PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS

DESIGN AND ENGINEERING PRACTICE

MANUAL

MANAGING SYSTEM INTEGRITY FOR LIQUID

HYDROCARBON PIPELINES

(AMENDMENTS/SUPPLEMENTS TO API 1160-2001)

PTS 30.40.60.14
February 2010

© 2010 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD (PETRONAS)

All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or
by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the permission of the copyright
owner.
 PTS 30.40.60.14
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PREFACE

PETRONAS Technical Standards (PTS) publications reflect the views, at the time of publication,
of PETRONAS OPUs/Divisions.

They are based on the experience acquired during the involvement with the design, construction,
operation and maintenance of processing units and facilities. Where appropriate they are based
on, or reference is made to, national and international standards and codes of practice.

The objective is to set the recommended standard for good technical practice to be applied by
PETRONAS' OPUs in oil and gas production facilities, refineries, gas processing plants, chemical
plants, marketing facilities or any other such facility, and thereby to achieve maximum technical
and economic benefit from standardisation.

The information set forth in these publications is provided to users for their consideration and
decision to implement. This is of particular importance where PTS may not cover every
requirement or diversity of condition at each locality. The system of PTS is expected to be
sufficiently flexible to allow individual operating units to adapt the information set forth in PTS to
their own environment and requirements.

When Contractors or Manufacturers/Suppliers use PTS they shall be solely responsible for the
quality of work and the attainment of the required design and engineering standards. In particular,
for those requirements not specifically covered, the Company will expect them to follow those
design and engineering practices which will achieve the same level of integrity as reflected in the
PTS. If in doubt, the Contractor or Manufacturer/Supplier shall, without detracting from his own
responsibility, consult the Company or its technical advisor.

The right to use PTS rests with three categories of users:

1) PETRONAS and its affiliates.

2) Other parties who are authorised to use PTS subject to appropriate contractual
arrangements.
3) Contractors/subcontractors and Manufacturers/Suppliers under a contract with
users referred to under 1) and 2) which requires that tenders for projects,
materials supplied or - generally - work performed on behalf of the said users
comply with the relevant standards.

Subject to any particular terms and conditions as may be set forth in specific agreements with
users, PETRONAS disclaims any liability of whatsoever nature for any damage (including injury
or death) suffered by any company or person whomsoever as a result of or in connection with the
use, application or implementation of any PTS, combination of PTS or any part thereof. The
benefit of this disclaimer shall inure in all respects to PETRONAS and/or any company affiliated
to PETRONAS that may issue PTS or require the use of PTS.

Without prejudice to any specific terms in respect of confidentiality under relevant contractual
arrangements, PTS shall not, without the prior written consent of PETRONAS, be disclosed by
users to any company or person whomsoever and the PTS shall be used exclusively for the
purpose they have been provided to the user. They shall be returned after use, including any
copies which shall only be made by users with the express prior written consent of PETRONAS.

The copyright of PTS vests in PETRONAS. Users shall arrange for PTS to be held in safe
custody and PETRONAS may at any time require information satisfactory to PETRONAS in order
to ascertain how users implement this requirement.
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Document No : PTS 30.40.60.14

Document Title : Managing System Integrity for Hazardous Liquid Pipelines
(Amendments/Supplements to API 1160-2001)

This is a controlled document

Acknowledgement
This document was jointly prepared with contribution from the following list of personnel

1. M Nazmi M Ali Principal Engineer (Pipeline Integrity) PGB

2. M Ashri Mustapha Principal Engineer (Pipeline Integrity) PCSB
3. Zaabah Abdullah Staff Engineer (Pipeline Integrity) PGB
4. Purnomo Setyawendha Senior Pipeline Engineer PCSB
5. Nestor Mendoza Pipeline Head PCSB
6. Raja Zahirudin Raja Ismail Staff Engineer (Pipeline Integrity) PCSB
7. Ahmad Sirwan Mat Tuselim Staff Engineer (Pipeline Design) GTS
8. Rosman Ariffin Staff Engineer (Pipeline Design) GTS
9. Azlan Abdul Rashid Engineering Manager PS Pipeline SB
10. M Shuhairy Alwi Mechanical Engineer PS Pipeline SB
11. M Nasahie Akbar Ali Engineering Manager PGB
12. M Nazri M Zain Pipeline Head PCSB
13. M Aidi Rais Senior Pipeline Engineer PCSB
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................6

1.1 SCOPE........................................................................................................................6
1.2 DISTRIBUTION, INTENDED USE AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS ...........6
1.3 DEFINITIONS .............................................................................................................6
1.4 CROSS-REFERENCES .............................................................................................7

PART II AMENDMENTS/SUPPLEMENTS TO API 1160 …….............................................8

1 INTRODUCTION………………………………………...............................................8

2 SCOPE……………………………………..………………………………………………..8

3 REFERENCES………………………………………………………………………………9

4 TERMS, DEFINITIONS, AND ACRONYMS……………………………………………..9

5 INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM…………………………………...………..…10

6 HIGH CONSEQUENCE AREAS………………………………………………………….11

7 DATA GATHERING, REVIEW, AND INTEGRATION………………………………….12

8 RISK ASSESSMENT IMPLEMENTATION…………………………………………….13

9 INITIAL BASELINE ASSESSMENT PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND

IMPLEMENTATION………………………………………..………………………………16

10 MITIGATION OPTIONS…………………………………………………..…………….…18

12 INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT OF PIPELINE PUMP STATIONS AND

TERMINALS………………………………………………………………………………..19

13 PROGRAM EVALUATION……………………………………………….….…………… 20

14 MANAGING CHANGE IN AN INTEGRITY PROGRAM………….….…………………21

Appendix B – Repair Strategies ……………………………………………………….....23

PART III REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………………...24

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PART I INTRODUCTION

1.1 SCOPE

This PTS specifies requirements and gives recommendations for managing the
integrity of Liquid hydrocarbon pipelines system in onshore and offshore
installations. This PTS is not applicable to Gas pipelines system.

Part II of this PTS provides amendments and supplements to clauses of API

1160. The Section numbering in Part II follows that of API 1160. Where clauses
of API 1160 are not amended or supplemented by this PTS they shall apply as
written.

Design of pipeline system is addressed in PTS 20.214.

1.2 DISTRIBUTION, INTENDED USE AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise authorised by PETRONAS, the distribution of this PTS is

confined to companies forming part of PETRONAS or managed by a Group
company, and to Contractors and Manufacturers/Suppliers nominated by them.

This PTS is intended for use in oil refineries, gas plants, chemical plants, oil and
gas production facilities, supply/marketing installations, and pipelines system
installations within PETRONAS Group.

If national and/or local regulations exist in which some of the requirements may
be more stringent than in this PTS, the Contractor shall determine by careful
scrutiny which of the requirements are more stringent and which combination of
requirements will be acceptable as regards safety, environmental, economic, and
legal aspects. In all cases, the Contractor shall inform the Company of any
deviation from the requirements of this PTS which is considered to be necessary
in order to comply with national and/or local regulations. The Company may then
negotiate with the Authorities concerned with the object of obtaining agreement
to follow this PTS as closely as possible.

1.3 DEFINITIONS

1.3.1 General definitions

The Authorities are governing bodies that regulate the operation and
maintenance of liquid hydrocarbon pipeline systems.

The Company is the party which owns part or all of the pipeline systems. The
Company will generally specify the technical requirements. The Company may
also include an agent or consultant authorised to act for, and on behalf of, the
Company.

The Contractor is the party which engaged by the Company to carry out integrity
management and/or maintenance and/or operation activities for the pipeline
systems.. The Company may undertake all or part of the duties of the Contractor.

The Consultant is the party which provides technical consultancy services and
expertise to perform duties specified by the Company.
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The Manufacturer is the party which manufactures and/or supplies equipment to
perform duties specified by the Company.

The Operator is the party that owns or operate the pipeline system jointly with
the Company or otherwise.

The Vendor is the party which supplies equipment and/or services to perform the
duties specified by the Company.

The word shall indicate a requirement.

The word should indicate a recommendation.

1.3.2 Specific definitions

Pipeline Integrity Management System (PIMS) is an integrated management

system consisting of documentation, database and tools established for the
purpose of managing integrity of Liquid Hydrocarbon pipeline systems throughout
its life cycle.

Onshore Pipeline System: all parts of physical facilities including: pipe, valves,
fittings, flanges (including bolting and gaskets), regulators, pressure vessels,
pulsation dampeners, relief valves, and other appurtenances attached to pipe;
compressor units; metering stations; regulator stations; and fabricated
assemblies. Included within this definition are Liquid Hydrocarbon transmission
and gathering lines, transporting Liquid Hydrocarbon from production facilities to
onshore locations, and Liquid Hydrocarbon storage equipment of the closed-pipe
type, which is fabricated or forged from pipe or fabricated from pipe and fittings

Offshore Pipeline System: all components of a pipeline installed offshore for

transporting Liquid Hydrocarbon other than production facility piping. Tanker and
barge loading hoses are not considered as part of offshore pipeline system i.e.
per Chapter IX of ASME B31.4-2002.

1.4 CROSS-REFERENCES

Where cross-references to other parts of this PTS are made, the referenced
section number is shown in brackets. Other documents referenced in this PTS
are listed in (Part III).
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PART II AMENDMENTS/SUPPLEMENTS TO API 1160-2001

1 Introduction

1.1 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES

Page 1, 3rd paragraph, last statement

The following statement to be deleted,

“This standard also supports the development of integrity management programs

required under Title 49 CFR 195.452 of the federal pipeline safety system regulations.

Page 1, 4th paragraph, last statement

Amend the statement as follows,

“Users of this standard should be familiar with the pipeline safety regulations (Title 49
CFR Part 195 Petroleum (Safety Measures) Act 1984), including the requirements for
pipeline operators to have a written pipeline integrity program, and to conduct a baseline
assessment and periodic reassessments of pipeline integrity management.”

2 Scope

Page 2, 1st Paragraph

Amend the paragraph as follows,

“This standard is applicable to pipeline systems used to transport hazardous liquids as

defined in Title 49 CFR 195.2 Petroleum (Safety Measures) Act 1984. The use of this
standard is not limited to pipelines regulated under Title 49 CFT 195.2 Petroleum (Safety
Measures) Act 1984, and the principles embodied in integrity management are applicable
to all pipeline systems.”

Page 2, 2nd Paragraph

Amend the paragraph as follows,

The guidance is specific to the onshore & offshore pipeline, line pipe along the right-of-
way, from scraper trap to scraper trap, but the process and approach can and should be
applied to all pipeline facilities, including pipeline stations, terminals and delivery facilities
associated with pipeline systems. Certain sections of this standard provide guidance
specific to pipeline stations, terminals, and delivery facilities.
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3 References

3.1 REFERENCE CODES, GUIDELINES AND STANDARS

Page 2, delete and replace as follow,

DOT
49 CFR Part 195 Transportation of Hazardous Liquids by Pipeline

& replace with,

Malaysian Governing Act

PSMA 1984 Petroleum (Safety Measures) Act 1984

4 Terms, Definitions, and Acronyms

Page 3 & Page 4, the amendments are as follows,

current established maximum operating pressure: The actual maximum operating

pressure (MOP) of the pipeline, sometimes different from the design MAOP. The current
established MOP may be set due to the necessity to derate a pipeline or for other
reasons.

High Consequences Areas (HCA): Those locations where a pipeline release might have
a significant adverse effect on an unusually sensitive area (See CFR 195.6) , a high
population area, an other populated area, a commercially navigable waterway, for
offshore pipeline 1km (one) from shoreline taken during lowest tide and Zone 2.This
definition is specific regulations in the United States, see 49 CFR 195.

MAOP: Maximum allowable operating pressure.

“Operator: A person who owns or operates pipeline facilities. Definition based on 49

CFR 195)

safe operating pressure: The pressure, calculated using remaining strength of corroded
pipeline formulas, where all corroded regions will withstand a pressure equal to a stress
level of 1.39 times the maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP).

“stand-up (operational) test: A pressure test to determine the leak tightness of a

pipeline or pipeline segment. This test is typically conducted with product (or water) at a
pressure significantly less than hydrostatic test pressure required by 49 CFR Part
195.304 ASME B31.4 (1.25 times maximum operating pressure [MOP]) and does not
exceed the MAOP of the pipe. A pipeline company may conduct this test after a pipeline
is lined up but prior to beginning the movement (delivery).”

Zone 2 – is the portion(s) of pipeline system located at an offshore platform from pig trap
down to the riser bottom bend at the seabed including an extra length of pipe of at least
five times pipe diameters beyond the riser bottom bend or fitting. By virtue of the wide
variety of configurations, the exact location of the transition between riser and subsea
pipeline may be technically selected on a case by case basis. Further, should there be
potential failures, the location of the transition should be derived from a qualitative risk
assessment and agreed upon by the Company.
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5 Integrity Management Program

5.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Page 4, 2nd paragraph, 1st statement:

Amend the statement as follows,

“Developing and implementing an integrity management program is required under the
federal safety regulations in 49 CFR 195.452. under PSMA for the safe and reliable
operations of a pipeline system.”

5.2 FRAMEWORK ELEMENTS

Page 5, 1st paragraph, delete the 4th statement.

“This analysis is required by 49 CFR 195.452. Guidance for making these

determinations is provided in Section 6 of this standard.”

Page 6, 2nd paragraph, last statement

Delete the following,

“Because of the ,limited time in which to prepare the Baseline Assessment Plan is
required by 49 CFR 195.452, some operators may find a screening approach as the most
practical approach to priotise line segments for integrity assessment.”

Page 6, 5th paragraph, 3rd paragraph

Amend the statement as follows,

“For pipeline segments that could affects HCAs, 49 CFR 195.452 requires that a
documented baseline assessment plan should to be prepared which identifies the internal
inline inspection technique(s), pressure testing, or other technology that will be used to
assess the line integrity, the scheduled for conducting these assessments, and the
justification for the integrity method selected.
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6 High Consequences Areas (HCA)

6.1 INDENTIFYING HIGH CONSEQUANCE AREAS

High consequence areas, commonly called HCAs, are those locations where a pipeline
spill might have significant adverse impacts to population, the environment, or
commercial navigation. HCAs are defined under 49 CFR Part 195.450 and are described
in the foreword to this standard. The definitions for various types of HCAs are
periodically reevaluated and operators should be familiar with the current regulations for
managing pipeline system integrity and the definitions of HCAs. The federal government,
through the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), makes maps and databases describing
HCAs available to the pipeline industry and to the public through the OPS website. An
operator must consider the federally prescribed HCAs in developing a pipeline integrity
management program. The physical location of some HCAs will change over time as
new population and environmental resource data becomes available. Accordingly, the
maps delineating the locations of HCAs are expected to be updated. Hence, it is
important that the operator periodically ensure that its integrity management program
considers the most recent HCA location information. provided by the government.

 
6.4 DOCUMENTING HCA INFORMATION

Delete the paragraph and replace with the following statement,

Pipeline Operator shall keep HCA information in database system. The information shall
be kept updated and reviewed annually.

HCA maps and databases provided by the Office of Pipeline Safety will include
information about the quality of the HCA map or data. Commonly called “meta data” or
data about the data, operators should document the meta data for the HCA information at
the time they acquire the HCA information from the Office of Pipeline Safety or other
sources. In addition to HCA information obtained from OPS, operators must document
any HCA areas identified during routine operator conducted risk assessments, right-of-
way surveillance or other activity related to HCAs.
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7 Data Gathering, Review, and Integration

7.1 Data Sources

Page 8, 2nd paragraph,

Amend the statement as follows,

“Design,  material,  and  construction  records. Design information is used to identify
the design pressure and other loads, nominal pipe diameter, and design wall thickness.
The material information should include the grade of steel, type of weld, type of welding
procedure, type of coating, and pipe manufacturer, as well as all available material
certification records. Important construction and inspection records include as-built
drawings, pipe laying procedures, procedures for making field bends and welds, type of
backfill, and depth of cover and weld map/book. Final documentations requirement as
mention in sub-section 7.2.2 ”

Page 8, 4th paragraph,

Amend the statement as follows,

“Operation,  maintenance,  inspection,  and  repair  records. Operating data and
control procedures are used to identify maximum operating pressures (MOPs) and
pressure fluctuations, commodities transported, operating temperatures, control and
communications hardware and software, operator qualification and training, etc.
Maintenance records are used to determine the effectiveness of corrosion protection and
other activities to assure pipeline integrity. In-line and other inspection data are used to
identify areas of corrosion, dents, cracks, and other defects. Repair records identify
problems that have occurred in the past and could potentially occur in the future. These
records also identify the specific locations where these problems have been eliminated in
the system. Records or reports such as lesson learnt and main cause of repair works
will be an added advantage to the data source.

A comprehensive database system will benefits the Pipeline Operator to store all the
above information and readily accessible whenever required.

7.2.2 Locating Required Data

Revised / include as follows:

To include
• Project handover documentations
• Corrosion Design Basis Memorandum (CDBM)
• Corrosion Management Plan (CMP)
• Pipeline Design Basis
• X-Ray film & reports
• Weldbook/weldmap
• Design change record/notice
• Precomm & commissioning records
• Management of Change (MOC) records
• Operations & Maintenance Manual
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8 Risk Assessment Implementation

8.1 DEVELOPING A RISK ASSESSMENT APPROACH

Page 13, 4th paragraph

Amend the statement as follows,

The timeliness of the data. Conditions along the pipeline change over time. Information

types such as population density, and third-party excavation activity and marine activities
should be monitored and updated for use in risk assessments. Similarly cathodic
protection data that is collected periodically and reviewed annually should be
incorporated into risk assessments. The user must take into account the changing
conditions of key data when performing and using the results of risk assessments in
decision making.

8.7 CORE RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLGY COMPONENTS

Page 16, 6th paragraph,

Amend the statement as follows,

In many risk assessment method, the likelihood is estimated using combination of

variables in categories such as the following:

• External corrosion
• Internal corrosion
• TPD
• Ground movement
• Design & materials
• System Operations/maintenance & inspection
• Construction execution plan i.e. Offshore Pipeline laying
• Free Spanning
• Internal erosion
• Drop Object
• On bottom stability
• Anchor/Trawler
• Seismic effect
• Product compositions

The consequence is estimated as a combination of variables in categories such as:

ƒ Environmental receptors
ƒ Population People
ƒ Business interruption: economic impact to company revenue and profit.
ƒ Spill size
ƒ Spill spread
ƒ Product hazard
ƒ Company & Operator image/ reputation
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Page 17, Figure 8.2 – amend the simplified risk assessment hierarchy as follows

Excavation

Anchor
drag/ drop

Dropped
object

Trawling
activities

Intrusion

Page 17, 2nd paragraph

Amend the following statement as follows

Factors that drive these decisions include:

ƒ Scope of the risk assessment: i.e., which assets are included/ excluded from the
assessment.
ƒ Equipment boundaries such as pump stations or block valves.
ƒ Geographical boundaries such as state lines or rivers.
ƒ Desired minimum/maximum length of any one segment (i.e., ft, mile, etc.).
ƒ How system databases are set up and organized; this is important since data will be
transferred from one or several databases into the risk assessment method.
ƒ Design changes (i.e., grade, wall thickness, coating type, etc.).
ƒ Population density/type changes.
ƒ The presence of environmentally sensitive or population sensitive (i.e., schools,
churches, etc.) areas.
ƒ Offshore pipeline can be segmentized based on the following i.e. riser above water,
riser below water, subsea pipeline zoning, shore approach etc.
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Page 18, 2nd paragraph

Amend the following statement as follows

Some additional criteria to evaluate the results of a risk analysis:

ƒ Are the uncertain data (anomalies) been verified by means of actual measured or
site verification?
ƒ Are the data and analyses handled competently and consistently throughout the
system? (Can the logic be readily followed?)
ƒ Is the analysis presented in an organized and useful manner?
ƒ Are all assumptions identified and explained?
ƒ Are major uncertainties (e.g., due to missing data) identified?
ƒ Do evidence, analysis, and argument adequately support conclusions and
recommendations?

8.11 CONTINUOUS RISK ASSESSMENT

Page 21, 3rd paragraph

Add to the last bullet as follows

Some of the factors an operator should consider in determining when to perform a re-
assessment of a specific pipeline system or segment include:

ƒ Number of repairs required during the previous inspection, testing, and mitigation
activity.
ƒ Type of defects found during previous inspections and testing.
ƒ Causes of defects found during previous inspections and testing.
ƒ Rate of degradation of the pipeline (when known).
ƒ Potential consequences of the most likely pipeline failures.
ƒ Quantity and quality of information known about the pipeline. (The less information
that is available means a greater uncertainty in understanding the risk. Hence,
potentially significant risks could be unrecognized).
ƒ Pipeline sections exhibiting characteristics in common to newly discovered pipeline
releases.
ƒ Change in service or significant change in operating parameters.
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9 Initial Baseline Assessment Plan - Development and Implementation

9.1 INITIAL BASELINE PLAN

Page 21, 1st paragraph,

Add the following statement as follows,

“The baseline plan is develop as a result of initial data gathering and risk assessment
(see section 7 and 8), and consists of an initial inspection plan and possibly some
mitigation activities including a schedule for these activities. Baseline inspections shall
be conducted prior to introduction of Liquid hydrocarbon to the pipeline system.

Page 21, 3rd paragraph,

Amend the statement as follows

“The operator should consider the following factors in developing the baseline plan:

1. Pipeline anomalies ….

2. Various inspection techniques typically used for underground pipelines / subsea

pipeline.

3. Methodology…

4. Pipeline repair methodologies….

9.4.2 Setting Re-Inspection Intervals

Page 25, 1st paragraph,

Amend the last statement as follows,

“Other methods for setting re-inspection intervals may be appropriate, for example to
conduct RBI.”

Page 25, 2nd paragraph,

Amend the last statement as follows,

“API 570 Piping Inspection Code, Section 7.1 – Corrosion Rate Determination or other
equivalent standard, offers guidance in this area.

9.5 Hydrostatic Testing

9.5.1 Value of Hydrostatic Testing

2nd para, page 25

Hydrostatic testing validates integrity at the time of the test by demonstrating the integrity
of a pipeline with respect to the established MAOP and the leak tightness of a pipeline.
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9.6 STRATERGY FOR RESPONDING TO ANAMOLIES IDENTIFIED BY IN-LINE

INSPECTIONS

Page 29, Delete last statement.

ASME/ANSI B31.4 Section 451.6 provides specific limits for disposition of certain defects.
49 CFR Part 195.452 provides specific limits for the disposition of certain defects.

9.7 REPAIR METHODS

Page 29, 1st paragraph,

Amend the statement as follows,

Inspections conducted per an operator’s integrity management plan will identify
anomalies that must be evaluated. A number of these anomalies will require repair. This
section and Appendix B provide guidance for repair. The information in this standard
should not be considered a complete summary of every type of repair, but an overview of
some of the more frequently used techniques in the industry today. In the absence of
detailed company procedures for pipe replacement or repair, the Pipeline In-service
Repair Manual should be consulted and approvals of proposed method shall be obtained
from principal of related discipline. PTS 31.40.60.12 Pipeline Repairs (Supplement to
ANSI/ASME B31.4 and B31.8) and/or ASME B31.8 requirements and/or other proven
international recognized code and standard and/or industry’s best practices shall be
considered in the pipeline repair works.

Page 29, 3rd paragraph

All repairs will be made with materials that meet or exceed the MAOP of the impacted
portion of the pipeline and comply with applicable regulations.
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10 Mitigation Options

10.1 PREVENTION OF THIRD-PARTY DAMAGE

Amend as follow,
TPD is a major cause of pipeline releases. For example, Current US DOT data indicates
that roughly one-quarter of all reported pipeline incidents are caused by TPD. The
following mitigation activities should be considered.

Page 29, Amend as follows,

10.1.1 One-call Utility Location Systems One Call Emergency Number

Each Pipeline Operators shall have designated One Call Emergency number.

10.2.1 Monitor & Maintain Cathodic Protection

2nd paragraph, Page 31, Amend the paragraph as follows,

Additional monitoring of cathodic protection systems utilising close interval potential

surveys (CIPS), direct current voltage gradient (DCVG) and/or coating integrity surveys
should be considered. Advanced inspection methods such as Magnetometry
Tomography Method (MTM) and Phonon Energy Inspection Method can be considered to
inspect, monitor and control the pipeline corrosion. Risk assessment, including
inspection data, results of routine system monitoring, open hole inspections data and
release history are factors which may indicate that a close interval potential survey is
needed.

10.2.3 Pipeline Maintenance Cleaning

1st paragraph, Page 31, Amend the paragraph as follows,

Periodic maintenance cleaning of a pipeline is at times an effective method to minimise

internal corrosion as well as improve pipeline characteristics. Types of Pigs to be used
shall be in-line with Pipeline Operators’ Operations & Maintenance Manual.

Page 31, Add the following clause,

10.2.4 Chemical Treatment Program

Chemical treatment program shall be in-line with Pipeline Operators’ Operations &
Maintenance Manual.

10.4 Pipeline Operating Pressure Reduction

1st paragraph, Page 34, Amend the paragraph as follows,

Operating pressure reduction or derating is used as both a temporary and occasionally

permanent measure to reduce risk.
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12 Integrity Management Plan of pipeline Pump Stations and Terminals

12.1 DATA GATHERING

12.1.2 Facility Data

Page 35, amend bullet no.6 & add the following,

The following types of data are useful in conducting a risk assessment for stations and
terminals:

• Information about environmental concerns near the facility. Such information includes:
- Population in vicinity down-gradient and/ or downwind
- Public buildings
- Public roads and highways
- Evacuation roads
- Commercially navigable waterways
- Groundwater monitoring well locations
- Water Quality
- Communication with Operators & external stake holders

Page 35, amend bullet point no. 8 & add the following,

• Information about the capabilities for emergency response at the facility. Such
information includes:
- Firefighting capability at facility, including equipment and training
- Local fire departments, capabilities, and location
- Automatic remote communication from main fire panel to local fire department

12.3 Mitigation Options

Page 36, 1st paragraph, bullet point no. 3

Add the following at the end of bullet point

• Instrumentation or systems that detect the presence of product once it has escaped from
the piping and to immediately trigger the emergency shutdown system.

12.3.7 Facility Design Considerations

Page 36, 1st paragraph, additional bullet point no. 8

Add the following as bullet point no. 8

As new facilities are built, or when existing facilities are refurbished or reconfigured,
improved design features can be incorporated into facilities, such as:
• Make piping accessible for inspection such as limiting the amount of buried piping.
• Avoid buried flanged or threaded connections.
• Avoid low flow and dead legs.
• Minimize the number of small taps which are subject to damage.
• Install impervious barriers of linings under tanks and piping.
• Road surface drainage through underflow retention ponds.
• Install remote tank gauging.
• Install independent high level alarm system.
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13 Program Evaluation

13.1 PERFORMANCE MEASURES

Page 37, 3rd Paragraph items no 1 & 2

Amend the statement as follows,

Of the ten required performance measures the following shall be included,

1. A performance measurement and a goal to reduce the total volume of from

unintended releases with an ultimate goal of zero.

2. A performance measurement and a goal to reduce the total number of

unintended releases (based on a Operator’s specific threshold of five gallons)
with an ultimate goal of zero.

Page 37, 4th paragraph, items no 1 & 2

Amend the statement as follows:-

Of the ten required performance measures the remaining five should be included at least
the following types,

1. A performance measurement and a goal to reduce the total volume of from

unintended performance measure based upon internal audits of the operator of
pipeline system. per CFR Part 195

2. A performance measure based upon external audits of the operator of pipeline

system. per CFR Part 195

13.4 MEASURING PERFORMANCE USING EXTERNAL COMPARISONS

Page 38, 2nd Paragraph

Amend as follows,

Operators should also conduct periodic evaluations of their own performance in

comparison with industry-wide data sources. For example, an operator should
periodically review its performance in comparison with the database managed by Pipeline
Operators. the Office of Pipeline Safety based on 49 CFR Part 195 incident reporting
requirements. Operators may also take advantage of voluntary performance tracking
programs such as that of the American Petroleum Institute through its Pipeline
Performance Tracking Initiative.

13.5 AUDITS

Page 40, delete the last bullet,

• Is there a formal review of the data provided by federal data sources, such as
U.S. DOT Office of Pipeline Safety concerning HCAs (locations/sizes) that may
have changed and what is the frequency of that review?
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14 Managing Change in an Integrity Program

Page 40, 2nd paragraph

Add the following statements, after 2nd paragraph

a) Formal management of change procedures shall be developed in order to identify and

consider the impact of changes to pipeline systems and their integrity. These procedures
should be flexible enough to accommodate both major and minor changes, and must be
understood by the personnel that use them. Management of change (MOC) shall
address technical, physical, procedural, and organizational changes to the system,
whether permanent or temporary. The process should incorporate planning for each of
these situations and consider the unique circumstances of each.

A management of change (MOC) process includes the following:

a) reason for change
b) authority for approving changes
c) analysis of implications
d) acquisition of required work permits
e) documentation
f) communication of change to affected parties
g) time limitations
h) qualification of staff

b) The operator shall recognize that system changes can require changes in the integrity
management program and, conversely, results from the program can cause system
changes. The following are examples that are gas-pipeline specific, but are by no means
all-inclusive.
1) If a change in land use would affect either the consequence of an incident, such as
increases in population near the pipeline, or a change in likelihood of and incident,
such as subsidence due to underground mining, the change must be reflected in the
integrity management plan and the threats reevaluated accordingly.
2) If the results of an integrity management program inspection indicate the need for a
change to the system, such as changes to the CP program or, other than temporary,
reductions in operating pressure, these shall be communicated to operators and
reflected in an updated integrity management program.
3) If an operator decides to increase pressure in the system from its historical operating
pressure to, or closer to, the allowable MAOP, that change shall be reflected in the
integrity plan and the threats shall be reevaluated accordingly.
4) If a line has been operating in a steady-state mode and a new load on the line
changes the mode of operation to a more cyclical load (e.g., daily changes in
operating pressure), fatigue shall be considered in each of the threats where it
applies as an additional stress factor.

c) Along with management, the review procedure should require involvement of staff that
can assess safety impact and, if necessary, suggest controls or modifications. The
operator shall have the flexibility to maintain continuity of operation within established
safe operating limits.
 PTS 30.40.60.14
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d) Management of change ensures that the integrity management process remains viable
and effective as changes to the system occur and/or new, revised, or corrected data
becomes available. Any change to equipment or procedures has the potential to affect
pipeline integrity. Most changes, however small, will have a consequent effect on another
aspect of the system. For example, many equipment changes will require a
corresponding technical or procedural change. All changes shall be identified and
reviewed before implementation. Management of change procedures provides a means
of maintaining order during periods of change in the system and helps to preserve
confidence in the integrity of the pipeline.

e) In order to ensure the integrity of a system, a documented record of changes should be

developed and maintained. This information will provide a better understanding of the
system and possible threats to its integrity. It should include the process and design
information both before and after the changes were put into place.

f) Communication of the changes carried out in the pipeline system to any affected parties
is imperative to the safety of the system. As provided in para. 10, communications
regarding the integrity of the pipeline should be conducted periodically. Any changes to
the system should be included in the information provided in communication from the
pipeline operator to affected parties.

g) System changes, particularly in equipment, may require qualification of personnel for the
correct operation of the new equipment. In addition, refresher training should be provided
to ensure that facility personnel understand and adhere to the facility’s current operating
procedures.

h) The application of new technologies in the integrity management program and the results
of such applications should be documented and communicated to appropriate staff and
stakeholders.

(Note ‐ The above paragraphs are extracted from ASME B31.8S‐2004 – Managing 
System Integrity of Gas Pipeline Systems, Section 11, Page 32)
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Appendix B – Repair Strategies

B.1 General

Page 47, 1st Paragraph,

Replace with the following statement,

49 CFR Part 195 (We are not referring to Code of Federal Regulations) this describes
rules for repair. The current rule states that repairs can be made by a method that
reliable engineering tests and analysis show can permanently restore the serviceability of
the pipe. This gives the operator the flexibility to use new or innovative repair
technologies. All repairs that are following the method which engineering tests and
analysis method for proving a repair is acceptable shall be witness and approved by
principal. All repairs using clamps and sleeves shall be approved by principal prior to
work execution.

Page 49, add new Sub-section as follows,

B.10 New Repair Method

New technology for repair of pipeline can be considered provided it is proven in terms of
engineering reliability and strength. The repair strength shall be tested by a certified third
party laboratory on mechanical strength design following requirements of ASME B31.4 or
B 31.8 and proven engineering analysis.

Approval from principal is mandatory for application of such repair method.

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PART III REFERENCES

In this PTS, reference is made to the following publications:

NOTE: Unless specifically designated by date, the latest edition of each publication shall be used, together with any
amendments, supplements or revisions thereto.

PETRONAS STANDARDS
Index to PTS publications and standard specifications PTS 00.00.05.05

Pipeline and Riser Engineering PTS 20.214

Pipeline repairs (Supplements to ANSI/ASME B31.4 and B31.8) PTS 31.40.60.12

Managing System Integrity of Gas Pipelines PTS 30.40.60.13

(Amendments/Supplements to ASME B31.8S-2004)

AMERICAN STANDARD

Managing System Integrity for Hazardous Liquid Pipelines

API Standard 1160
1st Edition, NOV 2001
Issued by:
API Publishing Services,
1220 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005

Managing System Integrity of Gas Pipelines

ASME B31.8S-2004
Issued by:
The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
Three Park Avenue,
New York,
NY 10016-5990, USA.

NORWEGIAN STANDARD

Offshore Standards
DNV-OS-F101
Submarine Pipeline Systems
October 2007

Issued by:
Det Norske Veritas (DNV)
Veritasveien 1,
NO-1322 Høvik,
Norway.