergarten and third-grade children. If w e
k n ew only that older ch ildren ’s draw ings elicited m ore correct attri­
butions, w e m ight conclude that it w a s a m atter o f representational
ability im proving w ith age. T h e older a child is, the better she/he
can m ake a dress lo o k like a dress and a m oustache lo o k lik e a
Developmental Aspects of Gender 105
m oustache. W hile this is ob viou sly one factor, it does not explain
w h y presch oolers are better, relative to others, in attributing gender
"to preschool draw ings or w h y presch ool and kindergarten children
are better, relative to others, in attributing gender to kindergarten
draw ings. If youn ger children’s ideas about gender are as egocentric
as they h ave been asserted to be, then presu m ably there w ou ld be
little conceptual inform ation w h ich th ey shared and little in their
draw ings w h ich could be sharable. This w as not the case. There
m ay be som ething about gender w h ich youn g children share w ith
each other, but w h ich is not shared w ith older children or aduts. W e
exam ine this further in Chapter 6.
Som e inform ation about the developm ent o f gender attribution
p rocesses can be gained b y looking at the reasons p articipan t^ in the
study gave fo r the gender attributions th ey m ade. T h e particular
categories o f reasons (hair length, clothing, size, b o d y features) do
not inform us about the deep structure o f gender attribution, about
w h eth er young children attribute gender d ifferently from older ch il­
dren and adults, any m ore than asking an adult "W h a t m akes som e­
one a m an?” does. W hat w e can illum inate, though, is the develop ­
m ent o f the so cia lly constructed m eaning o f gender, if w e take the
kinds o f answ ers participants give to constitute w h a t th ey under­
stand to be “ good reasons” fo r gender.
O ur purpose in soliciting reasons w as not to catalog them, detail­
ing stages in cogn itive developm ent. A m p le evidence has already
been collected (e.g., Kohlberg, 1966; K atcher, 1955; Thom pson and
Bentler, 1971) w hich show s that youn g children cite hair length and
clothing as gender cues and that adults use b iological signs.11 The
reasons that the youn gest children gave suggest that th ey h ave not
y e t learned that any reason is not enough; it m ust be a “ good reason.”
Th at is, it m ust be placed w ithin a gender “ appropriate” context. For
exam ple, both preschool and adult participants freq u en tly gave b ody
parts as reasons. W hile preschoolers, fo r the m ost part, m erely
nam ed the b ody part (“ W h y is this a picture o f a b o y ?” "H is h an ds”
or “ His fa c e ” ), the adults characterized the featu res in a particular
w a y ("B ecause o f the aggressive exp ression on his fa c e ” or “B ecause
his arms are in an athletic p o se” ).
P reschool and kindergarten participants give m ore "w ro n g ” rea­
sons than anyone else. Their reasons tend to m ake no sense to
adults, to be seen as idiosyn cratic and uninform ative. Such a list
w ou ld include: round eyes, long tongue, ears, chin, nostrils, w ebbed
feet. Instead o f treating the youn gest children's reasons as idiosyn-
106 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
cratic and uninform ative, an analysis o f their "erro rs” reveals some
m ethodical aspects of their construction of gender and of the d evel­
opm ent of that construction.
D oes the fact that children give these reasons m ean that th ey are
using these cues, or does it m ean that th ey are not describing the
cues they use and are "m erely ” trying to give "good reasons?” A l­
though presch oolers w ere the least lik e ly to say "I don’t k n o w ”
w hen asked to m ake a gender attribution, they w ere the m ost lik ely
to say "I don’t k n o w ” w h en asked to give a reason for the attribu­
tion. P resch ool and kindergarten participants w ere also the m ost
lik e ly to give tautological reason*, fo r their attributions (“ It’s a
m an because it is ” or "B ecause I say so ” ].
G ivin g reasons is not the same as m aking a gender attribution. It
m ay be that the adults and older children could h ave m ade more
accurate gender attributions than th ey did to the preschool and
kindergarten draw ings, but, not finding anything in the picture that
could serve as a "good reason,” they assum ed that they did not kn ow
the gender.12 T h e youn gest children m ay not h av e been concerned
w ith “ good reason s,” not y e t sharing in the adult construction of
reality, and thus w ere not "a fra id ” to s a y “ I don ’t k n o w w h y it’s a
m an” or “ It’s a man ’cause it is,”
The reasons verb alized are not n ecessarily the cues used. W e can
postulate that fo r children, as fo r adults, gender is attributed on the
basis o f some, as y e t unknown, criteria, and then w h a t is given is a
good reason, that is, evidence that supports the w a y children con­
struct gender and the incorrigible propositions o f that construction.
For exam ple, Loren, w hom w e quoted at the beginning o f this chap­
ter, said h is p icture w a s a b o y b ecau se it w as bigger. A lth ou gh
L oren’s b o y is bigger than Loren’s girl (in term s o f face size], in m ost
o f the ch ildrens’ draw ings b o y and girl figures did not differ notice­
ab ly in size. S everal children besides Loren said that their picture
w as a b o y because it w as bigger, even though it w as actu ally no
bigger than their draw ing of a girl. The draw ings w ere the same
size, but they w ere asked to m ake a differentiation and they did
so— either because w hen they drew the picture th ey intended
there to be a size difference w h ich th ey w ere not skilled enough to
draw , or because they kn ew they w ere supposed to see a difference
(otherwise, w h y w ou ld the adult h ave asked them?]. H aving classi­
fied the draw ing, children m ust give a reason fo r the classification
w h ich displays the factual status o f gender, as they construct the
facts. S in ce the facts, fo r m any children, are in terms of p h ysical
Developmental Aspects of Gender 107
cues lik e size, this is the reason th ey give, thus d isp layin g the “ ob jec­
tive fa c tic ity ” o f gender.
- A d u lts do ex a ctly the sam e thing as these children. The reasons
adults give for gender attributions d isp lay and produce a sense of
the factual, ob jective status o f prim ary and secon dary gender char­
acteristics as an invariant dichotom y, regardless of w hether, in any
p articular case, that dichotom y appears "in the p ictu re.” W hen w e
say, "I k n ew he w a s a m an because o f h is broad shoulders and the
w a y he w a lk e d ,” w e do not base those reasons on any m easure w e
m ake o f those characteristics. W e k n o w h e is a m an (or at least w e
kn ow that he is sim ilar or different from us], and the reasons w e give
disp lay that w e kn ow w hat “ m an” m eans; th ey do not necessarily
describe w h a t he did, or h ow w e m ade the decision. ^
W hat differentiates adult gender concepts from those o f young
children is that adults "k n o w ” the so cia lly constructed "sign s” o f
gender and th ey "k n o w ” that these signs are invariant. Som e o f the
differences b etw een the w a y adults and children understand “rea­
so n s” are reflected in the errors som e kindergarten children m ade in
attributing gender to their ow n draw in gs one m onth later. (See
T ab le 4.2]
Som etim es "id io syn cra tic” reasons are given (“ ’cause it has a
face"]. The sam e cues m ay be used, at different times, to sign ify
m aleness and fem aleness (Example 1]. A cue from a p articular m em ­
b er of a gender (e.g., “ m y m other” ] m ay be used, b u t it is n ot one
that is generalized b y the child to be an invarian t feature o f that
gender o ve r tim e (Exam ple 2]. T h ese children do not y e t kn ow tw o
im portant things. One is that a "good reaso n ” fo r gender is dichoto-
m ous and generalizable. The second is that gender is a (socially
constructed and shared] set of qualities that are “ kn o w n ” to be
invarian t over time.
It w ou ld be a m istake to call the reasons given b y the children
“ gender cues,” but they are tryin g to be m ethodical; that is, they
k n o w th ey m ust give a reason, w h ic h is a step b eyon d “ I don’t
k n o w ” or “ ’Cause I say so." O nce th ey begin to understand “ good
reason ," they start to respond as Loren did. Size and h air length are
treated b y children at a certain stage as dichotom ous, generalizable
variables, in the sam e w a y as adults treat genitals and secondary
gender characteristics.
H ow ever, even w ith an understanding o f w hat a “ good reason” is,
youn g children still do not share in the adult m ethod o f constructing
gender. Children do not "understand” invariance. F ive y ear old
ch ildren b elieve that if y o u p u t a dress on a m an he could change
108 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach Developmental Aspects of Gender 109
Table 4.2 Examples of Children’s Reasons invarian t and not able to undergo any transform ations. Genital
transform ations are seen as not really changing the true gender of
Gender Attribution Reasons
a-person. It is m ore like changing w ater into steam — it is essentially
EXAMPLE 1 still w ater, although in another form. O nce children h ave incorpor­
1st Session: Boy Because boys have short hair and ated the concept of an invariant gender dich otom y based on biology
i
they don’t have beautiful eye­ into their rules for seeing gender, th ey becom e able to collaborate
lashes. They have boys’ shoes in the social construction of gender, in m aking gender a "re a l” fact.
like his. Boys don’t wear pony­ A rev iew o f p sychological theories o f gender developm ent has
tails either. sh ow n three w a y s in w hich it is p ossible to construct h o w children
2nd Session: Girl It's a second grader with short com e to share w ith adults the reality o f gender. O ur ow n th eory is
hair. Sometimes girls have short a fourth w a y o f constructing reality and w e h ave sh ow n h ow it is
hair. p ossible to see the social construction o f gender as a developm ental
process. The n ext chapter deals w ith gender construction not devel-
EXAMPLE 2 opm entally, but as an ongoing process in every interaction. *
1st Session: Girl Green eyes just like my mother.
2nd Session: Boy Looks big.

EXAMPLE 3
NOTES
1st Session: Girl This is a girl monster ’cause it
has a face on it. 1. Readers are referred to Freud (1925), Mischel (1966; 1970), and
2nd Session: Boy It is a cook with no hair. Kohlberg (1966) for the most complete statements of these theoretical
positions on gender.
EXAMPLE 4 2. We are deliberately referring to this group as “children without
This is a skeleton mother ’cause penises” rather than "children with clitorises” or "children with vaginas,”
1st Session: Girl
it has long legs and she has no because in Freud’s theoretical framework it is their lack of penises rather
colors only red. than their possession of something else which distinguishes them and
influences their psychosexual development in a particular direction.
2nd Session: -B o y It’s a little kid skeleton. Boys are
3. This discussion contains only a few examples of modern
skeletons.
psychoanalytic treatments of gender development. See Strouse (1974)
and Miller (1973) for more complete presentations.
into a w om an. A d u lts kn o w that this is not "tru e," but they believe 4. Whether there are specific “ sex differences” in behavior is not the
that if yo u put a penis on a w om an and rem ove her breasts, ovaries, same as whether there are gender roles (i.e., expectations that males and
and uterus and give her androgens she could change into a man. females are supposed to be different). The area of "sex differences" is
The increasing incidence of persons w h o get their genitals surgi­ too extensive for us to treat it in any detail. (See Maccoby and Jacklin,
cally transform ed (transsexuals) poses a dilem m a for the adult con­ 1974.) As we have stated before, the question of “real" differences
struction o f gender. Since adults hold the concept o f gender in vari­ between the genders is separate from the question of the expectation of
ance as an incorrigible proposition, there m ust be a w a y to interpret differences, the formation of a gender identity, and the ability to label
genital transform ations so as to m aintain the im possibility of gender others with the “ appropriate” gender label and to have oneself labeled
“ correctly" by others. The assertion by Mischel and others that there are
transform ations. The w a y invariance has been m aintained is either
very few "real" gender differences does not call into question the fact
b y applying a biological characteristic that cannot y e t be changed
of gender identity or gender attribution. If the "fact” that there are few
(e.g., gender chrom osom es in sports) or, m ore com m only, esp ecially “ real" gender differences becomes part of general cultural expectations,
in p sych o lo g y and biology, through the developm ent o f a n ew con­ there may eventually be changes in gender role expectations. Conversely,
cept, gender identity, w h ich assures that gender w ill continue to be as ideas of gender role change, psychologists will find fewer "sex
110 Gender: A n Ethnomethodological Approach Developmental Aspects of Gender JH

differences,” not just because socialization practices will change, but also referring to the pictures they had just drawn, rather than to the pictures
because psychologists, who are first of all everyday members, will change they saw in the second session. Hair length was given as a reason by
their expectations about what they will find, and will consequently all groups. Clothing was not a frequent reason until kindergarten,
look for and "discover" very different things. whereupon it was used most frequently by each group, including adults.
5. Green has studied only a few girls who want to be boys, and a few Although adults did use body parts as reasons (see text), they could not
female-to-male transsexuals. Part of the reason why there may be so use many secondary gender characteristics since they were constrained by
few is that “boyish" behavior in girls is much more tolerated, and the concrete pictures they were looking at. Children do not
"tomboys" are not seen as needing treatment the way "sissies" are. Based draw breasts, hips, beards, etc. very frequently.
on the cases he has studied, Green hypothesized that the dynamics 12. Gender attribution may not be synonymous with being able to make
are similar for girls. a differentiation of some sort, e.g., being able to tell whether another
6. Whether the statement is “I must be a girl" or "I want to be a girl” is similar to or different from the self. This is further developed
probably depends on whether or not the child has incorporated adult in Chapter 6.
rules for constructing gender. The child who “understands” that gender
transformations involve body transformations also understands that
although liking "girl” things might make him want to be a girl,
that liking does not make him into a girl,
7. There are others (e.g., Rekers and Lovass, 1974) who use behavior
therapy, including aversion therapy, to treat effeminate boys. Even though
they claim success, their methods and their encouragement of strongly
dichotomized gender roles and behaviors as a sign
of “mental health" are highly questionable.
8. For example, because little boys have penises, they think everyone
has a penis. This does not mean, however, that little girls think that
they had a penis and lost it as Freud maintained (Horney, 1926).
9. We thank the following schools for their cooperation: Purchase
Children's Center, Sarah Lawrence Early Childhood Center,
Quaker Ridge Elementary School, and Seely Elementary School.
10. Ten preschool children saw eight drawings each: their own set,
another set of preschool drawings, a set of kindergarten drawings, and a
set of third-grade drawings. Ten kindergarten, ten third-grade, and ten
adult participants saw twelve drawings each: two sets of preschool, two
sets of kindergarten, and two sets of third-grade drawings. The drawings
were not presented in pairs, but were shown in random order, with the
child’s own drawings undifferentiated from the others’. Each of the sixty
drawings was seen by at least five participants. Half of the participants
were male and half were female. None of the
analyses revealed “sex differences."
The children's drawings study has been replicated in Japan by
Sheila Sweet. A preliminary analysis of the data indicates patterns
similar to the ones reported here.
11. The specifics of our findings on this point are complicated, but, like
good positivists, we can mold them into a sensible pattern. Size was not as
common a reason as previous research (Kohlberg, 1966) suggested it
would be. Only preschoolers used size to any degree, and then mainly in

5 _______________
GENDER CONSTRUCTION
IN EVERYDAY LIFE:
TRANSEXUALISM
There're only two alternatives in
society. You’re either a man or a
woman. If I don’t feel like a woman
then it's got to be the other way. . . .
Because I didn’t feel comfortable
in the first postiion, I’m going into
the second. I’ll give it a try.
R obert 1—a female to male
tran ssex u al, age 26
There are thousands o f transsexuals in the U nited States today.
W ith fe w exceptions (e.g., Garfinkel, 1967), the interests o f the sci­
entific com m unity h ave fo cu sed either on transsexuals as interest­
ing cases o f social deViance (e.g., Feinbloom , 1976) or on the pathol­
ogy (e.g., Person, 1974), etiology (e.g., Stoller, 1968, 1975), and treat­
m ent (e.g., Benjam in, 1966) o f transsexualism . In contrast, our inter­
est in transsexuals is not in terms o f transsexualism , per se, but only
in term s o f w h a t transsexualism can illum inate about the day-to-day
social construction o f gender b y all persons. T o gather inform ation
on this process w e conducted in-depth in terview s w ith fifteen trans­
sexuals. The relative uniqueness o f our fo cu s w as reflected in their
reactions to it. A s is common am ong this group of people, they w ere
fam iliar w ith the scientific literature on transsexualism (Sulcov,
1973; Person, 1974). Som e seem ed annoyed, some seem ed relieved,
and some seem ed interested that our only concern w as w ith h o w their
experience could expose u niversal featu res o f gender construction.
A ll, how ever, w ere som ew hat surprised that w e had little interest in
learning the causes of their transsexualism or in questioning their
definitions of them selves. In addition to these interview s, w e have
included, in an appendix to the book, excerpts from letters w e re­
112
Gender Construction in Everyday Life: Transsexualism 1x3
ceived from a friend w ho is a transsexual. The appen dix illustrates
one p erson’s construction of gender and should be read in light o f
the points m ade in this chapter.
It is not ju st specific behaviors o f transsexu als that illustrate the
social construction o f gender. The existence o f transsexualism , itself,
as a va lid diagnostic category underscores the rules w e h ave fo r
constructing gender, and show s h o w these rules are rein forced b y
scientific conceptions o f transsexualism .
In C hapter 1 w e described the natural attitude and the phenom en­
ological m ethod o f “ bracketing” this attitude. Tem p orarily suspend­
ing “ b e lie f” in the independent, ob jective reality o f social and sci­
entific facts like gender allow s us to see h o w the sense o f objective
facts is produced in everyd ay interaction. H arold G arfinkel, in w hose
w o rk this chapter and this book is grounded, has studied several
concrete phenom ena in order to illustrate general principles of the
social construction o f reality. One o f the phenom ena he has studied
is gender, through presenting the case o f A gn es, a 19 y e a r old genetic
m ale. A lth ou gh A gn es had a penis, she claim ed to h ave alw ays felt
h erse lf to be fem ale and to h ave natu rally d evelop ed fem ale secon­
dary gender characteristics at puberty. She requested the construc­
tion o f the “ appropriate" genitals from the U C L A M edical Center,
and w as in terview ed b y G arfinkel under their auspices. Garfinkel
w as interested in the abstract idea o f continuous gender accom plish­
m ent in e very interaction. H ow ever, he did d raw som e concrete con­
clusions about w h at it w as A gnes had to do to create a sense o f being
a “ re a l” wom an. In the beginning o f his discussion, G arfinkel pre­
sents the "fa c ts ” w h ich form our natural attitude tow ard gender.
He then sh ow s h o w A g n e s’ accom plishm ent w as to produce a sense
o f those facts even though she w as an exam ple of h ow those facts
are not alw ays true.
O ur natural attitude tow ard gender (i.e., the real, ob jective facts)
consists o f the fo llo w in g (Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 122-128 )2:
1. There are tw o, and only two, genders (fem ale and male).
2. O n e’s gender is invariant. (If you are fem ale/m ale, you alw ays
w ere fem ale/m ale and you a lw a ys w ill be fem ale/m ale.)
3. G enitals are the essential sign o f gender. (A fem ale is a person
w ith a vagina; a m ale is a person w ith a penis.)
4. A n y exceptions to tw o genders are not to be taken seriously.
(They m ust be jokes, pathology, etc.)
5. There are no transfers from one gender to another except cere­
m onial ones (masquerades).
114 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
6. E veryon e m ust be classified as a m em ber o f one gender or
another. (There are no cases w here gender is not attributed.}
7. The m ale/fem ale dichotom y is a '‘n atu ral" one. (Males and fe ­
m ales exist independently o f scien tists’ [or anyone else’s] cri­
teria fo r being m ale or female.)
8. M em bership in one gender or another is "n atu ral.” (Being fe ­
m ale or m ale is not dependent on an yon e’s deciding w h at you
are.)
O ur discussion in C hapter 2 suggests that these “ fa c ts ” about gender
are not universal; berdache contradict m ost o f them. N evertheless,
these are the " fa c ts ” o f gender in terms o f W estern reality.
It m ight seem that in light o f these facts transsexualism cannot be
taken seriously. T h e existence o f transsexuals appears to deny at
least points 2 and 5. But if w e b racket the "fa c ts ,” w h at w e find is
that the transsexual, through his/her concerns w ith “ passing," and
the m edical and legal professions, through their treatm ent o f trans­
sexualism , reveal the production of the natural attitude tow ard gen­
der. The transsexual produces a sense o f the fa c tic ity o f gender in
social interactions in the sam e w a y everyon e produces it. The natural
attitude allow s no exceptions, so the transsexual, an apparent ex cep ­
tion, is seen as not an exception after all, but rather an exam ple of
the “ o b jective" truth o f the facts. T h is is the p aradox that is dem on­
strated throughout this chapter.
G arfinkel’s assum ption (which w e share) is that som ething can be
learned about w h a t is taken for granted in the "norm al” case by
studying w h at happens w hen there are “ violation s.” T ranssexuals
take their ow n gender fo r granted, but th ey cannot assum e that
others w ill. Consequently, transsexu als m ust m anage them selves
as m ale or fem ale so that others w ill attribute the “ correct” gender.
It is easier fo r us to see that transsexu als “ do” (accomplish) gender
than it is to see this process in nontranssexuals. The transsexuals'
construction o f gender is self-conscious. T h e y m ake obvious w hat
n ontranssexuals do “ natu rally.” E ven though gender accom plish­
m ent is self-conscious fo r transsexuals, th ey share w ith all the other
m em bers o f the culture the natural attitude tow ard gender. The w ays
transsexu als talk about the phenom enon o f transsexualism , the
language th ey use, their attitudes about genitals, and the questions
th ey are unable to answ er, point to their b elief that though others
m ight see them as violating the facts, they, them selves, b elieve that
they are not violating them at all.
In this chapter w e show h o w (1) the concept o f transsexualism
Gender Construction in Everyday Life: Transsexualism 115
as understood b y the m edical and legal p rofession s, and (2) the
p ractices o f transsexuals in everyd ay interaction s produce the sense
of- the reality o f tw o and only tw o genders. The p rocess o f gender
attribution both in term s o f w h at needs to be done to be taken as
the “ correct” gender and in terms o f w h a t rules others apply to
m ake an attribution is also made clearer b y stud ying these “ ex cep ­
tions” w h o are, after all, only exam ples o f-w h a t is m ore difficult to
see in n on exceptional cases.
CRITERIA FOR
DETERMINING
TRANSSEXUALISM *
W e defined transsexualism in C hapter 1 and w e h ave used the
term throughout the b ook w ithou t explaining h ow it is determ ined
w h eth er som eone is really a transsexual. Su lco v (1973) w rote an
exh au stive treatise on the social rea lity o f transsexualism . In it he
differentiates tw o kinds o f definitions o f transsexualism . One type
of definition explains w hat transsexualism “ really is .” This w ould
include w h a t Stoller (1968) refers to as a characterological defini­
tion— one based on various p sych ological criteria. “ . . . A transsexual
(is) a person w ho feels him self (con sciously and unconsciously) to
belong to the opposite sex w hile not denying his sexual anatom y”
(Stoller, 1968, p. 132). The second kind o f definition, the one that
S u lco v found to be in accordance w ith his persp ective, is a definition
in term s o f a system o f treatm ent: A transsexu al is som eone w h o is
receivin g horm one therapy and genital surgery in order to be seen
as the gender other than the one he/she w as assigned at birth. Su l­
co v concluded that the social reality o f transsexualism is as a par­
ticu lar kind o f treatm ent that facilitates the routine m ovem ent b e ­
tw een genders and thus legitim izes that m ovem ent. This definition
allow s us, given our research interest, not to be concerned w ith
w hether w e h ave in terview ed “ real” transsexuals. D efining trans­
sexualism according to a system o f treatm ent does present some
problem s, h ow ever. N ot all people w h o ■ present them selves for
corrective surgery and horm one therapy define them selves as trans­
sexuals. For exam ple, there are herm aphrodites w ho request genital
surgery to reduce the am biguity o f their genitals and m ale prostitutes
w h o m ay w an t m am m ary developm ent to aid them in their trade.
A second problem is that not all transsexu als request corrective sur­
gery or horm one therapy. Pauly (1974) claim s that fem ale-to-m ale
116 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
transsexu als are m ost lik e ly to request surgery only w hen th ey w ant
to legally m arry. O th erw ise m any can liv e su ccessfu lly as men
w ith o u t m edical intervention. It m ay not occur to older transsexuals
to request surgery until they d isco ver a precedent. Feinbloom
(1976) reports a considerable rise in inquiries at the G ender Identity
S ervice in B oston from m en over 45 after the publication o f Jan
M orris’s Conundrum .
For our purposes w e have divided the definition question into
tw o parts: (1) W hat p ro o f does the m edical profession require in
order to prescribe horm one therapy and genital surgery? and (2)
W h at p ro o f does the legal p rofession require in order to allow change
o f gender status? T h e answ ers to these questions reflect so ciety ’s
assum ptions about gender. The fa c t th at m edical and legal criteria
are changing suggests that the social definition of gender is changing.
B y w h a t criteria, then, do doctors decide that a person can receive
treatm ent fo r transsexualism ? B efore 1£)66 and the opening o f the
Johns H opkins G ender Identity Clinic, transsexualism w as not a
legitim ate diagnostic .category and there w a s no treatm ent in the
U nited States fo r such persons. W hen A gn es first saw doctors in
M id w est C ity prior to her acceptance at the U C L A M edical Center,
she w as declared to he male. “ In the final analysis the cap acity to
p erform the m ale reproductive function settled A gn es' se x ” (Gar-
finkel, 1967, p. 123)..,jBecause her testes could function (although
suppressed b y large amounts o f estrogen), she w as capable o f p ro­
ducing sperm, and w a§ therefore m ale. A t U C L A , w here she finally
received treatm ent, the m edical team had different criteria. T h ey
perform ed genital surgery on individuals w ith b ioph ysical problem s.
Since th ey noted high concentrations o f estrogen in A g n e s’ system
(and assum ed that the estrogen w a s being produced naturally), they
decided that she had a b io ph ysical problem (androgen insensitivity
syndrom e), and on the basis o f that diagnosis and her fem ale gender
identity, th ey declared her to be fem ale. T h e fact that she w as “ re-
p ro d u ctive ly m ale” w as irrelevant.
A gn es participated in the decision m ade about her gender b y con­
structing fo r the doctors (and fo r Garfinkel) the "o b je ctive fa c t” of
a b iological root of her problem . A s it w a s later revealed, she pre­
cipitated the pubertal signs o f fem alen ess b y taking estrogen w hich
had been prescribed fo r her m other. A g n e s ’ intention w as to display
h erself, through her talk, as a lw a y s h avin g been a real wom an, as
"real" was defined by the doctors, so that the doctors w ou ld agree
to surgery. N ot only did she h ave to present h erself to the w orld as
Gender Construction in Everyday Life: Transsexualism H7
a real w om an, she had to present h erself to the doctors as a bio­
logical w om an w ith an abnorm ality— a set o f m ale genitals.
E v en now , over 10 years later, the m edical p rofession is m ore w ill­
ing to recom m end corrective surgery fo r persons w h o can prove that
their "d iso rd er” has a biological root (Pauly, 1974). The Erikson
Foundation, one o f w hose functions w as to help transsexuals and
educate the public about transsexualism , advised that since health
insurance policies allow coverage only fo r the “ n ecessary treat­
m ent o f an injury or disease . . . best results (are) obtained w hen
the condition (transsexualism ) is presented as a 'neuroendocrin­
ological or psychohorm onal disorder,’ ab solu tely requiring and re­
sponsive to surgical and horm onal treatm ent.” (Erikson, 1974, pp.
22-23). C riteria for providing horm onal treatm ent is less s tr id e n t
than fo r surgical treatment. There are three reasons for this: (1)
M any o f the effects o f horm one therapy are reversible. (2) H orm one
treatm ent precedes surgical treatm ent b y at least six m onths w hile
transsexu als “ p ractice” livin g as their “ n e w ” gender. (3) Hormone
therapy does not tam per w ith the essential sign o f gender— genitals.
(The enlarged clitoris of fem ale-to-m ale tran ssexu als that results
from androgen therapy is reversible if th erap y is halted.)
M ost clinicians and m edical researchers (except perhaps the m ost
co n servative3 psychonanalysts) suspect that transsexualism has a
b iological (prenatal hormonal) com ponent. Transsexuals, them selves,
talk about having a birth defect and m ake it clear that their trans­
sexualism is not a m atter o f choice. G iven the state o f m edicine,
h ow ever, there is as y et no w a y of m easuring this h ypoth esized
prenatal influence. Consequently, transsexuals m ust provide evi­
dence that w ould at least concur w ith a prenatal horm onal explana­
tion. This evidence consists o f proving, through talk, that th ey have
alw a ys felt, as fa r b ack as they can rem em ber, like the gender other
than the one they w ere assigned. (One draw back o f this criterion is
that it is difficult to determ ine the va lid ity o f such a claim. A nyone
fam iliar w ith the literature on transsexualism kn ow s that in order
to be considered a transsexual by a m edical exam ining team, one
m ust talk about alw ays having felt like a m em ber o f the "op p osite”
gender.) Transsexuals no longer h ave to provide b ioph ysical evi­
dence, but they still m ust provide evidence o f alw a ys having been
one gender, o f having had, since birth, an invarian t gender identity.
The so cia l-p sych o lo g ica l criterion o f gender identity is grounded in
biology, that is, prenatal hormones.
W hen social-p sych ological criteria are applied to determ ine “ true”
118 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
gender identity, certain o f so ciety ’s ideas about gender are revealed.
In order fo r an assigned fem ale to be declared male, he m ay need to
perform all aspects of the m ale gender role to a stereotyp ical extent.
If fem ale-to-m ale transsexuals can assum e a m ore fem inine role,
then they w ere not really transsexuals after all (Pauly, 1974). A
p sych iatrist reports (Erickson, n.d.) that he h elp ed a patient realize
that he w as not really a m ale-to-fem ale transsexual because he con­
tinued relating sex u a lly to w om en. “ So finally . . . I asked him:
‘W hat do you w an t to be, a Lesbian?’ A n d that crystallized the con­
tradiction fo r him . . .’’ (p. 7, our em phasis). Thus in order to be a
transsexu al one m ust also m eet the criteria o f being a “ norm al”
m em ber o f one’s “ ch osen” gender.
There is some suggestion that not only m ust one be normal, but
it helps to be attractive. A clinician during a panel session on trans­
sexualism at the 1974 m eeting of the A m erican P sych ological A s so c i­
ation said that he w as m ore convinced o f the fem aleness o f a male-
to-fem ale transsexual if she w as particularly beautiful and w as
capable o f evoking in him those feelings that b eautifu l w om en gen­
e rally do. A n o th er clinician told us that he uses his ow n sexual in­
terest as a criterion for deciding w hether a transsexual is really the
gender she/he claims.
A ttractiven ess is o b vio u sly not a form al criterion; h ow ever, trans­
sexuals m ust dem onstrate that their public p h ysical presentation is
credible enough to allow them to “ p ass" as their “ n ew ” gender. M ost
gender clinics require that transsexuals liv e for at least six m onths
as their “ n e w ” gender prior to receivin g genital surgery. The m edical
profession considers the tran ssexu als’ com fortableness w ith their
“ n e w ” gender and their success in being “ taken fo r ” a man or a
w om an im portant factors in the gender m em bership decision. W e
think that these factors (com fortableness and success) constitute
gender m em bership and w e dem onstrate this point throughout this
chapter.
Presum ably because clinicians h ave not agreed upon form al cri­
teria fo r perform ing corrective surgery, the legal profession has sim i­
la rly reached no concensus. In the legal record there are both p osi­
tive and negative decisions regarding requests fo r change o f gender
status.'* O ne o f the m ajor criteria seem s to be the cap ability o f the
individ ual to perform sexual and/or reprod uctive functions o f either
gender. (In this sense the legal profession is applying m edical stand­
ards o f 10 years ago.) The courts that h ave denied applications for
change o f nam e have done so on the grounds that the petitioners
do not function procreatively or sexually as the gender for w hich
Gender Construction in Everyday Life: Transsexualism 119
th ey are applying. These criteria are som ew hat arbitrary since there
are clearly nontranssexual fem ales w h o are unable to con ceive and
nen tran ssexu al m ales w ho are unable to im pregnate. Sim ilarly, there
are nontranssexual m ales and fem ales w h o because o f a p h ysica l or
p sych ological d ysfu nction are unable to perform sexu ally. W h at the
courts seem to be saying is that if a person does not h ave the appro­
priate chrom osom es, they at least should h ave appropriately fu n c­
tioning genitals and internal equipm ent. G iven the sexual and pro-
creative criteria, the courts are o b vio u sly prejudiced against the
fem ale-to-m ale transsexual w ho, unlike his counterpart, cannot as
y et receive genitals that look and function p erfectly. The court has
disregarded the opinions o f doctors w ho claim that their fem ale-to-
m ale transsexual patients are true m ales because th ey h ave received
m astectom ies and are undergoing horm one treatm ent. The criterion
of gender identity does not appear to h ave had an im pact on the
courts. Joseph, a fem ale-to-m ale transsexu al w ith ou t a sexu ally fu n c­
tioning penis, com plains that only w hen it becom es tech n ically easier
to create penises w ill doctors take fem ale-to-m ale transsexu als m ore
seriously. The sam e could be said o f judges.
One court decision cites the Com m ittee on P ublic H ealth o f the
N ew Y o rk A cad em y o f M edicine w h ich proclaim ed: “ It is question­
able w h eth er law s and records should be changed and thereby used
as a m eans to help p sych ologically ill persons in their social adapta­
tio n ” (M atter o f Fernandez, 1976, p. 12). There is other evidence
w h ich im plies that the legal profession does not see the transsexual
as a “ real” man or w om en. Failure to inform on e’s spouse that one
is a transsexual and has undergone corrective surgery is grounds for
annulm ent or divorce since the m arriage m ay be considered to have
been entered into frau dulently (Erickson, 1974, p. 32). Fraudulent,
in this context, appears to mean m ore than that the person cannot
function reprod uctively; it im plies that h e/sh e is not w h a t he/she
appears to be in terms o f gender.
It is interesting to note that transsexu als h ave used legal criteria
to their advantage by evoking the negative. T h ey subm it that a new
or am ended birth certificate should be granted because surgical pro­
cedures w ere perform ed leavin g the person no longer a functional
fem ale (unable to bear children) or no longer a functional m ale (un­
able to im pregnate a woman) (Erickson, 1974).
To sum m arize the legal position o f transsexualism , w ith regard to
our interest in decisions about gender, genitals are not m erely a
clarifyin g sign of gender; they are its essential sign. T o be sym pa­
thetic w ith the legal profession, it is difficult to legislate criteria for
220 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
I-
deciding w h a t is really, a m ale or a fem ale w hen this is supposed to
be an o b jective fact, npt am enable to legislation.
A fte r seeing Jan M orris on television , one o f our students per­
p le x e d ly inquired: If h person thought h e/sh e w ere a horse, and
surgical techniques wqjje available fo r transform ing that person into
a horse, w h y shouldn’t; that person have a right to becom e a horse?
His point should be taken seriously. Transsexualism , as a legitim ate
diagnostic category, exists largely because o f advancem ents in m edi­
cine and cosm etology. It is a category constructed to alleviate am bi­
guity— to avoid the kinds o f com binations (e.g., m ale genitals-fem ale
gender identity) that m ake people uncom fortable because th ey v io ­
late the b asic rules about gender. If genitals could not be changed,
gender id en tity w ou ld h av e to be. S in ce genitals can n o w be changed,
gender identity can n ow be seen as the less flexible criterion. W hat
w e h av e w itnessed in the la st 10 years is the triumph o f the surgeons
o ver the psych oth erapists in the race to restore gender to an unam ­
biguous reality.
Prince (1973) m aintains that w h at transsexu als have is not “ gender
d ysp horia” (the m edical category under w h ich transsexualism is sub­
sumed) but “ sexual dysp horia.” T h ey are not dissatisfied w ith their
gender but w ith their genitals, becau se those genitals do not cor­
respond to the gender w ith w h ich th ey fe e l com fortable. There m ust
be congruence betw een the tw o, given the rules. In a society that
could tolerate la c k o f correspondence, there w ould be no transsex­
uals. There w ould be m en w ith vaginas and w om en w ith penises or
perhaps different signs o f gender. Sim ilarly, if men could w ear
dresses there w ou ld be no transvestism , as w e n o w understand the
category.
Robert, a fem ale-to-m ale transsexual, speculated about w hether
he w ould have had to change in to d ay’s w orld o f m ore flexible gender
roles. A lth ou gh he concluded that he w ou ld still have needed to
change because he did .not feel like a w om an, w e b elieve that it w as
n ot because he did not: fe e l like a w om an that he had to get surgical
and horm onal treatment, but rather b ecau se he did not feel com ­
fo rtab le h avin g a vagina and breasts w h en other people w h o had
vaginas and breasts seem ed so different so cia lly and p sych ologically
from him. t a beard.
S cien ce w ill soon b e able to construct p erfectly functioning
penises. B ecause o f tbps w e w ill n ever k n o w w h at w ould h ave been
the long-range repercussions, in concepts about gender, o f having a
group o f men in society w h o do not h ave penises. W e suspect that
in a so ciety that allow ed men to h ave vagin as and w om en to h ave
Gender Construction in Everyday Life: Transsexualism 121
penises, the b iological im perative o f gender w o u ld w eaken . G ender
m em bership w ould be based on gender id en tity rather than genitals.
-A lth o u g h gender identity is grounded in b iology (insofar as current
research is seeking its root in prenatal horm ones), a biological sub­
strate, inaccessible to public view ing, is clearly less p o w erfu l in
every d a y gender attributions than a biological cue (genitals) w hich
is potentially public.
N o w that w e h ave show n h o w the concept of transsexualism in
m edicine and la w underscores and supports the rules our society
has fo r constructing gender, w e w ill sh ift to a discussion o f h o w the
reality o f gender is supported b y transsexu als in their everyd ay
interactions.
TRANSSEXUAL
BEHAVIOR AND THE
NATURAL ATTITUDE
H ow is transsexualism reconcilable w ith the " fa c t” that gender
is invarian t and there are no transfers? A s w e m entioned at the end
o f the last chapter, it is easily reconcilable if w e think o f the trans­
sexual not as changing gender but changing genitals. Gender re­
m ains invariant. For exam ple, one is and alw a ys has been a fem ale.
It is m erely the sign o f the gender (the genitals) w h ich must be fixed
T h e fa c t that genitals m ust b e fixed to b e the "righ t” ones to go w ith
the gender helps create a sense o f the “ fa c t” that genitals are the
essential sign o f gender.
This is dem onstrated in the w ay s transsexu als refer to them selves,
their bodies, and to the surgical operations th ey request. A male-to-
fem ale transsexual, being in terview ed on N B C ’s "T o m o rro w ” tele­
vision program w as asked, “ H ow w as you r beard taken care o f?”
T h e tran ssexu al answ ered, “ I w a s fortunate. I n ever had m uch o f a
facial hair growth pattern" (emphasis ours). The fa ct that she used
this particular language is evidence o f her b elief th at real w om en
do not h ave (and never did have) beards. If th ey h ave anything,
they h ave facial hair. Since she w as a lw a ys a w om an, she never had
V e ry seldom did the transsexuals w e in terview ed refer to them ­
selves as “ transsexual” (although they w ou ld all adm it to being
defined as such); rather they talked about "those o f us w ho have
changed.” In other w ord s, although th ey m ay h av e at one tim e been
seen as one gender and w ere now seen as the other, th ey w ere never
122 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
outside one of the tw o gender categories. In support o f their claim
to h ave alw a ys been one gender, they request “ corrective surgery”
not "sex -ch an ge” operations'* (Kando, 1973). T h ey are not changing
gender, only correcting a m istake. O ne fem ale-to-m ale transsexual
w ro te to several insurance com panies asking them to w rite policies
fo r transsexu als that w ou ld include coverage for “ penis reconstruc­
tion." This term inology suggests that a penis had been there before,
m uch like a person injured in an accident m ight request “ facial re­
construction." A t the ve ry least it im plies that the penis alw ays
belonged there. A gnes, after surgery, described being treated as a
"real fem ale after a ll” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 128). T h e altered sign
confirm ed the unalterable essence. G arfinkel presents in great detail
evidence that A gn es did not see her situation as a m atter of choice.
She stated that a vagina should only be constructed if it should
h ave been there all along. These are exam ples o f how , through talk,
the transsexu als sh ow their b elief in the b asic in variab ility o f gen­
der, and their b e lie f that the (visible) genitals m ust be altered to
conform to the person’s true (invisible) gender.
A p sych o an alytic psych oth erap ist w ho regards transsexualism as
a pathological condition m aintains that the em phasis transsexuals
place on surgically receivin g the appropriate genitals is obsessive.
“ (It is) as though the sexual organ p rovides the totality of gender”
(Erikson E ducational Foundation, n.d., p. 25). W hat this therapist
sees as an o b sessive preoccupation, w e v ie w as evidence o f the
tran sse xu als’ acceptance o f the natural attitude tow ard gender. A
m ale has a penis and a fem ale has a vagina. This is a relatively easy
task fo r m ale-to-fem ale transsexuals, since surgical techniques are
availab le fo r constructing a vagina. There are no cases cited w here
a m ale-to-fem ale transsexual is satisfied w ith m erely the rem oval of
the penis. The fem ale-to-m ale transsexual has a m ore difficult prob­
lem. H ow does he reconcile the fact that m ales have penises, he is
a male, and y e t he m ay not have a penis (or at least not a fu lly fu n c­
tioning one)? E ven in this case, though, getting a penis is extrem ely
im portant. If he does not have a penis, he at least b elieves that he
should h ave one, and, h opefully, w ill som etim e in the future.
One fem ale-to-m ale transsexual w h en asked, “ W hat is the m ost
im portant thing to have to be a m an?” answ ered, " A penis.” He then
adm itted that although he w as a m an w ith ou t a penis, it w as his
b iggest preoccupation. The “ ob session ” w ith having the sign m ay
constitute, fo r him, proof that the sign should be there. O ccasionally
w h en he has sexual relations w ith his w ife, he thinks about not h a v ­
ing a penis, and this rem inds him o f the period w h en he tried to be
a lesbian. Being a lesbian w as catastrophic, since he w as treated b y
Gender Construction in Everyday Life: Transsexualism 123
his partners as fem ale; his genitals w ere seen b y them as a vagina
and clitoris, rather than being treated as “ abnorm al” m ale genitals.
- A n oth er fem ale-to-m ale transsexual w ho did not h ave a penis
stated that the difference b etw een w om en and m en w a s that they
had different sex organs. One w a y that he handled this apparent
in con sisten cy w as to refer to his sexual organs as “ gen itals" rather
than as his “ vagin a” or “ clitoris.”
A p sych iatrist in terview ed by the Erilcson foundation said
. . . While it is true that relatively few female-to-male transsexuals
insist upon the creation of an artificial phallus, this would not to my
mind indicate that a created organ has any less importance in this
case. It simply reflects an acceptance of the fact that as her0 doctor
will inform her, the techniques for this surgical procedure ajg at
present far from being perfected, and that the results would leave a
great deal to be desired. . . . Mastectomy and hysterectomy are
always desired. . . . When the results of phalloplasty are more satis­
factory. . . . I would anticipate that the request for this procedure
would be accordingly universal. (Erikson, n.d., p. 33)
The im portance o f getting the appropriate genitals as a sign o f
belonging to the real gender is not restricted to the transsexual, but
is also reflected in the attitude of the tran ssexu al’s fam ily. Garfinkel
(1967, p. 128) reports that A g n e s’ fam ily reacted to h er preoperative
“ cross-dressing” w ith "consternation and disapp roval,” but once
she received the genital surgery th ey responded w ith relieved ac­
ceptance o f her fem aleness.
W hat could be seen as an “ o b sessive " em phasis is surely less
“p ath ological” than i f the individual insisted that she w as a w om an
w ith a penis. The latter w ould be seen as “ cra zy ,” since it contra­
dicts one o f the facts of gender, nam ely there is no such thing as a
w om an w ith a penis. The fact that "p reop erative tran ssexu al” and
“ p ostoperative tran ssexu al” are m ajor classifications im plies that
genital surgery is intended and that “ proper” genitals are a neces­
sary aspect o f the conceptualization.
A sid e from the w ay s transsexuals deal w ith the fact that they
h av e the "w ro n g ” genitals, the w a y s they responded to som e o f the
questions w e asked show s the w o rk in volved in confirm ing the
natural attitude. A lm ost all the transsexuals w e in terview ed had
difficulty w ith the follow in g questions: “ W hat did you h ave to learn
in order to be su ccessfu lly taken as a m an/w om an?” “ Is is different
to be a man in this society than it is to be a w om an?" “ Did you ever
m ake m istakes w hich caused people to doubt y o u ? ” “ H ow do you
kn ow if y o u ’re doing a good jo b ?” A t first w e assum ed that our ques-
124 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
tions w ere poorly phrased; then w e thought that our interview ees
w ere ju st being evasive. Finally, w e concluded that their nonre­
sponses w ere inform ative. W e decided this b y asking these same
questions o f non tran ssexual m ales and fem ale. T h ey could not
answ er them either. To ask a “ real” fem ale if she ever made m is­
takes is rather senseless, since her gender cannot be doubted. The
tran sse xu als’ inability to answ er these questions w as a w a y o f p ro­
ducing a sense of the naturalness o f their gender— proof they are
like everyone else, not freaks.
O ccasio n ally a transsexual said som ething that suggested that
he/she w as not concerned w ith displayin g som e asp ect o f the natural
attitude tow ard gender. W e then found ourselves questioning the
“ re a lity ” of that person’s gender. In other w ord s w e found ourselves
w ondering w hether the person w a s (1) "re a lly ” a transsexual, and
(2) “ re a lly ” a m em ber o f the gender to w h ich he/she claim ed to be­
long. One m iddle-aged fem ale-to-m ale tran ssexu al told us that he
w a s not p articularly interested in obtaining a penis, and that he only
got a m astectom y because his w ife encouraged him to do so. (He
did claim to be h appy about having needed a h ysterectom y fo r m edi­
cal reasons.) A ll of thisl! w e felt, could be seen as evidence of his
not w an ting to be a w oinan rather than his conviction that he w as
a man. H is b a sically lovi^-keyed attitude tow ard the penis as a sign
o f m ale gender contradicted the b eh avior o f other transsexuals. It
m ay be that he had a m ale gender role iden tity rather than a m ale
gender identity. This exam ple neither p roves nor disproves that the
in terview ee w as a transsexual. It sh ow s that doubt about gender
attribution can be generated b y a failure to exh ibit all aspects of the
natural attitude in interaction, even w ith those w h o under certain
circum stances can b racket the natural attitude. This person unques­
tionab ly looked like a man; h ow ever, w ith ou t his presenting him self
“ p ro p erly” it w as difficult to see him as a “ natural” male. In order
to m aintain a stable gender attribution of another person, it is neces­
sary to see the natural attitude displayed.
O ther transsexuals m anaged to display the natural attitude in their
talk, w h ile at the same time dem onstrating to us that they saw the
natural attitude as an attitude. O ne young man spoke of "d ecid in g”
w h ich gender to be. He said he w an ted to be a w om an (and he lived
as one) because it w as easier than being a m ale hom osexual. He
even tually “ decided” to be a man again. T h is man and others w e
h ave talked w ith h ave been affected b y their transsexualism in such
a w a y that the natural attitude has becom e bracketed for them (at
Gender Construction in Everyday Life: Transsexualism 125
least tem porarily). It is not that they do not hold the natural attitude
in m ost o f their interactions, hut rather that b y virtue of their trans­
sexualism they have glim pses o f gender as a social construction.
T h ey do not, h ow ever, speak o f gender as “ so cia lly constructed.”
O ne transsexual described it as "seeing m asks and h y p o crisy ” and
suggested that everyone should go through a change in order to see
h o w arbitrary gender is. T ran ssexu als’ v ie w o f gender as socially
constructed in no w a y caused us to doubt their gender, since w hile
talkin g about social constructions, th ey continued to disp lay for us,
through their talk, that they w ere "re a l” m en or w om en.
One articulate fem ale-to-m ale transsexual asserted that at least
part o f the difference b etw een m en and w om en is social. “ It’s a state
o f m ind on you r part and the people w ho see y o u .” He claim ed that
he could dress up as a w om an and pass. For all intents and purposes
he w ou ld then be a wom an. A penis is im portant to him for his state
o f mind even though others do not see it. For others he fe lt that his
heard and h airy chest w ere w h at w as im portant. U nlike an y other
fem ale-to-m ale transsexual w e in terview ed, he free ly labeled him ­
s e lf as a fem ale in his childhood, fo r exam ple, “ W hen I w as a little
girl.”
Som e m ale-to-fem ale transsexuals w h en asked w hether they felt
m ore lik e transsexuals or like w om en answ ered “ tran ssexu als.” Their
friends w ere other transsexuals and th ey could not conceive of
totally passing. One in particular talked about h o w the “ in-betw een
state o f being a transsexu al” w as w orse than being m ale or fem ale
because "people don’t kn ow h o w to relate to y o u .” A lth ou gh atti­
tudes such as this m ay be due to these w om en being preoperative,
the fa ct that th ey w ere able to conceive o f them selves as not really
m em bers of either gender at that m oment is suggestive. T h ey believe
that everyone m ust be classified as one gender or another, but b y
seeing that they are tem porary exceptions to this rule, th ey m ay
com e to understand that the rule is constructed.
Finally, w h a t Su lcov (1973) calls “ p roselytizin g tran ssexu als” —
those w ho are celebrities and present them selves p u b licly as trans­
sexuals— open the w a y for others to see gender as a social construc­
tion. These transsexuals are differentiated from those w ho pass and
in passing seek to preserve the social order o f tw o genders. The
transsexual w ho rem ains identified as a transsexual is a reminder
that one or m ore of the facts o f gender can be violated, and yet w e
can still m ake some kind of gender attribution.
126 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
CREATING GENDER
ATTRIBUTIONS
E veryon e m ust display her or his gender in every interaction,
This is the sam e as saying everyone m ust pass or everyone m ust
insure that the "co rre ct” gender attribution is m ade o f them. The
risks of being “ d isp roved,” of not being taken as the gender in­
tended, are m inim al fo r nontranssexuals. A lth ou gh they m ust avoid
giving grounds fo r doubt, they are generally not concerned w ith
being doubted and consequen tly are not concerned w ith their pres­
entations. If nontranssexuals are seen as the “ w ro n g ” gender, it is
often upsetting, because no preparation has been m ade fo r such an
event. This is because fe w people besides transsexu als think of their
gender as anything other than “ n atu rally” obvious. A “ w ron g" attri­
bution in this case turns into an unintentional (and disconcerting)
bracketin g o f the real w orld. T ranssexuals, on the other hand, have
planned in advance h o w to handle these situations and consequently
tend to be continually self-conscious about their presentations. T h ey
b elieve that the consequence o f not passing is potential devastation.
G offm an (1963) differentiates tw o kinds o f stigm as, those that are
extern ally visible (e.g., a disfiguring birthm ark), and those that are
hidden (e.g., a secret p ast as a crim inal). Both kinds o f stigm as are
poten tially discrediting. Feinbloom (1976) discusses this notion of
stigm a in regard to transsexualism and show s h o w transsexuals must
“ p ass" in order to keep secret their visible stigm as (e.g., an adam ’s
apple in a wom an) and their hidden stigm as (e.g., a man h avin g at­
tended an all girls’ high school).
T h e problem w ith conceptualizing “ p assin g” as discrete m anage­
m ent d evices is that this em phasizes its deceptive features and
overlooks the ongoing process of “ doing” gender in e ve ry d a y inter­
actions that w e all engage in. (See Garfm kel, 1967, pp. 164—175 fo r a
critique o f Goffm anesque analyses.) W e explained in C hapter 1 that
in this usage, everyone is engaged in passing, in creating a sense of
them selves as being one gender or another. In order fo r gender to
be p erceived as “ natural,” h ow ever, it m ust not be seen as passing.
(See Rule 8 o f the natural attitude.) A cco rd in g to the natural atti­
tude, real m en and w om en do not pass. W hen w e b racket the natural
attitude and see gender as constructed, then passing is not con ­
ceptualized as deceptive. It is disp layin g for others w h at one intends
to be taken as. Passing, in this sense, m akes no assum ptions about
w h a t one “ re a lly ” is.
To illustrate, Jane Fry, a m ale-to-fem ale transsexual, served duty
Gender Construction in Everyday Life: Transsexualism 127
on an all-m ale ship during the years w h en she w as preoperative
(Bogdan, 1974). From her point of vie w , she w as “ p assin g” as a male,
since even though she kn ew she w as fem ale, she needed to be seen
as m ale in order to remain on the ship. B ecause she had a penis, she
w ou ld not h ave been considered to be engaging in decep tive b e­
h avior b y m ost people. On the other hand, M ike w ou ld h ave been.
M ike, a fem ale-to-m ale transsexual, also served duty on an all-m ale
ship. His beh avior m ight h ave been considered passing, in the decep­
tive sense, since he had w hat others w o u ld h ave judged to be fem ale
genitals. N evertheless, both Jane and M ike m anaged to create a sense
o f the reality o f their m aleness for those With w hom they interacted.
Robert, a fem ale-to-m ale transsexual, looked m asculine as a teen­
ager. He w as not certain he w as a transsexu al at that time and
tried to liv e as a fem ale. B ecause it w as upsetting w h en he w as m is­
taken fo r a male, he tried to do w h at had to be done to be taken as
fem ale. He learned to w alk in a fem inine w a y , avoided w earing
pants, and in general tried to lo o k like a fem ale (for w h ich he had
the corresponding genitals). A lth ou gh he w as u su ally accepted as a
fem ale and w ould not have been considered b y m ost people as
passing, in his w ords he “ fak ed being a w om an.” He had to concen­
trate his energies on being seen as fem ale. W hen he later began liv ­
ing as a m an he no longer saw him self as passing. That, to him, w as
ju st being natural. In the social construction sense, h ow ever, he w as
not doing anything more or less to be taken as a m an than he had
done to be taken as a woman.
It is not that transsexuals know , in a n y system atic w ay, w hat
needs to be done to be taken as the “ correct" gender. It is not a
m atter of a recipelike, system atic presentation. W e w ill discuss four
broad areas o f self-presentation w h ich contribute to gender attribu­
tions: (1) general talk (both w hat is said and how it is said), (2) public
p h ysical appearance, (3) the private body, (4) talk about the personal
past. Since gender attributions are m ade in the initial stages of
an interaction, u su ally long before a person undresses or talks
about her/his personal past, w e assum e that public p h ysical appear­
ance and general talk are the m ajor contributors to initial gender
attributions. W e postpone a discussion o f h ow m uch (or whether)
gender attributions need to be m aintained over tim e except to sug­
gest that the private b od y and talk about the personal past probably
p lay a role in m aintenance. The m ethods b y w h ich transsexuals pro­
vid e others w ith “ inform ation" about these four categories is the
substance of m uch o f this chapter. It m ust be kep t in mind, h o w ­
ever, that w e are studying transsexuals not because th ey create gen-
128 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
der attributions in a particularly u nusual w ay, but because, on the
contrary, they create gender in the m ost ordinary o f w ays, as w e all
do.
General Talk
Som e techniques fo r “ proper” talk can be learned through o b serva­
tion and rehearsal: learning to say "ro b e” instead of "h ou secoat”
w hen shopping for m en’s clothing; learning to talk “ dirt” w ith other
m en (a difficult task fo r som eone raised as a girl in a strict Catholic
fam ily). Joseph, a fem ale-to-m ale transsexual, claim ed to have
learned about behaving like a man from reading the Playboy A dvisor.
W h ile the conventional m ethod is to w atch the men and w om en
around you, som etim es p rofession al help is required. There are
speech therapists w h o ,coach m ale-to-fem ale transsexuals in raising
the pitch and resonance o f their voices, introducing softening quali­
ties, developing a m ore “ fem inine” vocab ulary, articulating more
carefully, producing a greater range of inflection, and m aking freer
facial m ovem ents. (Thqre is a sizable b od y o f recent research on
gender differences in vocalization s and language usage, K ey, 1975;
Thorne and H enley, 1&75). It is som etim es suggested that male-to-
fem ale transsexuals sp eck in a w hisper or falsetto; if the voice is still
deep, it is advised that escorts order fo r them in restaurants
(Feinbloom, 1976). B ooklets published b y the Erikson E ducational
Foundation to advise transsexuals in p assing techniques offer hints
such as: . . W hen introducing h erself on the telephone, (the male-
to-fem ale transsexual) should begin the conversation b y saying,
‘This is M iss X .’ In that w ay, should she still need some practice in
fem inizing her voice, and if the person on the other end o f the line
is in some doubt as to her sex, this assertion u su ally w ill resolve the
question in her fa v o r” (Erikson Foundation, 1974, p. 26). This advice
illustrates a fact about gender w h ich w e w ill discuss further; once
a gender attribution is made, the particulars (in this case the voice)
w ill be filtered through that attribution and used to confirm it; for
exam ple, “ It is a h u sky-voiced fem ale.”
Public Physical Appearance
T ranssexuals not only learn gender-specific speech skills, but also
w a y s o f presenting their bodies that go b eyon d learning to dress as
a m ale or fem ale. The p ow er of p h ysical appearance in form ing gen­
der attributions cannot be denied. Fem ale im personators, men in the
Gender Construction in Everyday Life: Transsexualism 129
entertainm ent field w hose act (dancing, singing, telling jokes) in­
v o lv es pretending to be fem ale, are aw are o f h o w com pelling physi-
caf appearance is. N ew ton (1972) notes that in order for fem ale
im personators to p rove that they are really m en th ey w ill som etim es
at the end o f the act rem ove their w igs or falsies. M uch of the enter­
tainer’s skill lies not in m erely singing and dancing but in im per­
sonating a fem ale w h o is singing and dancing. A n audience that
faile d to be convin ced of the entertainer’s m ale gender, w ou ld be
m issing a crucial part o f the total act.
T ranssexuals, in contrast to fem ale im personators, do not w ant
to give others an y reason to doubt w h at seem s to be under their
clothes, lest their behavior be seen as a m asquerade. " A little extra
padding, a scarf, gloves, etc., can all be used to m aintain the illusion7
of fem ininity . . .” (Feinbloom, 1976, p. 233). In this w ay, broad
shoulders, an adam ’s apple, and large hands can be cam ouflaged.
M ale-to-fem ale transsexuals learn elaborate techniques for conceal­
ing the penis, w hich w ou ld be esp ecially im portant in certain cir­
cum stances (wearing a bikini). Fem ale-to-m ale transsexuals have an
opposite problem . T h ey are advised to stuff a p air o f socks into an
athletic supporter before exercising in a public gym nasium . It is
suggested that those w h o have not had surgery bind their breasts;
there are several m ethods for doing so (Erikson Foundation, 1974).
T h ese techniques are m entioned b y transsexuals and in the litera­
ture as being things that should be m astered in order to be taken as
real m en or w om en. W e know , h ow ever, that people often have very
distorted ideas about real men and w om en. The entire field o f “ sex-
ro le ” stereotyping attests to this. “ W e define w h a t a man or w om an
is according to w h at w ill enable us m ost u n eq u ivocally to cla ssify
ou rselves in the desired gender group” (Kando, 1973, p. 28). W om en
w ith sm all breasts w ho are confident about their fem alen ess do not
use breast size as a criteria for gender decisions. On the other hand,
w h a t transsexuals b elieve constitutes a credible m ale or fem ale m ay
be related to w h at troubles them p erson ally about passing. M ike, a
m iddle-aged fem ale-to-m ale transsexual w ith a slight physique,
talked to us about h o w im portant it is for a man to be p h ysically
strong. He exercises his hands especially, because he is self-con­
scious about their sm allness. Transsexuals w ho see gender charac­
teristics as totally dichotom ous are rem inded b y p rofession als that
there are m any hairy, m uscular w om en, w om en w ith h u sky and
attractive voices, and short, hairless men.
H erschberger (1970) discusses the p sych ological effects of the w ord
“ norm al.” A ccord in g to her, the w ord is so p ow erfu l that a man in
J
130 Gender: An Ethnoraethodological Approach
our society m ay only fe e l totally m ale w hen in the presence of a
w om an shorter than him self. W hen confronted w ith a taller w om an
he m ust either accept his ow n "ab n o rm ality” or conclude that the
w om an is abnorm ally tall and even m asculine. M arian, a male-to-
fem ale transsexual, feels m ore like a w om an in the presence of men
than in the presence of other w om en. She thinks this is because other
w om en are a rem inder to her that she is not a "re a l” wom an.
If nontranssexuals, w ho have m inim al concern w ith being doubted,
need to exaggerate m aleness and fem aleness, transsexuals ought to
h ave even m ore distorted view s. In fact, given their life exp eri­
ences, it is to be expected. A youn ger fem ale-to-m ale transsexual
spoke about h o w “ turned off” he w as b y older transsexuals w ho
seem preoccupied w ith "H o w have yo u been the ‘m ale’ this w eek ?"
He, on the other hand, claim ed to be less concerned w ith m aking
“ that p erfect m asculine im age.” He kn ow s that it is not n ecessary
to exaggerate m annerism s, and although he m entioned a num ber of
stereotyp ical m ale m annerism s (e.g., loping w alk] w hen w e asked
him w h at m akes som eone a man, he adm itted that none o f them
w ere really important. W hat is im portant is the initial presentation.
“ O nce you tag som ebody y o u ’re right, and th at’s it. A lot o f trans­
sexuals don’t believe that."
The Private Body
P ostoperative m ale-to-fem ale transsexuals h ave little or no reason to
p rotect their bodies from being view ed . Breast developm nt occurs
w ith estrogen therapy and can be supplem ented w ith silicone im­
plants. G enital surgery is often so su ccessfu l that even experienced
gyn ecologists do not question the authen ticity of the tran ssexu als’
genitals. Janet, a m ale-to-fem ale transsexual, described a visit to a
gyn ecologist w ho, not know ing that Janet w as a transsexual, told
her that there w as a cyst on one of her ovaries. Janet protested
that this w as im possible. The doctor exp lain ed that he ought to
k n o w since he w as a gynecologist, w hereupon she countered with,
“ W ell, I ought to know ; I’m a tran ssexu al.” This exam ple not only
attests to the excellence of m ale-to-fem ale genital surgery, but it
also provides a good illustration o f the construction o f gender. The
doctor, having decided b y visual inspection (undoubtedly prior to
Janet’s undressing] that she w as fem ale, w ou ld interpret anything
else he sa w or fe lt in light o f that attribution. The sw ellin g beneath
her abdom inal w alls m ust be a cyst; there w as no reason to expect
Gender Construction in Everyday Life: Transsexualism 13J
it to be a prostate gland. A s a nurse w ho heard this story so aptly
phrased it: “ If you hear hoofbeats, you don ’t lo o k fo r eleph ants.”
-Preoperative m ale-to-fem ale transsexuals and virtu ally all fem ale-
to-m ale transsexuals m anage their bodies in such a w a y that others
do not see them undressed. M ajor problem s center around using
public restroom s and avoiding required p h ysicals. T h e E rickson
m anual (1974] is quite conservative on these points and advises
transsexu als not to use public restroom s if p ossib le and not to apply
fo r jobs w ith large com panies, since m ost require com plete p h ysicals
of n ew em ployees. The follow in g exam ple? from in terview s w ith
fem ale-to-m ale transsexuals illustrate som e 'of the w a y s transsexuals
m anage their private bodies.
M ike, a fem ale-to-m ale transsexual, joined the m erchant m arines
in his early tw enties (even though at that time he had had no^sur-
gery and w as not taking male horm ones). He volun teered for the
job o f cook not only because it required less p h ysical strength, but
because he w ould have to get up earlier than the others and could
use the toilets and show ers privately. E ven so, he alw a ys selected
the last sh ow er stall in the row . O nce w h en asked b y his buddies,
“Did you ever la y a girl?’’, he failed to think fa s t enough and told
them no. T h ey took him to a w horeh ou se w here, u nbeknow n st to his
friends, he spent his time talking to the prostitute. He explained to
h er that he did not w ant to have sex because he had a girl back
hom e to w hom he w anted to be faith fu l. This w as apparently a legit­
im ate reason to keep his pants on. A fte rw a rd s he told his friends
that he had “ a great la y .”
T h e Erikson guide for transsexuals (1974, p. 7) suggests that male-
to-fem ale transsexuals should a lw a ys urinate in a seated position
w ith their feet pointed outward. A sid e from the concern o f being
seen, the m anual cautions about aud itory signs. “ . . . Fem ale-to-m ale
transsexuals are advised (to) keep the toilet flushing w h ile m aking
use o f the cubicle fo r urination.” The sound o f the urinal stream
m ay be one of the m ore subtle gender cues.
R obert takes a book w ith him into public toilet stalls. He tries to
use stalls w ith doors, but if none are available he ju st sits dow n
w ith his pants pulled high above his knees. A t first he w as con­
cerned about this but he reassured him self: “ M en sit down. So I
can sit dow n w ithou t being susp ected.” He no longer w orries that
the other men at w ork have not seen him at the urinal since he does
not rem em ber seeing each of the other men standing there. A non­
transsexual m ale p robably w ould not w on d er w h eth er he has seen
132 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
other men at the urina|. A lack o f concern w ith gender is part of its
naturalness and highlights h ow gender is unproblem atic in the fabric
of everyd ay life. Untif. transsexuals understand this, they are con­
tinu ally concerned w ith “ passing” techniques.
I One fem ale-to-m ale transsexual in describing his childhood can
The Personal Past
The reason that protection o f the genitals from public view in g is so
im portant should be obvious. If genitals are the m ajor insignia of gen­
der {and if, as w e w ill discuss in C hapter 6, gender attribution is
essentially synonom ous w ith genital attribution) then it is necessary
that everyth in g be done to protect the body. But it is also clear that
v e ry fe w o f our interactions in vo lve a p ub lic view in g (or potential
view ing) o f our genitals. W e m ust give the im pression of having the
appropriate genitals to people w ho w ill undou btedly never see them.
This is the same as saying w e m ust give the im pression of being and
alw ays having been the gender w e la y claim to. G ender is historical.
In concrete terms this in vo lves talking in such a w a y that w e reveal
ourselves to have a h istory as a m ale or a fem ale. T ranssexuals must
not only conceal their real p ast (in m ost cases), but they m ust also
create a n ew past. M arian stated that she w orries about referring to
h er p ast because she thinks o f her p ast as in volvin g the activities of
a social male. C learly w h at m ust be accom plished if the current
presentation is to succeed, is for the social past to be reevaluated
fo r the s e lf before it can be constructed fo r others (e.g., “I w a sn ’t
a fem inine boy, I w as a stereotyp ical girl” ).
Som e things m ay be re la tively easy to change (e.g., name); other
things m ay be more difficult and in som e cases im possible (e.g., school
and m edical records).; A t all times the transsexu al must rem em ber
w h a t details from her/his real past h ave been included in the new
h isto ry and w hich of these h ave concrete docum entation. Feinbloom
(1976) states that it ijs essential fo r the transsexual to remember
w h a t w as said in one place in order to escape detection and “ to
explain the gaps o f time produced b y those events in the earlier
life that he or she cannot ack n o w led ge” (p. 237). For a male-to-
fem ale transsexual w ho spent tw o years in the army, there are sev­
eral alternatives: She could tell people that she spent tw o years in
the arm y as a W A C ; or she spent those tw o years engaged in some
other a ctiv ity like going to college. O r she could be evasive regard­
ing her background and never m ention those tw o years.
O b vio u sly the least problem atic course o f action (the one that
requires the fe w e st num ber of additional constructions) is to use
Gender Construction in Everyday Life: Transsexualism 133
actual details from the past. It is because initial gender attributions
are so p o w erfu l that m ost biographic details can be credited to either
gender category. O nce it is decided that yo u are fem ale (or male),
m ost item s you reveal about your past w ill be seen as fem ale (or
male) history.
state w ith no dissim ulation that he played ball, clim bed trees, and
w as generally rough and aggressive. This w as, in fact, his childhood
as a "tom b oy.” He supports this description o f his p ast b y using such
phrases as "w h en I w as a kid.”
W hen Robert is asked about his first dating experien ces he de­
scribes the girl from his high school he w ou ld h ave liked to date.
Thus he draw s upon his actual teenage fan tasy life to creat^ his
biography.
The tran ssexu al’s fam ily can be a source o f difficulty or they can
be a u seful tool in passing. S u lcov (1973) claim s that m ost “ slip s”
are m ade b y fam ily m em bers— sayin g “ him ” fo r "h e r” and vice
versa. W anda, a m ale-to-fem ale transsexual, told us o f her horror
w hen her m other introduced her “ n e w ” daughter, W anda, as "m y
son.” W anda and her husband w ere so em barrassed that they left
the scene. W anda assum ed that the slip w as in evitab ly discrediting,
and y et if w e im agine the same event occurring to a nontranssexual
fem ale, it is lik ely that the m other’s beh avior w ou ld be treated as a
joke. E veryon e w ou ld laugh and say som ething like, “ Poor m other
m ust be getting sen ile.” In m ore intellectual circles the m other m ight
be teased as having com m itted a Freudian slip. Thus, it is not the
slip, per se, w hich is discrediting; it is the handling o f it.
One H ispanic transsexual said her fa m ily ’s solution w as to stop
referring to her w ith gender-linked pronouns and nam es. A nother
transsexual w as aided b y his m other w ho created for the neighbors
a m yth ical tw in sister fo r her son. In this story the tw ins do not get
along and consequently they n ever visit the m other at the same
time. A s the transsexual begins to liv e m ore continuously as a man,
presum ably the “ sister” w ill m ove aw ay.
Part of w h at it m eans to give a credible biography in volves giving
good reasons. A good reason is one that does not jar w ith one’s gen­
der presentation— that does not arouse doubt. It m ay not be clear to
a transsexual (or anyone creating a n ew biography) w h at constitutes
a good reason until a m istake is made. A n d again, it is u nlikely that
giving one bad reason w ould be enough to alter a gender attribution.
Those fe w tim es w hen tran ssexu als’ reasons im pressed us as not
v e ry good w ere w hen they w ere sw eeping generalizations about
134 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
gender-role behavior. Janet, a thoroughly credible wom an, w hen
asked b y us w h at she says w hen she and her fem ale friends talk
about their first m enstruation, responded, “ W om en don’t talk about
those things.’’ Had she told us that, “ M y friends don’t talk about
such things," w e w ou ld h ave found h er answ er less striking. W e feel
sure that her answ er w ou ld have gone unnoticed b y anyone w ho
kn ew nothing of her real past, y e t it could h ave been used as e vi­
dence o f her transsexualism by som eone looking for evidence.
A sim ilar exam ple in volves a fem ale-to-m ale transsexual, w ho
w hen discussing his h esitancy to use public bathroom s, said, “ M en
don ’t like to go to the bathroom w hen other guys are there.’’8
T h e best kinds o f reasons are those that are m ultifunctional. T h ey
not only provide the transsexual w ith m any excu ses fo r the cost of
one “ fab rication ,” but they allow other people to use the inform ation
fo r interpreting m any of the tran ssexu al’s behaviors.
1. M ike tells people that he did not serve in the arm y because of
a bad back. T h is sam e reason excuses him from liftin g h eavy
objects.
2. Kando (1973) cites the exam ple of a m ale-to-fem ale transsexual
w ho told her husband that she w as unable to bear children
becau se o f a hysterectom y. H er prior hospitalization fo r genital-
change surgery w as then seen b y the husband as hospitalization
fo r the hysterectom y.
3. A lth o u gh Robert w as self-conscious about his pierced ears, he
explained them as having been a requirem ent for the street gang
he belonged to. This story also supports his biography o f a “ real
b o y ’s ” childhood.
W hile w e have been careful not to characterize these techniques
as deceptive, a num ber o f the transsexuals (especially the younger
ones) w e interview ed w ere concerned b y w h a t they p erceived as the
n ecessary “ lyin g ” they m ust do. S uch attitudes ranged from feeling
bad about having to give a lo t o f excu ses to actually denying that
th ey had to do so. One w om an w h o denied that she had to “ lie" at
all m ay h ave been trying to prove to us that she w as such a natural
w om an that she did not need to fab ricate anything about her past—
her past w as the past of a “ real” w om an. U nder more careful ques­
tioning she adm itted that there w ere som e aspects o f her life that
she could not talk about to m ost people.
A fem ale-to-m ale transsexual, prior to a m astectom y, needed to
Gender Construction in Everyday Life: Transsexualism 135
explain to acquaintances w h y he did not rem ove his shirt at the
beach. E ven though he saw his excuse as a good (i.e., necessary)
one, he still fe lt bad. “ Feeling b ad” w ou ld in no w a y keep him from
m aking the required excuses since he b elieves his gender status to be
at stake. He claims, though, that m any transsexu als are not good at
giving excuses because they are scared.
Transsexuals w ho need help constructing biographies and learn­
ing good reasons can consult other transsexuals. One p h ysician con­
ducts role-playing sessions w h ere fem ale-to-m ale transsexu als can
give m ale-to-fem ale transsexuals advice on h o w to pass as w om en
and vice versa. A m ale-to-fem ale transsexual w as role-playing the
fo llo w in g situation. “ She's having lunch w ith the other girls from
the office and som eone says, as w om en w ill, ’I feel out o f sorts to­
day. I ju st got m y period. I w as going to go to the beach this w e e k ­
end, but I don’t like to sw im w hen I’m m enstruating.’ A n d then
som eone turns to the transsexual and asks, ‘Do you prefer to use
Tam pax or K o tex?’ ” The role-playing transsexual w a s stunned by
this question w h ich she had n ever anticipated. It took a fem ale-to-
m ale transsexual w ith a girl’s h istory to inven t such a situation
based on his past experience (Erikson, n.d., p. 15).
W e h ave discussed those aspects o f gender that m ay be spe­
cifically taught to transsexuals. H ow ever, m uch o f w h a t it m eans
to be a w om an or a man can not be ex h au stively articulated and can
not be learned by rote. M any o f the transsexu als w e interview ed
talked about just “pickin g things up as th ey w en t along." The w a y
th ey talk about learning to pass is like som eone explaining how
he/she learned language as a child.
The “ trick ,” if there is such a thing, seem s to be confidence. Both
the literature and the transsexuals, them selves, m ention the need to
feel and act confident. “ . . . The n e w ly em erged transsexual is con­
stantly on guard and overly sen sitive to all nuances in relationships.
W ith experience he or she learns that others are not as quick to
sense, or as alert to notice as exp ected ” (Feinbloom , 1976, p. 238).
“ . . . M ost people w ill take you at fa ce valu e . . . if you are not
apologetic in you r m anner . . . . T h e k ey to being accepted b y others
is you r ow n self-acceptance. . . . A n attitude o f quiet self-confidence
w ill get the best results” (Erikson, 1974, p. 6, 12). “ . . . The transsex­
ual gradually acquires a com fort and spontaneity . . . that sm ooths
the rough edges off his (sic) m anner and m akes it unrem arkable and
con vin cin g” (Erikson, n.d., p. 9). T h e k e y w ord is “ unrem arkable.”
Several transsexuals m entioned “ not overdoing it.” O ne talked about
136 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
the need to be “ cool,T:not to react w ith ou t first thinking. A nother
suggested that if you are really confident, then you do not w orry
about the “ sm all stuff.**
G arfinkel (1967) has, explained that passing is an ongoing prac­
tice. This is because gender is om nirelevant to the affairs o f every­
day life. A lth ou gh transsexuals m ust he and act confident that no
one is going to discover their stigma, th ey m ust consciously, contin­
ually, m ake a presentation that w ill not allow anyone to discover it.
G ender is a n ecessary background to e very act. That successful
passing requires the continual need to w ork at routinizing daily
activities indicates this background feature of gender.
For A gn es such w o rk in volved alw ays anticipating w h at might
be asked o f her and answ ering questions in such a w a y that they
w o u ld appear to require no further explanation. She avoided em­
p lo y e rs’ “ checking u p ” on her past by providing them w ith answ ers
that p ortrayed her as not unusual in an y sense. W ith the doctors
w h o in terview ed her she m anaged her gender presentation b y w ith ­
holding inform ation— speaking in generalities and pretending not to
understand questions w ho se answ ers m ight be used to see her as a
male.
For M ike, on board ship, his routinizing in volved presenting a
total persona o f shyness and naivete. C onsequ ently everythin g he
did (any potential errors he m ight have comm itted) w ere seen as
arising out o f his particular style. His failure to undress in front of
others w as interpreted in this o verall person ality context as m odesty
rather than fem aleness. In later years he kept his private life (among
people w ho kn o w of his past) and his p rofession al life (among peo­
ple w ho do not) com pletely separate.
M arian developed a sim ilar technique. In w o rk situations she pre­
sents h erself as quiet and reserved, thus insuring that other em ploy­
ees w ill n ot probe into her personal life. W ith friends w ho kn ow
about her transsexualism , she is v e ry different.
“ W orkin g” at gender can even go so fa r as creating a physical
presence that does not provoke notice. M ale-to-fem ale transsexuals
w ho are esp ecially concerned not to be m istaken for drag queens
say that it helps to be ordinary looking.
W hile w e agree w ith G arfinkel that gender is om nirelevant in
every d a y interactions, and that gender “ w o rk ” is required, w e do
not b elieve that the bulk o f the w o rk is required o f the one d isp lay­
ing gender. Rather, w e assert that m ost Of the w ork is done for the
disp layer b y the perceiver. The disp layer creates the initial gender
attribution, p robably by his/her public appearance and present talk.
Gender Construction in Everyday Life: Transsexualism 137
H ow ever, after that point, the gender attribution is m aintained by
virtue o f tw o things: (1) E very act of the d isp la y er’s is filtered
through the initial gender attribution w h ich the p erceiver has made;
(2) The p erceiver holds the natural attitude (e.g., gender is in vari­
ant). In short, there is little that the d isp layer needs to do once
he/she has provided the initial inform ation, excep t to m aintain the
sense o f the “ naturalness” o f her/his gender. Passing is an ongoing
practice, but it is practiced b y both parties. Transsexuals becom e
m ore “ n atu ral” fem ales or m ales and le ss self-co n scio u sly trans­
sexuals w hen they realize that passing is not totally their responsi­
bility. This realization gets translated into confidence that the other
w ill contribute to m aking and sustaining the gender attribution8 and
confidence that unless a m onum ental error is m ade, the initial gen­
der attribution w ill not be altered. "P roselytizin g tran ssexu als” w ho
ob ject to their gender not being taken seriou sly h ave m ade it diffi­
cult, or im possible, for others to share in the m aintainance o f their
gender b y continually confronting others w ith a blatant violation of
the natural attitude.
The extent to w h ich “ errors” can be overlooked is illustrated in the
fo llo w in g exam ple. W e had met Rachel, a m ale-to-fem ale transsex­
ual, w hen she w as still livin g as a m ale nam ed Paul. W hen she had
just begun to “ b e ” Rachel w e w ere w ith her in a social situation
w here only the three o f us k n ew about h er background. O n this
occasion w e called her “ P aul” several tim es and even referred to
her as "h e.” Y e t she continued to be treated and accepted as a
fem ale w ith no questions asked.10 A n interpretation consistent w ith
the argum ent w e have just proposed is that the other people had
m ade an unam biguous initial gender attribution of R achel as fem ale
and either assum ed th ey had m isheard us or did not hear us in the
first place. T h ey m aintained the gender attribution for Rachel. There
Was nothing that she or w e needed to do to " s a v e ” the situation.
O nce a gender attribution is m ade, virtu ally anything can be used to
support it. (Analogously, once it is discredited, then anything can be
used to support the discreditation, e.g., "I alw a ys kn ew he w a sn ’t
a w om an because his hands w ere so large.” )
T h e kind o f confidence exhibited b y transsexuals w ho recognize
other p eop le’s role in contributing to gender attributions is illu s­
trated in the follow in g incidents:
1. Jane Fry, a m ale-to-fem ale transsexual tried to get an I.D. card
from a clerk w ho noted that Jane Fry w as listed as John Fry in
the records. The clerk asked, "A re you fem ale?” Jane answ ered
138 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
in an inflam ed tone, “ W hat do you w ant me to do? Strip and
p rove it?” The clerk got flustered and gave Jane the I.D. card
(Bogdan, 1974, p, 182J. The fa ct that Jane w as preoperative
at the time, and if she had stripped w ould h ave revealed a penis,
is im portant in so far as it testifies to her confidence that the
clerk held the natural attitude tow ard gender; in seeing Jane as
fem ale, the cleric kn ew the “ co rrect” genitals w ould be there.
2. Robert, a fem ale-to-m ale transsexual, needed to get the gender
on his birth certificate changed. He self-assu redly explained to
the clerk in charge that som eone had ob viou sly m ade a m is­
take. He said that his m other only spoke Spanish and the error
w as p robably due to that. The clerk, looking at the handsom e,
bearded young man standing before her sym pathetically re­
sponded, “ T h e y ’re alw a ys m aking m istakes like that.” A c co rd ­
ing to Robert, “ If you apprehend trouble, you m ake it.” From
our point of vie w the clerk interpreted R obert’s reasonable
com plaint in the context of the visu al and auditory inform ation
available to her. The im m ediate gender attribution w as so strong
and his presentation so credible that she could not h ave seen
R obert as other than male. The only explanation possible w as
that there had been a clerical error in issuing the original birth
certificate.”
3. R obert had a sim ilar encounter w ith a derm atologist w ho
w anted to give him a full exam ination. R ob ert’s reaction was,
"T h a t’s out of the question.” W hile that m ay seem like a sus­
picious response to som eone reading this account of a trans­
sexu al's behavior, it w as o b vio u sly accep tab le to the doctor
w ho responded, “ I understand h ow you fe e l.” The doctor prob­
ably interpreted R obert’s answ er as that o f a p articularly bash­
fu l man. W hile it m ay not have been com m on beh avior in a
doctor’s office, it w as legitim ate behavior, and thus not d is­
crediting o f gender. O nce a gender attribution has been made,
anything a person does w ill be seen as congruent w ith that
gender attribution. There is no reason to think that som eone is
taking androgens unless you have already begun to doubt that
th ey are male. R obert’s encounter w ith the doctor highlights
the point that transsexuals can engage in behavior that m ay
bring into question their norm alcy, but w hich need not bring
into question the status of their gender. Gender, then, has
Gender Construction in Everyday Life: Transsexualism 139
prim acy over other attributes. W hen confron ted w ith atypical
behavior, one decides that the perform er is a “ stran ge” man
long before deciding that the perform er is not a man after all,
but a w om an. The latitude that a person has in perform ing
a typ ical behavior, before that p erso n ’s gender is called into
question, is a crucial issue.
4. R obert m ade a visit to his old neighborhood as his “ n e w ” gen­
der. A friend from high school stopped him on the street, told
him he looked fam iliar, and asked if he had any sisters. Rather
than getting upset or defensive, R obert answ ered “ y e s ” and
calm ly nam ed all his sisters.
A lth ou gh R obert is a totally credible m an and has “ p assed ” in
countless situations, he is still uncom fortable w hen the to^ic of
transsexualism is discussed in his presence b y people w h o do not
kn ow about his past. He is not sure w h a t a "n orm al” m ale reaction
is and w hether he w ill give him self a w a y if he should defend the
legitim acy of transsexualism . He adm its that, as in all n ew situations,
he w ill feel threatened until the first tim e he tries it; and in trying it
he w ill sim ultaneously be doing "n atu ral” b eh avior and learning
“ n atu ral” behavior.
W hat w e h ave been calling "con fid en ce" w h en exhibited b y trans­
sexuals is w hat, for nontranssexuals, w ou ld be seen as a display of
the natural attitude. Transsexuals are confident once th ey accept
their gender as unquestionable becau se gender (in the natural atti­
tude) is unquestionable once an attribution has been made.
G ender fo r the nontranssexual is not problem atic. It is a b a ck ­
ground feature of everyd ay life, but it need be o f no concern.
Transsexuals, in routinizing their d aily activities, are m anaging them ­
selves deliberately— som etim es m ore deliberately than nontrans­
sexuals— but the aim of this m anagem ent is to keep their gender
from being problem atic fo r other people as w e ll as fo r them selves.
The difference b etw een the confident attitude o f the transsexual and
the everyd ay attitude o f the non tran ssexual lies only in the history
o f the individual. H ow ever, in the process o f gender attribution h is­
tory is irrelevant. There are only people w ho succeed, during on­
going social interaction, in being, fo r each other, either m ales or
fem ales. A ll persons create both the reality o f their ow n specific
gender and a sense o f its history, thus at the sam e time creating the
reality o f tw o, and only two, natural genders.
140 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach Gender Construction in Everyday Life: Transsexualism 444

NOTES ideas about males’ bathroom idiosyncracies); however a male colleague

who listened to the interview tape (and who knew the interviewee
1. All names of transsexuals and any identifying information have was a transsexual) characterized the comment as not a good reason.
been altered.
9. Under certain circumstances, it is expected that the perceiver will
2. The natural attitude toward gender as detailed by Garfinkel and the contribute minimally to the gender attribution, and consequently the
"facts” about gender which, according to Kohlberg (1966), young children transsexual must be more self-conscious about her/his presentation. For
do not know, are strikingly similar. In light of our analysis of the example, when a transsexual is interviewed by a clinician who must
development of children's ideas abut gender, this is not surprising. It is determine whether the transsexual is “really” the gender she/he claims,
also interesting to compare the natural attitude with Money and Ehrhardt’s the clinician may attempt to withhold a gender attribution and try to judge
(1972) “formula” for insuring that a child develops an unambiguous each of the transsexual’s acts independently without seeing the act as
gender identity (p. 152). The “formula" can be seen as a scientific emanating from a male or female. We believe that this is such a formidable
statement of the natural attitude. task that this stance can be maintained only for the briefest period.
3. We are not the first to note that "liberals” in the field of ; 10. This example illustrates in two ways the resistence of initial gender
transsexualism often hold a biological view which is the reverse of what attributions to change: the power of the other people's gender attribution
one usually finds. (On issu'es such as race and intelligence liberals generally to Rachel as female, and the power of our initial gender attribution to
look for social-psychological causes.) Some (e.g., Raymond, 1977) claim Paul as male.
that this “liberal” perspective disguises a basically conservative and
11. As transsexualism becomes a more socially shared reality, birth
sexist attitude toward gender roles.
certificate clerks and others in similar positions may come to see that there
4. Judicial rulings regarding change of gender status include: are other explanations besides clerical errors. In doing so,
Anonymous v. Weiner ? 7QN Y.S. 2d, 319-324,1966 (unfavorable ruling); however, their ideas about gender will necessarily change.
In re Anonymous 293 N.Y.S. 834-838,1968 (favorable ruling); In re
Anonymous 314 N.Y.S. 2d, 668-670,1970 (favorable ruling); Corbett v.
Corbett (otherwise Ashley) 2 W.L.R. 1036, 2 all E.R, 33,1970, (unfavorable
ruling); Matter of Fernandez, New York Law Journal, 3/15/76,
p. 12, col. 2 (unfavorable ruling).
5. The term “sex reassignment” is now being used as a substitute for
"se x change" in the professional literature on treatment of transsexualism.
The former term implies a rehabilitative process, while the latter implies
that a person was once one gender and is now the other. Because of
our perspective we think “reconstruction” is yet a better term.
6. This doctor's use of the feminine pronoun to refer to the female-to-
male transsexual suggests an underlying attitude of skepticism toward the
legitimacy of the transsexual’s gender claim. And yet this doctor was
presented as being sympathetic toward transsexualism and an advocate of
corrective surgery. Stoller, an eminent clinician in the field of
transsexualism measures the strength of patients' gender identities by the
pronouns he finds himself automatically using (Stoller, 1968, p. 235).
However, We think the pronoun he uses is a measure of the gender
attribution Stoller has made, since as he indicates earlier in his book
(p. 192) gender identity can only be measured by asking the person.
7. It is not clear whether by "illusion of feminity” Feinbloom means
that femininity in general is an illusion or that the transsexual’s
femininity (or femaleness) is.
8. We did not find this statement suspicious (having no firmly developed

6_______
TOWARD A
THEORY OF
GENDER
W hen w e first began to think about gender as a social construe-
tion, w e devised a “ gam e" called the Ten Q uestion G ender Game.
The p layer is told, “ I am thinking o f a person and I w an t you to tell
me, not w ho the person is, but w hether that person is fem ale or male.
Do this b y asking me ten questions, all o f w h ich m ust be answ erable
b y ‘y e s ’ or ‘no.’ Y o u m ay ask any question except, ‘Is the person
m ale?’ or ‘Is the person fem ale?’. A fte r each question, based on the
an sw er I have given you, tell me, at that point in the game, w hether
you think the person is fem ale or m ale and w h y you h ave decided
that. Then ask your n ext question. Y ou need not stick w ith your first
an sw er throughout the game, but regardless o f w hether you stay w ith
your original choice or change your decision you must, at each
point, explain your choice. A t the end o f the game I w ill ask you to
give yo u r final decision on the p erson’s gender."
The game is reasonably simple, fun to play, and is not unlike
“ T w e n ty Q uestion s.” Our game, h ow ever, is not ju st for fun. Instead
o f answ ering the p la y e r’s questions on the basis o f the character­
istics o f som e real person, w e responded w ith a prearranged, ran­
dom series of " y e s ’s ” and “ n o’s." The game is a form of the “ docu ­
m entary m ethod,” 1 and w e created it both in order to find out w h at
kinds o f questions the players w ould ask about gender, and, m ore
im portantly, to u ncover h ow the p layers w ou ld m ake sense out of
w h at is, in m any cases, seem ingly contradictory inform ation. The
fo llo w in g is a transcript of a typ ical game:
Player: Is this person living?
Interview er: No. W hat is it?
P: It w as an irrelevant question. I sh ouldn’t h ave asked you that
question. No basis for judging it. Is the person over 5'8" tall?
I: Y es
1 /19 .
Toward a Theory of Gender 143
P: M ale. T h e p robability in m y m ind o f a taller person being m ale
is higher fo r m ale and low er fo r fem ale.
Is the person over 160 pounds in w eigh t?
I: No.
P: W ell, n o w I’m m ixed. I’d still say leaning tow ard male.
Is the person under 140 pounds in w eigh t?
I: No.
P: So, w e're b etw een 140 and 160 pounds. I'd say m ale on the
basis of p h ysica l characteristics. A p erson over 5'8" betw een
140 and 160 pounds . . . I’d tend to w a rd male.
W ell, w h a t else can I ask about this person? (long pause) W ell,
I mean, th ere’re ob viou sly som e questions I can’t ask .
I : Like w hat? ^
P: Like does this person w ear skirts?
I: Yes.
P: The person does w ear skirts. Then it’s fem ale I assum e because
I assum e in general w hen people w e a r skirts th e y ’re fem ale.
The exception being Scottish m ales perhaps under som e con­
ditions, but I assum e on the basis o f p robab ility that th at’s it.
I’ve established in m y mind that the person is probab ly— w ith ­
out asking directly questions about the sex o f a person. I have
to ask five m ore questions?
I: Yes.
P: Is the person a mother?
I: No.
P: W ell I can ’t— th at’s a sex-directed question . . . W ell, I’m still
leaning tow ard fem ale, (long pause)
D oes the person h ave a 9 to 5 job?
I: No.
P: W ell, I’m leaning tow ard fem ale.
I: W h y?
P: Skirts, the p h ysical attribution m ake p ossible— p h ysical char­
acteristics m akes possible fem ale and not h aving a rem unera­
tive job m akes less lik ely in m y m ind that the p erson’s male,
(long pause) W hen the person w as a child, I don ’t kn ow if this
is a legitim ate question, did the person p la y w ith dolls a lot?
I: No.
P: N o? W ell I’m still leaning tow ard fem ale, because fem ales
don’t have to p lay w ith dolls. I’m avoiding— I m ean th ere’re
substitute questions for “ is the person fem ale or m ale,” but I
assum e I can ’t ask those question.
144 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
I: Y es yo u can ask anything.
P: But if I ask som e questions it’s essen tially . . .
I: Y ou can ask me anything.
P: (long pause) W ell, th ere’s a system to this. If one thinks o f good
questions one can n arrow it d ow n very w ell, Iim agine— any
other p h ysical ch aracteristics . . . W ell, you can ’t ask questions
about p h ysical characteristics if th ey determ ine w h eth er the
person is m ale or fem ale.
I: Y es, yo u can.
P: D oes the person have protruding breasts?
I: Yes.
P: Then m ore lik e ly to be fem ale, (long pause) I'm trying to think
of good questions. W e covered p h ysica l characteristics, job re­
lations . . . I’ll ask another p h ysical question.
Does the person have developed biceps?
I: Y es. I’d lik e yo u r final answ er.
P: W ell, I think tHe answ ers I’ve been given— the answ er to the
last question about develop ed biceps, leads me to doubt
w hether w e ’re talking about a w om an but the— and the p h ysi­
cal characteristics describe, that is height and w eig h t could be
both m an or w pm an in m y m ind although I tended a little bit
tow ard man, buit the several questions tip it in m y mind. The
w earing o f skirts, the protruding breasts, the nonrenum erative
job m ake it m ore lik e ly in m y m ind that I’m talking about a
w om an than a man. A lth ou gh the developed biceps, as I under­
stand it, throw s a m onkey w ren ch in it because I don’t kn ow
if it could be accurate to characterize an y w om an as h aving
develop ed biceps, but perhaps you can.
W e h ave p layed this game w ith o ver 40 people. A sum m ary of
w h a t occurs includes the fo llo w in g observations: (1) P layers ex­
h ibited the rule-guided behaviors described b y G arfinkel (1967, pp.
89-94), including perceivin g the answ ers as answ ers to their ques­
tions, seeing patterns in the answ ers, w aitin g fo r later inform ation
to inform earlier inform ation, and so on. (2) Sp ecifically in term s of
gender, all players w ere able to m ake sense out o f the apparent in ­
consistencies in the answ ers, such that players w ere led to postulate
bearded w om en and men w ho w ere transvestites. In one case the
p la yer concluded it w as a herm aphrodite, and in another that it w as
a transsexual. In all other cases the final decision w as either “ m ale"
or “ fem ale.” (3) O nly 25 percent of the players asked about genitals
in the first three questions. M ost p layers asked questions about
Toward a Theory of Gender 145
either gender role behaviors or secondary gender characteristics.
W hen asked after the game w h y th ey did not ask about genitals,
players explained that it w ould have been tantam ount to asking “ Is
this person a m ale (or fem ale)?” , w h ich w as an unacceptable ques­
tion since finding the answ er w as the object o f the game. Players
kn ew that their task w as to discover the gender o f the person w ith ­
out asking about gender specifically, synonym ous, to them, w ith
asking about genitals. Some o f the players w ho did ask about geni­
tals and received answ ers refused to ask an y m ore questions, claim ­
ing that there w as no reason to do so. T h ey w ere ab solu tely certain
o f the p erson’s gender, even if that decision conflicted w ith the
other pieces o f inform ation they received. (4) O n ly tw o people w ho
asked about genitals asked about a vagin a b efore asking gbout
w h eth er the person had a penis. One w as told “ y e s ” the person had a
vagina, and the other w as told “n o .” Both o f them then asked i f the
person had a penis. O f the fifteen people w ho asked about a penis
first, eight w ere told "y e s,” and none of them then asked about a
vagina. O f the seven w ho w ere told “ no,” only fou r then asked if
the person had a vagina.
The w a y in w hich persons played this “ gam e” suggested to us that
(1) G ender attributions are based on inform ation w hose m eaning is
so cia lly shared. Not ju st any inform ation w ill inform a gender attri­
bution, and certain inform ation (biological and physical) is seen as
m ore im portant than other inform ation (role behavior). (2) Once a
gender attribution is made, alm ost anything can be filtered through
it and made sense of. (3) G ender attribution is essen tially genital
attribution. If you “ k n o w ” the genital then you kn ow the gender. (4)
In some w ay, kn ow ledge about penises m ay give people m ore in­
form ation than kn ow ledge about vaginas.
THE OVERLAY STUDY
In order to investigate further the relationship betw een gender
attribution and genital attribution, and to collect additional inform a­
tion about the relative im portance of p h ysical characteristics in
deciding gender, w e designed a m ore form al study. A set of plastic
overlays w as prepared. D raw n on each overlay w as one physical
characteristic or one piece of clothing. T h e eleven overlays w ere:
long hair, short hair, w id e hips, narrow hips, breasts, flat chest,
bod y hair, penis, vagina, "u n isex ” shirt, “ u n isex” pants. W hen the
overlays Were placed one on top o f the other, the result w as a draw-
146 Gender; An Ethnomethodological Approach Toward a Theory of Gender
ing o f a figure w ith various com binations o f typ ica lly m ale and
fem ale p h ysical gender characteristics. T h e overlays, in com bination,
produced n in ety-six different figures. E ach figure had either long or
short hair, w id e or n arrow hips, breasts or a flat chest, b od y hair or
no b ody hair, and a penis or a vagina. Figures w ere either unclothed,
w o re a non-gender-specific shirt and pants, or w ore one o f the tw o
articles o f clothing. A ll figures had the same, non-gender-specific
face. (See Figures 6.1 and 6.2 for tw o o f the figures used.)
W e assum ed that the figure that had m any typ ical fem ale charac­
teristics w ould be seen as fem ale, and the figure that had m any
typ ical m ale ch aracteristics w ou ld be seen as male. W hat, though,
w o u ld people decide about the “ m ixed ” figures? W ould the figures
be am biguous stimuli, stum ping the participants, or w ould sense be
m ade o f them as in our Ten Q uestion G ender G am e? H ow w ould the
presence or absence o f particular cues, esp ecially genitals, affect the
p articipan ts’ perceptions of other p h ysical characteristics?
Each o f the ninety-six figures w as sh ow n to ten adults, five m ales
and five fem ales. The 960 participants w ere asked three questions:
(1) Is this a picture of a fem ale or a m ale? (2) U sing a scale of 1 to
7, w here 1 m eans not at all confident and 7 m eans very confident,
h o w confident are you o f your answ er? (This w as, in part, to give us
inform ation about w hether the forced choice in Q uestion 1 w as a
clear gender attribution or m erely a guess.) (3) H ow w ould you
change the figure to m ake it into the other gender?
From the participants' answ ers, not on ly w ou ld w e h ave an "o b je c ­
tiv e ” m easure o f the relative w eigh t o f various characteristics in
m aking gender attributions, but, in seeing h o w people construct
gender from “ con tradictory” cues, w e w o u ld gain some understanding
o f the phenom enological reality of fem alen ess and m aleness. A s w e
h ave pointed out p revio u sly in this book, people w h o are designated
“m ales” and “ fem ales” va ry w ithin gender and overlap b etw een
genders on every social and biological variable. H ow, then, is gender
dichotom ized such that, phenom enologically, there are only m ales
and fem ales? B y controlling the variab les and b y slow ing dow n the
gender attribution process b y m eans o f this overlay study, w e hoped
to see the construction o f gender. A lth o u gh m aking judgm ents about
draw ings is not the sam e as m aking judgm ents about real people,
insights gained from the form er are valuab le in understanding the
latter.
W hat constitutes gender? G eorge D evereux, a p sych oan alytic
Figure 6.1 Figure with penis, breasts, hips, no body hair, and
anthropologist, claim s that “ . . . m uch o f m ankind’s high degree of
long hair.
sexual dim orphism is due to the w om an’s conspicuous fem aleness:
148 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach Toward a Theory of Gender 149

Figure 6.2 Figure with vagina, no breasts, no hips, body hair, and
short hair.
she is sex u a lly alw ays responsive and has perm anent breasts. M an
is not m ore ob viou sly m ale than the stallion; w om an is m ore con­
sp icu ou sly fem ale than the m are . . .” (1967, p. 179, italics ours). The
findings o f the overlay study are in direct refu tation o f D evereu x’s
assertion. It is the penis w h ich is conspicuous and apparently im pos­
sible to ignore, and it is the m ale figure w h ich dom inates the reality
of gender. These findings hold for both m ale and fem ale v iew ers of
the figures.
One w a y to analyze the relative im portance of the genitals is to
ask h o w m any participants made a “m ale” gender attribution and
h o w m any a "fem a le” gender attribution w h en the figure, irresp ec­
tive o f all other gender characteristics, had either a penis, a vagina,
or had its genitals covered b y pants. C onsidering first the thirty-tw o
figures w h o se genitals w ere covered, ten o f these figures had pre­
dom inantly “m ale” characteristics (at least three out o f four), ten
had predom inantly “ fem ale” characteristics, and tw e lv e had an equal
num ber o f “ fem ale” and "m ale” characteristics. If “ fem ale” and
“ m ale” gender cues w ere equally “ p o w erfu l,” w e w ou ld exp ect that
50 p ercen t o f the participants w ou ld provide a “ m ale” gender attri­
bution to the covered-genitals figure, and 50 percent w ou ld provide a
“ fem a le” gender attribution. This did not occur.
There w ere a disproportionate num ber o f "m ale” gender attribu­
tio n s -s ix ty - n in e percent — to the covered-genitals figure. This find­
ing can be understood in light o f other data collected. Seavey, Katz,
and Z a lk (1975) report that adults w h o interacted w ith a b aby w ith ­
out know in g its gender m ore often thought the in fan t to be a boy.
(The b aby used in the study w as fem ale.) In another study (Haviland,
1976), m en and w om en incorrectly labeled girls "m ale” tw ice as often
as th ey labeled boys “ fem ale.” In C hapter 4 w e discussed the chil­
dren ’s draw ings study but did not, at that time, p resen t data regard­
ing the direction of errors in gender attributions. Kindergarten, third-
grade, and adult participants attributed “ m ale” to a fem ale figure
m ore often than they attributed “ fem ale” to a m ale figure. Pre­
schoolers, w ho do not y et participate in the adult social construc­
tion of gender, did not show this bias. On the other hand, kinder­
garteners, w ho hold the m ost rigid and stereotyped ideas about gen­
der, erred in saying “ m ale” five tim es m ore often than they erred in
saying “ fem ale.”
This predisposition to think and guess “ m ale” irrespective of
external stim uli is reflected in other cultural phenom ena such as the
use o f the generic “ h e.” Had our participants been asked to attribute
gender to an inkblot, they m ight h ave responded “ m ale” more often
150 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
than “fem ale.” H ow ever, the participants w ere not ju st “ thinking
m ale” (making judgm ents irresp ective of stimuli] but actually “ see­
ing m ale,” filtering the external stim uli through “ androcentric” gen­
der attributions. In other w ords, not only is there a tendency to re­
spond w ith a “ m ale” answ er, but on p ractical occasions p eo p le’s
perceptions are such that the stim uli lo o k “ m ale.”
O ur evidence fo r asserting this com es from an analysis o f the dis­
tribution o f gender attributions for the figures w ith various second­
ary gender characteristics. V irtu ally all the “ fem ale” cues (long
hair, w id e hips, breasts, no b o d y hair), and even the cues w e in ­
tended to be neutral (clothing), w ere seen b y at least 55 p ercen t of
the participants as m ale cues. N ever w ere m ale cues (short hair,
b o d y hair, n arrow hips, flat chest) seen b y m ore than 36 percent of
the v iew ers as fem ale cues. W e cannot blam e this on poorly draw n
fem ale characteristics, since these sam e “ fem ale” cues w ere per­
ceived as fem ale in a predom inantly fem ale context. For exam ple,
overall, 57 percent o f the figures w ith breasts w ere seen as male.
Three and a h alf p ercen t o f the participants w ho m ade a “m ale”
gender attribution to the figure w ith breasts said that adding breasts
w as the first thing that should be done to m ake the figure fem ale.
H ow ever, o f those participants w ho sa w the figure as fem ale, over
h a lf o f them m entioned “ rem ove the b reasts” as the first thing to
do to m ake it male. Thus, in a fem ale con text the fem ale cue w as
salient, but in a m ale context it could either be “ ignored” or seen as
a m ale cue. In phenom enological reality although the presence o f a
“ m ale” cue, m ay be a sign o f m aleness, the presence of a "fem a le”
cue, b y itself, is not necessarily a sign of fem aleness. A s w e shall
see, the only sign o f fem aleness is an absence o f male cues.
O ur discussion thus far has been lim ited to “ secon d ary” p h ysical
cues. Presum ably figures w ithout pants, sh ow ing either a penis or a
vagina, provide view ers w ith additional gender inform ation and
m ove them further from the fifty-fifty split w e h ypothesized. If
genitals w ere the definitive gender cue then w e w ou ld exp ect that
figures w ith penises [irrespective o f any other com bination o f gender
ch aracteristics they had) w ould be seen b y 100 p ercen t o f p artici­
pants as male, and figures w ith vaginas w ou ld be seen b y 100 per­
cent o f participants as fem ale. W hile genital cues increase the num ­
ber of gender attributions tow ard the “ appropriate” gender, the
difference betw een the presence o f a penis and the presence o f a
vagin a is profound. T hose participants w ho sa w a figure w ith a penis
responded like our h ypoth etical sam ple fo r w hom the genital w as
the definitive gender cue, but those participants w ho saw a figure
Toward a Theory of Gender 151
w ith a vagin a did not. The presence o f a penis is, in and of itself, a
p o w erfu l enough cue to elicit a gender attribution w ith alm ost com ­
plete (96 percent) agreem ent. The presen ce o f a vagina, how ever,
does not h ave this sam e pow er. O ne third o f the participants w ere
able to ignore the reality o f the vagin a as a fem ale cue.2
If w e con ceived o f the processing o f gender cues as additive, then
w e w ou ld conceptualize our findings in the fo llo w in g w ay : There
existed in participants a tendency to th ink and see m aleness w hich
produced "b a selin e” gender attributions o f 69 p ercen t m ale and 31
p ercen t fem ale. Participants w ho sa w the “ u n d ressed ” figure had
one m ore piece o f inform ation to produce an attribution. G enitals
provided approxim ately 30 percent m ore inform ation. “ F em ale” gen­
der attributions increased from 31 p ercen t to 64 p ercen t w h en a
vagin a w as added. “ M ale” gender attributions increased fr§m 69
p ercen t to 96 percen t w hen a penis w a s added. A cco rd in g to this
conceptualization the genital is ju st one m ore piece o f inform ation.
It is not that the penis is a m ore p o w e rfu l cue than the vagina, but
th at each genital has a 30 p ercen t p o w er w h ich is added onto a
differential baseline (not based on genitals).
W e do not, h ow ever, interpret the findings in that w ay . W e con­
ceive o f the p rocessing o f gender cues m u ltip licitively. Cues w ork
in a gestalt fashion. The genitals fun ction as central traits (Asch,
1946), affecting the interpretation o f each o f the other cues. O nce
participants decided that the figure had a penis, they w ere even
m ore lik ely to see the long hair as “ reason ab le” m ale hair length,
ign ore/m isperceive the w id th of the hips, and see the facial features
as “m asculine.” Sim ilarly, once they accep ted the reality o f the
vagina, th ey w ere'm o re lik ely to see short hair as “ reason ab ly” fe ­
m ale, and see the facial featu res as “ fem inine.” If the vagina w ere
as definitive a gender cue as the penis and functioned as a central
trait, then it w ou ld produce fem ale gender attributions w ith 96 per­
cent agreement-— overcom in g the bias against such an attribution
in the covered-genital condition. In fact, as som e o f our other find­
ings indicate, the vagina does not function in this w a y . It is either
ignored/m isinterpreted in the first place or w h en recognized does
not h ave the p ow er to influence the other cues.3
Penis equals m ale but vagin a does not equal fem ale. H ow m any
additional fem ale cues does the figure w ith a vagin a need to have
in order to produce fem ale gender attributions 96 percent o f the
time? In other w ords, h ow fem ale did a figure h ave to lo o k before
virtu ally all participants said that it w as a fem ale? There is no single
fem ale cue that in conjunction w ith a vagina produced fem ale gender
152 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
attributions m ore than 81 percent o f the time. Figures w ith a vagina
and tw o other female? cues produced fem ale gender attributions
m ore often. If the tw o other fem ale cues w ere long hair and breasts,
fem ale gender attributions w ere given 95 percent o f the tim e— as
often as m ale gender attributions w ere given w h en the penis w as
present. E ven adding apother fem ale cue (vagina plus three fem ale
cues] brings the percentages o f fem ale gender attributions above
95 p ercen t in only tw o conditions: the figure w ith w id e hips, breasts
covered, lon g hair; and the figure w ith no b od y hair, breasts, and
long hair. E ven w hen the figure has a vagina, the rem aining male
cues are o b vio u sly operative and p o w erfu l.
The differential re ality o f the genitals is noted again w hen w e look
at the participan ts’ certain ty answ ers. Y ou n g children are "b etter”
at attributing gender to clothed figures than to naked ones (Katcher,
1955), presum ably b ecau se genitals are not part of the w a y they
construct gender. H ow ever, adults are not alw a ys m ore certain of
their attributions to naked figures than to clothed figures. T h ey are
only m ore certain o f their attribution to naked figures w hen the
genital exposed is a penis. W hen the genital is a vagina, they are no
m ore certain than w h en the genitals are covered.. Participants w ere
m ost certain of their gender attributions w h en the figure they judged
had a penis, and least certain w hen the penis w a s strongly contra­
dicted. If w e consider the sixty-fou r conditions w here the genitals
w ere exposed, in tw en ty-five o f them at le a st one-half o f the p artici­
pants gave certainty scores o f " 7 ” , indicating th ey had no doubt
ab out the figure’s gender. The penis w as a cue in tw en ty-tw o o f
those conditions. There w as only one condition w here at least one-
h a lf o f the participants w ere v e ry uncertain (scores o f 1,2, or 3). In
this condition the figure had a penis and fou r fem ale cues.* The
p articipan ts’ u ncertainty in that condition w a s also reflected in the
fa c t that one-half identified the figure as m ale and the other h alf
as fem ale.
M ore evidence regarding the phenom enological reality of the penis
com es from participants’ responses to h o w th ey w ould change the
figures w ith genitals. W e coded the “ ch an ge” answ ers relating to
genitals into three categories: (l) rem ove genitals, (2) add genitals,
(3) change genitals. If the penis and vagin a are equally real features
then w e w ou ld exp ect just as m any participants to h ave said "add
a vagin a” to create a fem ale as said "ad d a p en is” to create a male.
A n d sim ilarly w e w o u ld exp ect as m any to h ave said "rem ove the
p en is” to m ake a fem ale as "rem ove the va g in a ” to m ake a male.
W e did not find this.
Toward a Theory of Gender 153
In changing a m ale to a fem ale 38 p ercen t o f the p articipan ts m en­
tioned rem oving the penis, but only one p ercen t said that it w as
-n ecessa ry to add a vagina. W hen changing a fem ale to a m ale, the
findings are reversed. T h irty-tw o p ercen t o f the participants said
that a penis needed to be added to m ake a m ale but only one percent
said that the vagin a need be rem oved.
Thom pson and Bentler (1971) exam ined the relative im portance
o f p h ysica l gender cues, testing responses to nude dolls w ith various
com binations o f m ale and fem ale gender characteristics. If w e com ­
pare the data th ey collected w ith the findings o f the overlay study
there is a significant sim ilarity. The adults in Thom pson and
B ender's study gave the doll w ith a m uscular b ody structure, short
hair, and m ale genitals the m axim um “ m ale” score; they gave the
doll w ith a rounded b ody structure, long hair, and fem ale genitals
the m axim um “ fem ale” score. W hen the cues w e re gender-consistent
th ey w ere equally w eighted. W hen the cues w ere in contradiction,
h ow ever, the genitals clearly had differential m eaning and pow er.
Participants rated the doll w ith m uscular b ody structure, short hair,
and fem ale genitals only som ew hat less m asculine than the m axi­
mum m ale score, w hile they rated the d olf w ith rounded b ody struc­
ture, long hair, and m ale genitals con siderab ly less fem inine than
the m axim um fem ale score. T h e p o w er o f the penis lies n ot in its
absence, since the m asculine doll m inus the penis w as still seen as
v e ry m ale, but in its presence. T h e fem inine doll w ith a penis could
not be seen as fem ale.5
There seem to be no cues that are definitely fem ale, w h ile there
are m any that are definitely m ale. To be m ale is to "h a v e ” som ething
and to be fem ale is to "not h a v e ” it. This proposition is related to
our earlier discussion o f a “ m ale response b ia s” and both are in­
tegral to the social construction o f gender. The im plications o f this
are exp lored in m ore detail in a later section o f this chapter.
T o sum m arize the overlay study: G ender attribution is, for the
m ost part, genital attribution; and genital attribution is essentially
penis attribution. In the next section w e argue that penis attribution
takes place irresp ective o f the biological genitals and on the basis
o f the cultural genitals.
CULTURAL GENITALS
G arfinkel (1967) m akes a distinction b etw een the possession of
a penis or a vagina as a biological even t and the possession of either
154 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
genital as a cultural event. The cultural genital is the one w h ich is
assum ed to exist and w hich , it is believed, should be there. A s e v i­
dence o f "natural se x u a lity ,” the cultural genital is a legitim ate p os­
session. E ven if the genital is not present in a p h ysica l sense, it
exists in a cultural sense if the person feels entitled to it and/or is
assum ed to h ave it.
A cco rd in g to our p ersp ective and the language w e h ave been
using, cultural genitals are the attributed genitals, and since it is the
penis w h ich is either attributed or not attributed, w e m aintain that
the only cultural genital is the penis. It belongs to m ales and is
attributed b y m embers as a part o f the gender attribution process in
particular instances. P h ysical genitals b elon g only to p h ysical (gen-
derless) bodies and consequently are not part o f the social w orld.
A ttribu ted genitals are constructed out o f our w a y s o f envisioning
gender and alw ays exist in every d a y interactions. M ales h ave cul­
tural penises and fem ales h ave no cultural penises, even cardboard
draw ings w earing plastic pants. H ow else are w e to understand the
participants in the overlay study w h o claim ed that the w a y to
change a clothed m ale figure into a fem ale w a s to "rem ove the
p enis," or the child w ho sees a picture of a person in a suit and tie
and says: “ It’s a man because he has a pee-pee.”
P h ysical genitals are a construction o f b iological and scientific
form s o f life and are relevan t only to that perspective. Penises do
not exist in isolation. T h ey belong to, and are presum ed to be at­
tached to, m ales. W hen w h at looks like a penis is found to be
attached to a fem ale, it is treated as a penis only in the p h ysical (non­
social) sense. )anet, a m ale-to-fem ale transexual w e interview ed,
told us of one or tw o occasions prior to surgery w hen she had sexual
encounters w ith men. These men did not treat the (physical) penis
b etw een h er legs as a (social) penis. T h ey seem ed to have decided
that it w as “ all right" that Janet appeared to h ave an inappropriate
p h ysical genital because they had already decided that the genital
had no reality in a cultural sense. This exam ple illustrates that if
the p h ysica l genital is not present w hen it is exp ected (or vice versa),
the original gender attribution is not n ecessarily altered. W hen e x ­
pectation s are violated a change in gender attribution does not n ec­
essarily fo llo w . It is the cultural genital w h ich p lays the essential
role in gender attribution. (See also Garfinkel, 1967, p. 157.)
T h e o verlay study has confirm ed G arfin kel’s (1967) analysis that
in the natural attitude genitals are the essential insignia of gender.
M ore specifically the findings suggest that it is the penis w h ich is
essential. G arfinkel argues that w hen w e “ do” gender in particular
Toward a Theory of Gender 155
instances w e are creating the reality of gender as a construct. It is
apparent, though, that w e not only create gender as a construct, but
'w e create the specific categories o f "fe m a le ” and “m ale." W e m ust
be doing m ore than gender; w e m ust be doing fem ale or male gen­
der. W h ile G arfinkel’s analysis o f the natural attitude tow ard gender
p rovides us w ith the best (and only) guide to h o w gender is accom ­
plished, he does not tell us h o w fem ale and male are accom plished.
W hen he discusses A g n es’ concern w ith being a “ real w om an,” his
em phasis is on w hat real m eans fo r A gu es and for those m aking
judgm ents about A g n e s’s gender. W hat does gender have to be in
order to be taken as real? W e are em phasizing the w om an part of
“ real w om an.” A m ale and a fem ale m ay engage in the sam e prac­
tices fo r the purpose o f convincing others that th ey are really the
gender th ey assert. T h ey must, h ow ever, engage in different p rac­
tices if th ey w an t to convince others that they are one particular
gender and not another. To say that attributing “ p en is” leads to
attributing a m ale gender does not exp lain h o w w e attribute penis
in the first place, nor under w h at conditions an attribution of no­
penis occurs.
The relationship b etw een cultural genitals and gender attribution
is reflexive. The reality o f a gender is “ p ro ved ” b y the genital w hich
is attributed, and, at the sam e time, the attributed genital only has
m eaning through the socially shared construction o f the gender attri­
bution process. R eflexivity is an intrinsic feature o f reality (Mehan
and W ood, 1975). The question o f h o w m em bers reflex iv ely create
a sense o f them selves as fem ale or m ale, as w e ll as m ake attribu­
tions of others, is the topic o f the n ex t section.
DOING FEMALE
AND MALE
T h eory and research on h o w “ norm al” people present them ­
selves as either fem ale or m ale has been alm ost totally absent from
the literature. The m ost suggestive is a brief, but im portant paper
b y B ird w h istell (1970). Taking it fo r granted that there are tw o gen­
ders and that, in order to reproduce, the tw o genders m ust be able
to tell each other apart, B ird w h istell raises the question o f w h at the
critical “ gender m arkers" are for hum an beings. He rejects genitals
as a m arker because they are u su ally hidden and because children
do not treat them as a relevan t characteristic. He also rejects
“ secondary sexual ch aracteristics” as being far from dichotom ous,
156 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
at least w hen, com pared to those m arkers in other species (e.g.,
plum age in birds). B ird w h istell b elieves that "tertiary sexu al” charac­
teristics” (nonverbal behaviors such as fa cia l expression, m ovem ent,
and b ody posture) are the predom inant gender m arkers for humans.
U sing data and inform ants from seven cultures, he dem onstrates that
m em bers can recognize and sketch out, in a rough w ay, typical and
atyp ical non verbal beh aviors for fem ales and m ales. In a study o f
A m erican “ gender m arkers,” B ird w h istell indicates som e o f the b ody
postures and fa cia l expressions that differentiate m ales and fem ales,
concentrating on b eh aviors that co n vey sexu al interest. He em pha­
sizes that no non verbal behavior ever carries m eaning divorced
from the context in w h ich it occurs.
W e agree w ith B ird w h istell on the im portance o f understanding
gender disp lay and recognition, as w e ll as w ith his assertion that
genitals and other p h ysica l characteristics are not the critical signs
o f gender. It is inform ative that people can describe and recognize
typ ica l and atyp ical gender displays, but if a disp lay can be ch arac­
terized as typ ical or atypical, then the gender o f the person w h o is
displayin g has already been attributed. Therefore typ ical displays
are not n ecessary to m ake a gender attribution nor are atyp ical dis­
p lays grounds fo r doubting an attribution. A w om an is still a wom an,
regardless of w hether she is being (nonverbally) m asculine or fem ­
inine,
B ird w h istell’s w o rk does not u ncover particulars of the gender
attribution process. His ;data on A m erican gender displays w as col­
lected in the sam e w a y as e ve ry other stu d y on "s e x differences.”
People w ere sorted in the first place into one o f tw o gender categor­
ies, and only then, after-an initial gender attribution w as made, w ere
these displays compared. This technique, as w e h ave stated before,
in vo lves assum ptions that m ilitate against uncovering the gender
attribution process. B y accep ting the fa ct o f tw o genders and p re­
categorizing people as one or the other, the researchers have already
(im plicitly) decided th a t there are differences. G iven their ideas o f
w h a t fem ale and maleTttean, certain differences take on im portance,
w h ile others are seen aa irrelevant. On the one hand, variables m ay
be chosen fo r study because th ey fit the list o f differentiating char­
acteristics w h ich researchers already "k n o w ” men and w om en have
(e.g., "preening” behavior). On the other hand, some cues m ay he
ignored, either because th ey seem so obviou s that th ey are not w orth
studying (e.g., w earing a dress) or becau se th ey are not considered
relevant; that is, they are not part of the social construction o f gen­
der (e.g., the color o f the person’s hair).
Tow ard a Theory ot Gender 157
In order to fu lly understand the role o f non verbal beh aviors in the
gender attribution process, it is n ecessary to understand that the
~ social construction of gender determ ines w h y and h o w w e study cer­
tain phenom ena. Rather than asking people to notice or describe the
typ ical and atyp ical behaviors of their ow n and the other gender
(which, as even B irdw histell notes, can n ev er result in an exhaustive
list), inform ation could be gathered on w hich , if any, nonverbal
behaviors are "conditions o f failu re.” In w h a t non verbal w ay s could
a person b ehave such that her/his gender is questioned? A lth ough
our ow n interests are theoretical, such concrete kn ow ledge has prac­
tical im plications fo r transsexuals and others. If the conditions of
failu re could be described, then people could be any gender they
w an ted to be, at any time. ^
Th e gender attribution process is an interaction b etw een displayer
and attributor, but concrete displays are not inform ative unless in ­
terpreted in light o f the rules w h ich the attributor has for deciding
w h a t it m eans to be a fem ale or m ale. A s m embers o f a sociocultural
group, the displayer and the attributor share a kn ow ledge of the soci­
a lly constructed signs o f gender. T h ey learn these signs as part of
the process o f socialization (becom ing m embers). In our culture
these signs include genitals, secondary gender characteristics, dress
and accessories, and nonverbal and paralinguistic behaviors. A s w e
established in Chapters 2 and 4, these concrete signs o f gender are
n o t necessarily universal, nor are th ey n ecessarily the sam e signs
used b y children.
In learning w h at the signs of gender are, the disp layer can begin
to accentuate them, to aid in creating the gender dichotom y. For
exam ple, as H aviland (1976) has dem onstrated, height of the eyebrow
from the center o f the pupil differs considerably betw een adult
A m erican w om en and men, but is virtu ally identical in m ale and fe ­
m ale infants and youn g children. The difference in adults is ob vi­
ou sly aided, if not caused, b y eyeb row tw eezing and exp ressive style.
A lon g w ith the displayer learning to accentuate certain signs, the
attributor contributes to the accentuation of gender cues b y selective
perception. For exam ple, m embers of our culture m ay look for facial
hair, w hile in other cultures this m ight not he considered som ething
to inspect. In learning to look for facial hair, the attributor perceives
in greater detail signs o f facial hair than w ould be the case i f facial
hair w ere not a cue. Selective perception occurs in m any other con­
texts. Eskim os differentiate various kinds of snow (W horf, 1956);
p eople see m ore or less aggressive b eh avior in a fo o tb all game, de­
pending on w hich side they support (Hastorf and Cantril, 1954).
158 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
A lth o u gh w ithin a p o sitivist fram ew ork it is im portant to deline­
ate specific gender cues and unravel the p rocess in vo lved in learning
to accentuate and se le ctive ly p erceive these cues, doing so glosses
over the deeper structure of the social construction of gender. M em ­
bers do not sim p ly learn rules fo r telling fem ales from m ales. T h ey
learn h o w to use the rules in their relation to the socially shared
w o rld of tw o genders. There is no rule fo r deciding “ m ale” or fe ­
m ale” that w ill alw a ys w ork. M em bers need to know , for exam ple,
w h en to disregard eyeb ro w s and lo o k fo r hand size. G ender attri­
butions are m ade w ithin a particular social context and in relation
to all the routine featu res of everyd ay life (Garfinkel, 1967). A m ong
the m ost im portant o f these features is the b asic trust that events
are w h at th ey appear to be and not perform ances or exam ples of
deceit (unless one is v iew in g a perform ance; in that case the a s­
sum ption is that it is a "re a l” perform ance w h ich carries w ith it
other routine features).
G iven b asic trust regarding gender, su ccessfu lly passing trans­
sexuals, b y virtue of being successful, w ill be im possible to locate
(Sulcov, 1973). To be su ccessfu l in one's gender is to prevent any
doubt that on e’s gender is ob jectively, extern ally real. W e do not
liv e our liv e s searching fo r deceit, and, in fact, cla ssify people w ho
do as paranoid. In contexts w here d eceit regarding gender is made
salient, everyo n e's gender m ay begin to be doubted. For exam ple,
Feinbloom (1976) reports that w hen she speaks on panels that include
“ real" transsexuals, she, presenting h erself as a “ real” wom an, is
som etim es asked if she is a transsexual. The con text in w h ich per­
sons appear reflexively create the p ossib ility or im possibility of
being real or "o n ly ” passing.
If there are no concrete cues that w ill alw ays allow one to make
the “ co rrect” gender attribution, h o w is categorizing a person as
either fem ale or m ale accom plished in each case? O ur answ er, based
on findings o f the o verlay study, reports from transsexuals, and the
treatm ent o f gender in the p ositivist literature, takes the form o f a
categorizing schem a. The schem a is not dependent on any particular
gender cue, nor is it offered as a statem ent o f a rule w h ich people
fo llo w lik e robots. Rather, it is a w a y o f understanding h o w it is that
m em bers of W estern reality can see som eone as either fem ale or
m ale. The schem a is: See somone as fem ale only w hen you cannot
see them as male. E arlier in this chapter w e stated that in order for
a fem ale gender attribution to be m ade, there m ust be an absence of
anything w h ich can be construed as a “ m ale o n ly ” characteristic. In
order fo r a “ m ale” gender attribution to be m ade, the presence of at
Toward a Theory of Gender 159
least one “m ale” sign must be noticed, and one sign m ay be enough,
esp ecially if it is a penis.6 It is rare to see h person that one thinks
is~a man and then w onder if one has m ade*a "m istake.” H ow ever,
it is not uncom m on to w onder if som eone is “ re a lly " a wom an. The
relative ease w ith w hich fem ale-to-m ale transsexu als “ p a ss” as com ­
pared to m ale-to-fem ale transsexuals u nderscores this point. It is
sym bolized b y the m ale-to-fem ale transsexual needing to cover or
rem ove her fa cia l hair in order to be seen as a w om an and the fe ­
m ale-to-m ale transsexual having the option o f grow ing a beard or
being clean shaven. The fem ale m ay not h ave any “ m ale” signs.
T h e schem a, see som eone as fem ale on ly w h en you cannot see
them as male, is not a statem ent o f p ositivist fact. It is not that
“m ale” gender characteristics are sim ply m ore obvious than “ fem ale”
ones or that the presence o f a m ale cue is m ore obviou s than its
absence. The salience of m ale ch aracteristics is a social construc­
tion. W e construct gender so that m ale ch aracteristics are seen as
m ore obvious. It could be otherw ise, but to see that, one m ust sus­
pend b elief in the external reality o f "o b je ctiv e fa c ts .”
To fail to see som eone as a man is to see them as a w om an and
vice versa, since “ m ale" and “ fem ale” are m utually constitutive.
H ow ever, the conditions o f failure are different. The condition of
failure fo r being seen as a w om an is to be seen as h aving a concrete
"m ale” characteristic. The condition o f failure fo r being seen as a
m an is to be seen as not having any concrete “ m ale” characteristics.
In the social construction o f gender “ m ale" is the prim ary construc­
tion.7
GENDER ATTRIBUTION
A S AN HISTORICAL
PROCESS
The gender attribution process is sim ultaneously an ahistorical
and an historical process. It is ahistorical in the sense that w e h ave
been discussing; gender attributions are m ade in the course of a
particular, concrete interaction. It is h istorical in the sense that it
creates and sustains the natural attitude tow ard gender and hence
gender as a perm anent feature. The h istoricity o f gender is consti­
tuted in the course o f interaction. In ongoing interactions, once a
gender attribution has been made, it is no longer n ecessary to keep
“ doing m ale” or “ doing fem ale.” W hat Garfinkel, A gnes, and m any
others h ave failed to recognize is that it is n ot the p articular gender
w h ich m ust be sustained, but rather the sense o f its “ naturalness,”
160 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
the sense th at the actor has a lw a ys been that gender. In sharing the
natural attitude, both actor and attributor can assum e (and each
kn o w s the other assumes] that gender never changes, that people
"re a lly " are w h at th ey appear to be. A s a consequence of holding
the natural attitude, the attributor filters all o f the actor’s behaviors
through the gender attribution that w a s m ade, and the actor’s b e­
h aviors are m ade sense o f w ithin th at context. A s w e have illu s­
trated in C hapter 5, alm ost nothing can discredit a gender attribution
once it is m ade. E ven the loss o f the original criteria used to m ake
the attribution m ight w e ll becom e irrelevant. T h e m an m ight shave
his beard; the w om an m ight h ave a m astectom y. T h e gender attribu­
tion w ill not change, though, m erely b ecau se these signs no longer
exist.
S in ce discrediting gender attributions is a m atter o f discrediting
naturalness, this can oiily occur over time through a violation of the
gender invariance rulei The person m ust create a sense of having
"ch an ged ” genders. She/he m ust vio late the naturalness o f the
gender {i.e., its historicity) b efo re discrediting occurs and a new
gender attribution is m ade. E ven then, a discrediting of the original
gender attribution w ill not n ecessarily occur. G ender attributions are
so im pervious to change that the person w ill be seen as “ c ra zy ” long
b efo re she/he is seen as being the other gender. F or this reason,
transsexu als find it m ost difficult to be seen as their “ n e w ” gender
b y those people w h o m ade their acquaintance in their "origin al”
gender. T h e first im pression w ill not dissipate for a lon g tim e (Fein-
bloom , 1976). If, h ow ever, the first im pression is m ade w hen the
transsexual is in his/her “ n e w " gender, it w ill be m ost difficult to
d iscred it that attribution, regardless of the inform ation given to the
attributor. W e h ave had transsexuals lectu re in classroom s and h ave
had students question the auth en ticity o f the lecturers' transsexual­
ism. Th ese students w ere unable, after a conscious search, to sp ecify
an y cues that w ould unqualifiedly cla ssify the transsexuals' gender
as other than that w h ich they appeared to be. The kn ow ledge that
th ese p eop le had adm ittedly been assigned the other gender at birth
and had liv ed 30 years as that gender becam e problem atic for the
students (and fascinating to us] becau se that inform ation b y itself
could not be used to discred it the gender attribution.
If transsexu als understood these featu res o f discrediting th ey
w o u ld [1] fo cu s on creating d ecisive first im pressions as m ale or
fem ale and (2] then stop w orryin g about being the p erfect man or
w om an and concentrate on cultivating the naturalness (i.e., the h is­
toricity) o f their m aleness or fem aleness.
Toward a Theory of Gender 161
Just as any concrete cue can be cited as a reason for m aking a
gender attribution, once an attribution has been discredited, anything
concrete can b e u sed as a “ good reason ” fo r the discrediting. "I
k n e w she w as ‘r e a lly ’ a w om an because o f her slight b uild.” In the
case o f discrediting, just as in the case o f original attributions, the
“good reaso n s” given are n ot n ecessarily the cues u sed during the
process.
T h e reason that “ norm als" do n o t w a lk around questioning the
gender attributions they m ake or w ondering w h eth er people w ill see
them as th ey “ re a lly ” are, is not because gender is a given, but be­
cause gender invarian ce is an incorrigible proposition. Rather than
violatin g invariance, people use w h at m ight be seen as discrediting
inform ation to reflexively support this proposition. “ 1 know«.that
Greta has a penis, but that’s irrelevant, since sh e's re a lly a w om an.”
A ll o f us, transsexuals and “ norm als” alike, are in as little or as
m uch danger o f not being able to b e seen as w h a t w e "re a lly ” are.
It is our m ethod of applying inform ation w h ich m aintains our gen­
der, n ot som e intrinsic quality o f our gender, itself.
GENDER DIMORPHISM:
THE PROCESS AND
IT S IMPLICATIONS
O nce a gender attribution is made, the dichotom ization process
is set into m otion. T h e cues in volved in the schem a w h ich led to the
attribution are seen as connected w ith a m yriad o f other cues w hich
are consequen tly also attributed to the person. A ll o f these cues
taken together, or any o f them separately, can then b e u sed as
reasons for having m ade the attribution in the first place. For exam ­
ple, people m ight decide that som eone is m ale partly because they
notice the presence o f a beard w h ich is a so cia lly constructed "m ale”
cue. If asked, “H ow do yo u kn ow the person is m ale?” the attributor
m ight answ er, "B ecause he had n arrow hips, a beard, and he w alked
like a m an.” T h e attributor m ay not have originally noticed the
oth er’s hips or w alk, and in term s o f a m easurable distribution, the
other m ight not have narrow hips or a “ m asculine” kind o f w alk.
Since the other has been dichotom ously placed into the gender cate­
gory “m ale,” and since the attributor “ k n o w s" that men h ave nar­
row er hips than w om en and w alk in a d istin ctive w ay , these features
com e to be seen as having been im portant in the attribution (see, e.g.,
S e a v e y et al., 1975). T h e y are important, h ow ever, only because o f
162 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
the w a y w e construct fem ale and m ale as dichotom ous, non overlap ­
ping categories w ith m ale characteristics generally constructed to
be m ore obvious.
It has becom e in creasin gly acceptable to assert that the d ich oto­
m ous beh aviors w h ich w e attribute to the tw o genders (i.e., gender
roles) are not necessarily the w a y w om en and m en actually behave.
Th ere is grow ing evidence that the genders behave in v e ry sim ilar
w a y s; and y e t m any people continue to m ake differential attribu­
tions o f m otives and b ehaviors, and to interpret beh avior and its
consequences in a dichotom ous w ay , depending on w hether the
acto r is fem ale or m ale (e.g., D eaux, 1976; Rubin et al., 1974). D icho­
tom ous gender role behaviors are o verlayed on dichotom ous gender
w h ich has traditionally m eant tw o dim orp h ically distinct biological
sexes. In the same w a y that beh avior is dichotom ized and overlayed
on form , form is dichotom ized and overlayed on social construction.
G iven a constitutive b e lie f in tw o genders, form is dichotom ized in
the process o f gender attribution at le a st as m uch as beh avior is. A s
a resu lt w e end up w ith tw o genders, at least as different p h ysica lly
as th ey h ave been traditionally thought to be beh aviorally.
T he social construction o f gender qnd the gender attribution pro­
cess are a part of reality construction. No m em ber is exem pt, and
this construction is the grounding fo r all scientific w o rk on gender.
T h e natural attitude tow ard gender and the every d a y p rocess of
gender attribution are constructions w h ich scien tists bring w ith
them w h en they enter laboratories to “ d isco v er” gender character­
istics. Gender, as w e h ave described it, consists of m em bers’ m eth­
ods for attributing and constructing gender. Part o f m em bers’ con­
struction in volves seeing gender as consisting of, and being grounded
in, o b jective biological characteristics. O ur reality is constructed in
such a w a y that b io lo gy is seen as the ultim ate truth. This is, of
course, not necessary. In other realities, for exam ple, deities replace
b io lo g y as the ultim ate source o f final truth. W h at is difficult to see,
h ow ever, is that b iology is no closer to the truth, in any absolute
sense, than a deity; nor is the reality w h ich w e h av e been presenting.
W hat is different among different w a y s of seeing the w o rld are the
p ossibilities stem m ing from basic assum ptions about the w a y the
w o rld w orks. W hat m ust be taken fo r granted (and w h at need not
be) changes depending on the incorrigible propositions one holds.
The questions that should be asked and h o w th ey can be answ ered
also differ depending on the reality. W e h av e tried to show , through­
out this book, h ow w e can give grounds fo r w h a t biologists and
social scientists do, and h o w the every d a y process o f gender attri­
Toward a Theory of Gender X63
bution is prim ary. Scientists construct dim ophism w here there is
continuity. H orm ones, behavior, p h ysica l characteristics, d evelop ­
m ental processes, chrom osom es, p sych o lo g ica l q ualities h ave all
been fitted into gender dichotom ous categories. Scientific know ledge
does not in form the answ er to “W h a t m akes a p erson either a m an
or a w om an?” Rather it justifies (and appears to give grounds for)
the already existin g kn ow ledge that a person is either a w om an or
a man and that there is no problem in differentiating b etw een the
tw o. Biological, psych ological, and social differences do n ot lead to
our seeing tw o genders. Our seeing o f tw o genders leads to the
“ d isco v e ry ” o f biological, psych ological, and social differences.
In essence w e are proposing a paradigm change in the w a y gen­
der is view ed, a sh ift to seeing gender attribution as p rim ary and
gender as a p ractical accom plishm ent. In the rem ainder o f this
chapter w e outline som e o f the th eoretical and p ractical im plica­
tions o f such a shift.
One consequence o f the sh ift is a n ew fo cu s fo r research. Instead
of concentrating on the results of seeing som eone as fem ale or m ale
(“ sex difference” research), scientists can begin to u n cover factors
in the gender attribution process. W e h ave offered som e suggestions
on h o w this can be done, and w ill end the b ook w ith a fe w more.
H ow ever, unless this research is undertaken w ith a concurrent
acceptance o f the proposition that gender is a social construction,
there w ill not be, and cannot be, any rad ical changes in either h ow
science is done or in h o w gender is v ie w e d in e v e ry d a y life.
M an y o f those concerned w ith sexism and the position o f w om en
in so ciety h ave suggested that w h a t is need ed is a change in the con­
cept of, or even the elim ination of, gender roles. T h e assertion is
that, even though the genders are p h y sica lly dim orphic, excep t fo r
a fe w biological differences related to reproduction, there is no
n ecessary reason fo r any sort o f differentiation. Rubin (1975) has
w ritten an excellen t article, taking a strong position on this. She sees
gender as a product o f social organization, as the p rocess b y w hich
“ m ales” and "fem a les” (the tw o sexes) becom e transform ed into
“ m en” and "w o m en ” (the two genders). H er analysis dem onstrates
the p ossib ility o f "th e elim ination o f ob ligatory sexu alities and
sex roles, . . . o f an androgynous and genderless (though not sex ­
less) so c ie ty " (p. 204). Rubin's analysis o f gender, w h ile com patible
w ith ours, still is grounded in, and takes fo r granted, the objective
reality o f tw o b iological "se x e s .” S u ch a position does not question
the fa cticity o f tw o genders, as w e m ean “ gender.” A n “ androgynous
so ciety ," b y definition, retains the m ale/fem ale dichotom y b y agree-
104 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
in g to ignore it. B ecau se accepting the fa c tic ity of tw o genders (or
sexes; the form er includes the latter) m eans accepting the assum p­
tions w h ich ground the gender attribution p rocess, a "sim p le” elim ­
ination of gender role w ill not change w h a t it m eans to be fem ale or
m ale. The social construction of gender revealed through the gender
attribution process creates and sustains androcentric reality. "M ale"
characteristics are constructed as m ore obvious; a person is fem ale
only in the absence o f "m ale1' signs; there is a b ias tow ard m aking
a m ale gender attribution. In the p ro cess o f attributing "m ale" or
"fem ale," dichotomous; p h ysical differences are constructed, and
once a p h ysical dichotqm y has been constructed it is alm ost im pos­
sible to elim inate sociological and p sych ological dichotom ies. G iven
that the p h ysical dichotom y is androcentric, it is inevitable that the
so cial one is also.
W h en ever science has offered evidence o f a biological continuum ,
but everyd ay members: insist (because of the w a y reality is con­
structed) that there are,discrete categories, there h ave been attem pts
to legislate against the continuum . L aw s in the U nited States on
w h a t constituted a “ N egro" and la w s in N azi G erm any on w h a t con ­
stituted a Jew are tw o q f the m ost obvious exam ples. These law s did
not reject biology, sincp b io lo gy is a cru cial part of the construction
o f W estern reality, butjjused biology. R ace w a s seen as grounded in
the am ount o f biological m atter (“ blood ,” or genetic m aterial) of a
certain type w ithin a hum an body. Rulings in sports (see C hapter 3)
w h ich legislate a person’s gender are n o t v e ry different from such
law s. A s scientists find fe w e r biological, psych ological, and social
dichotom ies and more b iological, psych ological, and social continua,
it is n ot im possible that legislators w ill attem pt to le g a lly define
"fe m a le ” and “ m ale,” rather than relying on specific judicial rulings.
A s long as the categories “ fem ale” and “m ale” p resen t them selves
to people in everyd ay life as external, o b jective, dichotom ous, p h ysi­
cal facts, there w ill be scientific and n aive searches for differences,
and differences w ill be found. W h ere there are dichotom ies it is
difficult to avoid evaluating one in relation to the other, a firm fou n ­
dation fo r discrim ination and oppression. U nless and until gender, in
a ll o f its m anifestations in clu din g the physical, is seen as a social
construction, action that w ill rad ically change our incorrigible propo­
sitions cannot occur. People m ust be confron ted w ith the reality o f
other possibilities, as w e ll as the p o ssib ility o f other realities.
Scientific studies o f gender are ultim ately grounded in the b io­
lo gical im perative o f reproduction. D im orphism is seen as n ecessary
Toward a Theory of Gender I 65
fo r sperm and egg cell carriers to id en tify one another. M an y o f
those w ho argue against the blurring of gender roles, against an­
drogyny, against the claim of transsexuals to be a different gender,
base their arguments on this "b iological im p erative.” One extrem e
form o f the argum ent is that if there are not clear roles, functions,
and appearances, people w ill not develop “ h e alth y ” gender identi­
ties, no one w ill kn ow h o w to, or w an t to, reproduce, and the species
w ill becom e extinct.
The m ajor prem ise of such arguments is that “ m ale” and “ fem ale”
are the sam e as "sperm carrier” and “ egg carrier.” H ow ever, w hat
w e have been dem onstrating throughout this b ook is that th ey are
not. “ M ale” and “ fem ale” are grounded in the gender attribution
process and are social constructions. T h e y are m ore encom passing
categories than sperm and egg carrier. N ot all egg carriers are fem ale
and not all fem ales are egg carriers; not all sperm carriers are male,
nor are all m ales sperm carriers.
The only requirem ent for the "b iological im p erative” of reproduc­
tion is th at sperm and egg carriers m ust be identifiable to each other
fo r reproductive purposes. H ow ever, not every hum an being can
reproduce, nor does every hum an being w ho carries reproductive
cells w an t to reproduce. Reproduction is not even a p ossib ility for
hum an beings throughout m uch o f their life cycles. Sperm cell car­
riers are rarely youn ger than thirteen or fourteen, and p robably
h av e an increasing num ber o f d efective sperm cells as they grow
older (Evans, 1976). Egg cell carriers are u su ally no youn ger than
eleven or tw elve, and can reproduce fo r only a fe w days each
m onth fo r 30 to 40 years, w h ich totals perhaps 3V2 years over their
life span w hen they could be identifiable as capable o f reproduction.
Thus, for all people, reproduction is not a continuous fact o f life.
In addition, technologies like artificial insem ination, the develop ­
m ent o f techniques fo r ovarian and uterine transplants, and genetic
engineering m ay, in the future, change our ideas o f w h a t the “ bio-
logicol im p erative” for reproduction is.
T h e argument that certain "suitable sex differences” or stable
secondary gender characteristics are n ecessary in order to m ake a
differentiation betw een egg and sperm carriers is not an argum ent for
the b iological im perative. Rather, it is an arum ent for the m ainten­
ance o f gender. Such argum ents are based on the social construction
o f gender, o f being fem ale and male, w h ich is m uch m ore than
reproduction and, in fact, has little to do w ith reproduction. G en­
der, in science and in everyd ay life, is constructed to be dichotom ous
not only from birth, but even after death. A w om an w ho dies re-
166 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
m ains a w om an forever. If there w ere cultures w hose dead becam e
neuter, then this w ou ld suggest very different ideas about gender.
There are alternative w ay s w e can begin to think about gender,
n ew constructions fo r w h ich "gender" is p robably not even the m ost
appropriate w ord. Som e people, at some points in their lives, m ight
w ish to be identified as sperm or egg cell carriers. E xcept for those
times, there need be no differentiation among people on an y of the
dichotom ies w h ich gender im plies. B ecause the reproductive dich o­
tom y w ou ld not be constituted as a lifetim e dichotom yi it w ou ld not
be an essential characteristic o f people. E ven the reproductive
dichotom y m ight som eday be elim inated through technology. No
technological developm ent related to reproduction, h ow ever, is
n ecessary in order fo r a n ew social construction to appear.
O ur description o f this alternative p o ssib ility is not m eant to be
read as a prescription fo r a n ew social order, but as a theoretical
"blu ep rin t.” Perhaps som e readers w ill feel that w e are describing
m yth or science fiction (see LeGuin, 1969, 1976). Th at is not our
purpose here either, although both m yth and theory serve im portant
functions. It w ould be naive to assum e that any statem ent o f alterna­
tives could, b y fiat, change the w a y m em bers v ie w reality. W e do not
exp ect that there w ill develop a w hole n ew social construction of
gender in everyd ay life. W hat w e are arguing is that the w orld w e
h av e n o w is no m ore or less "re a l” than any alternative. W hat w e
are dem onstrating is that through our theoretical fram ew ork ex cit­
ing alternative possibilities fo r understanding the m eaning of gender
present them selves.8
A s w e h ave reexam ined the literature on gender, and as w e have
an alyzed the data w e collected on the gender attribution process,
w e h ave becom e convinced o f an intriguing p ossibility. The process
o f gender attribution (deciding w h eth er som e one is fem ale or male)
and the resultant gender identification (assigning the label “ fem ale”
or “ m ale” ) m ay not be the sam e thing as “ gender” 0 differentiation—
kn ow in g w hether the other is sim ilar or different from oneself, per­
haps in term s o f som e basic reprod uctive criteria.
A lth ou gh children are not 100 percent accurate in assigning gen­
der labels until th ey are four or five, and although th ey cannot give
"good reason s” for their identifications until they are som ew hat
older (see Chapter 4), Lew is and W eintraub (1974) reported that
infants, before they are a year old, can m ake som e kind of differ­
entiation betw een “ fem ales" and “ m ales." M ale infants looked at
pictures of other m ale infants longer than at pictures o f fem ale
infants, and the reverse w as true fo r fem ale infants. W hat is most
Toward a Theory of Gender 167
interesting about this study is that L ew is reports (Friedm an et ah,
1974, p. 191) that adults could not m ake accurate gender attributions
te the pictures w hich the infants differentiated. The adults could not
say, b eyon d a chance level, w hether an in fan t pictured w as fem ale
or m ale. Lew is, h ow ever, did not report w h eth er the adults could
differentiate in the same w a y the infants did, that is, on the basis
o f length o f eye contact w ith the picture.
L ew is term s w h a t the infants did "gender differentiation.” Both
K ohlberg and G reen (Friedman et al., 1974, pp. 192-193) assert that
the in fan ts’ beh avior has nothing to do w ith gender and that it is
“m erely” a self-o th e r distinction, since the infants w ere too youn g to
h ave gender identities and/or gender concepts. W e agree. G ender
attribution and gender identification are not p ossible b efore theJLndi-
vidu al shares m em bers’ m ethods fo r seeing and doing gender. It is
possible, h ow ever, that infants can m ake “ gender” differentiations
— the differentiation n ecessary for the “ biological im perative" o f re­
production— a process very different from gender attribution.
W ere the infants using cues that adults could not p erceive? Their
b eh avior seem s to be related to our finding in the children's draw ­
ings study (see C hapter 4) that presch oolers w ere better at determ in­
ing the “ gender” o f the other p resch oolers’ draw ings than any other
age group. It is also interesting that several transsexu als h ave m en­
tioned to us that they h ave the m ost difficulty “p assin g ” w ith young
children. Is it possible that there is som e ability w h ich hum an beings
h ave to differentiate sperm and egg cell carriers w h ic h is then over-
lay ed and superceded by learned m em bers’ m ethods fo r construct­
ing gender? O b viou sly a great deal m ore research on infan t and
ch ildren’s gender attribution and “ gender” differentiation processes
is needed, as w ell as research on h o w these p rocesses change over
time. It is also im portant to kn ow m ore about non verbal (e.g., eye
contact) indicators of “ gender” differentiation in adults.
It has becom e clear to us that w ithin the paradigm o f contem por­
ary scien ce w e cannot kn ow all that can even tu ally be uncovered
about w h a t it m eans to be a w om an or a man. A ll kn ow ledge is now
grounded in the everyd ay social construction o f a w o rld of tw o
genders w here gender attribution, rather than “ gender” differentia­
tion, is w h at concerns those w ho fear change. W ith the courage to
confront, understand, and redefine our incorrigible propositions, w e
can begin to discover n ew scientific kn ow ledge and to construct n ew
realities in everyd ay life.
168 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach Toward a Theory of Gender 169

NOTES data suggests w hy the female-to-male transsexual is not as overtly

1. This is the method (Garfinkel, 1967) by which members decide
meanings and assemble ajbody of knowledge on the basis of documentary
evidence. In Garfinkel's demonstration with a “rigged” question and
answer format, he showed how, in searching for patterns, members make
sense of incomplete, inappropriate, and contradictory material, and
how they hear such answers as answers to their questions.
2. This was the one case where we found a difference between our
female and male participants. Twenty-eight percent of the male
participants said “male” when the figure had a vagina, but 43 percent of
the female participants said “male.” W hy should the presence of at least
one male cue in the context of a vagina be more salient to women
than to men when they are constructing gender? If constructing
"fem aleness” requires an absence of “m ale” cues, perhaps those who
have been so constructed (“w om en”) are more sensitive to violations.
Our sample of 960 participants was selected from those who happened
to be on the campuses of eight of the colleges and universities in the
New York Metropolitan area on the days the data was collected. It is
concerned with obtaining a penis as the male-to-female transsexual
is.with getting the penis removed.
6. Freud was right about the "obvious superiority” of the penis.
However, he considered the emphasis on the penis as an inevitable
psychological consequence of its objective reality. We are treating the
belief in the penis' objective reality as problematic. Those who read Freud
as being concerned with (socially real) phalluses, rather than (physically
real) penises, see psychoanalytic theory as being grounded in meanings
that come very close to our schema for differentiating females from males:
“ The alternative (is) between having, or not having, the phallus. Castration
is not a real ‘lack’ but a meaning conferred upon the genitals of a
woman. . .. The presence or absence of the phallus carries the difference
between the two sexual statuses, 'man' and 'woman' " (Rubin, 1975, p&191).
7. Several features of psychological and biological research and theory
on gender seem to have an intriguing relationship to this schema. The
specifics of the relationship are unknown and open to speculation, but
these features include the precariousness of the development of a male
gender identity and male gender role behaviors (as opposed to female),

3
possible that a sample of feminists would have placed more
the prevalence of theories of male gender development which cannot
emphasis on the reality of the vagina.
explain female gender development, and the scientific fact that,
. Even when participants were asked to judge a nude figure with no

8
beginning with conception, something (genes, hormones) must be
genitals, they more often responded “male.” In addition to the ninety-six added at every step to make the fetus male.
conditions already mentioned, we had sixteen “no-genital” conditions.
. The major dilemma of the ethnomethodologist is the problem of
We expected that “female” gender attributions would predominate, since
infinite regress. If we assert that reality is a social construction, w hy stop
the drawings would approximate what some have called the "hidden”
at gender as a social construction? Why not assert that “ sperm carriers”
female genitals. In fact, though, 58 percent of the participants labeled the
and “egg carriers” are as much of a construction as “male” or "female” ?
figure "male.” The "male” cues (short hair, narrow hips, body hair,
We all have to make a decision to take something for granted, to stop
flat chest) were obviously impossible to ignore.
somewhere; otherwise it would be impossible to get out of bed in the
4. In order to partially check the validity of using a drawing, we morning. Our decision has been to stop here; Others may wish to go on.
replicated this condition ppenis, breasts, hips, long hair, no body hair) using (See Mehan and Wood (1975) for a discussion of this problem and an
a photograph of an actual person (taken from a popular "sex” magazine). explanation of what Garfinkel (1966) meant when he said
The findings for the photograph were almost identical to the findings “Ethnomethodologists know ‘tsouris.’ ”)
for the drawing. Six participants identified the model as male and four as
9. We have used "gender” as a modifier because no other word exists
female. At least one half bf the participants had low certainty scores. In
to convey our meaning. However, we have set it in quotation marks to
addition, we showed ten participants a photograph of the same model with
differentiate it from gender, as the term has been used throughout
the penis hidden and pubib hair showing so that it looked like there
the book— the socially constructed, dichotomous categories of "male"
might have been a vagina.! Thus, we were able to closely replicate the
and "female” with all their layers of implications.
condition: vagina, breasts,*hips, no body hair, long hair. Again, the findings
for the photograph were very similar to our overplay results. Eight
participants identified the figure in the photograph as female.
5. Newton (1972) notes-that the most amateur mistake a female
impersonator can make is to fail to conceal the “ telltale” bulge of the penis.
Apparently that error is considered damaging enough to destroy the
illusion of femaleness. This piece of evidence in conjunction with our
APPENDIX

LETTERS FROM RACHEL

T h e fo llo w in g letters w ere w ritten over a tw o -yea r period b y a

m ale-to-fem ale transsexual nam ed R achel. W e first m et R achel in
1975 and began corresponding w ith her sh ortly thereafter. A t the
tim e w e met, R achel w as 27 years old and a graduate student in
b iology at a u n iversity in the southw est. She had begun estrogen
th erap y and electrolysis, but had not y e t undergone any surgery.
W hen w e m et R achel she w as still livin g as Paul, a m ale. O ur first
im pression o f her w as of a v e ry fem inine (but not effem inate) male.
B ecause she kn ew of our p rofession al interest in transsexualism ,
she told us she w as a transsexual. Paul looked so an drogyn ous that
at first w e w ere not certain w h eth er this person w as a m ale-to-fem ale
transsexual or a fem ale-to-m ale. O ur thinking o f h er at those first
encounters as a m ale w as based m ore on w h a t she told us about her
p resen t situation (e.g., that her nam e w as Paul and that she had not
begun livin g as a wom an) than on her p h ysica l presentation w hich,
b y itself, did not com pel either a m ale or fem ale gender attribution.
The letters w e h ave included here are not a com plete account of
R a ch el’s life during the years w h en she m ade the transition from
Paul to Rachel. A d d ition al inform ation about her life w as conveyed
in phone calls and during visits. A lso , there is ob viou sly m aterial
that R achel chose not to share w ith us, and consequen tly there m ay
be areas about w h ich the reader w ill h ave unansw ered questions.
W e h ave edited the letters, changing the details that w ou ld disclose
too m uch of R ach el’s identity and deleting redundant m aterial and
com m ents that w ere not directly relevan t to the purpose o f the
A p pen dix, w h ich is to provide an extended exam ple o f the social
construction o f gender. "
W hen w e decided to include this A p p en d ix as part of the book,
w e asked R achel if she w ould reread her letters and com m ent on her
feelin gs as she looked b ack at h erself o ve r the last tw o years. She
w rote a brief autobiography and also her reactions to some o f the
things she discussed in her letters. F ollow in g the letters, w e have
included excerpts from her retrosp ective account. The final part of
the A p p en d ix consists o f our analysis o f the w a y s R achel has b e­
com e a w om an.

171
172 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
(1) W inter, 1975
I just got your second letter and was really very disappointed to hear
that you didn’t even get my first letter for a variety of reasons. . . . The
letter was handwritten and was seven pages long—a tome. The other
reason that I was disappointed is that it included photos you requested,
that meant quite a lot to me. They were the only ones that existed and
I did want them back. I’m sure that the letter will be reconstructed
when we get together. I’m very much looking forward to it. I have been
writing another letter to you and interrupted it to write this
in order to be able to make a quick reply.
I agree about the name Monique. I didn’t come up with that name.
The woman to whom I was engaged to at one time, who is still a special
and undefinable friend offered that name because she wanted it to be a
name that she had never run into before. I have long been conscious
that it probably does have a little too much flash and glitter. But I don’t
like Monica. That’s a little wicked. Other friends like Rachel. It seems
to fit. I appreciate your feedback which is honest and straight off the hip.
Although it's painful, it’s also the most needed. In my next letter I will
briefly unfold the details of my recent trip to Dallas where some
important firsts, albeit small ones, occurred. But I’m beginning to see
that this whole thing or process is a series of small steps. The other day
in the lab when I am asrstraight as I ever get I met a woman and
conversed with her for ia long time. She assumed that I was a woman
until someone called m l Paul. It really blew her mind. Other interesting
events have been happening like that.
It appears that I may be among the ranks of the unemployed soon.
The company I have worked for is cutting back. Part time people are the
first to go. I will do everything possible not to let this interfere with
my trip to N.Y.
About my dissertation. Tentatively good news! The event that I
related to you (on the phone) was a real blessing in disguise. Rather
than do that group all over again, I talked it over with my adviser and
convinced him that part of the study wasn’t necessary anyway. And got
him to agree. So my dissertation has been cut in half. It seems much
more finite now. I have set Dec. as the time I will get out and hopefully
make the big transition. I’m really excited. This week I’m working on
my proposal which is only two years overdue. I hope to get it in first
thing next quarter and take prelims by the end of the quarter. I also
have been looking over the works of my forerunners and am much
encouraged. Some real junk has been put down on paper
in pursuit of Ph.D.’s. Poor trees!
I hope that my first letter gets back to me. I did return address it.
Please take care. . . . Would I be wearing out my welcome if I came and
stayed from one weekend to the next? My schedule is completely
flexible, My finances will be anywhere from good to bad depending on
Appendix 173
my job situation. Oh the ravages of uncertainty. At least I don’t have
to worry about being drafted.
If I get a Watts line at work I’ll call.
Oh yes, one more question? What’s the weather going to be like in
N.Y.? You might tell me what to pack. My wardrobe is not extensive.
But it’s nice. In my first letter I commented that one of my big conflicts
was between my liberated self and wearing some really traditional
clothes that I feel like I have been deprived of for so long. Eventually
after I am thoroughly entrenched in the role, I’m sure that a liberated
unisex thing will be my motif, but right now I still have some things to
get over. I grant you full license to give me as much guidance as you see
fit. Somehow I don’t think that the license need be granted.
Some of your comments have really helped.
Take care. Hurry and reply so I can make plans around yours. Until
then, and unless I get another name change. By the way is Rachel aH
that bad? Or is it more of the same. Let me know with both barrels
if you think not. I have to nix Monica.
In sisterhood,
Rachel
(2) One week later (responding to a set of questions we sent her)
Hi.
I’ve been trying to find time to sit down and answer your
questionnaire. In doing this I can answer the questions and perhaps
make comments on the questions themselves.
Before I do, though, I wanted to tell you about some of the nicer
things that are happening to me at least historically. Last weekend I
visited some friends in Dallas. It seems that everywhere I go there are
things to learn and especially nice people to meet. A notable feature
of this trip was that I got to be Rachel (which they preferred to Monique)
for the duration of the trip. One of many small milestones. Another
tiny one was that I fought back the compulsion to wear a dress at least
one day and wore a pants suit. This is more in keeping with the liberated
image I have of myself. A third and most important thing I think was
that I met people as Rachel, who had never heard of Paul or TS and
who never knew that there was anything out of the ordinary about my
womanhood. It was all very nice. Woman to woman communications are
different than male-male and male-female communications. It was
refreshing in a very vital dimension reminiscent of the old science
fiction where the protagonists were just running out of oxygen and
174 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
suddenly a fresh new supply is found or generated in the nick of time.
I met some neat every day people. Where I stayed, there was a sort of a
little community where everyone w as very close and were really with
one another. I really liked it. There are so many attractive things
in life and so little time. Que es la vida.
Let’s see, the questionnaire. Do I think of m yself as a woman or a TS?
In one respect I think of m yself as a woman or many respects,
increasingly more all the time in fact. I also see m yself as having been
latent in the old sense that the analytical schools see homosexuals.
I am "becoming” in the Rogerian sense if that says anything. I don’t
naturally identify m yself as a TS, only w hen a very unliberated
interaction spells out “I won't buy your act— I w on’t let you be a
woman.” My response is that “OK, then I am a TS in the
process of becoming a wom an.”
What does it mean to be a woman or a man? It initially begins with
where your head is, with your own identity, then internalizing, and
reflecting those things that are consistent w ith that identity, and acting
upon the world in w ays that are consistent with those identifications.
That’s an ideal definition. Generally all the identifying and role playing
is done for us, as w e are socialized. A more personal answer, which is
what you ’re after, is that the roles are very different. The masculine
role in our culture is typified in isolation through competition, stoicism,
aggression, etc. The feminine role is different and makes more sense
for me; it has been described {I agree with these) as being more tribal
and more together; there is a sisterhood where the male role is
antithetical to there being any brotherhood. Women have by far the
upper hand in sociofacilitative skills. That seem s to be very
important to me.
H ow does anyone know they are a woman? Most people that know
they are women are fortunate in that they were born as little girls.
I w asn’t. I do not know that I am a woman. But then again being
interested in epistemology I don't know anything. I w ill say that I feel
that I experience things more the w ay w om en do than men do. I am also
more comfortable existing with expectations that our society makes of
fem ales than I am with male expectations. I feel more real as a female
than I do as a male. Another thought— I’m sure that a lot of naturally
born wom en define them selves as women because they aren’t men.
In this world of hard core two genderism, to borrow Margo’s
terminology, if a person's sex and gender is coincident, all is well.
However if there is conflict, the result is a w hole lot of dissonance that
must be reduced. In evaluating oneself, a TS may come to see
figuratively that she is leaving a prescribed gender for one that is
better suited to her. Now then there are only two in our society. And
I’m sure that if a person rejects one gender one must come to feel that
they must be of the other. But it seem s to me that this is only part of the
process and is certainly not the core or heart of the issue as Green
Appendix 175
seem s to think. He has m issed taking into account the strength or
striving and approach that a person show s when making the transition.
If things were as the hypothesis suggests then the TS paradigm would
be basically an avoidance paradigm. There are strong elements of this in
transsexuals. It is very painful for people to include me in the world of
males. But it does me a gross injustice to say that my behavior, my
really positive striving as I see it is due to my not wanting to be male
identified. You’ll remember the classic self report of the little TS boys
saying that they wanted to be little girls ever since they can remember.
I don't recall them saying, ”1 didn’t want to be a little boy,” but rather,
"I want to be a girl.” I remember this very cl.early. I really wanted to be
like my sister and her little girl friends. It seem ed like a very cruel joke
that I w asn’t. As I see explaining the m otivation of gravitating toward
fem ininity because of one rejecting a masculine identity and then seeing
only one alternative is basically an avoidance response.
I really don’t feel like that’s w hat’s happening.
There are two sets of acquaintances, not friends, that do not know
that I am a TS. The first are those people at work where it would be
much less than prudent to make the disclosure. Hmm, now that I think
about it they are about the only ones who don't know and who know me
as a male. The other set knows me only as Rachel. By the w ay I wrote
you the letter at this point, I'm really sorry you didn't get m y first one. I
haven't had extensive experience with those people who know me only
as Rachel. (Gee I hope you two don’t dislike that name too—but if
you do please let me know.) Those people are heterosexuals who have
pretty cool heads and seem to be quite liberated and comfortable with
them selves. It's interesting the dimensions that a person picks to
describe people when the question is open ended.
H ow do I decide to tell someone? I’m most comfortable around people
when I can truly be myself. I can’t be me when people are making male
assumptions about me. To do so makes me uncomfortable, and they are
not really relating to the real me. I can expand this and pin it down for
you a little better. Males relate on the basis of charisma and bravado,
in general, Meaningful interpersonal exchanges are made by
rare males and by women much more often.
The w ay that I tell them varies, depending on how long I have known
them, the extent of our mutual investm ent in each other, the nature of
the commonalities in our relationship and, earlier, status differentials
were important, but very much less so now. A s of late I guess the way
that I told you was typical. Although I don't think I needed to tell
you. I had a strong feeling that you two knew.
I think perhaps there are slight differences in my behavior with
people who know me as a woman and those people who know me only
as a TS. Those differences come from my feeling more comfortable
with m yself and feeling more authentic w hen they don’t know. When
people know I'm a TS they monitor my authenticity and I am aware of
176 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
it. People expect ajjjrs to adhere more rigidly to the traditional stereotype
and set up pass/fail scales in their heads. I've watched people watch
me do things like t§ke my shoes off, etc. and heard them comment on
how femininely rdid it. Yet one would not watch a gender consonant
woman take her shoes off and if she deviated from “being feminine”
while doing it—sojwhat?
I am the woman that I am seen as being. I ask only that people grant
me that.
I know that I am “passing” (I don’t like that word. It isn’t appropriate
to TS’s really, as you know it’s borrowed from TV’s, but for lack of a
better one .. . ) when no one pays too much attention to me in public.
When I am being scrutinized carefully would be an indication that
something is amiss.
I deliberately softened some of my gestures and smoothed my walk a
bit. Actually, losing 40 lbs. of bulk meant that I had to deal with the
world in a very different way. A store’s glass door is something to be
negotiated with now rather than brushed aside. But so many things
came naturally. And my acquisition seemed to be one trial learning,
in doing a lot of things.
No one taught me anything.
Convincing other people hasn’t been difficult or in any way a discrete
task. Nor has it been a main objective, in that, well, life wouldn’t be
really livable if my main fears and worries were—gee, am I going to
pass? There are lots of everyday women who are much further away
from the traditional female stereotype than I and we never question
their femininity or womanhood at least.
I have seen women or people trying to pass who after scrutiny
turned out to be majles. Not having conversed with them I don't know
what their thing was. It was in the French quarter in New Orleans and
I was out walking around and suddenly I became especially aware of a
woman who was walking at a much faster than normal rate. Her rate
of travel was what gave her away. It was at night so it took me a while
to notice that she had on a rather improbable red wig. But not
even it was aberrant in the French Quarter.
If I looked very Masculine and could change only one thing . . .
I w ould change my tenure here on earth. It would depend on what was
making me look masculine really. That’s a hard question to answer.
If I were counseling other TS’s I would tell them that the biggest
danger is overstatement. To gravitate toward the mean in all possible
dimensions and not to call attention to themselves. That there is much
more to being a woman than physical appearance and to always
remember that.
All TS’s do not Want unusually big breasts. I don't. To answer your
question, I would have to say first possibly because they have gone a
long time without any at all. More importantly because breasts are the
most overt of discriminators because of their association with femininity
Appendix 177
and because they are unique to the female 52% of the world. Possible
sexual reasons are that breasts are important in the male
- interpretation of femininity.
Up to now I have made no errors that I have regretted. I haven't
made any slips. My friends have, however. I've been out in restaurants
and had them say, he’ll have another drink. At that point I’d like to
drop under the table, but just pretend like I didn’t hear it and hope it
had no significance to the waiter. These friends are people who
work beside me in lab, etc. where I have to be a guy.
I haven’t done anything inappropriate but I have done some things
that aren't necessary. Lately when I’m not swollen from electrolysis
I find that I am not perceived as a male. In fact after befriending a new
grad student I was surprised to find that she didn’t know that I was a
“male” until someone used my name. Prior to that we had been engaged
in conversation for about a half hour. What a compliment. To tie
things together and to answer the question, as of late apparently I don’t
need a dress and a “face” and other accessories to be perceived as a
woman. However, the opportunity to wear these occurs so infrequently
that it's really rewarding. I don't think this is the best way to be but I
feel that when I do move into the role full time that it will lose its reward
value; at least I hope so. The styles that I tend to buy are the sort of
things that Mary Tyler Moore wears and the other night she was
accused of impersonating a Barbie Doll on her show. Just nice clothes.
The sort of things a well-dressed woman would wear.
To my knowledge I've never been doubted as a true woman with only
one exception. I was frequenting a bar in both roles, and the personnel
had a better memory than I thought. .. although I make a fairly
unremarkable female, as a male I stand out a bit, at least I do here in
Houston. It wasn't until several weeks later that I found out that I had
been detected. I haven’t been back to that establishment since then.
It's improbable that anyone would ask me if I used to be a guy.
If it did occur, it would depend on who it was as to what I would do.
Knowing that the person themself must feel pretty awkward in asking
such a question, I think I would perhaps make a humorous reply tinged
with incredulity to try to get us both off the hook. I might reply, why
yes . . . in my first and fourth incarnations. One thing for sure I
wouldn't be facilitative unless perhaps the encounter were on a
one-to-one basis. The proposition is a basically mortifying one.
Do people treat me like a woman? I would have to say yes. Your
question is a loaded one. To be treated as a woman is a highly stylized
matter depending on the individuals involved in the interactions. It first
of all depends on how they interpret gender roles and the expectations
that each person sets up as a result of those interpretations. Those
things that are most meaningful to me might be the nature and content
of interpersonal communications I engage in. Male-male communications,
as I think I have stated somewhere before, are based on a lot of
178 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
bravado and charisma, modes of communicating which are mainly
without substance, potentially isolating and highly competitive. Female
communications can be meaningless just as male communication can
be sensitive, but in general female communications [based on the
women that I know) have more depth and is based a lot more on
sensitivity and empathy than males muster. There are real differences
in support and nurturance, qualities that are very important to me.
I also perceive that there are some real differences between the way
that females communicate among themselves and in mixed groups. For
these reasons I am much more comfortable being a woman among
women than a male.
Although [Jan] Morris has been criticized for being very unliberated
across a lot of dimensions, some of the things she says are in agreement
with my own views. The world is nicer to women than men. I find that
as a man I am treated with neutrality and indifference; as a woman
there is always a smile and people are just nicer, That doesn’t mean that
I groove on impedestalizing women to the point that we are treated as
if we are helpless. That’s not where I'm at at all. If any of the TS's
I have known treated me differently it was a couple of years ago when I
was much more of a neophyte and that was how I was treated.
Being a woman is pretty much as I thought it would be.
I don’t think there will be many significant changes in my behavior
after surgery. I think there might on the part of other people. I think
perhaps surgery to everyday people symbolizes and in their eyes
solidifies commitment. In their own heads I think they say, “Well, if
you’re willing to go through that much trouble and pain then I can at
least treat you as a woman.” In a lot of people’s heads, sex, gender,
gender roles, and genitals all have to be consonant. Surgery to me is
important to achieve some of this consistency. I’m really looking
forward to it but I'm aware that my head is as important in being
feminine as my genitalia. There are people with vaginas that are much
more masculine than I and people with penises that are more feminine.
I do know post surgical TS’s. They do report that the surgery
doesn't make much difference in how they are treated. They were
pretty completely female prior to surgery.
Buying women's clothes never was much of a problem. The local
stores generally employ senile old women for exploitative reasons and
they are easy to approach with a "shopping list” of things “for my
wife” without their thinking much about it. The more male and
more nervous and least interested one appears, the easier it is.
[WE ASKED RACHEL HOW SHE WOULD HANDLE SOME SPECIFIC
POTENTIALLY DISCREDITING SITUATIONS.]
It all depends. A lot of things could be explained such as my pills,
no children, and the absence of the menses if I said that I had had a
hysterectomy because of a cervical malignancy. If I didn’t want to go
Appendix 179
that far, I have been on several BC pills. I know how they make me
feel and can talk about it the same as any other woman. The menses—
~ obviously I never have had them but I've beep included by women
enough that I think I can pretty well make anyone think that I have
them or have had them. Children—never had any and am a
professional woman who doesn’t know if she is really dedicated
enough to properly care for a child. It's not big on my list at the
present.
Being with a guy. who wants to touch below the waist: This hasn’t
happened yet. I've never dated in the traditional sense. When I have
gone out with males it’s with friends who are quite aware of my
situation. I suppose the thing to do would be to tell them that this isn't
the right time of the month for that, or that I’m not that kind of girl
(tongue in cheek) or just coming on a little cold.
Past histories don’t have to be heavy on gender-specific information.
When an occasion calls for it, I can be fairly honest and therefore
consistent. I had sisters so I know what a female adolescence is like.
And there is plenty of overlap. High school idols, I loved the Beatles
and saw them in high school. My date was a photographer and we saw
them from the UPI pressbox.. . . How exciting!
You know how I feel about the women's movement. Homosexuality
in concept is fine and is up to the individual, At this point in my own
life sexuality is very low on my list of concerns. I'm a little confused as
just who or what is appropriate to relate to in terms of my own identity.
Male homosexuality as it is practiced can be cool, but it is very
objectifying and gamey usually. Female homosexuality can be beautiful
and on the other hand it can be very destructive. So can heterosexuality
for that matter. To sum it up homosexuality is pretty much of a non issue.
I don't spend much time thinking about drag queens. In general I
don’t think I really like the idea that much. Unsophisticated people
tend to confuse TV’s TS’s and DQ’s. And when I make a self disclosure
I have to go through a lot of shit because of the existing confusion.
DQ’s are parodying something that means a lot to me.
Your questionnaire was interesting. I don’t know how far you go in
interpreting your data. As I understand it your primary interests are
gender and not the TS as such. That’s cool. I think that you should pay
special attention to the TS’s concept of her/his self. You had a few
questions at the beginning but I’m not sure they’re the best. I’ll think
about it. A lot of your questions are aimed at determining the
individual’s role definition/expectations. I think that’s good. Your
questions on gender errors are good. Have you ever recognized a TS
and if so how? is good. The situational questions weren’t too threatening
or challenging. But then again I’m a good anticipator/manipulator.
It seems to be a good questionnaire.
I hope I've given you some food for thought, without having
made too big of a fool of myself.
It looks like I'll be driving to N.Y. Do you have any suggestions as
180 Gender: An Etii nomethodological Approach
to what to do with my car? I'd like to park it somewhere safe and free
if possible. That may De a pipe dream but if anyone would know it
would be you. Please keep in mind that it’s a little sports car on which
the door locks have failed. It would be easy to steal for anyone who
knew what they were doing. But it’s all I have. I am so much
looking forward to coming.
As I said in the lost letter meeting you two has precipitated a lot of
good things. Since meeting you in Chicago so many right on things have
happened! Anothecquestion . . . The garment district is up there.
I may have a little money for some clothes. Are there outlets for good
clothes at reasonable prices, or should I just go on and buy here?
Pardon my typing, I’m in the process of switching from two fingers
to ten, self taught. I’m not the dingbat that my typing would indicate.
I’m also a little more coherent.
Take care. Please write soon.
Love,
Rachel
(3) Tw o w eeks later
I can’t tell you whdt a lift it was today to see your bright yellow letter
in my box. I’d been apxiously waiting for your letter, too.
I’ve got a lot things tp1say.
First of all, I'm glad we got the name thing straightened out.
I had [so] many nam es.. . . I was beginning to feel like Sybil.
It was great talking to you two. I’m certainly not rich so we'll have
to color me extravagant. Actually my friend John and I sat to make
plans for the trip. I said to him, "John, let’s make plans for the trip."
From then on it went like the ballad of Gerald Ford . . . because we
realized that no plans could be made until I talked to you two. And being
the woman of action ;that I am, I called ,. . . I got so excited talking
about the trip that I didn't get any sleep that night, which isn’t
really that unusual. I keep Sominex in business:
After sitting down and thinking things over John and I got it together
enough to come up with an itinerary which is completely compatible
with your suggestions, We will leave Houston in the midge Saturday
morning and travel to Ohio. There we w ill have a mission of quixotic
proportions. I haven't seen my mother in a year since she learned her
son is really a daughter. So we are meeting on neutral territory at my
aunt’s, to whom I am closer to than I am my mother. She's a child of the
flower and is truly enlightened. My mother is directly descended from
Appendix 181
the vinegar berry and I must face her. As a matter of fact I’ll have to
face my Aunt too and their whole family whom I was very close to.
-T h e y ’ll have some adjusting to do. The first part of the trip could be
rough.. . . Oh well. To make matters tighter, Tuesday morning I'd like
to leave Ohio as Rachel. I hope they serve drinks on the train. Anyhow
sometime Tuesday morning w e’ll depart from Ohio to arrive in N.Y.
Please pay close attention to this part. It would be groovy if we could
arrange our schedule in such a way that it would be convenient for one
of you to meet us at the train station. It’s not a necessity, but it would
be appreciated. The last time I was there I didn’t have trouble
navigating, but I don’t know how far I have regressed in ten years.
Besides that, I was cleverly disguised as a teenage male (actually that’s
not too clever, but for reasons now unclear it seemed to be the thing
to doj. Please remember that my luggage and I will be thinking . . . %
somewhere in this city of eight million plus is Suzanne and Wendy. It
probably won’t be easy carrying that baggage around without
getting mugged (and worse). I’m really wide open
for suggestions as to what to expect.
I have a couple of requests. It would be nice to resign as resident
TS for a little while. I don’t know how many you know or see as
friends. I'd just like to be one of the girls to those around us. How
sensitized will your friends/associates be? Secondly, on your
accommodations I’m not particular. I’d like to spend as much time
with you two as I can without putting you two out. If possible if your
apartment and house come without other people that would be
preferred. I would be less than perfectly comfortable around unfamiliar
males I think. (The more traditional, the less comfortable.J The week
in N.Y. will be my first sustained attempt “in coming home.” I think the
time, place, and people will be right. You asked about anything special
. . . maybe a play? and I love good food. Who doesn’t? A party? that
would be cool if I’m still together and you're into it. Really nothing
concrete. Serendipitously I have found you another TS. John’s people
gave him a really hard time when they heard he was coming with a
WOMAN. So he elaborated. His friend has just lost a lover to the
operating table. If you're looking for someone to interview maybe after
I am introduced I can arrange for you to do so. By the w ay I
know after you read my tome that you’ll have questions
so we can go into things in depth then.(
I’ve been going through some neat things here as I have met some
people who are very understanding and have faith in me and what I'm
going through. I’ve gotten a chance to meet some nice people who have
never heard of Paul. A ll of these things are sort of new and nice.
I doubt that you will miss the fact that I’m highly reflective to the point
of dwelling on minutia and I'm sure that in the natural course of events
that I will have some shit to go through. Things will precipitate. But
I seem to be able to handle these things by anticipating them. I’m a
182 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
realist. I also know that in being me I can’t see me the w ay other people
do. So any feedback you can provide for me w ill be highly
appreciated. If you see any rough edges break out your polish.
Oddly enough the last time I was out I, by virtue of having been
seated at a table beside this guy, encroached on some other woman's
territory, her guy. It took me a while after the get-together to understand
the meaning of those poison darts she w as shooting at me. The
interesting thing is that friends heard her describe Rachel as one of
those tall slim brunettes—highly sophisticated, the kind she just
couldn’t stand. 1 think she mistook my bashfulness for sophistication.
I can be very shy, a quality which John mislabels as my southern charm.
A ll other things aside, the last couple of w eeks have not been good
ones. It’s certain that I w ill lose my job now. Other employers do show
interest but I fear that I am highly diversified to a point that it is a
disadvantage. Everything from brain research to x-ray physics to
computer programming. I’m not really interested in these things any
more. But until I get my degree they are my marketable skills, I’ll be
glad w hen I don’t have to do them any more. I'm also considering just
taking unemployment as a government assistantship and concentrating
on my dissertation, but that certainly w ould decrease my options right
after I get out of school. I would even have a hard time affording
hormones, one of life’s necessities.
I also had a car accident. The other driver w as a huge black who
insisted on trying to relate in a very male-male fashion. Thirdly,
Vivian, my long-term companion of four years, having realized that what
I am to be cannot fulfill her, has been accepted for overseas
teaching. I think I’ll be alone for a long time.
So this trip, the planning, and seeing you two w ill have important
maintenance functions for me. Overall, my spirits are pretty high.
I’ve been taking my Geritol and taking care of m yself, etc.
Write soon
With love,
Rachel
(4} Late Spring, after her visit to New York, w here she was
R achel for the whole time.
W e’re back and I know that Houston can never be the same. As John
and I pulled into town and saw the skyline w e both burst out laughing
and looked at each other and said at the same time— It’s not exactly
N ew York, is it? Do adaptation levels ever shift and in a
very short time, too. I think I know now where I w ill want
to settle down at least for a while.
Appendix 18 3
The trip did a lot of good and brought out many changes m ostly
for the good. I made the trip just before I w as due to make major
- (professional) changes anyhow, so I have a lot of adjusting to do
other than dealing with my newfound addiction to lox.
My own accomplishments amaze me. Keep in mind that I had
attended only one party publicly in my new identity where people did
not know about me. Then I came up there and met the people up there.
I had never considered what size bite I could chew. But I don’t think
that I would have chosen the size that som ehow seemed to present
itself. I do not mean to sit here and let my head swell; actually my
humility is intact.
I usually can make rather accurate predictions about me, upcoming
situations, and how I will respond to them, but coming back w as harder
to bear, a bigger down and far less comfortable than even I would
have predicted. There are some things that I have done here since I
have come back that have surprised me, too. I guess I’ll start at the
beginning for a change, making a little more sense than usual. (You
can’t imagine how I'll hate relinquishing my reputation for the
"idiosyncracy” of my usual style.) So you won't have to work as hard
to understand this letter.
We arrived in Ohio and went to my cousin’s house. I have only
learned to appreciate him recently. His wife, Sharon, is also a child of
the flower. They both are very accepting of my transition and Phil finds
me much more likeable as a female. A very special cousin Susan who
is one year to my senior came over that night. She also was very
complimentary and accepting. We w ent out to a nice Italian (at last)
dinner and really capped off the entire week w ith some very
human experiences.
The next day was the day to drive home, but I found that I really
couldn’t make the switch. I found it im possible to go into a men’s
room. I just couldn’t do it. So even Monday I jjist carried a purse with
me and used my feminine credit cards and everything w as a little easier.
I decided then to go more public at school and to make an unofficial
name change around the lab, etc. This w asn’t as easy as I had thought
it would be. You’ll remember that I said I don’t make errors and can be
consistent, but other people can be im possible w ith the best of
intentions. I simply requested that around the lab people refer to me as
Rachel. This took much effort because not only had habits been built up
but people grew nervous because they didn’t know who knows and
who doesn’t, and as it turns out there are a large number of fringe
people that you don't notice usually, who becom e painfully apparent
when such a transition is being made. Observation: No matter how
ready— or how much surgery or how wom anly I am, I’ll have to leave
here before I can begin to make a realistic change. So much depends on
the people around. As you found out yourselves, the set is very difficult
to break. By the way I did feel very real and genuine there. I felt real
oneness with m yself there with no conflicts at all. But it’s impossible
184 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
to do this around people who have known me in a previous
role (with for-the-most-part-exceptions like John],
Other advances have been made. The not having a past bit has
captured my attention. There are several publications going out of here
in which I was acknowledged for technical assistance, People were very
easily persuaded to change the name on the acknowledgements.
Secondly, a couple of journals have requested that w e publish a couple
of articles on my methodology. Guess whose name will be on those
papers. So many good thjrngs are happening, and I'm learning some
important things about human nature.
One thing I feel is significant. I can’t really feel at all comfortable in
behaving the w ay I did i|i New York in the lab, although I feel that
the me that came out in blew York was really me. I feel that there are
tremendous gradients thht will not let me do "those things.” Specifically,
the fantasies that I havi about coming across the w ay I did up there
here are that I would b< consumed. The fantasy is oral, but I think I
would in a real way lose all my credibility with the people
I interact with. It’s a real bind; I can't be ME.
Vivian and I are adjusting to the fact that we have to part. Tonight
w e were listening to Denver and his song Leaving On a Jet Plane
was playing and suddenly we were both crying our hearts
out and holding each other. It was heavy.
So all in all there are no more doubts or cobwebs; there are only
those things I must do in order to get to where I want to be. I was sorry
we didn’t get to spend more time together. I hope you didn’t feel like
you were babysitting or that you had a neurotic hanging on to your
coat-tails at times. Please remember that a lot hit me at once and there
was much to be digested. Things are happening very fast. I think,
however, that all in all my equilibrium is good. It's hell to have to be
two people. I think that perhaps you got a brief glance at how
complicated life can be. I have never been so aware
of the gap between academe and experience.
There were a couple of things that will seem mundane to you that
were touching to me. Joy was starting her period at the time and asked
me discretely if I had “ any equipment with me to start it with." I wish
I had. I will never have to (I don’t see this as a plus) but I’ll carry a
few tampons on occasion for those who might want to borrow them.
Kathy took me aside and told me what places on the machine would
snag your pantyhose and a couple of other in things that would be only
of interest to women. So much for that; it’s late and
I’m getting unusually nostalgic.
Take care, keep in touch. I feel more legitimate than ever in signing,
In sisterhood,
Rachel
Appendix 185
(5) One month later
- Hi,
I just thought that I would drop a note to inquire if you have
received my last letter which I sent a week after my return. I haven't
heard anything from you. The other alternative may be that you have
written and it got lost— if so you should know.
Things are much better these days. I was very upset at the prospect
of having to return to such a schizophrenic life style and I’m happy to
report that I haven’t. I have informed the majority of my acquaintances
of my plans and have been pleasantly surprised at the response. It’s
been pretty warm and receptive. Even the provincials of provincials,
our department chair, knows these days. To be "known" is not nirvana
of course but it means I can be more me which is important. As I said
in my last letter I’ll definitely have to leave here and start over. I have
gotten involved with a very intimate group of people who have never
heard of PW and I value being a member of their group highly.
Things have been pretty exciting here lately.
Both of you take care.
Rachel
(6) One month later
Dear Sisters,
Your letter arrived at a most opportune time. As usual a tremendous
number of important things have occurred since I wrote last.
I’ve mentioned that things have never been the same since N.Y. and
it's really neat that things are increasingly not the same. In a controlled
w ay I have gone public in the department, not something that in itself
is gratifying at all, other than it allows me to make the transition while
I'm still here in school, and that’s gratifyin’. As John puts it, it
seems that N.Y. released a lot of action-specific energy. Now even our
department head knows. I don’t know if I mentioned this or not.
I must report that all overt interactions with other parties
have been most human and quite accepting.
Things have changed so fast that it seems that Vivian has left, or at
least the relationship is cooling rapidly. She has become involved
with a very straight grad student (in Physics) who lives about one
hundred feet from me. I don't know of any w ay to communicate in
words the extreme pain, excruciation, and agony that this caused me.
J
186 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
For awhile I felt very suicidal. Loneliness doesn’t scare me, but it
sickens me. I have a high regard for myself to the point that it seems
almost a waste for me not to have someone to give to, to share with,
and to love. I can, however, understand Vivian’s frustration. I am the
changing entity in the relationship and am not the same person she fell
in love with four years ago. She has been constant and I still love her
tremendously, in a non-erotic but very affectionate and physical way.
What is happening, though, in reality, is probably the best for both of
us. She did something that was extremely cruel and sadistic in what
represented the redefinition of the relationship. This occurred on
Wednesday of this week and I was all but nonfunctional. Every time
I would start a protein fractionation I would burst out into tears. I had
to see committee members the next day and really looked horrible and
had to really try to fight back the tears while I was talking to them. The
one bright thing that happened was that I got your letter which dented
the all encompassing numbness. In the last couple of days I have seen
her and it seems that we will still be casual friends or more but nothing
has settled down yet. In losing her I do have more freedom; you’ll
remember that’s just what Joplin sang, freedom can be very cold and
lonely. Today I saw an attorney and she is going to see the court
Monday about my name change. I'm pretty excited about this. This
means that my six-month trial period is starting? is about to start?
I don’t know what constitutes it.
I see my doctor in Baton Rouge on May 20th. So I’ll know much more.
I did find out that Blue Cross and Blue Shield does have a two-year
preexisting conditions clause. HMMMMM. BUMMER especially when I
just found out that my mother just let my policy go, which would have
counted as time, about five years’ worth. My only hope for quick cash is
developing a prototype commercial system of the protein fractionation
equipment that I developed here. I’m not sure what the odds are that
we’ll be able to find a real world entrepreneur. I never have been too
functional outside my ivory tower world, hut then I never have wanted
to be.
I’m readjusting to poverty which, as it turns out, is not as much fun
as it used to be after having been affluent. If nothing else
money can buy pleasant diversions.
I’m trying to get up my courage to take prelims this quarter.
Something really funny happened the other day. My car had broken
down and since my income is zilch I had to do the work (which I hate)
on my car. I do it in surgical gloves to protect my manicure. I hate
grease. I was fuzzy because I had been doing electrolysis, dirty, unclean,
greasy, and my hair was very dirty. In short I was disgusted with
myself. I went to the store to buy parts for the car and talked to the guy
in the store for a while and was more than a little surprised when he
said, you don’t see many ladies working on their own cars these days! I
just smiled and said I had taken a course in school on it. He said he’d
Appendix 187
heard about the course and thought it was a great thing. Things
definitely aren’t as schizophrenic as they used to be. My record is still
- consistent, I haven’t been called sir since N.Y. even when I called the
hardware store and asked for liquid wrench.
I do have a hard time empathizing with your distress over not
accomplishing anything in a month or so. I feel bad in admitting it but
I sort of feel that if I were where you are I would be resting awhile,
at least for a couple of years after my degree. I have a lot of life to live
after school. Maybe I'm fooling myself—I don’t know. Could be that
I have some latent achievement need that will explode into actualization
after school; but if it's there, it’s pretty latent.
The more I think about it the sorrier I am that I missed seeing
more of the city. Really, I don’t have any regrets except that I didn’t
get to stay longer (the important part of the trip was more than
accomplished). I see a lot of the things I whizzed by on TV regularly
and get a little homesick for that place. I really liked it.
I definitely need more than Houston.
Please take care and write soon. Your last letter came at the
perfect time. No telling what kind of ups and downs I will have gone
through in the interim.
Love,
Rachel
(7) Tw o w eeks later
Hi,
Someday, perhaps in the near future even, I promise not to open a
letter by telling you that a lot has happened since I wrote last but not
this one because a lot has happened since I wrote last.
I am now legally me. It is amazing how a piece of paper with legal
hocus-pocus creates legitimacy. The name change has helped make
things more real and concrete for people around me too. I'm
learning so very much about human beings but I don’t think
it’s generalizable to other situations.
In reading the literature you w ill remember that prior to surgery
there is no legal reason for me to have fem ale status. I pulled a moot
trick in writing up the court order itself by using female pronouns
instead of their alternative. The judge didn't notice this in signing the
order. When creditors and other people that must see the order see
it those pronouns greatly facilitate things requiring much less discussion.
Last w eek I was a little surprised that people didn’t catch on faster
188 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
when changing credit cards, etc. Many never questioned that I had
not always been a woman. Even when handed the court order.
I went through a bad period due to being all alone and I think that
it was only natural that I questioned what I was doing. At no time,
however, could I generate any kind of male alternative to the direction
I am going, and am all the better for it. I hope that makes sense to you.
It's a little like religion to more conventional people.
Last Tuesday saw me in Baton Rouge to see the surgeon for my
checkup. We began talking about financing this thing which looks very
grim. Hopefully, the local Voc Rehab is considering two other
women like myself and possibly I will be a third case.
I have some very new literature dealing with Voc Rehab and
the TS which I will donate to them.
Today . . . I talked td two of my committee members; the first was in
molecular biology, my butside member; he is very straight but we
have always gotten along extremely well. Today was no exception even
after I told him. His response was that mine was a choice that everyone
has to make, which is remarkably enlightened for that type. I’m
b e gin n in g to stop dealing in terms of stereotypes; they just don’t seem
to hold anymore not eVen for biologists. My second member is a neat
guy. He taught me my basic biochem course and is a bit like Burt
Reynolds so I had things both good and bad going into our meeting.
I conduct myself no differently around him or dress no differently and
he hadn't noticed or suspected. Oddly enough I felt that I was in control
in this conversation. After taking his course I pretty much knew what
he looks for as far as body language and nonverbal communication is
concerned and was in control enough to come across exactly as I wanted
to. That isn’t to say that I was at all dishonest in what I communicated
but I was aware of precisely what messages he was getting.
Also today a friend, Michelle, was approached by our secretarial
staff who is very interested in a humane way rather than a voyeuristic
fashion. She explained the relevant things to them to their satisfaction.
They were one element that I had not known how to deal with because
I had pictured them as rather hard core traditionalists. The one
thing that I had failed to take into account is that they are sisters
and that transcends so very much if not all.
So as you can see it hasn’t been a dull week.
Rachel
(8) One month later
At last things do seem to be settling down to a dull roar and I’m
grateful. I’m completing the documentation on my protein fractionation
Appendix 189
technique and am looking forward to getting that completed.
I've gone ahead and entered and seem to have completed the
evaluation (pencil and paper part) in Baton Rouge. They do have a
compulsion to ask me to drive up there every month and tell them I'm
doing fine. They seemed initially to be a little threatened by me not
because I’m a TS but because I’m completing a Ph.D. The shrink and
I have clashed once as he needed to establish a "me-doctor . . .
you-sicky patient. . . I’m always right in what I say” relationship. But
he only got far enough to satisfy himself on that round. They are
definitely into the male-dominated medical model there. I really don’t
think they can even imagine that there are any alternatives. I was
complimented one day when I overheard a candid conversation between
the shrink and the surgeon. They both agreed that if I hadn’t told them
that I had once been a male that they wouldn’t have known.
Back at school my committe members have all individually accepted
my proposal. I have informed them all of my change of status and have
received nice patronizing responses. In reality though it seems that
the members that I don’t see very often (3 out of the 4) are very
threatened. I think that my committee meeting will have all the
elements of a three-ring circus. I want to take prelims by August 1st.
I keep having dreams of N.Y. I really liked it up there. A large
company has sent down some informal feelers down here concerning
offering me a job on Long Island. It might be worth it just to live up
there for a while. Oh yes, I have found a place right around the corner
that serves lox but without bagels which seems most incomplete. So
when I can afford it I treat myself to lox and crackers for lunch. I’m not
affording much these days. I'm completely a ward of the state being on
unemployment and just having qualified for food stamps. By the way, it
seems that Voc Rehab has paid all expenses for several TS's. I have
contacted them to find that this practice has a temporary (and maybe
permanent) hold on it because 1.) they suddenly realized that they had
no fixed policy on it and one is needed, and 2.) new Federal guidelines
have everyone confused on just what is permissible and what isn't as far
as Voc Rehab is concerned. It seems that in the case of the TS that the
whole policy will be contingent on the attitudes of the members of
the state board. Word has it that the conservatives are maintaining that
TS surgery is elective and therefore not fundable, But there are good
people (my surgeon for one) who are working very hard to get it
through. Voc Rehab hopes to have the issue cleared up by
early July. Keep your fingers crossed.
So that seems to be it. Please let me hear from you soon.
Take care—
In sisterhood,
Rachel
190 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
(9) One week later
Hi!
Such a dynamic greeting deserves a no less enthusiastic letter. And
not only that, I’m going to refer to myself in first person. It sounds
like you have been busy. I’m glad to hear that you two
are forging ahead with your book.
My work is coming along well; for the past three weeks I have been
doing the initial work on my dissertation, which will be completed
in another couple of days. Not only that, I am having a committee
meeting either this week or next, something I have feared for years
because of all the horror stories, and the fear has abated and I'm even
scheduling prelims for August 1st. If you knew me as well as I do,
these things can only mean one thing—BUSINESS, I want out.
I’m really tired of the piracy/lunacy and desire a little sanity.
Regarding camping, I don’t mind eating in the woods. I’ll eat anywhere
but I think that I’d probably opt to sleep in a hotel room. I guess that
makes me a semi-sissy. You see, I did a huge amount of camping when
I was a little girl (I don’t choke when I say that these days—I guess
it comes with practice) and spent all my spare time in the great out-of-
doors. Now it seems that I have lost all rapport with chiggers, ticks,
and mosquitos, value a shower in the morning above all, and feel huge
frustrations when I can’t find a place to plug in a hair dryer. On the
other hand it seems that oh so many of my peers are into this outdoors
thing. I have a feeling that when time permits (what a cop-out. . .
time will never permit) I’ll get back into it.
I have one piece of very exciting news. I have designed a small
‘’clinical/research’’ version of the apparatus that we use at school for
the protein separations. Currently there are no units that will do this
on the market (our technique is highly refined). We have submitted the
plans to my former employer and they’re very interested in it. They
are supplying us with the facilities to build a prototype. If they like it
they will buy the rights and pay a royalty. It would be more than a
year before they could go into production on it, but just think maybe
I always won’t be on foodstamps . . . sauteed mushrooms might be just
around the corner. I wish this had come a little earlier so I wouldn’t
have to be starving. It’s really a gig when we are showing people around
the lab and they ask "who designed this system” and the colleagues
say—she did. People’s eyes bulge. It really gets to them when
they see what a woman did. It’s good for us all. Take care.
Love,
Rachel
Appendix 191
(10) Fall—2-1/2 months later
Dear Wendy and Suzanne,
I’m glad I got your letter when I did because I had started writing
one to the both of you several times only to discard it midletter.
There is not a whole lot that is new for me to report. I think I
have passed prelims and will soon be admitted to candidacy soon.
That’s a groove.
Our newest capitalistic venture has had some snags but is still
making remarkable progress. We've had incredible legal hassles.
At any rate we have our first customer, which is not at all as paltry
as it sounds. Each unit will sell for nearly $7000! I have to fly to
San Francisco on our first consulting trip. That will at least pay for the
calculator that I had to buy to get through prelims. The interesting thing
is that the design I have developed is sound, there is no competition, and
it could really go somewhere. However I know that given enough rope,
at least a few inches, I can hang myself in the business world. I’m
not particularly an advocate of the profit motive—but owning and
running my own company would certainly let me be my own woman
which is an important plus.
The world has grown to be at least quite accepting. I think with
time poeple can get used to anything, even me. In fact, things are going
very well as far as settling down is concerned. I have noticed a gradual
change in the people who know and I can’t see any discriminable
difference in the way XX individuals and I are treated, which when
you think of it is a little mind bending. I’m getting to feel quite
legitimate. In fact, there are males who are sure that I really need
their own "special" kind of attentions. But I have kept my distance.
Remember the unicorn (they only made one).
Your comments about Medical Center struck me as being a little
harsh. I know there were some gross inaccuracies, because yes it was
commercial TV. But I am thankful that it was on TV at all. It was done
in a way that was minimally acceptable to the confused and
homoerotophobic public. I really remember going through those exact
things that Pat did in one form or another. The whole show was
certainly better than no show. I was a little surprised at some of my
own responses. My own transition was gradual as you will remember.
At a biology convention the hotel staff were calling me ma’am and I
was thrown out of the men’s room before my transition. My change
compared to Pat’s was evolution compared to revolution. He,
phenotypically, would make a less than probable woman, meaning
that such a person would have a questionable probability at being
happy postsurgically. John was less generous than I—“Pat was definitely
a drag," he said. I did feel a little less than comfortable in the last
five or ten minutes of the show. And would have a little harder time
192 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
at using “she” than you did in your letter. But she has every
right to try and that is what is important.
A couple of weeks ago I had a terrible case of gastroenteritis either
from the flu or from food poisoning so I had to go to hospital. It was
my first time to seek treatment in this life and needless to say I was a
little nervous. The nurse told me to take my blouse and bra off and slip
into a hospital gown. I'kept my slacks on under the gown as I was
supposed to. The doctor came in and started to examine me— kidneys,
chest, breasts, etc. and I thought it was all over and there would be
need for no frank dismissions until he started to unzip my slacks to
examine my lower half. A t that point the conversation went:
Rachel: Before you do that I think there’s something you should know.
MD: Yes?
R: I'm a preoperative TS.
MD: A what?
R: (I explained.)
MD: Gee, if you hadn’t told me I’d never have known. Have you lived
as a woman all your life?
fl; Since May.
MD: Amazing.
Then he really got off on the whole thing. I wanted him to fix my
stomach. The sad thing is that the only reason he unzipped my pants
was to listen to my stomach. He really never would have gone further
south. But I guess it was good for him. A s it was it still took me six
days to recover (from the gastroenteritis).
I keep having dreams; of N.Y. I liked it so much.
Houston is such a burg.
I’ve met a really neat guy with whom we founded a really intense
but platonic relationship, which is great because he’s married to a
radical feminist who hasn’t moved here yet from their home town.
He has perhaps the most fantastic head of any male I have ever met.
He’s in computer sciences and we have ever so much in common.
Intellectually, the relationship has been very stimulating,
which has been a much needed ingredient.
You know this has been a really upbeat letter. And it’s Friday
nite which is usually a ^ery blue time for me. But that doesn’t
even spoil things.
Take care and write soon.
Rachel
Appendix 193
(11) S ix w eeks later
Hi you two!
I must say that I was really glad to get your last letter as I was
in a very good mood and I received it at an opportune time. Because of
the w ay things have been going for the last couple of months almost
any time would have been a good time because everything has
been going very well for a long time now. How strange.
My dissertation is going very well. But how could things not go
well during the initial fractionations. There are many interesting
phenomena in the offing. Since I am the senior student in my lab and
I have a lot of say in what goes on in it, several of the new first-year
persons have decided that I must be their one and only mentor. A t
times I find myself being followed like Lorenz and his little geese. *
I think what they really want is a little mothering.
My social life has exploded. The only trouble with being very
much sought after is that it is definitely fattening. I'm counting
calories again. Tch Tch. I’m certainly having more fun.
Business seems to be going well too, which will eventually lead me
around to answering your question about the system you’ve asked about.
After a brief struggle with my adviser, which I won, corporate harmony
seems to be ours. Actually we incorporate Wednesday. It’s all very
exciting. It really has blown a lot of male minds (a very narrow and frail
entity at that) when visiting the lab to see what a woman can
accomplish. I think the phenomenon is good for all concerned. That
reminds me, I'm teaching a course in several different techniques on
bioassays at the graduate level as a result of a multitude
of requests from student peers.
I can’t tell you how excited I was about last spring’s trip to N.Y.
I’ll be very much more real on the next trip. I think you'll find that my
bashfulness has pretty much dissipated and I’ve even acquired
a little polish where there were rough edges.
I’m not sure what I want to do yet. It will depend on what we do
with the company and how much potential it seems to have. The system
being developed, by the way, is an advanced method for blood protein
separation using an electrophoretic technique that I developed for my
dissertation. It is very fast and reliable and relatively inexpensive. By
the way, how is Harry's research going? I hope he got it off the ground.
I never got a letter from him. And I’m not even the dark lady of
Houston anymore! Tell him that I'd like to hear from him and that if
he needs any consultation when I get up there I'll be glad to help
him within the limits of my meager talents.
I even find that one of the reasons that I have been so content
lately is that I have been accomplishing so much.
Sounds a little perverted doesn’t it?
J
194 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
I’ll have to tell you that I have been perfectly chaste since N.Y. which
has been absolutely no strain, and I have made no commitment to any
kind of an orientation so I’d at least like to see what it’s like. I must
say that many men have become very interested but they seem rather
monolithic and predatory. Sometimes being just another pretty face can
be quite a burden. But on the other hand I’ve never been so happy.
I’ve never regretted what I’ve done for a moment.
I'm going to visit home for the first time in a couple of years over
the holidays. I haven’t taken a vacation since I saw you two and it will
be a logical breaking point in my dissertation. It also may be a
breaking point for me. It’s quite probable that I w ill regret it. "You
can never go home again" w ill probably be very true for me.
I had some very straight friends, some who have never learned to
spell cosmopolitan much less become one, so I am one of the things
in heaven and earth of which they have never dreamed. It’s really sad.
The tragedy is theirs however, not mine.
It looks like I have given you enough to chew over. I’ll be looking
forward to your next letter. Write soon.
Love,
Rachel
(12) Four months later, Early spring, 1976
Someone borrowed my typewriter so I thought I’d handwrite you a
letter since I’ve found time to take a breath and write you a letter.
I’m sorry that I’ve been such a poor writer but you wouldn't believe
the schedule I’ve been keeping lately. It’s been rough. I’ve been doing
my dissertation, teaching a graduate course, and running our
mini-company. It’s demanding being President/secretary/designer
and the sales/marketing division all at once.
Spring arrived here very early and it’s been a pleasant spring.
I’ve been very much in demand and have been having a good time
learning the bump with some of the other students. I find that women
partners are much better than males. My measure is a bruise count
after each dance. The score is Harvey 117 and Jennifer 0. I'm sure
Harvey would be a great linebacker, however.
It seem s that with every plateau there are always new slopes to climb.
I’ve been very comfortable becoming me but looking back I'd have
to say I've been very tentative socially, and have buried m yself in
work. Part of the reason has been financial, but probably the residual
reasons have just been self-confidence and a pause while I get my
Appendix 195
head together. The woman, Jennifer, whom I have mentioned, is a very
close friend. She is very honest and a good friend who provides some
- very supportive feedback, the net effect of w hich has been to help me
with my self-confidence. W e’ve had a lot of talks about a lot of things.
It's strange, w e love each other a lot but she really wants a guy and
I respect that. I am looking more and more toward surgery. I think I’m
going to put a small ad in the MS. personals saying: Woman grad
student financially depleted needs m oney for surgery. Please help.
And see what happens. Right now that’s the only thing I can think of.
The other night Jennifer gave my hair a light frosting (light
meaning subtle). It looks pretty nice.
I don’t know what I'd like to do when I get out next fall. Maybe
I’ll put another ad in an international magazine. Position wanted:
Potential countess or potential princess desires countesship or
princesship. All counts and princes invited to apply. I'm an equal
opportunity employee. P.S. White horses preferred.
All kidding aside— one really unfair thing. The automatic
assumption and hence pressure is that I do a nice straight heterosexual
thing and pair off with a male. This I think is a compliment, but a
little unfair. Even Jennifer, I think, assumes this.
Gee what a m ellow night this is. It’s Saturday and I took a night
off from the world after having been rock and rolled to death last
night. For the first time in my life I'm listening to FM easy music
station. Hmm, just my luck the wine cellar’s locked.
Actually I feel like there are so many things to tell you that I’ll
just have to wait to see you. It’s only a month off you k n o w . . . .
In sisterhood,
Rachel
(13) Summer, five months later
I’m trying to resist the temptation to spend several paragraphs
apologizing and explaining w hy I haven’t written. However,
suffice it to say that I haven’t. . . .
So much has happened! The reason you didn’t hear from me
immediately after the trip to N.Y. was that I w ent through a real
blue funk for a month or six weeks and was seriously depressed. I just
sat around and stared at the walls and seem ed very down. I think
I was very worried about employment as my unemployment was
running out. Along about then Ted came into town and w e did the
town as well as it can be done. Later he called and offered me a job
196 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
(14) Late fall, 1976, three months later
w ith his firm. A t the time it seemed almost like a good idea so
I said yes. Since then, I’ve reconsidered as he wants to move
his company to Kansas City.
The net effect of the job offer w as to lift me out of my funk.
When I’m depressed I become even less disciplined than
usual and procrastinate a lot.
Oh yes: My dissertation research is finished. I haven’t started
writing yet and don’t intend to until fall because I want to play this
summer. It’s the first time in my life I’ve ever really done my
own thing and I sort of enjoy it.
I've had my first affair. W ell as much as I can have had one. It had
its good points as w ell as its bad ones. He was piddling around as an
undergraduate, is beautiful, rich and a gourmet. For the last two weeks
w e lived together. At the onset of the relationship I told him that I
had been through soirie recent traumas and w asn’t ready for any sex.
He said OK and away we went. He has exquisite taste. All and all
w e were good for each other. And he never knew. He has offered
to fly me to San Francisco to go on a cruise on his yacht. I spent last
nite writing him a letter to let him know that yes, I would come,
but along with it I supplied what I’m sure w ill strike him as
being some unusual insights into my past life.
Our company has delivered the first instrument. Many people want
to buy stock and several companies are calling and will visit the lab
this fall. After almost exactly one year of incredibly hard work we
brought home less than $900.00 which will go into my medical fund as
a first deposit. I don't really want to continue with the company. My
education in this field is pretty complete and it's time for me to move on
to other things. I don’t want to be shackled with a business venture.
W ho knows if I continue I might even be a success-—an outcome which
I w ill avoid. I’m starting to do some consulting in Oregon which may
develop into a job which is very exciting. It has to do with
electrophoresis and the analyses therei n. . . . I’m glad I’ve found
something that turns me on. So as you can see there have been very
few dull moments, and I really have been busy with virtually no time
to myself, even for maintenance. So forgive me.
N ow I have more time and w ill write.
Love,
Rachel
Appendix 197
_ Dear you two,
Perhaps you have noticed that I’ve fallen down in my letter writing
for which I must apologize. But in your last postcard you told me to
expect a letter soon. Oh we l l . . . . I’ve been both busy and not busy.
I’ve finally gotten so fed up w ith things at school that I am working
concertedly at finishing the dissertation. All I have to do now is
to do the data analysis, for which I have written computer programs,
and do the writing. It seem s to be at times formidable and
w holly unrewarding in itself.
I have come to realize that I spent the last several months in at
least a mild depression and have been working at a very low energy^
level. A lot of it has to do with my professional aspirations or lack of
them. I've said many times that a professional life seem s a bit too
regimented. I’m laid back enough that the so-called rewards of the
profession, i.e., publications, a prominent reputation, etc., are pretty
meaningless. It seem s to me that since w e really are here only once and
in that our stay is as short as it is-, that I can’t feel particularly
positive about dedicating that much time in my life to just fill pages in
journals. At the same time I do envy people who don’t share
those feelings.
The fact that I have interests and expertise in so many different
fields and could never get them together also bothers me. This week
I w as asked to be a guest speaker at three different seminars, one on
electrophoretic separations, another to a psych of women class on sex
differences and biology, and a third to a computer sciences class on
computers in the biological sciences. I can’t figure out where home is.
Although many colleagues admire this, such a widespread
distribution of expertise makes me feel rather insecure.
I endured one major trauma very recently. Several companies have
indicated a strong interest in our apparatus. I don't know if I told you
but the one in Utah is installed and is working fine. A nyw ay w e have
been negotiating with several companies for the eventual sale of the
rights. That fell through. Meanwhile I had started making firm plans
with Baton Rouge. At the same time when I was talking to Baton Rouge,
I found out that the procedures were much more expensive than I had
thought they were going to be. Net effect experientially was that I had
gotten very close and then been yanked much further away than I was
to start with. Gee . . . I lost some insulation (emotional) that I’ll never
be able to replace. But now looking back on it the crisis had some good
effects because it’s gotten me off my derriere and I’m doing something.
But what tantamount agony. The real world can indeed be ruthless.
So w e are still negotiating with the two largest companies. They came
to the lab to see the unit and commented that our unit is the most
198 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
elegant and sophisticated process they have ever seen. Company A
will be here at the end of next week. Company B wants me to come
to Boston for a job interview. Every time I come into contact with a
company I get a job offer. Ted got down on his hands and knees and
almost begged, but his company is gnat sized. I went to Cleveland a few
weeks ago and saw him and wasn’t taken particularly good care of, and
I'm sure that Ted doesn't even know how really grim his treatment was.
He lodged me in an apartment with no heat, and all there was to sleep
on was a mattress with a bedspread and a sheet. I was just beginning
to recover from bronchitis.. . .
Robert came up for a visit. He was the summer fling I wrote about.
I had written a letter to him explaining my situation to him and I don’t
think it made the slightest bit of difference to him, that is to say that
there were no cognitive shifts on his part that I could see. The sad
thing about Robert is that he is as existentially lost as I am but
much more anxious. He was here for four nights and completely drunk
for three which was typical of the summer. We’re both aware that to
each other we’re nice people to visit, but haven’t enough in common to
live together. But it was really nice to see him. He wants me to come
visit for Christmas. As of yet I haven’t made any definite plans.
I know this letter has had consistently down overtones which for the
most part is where I've been, but things seem to be taking an upturn.
After the ordeal last month which precipitated so much I'm definitely
less passive about most things. I’m still refusing to look for jobs yet so I
can keep my options open. It's so much more fun to be a dilettante.
The puddle I’m in is seeming ever smaller. My advisor is asking me to
stay here after my degree and research with him, which usually ends up
being for him instead. He’s very gifted. He’s gotten a good national
reputation based on research that I have designed (and others, of
course}. It’s an interesting tack that I have too much conscience for
and too little ambition. My forte is really problem solving and I am
most happy when I’m challenged. He loves this.
How are things going?
Take care and write.
Love,
Rachel
Rachel's Comments: Winter, Early 197?
I'm very touched at the opportunity to help the authors with their
appendix, first because they've found value in something I’ve had
Appendix 199
to offer and secondly, because here I have the chance to make
detailed commentary on a journey I took that most people rarely think
_ about, and yet is quite human. We rarely are provided with the
occasion to go back and make a “here and now” commentary on
something that happened there and then.
I can remember in my own experience that people could only
relate to small pieces of my existence, which was an ever present
source of frustration. Now I find that there are things in the transition,
as it becomes more remote in my past, that I can no longer relate to.
I met Suzanne and Wendy in February of 1975, and it was during
the summer of 1972 that my struggle to repress that which was
undeniable faltered and I acknowledged to myself that I was a
transsexual. At the time I was a hard working graduate student
in molecular biology in a southwestern university which was fillet^,
with some incredibly provincial people. I was very happily engaged
to a woman and then things inside me began to surface. It should
not have been such a surprise because I had been privately aware
of these things all my life. I certainly did experience the classic
phrase of the M-F-TS, “the very first thing I can remember as a child
was wanting to be a girl.”
During elementary school and junior high I never missed an
opportunity to either disappear out into the woods and cross-dress or
to do it when no one was at home, I kept my secret so well that my
parents were completely unaware of this and when I finally told them
of my plans and admitted my childhood activities they absolutely
refused to believe it. This had to be my ultimate irony where when
I needed to discuss these things with them, that my secret had been
so well kept there was no way to prove it.
I remember that during the fourth grade years I was particularly
feminine, playing with the girls, often wearing my shirts tied around
my waist to symbolize a skirt. It was a happy period but frustrating
because I didn’t have full feminine privileges; I wasn't going to grow
up and be a woman.
There was no one in my elementary school with the sophistication
to realize the implications of my behavior and I don't know how far
I could have gone with it. I do remember, however, that I gradually
became aware that if I continued with the feminine behavior that
some pretty bad things were going to “come down.” No one ever
said this to me, nor do I think it was recognized that a problem
existed, I just remember a feeling that I began to get—-to stop
behaving like girls do and behave like boys do. Although
Christine Jorgensen had come and gone from the public view at the
time, I had never heard of her. I couldn’t read at the time, and my
parents never discussed her in front of me. So there seemed to be
no alternatives but to grow up male. What pain, what a trap to be
stuck in a body that was going to shape your existence and sort
200 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
of carry you along with it whether you wanted to go or not. I felt
like a honey bee that has used its sting; the life had been pulled
out of me. This realization and the related decision was private. My
teachers, of course, had no way of knowing this, and every time
there was an odd number of girls forming a team for games or
whatever, I was put with them, a happy and sad eventuality. How
was I to compete in a male world if all I knew how to do was
jump rope?
My secret cross-dressing continued on into high school. High
school had its own set qf more adult horrors. There was gym class
where I was introduced .to the concept of the “jock” or athletic
supporter, which I’m hippy to say I never used once. There were
public showers, which I don’t think anyone noticed that I never used
once in five years. There were some things that were just too “male”
for me to tolerate. These differences were differences that I kept well
hidden, and I don’t think anyone noticed at all. I can say this because
if anyone had noticed I Would have been a target for much derision
and cruelty, and I neve? was.
I did become consumed by one sport and that was basketball
which became a compulsive year-round sublimation. It was a good
sport where there was no crushing body contact apd, since I was
medium height and very light weight and fast, I was rather
proficient. It took me a long time to earn respect in sports. Since I
had never played any real sport until high school, my motor skills
lagged behind my classmates'. It seems that by my junior and senior
years that these differences had disappeared in my one sport, and I
could play well enough to be on the school team, which I did not do.
During undergrad school I lived at home for the first two years
and whatever education I was getting was strictly academic. My
social skills were notably lacking. With this in mind I decided to join
a fraternity (a large national). It was not until I was twenty or
twenty-one that I began dating and oddly enough was rather successful.
Sexual experiences with women followed. Although I had a good
reputation I didn’t find sex to be at all what people advertised it to be
and explained it away by feeling that I had yet to find a really
compatible partner, a feeling that continued for several years.
My senior, year in college was a depressing one due to tiny finances
and I found that the only thing that would lift the depression was
to resume my cross-dressing, which continued into graduate school
as I was really unable tp discontinue it. Had anyone ever asked how
I explained the behavior or how I classified it I would have said that
I was a transvestite. Bpt there was more than that and during my
early years in graduate school I was becoming increasingly aware of
it. I began going to the-library and reading books on transsexuality.
I must say that the contents certainly seemed weird to me then and
Appendix 201
even now as I look back at them. It seems that they are written in
tones that suggest that the transactions therein had to have occurred
- under an eerie green light as strange and bizarre people went through
some rather unusual rituals. It must have been the clinical tones (with
the underlying implication that these people are sick) of the books
that gave the texts this flavor. I had difficulty identifying with the
people and their desperate struggles while at the same time there
were strange and undeniable feelings surfacing in me that would
soon equal the poor souls in the book. From one summer to the next
I asked myself the question—Am I one of these people? It seemed
not, for one thing thing my existence had certainly been punctuated by
what appeared to be success in a “male role” even if it did feel
most vacuous and empty. I remember uttering many male utterances
and doing many things now that I would consider offensive and
distasteful. I can only look back at the models I was supposed
to conform to and wonder why.
I had a split awareness, not in the schizophrenic sense at all,
but I know that except during my few most unaware years I did
not perceive women as the other, the alien, the incomprehensible
as most men do. I felt a genuine sameness under the skin. And I
began to ache all over and deep inside when I acknowledged that,
yes, although seemingly not "classical” (a figment of the imagination),
I was a transsexual.
What to do about it. I looked genuinely male and behaved that
way. I had the feeling that I would make a rather improbable
woman, less than attractive and light years from any kind of ideal.
It seemed then that my alternatives were either to live a male life of
ineffable spiritual pain that permeated my entire inner existence, or
I could become what I thought would be an externally grotesque,
rather sad, caricature of a woman. It seemed to be a difficult decision.
These decisions, I think, were paramount in the summer of 1972.
It was during this year that I decided to discuss the issue with a close
friend and thusly make a twenty-four year old privacy slightly public.
The results of the conversation weren’t as shattering as I had thought.
The conversation turned out to be a marathon catharsis, and at least
one Derson in the world shared the burden of my secret.
Very little happened in the following year that I can remember
other than I began to take some BG pills for their estrogen content
(something that I wouldn't recommend without a physician’s
supervision because many contain progestins which have
androgenic effects).
Significant things did begin to occur the next summer, or in April,
actually. I went to Dallas to see a friend who was a physician and
who was1very understanding and did a number of favors such as
track down a pair of TS’s for me to talk to. That was a weird
202 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
experience in itself. One was in her sixties with a very deep voice, and
I wondered at many of her self-delusions, The net effect verified
many of the fears I had of my own self-potentials.
It was the year that I went on my perennial crash diet and lost
45 pounds in four months going from 170 to 125. This brought about
a happy state of affairs as 1 felt much better about my body. It was
the year that I contacted Gay Liberation to find if there were any
known transsexuals in town to talk to. There was one with whom
I spent a very happy evening in a funeral parlor [they chose the
location—I didn’t). She was very encouraging and I saw that, yes,
there was such a thing as an attractive transsexual. She was a hair
dresser with a high school education and clung to rather traditional
definitions of what femininity was, and as it turned out we had
little to share intellectually. She couldn’t fathom university life,
much less graduate school.
I made a conscious decision to stay away from gay society. It’s
strange but I felt that the average gay had an equally dim awareness,
when compared to heterosexuals, of the transsexual phenomenon,
and had some rather contaminated expectations of me from their
experience with cross-dressers who are frequently encountered in
the gay world. I did not want to have to expend energy bucking
these gradients of expectation nor did I want to acquire any of these
mannerisms as I felt that they were only a parody of womanhood. There
is much misogynism in the gay world, and it is generally a very male
world and as such held little for me.
I did befriend a gay male however, w ho because of his active
role in the field of gay awareness w as also a significant and
appreciated person in my life. I’ll never forget the night that I, in
becoming Rachel, took my first walk around the block with him.
Later in the summer he took me to my first party which w as at
least slightly magic. It was not without cost for him because his
friends were surprised to see him with a woman and there were
jokes about his being a latent heterosexual.
There were internal or “head changes” that were equally important
as the cosmetic changes that were taking place. I began to think in
terms of what and who I wanted to be and as such, how was I to
get from where I was to be this person mentally. Here words begin
to fail because it is so difficult to describe how one takes oneself
apart, in terms of her basic assumptions that make the foundation for
all that the person is and says and does. I had to remold my most
molecular assumptions. I pictured all of these little assumptions as
little building blocks that make up our automatic and reflexive
behaviors. It was my task to take each one of these building blocks
out of the foundation, examine it in the light of who I wanted to be,
internally modifying it to work the way I wanted it to work, and put
it back into the foundation, only to pull out another block and do
Appendix
the whole thing over. This is as close as I can get to putting the
process on paper. During the process I really believe I became
- acultural almost, because I examined some cultural assumptions w e
make and for some reason remember that I became particularly
critical of the work ethic and product-oriented culture w e are
immersed in. What an unusual by-product.
So there were personality changes as w ell as physical changes.
I did my own electrolysis to remove my beard. It seems that I did
a very good job as I have no more facial hair and there
is no scarring, pits, or discoloration leaving only a soft, smooth face.
This was the time that I began to venture out in public in my
identity of Rachel. Things did seem brighter and the air did seem
lighter as Morris proclaimed, but I knew about the power of
suggestion. I continued to grow.
There is no doubt that there were external changes becoming
apparent in the person people knew as Paul. There were rumors
that I w as dying of cancer when I lost the weight. There were
awkward moments such as when a technician rushed into the lab
and was disappointed to find that it was I who had walked into the
lab rather than “a n ew girl.”
Most of all I can remember the pain and the agony. Momentary
satisfactions of going out and being Rachel were too episodic
and far apart. Perhaps one of the cruelest things, and here again
my words fail, is that the transsexual is constantly immersed in the
world where that which she wants most is constantly around her
and interacting with her. At times it seem ed so extraordinary how
the wom en around me could be so very unaware of them selves and
of their womanhood. Womanhood seemed such a privilege. No one,
I think, unless they have been through it can understand the
frustration. Now the frustration has completely faded and I'm
only glad that I remember it as I’m writing so I can put it down here
on paper. I don’t think I did a particularly good job. At the same
time I find that it is ever easier to take m yself for granted in my
day-to-day life and it must be that much easier for the rest of
womankind to do so in that they have never known any other
gender or sex role.
I think I have included the necessary biographical data to bring
the reader up to date to the point where I met Suzanne and Wendy
and began to write to them,
When I met Wendy and Suzanne, it was a time of great uncertainty
of how the world was going to respond to me in my everyday
life. Apparently I was right at the point where I was giving no
gender cues or better yet, I was a strange mixture of both. A w ay to
look at it would be that I had reached the androgynous ideal a
long time before the world was ready for it. I had a unique
opportunity to see what the world was like when its inhabitants
204 Gender: An Ethnomethodologica] Approach
could not tell what sex I; was. There was an equiprobability that
when I would approach a stranger in public to buy a toothbrush
or book that I would be addressed as sir or ma’am. My clothing was
uniformly unisex at the time. They weren’t the garb associated with
any alternate life style. Frequently, at work, people would come up and
ask me where I got those pants or that “shirt.” The men would say,
"wow, I really like those clothes but haven’t been able to find any
like it, where did you get them?” I would reply, “in some of the
campus stores,” while neglecting to tell them, “not in the men’s
department.” It’s also interesting to note that once the people, say
at work, had known me, they saw nothing really unusual about my
behavior even as naive people were perceiving me as a woman. A
perfect example was one day at lunch while on a trip to Washington:
Many of us were seated at a table, supposedly all males, when a
waiter came up and presented me with a customary rose “for the
lady.” That had to be one of my most embarrassing moments. There
was also the time I went in to the store to buy an ice cream cone and
the waitress looked up and said, “ Can I help you ma'am . . . . ah sir
. . . . ah ma’am . . . . ah sir.” As she continued to flip-flop her face
became more panic stricken as she found herself facing true
ambiguity. She finally just stopped using any gender-related
words, a technique I saw frequently. These events all came before
the transition.
In part I think my answer to the question “How do you know that
you are a woman?” [second letter] was partially an evasion. Please
note that these answers'were written pretransitionally. Possibly, it
was premature for me to answer some of these questions and possibly
not. They are at least valuable in contrast. My hiding behind
epistemology was philosophically consistent, so I can only answer the
question experientially and the answer is quite simply stated.
When I am out sitting-down at a table in a discussion with a group
of women I do not feel, or am I aware at all, that there is any
difference between us [unless the topic of discussion is on having
periods). I do feel that I am different from men. These experiences,
derived from settling into the role and being much more comfortable,
are more recent than I Vlas able to offer previously.
There is also a newly evolved set of rules for telling someone.
The new rule is—if at all possible—don’t. Previously when I was less
secure in my role there was a conscious striving to establish
necessary intimacy to tell someone about my past. This was
self-protective so I wouldn’t have to go through any trauma in case
of discovery. There was also the need to talk about it. Later as I
became more comfortable this was no longer necessary. Now my
strongest wish is to be just ordinary and not have my past known at
Appendix 205
all. Here in the department in school there is a most effective
grapevine which includes students, faculty, and secretaries
_ who have deprived me of the privilege of making disclosures to
those people that I see fit. It seems to me that this process strips
me of a valuable personal right, but it is a sad reality of life. Those
relationships that are spared this treatment are among my most
treasured. I long to be seen as just an ordinary woman. I have a
widespread academic reputation on campus, and at times it’s hard to
tell if my name is known because of my achievements or transition.
The phrase “I’ve heard a lot about you” is scary to me because of
the possibility that it has more than one meaning. At the same time
I have learned to take these things in stride and assume that
these things will evaporate after I have graduated and relocated.
The way that I tell people when it’s necessary varies with the
person. At times I start out by saying that I wasn't born a lady.
Media coverage has made it easier. I’ve considered saying that
Renee Richards and I have more in common than tennis. Actually
the grapevine takes care of most of it for me and acquaintances
who are interested in gaining insight into the phenomenon ask me
about it at times. It does create a class of people at school who
"may know” but I’m not sure. If they are closely connected with
the biology department experience has shown me that I should
assume they do. This doesn't always work out though, as I have
found out that people who have worked next to me for years,
meeting me just after the transition have not known; so there
are exceptions.
I now wear a wide range of styles. It’s rare that I ever look like
Mary Tyler Moore. There are times that I dress smartly and there
are times that I dress in a unisex fashion. Just recently I bought
a pair of leather boots that are in the fashionable western style
and my clothes need no longer be strictly feminine in the traditional
sense. I remember recently that I was in the Colorado mountains
on a hiking/skiing trip where there is only one way to dress. I was
particularly happy with my appearance which I thought was rather
androgynous with boots, several sweaters, and several pairs of pants
and was considering the possibility of a bulky appearance and was
amazed when a friend (naive) said, “Rachel, you get the Seventeen
magazine award of the day."
A very important parallel can be made to the person who grew up
very obese and sometime after adolescence loses a significant amount
of weight. Although the weight is gone and the clothes worn are
many sizes smaller, the individual's self-concept takes a much longer
time to "catch up” with the external realities. I certainly experienced
this phenomenon where I was buying clothes that were too large.
Over the years I have come down from a size 13 to a comfortable 9.
J
206 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
I’m 5'9" and weigh 128, which is rather thin. When people ask me
how much I weigh they are surprised by my answer. Their response is
that, “I can’t believe you weigh that much, you certainly don’t look like
you do.” I w ill diet much sooner than people think is necessary even
though I have the kind of frame that w ill not show an extra 10 pounds.
It hasn’t been until lately when I’ve found that some really attractive
women friends wear clothes larger than mine, have shoulders wider
than mine, that my negative feelings about my frame have begun
to fade away. The basis for these things has to be the old memory
of looking over a shoulder that was much larger and much more
muscle bound and hating myself. It’s taken awhile for those feelings
to dissipate.
My return to Houston after New York was most significant. I had
had a joyous week in New York. I liked the new me and the thought
of returning to Houston to a male existence was untenable. It
would be asking too much. It was getting very close to time
to make the switch.
In a way I had prepared things well. I had let people know
discretely, knowing that the word would get out like wildfire. I would
not have to tell many people; things would be rather obvious. It
was a crucial depressing time. I was claiming what was mine but the
emotional expenses were tremendous.
I made the request to lab personnel about the name and gender
pronoun change and there was a tremendous amount of variability in
people’s response. I must say they all tried very concertedly. There
were inevitable slip-ups. There were awkward very tense moments.
Simple mechanical operations become difficult. Outside people would
make professional calls into the lab for Paul. What were lab
personnel to do? Yell for Rachel or Paul? How was I to answer the
phone? Pain . . . embarrassment. But we all tried and ever so slowly
Rachel became more and more of a reality. One of my most effective
tools was a confrontive behavior modification approach. When
someone would yell for Paul I would not respond until I heard a yell
for Rachel. When in conversation someone referred to Paul I simply
looked at them squarely and asked sharply, "who?” No one but me
will ever understand or appreciate how painful that process was. My
advisor tried and seemed to have difficulty making the transition,
showing a definite lag. From conversations with others I heard that he
was inconsistent in his use of names and gender pronouns when I
was not around. This was a style I saw from time to time which I
referred to as “not doing homework," and as such was something
that I couldn’t directly operate on. Time was needed for complete
healing. The process seemed to take a few months before everything
settled out.
Appendix 207
A quite different kind of encounter, contrasted to lab personnel,
was encountering acquaintances, near and distant. These were
..people who I knew at a distance. They were perhaps the most surprised
and awkward. But some of them became good friends and others just
shook their heads and dropped out of my lifels picture completely.
Needless to say that this was radically affecting the relationship
between Vivian and myself. Our relationship in the past was not
sexual but very loving and very affectionate. We have since realized
perhaps that we had played special unique parts in each other’s life,
that we’ll never find anyone for whom we’ll care about as much as
we cared about each other. But at the time things Were more than
strained. She did have her sexual needs that were going completely
unsatisfied. She really tried to stay with me far longer than she should
have for both of our own good. But it was very soon after this that
she left. Amidst all of the other things I had to deal with, I would
soon have to deal with it all alone.
I thought I would have to leave Houston before I could make a
realistic change. Time has shown that this is not true with
qualifications. After two years, life is rather simple and routine in
the same place and in the same lab. The qualifications are two. The
first is that damned grapevine and the other is myself, I find that to
new acquaintances my past makes no difference. The report is rather
uniform that they can’t imagine me as a male. Those who have
asked to see pictures of me in the past simply shake their heads and
acknowledge that they would never recognize me as the person in the
picture. My face does seem to look almost entirely different, and
there is something seemingly very different about my cheekbones
seeming higher or more prominent. This may be because of the weight
loss. I’m not sure.
My reality is that even though it makes no difference to new friends
and acquaintances, their knowledge does make a difference to me.
I don’t feel quite as good around people who "know" as I do around
people who don’t. I know that a psychologist would say that the
dichotomy is artificial and the distinction is in my own head. There
seems to be some truth to this as people seem to forget completely,
but it’s harder for me. These things are a little painful to talk about but
they’re necessary for the record. The difference is that it’s more
pleasant for someone to make a completely "female” set of assumptions
about me than a partial set. By this I am specifically referring to
questions about my past, etc. Actually when people learn of my past
they tend to forget it. It’s me who has the hard time forgetting. It’s more
pleasant for someone to ask me about didn't I love horses when I
was a little girl, etc. That’s about the most concrete example I can
generate immediately. Just let the statement ride intuitively; the
relationship with those people who don't know feels better and
freer. The air seems fresher to me. I would say that there is no
difference in my behavior between the two populations.
208 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
There are several humorous stories about events that occurred
after my name was legally changed. In May I decided to go to a
department store and,get my credit card changed. Remember, at this
point I am now legally Rachel, supported by a court order specifying
that Paul Wright (she) is now and forevermore Rachel. The
conversation went like this:
Me: "Good afternoon, I’d like to have my credit card and name of
my account changed.”
Clerk: "Fine. My name is Mrs. Givens and I’ll be happy to help you.”
Me: "I've received a sex reassignment and I have the legal documen­
tation.”
My voice must have dropped in volume as I said this because she did
not hear it, or did not want to hear it.
Clerk: "May I see your card, Dear?”
I hand the card to her and watch a perplexed look cross her face.
Clerk: “Is this your father’s card, honey?”
Me: "No.”
Clerk: "Are you married? Is it your husband’s?”
Me: "No, it’s mine and I want the name changed."
Clerk (now obviously confused): "Your name was Paul Wright?”
Me: “It was.”
Clerk: "Oh you poor dear. No wonder you want your name changed!
Did your mompy really name you Paul?”
Me: "I’m afraid so.”
Clerk: "Just a moment, let me get your records.”
She disappeared into a door into an inner office and reappears studying
my portfolio with a more perplexed look on her face.
Clerk: "I don’t understand Miss, this record says male on it.”
Me: "That was more or less true at one time.”
Clerk (now pale with a sick look on her face): “Just a moment, let
me talk to the manager.”
She disappears suddenly into the inner office and after a brief
interlude suddenly people start leaving the office and making mass
exoduses toward the bathroom which conveniently is on the ante room
where I am. Others seeing that the bathroom was full just peeked out
of the door. There were many sets of eyes upon me and I felt rather
mortified. The clerk approaches with a manufactured smile and says,
" Won't you have a seat,” and begins to pour over my record.
The transaction was completed and I received my card promptly in
Appendix 209
the mail. But I still had not learned my lesson and besides really had to
make a public appearance to get my driver’s license changed. This
_ was much more dangerous as my legal status at this point was very
nebulous and poorly defined, putting me at the mercy of the people at
the motor vehicle division. I remembered that they all carried guns
and felt a little alarmed. Phil, aware of the possibility that very bad
things could happen, offered to go with me.
When we arrived the division was set up with three desks numbered
1, 2, and 3, respectively, in large three-foot numbers. There was a
moderate amount of activity at each desk. Anticipating the potential
for chaos I tried to wait until no one was at desk 1 before I approached
it but a guard blankly yelled, "Next step up—Don’t hold up the line.”
Suddenly it was my turn in a crowd of people. Phil was in the
background watching. It was time for a renewal luckily. The interaction
went this way:
Policewoman: "What’s the nature of your business?”
Me: “Renewal and name change.”
I had no idea what they were going to require for proof of change of
sex.
PW: “There is a form for a married woman changing her name."
Me: "I didn’t get married; I’m just changing my name.”
I showed her the court order.
PW: "Fine.”
Me: "I’d also like to change the address and the sex.”
PW: "Fine.”
It seemed she was going to fall asleep as I watched her write on the
top of my application for renewal:
“ Change Name"
"Change Address”
"Change Sex."
PW: "Just move on to the next desk, please.”
Phil told me that at that point our stoical policewoman # 1 turned
sunset red from head to toe. My job now was to carry the paperwork
to the remaining two desks where there was no necessity to show the
court order.
Policewoman # 2 (cursorily looking over the changes needed for
the license): “Let’s see, Change name—OK, Change address—
OK, and .. , Change sex.” She stopped and thought for a
second and looked at me.
"Gee. The division of motor vehicles really messed up this license.
Wrong name, address, and sex."
210 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
She stamped the application.
PW # 2 : "Take this to desk 3.”
A s 1 left Phil overheard Policewoman # 2 say to the now beet-red
# 1 : “I’ve never seen so many mistakes on one license.”
PW # 1 : “ You dummy . . . . That’s one of them transsexuals.”
PW # 2 [blinks): "Oh.”
Nothing eventful happened at desk # 3 .
Had anyone asked, “whom do you think will make the most
bizarre unempathetic response to your transition?” I would have
replied the secretarial pool in the departmental office. I was correct
as I found out later. They vacillated between face-to-face
empathy and a horrored acceptance. Later, as the years passed I think
time cured much and I became rather ordinary to a degree. One thing
was humorous, though. I couldn’t leave town for any amount of time
without rumors floating to the effect that "the surgery” was at
hand. All this was quite predictable.
Our department head, a rather rigid ex-naval officer, had always
disliked me. My advisor once told me that genuine talent threatened
him. With my transition he refused to use feminine gender pronouns
in relation to me. The secretarial pool and students were supportive
enough to discourage this, an act of untold courage for which I will
eternally be grateful. However, even a year later when he absolutely
had to speak of my accomplishments to strangers, as he advertised
the department, he would refer to me as “he” and use my old name.
Looking back on the events I’d have to say that this was certainly
the most uncomfortable time of the transition, and later things
concerning the transition just kept getting easier and easier.
In my eighth letter there are references concerning my first trip to
the psychiatrist with whom I would be working until surgery. I
would like to say that I got to know my therapist and have the
highest respect for him. He is a warm, competent, and intelligent
human being who treated me with the kind of concern that I needed.
I’ll always be grateful to him and will list him as a very special
friend. He never attempted to overwhelm me with what he knew, and
freely admitted what he didn’t know, which to me is one of the
highest virtues. It seems to me that he had a “touch of Zen" philosophy
to him, calmly accepting the fact that there are some things we can
never know and that some problems have no answers. A significant
set of attitudes, because it gave him some gracious qualities, as he
acknowledged his own humanness. He is not wise but shall be. He
reminds me of the saying ."Knowledge comes and wisdom follows."
Appendix 211
He has his knowledge and his wisdom is coming. Suffice it to say that
no one was comfortable on my first visits. But it is a privilege that
-we all understand this now, and have resolved it.
Things were beginning to move along at this point.
The reader w ill notice that priorities are changing. Where some
verification of how I am coming across is still important, I seem to be
more concerned with school and how to get money for surgery;
emphases are changing and my world is beginning to solidify.
I feel embarrassed about what I said about camping in letter 9.
During this period a concern was, gee what about my past and
childhood, Experientially and internally there is a disjointed
relationship betw een what I w as expected to be as a child and what
I am and who I am for that matter. During these months I became
concerned about that. I can live with the disjuncture, but I was
wondering how to communicate in a nonrevealing w ay about my past
to other people. It was in this passage where I was reality testing
and wanted to see the phrase, “when 1 w as a little girl" in print in
the letter. It didn’t feel honest then, it doesn’t feel honest now,
and I’ve found that it isn't necessary for me to say things like that,
so I don't. As far as I know this is the only example of such a reference
that I've ever written. In conversation it's sufficient to say things
like “when I was little” or “when I was young” the following things
h a ppe ne d. . . .
On the w hole my final letters are spent pondering professional and
financial things. It’s notable that gender transition is mentioned but
only in terms of how to go about raising m oney for surgery and how
to get rid of the company. Overall these are the kind of musings that
all graduate students pondering the job market go through. In
short it seem quite normal.
In conclusion, it seem s to me that even w ith m y tendencies tow ard
abbreviation that after so m any pages that there are still some loose
ends le ft unansw ered, so it seem s creative fo r me to m ake up a list
o f questions that I w ould ask a transsexual and an sw er them m yself.
So I shall.
1, A m I "happy"? If so, in w h at ways?
A . I like m yself m ore than I u sed to. I lik e m y b o d y and am
p leased w ith the person I have becom e. It w as an effort that took
active striving and som ehow through trial and error I h ave arrived
at a place that seem s to be fulfilling.
212 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
2. Do you m iss anything from your past?
A . The question once again begs a dichotom y that there are highly
differentiated realm s belonging to m ales and fem ales and that there are
things or gender-related activities that I no longer participate in. It’s
not true. O ne reason I suppose m ight be becau se m y p ast w as suffici­
ently pan-sexual that I’m not doing different things, I’m doing things
differently. It for me is a question o f change of styles m ore than
anything else. I think that people describing m y beh avior w ould
p retty m uch agree.
3. W hat difference do you see in the person that you are and the
person that you exp ected to be going into the transition?
A . I’m m ore alive aitd spontaneous. I'm surprised that people
use the w o rd sophisticated in describing me. I also don ’t see m yself
as being a “ caricatu re” as I expected at the very onset. I'm more
a ttractive than I thought I w ou ld he and m ore real.
4. In terms o f the "p ro ce ss” you w ent through, were there many
surprises?
A . Y e s and no. T h ere: w ere no real surprises other than the fact
that I p erceive as m uch continuity as I do. I didn't leave the depart­
m ent at school or Houston, w h ich in itse lf m akes things seem very
continuous.
5. H ow different is your life?
A . It's different and it’s not different. A s I said before, the changes
are changes o f style rather than areas.
I w ou ld say that I’m more m aternal, m ore into hum an relations,
perhaps m ore patient. B ut here it is also hard to separate the effects
o f the transition and plain m aturation and grow ing up. It’s really
v e ry hard to say w h a t processes are respon sible for w h at changes.
Perhaps I’m underplaying the changes m ore than I w an t to.
I don ’t k n o w that I have been at all successfu l, in putting the true
w id th and depth of w h at I h ave fe lt as I h ave experienced these
things. The reader w ill h ave to be the final judge. I’m too close to the
top ics at hand.
Appendix 213
Postscript: Letter from Rachel, 1977, post-surgery
- I am very happy. At times I wake up at night and remember that
everything has been taken care of and smile to m yself and roll over,
not quite sure that I’m not faintly lum inescent.. . . My doctor
required mammoplasty. Where I was a 32B I am now a 32C.
It’s a little strange but I feel more adequate.
The worst time I had was with urination and defecation. It took
a lot of time to get me off the catheters. But now it seems like all
my imputs and outputs are working fine.
I’ve learned alot about my body and how to keep it going.
I've got several funny stories to tell. Herr Doctors lost several
debates. It was so much fun. They’re not used to it.
For once I’ll feel like I’m as good as you are.
(That's within me—nothing you’ve done).
Love,
Rachel
AN ANALYSIS OF
RACHEL’S LETTERS
AND COMMENTS
W e have been in com m unication w ith R achel from a period in
w h ich she lived as a male through a “ transition” period to the pres­
ent w hen she is a fem ale. During the first period o f our correspon­
dence, betw een our m eeting her (as Paul) in the w in ter and her visit
w ith us (as Rachal) in the spring, w e needed to m ake an effort to
think o f her as fem ale. W e had n ever interacted w ith her as Rachel
and did not kn ow w hether the fem aleness that she had been creating
in her letters w ou ld be enough, com bined w ith a m ore deliberate
fem ale p h ysical appearance, to cause us to see her as fem ale. The
“ w o rk ” w ith w h ich w e approached her gender prior to her visit w as,
for the m ost part, absent once w e saw her, A lth ou gh w e slipped and
called her “ P aul” a couple of times, there w as, on the w hole, little
difficulty in thinking o f her and relating to her w om an-to-w om an
(w hatever that means). In R ach el’s later letters and visits the reality
o f Paul dissolved. The salience o f her fem aleness in the letters
(heightened b y such practices as closing “ in sisterh ood” ) reinforced
the fem aleness o f her presentation w h en w e w ere together and vice
versa.
J
214 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
W e included a fu ll range of R achel's w riting in order to give the
reader a broader sense o f w ho she is and h o w she expresses herself.
In particular, the reader, in seeing that w h at m uch of Rachel w rote
could h ave been w ritten b y any w om an, should gain some apprecia­
tion fo r h o w a sense o f fem alen ess is accom plished b y filtering
m aterial through a fem ale gender attribution. The tone is exp eri­
enced as "fen u n in e” and the content is “ m ade sense o f” because the
letters are seen as fem ale authored.
T h ere is a second and more im portant reason w h y w e included
m aterial about all aspects of R achel's life. W hat is m ost com pelling
about h er letters and com m ents is that over time her preoccupation
w ith transsexualism is replaced by other interests and concerns.
H er gender has becom e an integrated featu re o f her life as it is for
all w om en. No longer is she p reoccupied w ith being seen as a wom an,
but she is concerned n ow w ith w h at kind o f w om an she should
spend h er life being. She has the kind o f concerns w e can read ily
associate w ith any construction of a “norm al" fem ale: W hat type of
clothing w ill express her personal style and philosophy? W hat sexual
orientation should she choose? W hat kind o f w o rk w ill m ake her
happy? She gravitates from a plan to give up her technical w ork
because it reflects an earlier (male] s e lf to integrating those stereo-
ty p ica lly “ m ale" skills into a coherent fem ale self. She n ow ap­
p aren tly enjoys that w ork.
F ollow in g her transition, as her gender becam e m ore natural, she
m ade fe w e r and fe w e r references in her letters and phone calls to
transsexualism . There are m inim al references to her being a trans­
sexual in the com m entary she w ro te fo r this book. R ach el's com ­
m ents co n vey a strong sense that her p ast seem s very rem ote to her
and is difficult fo r her to id en tify w ith. W hile this is not an uncom ­
m on experience, even fo r those w ho do not h ave an extraordinary
history, it is in this particular case suggestive. A distancing o f h erself
from her past coupled w ith a n ew "ru le ” not to tell people about it,
indicates that she is succeeding in constructing a sense of “ natural"
fem aleness not only for others, but fo r h erself as w ell.
R achel has e ve ry reason to w an t to d isso lv e the salience o f her
transsexualism for us and others. T o ask w hether her preoccupation
w ith transsexualism is as slight as h er letters w ould lead us to be­
lieve, is legitim ate, but is relevan t only fo r concerns about p sych o ­
dynam ics, not for concerns about social construction. It cannot be
denied, though, that the concerns that R ach el does verbalize are the
kind that presum e no doubt about w h a t gender one is.
L ike a good ethnom ethodologist, Rachel understands that w hat
Appendix 215
people lo o k for as discrediting or valid atin g inform ation (e.g., h ow
fem inine she is] are actually not w h a t th ey use for deciding her gen­
der, but instead constitute “good reaso n s” for the gender attribution.
In addition, there is evidence in her letters and com m entary o f
h o w p eople construct gender to b e invariant. Th ere w ere a num ber
o f occasions w here people w ere clearly trying to m ake sense out o f
R achel as she changed from Paul. M aking sense did not u su ally mean
acknow led gin g h er gender transform ation. In fact, that w as the last
thing people did: their first m ethod w a s to m ake sense out o f contra­
dictory inform ation in any other possible w ay . She looked different
b ecau se she had cancer or because she had lost a great deal of
w eigh t: she w an ted her credit cards and d river’s licen se changed
because a clerical error had been m ade. ^
U nlike A gn es w ho w as d efen sively adam ant that G arfinkel see her
as alw a ys h aving been fem ale and not m isunderstand the things she
told him (not interpret her p ast as being the p ast o f a m ale), R achel
allow s us to see h ow she is constructing gender at the sam e tim e that
she cred ibly displays it to us. She appears to k n o w that her cred ibil­
ity is not dependent on hiding the construction, and is ve ry clear in
stating that she “ had once been a m ale” and is n o w fem ale. She can
adm it that to say “ w hen I w as a little girl” is dishonest, and unneces­
sary. The language she uses does not hedge the fact that she under­
w en t a rad ical transform ation: “ (being] tw o p eop le," “ becom ing me,'*
“ m y change.” T y p ica l transsexu al jargon lik e “ I w a s a lw a ys a
w om an ” is absent from R a ch el’s letters. A lth ou gh she w ould adm it
to a lw a ys having felt like a wom an, she differentiates gender identity
from gender attribution and recogn izes th at a b elievab le gender
presentation does not depend on a denial o f its evolution. She also
is cognizant that it is an evolution. (Of course, the com parison b e­
tw een A gn es and R achel is not really fair. A gn es m ade her transition
during a m ore “ co n serva tive” era, ahd w e are not p h ysician s w hom
Rachel had to convince o f alw ays "having been a w om an in order to
get surgery.]
R ach el is aw are o f the interaction betw een d isp lay and attribu­
tion in determ ining w h eth er she is really (in a social sense] a w om an
or a man. There is no question that R ach el’s surgery m akes her feel
m ore authentic, but all along she w as able to see that genitals w ould
also be im portant p roof fo r others (particularly others w h o k n ew her
as Paul] o f her essential fem aleness.
There are a num ber o f exam ples in the letters w h ich sh ow the
im portant role other people p layed in creating the legitim acy o f the
fem ale gender for Rachel. T h e w om an at the p arty w h o p erceived
216 Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach
R ach el as a com petitor fo r her man, the w om an w h o asked to b orrow
a tampon, the w om an w h o w arn ed R achel about tearing her nylons,
the m an in the hard w are store w ho com m ented on h er autom otive
interests— all o f these people, kn ow in g nothing about R ach el’s past,
h elp ed create the reality: o f her gender b y confirm ing its cred ibility
through a gender attribution.
Th e beh avior o f those people w h o k n e w R ach el as Paul (and had
to handle her change) illustrates another im portant point. W hat
com es across in the letters is the relative ease w ith w h ich they
seem ed to respond to R achel as fem ale. W e o n ly h av e R ach el’s p er­
ception o f their treatm ent o f her, but this, in itself, is im portant since
it seem s clear th at her percep tion o f the p ositive feed b ack she got
from both strangers and, p rior associates (even b efore she w as d e­
lib era tely presenting h erself as Rachel) w a s cru cial in instigating,
m aintaining, and even a t points accelerating the rate o f transition. It
w as the continual, p erva sive being o f R achel in ev e ry d a y in terac­
tions w h ich created h er fem aleness, n ot ju st the concrete actions
she had to take to change h er legal identity: getting her credit cards
and nam e changed, seeing doctors and preparing for surgery. There
is m uch in R a ch el’s letters w h ich reveals h er understanding o f this.
In lo o kin g o ver h er past, R achel is n o w able to discern that not
e v e ry situation was conflict free, not everyo n e around h er g ave her
u neq uivocal treatm ent as a “re al” w om an. She can see this n o w b e­
cau se she shares the natural attitude and fo r h er as fo r all m em bers
w h o treat gender as a natural fact, constant rein forcem en t o f one’s
“ re al” gender is not n ecessary (and is p oten tially insulting). G ender
m ay n o w be taken fo r granted as som ething th at exists independently
o f a n y concrete interaction.
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 AUTHOR INDEX
Amdur, N. E., 54 Ehrhardt, A., 11, 50, 51, 55, 56, 57, 58,
Angelino, H., 25, 26 6 0 , 61, 63, 66, 70, 71, 74, 80, 86, 140
Asch, S. E., 151 English, D., 42
Enswiller, T ., 18
Bardwick, J., 66 Erikson Foundation, 1 1 7 ,1 1 8 , 1 1 9 ,1 2 2 ,
Barker-Benfield, B., 66 1 2 3 ,1 3 5
Beck, F „ 78 Evans, G., 165
Bem, S., 7, 83
Benedict, R., 29 Feinbloom, D „ 112, 116, 1 2 6 ,1 2 8 , 129,
Benjamin, H., 27, 113 1 3 5 ,1 4 0 ,1 5 8 ,1 6 0 *■
Bentler, P. M „ 105, 153 Forgey, D. O., 25, 26
Birdwhistell, R„ 2, 155, 1 5 6 ,1 5 7 Frank, R., 65
Block, J., 93 Freud, S., 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 100,
Bogdan, R ., 127, 138 109, 1 1 0 ,1 6 9
Borgoras, W., 25, 29, 33, 35, 39 Friedman, R „ 60, 63, 74, 167
Botella Llusia, J., 74 Frisch, R ., 48
Brennan, J. G., 64
Bronfenbrenner, U., 91 Garfinkel, H., 2, 3 ,4 , 1 8 ,1 9 ,1 1 1 , 112,
Broverman, D. M., 67 113, 1 1 4 ,1 1 6 , 1 2 2 ,1 2 3 ,1 2 6 , 136, 140,
Broverman, I., 12 144, 1 5 3 ,1 5 4 ,1 5 5 , 1 5 8 ,1 5 9 , 1 6 8 ,1 6 9
Gerard, P., 78
Cantril, H., 157 Gertz, D., 19
Cao Van L i, 2 6 ,2 7 Goffman, E„ 126
Castenada, C., 5 Goldfoot, D., 62
Churchill, L., 9 Goy, R., 62
Colley, T., 74 Green, R., 1 1 ,9 3 ,9 4 ,9 5 , 110, 1 6 7 ,1 7 2 ,
Crawley, E„ 2 1 ,2 9 , 35, 38 175

Dalton, K., 67 Hampson, J. G., 70, 71

D'Andrade, R. G.. 24 Hampson, J. L., 70
Davenport, W., 36 Hanley, D., 52
Deaux, K„ 1 8 ,1 6 2 Hassrick, R. B., 25, 29
Demause, U , 82 Hastorf, A., 157
Denig, E, T „ 29, 36 Haviland, J. M., 149, 157
Denmark, F., 58 Heilbrun, A. B., 100
Devereux, G., 25, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 38, Heiman, E, M„ 26, 27
39. 1 4 6 ,1 4 9 Henley, N „ 128
Dimen-Schein, M., 41 Herschberger, R., 6 2 ,1 2 9
Douglas, J., 4 Hill, W. W„ 21, 25, 30, 31, 34. 35
Dworkin, A., 74 Hoebel, E. A., 29, 35
Hollingworth, L. S,, 67
Edgerton, R. B., 22, 23, 26, 35 Honigmann, J. J., 21
Ehrenreich, 8., 42 Horney, K „ 90, 1 0 0 ,1 1 0

227

]
228 Auth or Index Author Index 229

Husserl, E., 5 Morris, D., 61 Taylor, 42, 46, 50, 51, 78 Weiner, B., 18
Hutt, C„ 12, 24, 74, 75 Morris, J., 116, 120, 178 Thompson, S. K., 1 0 3 ,1 0 5 , 153 Weintraub, M., 166
Muensterberger, W., 35 Thorne, B., 19, 128
West, C., 18
Imperato-McGinley, J„ 79 Toulmin, S., 43
West, D. J., 33
Newton, E., 14, 41, 1 2 9 ,1 6 8 Tucker, P., 80
Westermarck, E., 22, 30
Jacklin, C., 12, 72, 79, 89, 93, 98, 109 Nisbett, R., 18 Westman, J., 58
Jones, E., 18 Ullian, D., 102
Whorf, B. L., 157
Oakley, A., 75 Winick, C., 56
Kando.T., 1 2 2 ,1 2 9 ,1 3 4 Ogunro, C., 63, 71 Valins, S., 18
Wittgenstein, L., 3
Kanouse, A., 18 Opler, M. E .,3 2 Vande Wiele, R., 60, 74
Wood, H„ 4 ,1 5 5 , 169
Karlen, A., 25, 27, 29, 30, 32, 35, 39 Orne, M., 60 Voorhies, B., 23, 29
Katcher, A., 1 0 5 ,1 5 2 Ounstead, C., 4 2 ,4 6 , 5 0 ,5 1 ,7 8 Yorburg, B., 1 1 ,1 2 , 24
Katz, P. A., 149
Kelley, H„ 18 ;i Paige, K„ 67 Wachtel, S. S., 78
Zalk, S. R., 149
Key, M. R., 128 Parlee, M. B., 67 Walzer, S., 78
Zarwell, D., 58
Kluckhohn, C„ 31 Parsons, E. C., 28, 29, 34, 35 Waters, J., 58
Zimmerman, D., 18
Koeske, G., 67 Pauly, I. B., 6 4 ,1 1 5 , 117, 118 Weideger, P., 66
Zugar, B., 71, 75
Koeske, R .,6 7 Pelto, P. J., 30
Kohl berg, L. A., 86, 92, 9 6 ,9 7 , 98[ 100, Person, E., 86, 8 9 ,9 1 ,1 1 1
101, 102, 103, 105, 109, 110, 140, 167 Piaget, J., 96
Kroeber, A. 22 Prince, V ., 120
Kuhn, T. S., 43, 80, 101
Raymond, J., 140
Lang, T ., 65 Rebecca, M., 83
LeGuin, U., 166 Reichard, G., 28, 30, 38
Lev-Ran, A., 63, 64, 70 Reinisch, J., 61, 63, 64, 79
Lewis, M., 72, 166 Rekers, G. A ., 7, 110
Lewis, V. I., 60 Rensberger, B., 43
Lillie, F. R „ 74 Rose, R. M., 60
Lopata, H. Z., 19 Rosenberg, B., 7, 10, 24, 25
Lovass, O. I., 7 , 110 Rosenthal, R., 60
Lowie, R. H., 35 Rubin, G., 80, 1 6 3 ,1 6 9
Lurie, N. O., 31, 35 Rubin, J. Z „ 162
Lyon, M. F., 50
Sacks, H., 18
McArthur, J., 48 Sagarin, E., 79
Maccoby, E., 12, 72, 89, 9 3 ,9 8 ,1 0 9 Schneider, D. M ., 77
McClintock, M., 73 Seavey, C. A ., 149,161
M cllwraith, T ., 29 Shedd, C. L., 25, 26
McKenna, W., 67 Sherfey, M. J., 79
Malinowski, B., 89 Sherman, J., 61
Martin, M. K., 23, 29 Skinner, A ., 25
Mead, M,, 23, 24, 89 Stevenson, M. C., 29, 33, 34
Mehan, H„ 4, 1 5 5 ,1 6 9 Stoller, R. J., 7 ,8 ,1 0 , 11, 1 3 ,5 5 ,9 0 ,1 0 0 ,
Miller, J. B,, 109 1 1 2 ,1 1 5 ,1 4 0
M illet, K., 24 Strouse, J., 109
Mischel, W„ 9 1 ,9 2 , 93, 109 Sulcov, M. B., 112, 115, 125, 133, 158
Money, J., 11, 50, 51, 55, 56, 57, 58, 80, Sutton-Smith, B., 7 ,1 0 , 24, 25
61, 63, 64, 66, 70, 71, 74, 79, 80, 86, Sverdrup, H. U., 33, 34
140 Sweet, S., 110
 SUBJECT INDEX
Adrenogenital syndrome, 60—61, 63, 64
Androcentrism, in gender attribution,
1 4 9 -1 5 0
and genitals, 153
in psychological theory, 99—100
as social construction, 164
see also Sexism
Androgen insensitivity syndrome, 49 —50,
56, 6 3 ,7 1 , 116
Androgyny, 8 3 ,1 6 3 —164, 165
Attribution theory, 18
Barr bodies, 53
Bardache, defined, 24—26
explanations for, 29
methodological problems, 28 —32
see also Cross dressing; Gender attribu­
tion; Gender dichotomy; Gender
identity; and Gender role
Children, drawings by, 81, 103—108, 110—
111
ideas about gender, 81—82, 92—93, 9 4 —
95, 96, 100, 1 0 1 -1 0 9 , 110
Chromosomes, 47
abnormalities, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 78
dichotomization of, 74
and sports, 52—55, 78—79
see also Gender attribution; Gender
identity;and Gender role
Cognitive developmental theory, 96—99
critique of, 98—99
see also Gender attribution; Gender
identity ;and Gender role
Common sense, as grounds for science, 4,
68, 7 3 - 7 8 , 99, 1 6 2 -1 6 3
Conditions of failure, 3, 157, 159
Constancy, of gender, 96 —97, 1 0 2 ,1 0 7 —
109, 120, 122
of objects, 4, 5
Cross-dressing, 14, 19—20, 199—200
by berdache, 28
see also Female impersonators;
Transvestism
Documentary method, 142—145, 168
Erikson Foundation, 117
Ethnomethodology, 18, 31, 169
explained, 4 —5
%
Female impersonators, 128—1 2 9 ,1 6 8 —169.
See also Cross-dressing
Female and male, defined, 2, 3, 76
Femininity and masculinity, 7, 54
defined, 15—16
as fact for psychology, 83
Gender, defined, 7, 78
Gender assignment, defined, 8
genitals as criteria for, 59
universality of, 36—37
Gender attribution, in animals, 62
biological criteria for, 76
chromosomes as criteria for, 51—55
and cognitive developmental theory,
9 8 -9 9
and cultural genitals, 155
defined, 2
development of, 103—109
and "gender” differentiation, 166—167
genitals as criteria for, 58—59
hormones as criteria for, 68
importance of, 2 , 1 3 , 1 5 —17
as interactive process, 126—139
internal organs as criteria for, 56
maintenance of, 137—1 3 9 ,1 4 1 , 159—161,
2 0 8 - 2 1 0 ,2 1 5 - 2 1 6
and overlay study, 145—153, 168
and psychoanalytic theory, 88—89
rules for, 5, 6, 150, 1 5 7 -1 5 9 ,1 6 9
and social learning theory, 92
universality of, 23, 32—36, 38, 80
Gender dichotomy, 3 ,1 2 ,1 3 ,5 5 ,9 9 ,1 3 9 ,1 5 7
231
232 Subject Index
in aminals, 62
biological grounds for, 42 —43
and hormones, 73 —74
as social construction, 161 —167
universality of, 23—24, 27
Gender identity, children's ideas about,
101-102
and cognitive developmental theory,
9 6 -9 7
critical period for, 9—10
defined, 8
effects of chromosomes on, 49 —50
effects of external reproductive organs
on, 57
effects of hormones on, 63—65
effects of internal reproductive organs
on, 55—56
and gender constancy, 120
and psychoanalytic theory, 85—86* 90
as social construction, 75—76
and social learning theory, 92, 93 .
universality of, 37
Gender invariance, see Constancy
Gender role, animal studies, 61—63
children's ideas about, 102—103
and cognitive developmental theory, 97
as criteria for transsexualism, 117—118
defined, 11—1 2 ,1 9
effects of chromosomes on, 50—51
effects of external reproductive*organs
on, 57—58
effects of hormones on, 65—68, 71 —72
effects of internal reproductive organs
on, 56
and psychoanalytic theory, 88
and social learning theory, 9 2 ,9 3
universality of, 23—24, 38
Gender-role identity, defined, 10,11
Genitals, attribution of, 145
cultural, 153—155
differential reality of, 150—153
and transsexualism, 1 2 0 ,1 2 2 —123
see also Gender attribution; Gender
identity; and Gender role
Gloss, 158
defined, 18—19
Good reasons, adults', 1 0 6 ,1 0 7 ,1 6 1
biological criteria as, 76—77
children's, 1 0 3 ,1 0 5 -1 0 7
and transsexualism, 133—135, 215
Subject Index 233
Guevedoces, 79 Reflexivity, 155, 158
Transsexualism, compared to berdache,
Reproductive organs, see Gender attribu­
Hermaphroditism, 1, 23, 70, 78, 115 2 6 -2 7 , 3 9 -4 0
tio n ; Gender identity; Gender role;
Potok, 2 2 -2 3 defined, 1 3 -1 4 , 115
and Genitals
progestin-induced, 63 etiology of, 6 4 , 9 3 - 9 5 ,1 1 0 ,1 1 7
Heterosexual, 57 Sex, defined, 7 and gender attribution, 126—139
defined, 1 5 and gender constancy, 122
Sex change, see Transsexualism
Homosexual, berdache as, 25, 28 legal criteria for, 118—1 2 0 ,1 4 0
Sex differences, 9 3 ,1 0 9 —110, 163. See
defined, 15 medical criteria for, 116—117
also Gender role
i Hormones, 48—49, 79 and natural attitude, 1 1 4 ,1 2 1 —125
Sexism, 163—164. See also Androcentrism
and behavior, 5 8 -6 0 , 63, 66, 7 2 - 7 3 Sex role, see Gender role and psychoanalytic theory, 89
and brain structures, 64—66, 73 studies of, 112
Sex test, see Chromosomes, and sports
dichotomization of, 73—74 see also Gender role; Genitals
Sexual reproduction, 45—47, 78
see also Adrenogenital syndrome; and gender, 165—166
Transvestism, and berdache,
Androgen insensitivity syndrome; 25
Social learning theory, 9 1 —95
Gender identity; and Gender role defined, 14
critique of, 95, 97—98
Stereotype, defined, 12 see also Cross-dressing; Female
Identification, and cognitive developmental impersonators
theory, 97
defined, 91
and psychoanalytic theory, 85—8 7 ,9 0
and social learning theory, 92
Incorrigible propositions, 5 ,1 0 ,4 3 , 74, 77,
99, 101, 106, 108, 1 6 1 ,1 6 2
defined, 4
Intersexual, see Hermaphroditism
Language, of transexuals, 128
Lyon hypothesis, 50
Male, see Female and male
Masculinity, see Femininity and masculinity
Menstrual cycle, 64, 66—68
Natural attitude, defined, 4
and passing, 126, 139
toward gender, 113—114, 140, 1 5 4 ,1 6 0 ,
162, 216
see also Transsexualism
Nonverbal behavior, 1 5 5 -1 5 7
Paradigms, 80, 100—101
Passing, 1 2 5 -1 2 8 ,1 3 2 ,1 3 3 ,1 3 6 - 1 3 7 ,1 3 9
defined, 19
Phenomenology, 5, 113
Prenatal development, 47—48
Psychoanalytic theory, 8 4 —91, 109, 169
critique of, 8 9 —91, 97
Psychosexual neutrality, 70—71
Pubertal development, 4 8 —49