The Cult of Martyrs-Mario Ferrero PDF

The Cult of Martyrs
Author(s): Mario Ferrero

Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 57, No. 5 (October 2013), pp. 881-904
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Article
Journal of Conflict Resolution

57(5) 881-904
> The Author(s) 2012
The Cult of Martyrs I\cpi IIIU dllU pel IIIIMIV/II.
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0022002712453705
jcr.sagepub.com
Mario Ferrero
Abstract
This article suggests a rational explanation for extreme voluntary sacrifice in situations
in which the state of the world when the decision must be made is observable only by
the agent. Such explanation is the cult of martyrs, heroes, and saints. This cult may
get out of control and fuel fanaticism, or excessive sacrifice from the standpoint of
the sponsoring organization. A survey of the historical evidence of Christian
martyrdom strongly suggests that martyrs were driven by the expectation of a cult
in this world, not by otherworldly rewards. In particular, it is argued that the
evidence of excess martyrdom in both Muslim Spain and the Roman Empire
strongly speaks for the cult theory.
Keywords
martyrdom, cult, suicide terrorism, Christian martyrs, principal-agent model
Economists have recently tried to come to grips with the difficult problem of finding
a rational explanation for martyrdom, or the voluntary sacrifice of one's life osten
sibly made for the purpose of serving the common good, however understood. The
main contributions to this literature include Azam (2005), Ferrero (2006), Harrison
(2006), and Wintrobe (2006). Though widely different, all these approaches share
the feature that no reliance is placed on the expectation of reward in the hereafter,
which makes the models applicable to both religious and secular martyrs—a valu
able feature since both types abound, and sometimes shade into one another, in the
real world. On the other hand, all the mentioned approaches also share one
limitation: the need or usefulness of the life sacrifice in a given circumstance is public
'Department of Public Policy and Public Choice, University of Eastern Piedmont, Alessandria, Italy
Corresponding Author
Mario Ferrero, Department of Public Policy and Public Choice, University of Eastern Piedmont,
Via Cavour 84, 15100 Alessandria, Italy.
Email: ferrerom@sp.unipmn.it
882 Journal of Conflict Resolution 57(5)
information, so that each model concentrates on condi

tion and suggests a device that makes the contract enf
self-enforcing. Relatedly, in such a setup, the demand
or is implicitly assumed to be unlimited: the organizat
when it wants it done, its only problem is to motiva
While the assumption of full information is often ad
case: the long, varied history of martyrdom from an
replete with examples—from nineteenth-century anarc
to Christian martyrs during the Reformation—in wh
martyrdom is observable only by the individual or gro
nization which sponsors them. Furthermore, the mism
or demand and supply of particular actions, can occur
be forthcoming when the organization would welcome
circumstances, and conversely, suicidal action may be
harms the organization. In other words, perhaps surpr
tion that sponsors self-sacrifice there may be too much
instances of both early Judaism and early Christianity c
case, then clearly the problem must lie with the incen
This article works within the framework set forth in
it to account for unobservable martyrdom situations an
as well as insufficient, supply of martyrs. It retains the
ability, not certainty, of death, which makes expected
which places martyrdom on a continuum of contracts
heroism, political insurgency, civilian self-immolatio
tions. The only conceptual innovation the article make
ity theory is the assumption that (some) people care
remembered after death: even though their preferenc
in the next world, altruism toward family or communi
as such, they value the survival of their good deeds in t
who will have witnessed their sacrifice. The device th
martyrs, or of heroes, that the organization, or "societ
cult can take many organizational forms, but in essenc
son by his or her followers and their descendants that
death. This key assumption does not seem outlandish—
for the common good of future generations (Azam 200
(Harrison 2006; building on Akerlof and Kranton 2000
preferences for one's own (Wintrobe 2006). On reflec
kind of earthly survival beyond death: most ordinary pe
Ludwig van Beethoven or Leonardo da Vinci through e
people through becoming the object of the survivors'
require a belief in life after death: the expectation of a
son's death may be a psychological reward that the p
These people will naturally tend to be young, unmarri
Ferrero 883
which accord
the world. Fin
can be, and of
sacrifice, the
extension, ho
touch upon h
The remaind
simple hidden
Historical Evi
supports feat
sus the Herea
tyrdom in se
The last sect
A Simple
The full-info
tract between
members cer
period, when
complies his
contract, he
yields a level
Members com
on reneging
the extent th
the sanction
requirement
reneging, can
information
rence of rene
mechanism w
with dichoto
potential mar
The focus on
may seem to
martyr really
action does n
person may b
be the same a
fice; in other
the organizat
insufficient
preferences—or, in the language of agency theory, t

compatible with the principal's objective—a (imp
between the two parties, which must provide the agen
way the organization desires; the incentives may be p
(punishments). If the incentives are right the contra
enforcement does not mean or imply coercion but on
best interest voluntarily to choose to comply with the
the operation is so completely decentralized that in ef
the notions of insufficient or excessive martyrdom lo
may feed on itself (as in the case of self-immolation
Historical Evidence).
To sharpen our focus on essentials, consider a si
zation of a random state variable, 0, occurs, and c
undertaken by the agent. While the organization obs
realization of 0 is observed only by the agent. Z
assume that both variables can take on only one
(M) and nonmartyrdom or normality (N), where the
that one "behaves like a martyr," that is, is willing t
though not necessarily dying in the process. A sit
that in the organization's judgment would call for th
the organization knew enough about it. A martyr
with probability P, known to all parties. Both th
returns and the agent's utility depend on the acti
in the following way. The organization gains returns
the action matches the situation; that is, (a, 0) = (M,
does not, that is, (a, 0) = (M, AO or (.N] M), while
N). Call the pair (a, 0) = (M, M) appropriate martyr
appropriate nonmartyrdom, the pair (a, 0) = (M, N
ticism, the pair (a, 0) = (N, M) insufficient marty
fanatics are those who act like martyrs when the sit
behavior, while defectors are those who avoid sacrifi
call for it. Therefore, while there is no presumption
should generally be better or worse than appropriate
that the organization's long-term interests are harmed
or insufficient martyrdom occurs. Thus,
r(M,M),r{N,N)>r(M,N),r(N,M). (1)
Turning to the agent, without loss of generality, we assume risk neutrality on

of the agent. People who engage in such activities are not noted for their av
risk, and risk aversion would only complicate the algebra without yielding
tional insight. As is standard in the principal-agent literature, we assume t
viduals' utility is an additively separable function of the benefits provide
Ferrero 885
organization
structure of
U = ba —
For future r
c(M,N) > > c(N, M) > c(N,N). (3)

Thus, due to the dichotomous structure of actions and states, cost
nization's returns above) are discrete values for each action/state
uous variable that is a function of effort as in the usual, continu
models. The first specification of the cost schedule in equation (2
ply says that in any state of the world, life is preferred to death. T
schedule (3), however, which satisfies schedule (2) but adds furth
the way cost varies with 0, is not obvious and deserves comment
the inequality says that martyr behavior when the situation calls
costly to the agent than the same behavior when it is unwarranted
a reasonable assumption but is not a logical necessity: "exhibitio
otherwise. The second part of the inequality says that nonmartyr
is just the right thing (N, N) is less costly than defection in a marty
M). This too seems reasonable, possibly because of the sense of g
defector, but is not a logical necessity: "shameless" people would
These two assumptions about the cost structure are critical: as w
assumption fails the optimal contract that deters both fanatics and
exist, while if both assumptions fail such a contract certainly do
With two types of action we have two values of the benefits, bM
latter are the ordinary benefits that accrue to group members as a r
behavior, bM is special. If the martyr's action results in death, as
case, these benefits consist in his anticipation, at the time of acti
will keep his name and deeds alive, praised and loved through tim
cial" assumption about preferences discussed in the introduction
As a benchmark, let us first examine the full-information situa
zation observes the realization of 0, it can direct members' behav
and write down the corresponding rewards in the contract. Give
vation utility if, the organization maximizes its expected net ret
participation constraint:
max P[r(M, M) - bM\ + (1 - P)[r(N,N) - bN]

bu,bN ^
s.t. P[bM - c(M
Clearly, the partici

because of risk neu
equality will be equ
We now turn to our central concern, when the r

unobservable by the organization. Now the appropriate
be specified ex ante in the contract. Rather, appropriat
make it in the agent's interest to behave as the princip
she could observe the actual state. The organization's
maxP[r(M,M) -bM} + { 1 - P)[r(N,N) - bN}

bM,bn
s.t. (i) P[bM - c(M,M)] + (1 - P)[b>j - c(N,N)] > U° (participation) ^

(ii) bM - c(M, M) > bN - c(N, M) (no defectors)
(iii) bN - c(N,N) > bM - c(M,N) (no fanatics).
The participation constraint (i) is now supplemented by two incentive-compatibilit
constraints. Inequality (ii) says that when a martyrdom state obtains, behaving as
martyr yields utility no lower than defecting does; similarly, inequality (iii) say
that when a normal situation obtains, the utility from normal behavior is no lowe
than the utility from martyr behavior, or fanaticism. Note that unlike the PC, th
ICs are independent of probabilities: once a state 0 is realized, what could happen
in a different state does not matter.
Using the assumptions about cost in (2), constraints (ii) and (iii) yield
0 < c(M,M) - c(N,M) <bM-bN< c{M,N) - c{N,N). (6)

If the reward structure satisfies this inequality, the organization will always get what
it wants4 and achieve a first-best outcome as under full information. Also, in the
optimal contract the PC (i) will again bind5 while the ICs may or may not bind and
consequently, condition (6) may or may not be satisfied as strict equalities. As in the
full information case, it is still the case that a range of (bM, bN) pairs of values is com
patible with the optimal contract, and that the PC only says that, if U° is taken to be
nonnegative, bM and bN cannot both be <0. Now, however, the range of solution val
ues is sharply narrowed by the incentive constraint (6): bM must now be strictly
greater than bN and therefore, it must be strictly positive. Thus, while a cult of mar
tyrs is possible but not necessary under full information, it is strictly necessary for a
hidden-information contract to work.
Further insight into the conditions required for the martyrdom contract to work
can be gained by closer examination of incentive condition (6; see appendix A for
details). First, if the latter holds with strict inequalities, there is a broad margin to
accommodate the efficient (bM - bN) value, but if condition (6) holds with strict
equalities throughout, then both ICs bind and there is a unique (bM - bN) value
that satisfies the condition: the optimal contract still exists but is more "brittle."
This turns out to be the case when dc/da is invariant to 0: the extra cost of moving
from action A to M is the same in all states of the world. Cost schedule (3), holding
with all equalities, is sufficient to ensure fulfillment of condition (6) in this
"brittle" case.
Ferrero 887
Second, a w
support fulf
antees its fu
first part or
part of (3) ar
cifically, if t
tion would no
N)), it is eas
"wrong" the
be martyred
of inequality
again on how
meless so th
can never be
neously dete
condition (6)
enough to de
defectors, bu
Finally, but
ture that sup
any alternativ
to define as
N) > c(M, M))
include c(M,
meless prefer
defection pos
nor a sufficie
The conclus
robust to al
on any speci
are really w
organizatio
across the w
in the real
the organiz
larly of the
that either defection or fanaticism will be the norm.
Some Historical Evidence
The single empirical reference for the analysis in Azam (2005), Harrison (2006), a
Wintrobe (2006) is current Islamic suicide terrorism. Although Ferrero (2006) s
veys a broader range of cases, most involve tightly directed suicide missio
Journal of Conflict Resolution 57(5)
including the Assassins of the medieval Middle East, the Palestinian suicide bom
bers, the Iranian pasdaran of the 1980s, the Japanese kamikaze, and Sri Lanka's
Tamil Tigers. All such instances approximate fairly well the condition of full infor
mation. Although a cult usually exists in those cases too, in this section we focus
attention on a sample of cases in which the agent is virtually alone in evaluating
the situation and making the decision. The cases span all the range from the reli
gious to the secular.
The paragon of the cult of heroes is found in Greek antiquity (see Wikipedia
[2009a], and the references therein). Starting at least with Homer's poems, certain
fateful characters willfully chose fame and honor instead of leisure for the sake
of living on in the memory of subsequent generations. The early heroes, like
Achilles, were mythical but their cult was historical, continuing well into Roman
times; in time, historical figures again and again followed on their steps. If we
believe the ancient sources, this shows that extreme sacrifice, to varying degrees,
can indeed be motivated by the expectation of a cult. It must be noted that this clas
sical prototype is unambiguously secular, since ancient paganism had no concep
tion of the afterlife as a reward and punishment system.
Coming closer to us in time, three groups of cases can be distinguished. The first
involves the fighting martyrs, even if religiously inspired, and includes the Sikhs of
the heroic days, the Muslim jihad fighters,6 as well as war heroes7 of all stripes
across history. Here, the cult of martyrs and heroes has been under the control of
an army, or a militarily oriented religious organization, and so has proven reliable
as an incentive system (Cook 2005, 2007; Fenech 1997). Due to the completely
decentralized organization of the Sunni Muslim religion, however, a given martyr
cult may be functional to the incentives devised by a given Muslim group for its
members but not to other groups, nor arguably, to the Islamic cause in general.
Be that as it may, organizational decentralization clearly promotes proliferation of
this class of martyrs and their cult.
The second group involves suffering passive death at the hands of persecutors
or enduring lifelong sacrifice. Here, the cult may escape the control of the sponsor
ing religion and feed on itself, yielding excessive deaths; or, the sacrifice may be
endorsed by a splinter group that fosters the cult and thrives on it. After the expe
rience of the Jewish zealots in the war against the Romans of CE 66-70, rabbinic
Judaism tried to restrain martyrdom by stringent rules (Shepkaru 1999). Early
Christianity was beset by excessive, unnecessary sacrifice of lives, both in the
mainline church (discussed in detail in the next section) and in several deviant, rad
ical sects such as the Montanists (Klawiter 1980; Trevett 1996, 121-29, 176-84)
and the Donatists (Frend 1971): decentralized cult was too strong (Ferrero
2006). Thereafter, in the mainline Western church, a secular shift to centralized
canonization by the popes occurred, both for martyrs and saints in general, which
gradually brought the cult under church control—something that makes sense only
if the cult itself had been judged excessive in the earlier period (Delooz 1969; Fer
rero 2002). This shift was a controversial affair that began in the High Middle Ages
Ferrero 889
and came to a
crop of Catho
the French r
three centur
indication o
change only
Finally, the t
actions. A cul
ple, by comm
of the Soviet
praise and pr
12,745 such t
(Wikipedia 20
rero 2006) an
responsive to
lineage witho
ing can encou
Consider self-
data set from
tions, especia
dence of an o
"vanity," tha
up for past pe
to trace (pp. 1
commemorat
never uses the
for the atroci
be "easy," com
requires no o
investment a
in many cases
tation—which
others to join
teering for fi
secure a mart
zation, it is no
a rare case in
Party (PKK)—
Christian
As the last se
afterlife rew
provide an alternative explanation. Restricting now o

denominated martyrs, up to this point this article h
hypothesis can be as good as the hereafter hypothes
behavior. In this section, we ask what kind of eviden
criminate between the two hypotheses. For any eviden
it would seem that three conditions must be met: first,
choice in the individuals' behavior—that is, it must
death without apostatizing; second, the theology mu
rewards granted a martyr are equally available for oth
and third, there must be a correlation between differ
martyr and some observable characteristics or streng
ence of "excess" martyrdom or fanaticism can be a
condition disqualifies the Muslim and the Sikh marty
cussion: the Hadith and the Jihad literature (though not
for special treatment in heaven, where certain rewar
uniquely available to them and not to other righteo
37-38); similarly, the Sikh martyrs are granted liberat
and union with God whereas ordinary believers are
case is too complex to be dealt with here as their the
controversial. Therefore, this section focuses on Ch
and European heartlands,8 which offers a rich variet
mises the same bliss to all who are granted access to
Jesus and the Early Christian Martyrs

The most spectacular example of someone who underw
of a cult among the living and not for gaining access
Jesus of Nazareth. This is true whether one looks at th
man or one accepts the Christian claim about the divini
was divine, he was one of the persons of the Godhead
rose again to deliver the hope of salvation to all who
worship him. So, we can say that the purpose of his
a cult centered on himself as the Son of God. If Jes
apocalyptic Jewish prophet who preached the impen
of God for the redemption of all Israel and then face
soon to return in glory to establish the kingdom. He wa
a place in heaven for himself: he thought of himself a
his followers hail him as Messiah, and looked confid
right hand of God. All his followers had to do to ea
upcoming kingdom was to believe his promise, reme
alive—which they did. In the event, this particular cul
ing of apocalyptic hope and gave rise to a major worl
appears as the archetypal "fanatic" martyr in the tech
Ferrero 891
the Judaism o
that the Mess
sacrifice himself and die on a cross.
The two centuries between the early second century and Emperor Constantine's
edict of toleration (CE 313) were the age of Christian martyrs in the Roman
Empire.10 The Roman authorities typically put Christians to the sacrifice test: a
largely symbolic acknowledgment of the Roman gods as a token of loyalty to the
empire, upon which they would be free to continue to practice their religion; in
other words, unlike the Jews, the Christians were not excused from practicing what
they saw as idolatry. Large, though unquantifiable, numbers no doubt yielded to
the persecutors and apostatized, but several thousands died, while another untold
but large number, for a variety of reasons, were lucky enough to escape execution
without recanting.
While the standard account by Christian historians presents the martyrs as
dying "for the Name of Christ," that is, to witness their faith, there are at least four
reasons to think that the pursuit of a cult is a better description of their actions. First,
voluntary martyrdoms were pervasive: many Christians were not sought out and
apprehended but spontaneously offered themselves up to the Roman authorities,
courting their own death in a way that bordered on suicide. Church leaders and theo
logians were only too aware of this widespread eagerness for martyrdom and, from
Clement to Origen to Cyprian, relentlessly tried to restrain it. However, their mes
sage did not get through because the church itself was of two minds: other prominent
leaders, including the great orator Tertullian in the early third century and later the
Donatist sect in North Africa, enthusiastically endorsed and supported the voluntary
martyrs. Not until the end of the fourth century, in the then Christian Empire, did
the church settle on a definitive, unambiguous injunction against suicide, which has
persisted as a central Christian doctrine down to this day. Second, although volun
tary martyrdom was a Christian innovation, it was not made up from whole cloth, as
it connected to, and drew support from, an influential precedent: the well
established, time-honored, Roman pagan tradition of noble suicide, dating back to
Roman antiquity and refuelled by Stoic and Cynic philosophy in imperial times. Ter
tullian was perhaps the most outspoken heir to, and apologist for, this view among
the Christians. Bowersock (1995, 72-73) writes that "Without the glorification of
suicide in the Roman tradition, the development of martyrdom in the second and
third centuries would have been unthinkable. The hordes of voluntary martyrs would
never have existed. Both Greek and Jewish traditions stood against them. Without
Rome, a martys would have remained what he had always been, a 'witness' and
no more." Third, since persecution always struck in the cities and was often loca
lized and unevenly and intermittently enforced, those Christians who chose not to
be martyred in a persecution had the option of leaving the city, as Jesus himself had
instructed them to do (Matthew 10:23) and as the great Cyprian himself did in
CE 250 (Bowersock 1995,43,54). Again, some leaders condemned flight, others did
not. Fourth, and perhaps most important, martyrdom was an urban phenomenon.
Although Roman governors routinely toured the provi

martyrs regularly showed up in the big cities or, if im
to be transferred there to be tried in the central squa
tacles of blood sport in the city amphitheater (Bower
sumably advance the cause of the church with maximu
their ordeal much like the Sophists, who also drew cro
and preaching lengthy sermons to an intrigued audie
of God, athletes performing in the Graeco-Roman ur
soldier martyrs appeared under Emperor Diocletian
context provided an analogue to the civic one (Bow
facts strongly speaks for the cult theory since no va
of salvation has ever claimed that heavenly rewards a
interrogated in small towns or executed out of sig
remarked, "The assurance of a lasting reputation upon
to the vanity of human nature, often served to animat
(quoted in Bowersock 1995, 4).
The Martyrs of Cordoba

Between 850 and 859 forty-eight Christians were exe
ment of Cordoba on two different charges: most made
prophet Muhammad in public places, while some were
tage who had previously kept their faith secret but su
public as apostates. All concerned fully knew that both
capital offenses under Islamic law, so they deliberately
hailed as martyrs by the group of radical Christian c
which they belonged, but at the same time were dispa
makers by many—possibly the majority—of their fello
laity. So, clearly we have here a case of militant dissen
and hence a level of martyrdom that is "excessive" fro
Following Coope's (1995) careful study, our task is to a
explain their behavior.
By the middle of the ninth century, relations betw
were relatively peaceful and functional in Muslim
Muslim monotheists living in an Islamic society), Chr
discrimination but otherwise were free to practice th
by their own laws. Many were drawn to the emir's cou
Then the martyrs' movement precipitated a crisis in M
a bitter split within the Christian community. The gover
attacks by arresting clergy, closing monasteries, rais
missing them from government service—all on the pr
munity as a whole was accountable if some of its mem
result, prominent Christians spoke out against the mo
Ferrero 893
of bringing d
ish" motives.
seek the Chri
"selfish" mot
The moveme
lectual leader
chronicled th
didates who w
the group. Th
life; in a para
ensure "their
then dying
quences" (Coo
to recant, it
martyrs' rank
under Muslim
victims were
time in a mo
giously mixed
literate in La
tion of the M
already takin
On the other
provides a clu
tation of a c
monastery w
munity. Som
celebrities ev
prestige mus
gius told thei
low them, ou
end of the cy
of the marty
bers of mira
Eulogius had
Why, then,
exactly at tha
in Cordoba h
bers of Chri
neglecting L
Christianpra
circumcision
the collective
before, when following the Muslim conquest conv

never happen again thereafter, as conversion progres
hopeless. By their provocation on the Muslim est
associates were targeting not really the Muslims but
were willing to seek accommodation and compromis
or minimize their religion, and thereby "sell out" the
authorities' backlash against Christians at large was
movement's prime goal: to show in practice that whe
ously, the middle ground vanished and life under
(Coope 1995, 7-11). In other words, Eulogius's sta
Europe would have been called an anti-Nicodemite st
position was strongly reminiscent of Donatism in
1995, 62-63). Therefore, the 850s were a critical point
building on the heroic tradition of early Christianity, c
still possible to try and persuade fellow Christians to
and thereby tum back or at least slow down the clock
movement proved irrelevant to the conversion and
secure a martyr cult; remarkably, this "cult" was ta
Spanish historical scholarship, which has hailed Eulo
runners of Spanish nationalism (Coope 1995, XI-XII). N
priest working in a backwater of Christianity.
Conflicting Martyrdoms in Post-Reformation Eu

A uniquely interesting case study is provided by relig
century following the Reformation. Here, we see thr
dom traditions developing alongside each other, all ap
sources, and each claiming as own martyrs the victim
three traditions—Protestant, Anabaptist, and Cathol
deeds of their saints in elaborate martyrologies and pr
Of course, each group denounced the others' as "
attempts on all sides at finding behavioral criteria to
failed: each group had to recognize that the others' w
fering and dying as its own, so that all groups event
tum that "not the punishment, but the cause, make
leading scholar of the subject, Gregory (1999), to ta
words and argue that they self-consciously died becau
ness to the Lord's word as they understood it in the
is a healthy counterweight to allegations of benight
popular in the relevant historical literature, Gregor
nizes that "Thousands of people endured death ( —
their convictions, and literally millions ( ) more o
changes without significant incident. ( ) Taken se
Ferrero 895
one a candid
people believ
complete ste
lations baff
fore account
martyrs." To
condition fo
cult provide
First, as wi
alternative t
by controve
"anti-Nicode
ness) was no
1999, 154, 2
tors often di
often were w
Prosecution
them; judici
accused, eve
1999, 78-81,
death and th
biguously. T
theology of m
strength of
martyrs wer
self-reliance
as one Anaba
prison "so th
and not on m
essary help
would not le
those concer
much (Grego
self before o
must be bec
because the
The upshot o
ronmental co
then we are
persecuted t
differed acr
And indeed
cult, still ve
Empire. The doctrine of penance and Purgatory dev

made now possible even for apostates to repent, clean
something the early Christians had never taken for g
should have encouraged defection. On the other h
themselves of a unique additional incentive: unlike th
not only were remembered and loved by survivors bu
intercession with God on behalf of supplicants and wo
the event, most European Catholics were safe, while p
the Netherlands—and there only against priests—an
for open defiance of Elizabethan laws; those most at
elite of English seminarians and Jesuits who volu
England in the same way as they did in the over
297). So for these relatively localized, small number
some 4,400 Protestants and Anabaptists combined: G
proved just sufficient.
The Protestants, and especially the Calvinists who
trine and were hard-tested in France and elsewhere,
They of course would not hear of intercession and mi
on the other hand they could not get away with defecti
the Catholics could. Under the doctrine of predestina
face of death might have been promoted and unders
God—a typically unverifiable quality (Gregory 1999,
theology of grace from, and reliance on, God when
incentive less than binding. All told, the clearest in
hardly sufficient to sustain martyrdom on the scale
required is the massive, long-lasting barrage of anti-
foremost by John Calvin himself, apparently far m
groups (Gregory 1999, 154-55).
Like the Protestants, the Anabaptists too would ha
intercessions nor would they allow themselves the ben
large numbers recanted (Gregory 1999, 80, 208), yet
more than half of the roughly 4,400 non-Catholic m
1996, 49)—a remarkable, if grim, record for a singl
within the German- and Dutch-speaking lands. The pr
they very early renounced any attempt at political in
plete separation, thereby forsaking any possibility of
ing targets for persecution by both Catholics and Pro
was no safe haven for the Anabaptists and their num
obverse side of this was a source of great strength:
suffered but never killed, like Christ himself and the
This unique status of nonvictimizing victims enhanc
righteousness in their own eyes, thereby reinforcin
ance. Remarkably, the legacy of their martyrs outlive
Ferrero 897
their cult ha
day (Gregor
To cap this d
Frith, an ea
England in 1
cause of my
our prelates'
verily chang
article of th
Gregory 199
about the Lo
it (i.e., the d
have been co
plifies well t
the memory
accept marty
Back to the
The discussio
tures that se
be avoided w
observed will
possibly the
sistent probl
early moder
In these last
teachings, w
because the c
or because gr
right-hand s
tyrdom con
In particular
evidence in f
of martyrs o
defection in
ship's effort
vate complia
satisfied). Bu
indeed motiv
by worldly p
found to live
either for or
The opposite case of contract failure, however, is d

from the church's point of view, or fanaticism, canno
by an urge for afterlife rewards. Granted, the faith w
was not yet sharpened enough to disqualify the volunt
branding him a suicide. If we were dealing with some
we could discount it as due to the odd zealot entertaining
involved in the Roman and Spanish movements were
capable of consistent and sustained action through time,
ongoing cult and feeding into it. In their words, the m
Christ," the archetypal, model martyr. But join in wha
this could be achieved in other ways—join with Christ in
most natural interpretation. The hereafter hypothesis
account for organized, collective, long-lasting fanaticis
Summary and Conclusion

This article has argued that when the decision to sacri
or secular) collective cause is taken under conditions th
third parties, such as the sponsoring organization, th
rationally be explained by the pursuit of a worldly c
appeal to otherworldly motivations—even when osten
A simple principal-agent model shows that a contract
tion's preferences about martyrdom will in general e
ences are not too strongly at odds with the organizat
contract requires the cult to be neither too strong nor t
case it will foster excessive sacrifice, or fanaticism, w
allow defection, or insufficient supply of volunteers. H
defectors in check, the organization must retain full con
is not always the case.
To follow, a selective review of historical eviden
range of cases that fit the broad features of the mod
heroes, through Islamic, Jewish, and Christian marty
and people who choose to die without killing. Then
particulars of Christian martyrdom, beginning with
with the Roman martyrs, the Spanish martyrs, and
of martyrdom in Reformation Europe, has found
hypothesis in preference to the hereafter hypothesis
of observed behavior. In particular, the evidence of e
cism in both Muslim Spain and the Roman Empire
speak for the cult theory.
If we were to draw policy implications for the way o
ists—the type of martyr that makes headlines today—t
model in this article is clear enough: do not waste any
Ferrero 899
volunteers bu
turning peop
Even though
because of th
surely loomin
Acknowled
An earlier draf
Choice Society
The author is i
useful comment
Appendix
For ease of reference, let
c(M, N) = A
c(M,M)=B
c(N, M) = C ^
c(N,N) = D.
The cost structure assumed for problem (2) in the text implies
B > C and A > D. (A2)

If all c(a, 0) 0, there are six possible cost schedu
with (A2):
A > B > C > D. (A3)
A > B > D > C. (A4)
A > D > B > C. (A5)
B > A > C > D. (A6)
B > A> D > C. (A7)
B > C > A> D. (A8)
The first schedule (A3) is schedule (3) in the text.

If we assume c(N, N) = D = 0, as might perhaps seem reasonable, then schedule
(A5) becomes impossible, while (A4) and (A7) survive only with D — C = 0 (in
which case they become identical to (A3) and (A6), respectively).
IC (ii) in problem (5) yields bM- bN>B - C> 0, while IC (iii) yields A - D>
i>M ~ fr.v- Together these yield
A-D>bM-bN>B-C>0, (A9)
which is condition (6) in the text.
If at least one of (ii) and (iii) does not bind, the incen
A - D> B — C (A10)
or
A — B > D - C. (A10')
The latter is always satisfied under schedule (A3) with at
because (D - Q < 0. Inspection shows that (A10) or (A
satisfied under schedules (A4) and (A5), which embody
ture (D > Q. On the other hand, (A 10) or (A 10') may or m
schedules (A6) and (A8), which embody an "exhibitionist"
Finally, the incentive conditions can never be satisfied u
embodies both shameless and exhibitionist preferences (D
Note that only schedule (A5) embodies a "love of ma
just noted it does not ensure against defection because D
If both ICs (ii) and (iii) bind the incentive condition be
A-D = B-C> 0 (All)

or
A — B — D ~ C. (AIT)
This is always satisfied under schedules (A3), (A4), (A6
ities throughout (in which case these four schedules colla
that c(.) is invariant to 0. It also may or may not be satis
with strict inequalities throughout. Furthermore, (Al 1)
be satisfied under schedules (A5) and (A8), whet
or inequalities.
It bears noting that schedule (A7) with all equalities ensu
tive condition (All') but the same schedule with any or al
ure of condition (A10'), as shown above. This is becaus
borderline cost structure (implying dc/da — 0).
The fact that (All) or (All') may—though need n
schedules (A4) and (A6) with strict inequalities as we
(A5) and (A8) shows that uniqueness of the optimal s
not require that c(.) be invariant to 0 (i.e., 0c/00 = 0) but
iant to 0 (i.e., 02c/(0a00) = d2c/(000a) = 0), which is th
procally, multiplicity of (bM - bN) requires d2c/ (0a00) <
of(A10).
Ferren 901
Declaration
The author d
and/or publi
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of
this article.
Notes
1. Another stream of economics literature, including Iannaccone (2006), Iannaccone and

Berman (2006), and Berman (2009), focuses exclusively on the demand for martyrdom,
minimizing the problem of accounting for the individual's decision to be martyred as well
as ignoring the possibility of excess martyrdoms. That literature is therefore not germane
to this article.
2. Some people who cannot manage to become famous for their good deeds may try to
become (in)famous for their ominous deeds: this is the Herostratos syndrome, named
after an otherwise unknown fellow who burned down a great temple in ancient Greece
for the sake of being remembered for the act. This is an interesting, and possibly rele
vant, variation on our theme of survival in memory after death; to the extent that
Herostratos made a name for himself and inspired imitation and emulation through the
ages, one can even speak of a cult of sorts, though not an organized one. See Borowitz
(2005) for discussion. However, it falls outside the scope of this article because it is
hard to imagine an organization sponsoring such acts and writing a contract to hire
Herostratic characters.
3. These words' definitions are sometimes blurred and shade into one another. "Martyr"
seems to involve intention to die if necessary, but "hero" also does, perhaps with a lower
probability. People are usually celebrated as martyrs ex post facto only if they die while
heroes often survive. For the purposes of this article, as will become clear later, we focus
on action based on a willingness to die even if not necessarily followed by actual death,
called martyr behavior. A saint may be anything, including martyrs as a subset. To
sharply differentiate between martyr and saint one needs a bureaucratic procedure to pro
cess cases, which is what the Roman Catholic Church has: a martyr is someone who chose
to die for the faith when this was not inevitable, not somebody caught in the crossfire; a
saint is everything else but dying for the faith (see the discussion in Ferrero 2002). We
will see these distinctions in action in section Christian Martyrs: The Cult versus the
Hereafter Hypothesis. Other organizations are often less obsessed with classification and
just leave it there.
4. It may be the case that implementing the contract that solves problem (5) proves to be too
costly for the organization, which would then be better off by giving up on the pursuit of
martyrdom entirely. This can be checked by comparing net benefits under (5), with con
straint (i) binding, to net benefits when the action requested of the agent is always N and
correspondingly bM = bN, subject to only the PC and IC (iii; which then reduces to cost
schedule (2)). As one would expect, it turns out that the c

for the organization if moving from a = N to a = M whe
increase in returns than in costs; that is, r{M, M) — r(N
remainder of this article, we assume that this is always
5. This is because the incentive constraint (6) depends only
their absolute value. If the agent enjoyed a surplus, bene
keeping their ratio constant until the PC binds. The fact
this model entails neither a distortion of outcomes (an e
the agent as a rent on his information monopoly may
principal-agent theory. However, it is only a consequence
of action, which creates a "hit-or-miss" situation: to get
to succeed, action must be at its first-best value in eithe
the reason why each of the two incentive compatibility c
at the optimal contract.
6. There seems to have been hardly any instance of passi
persecution after the days of Muhammad, because Islam
tified with power. In Islam, martyrdom is sought rather
2007, 23-30).
7. Of course, this class cannot encompass the millions of soldiers who died in war, often in
undocumented incidents, sometimes unrecognized, and celebrated as a group or in cults
of the "unknown" soldier, because the degree of choice there is questionable or simply
nonexistent. To qualify for a cult in the sense, and with the function, envisioned in this
article, death, or risk of death, must have been incurred in acts of uncommon valor and
celebrated as such.
8. Martyrdom in the Christian missions overseas would be a promising extension of this

study. As one example, the case of the Korean Catholic martyrs of the nineteenth century
appears similar to the ancient Roman case; see Finch (2009).
9. The "quest for the historical Jesus" has given rise to a large and controversial literature.
Here, I follow Sanders (1993) and Fredriksen (1999).
10. The standard reference is Frend's (1965) detailed account. However, I found the
shorter, sharper discussions in de Ste Croix (1963) and Bowersock (1995) particularly
illuminating. See also the analysis in Ferrero (2006), which accurately deals with
defection, but touches on fanaticism only as a problem for the church hierarchy' hold
on power.
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The Cult of Martyrs

Author(s): Mario Ferrero

Journal of Conflict Resolution

information, so that each model concentrates on condi

preferences—or, in the language of agency theory, t

Turning to the agent, without loss of generality, we assume risk neutrality on

c(M,N) > > c(N, M) > c(N,N). (3)

max P[r(M, M) - bM\ + (1 - P)[r(N,N) - bN]

Clearly, the partici

We now turn to our central concern, when the r

maxP[r(M,M) -bM} + { 1 - P)[r(N,N) - bN}

s.t. (i) P[bM - c(M,M)] + (1 - P)[b>j - c(N,N)] > U° (participation) ^

0 < c(M,M) - c(N,M) <bM-bN< c{M,N) - c{N,N). (6)

Some Historical Evidence

provide an alternative explanation. Restricting now o

Jesus and the Early Christian Martyrs

Although Roman governors routinely toured the provi

The Martyrs of Cordoba

before, when following the Muslim conquest conv

Conflicting Martyrdoms in Post-Reformation Eu

Empire. The doctrine of penance and Purgatory dev

The opposite case of contract failure, however, is d

Summary and Conclusion

B > C and A > D. (A2)

A > B > D > C. (A4)

A > D > B > C. (A5)

B > A > C > D. (A6)

B > A> D > C. (A7)

B > C > A> D. (A8)

The first schedule (A3) is schedule (3) in the text.

A-D = B-C> 0 (All)

1. Another stream of economics literature, including Iannaccone (2006), Iannaccone and

schedule (2)). As one would expect, it turns out that the c

8. Martyrdom in the Christian missions overseas would be a promising extension of this

Cook, David. 2005. Understanding Jihad. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ferrero, Mario. 2006. "Martyrdom Contracts." Journal of Conflict Resolution 50:855-77.

Frend, W. H. C. 1971. The Donatist Church. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.

Iannaccone, Laurence. 2006. "The Market for Martyrs." Interdisciplinary Journal of

Trevett, Christine. 1996. Montanism. Gender, Authority and

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