People of the Philippines vs TranquilinoLagman

66 Phil. 13 – Political Law – Defense of State

In 1936, TranquilinoLagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1
(National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do so because he has a father to support, has
no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the
said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave
the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable
should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it
establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in
faithful compliance therewith. “The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this
duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.”

People vs Linsangan

Facts:
Ambrosio Linsangan was prosecuted for nonpayment of the cedula or poll tax under section 1439, in connection
with section 2718, of the Revised Administrative Code. After due trial, he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for
5 days, and to pay the costs. The case was tried and decided before the Constitution of the Philippines took effect but
while the appeal was pending, the said Constitution became effective, and, section 1, clause 12, of Article III thereof
provides that "no person shall be imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax." Linsangan appealed, alleging
that the trial court erred in not declaring said sections of the Revised Administrative Code unconstitutional and void.

Issue:
Whether, in view of section 1, clause 12, of Article III of the Constitution, the judgment of conviction
against Linsangan can stand

Held:
Section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, provides:

All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended,
altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and all references in such laws to the Government or
officials of the Philippine Islandsshall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and
corresponding officials under this Constitution.

It seems too clear to require demonstration that section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code is inconsistent
with section 1, clause 12, of Article III of the Constitution, in that, while the former authorizes imprisonment for
nonpayment of the poll or cedula tax, the latter forbids it. It follows that upon the inauguration of the Government of
the Commonwealth, said section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code became inoperative, and no judgment of
conviction can be based thereon. (People vs. Ambrosio Linsangan, G.R. No. L-43290, December 21, 1935)
People vs. Linsangan [GR 43290, 21 December 1935] En Banc, Abad Santos (J): 9 concur

Facts: Ambrosio Linsañgan was prosecuted for nonpayment of the cedula or poll tax under section 1439, in
connection with section 2718, of the Revised Administrative Code. After due trial, he was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for 5 days, and to pay the costs. The case was tried and decided in the trial court before the
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Constitution of the Philippines took effect. But while
the appeal was pending, the said Constitution became effective, and section 1, clause 12, of Article III thereof
provides that "no person shall be imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax." Linsañgan appealed, alleging
that the trial court erred in not declaring said sections 1439 and 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code
unconstitutional and void, as the judgment of conviction violates the provision of the Philippine Autonomy Act
interdicting imprisonment for debt.

Issue: Whether, in view of section 1, clause 12, of Article III of the Constitution, the judgment of conviction against
Linsañgan can stand.

Held: Section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in
force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative,
unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly,
and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far
as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution." Section 2718 of the
Revised Administrative Code is inconsistent with section 1, clause 12, of Article III of the Constitution, in that,
while the former authorizes imprisonment for nonpayment of the poll or cedula tax, the latter forbids it. It follows
that upon the inauguration of the Government of the Commonwealth, said section 2718 of the Revised
Administrative Code became inoperative, and no judgment of conviction can be based thereon. It results that the
judgment appealed from must be reversed, and the case dismissed with costs de oficio.

Sura vs Martin Digest

Facts:
Vicente S. Martin, Sr. was ordered by the CFI Negros Occidental to recognize his natural son and to provide
support at P100 per month. Martin appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter court affirmed said decision. A
writ of execution was issued but it was returned unsatisfied. The Sheriff's return of service stated: "The
judgment debtor is jobless, and is residing in the dwelling house and in the company of his widowed mother, at
Tanjay, this province. Debtor has no leviable property; he is even supported by his mother. Hereto attached is the
certificate of insolvency issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Tanjay, Negros Oriental, where debtor legally
resides." For failure to satisfy the writ of execution, plaintiff's counsel prayed that defendant be adjudged guilty
of contempt of court. The trial court granted the prayer and ordered the arrest and imprisonment of Martin.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the orders of arrest and imprisonment of Martin for contempt of court for failure to satisfy the
decision requiring him to support his natural son due to insolvency were violative of his constitutional right against
imprisonment for debt.

2. Whether or not Martin's failure to satisfy the judgment amounts to disobedience to be considered
indirect contempt.

Held:
1. The sheriff's return shows that the judgment debtor was insolvent. Hence, the orders for his arrest and
imprisonment for failure to satisfy the judgment in effect, authorized his imprisonment for debt in violation of the
Constitution.

2. The orders for the arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contempt for failure to satisfy a judgment to pay past
and future support are illegal because such judgment is a final disposition of the case and is declaratory of the rights
or obligations of the parties. Under Section 3(b), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, the disobedience to a judgment
considered as indirect contempt refers to a special judgment which is defined in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, as that which requires the performance of any other act than the payment of money, or sale or delivery of real
or personal property which must be enforced by proper contempt proceedings.

Morever, the writ of execution issued on the judgment required "the sheriff or other proper officer" to whom it was
directed to satisfy the amount out of all property, real and personal, of the judgment debtor. The writ of execution
was, therefore, a direct order to the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it was directed, and not an order to the
judgment debtor. In view thereof, the judgment debtor could not, in the very nature of things, have
committed disobedience to the writ. (Sura vs. Martin, G.R. No. L-25091, November 29, 1968)

Sura vs. Martin

The arrest of defendant for failure, owing to insolvency, to pay past and present support was declared invalid.

The disobedience to a judgment considered as indirect contempt does not refer to a judgment which is a
final disposition of the case and which is declaratory of the rights of the parties, but to a special judgment,
which is defined as a judgment "which requires the performance of any other act than the payment of money,
or the sale or delivery of real or personal property.

Facts:
CFI of Negros Occidental rendered a decision ordering defendant Vicente S. Martin, Sr. to pay past and future
support at P100 per month. Martin appealed to theCourt of Appeals but the latter court affirmed said decision.

A writ of execution was issued but it was returned unsatisfied. The second paragraph of the Sheriff's return of
service, dated September 21, 1964, stated: "The judgment debtor is jobless, and is residing in the dwelling house and
in thecompany of his widowed mother, at Tanjay, this province. Debtor has no leviable property; he is even
supported by his mother. Hereto attached is the certificate of insolvency issued by the Municipal Treasurer of
Tanjay, Negros Oriental, wheredebtor legally resides."

In 1964, counsel for plaintiff prayed that defendant, for failure to satisfy the writ of execution, be adjudged guilty
of contempt of court.

In the Orders of January 9, and February 1, 1965, CFI of Negros Occidental ordered the arrest and imprisonment of
defendant Martin.

Issue:
Whether or not the orders of arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contemptof court for failure to satisfy the
judgment were legal

Held:
The orders for the arrest and imprisonment of the defendant, Vicente Martin, Sr., for contempt of court for failure to
satisfy the judgment were illegal, in view of the following considerandos:

(1) The writ of execution was a direct order to the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it was directed, and not an
order to the judgment debtor. In view thereof, the judgment debtor could not, in the very nature of things, have
committeddisobedience to the writ.

(2) The sheriff's return shows that the judgment debtor was insolvent. Hence the Orders of 9 and February 1, 1965,
in effect, authorized his imprisonment for debt in violation of the Constitution.

(3) The disobedience to a judgment considered as indirect contempt in Section 3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
does not refer to a judgment which is a finaldisposition of the case and which is declaratory of the rights of the
parties, but to a special judgment, which is defined in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court as a judgment "which
requires the performance of any other act than the payment of money, or the sale or delivery of real or personal
property."

According to Moran:

Generally, any order or judgment of a court finally disposing of an action should be enforced by ordinary execution
proceedings, except special judgments which should be executed by contempt proceedings in accordance with Rule
39, sec. 9," citing Caluag, et al. vs. Pecson, et al., 82 Phil. 8. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 Ed.,
Vol. 3, p. 320.)

(Sura vs. Martin, G.R. No. L-25091, November 29, 1968)

Sura vs. Martin [GR L-2509, 29 November 1968] En Banc, Capistrano (J): 8 concur

Facts: In Civil Case 5580 of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental, through Judge Eduardo D.
Enriquez, judgment was rendered on 20 June 1961, amended on 15 July 1961, ordering the Vicente Martin Sr. to
recognize Vicente Martin Jr. as his natural son; to provide Vicente Martin Jr. support in the monthly rate of P100
from 10 December 1959 until the latter reaches the age of majority, and to pay the attorney's fees in the amount of
P1,000 plus the costs. From the judgment, Vicente Martin Sr. appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter Court,
in CA-GR 30388-R, affirmed said decision on 30 January 1964. On 9 May 1964, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Negros Occidental, through Judge Jose R. Querubin issued the order, ordering the Clerk of Court to issue writ of
execution, same being forwarded to the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Oriental. Pursuant to said order, a writ of
execution was issued on 9 May 1964 by the Clerk of Court, and the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Oriental served the
same upon the defendant in Tanjay, Negros Oriental but returned the writ unsatisfied. The second paragraph of the
Sheriff's return of service, dated 21 September 1964, stated that "the judgment debtor is jobless, and is residing in
the dwelling house and in the company of his widowed mother, at Tanjay, this province. Debtor has no leviable
property; he is even supported by his mother. Hereto attached is the certificate of insolvency issued by the Municipal
Treasurer of Tanjay Negros Oriental, where debtor legally resides." On 6 October 1964, Nilda Sura's counsel (in
behalf of here minor child Vicente Martin Jr.) prayed that Vicente Martin Sr., for failure to satisfy the writ of
execution, be adjudged guilty of contempt of court. On 28 November 1964, the Court issued the order granting
Vicente Martin Sr. to fulfill the decision of the court within the period of 30 days or he shall be held in contempt.
Vicente Martin Sr. having failed to satisfy said order, the Court on 9 January 1965 issued the order ordering the
arrest of Martin Sr. On 26 January 1964, Martin Sr.'s counsel filed a notice of appeal, and at the same time prayed
for the fixing of a bond for the temporary release of the defendant. On 1 February 1965, the Court issued the order
directing the confinement of Martin Sr. to the provincial jail, adn fixed bail at P7,000 if Martin Sr. desired to appeal
the case. Martin Sr. appealed.

Issue: Whether the imprisonment of Martin Sr. for failure to satisfy the decision requiring him to support his natural
son at the monthly rate of P100, due to insolvency, violative of the constitutional right against imprisonment for
debt. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

Held: The orders for the arrest and imprisonment of Vicente Martin, Sr., for contempt of court for failure to satisfy
the judgment were illegal, in view of the following considerations: (1) The judgment ordering Martin Sr. to pay past
and future support at P100 per month was a final disposition of the case and was declaratory of the obligation of
Martin Sr.. The writ of execution issued on the judgment with respect to past support in the amount of about P6,000
required "the sheriff or other proper officer" to whom it was directed to satisfy the amount out of all property, real
and personal, of the judgment debtor in the manner specified in Rule 39, Section 15, of the Rules of Court. The writ
of execution was, therefore, a direct order to the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it was directed, and not an
order to the judgment debtor. In view thereof, the judgment debtor could not, in the very nature of things, have
committed disobedience to the writ. (2) The sheriff's return shows that the judgment debtor was insolvent. Hence the
Orders of January 9 and February 1, 1965, in effect, authorized his imprisonment for debt in violation of the
Constitution. (3) The disobedience to a judgment considered as indirect contempt does not refer to a judgment which
is a final disposition of the case and which is declaratory of the rights of the parties, but to a special judgment, a
judgment "which requires the performance of any other act than the payment of money, or the sale or delivery of
real or personal property." According to Moran, generally, any order or judgment of a court finally disposing of an
action should be enforced by ordinary execution proceedings, except special judgments which should be executed
by contempt proceedings. The Court reversed the orders of the lower court.

Sura v Martin; G.R. No. L-25091; 29 Nov 1968; 26 SCRA 286

FACTS:
Appellant was the losing party in a civil case for support. The trial court ordered his arrest and imprisonment for
failure to pay such support.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not his arrest and imprisonment were illegal.

RULING:
YES. The sheriff’s return shows that the judgment debtor was insolvent. The orders, in effect, authorized his
imprisonment for debt in violation of the Constitution.

Appealed orders are REVERSED.

LOZANO v. MARTINEZ G.R No. L-63419. December 18, 1986 (CASE DIGEST)

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

POLICE POWER

FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity

as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch XX, Manila, and HONORABLE
JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.
 X XXXXX

G.R. No. L-63419. December 18, 1986

YAP, J.:

FACTS:
This is a consolidated case, the petition arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the BP 22 also
known as Bouncing Check Law. The defendant in these case moved seasonably to quash the information on the
ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were
denied by the respondent trial court, except in one case, which is the subject of G.R No. 75789, wherein the trial
court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to the court
for remedy. Those who question the constitutionality of the said statute insist the following ground:

1) It offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;

2) it impairs freedom of contract;
3) it contravenes the equal protection clause;
4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and
5) its enactment is flawed in the sense that during its passage the interim Batasan violated the constitutional
provision prohibiting to a bill on Third Reading.

ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 22 or the Bouncing Check Law is unconstitutional.

RULING:

No, the enactment of the assailed statute is a valid exercise of Police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt. It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a
person for non-payment of debt ex contractu, but certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to
prescribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not only acts which the
law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because
of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The
state can do this in the exercise of its police power.

The enactment of the said statute is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and
issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.

Lozano vs Martinez Digest

Facts:
Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law). They moved
seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute
being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the trial
court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected thus appealed.

Issue:
1. Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt
2. Whether it impairs freedom of contract
3. Whether it contravenes the equal protection clause
Held:
1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment
of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order addressed to a
bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn,
sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or
assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted
as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as
convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such
perception is confidence. If such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be
greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred
for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the
payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into “lawful” contracts. Contracts
which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as
mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute
for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or is
discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as
responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by
his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal
protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners’ posture ignores the well-
accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of
individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable
or arbitrary. (Lozano vs Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986)
Lozano v. Martinez

Political Law. Constitutional Law 2. Police Power.

Lozano v. Martinez
G.R. No. L-63419; December 18, 1986

FACTS:
Petitioners assail the validity of BP 22, also known as the Bouncing Check Law. BP 22 punishes a person “who
makes or draws and issues any check on account for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank..”. It is aimed at putting a stop to the practice of issuing checks
that are worthless which causes injury to the public interest. Contentions on the law are that: 1) it offends
constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; 2) it impairs freedom of contract; 3) it contravenes the
equal protection clause; 4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and 5) its enactment is flawed
because the Interim Batasan violated the prohibition on amendments in the Third Reading

ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 22 is a valid law (police power)

HELD:
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The effects of issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of
the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large since putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation can pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Hence, the enactment of BP 22 is a valid
exercise of police power and is not in conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

There is no valid ground to sustain the contention the BP 22 impairs freedom of contract since contracts which
contravene public policy are not lawful. The statute does not deny the equal protection clause since it only penalizes
the drawer of the check and not the payee. BP 22 also does not constitute undue delegation of legislative powers.
Contrary to the contention, the power to define the offense and to prescribe the penalty are not delegated to the
payee. On the last contention, the Interim Batasan investigated the matter and reported that the clause in question
was an authorized amendment of the bill. With all the foregoing reasons, the constitutionality of BP 22 is upheld.

Lozano v. Martinez
G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the
HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.

YAP, J:
Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check
Law, assail the law's constitutionality.
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the draweebank for the payment of said check in full
upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank
to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one
year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed
P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a
credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a
state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where
payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application,
the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the
amount of the check.

Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of
the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached
thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute prima facie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and
the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or
attached by the drawee on such dishonored check."

The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the contrary to
overcome the said presumptions.

ISSUE: Whether or not (W/N) BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt.

HELD: No.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes.
The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain
of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects
on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the
payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance
of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.

ISSUE: W/N BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract.

HELD: No. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts.
Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be
categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a
convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the
regulatory power of the state.
ISSUE: W/N it violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: No. Petitioners contend that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since
without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This
argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the
swindled. Moreover, the clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary.

FLORENTINA A. LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ

G.R. NO. L-63419 146 SCRA 323

DECEMBER 18, 1986

FACTS: The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing
Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these petitions for decision. The
question is definitely one of first impression in our jurisdiction.

These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The defendants in those cases
moved seasonably to quash the information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the
statute being unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the bouncing check law is unconstitutional?

HELD: BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks
that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice, as discussed later, is proscribed by the state
because of the injury it causes to the public interests.

Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: (1) it offends the constitutional provision forbidding
imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs freedom of contract; (3) it contravenes the equal protection clause; and (4) it
unduly delegates legislative and executive powers;

Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? To answer the question, it is
necessary to examine what the statute prohibits and punishes as an offense. Is it the failure of the maker of the check
to pay a debt? Or is it the making and issuance of a worthless check in payment of a debt? What is the gravamen of
the offense? This question lies at the heart of the issue before us.

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes.
The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain
of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects
on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order.

The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable (least limitable) of
powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is a power not
emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens
to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and
welfare."

The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance
of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.

It is not for us to question the wisdom or impolicy of the statute. It is sufficient that a reasonable nexus exists
between means and end. Considering the factual and legal antecedents that led to the adoption of the statute, it is not
difficult to understand the public concern which prompted its enactment. It had been reported that the approximate
value of bouncing checks per day was close to 200 million pesos, and thereafter when overdrafts were banned by the
Central Bank, it averaged between 50 million to 80 million pesos a day.

By definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on demand. It is a written order on a bank,
purporting to be drawn against a deposit of funds for the payment of all events, of a sum of money to a certain
person therein named or to his order or to cash and payable on demand. Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a
mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that
the drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation
to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon
presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce.
Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial
and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shakes the
usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nit. Any practice therefore
tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc
in trade circles and the banking community.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the
payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. As aptly stated:

“The 'check flasher' does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the pillars of business; and to my mind, it
is a mistaken charity of judgment to place him in the same category with the honest man who is unable to pay his
debts, and for whom the constitutional inhibition against' imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud was
intended as a shield and not a sword.”

In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

As stated elsewhere, police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of changing times.
There are occasions when the police power of the state may even override a constitutional guaranty. For example,
there have been cases wherein we held that the constitutional provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield to
the police power of the state. Whether the police power may override the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to address. This bridge has not been reached, so there is no
occasion to cross it.

We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

We find no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs freedom of contract. The freedom of contract
which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public
policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks cannot be categorized as mere contracts. It is a
commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms
part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

Neither do we find substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or is
discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as
responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by
his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal
protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-
accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of
individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable
or arbitrary.
It is also suggested that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation of legislative powers, on the theory that the
offense is not completed by the sole act of the maker or drawer but is made to depend on the will of the payee. If the
payee does not present the check to the bank for payment but instead keeps it, there would be no crime. The logic of
the argument stretches to absurdity the meaning of "delegation of legislative power." What cannot be delegated is
the power to legislate, or the power to make laws which means, as applied to the present case, the power to define
the offense sought to be punished and to prescribe the penalty. By no stretch of logic or imagination can it be said
that the power to define the crime and prescribe the penalty therefor has been in any manner delegated to the payee.
Neither is there any provision in the statute that can be construed, no matter how remotely, as undue delegation of
executive power. The suggestion that the statute unlawfully delegates its enforcement to the offended party is far
fetched.

LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ [146 SCRA 323; NO.L-63419; 18 DEC 1986]

Facts: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made, contending that
no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners
thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the
accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motionsto quash. However, the Supreme Court
finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.

Issue: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exerciseof police power of the State.

Held: The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to
the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not
intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.

The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but anoffense against public order. The thrust of the law
is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. An act
may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts
on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in
the exercise of its police power.

Lozano vs Martinez GR L-63419 18 December 1986

Facts: Defendants were prosecuted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law). They contended that
statute is unconstitutional being contrary Constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. BP 22
punishes a person “who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue
that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment.” RTC denied their motions apart from one declaring it unconstitutional hence the petition for relief.
Issue: Whether or not Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law) is unconstitutional?
Decision: BP 22 constitutional. The law is intended not to coerce the debtor to pay his det. The offense being
punished is the act of making and issuing a worthless check that is dishonored upon presentation. Putting them into
circulation hurts public interest. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but against public order.
It is sufficient to have reasonable connection between means and end. The facts leading to the adoption of BP 22 is
cloaked with public concern. Flooding the system with worthless checks will pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and public interest.

People vs Nitafan Digest

acebook

Facts:
Private respondent K.T. Lim was charged with violation of B.P. 22. He moved to quash the Information of the
ground that the facts charged did not constitute a felony as B.P. 22 was unconstitutional and that the check he issued
was a memorandum check which was in the nature of a promissory note, perforce, civil in nature. Judge Nitafan,
ruling that B.P. 22 on which the Information was based was unconstitutional, issued the questioned Order quashing
the Information. Hence, the appeal.

Issue:
Wether a memorandum check is within the coverage of B.P. 22

Held:
A memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check, with the word "memorandum", "memo" or "mem"
written across its face, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to pay the bona fide holder absolutely, without
any condition concerning its presentment. Such a check is an evidence of debt against the drawer, and although may
not be intended to be presented, has the same effect as an ordinary check, and if passed to the third person, will be
valid in his hands like any other check.

A memorandum check comes within the meaning of Sec. 185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
which defines a check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. A memorandum check, upon
presentment, is generally accepted by the bank. Hence it does not matter whether the check issued is in the nature of
a memorandum as evidence of indebtedness or whether it was issued is partial fulfillment of a pre-existing
obligation, for what the law punishes is the issuance itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was
issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as an evidence of a
pre-existing debt, is malum prohibitum.
A memorandum check may carry with it the understanding that it is not be presented at the bank but will be
redeemed by the maker himself when the loan fall due. However, with the promulgation of B.P. 22, such
understanding or private arrangement may no longer prevail to exempt it from penal sanction imposed by the law.
To require that the agreement surrounding the issuance of check be first looked into and thereafter exempt such
issuance from the punitive provision of B.P. 22 on the basis of such agreement or understanding would frustrate the
very purpose for which the law was enacted — to stem the proliferation of unfunded checks. After having
effectively reduced the incidence of worthless checks changing hands, the country will once again experience the
limitless circulation of bouncing checks in the guise of memorandum checks if such checks will be considered
exempt from the operation of B.P. 22. It is common practice in commercial transactions to require debtors to issue
checks on which creditors must rely as guarantee of payment. To determine the reasons for which checks are issued,
or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public responses in the stability and
commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in
banking communities. (People vs. Judge Nitafan, G.R. No. 75954, October 22, 1992)

In RE Habeas Corpuz of Benjamin Vergara et. al. Vergara vs. Gedorio [GR 154037, 30 April 2003] Second
Division, Austria-Martinez (J): 3 concur

Facts: Pending the settlement of the estate of the late Anselma P. Allers, Eleuteria P. Bolaño, as Special
Administratrix of the estate, included the property (located in Dr. A. Santos Ave., Parañaque City) leased by Berlito
P. Taripe to Benjamin Vergara, Jona Sarvida, Milagros Majoremos, Majorie Jalalon, May Joy Mendoza (@ May Joy
Sandi), Joy Saballa (@ Josephine Saballa), Mabelyn B. Vergara, Rio Sarvida, Francisco Majoremos in the inventory
of the estate. The probate court issued the Order dated 5 October 1999, decreeing, among others, that the Taripe's
lessees and listed in the Inventory to pay their respective monthly rental regularly starting the month of August,
1999, including arrears if any, to the duly appointed Special Administratrix Mrs. Eleuteria P. Bolaño, until further
notice. Copies of the order were sent on 12 October 1999 to Vergara, et. al. via registered mail. 5 months later, on
motion of Bolaño, as Special Administratrix, the probate court issued a writ of execution on 3 March 2000 to
enforce the order dated 5 October 1999. The Sheriff submitted a return dated 10 August 2000 stating that on 5 June
2000, he met with Vergara, et. al. but failed to collect the rentals due on the property as Taripe had already collected
from them three months advance rentals. On 4 August 2000, Bolaño filed a motion to require Vergara, et. al. to
explain why they should not be cited in indirect contempt for disobeying the 5 October 1999 order of the probate
court. Vergara, et. al. were served copies of the motion by registered mail. The probate court granted the motion in
its Resolution dated 7 September 2000. Vergara, et.al. were furnished copies of the said Order on September 27,
2000 by registered mail. 6 months later, in a letter dated 18 March 2001, some of the lessees, together with the other
tenants of the property, informed the probate court that they are "freezing" their monthly rentals as they are in a
quandary as to whom to pay the rentals. Bolaño then filed on 20 March 2001, a motion to cite Vergara, et. al. in
contempt, which was set for hearing on 11 May 2001. In its Order dated 11 May 2001, the probate court found
Vergara, et. al. guilty of indirect contempt and ordered them to pay a fine of P30,000.00 each and to undergo
imprisonment until they comply with the probate court's order for them to pay rentals. Vergara, et. al. again wrote
the probate court on 11 June 2001 asking that the indirect contempt "slapped" against them be withdrawn. They
stated that their failure to attend the 11 May 2001 hearing was due to financial constraints, most of them working on
construction sites, receiving minimum wages, and repeated that the reason why they are freezing the monthly rentals
is that they are uncertain as to whom to remit it. Upon motion of Bolaño, the probate court, per its Order dated 16
November 2001, issued a warrant of arrest on 19 November 2001. On 24 December 2001, Vergara, et. al. were
arrested by Ormoc City policemen. On 26 December 2001, Vergara, et. al. filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. On 3 January 2002, the appellate court ordered the temporary release of
Vergara, et. al. After due proceedings, the appellate court rendered its decision on 26 March 2002 denying the
petition for lack of merit. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, Vergara, et. al. filed the petition for
review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether imprisonment due to non-payment of rentals, made in contravention of the trial court’s order, is
within the purview of the right against imprisonment from debt.

Held: The trial court's finding of contempt and the order directing the imprisonment of Vergara, et.al. to be
unwarranted. The salutary rule is that the power to punish to contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not
vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. Court must exercise their contempt
powers judiciously and sparingly, with utmost self-restraint. Except where the fundamental power of the court to
imprison for contempt has been restricted by statute, and subject to constitutional prohibitions where a contemnor
fails or refuses to obey an order of the court for the payment of money he may be imprisoned to compel obedience
to such order. Imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) civil purpose cannot be resorted to until all other means fail, but the court's power to order the
contemnor's detension continues so long as the contumacy persists. In Philippine jurisdiction, Section 20, Article 3
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution expressly provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used in
the Constitution, refers to civil debt or one not arising from a criminal offense. It means any liability to pay arising
out of a contract, express or implied. Herein, Vergara, et. al., as recognized lessees of the estate of the deceased,
were ordered by the probate court to pay the rentals to the administratrix. Vergara, et. al. did not comply with the
order for the principal reason that they were not certain as to the rightful person to whom to pay the rentals because
it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had originally leased the subject property to them. Clearly, the payment of
rentals is covered by the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment.

In re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Benjamin Vergara et. al. vs. Gedorio

Facts:
Petitioners were tenants of Berlito P. Taripe on a certain property located in Parañaque City. Pending the settlement
of the estate of the deceased Anselma Allers, respondent Eleuteria P. Bolaño included the property leased by Taripe
to petitioners in the inventory of the estate. In the Order dated October 9, 1999, the probate court directed petitioners
to pay their monthly rentals to Bolaño, the duly appointed Special Administratrix. For failure to comply with the
said order, Bolaño filed a motion to cite petitioners in contempt. The court found petitioners guilty of indirect
contempt and ordered them to pay a fine of P30,000.00 each and to undergo imprisonment until they comply with
the probate court's order for them to pay rentals. Petitioners were then arrested by virtue of a warrant of
arrest. Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners
were temporarily released but the CA later denied the petition and recalled the release order. Hence, the appeal.

Issue:
May petitioners be imprisoned for non-payment of rentals made in contravention of the trial court's order?

Held:
The salutary rule is that the power to punish to contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive
principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. Court must exercise their contempt powers
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost self-restraint.

Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution expressly provides that no person shall be imprisoned for
debt. Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to civil debt or one not arising from a criminal offense. It means any
liability to pay arising out of a contract, express or implied. In the present case, petitioners, as recognized lessees of
the estate of the deceased, were ordered by the probate court to pay the rentals to the administratrix. Petitioners did
not comply with the order for the principal reason that they were not certain as to the rightful person to whom to pay
the rentals because it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had originally leased the subject property to them. Clearly,
the payment of rentals is covered by the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment.

Moreover, petitioners cannot be validly punished for contempt under Section 8, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
because herein subject order is not a special judgment enforceable under Section 11, Rule 39. The order directing
the payment of rentals falls within the purview of Section 9. Until and unless all the means provided for under
Section 9, Rule 39 have been resorted to and failed, imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for civil
purposes cannot be resorted to by the courts.

Under Section 9(b), Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, in cases when the execution calls for payment of money and the
obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode or payment acceptable to
the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature
whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the
option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment.
If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and
then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment. The sheriff shall sell
only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment obligor which has been levied upon. When
there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell
only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees. Real property,
stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal property, may be
levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment.

The writ of execution issued by the trial court in this case commanded its sheriff to collect from petitioners the
rentals due from the property, and should they fail to pay, from petitioners' personal/real properties sufficient to
cover the amounts sought to be collected. It was not addressed to petitioners. It pertained to the sheriff to whom the
law entrusts the execution of judgments, and it was due to the latter's failure that the writ was not duly enforced. (In
RE Habeas Corpuz of Benjamin Vergara et. al. vs. Gedorio, GR 154037, April 30, 2003)

People v Estoista; G.R. No. L-5793; 27 Aug 1953; 93 Phil 647

FACTS:
Appellant was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence and illegal possession of firearm. He was
acquitted of the first offense and found guilty of the second for which he was sentenced to one year imprisonment.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the form of the penalty and the duration of the imprisonment imposed on the appellant infringe the
constitutional provision against cruel and harsh punishment.
RULING:
NO. Confinement from 6 to 10 years for possessing or carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to
the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to suppress or curb. The rampant lawlessness against property,
person, and even the very security of the Government, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying
and use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal circumstances might appear excessive. If
imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in view of certain circumstances, the law is
not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be
judged in the light of exceptional cases.

Judgment is MODIFIED, sentencing the appellant to imprisonment for five years.

Right Against Cruel and Inhuman Punishment

ARTICLE 3, SECTION 19 Philippine Constitution

----- Cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment; excessive fines -----

People v. Estoista
- illegal possession of firearms – Republic Act. No. 4 is constitutional. It does not go against the constitutional
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment having due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes
to curb.

People v. Echegaray
– death penalty; constitutional – Courts are not the fora for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the
death sentence where the law itself provides therefor specific and well defined criminal acts; Congress has the power
to re-impose the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes; This entails: 1) define and describe what heinous crimes mean; 2) specify and penalize by death only crimes
that qualify as heinous; 3) Congress be move by compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.

People V. Dionisio
22 SCRA 1299
FACTS: On or about the 19th day of August, 1962, in Manila City, Rosauro Dionisio, a person who is not duly
authorized in any capacity by the Games and Amusement Board to conduct a horse race, did then and there willfully
and unlawfully offer, arrange and collect bets for the Special Daily Double Race being then conducted at the Sta.
Ana Racing Club at Makati and for that purpose has in possession the cash amount of P8.50, one Nueva Era Racing
Program, dated August 19, 1962, one list of bets, one ballpen and one booklet of Daily Double receipt. He was
thereby charged in violation of Republic Act No. 3063.
ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty applied to his offense infringes the Constitutional provision that “Excessive
fines shall not be imposed nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.” (Art III Sec. 1 clause 19, of the Constitution
of the Phils)
RULING: Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in themselves cruel and unusual punishment, for the
Constitutional structure has been interpreted as referring to penalties that are inhumane and barbarous, or
shocking to the conscience and fines or imprisonment are definitely not in this category. Nor does mere severity
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
“The Social Scourge of Gambling must be stamped out. The laws against gambling must be enforced to the limit.”
(Peo v. Gorostiza, 77 Phil 88)

People v Dionisio; G.R. No. L-25513; 27 Mar 1968; 22 SCRA 299

FACTS:
Appellant was charged with and convicted of violating Republic Act No. 3063 and sentenced to imprisonment for
one month.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the penalty imposed in RA 3063 infringes the constitutional provision against cruel and harsh
punishment.

RULING:
NO. Mere severity does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. The fact that the punishment authorized by the
statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. To come under the ban, the punishment must be “flagrantly and
plainly oppressive”, “wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community.”

Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

People v Dacuycuy
Facts:
Private respondents were charged with violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. They also
charged constitutionality of Sec.32 (…be punished by a fine of not less than P100 nor more than P1000, or by
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.) of said R.A on grounds that it a.) imposes a cruel and unusual
punishment, b.) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Judge Dacuycuy ruled that the said section is a
matter of statutory construction and not an undue of delegation of legislative power.

Issue:
W/N Sec. 6 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power and is valid.

Held:
NOT VALID! The duration of penalty for the period of imprisonment was left for the courts to determine as if the
judicial department was a legislative dep’t. The exercise of judicial power not an attempt to use legislative power or
to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the admin. of justice and the app. of existing laws to the facts of
particular cases. Said section violates the rules on separation of powers and non-delegability of legislative powers

People vs Dacuycuy
173 SCRA 90 (1989)
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy, Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M. Zanoria

Facts:
On April 4, 1975, private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M. Zanoria, public
school officials from Leyte were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte for violating Republic Act
No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers). The respondents pleaded not guilty and petitioned for certeriori
and prohibition with preliminary injuction before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VII alleging that:
a. The Municipal Court of Hindang has no jurisdiction over the case due to the correctional nature of the penalty of
imprisonment (as state in Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 4670) prescribed for the offense
b. Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is unconstitutional because, (1) the term of imprisonment is unfixed and may run
toreclusion perpetua; and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of
imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the
Government.

On March 30, 1976, the petition was transferred to Branch IV where the respondent Judge, Judge Dacuycuy ruled
that R.A. No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal
and city courts.

Issue:
Whether or not Repbulic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional.
Whether or not the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case.

Held:
Yes, Republic Act No. 4760 is unconstitutional.
Section 32 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power by vesting in the
court the responsibility of imposing a duration on the punishment of imprisonment, as if the courts were the
legislative department of the government.

Yes, the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case.
Republic Act. No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, considers crimes punishable by fine of not more than
Php 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of municipal courts.

Decision:

The decision and resolution of respondent Judge (Judge Dacuycuy) are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is hereby ordered to be remanded to the Municipal
Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.

People v Echegaray G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997

Per Curiam

Facts:
The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of
raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant
was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's
grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. This was
dismissed.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the
services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines.
A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal
matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former
counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

Issue: Whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty.

Ratio:
One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against threatened and actual evil.
Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that define and punish illegal acts that may
be committed by its own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences
the criminals in accordance with these laws.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or not the death
penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against
cruel and unusual punishments.
Harden- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the
United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.
Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally
wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our
criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law
regardless of their private opinions,"
Munoz- A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which
expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be
imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if
already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough
Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution than the form in
which the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the death penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact legislation re-imposing the death
penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Senate
proceeded to a two-step process consisting of: first, the decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death
penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes.
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no abstention, the Chair declared that the
Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal
Code.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death penalty was not completely abolished
by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the death penalty and gave Congress the discretion to review
it at the propitious time.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly
identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by
reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily penalized by death. The
proper time to determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to
pass on a death sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the
trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say, however, that the
aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the
heinousness of the crime for the trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659
which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the House of Representatives reveals that,
while both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors to the death penalty, the Lower House seemed less
quarrelsome about the form of the death penalty bill as a special law specifying certain heinous crimes without
regard to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and more unified in the perception of what crimes are heinous
and that the fact of their very heinousness involves the compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if not completely
eradicate, their occurrence. Be it the foregoing general statement of Representative Sanchez or the following details
of the nature of the heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros
Oriental, there was clearly, among the hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to their
cause.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-impose the death
penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative
power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1) that Congress
define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only
crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill
and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be
imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous
in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in
enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of heinousness must be squarely applied.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed
with each other. Because the subject crimes are either so revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of
the human standards of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and consequences so destructive,
destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our socio-political and economic agenda as a developing
nation, these crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a
death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be
perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision
require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate
criminality in society.
It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming upsurge of such crimes", for
the same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice,
public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds
compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes."

People v. Echegaray (CRIM1)

People of the Philippines v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo

People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo, Defendant Appellant

Per Curiam
Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
Date: February 7, 1997
Ponente: As it is a Per curiam decision, the court is acting collectively & anonymously.

Facts:

 The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the
crime of raping his ten-year old daughter.
 The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted
out the supreme penalty of death.
 The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of
the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. The
motion was dismissed as the SC found no substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb the verdict.
 On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained
the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines. (FLAG)
 A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant aiming
for the reversal of the death sentence.
 In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and
legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former
counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is unconstitutional

Held: No.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration & supplemental motion for reconsideration are denied for lack of
merit.

Ratio:
 Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment as
ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme
Court, in Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is
misleading and inaccurate.
 The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading the
procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory
in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination
against the black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional
discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty.
 Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se. While the
U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion
which these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters,
guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices
and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
 accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment for the
crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life.
 In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Coker v. Georgia:: "Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity
and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified
taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include the
death of or even the serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not.
Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not
over and normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 'is unique in
its severity and irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life"
 The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds:
 first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper
punishment for the crime of rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape in their new
death penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman;
 Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any
bearing on the Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture.
 second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's
spiritual integrity, physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.
 Phil. SC: we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of whether or
not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the circumstance of death on the part of
the victim. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an
eye, a tooth for a tooth".
 The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty in specified
crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had entered our legal system
through the old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
 Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence with the
enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with
the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson
resulting in death.
 The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or not
the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
 Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive.
In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as
used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.
 People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the
supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the
statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial
officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions,"
 Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement
that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should
first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said
provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed
to abate criminality in society
 what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of
law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to
impose the death penalty for said crimes.
 Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in which the same
was committed or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the law, public
peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity are
repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a people.
 The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this means that the rest of society is
obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her own physical body,
and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social preferences and needs.
 Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom
resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive
arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of
other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the
victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill
him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson,
and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized
by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
 SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because:
 the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply
dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses
from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry
 they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a
repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they
must be permanently prevented from doing so
 People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury
to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every
person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx
an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself.

People v Echegaray; G.R. No. 117472; 07 Feb 1997; 267 SCRA 682
FACTS:
Appellant was convicted of the crime of rape committed against his young daughter and was meted out the supreme
penalty of death.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the re-imposition of the death penalty for heinous crimes violates the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.

RULING:
NO. The death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably
execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the
national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a
disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their
victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the
survival of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so.

Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are DENIED for lack of merit.

Right Against Cruel and Inhuman Punishment

ARTICLE 3, SECTION 19 Philippine Constitution
----- Cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment; excessive fines -----

People v. Estoista
- illegal possession of firearms – Republic Act. No. 4 is constitutional. It does not go against the constitutional
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment having due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes
to curb.

People v. Echegaray
– death penalty; constitutional – Courts are not the fora for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the
death sentence where the law itself provides therefor specific and well defined criminal acts; Congress has the power
to re-impose the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes; This entails: 1) define and describe what heinous crimes mean; 2) specify and penalize by death only crimes
that qualify as heinous; 3) Congress be move by compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.

----- Effect of abolition on application of penal laws -----

1. People v. Muñoz
– 1987 Constitution does not expressly declare the abolition of the death penalty. It merely says that the death
penalty shall not be imposed and if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua;

----- Death Penalty -----

1. People v. Bon
– repeal of RA 7659 by RA 9346 – There can be no harmony between RA 9346 and the RPC unless the latte statute
is construed as having downgraded those penalties ATTACHED to death by reason of the graduated scale under Art.
71 of the RPC; RA 9346 unequivocally bars the application of the death penalty
ECHEGARAY v. SEC. OF JUSTICE

January 19, 1999 (G.R. No. 132601)

PARTIES:

Petitioner: LEO ECHEGARAY

Respondents: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL

FACTS:

On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same

day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not
only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the

execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered… that by granting

the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function.

HELD:

No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant

reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The

provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their

decisions after their finality.

The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each

other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.

For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused

after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our

government.

G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998

LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
FACTS :
On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouse’s ten year old daughter and was
sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
raising for the first time the constitutionality of RA 7659 “ The Death Penalty Law”, and the imposition of death
penalty for the crime of rape. The motions were denied with the court finding no reason to declare it unconstitutional
and pronouncing Congress compliant with the requirements for its imposition.

RA 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The mode of execution was
changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice promulgated the rules and regulations to
implement R.A 8177 and directed the Director of Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and Director of
Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution, contending that RA 8177 and its implementing rules are
unconstitutional and void. The Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City and Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 104
were later impleaded to enjoin them from setting a date of execution.

On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment and mandated the parties to mantain status quo .
Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status quo and to request for TRO until resolution of the petition.
The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the RA in question is
unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his contention. CHR filed a motion for Leave of Court to
Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae alleging that the death penalty is cruel and degrading citing applicable
provisions and statistics showing how other countries have abolished the death penalty and how some have become
abolitionists in practice . Petitioner filed a reply stating that lethal injection is cruel, degrading , inhuman and
violative of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

ISSUE :
WON R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for being an undue delegation of
legislative power

HELD:
THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19 OF THE RULES
AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.

The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system of government and each department has exclusive
cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. A consequence of the
doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. In Latin maxim, the rule is : potestas
delegata non delegari potest.” (what has been delegated, cannot be delegated). There are however exceptions to this
rule and one of the recognized exceptions is “ Delegation to Administrative Bodies “

The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection.

The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of the task of
government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad
problems demanding its attention.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation
of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself – it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate – and (b) fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate
or determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out the death penalty,
the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority.

RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries,
and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
purpose may be carried out.

Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999

Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on
that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of
the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant
reprieve.

Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final and executory, still has jurisdiction over
the case

Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality of the
judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has
become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute andenforce it.

The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the
subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process
of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to
intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening
contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders
to make them comform to law and justice.

The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has in effect granted
reprieve which is an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who has
been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate
courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a
state of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the
execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any timeamend the Death
Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that
ofcommutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered
as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive,
the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason
that there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an
accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of
the government.

Echegaray v Secretary of Justice 301 SCRA 96 1.19.99

"On finality of decision"

F: Leo Echegaray is a convict subject to lethal injection (RA 8177). The SC issued a temporary restraining order for
the execution until it ensures that there will no longer be any repeal or modification as to the implementation of RA
8177. Such action by the court was questioned since it already rendered a final judgment on the case.
I: WON the court loses its jurisdiction on a decided case with a final judgment.

R: The SC does not lose its jurisdiction over a case with a final judgment rendered upon it. What it cannot do is
modify or amend the final decision. The court held that by finality of judgment, the court loses its jurisdiction to
amend the decision but retains its power to execute or enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the
court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter a decision. The former continues for the
purpose of enforcing the judgment while the latter terminates after the final judgment is rendered for after the
judgment becomes final, facts and circumstances may transpire which may render the execution unjust or
impossible.

IN RE: PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO ET AL

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN

(MARINES) CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES) CAPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, PA LT. SG

JAMES LAYUG, PN CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN

HOMOBONO ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO

vs.

GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, and SEC. ROILO GOLEZ

G.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005

FACTS: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered

and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”), an upscale apartment complex, located

in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive

devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration

and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.

Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations

with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers

then returned to their barracks. On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to

all the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The

transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers’ involvement in the

Oakwood incident.

On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the Regional Trial Court of

Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The government

prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup d’etat as defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal

Code of the Philippines, as amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The trial court later

issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (“Trillanes”) and Capt.

Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP. On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all
Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the

Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.

Petitioners filed a petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA, however the same was denied. The Court of Appeals

found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court pointed out that the detainees are already charged of coup

d’etat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees’

confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees and petitioners do not even question.

ISSUE: WON the denial of the petition for Habeas Corpus was valid

HELD: YES

For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of the

propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should issue the writ and

release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is

inapplicable. After actively participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped from

claiming that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their petition.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to address the

detainees’ complaint against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas

corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine

whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty.If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court

orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings

terminate.

The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.

A mere allegation of a violation of one’s constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will extend the scope of the

writ only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting

in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive

penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess.

AS TO DENIAL OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL: The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the

detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to confer with the detainees. The detainees’ right to counsel is not

undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission,
petitioners were given time to confer with the detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit.23 Thus, at no point

were the detainees denied their right to counsel.

AS TO INHUMANE PUNISHMENT: The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the

ISAFP Detention Center. This measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from

passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to another. The boarded grills ensure security and prevent

disorder and crime within the facility. The diminished illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in

the fact of detention, and do not constitute punishments on the detainees.

The limitation on the detainees’ physical contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid

security concerns.

AS TO RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION: The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP

authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the

letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees’ personal courier and not as

their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential

communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the

letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention

officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.

Criminal Case: Perez vs People G.R. No. 164763, February 12, 2008
ZENON R. PEREZ VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 164763, February 12, 2008

Malversation of Public Funds

Facts:
An audit team conducted a cash examination on the account of petitioner, who was then the acting municipal
treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. In the course of the audit, the amount of P21,331.79 was found in the safe of petitioner.
The audit team embodied their findings in the Report of Cash Examination, which also contained an inventory of
cash items. Based on the said audit, petitioner was supposed to have on hand the total amount of P94,116.36,
instead of the P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57. When asked by the auditing team as to the location of
the missing funds, petitioner verbally explained that part of the money was used to pay for the loan of his late
brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family, and the rest for his medicine.

As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin prepared a memorandum dated January 13, 1989 addressed to the
Provincial Auditor of Bohol recommending the filing of the appropriate criminal case against petitioner.

Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds, defined and penalized
by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code

Issue:

Is petitioner guilty of malversation?

Issue:

Is petitioner guilty of malversation?

Ruling:

YES. Malversation is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The acts punished
as malversation are: (1) appropriating public funds or property, (2) taking or misappropriating the same,
(3) consenting, or throughabandonment or negligence, permitting any other person to take such public funds or
property, and (4) being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.

There are four elements that must concur in order that one may be found guilty of the crime. They are: (a) That the
offender be a public officer; (b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of
his office;(c) That those funds or property involved were public funds or property for which he is accountable; and
(d) That he has appropriated, took or misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take them.

Evidently, the first three elements are present in the case at bar. At the time of the commission of the crime charged,
petitioner was a public officer, being then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. By reason of his public
office, he was accountable for the public funds under his custody or control. In malversation, all that is necessary to
prove is that the defendant received in his possession public funds; that he could not account for them and did not
have them in his possession; and that he could not give a reasonable excuse for its disappearance. An accountable
public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only
evidence is shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily.

Verily, an accountable public officer may be found guilty of malversation even if there is no direct evidence
of malversation because the law establishes a presumption that mere failure of an accountable officer to produce
public funds which have come into his hands on demand by an officer duly authorized to examine his accounts
is prima facie case of conversion. Because of the prima faciepresumption in Article 217, the burden of evidence
is shifted to the accused to adequately explain the location of the funds or property under his custody or control in
order to rebut the presumption that he has appropriated or misappropriated for himself the missing funds. Failing to
do so, the accused may be convicted under the said provision.

However, the presumption is merely prima facie and a rebuttable one. The accountable officer may
overcome the presumption by proof to the contrary. If he adduces evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said
funds or property to personal use, then that presumption is at end and the prima facie case is destroyed.In the case at
bar, petitioner was not able to present any credible evidence to rebut the presumption that he malversed the missing
funds in his custody or control.

PEREZ VS PEOPLE OF T HE PHILIPPINES (2008)

[Perez vs. People; 544 SCRA 532; G.R. No. 164763; February 12, 2008] Criminal Law| Mitigating Circumstance

Article 13: Mitigating Circumstance

FACTS:
Petitioner, Zenon Perez was then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol, was found to be guilty of
malversation of public funds. That upon the examination of the Provincial Auditor’s Office to the account of the
petitioner, it was found out that instead of the supposed cash on hand amounting to 94k, there was only 21k, thus
incurring a shortage of 73k. (estimated)
When asked by the auditing team, as to the location of the missing funds, the petitioner explained that part of the
money was used to pay for the loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family, and the
rest for his medicine.
Petitioner remitted to the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol the amounts of 10k and 15k until the full
restitution of the missing money on April 1989.

HELD:
Full restitution of the amount malversed, which is akin to voluntary surrender, will not in any way exonerate an
accused, as payment is not one of the elements of extinction of criminal liability, though, at most, payment of the
amount malversed will serve as a mitigating circumstance akin to voluntary surrender.
However, the commission of the crime was attended by the mitigating circumstance akin to voluntary surrender. As
correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner restituted the full amount even before the prosecution could
present its evidence.
The Court also holds that aside from voluntary surrender, petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of no
intention to commit so grave a wrong, again in relation to paragraph 10 of Article 13. The records bear out that
petitioner misappropriated the missing funds under his custody and control because he was impelled by the genuine
love for his brother and his family. Per his admission, petitioner used part of the funds to pay off a debt owed by his
brother.
Another portion of the misappropriated funds went to his medications for his debilitating diabetes. Further, as shown
earlier, petitioner restituted all but Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00) of the funds in less than one month and a half
and said small balance in three (3) months from receipt of demand of COA on January 5, 1999. Evidently, there was
no intention to commit so grave a wrong.

LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014 PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:
 Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation to sell the same
and remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after the expiration of 30 days.
 The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy.
 When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but to no avail.
 Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz.
 Corpuz argued as follows:
a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy.

b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry should be returned and the date when crime
occurred is different from the one testified to by Tangcoy.

c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.

d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction

ISSUES and RULING

Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best evidence rule (only original
documents, as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)?
Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they
were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.

Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and
testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution’s
formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt.

Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence?
No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1,
subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the
owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime. Hence, the exclusion of the period
and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally
defective.

Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information:

1. The designation of the offense by the statute;

2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;

3. The name of the offended party; and

4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.

The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information indicates that the time of offense was committed “on or
about the 5th of July 1991,” such is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule
requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.
What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of confidence?
Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows:

(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same;

(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of
such receipt;

(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and

(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be
verbal. The specific word “demand” need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person
charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount
to a demand.

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the accused, the
query was tantamount to a demand.

May a sole witness be considered credible?

Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, SC gives great respect to the
evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their
deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the
case.
 The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth is
established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and
credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.

Corpuz vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014
REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; EVIDENCE; FORMAL OFFER; FAILURE TO OBJECT;
OBJECTION WAIVED:According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in
evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same was merely a
photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records show that petitioner never objected to the
admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by private
complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the
prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is
that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such
objection shall be considered as waived.

CRIMINAL LAW; ESTAFA; TIME OF OCCURRENCE NOT A MATERIAL INGREDIENT: Another procedural
issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective Information filed against him. He contends that the
Information does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date
when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private complainant. This argument is untenable.
The CA did not err in finding that the Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to
the matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that the
gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a
material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the
crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.

CRIMINAL LAW; ESTAFA; TYPE OF DEMAND: No specific type of proof is required to show that there was
demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word "demand" need not even be used to
show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the
money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.

CRIMINAL LAW; DUTY OF THE COURT TO APPLY LAW: Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely
to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course
of such application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation,
modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its
terms. The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when
the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the
primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the
doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.

People vs. Camano [GRs L-36662-63, 30 July 1982] En Banc, Concepcion Jr. (J): 12 concur, 1 opined that
intoxication and voluntary surrender should mitigate the guilt of the accused, 1 dissented

Facts: Three years prior to 17 February 1970, Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor had a misunderstanding
with Filomeno Camano while fishing along Sagñay River. During this occasion it appears that Camano requested
Pascua to tow his fishing boat with the motor boat owned by Buenaflor but the request was refused by both. This
refusal greatly offended and embittered Camano against the Pascua and Buenaflor. No less than 10 attempts were
made by Amado Payago, a neighbor, inviting the accused for reconciliation with the victims but were refused.
Instead, Camano when intoxicated or drunk, used to challenge Buenaflor to a fight, and announce his evil intention
to kill them. On 17 February 1970, in the barrio of Nato, Municipality of Sagñay, Province of Camarines Sur,
between the hours of 4 to 5 p.m., after Camano had been drinking liquor, he stabbed twice Pascua with a bolo, called
in the vernacular Bicol "palas" while the latter was walking alone along the barrio street almost infront of the store
of one Socorro Buates. Pascua sustained two mortal wounds for which he died instantaneously. After hacking and
stabbing to death Pascua, Camano proceeded to the seashore of the barrio, and on finding Buenaflor leaning at the
gate of the fence of his house, in a kneeling position, with both arms on top of the fence, and his head stooping down
hacked the latter with the same bolo, first on the head, and after the victim fell and rolled to the ground, after said
blow, he continued hacking him, until he lay prostrate on the ground, face up, when Camano gave him a final thrust
of the bolo at the left side of the chest, causing instant death. Buenaflor sustained eight wounds. After killing the two
victims, he returned to his house, where he subsequently surrendered to Policemen Adolfo Avila, Juan Chavez, and
Erasmo Valencia, upon demand by said peace officers for him to surrender. When brought to the Police
Headquarters of the town for investigation he revealed that the bolo he used in the killing was hidden Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 7 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) by him under the table of his house. Following this tip, Patrolman
Jose Baluyot was dispatched, and recovered the weapon at the place indicated, which when presented to the Chief of
Police was still stained with human blood from the base of the handle to the point of the blade. And when asked as
to who was the owner of said bolo, the accused admitted it as his. He also admitted the killing of Godofredo Pascua
and Mariano Buenaflor. However, when he was asked to sign a statement, he refused. For the killing of Godofredo
Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor, Filomeno Camano was charged, under 2 separate informations, with the crime of
murder attended by evident premeditation and treachery. By agreement of the parties, the two cases were tried
jointly. Camano admitted killing Mariano Buenaflor, but claims that he did so in self-defense. He denied killing
Godofredo Pascua. The Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur found Camano guilty of the crimes charged in
Criminal Cases T-20 and T-21, and sentenced him to death. Hence, the mandatory review.

Issue: Weather death is a cruel and unusual penalty and not proper in the present case, considering Art. IV, Sec. 21
of the 1973 Constitution which provides that: "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel or unusual
punishment inflicted."

Held: The death penalty is not cruel, unjust or excessive. In the case of Harden vs. Director of Prisons (81 Phil. 741,
747) the Court said that "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In ExParte Kemmler, 136
U.S. 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution.' It
implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Still, since
the offense was attended by the mitigating circumstance of intoxication, without any aggravating circumstance to
offset it, the imposable penalty is the minimum of that provided by law or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years
of reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Camano should be sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in each case.

People v. Camano
115 SCRA 688

FACTS: On February 17, 1970, in the barrio of Nato, Municipality of Sagnay, Province of Camarines Sur, between
four and five in the afternoon, after the accused had been drinking liquor, he stabbed twice the victim Godofredo
Pascua with a bolo, called in the vernacular of Bicol “palas” which is a sharp bladed and pointed instrument about 2
feet long including the black handle, tapering to the end, about and one-half inches in width, while the latter was
walking alone along the barrio street almost in front of the store of one Socorro Buates. Godofredo Pascua sustained
two mortal wounds for which he died instantaneously. After hacking and stabbing to death Godofredo Pascua, the
accused proceeded to the seashore and on finding Mariano Buenaflore leaning at the gate of the fence of his house,
in a kneeling position, with both arms on top of the fence, and his head stooping down hacked the latter with the
same bolo.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not there is not evident premeditation;
2) Whether or not treachery is not present;
3) Whether or not superior strength is absorbed in treachery;
4) Whether or not alternative circumstance of intoxication was erroneously appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance;
5) Whether or not death is cruel and unusual penalty.
RULING:
1) As there is no direct evidence of the planning or preparation in the killing of Pascua and Buenaflor and of the
marked persistence to accomplish that plan, the trial court’s conclusion cannot be sustained;
2) The contention is without merit;
3) The contention is correct. The rule is already settled the abuse of superiority is absorbed in treachery;
4) There is merit in the contention. The alternative circumstance of intoxication should be considered as a mitigating
circumstance.
5) Death penalty is not cruel, unjust or excessive.
The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding the accused Filomeno Camano guilty of Murder in each of the two
cases. The offense being attended by the mitigating circumstance of intoxication, without any aggravating
circumstance to offset it, the imposable penalty is the minimum of that provided by law or 17 years, 4 months and 1
day to 20 years of reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant should be, as he is
hereby, sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in each case.

Melo vs. People [GR L-3580, 22 March 1950] Second Division, Moran (CJ): 6 concur

Facts: Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, on 27 December 1949, with frustrated
homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several
serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and
incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time. On 29 December 1949, at 8:00
a.m., Melo pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and at 10:15 p.m. of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from
his wounds. Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on 3 January 1950, and on the following day, 4
January 1950, an amended information was filed charging Melo with consummated homicide. Melo filed a motion
to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy, motion that was denied by the court. Melo filed the
petition for prohibition to enjoin the court from further entertaining the amended information.

Issue: Whether the second information, filed after the death of the victim, violates the accused’s right against double
jeopardy.

Held: Rule 106, section 13, 2d paragraph, provides that "If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the
filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double
jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial." Under this provision, it
was proper for the court to dismiss the first information and order the filing of a new one for the reason that the
proper offense was not charged in the former and the latter did not place the accused in a second jeopardy for the
same or identical offense. There is identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is exactly the
same as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when
it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. This rule of identity
does not apply, however, when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the
simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted
for an offense that was then inexistent. Further, when a person who has already suffered his penalty for an offense, is
charged with a new Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) and greater offense, said penalty
may be credited to him in case of conviction for the second offense.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Article 2, SECTION 21- Philippines Constitution

----- Attachment of jeopardy -----

People v. Ylagan
– physical injuries –
A defendant is in legal jeopardy when he was put to trial in the following conditions:
a. in a court of competent jurisdiction
b. upon a valid complaint or information
c. after he has been arraigned
d. after he has pleaded to the information

“without the consent of the accused” –

does not mean “over the objection of the accused” or “against the will of the accused” ; mere silence or failure to
object

People v. Balisacan
– homicide –
Existence of a plea is an essential requisite in order that the accused may be in jeopardy. In this case, he first entered
a plea of guilty and subsequently, he was ed to testify on the mitigating circumstances and he said he acted in self
defense: this had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty;
court should have required a new plea.

Cudia v. CA
– requisites in order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy/ substantiate an claim of
jeopardy –

a. a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second

b. first jeopardy must have been validly terminated
c. second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit of frustration thereof. Jeopardy does not attach
where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution

----- Termination of jeopardy -----

1. Bustamante v. Maceren
– reopening of a case –
No re-opening of a case may be ordered of a criminal case after accused has
started serving his sentence; a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting
an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served or the defendant ha waived in writing
his appeal; withdrawal of plea of guilty does not constitute waiver of defense of double jeopardy timely invoked.

People v. Obsania
– rape –
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the following
requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution/ double jeopardy attaches when:
a. a valid complaint or information
b. a competent court
c. defendant had pleaded to the charge
d. defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
consent dismissal with express consent of the defendant constitutes waiver
Rivera v. People
– transportation of marijuana –
VERBAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL which was not reduced into writing may be set aside by the judge and enter a
new one duly signed by him, reinstating the case

Cuison v. CA
– double homicide –
The promulgation of only one part of the decision i.e. liability for civil indemnity, is NOT A BAR, to the subsequent
promulgation of the other part, the imposition of the criminal accountability – doctrine on double jeopardy same as
in Cudia and Obsania cases.

People v. Velasco
– homicide and frustrated homicide – Requisites to successfully invoke double jeopardy (refer to Obsania); Where
an acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the trial court or an appeal on
a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule; An acquittal is final and unappealable
ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY whether it happens at the trial court of before the Court of Appeals;
doctrine that double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial may apply only when the Court finds that the criminal
trial was a sham because the prosecution
representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process.

Salcedo v. Mendoza
– homicide through reckless imprudence –
General rule: dismissal of criminal case upon motion or with express consent of accused will not be
a bar to the subsequent prosecution of the accused for the same offense. EXCEPTION TO THE RULE: when
dismissal is grounded upon the right of the accused to a speedy trial. This amounts to a judgment of acquittal on the
merits which bars the subsequent prosecution of accused for the same offense

Oriente v. People
– homicide; lead pipe –
It is well settled that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy; Courts have the inherent power to amend their decisions to make them
conformable to law and justice; change in penalty by the RTC did not involve
the consideration of new evidence but a mere “correction”

People v. Cajigal
– homicide to murder –
The change of the offense charged from homicide to murder is merely a formal amendment and not a substantial
amendment or a substitution;
----- Same offense; ordinance and states -----

People v. Relova –
theft of electricity; punishable by an ordinance and the RPC – A person who was charged for violating a
city ordinance which was dismissed for prescription of the offense may not be charged again under the RPC; claim
of double jeopardy is available even if prior offense charged under an ordinance is different from subsequent offense
charged in a statue where both offenses spring from the same act; where an offense is punished by different sections
of a statute, the inquiry, for the purpose of double jeopardy,
is on identity of offenses charged. In contrast, where an offense is penalized by an ordinance and a statute, the
inquiry is on the identity of acts; Identity of offenses (examining elements of the two offenses); identity of acts
(examining the locus or such acts in time and place); For double jeopardy
to be available, not all technical elements of the first offense need be present in the definition of the second offense;
Damages, civil liability – will continue to be heard

People v. City Court of Manila

– the defense of double jeopardy cannot prosper when there is no identity of the offenses charged. Evidence required
to prove one offense is not the same evidence required to prove the other; An appeal by the prosecution from the
order of dismissal by the trial court SHALL NOT constitute double
jeopardy if:
a. the dismissal is made upon motion or with express consent of the defendant;
b. dismissal is NOT an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case;
c. question to be passed upon the appellate court is purely legal (if dismissal is incorrect, case will be remanded to
the court of origin)

----- Rule on supervening facts –

Melo v. People
– physical injuries; injured party dies; homicide – The rule of identity does not apply when the
second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case, there
is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent.
Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction, the injured person dies, the
charged for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.

People v. Buling
– [less] serious physical injuries; X-ray; two physicians; two complaints -
The prosecution of the accused for less serious physical injuries is a bar for his prosecution with serious physical
injuries. If the X-ray examination disclosed the existence of a fracture when the second examination was made, this
must have been present during the first examination; There was therefore no supervening fact which would justify
application of the rule of double jeopardy.

MELO VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING EVENT/ SUPERVENING FACT DOCTRINE

FACTS:
Petitioner herein was charged with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo with a
kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different part of the body, requiring medical
attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the
same period of time.
During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty, but on the same day, during the night, the victim died from
his wounds. Evidence of death of the victim was available to the prosecution and the information was amended.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy, but was denied. Hence this
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the amended information constitutes double jeopardy.

HELD:
Rule 106, section 13, 2nd paragraph provides:
If it appears at may time before the judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court
may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense,
provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give
the bail for their appearance at the trial.

“No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense”. It meant that when a person is
charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without
the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense.

The protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense, the only exception
being, as stated in the same Constitution, that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. “SAME OFFENSE” under the general
rule, has always been construed to mean not only the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged
in the first information, but also that the two offenses are identical.

There is identity between two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be
sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. This is called SAME-EVIDENCE-TEST. In this connection, an
offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS of the former as
alleged in the information constitute the latter; vice versa.

This rule however does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution,
for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be
convicted for an offense that was then inexistent.Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and
after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in
jeopardy.

Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which charges the
character of the offense and, together with the fact existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense.

People vs. Obsania [GR L-24447, 29 June 1968] En Banc, Castro (J): 8 concur

Facts: On 22 November 1964, barely a day after the occurrence of the alleged crime, Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year
old victim, and her parents, Ciriaco Dollente and Carmelita Lureta, filed in the municipal court of Balungao,
Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery, alleging "That on or about 21st day of November 1964, at around
2:00 to 3:00 in the afternoon, particularly in sitio Cawakalan, barrio of Capulaan municipality of Balungao, Province
of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused Willy Obsania,
armed with a dagger, by means of violence and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did then and there
have carnal knowledge of the complainant Erlinda Dollente, against her will and on the roadside in the ricefields at
the abovementioned place while she was alone on her way to barrio San Raymundo." After the case was remanded
to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for further proceedings, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an
information for rape against the accused, embodying the allegations of the complaint, with an additional averment
that the offense was committed "with lewd designs". Obsania pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith
with his counsel moved for the dismissal of the case contending that the complaint was fatally defective for failure
to allege "lewd designs" and that the subsequent information filed by the fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not
cure the jurisdictional infirmity. On 8 January 1965, the trial court granted the motion and ordered dismissal of the
action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed by the offended party to allege that the acts committed by the
accused were with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case." From this order, the fiscal
appealed.

Issue: Whether the appeal of the Government constitutes double jeopardy.

Held: An appeal by the prosecution in a criminal case is not available if the defendant would thereby be placed in
double jeopardy. Correlatively, Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "When a defendant
shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to
the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information."
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the following requisites must
have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the
defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. The complaint filed with the municipal court in the
present case was valid; the trial court was a competent tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the case; the record shows
that the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. The particular aspect of double jeopardy, i.e. dismissal or
termination of the original case without the express consent of the defendant, has evoked varied and apparently
conflicting rulings from the Supreme Court. In People vs. Salico (1949), the Court held that "When the case is
dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense; because, his action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or
privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a
judgment of conviction against him." The Salico doctrine was adhered to and affirmed in People vs. Marapao (85
Phil 832, 30 March 1950), Gandicela vs. Lutero (88 Phil 299, 5 March 1951), People vs. Pinuela, et al. (91 Phil 53,
28 March 1952), Co Te Hue vs. Encarnacion (94 Phil 258, 26 January 1954), and People vs. Desalisa (GR L-15516,
17 December 1966). On the other hand, the doctrine of estoppel in relation to the plea of double jeopardy was first
enunciated in Acierto which held that when the trial court dismisses a case on a disclaimer of jurisdiction, upon the
instigation of the accused, the latter is estopped on appeal from asserting the jurisdiction of the lower court in
support of his plea of second jeopardy. The doctrine of estoppel is in quintessence the same as the doctrine of
waiver: the thrust of both is that a dismissal, other than on the merits, Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) sought by the accused in a motion to dismiss, is deemed to be with his express consent and bars
him from subsequently interposing the defense of double jeopardy on appeal or in a new prosecution for the same
offense. The Acierto ruling was reiterated in People vs. Amada Reyes, et al., (96 Phil 927, 30 April 1955); People
vs. Reyes, et al., (98 Phil 646, 23 March 1956); People vs. Casiano (GR L-15309, 16 February 1961), and People vs.
Archilla (GR L-15632, 28 February 1961). The case of Bangalao, Ferrer, and Labatete, did not actually abandon the
doctrine of waiver in Salico (and not one of the said cases even implied the slightest departure from the doctrine of
estoppel established in Acierto). In Diaz, Abaño, Tacneng and Robles, like in Cloribel, the dismissals therein, all
sought by the defendants, were considered acquittals because they were all predicated on the right of a defendant to
a speedy trial and on the failure of the Government to prosecute. Therefore, even if such dismissals were induced by
the accused, the doctrines of waiver and estoppel were obviously inapplicable for these doctrines presuppose a
dismissal not amounting to an acquittal. Here, the controverted dismissal was predicated on the erroneous contention
of the accused that the complaint was defective and such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the trial court, and not
on the right of the accused to a speedy trial and the failure of the Government to prosecute. The appealed order of
dismissal in the present case did not terminate the action on the merits. The application of the sister doctrines of
waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the
defendant personally or through his counsel; and second, such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not
necessarily amount to an acquittal. Indubitably, the present case falls squarely within the periphery of the said
doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of our jurisprudence. The case was remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law
PEOPLE VS. OBSANIA [23 SCRA 1249; G.R. L-24447; 29 JUN 1968]

Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. He
pleaded not guilty. Hiscounsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege vivid designs in the info.
Said motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the prosecution appealed.

Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in DoubleJeopardy.

Held: In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained in the
original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge, d) defendant
was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.

In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to dismiss.
The “doctrine of double jeopardy” as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case is dismissed with the
express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because
his action in having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason that
he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction
against him.

In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of the accused but
even upon the urging of hiscounsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if theindictment against
him is revived by the fiscal.

People vs. Yorac [GR L-29270, 23 November 1971] En Banc, Fernando (J): 8 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: Rodrigo Yorac was charged with slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod, the offended party
being a certain Lam Hock who, according to the medical certificate issued in 10 April 1968 by a Dr. Rogelio
Zulueta, a resident physician of the Occidental Negros Provincial Hospital, was confined "since 8 April 1968 up to
the present time for head injury." Then came a plea of guilty by Yorac on 16 April 1968 resulting in his being
penalized to suffer 10 days of arresto menor. He started serving his sentence forthwith. On 18 April 1968, the
provincial fiscal filed an information, this time in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, charging Yorac
with frustrated murder arising from the same act against Lam Hock upon another medical certificate dated 17 April
1968 issued by the same Dr. Zulueta. The later information for frustrated murder was based on a second medical
certificate after the lapse of one week from the former previously given by the same physician who, apparently, was
much more thorough the second time, to the effect that the victim did suffer a greater injury than was at first
ascertained. The lower court, presided by the Honorable Judge Nestor B. Alampay, considering that there was no
supervening fact that would negate the defense of double jeopardy, sustained the motion to quash (filed on 10 June
1968) in an order of 21 June 1968. The People appealed.
Issue: Whether the new medical findings warrant the filing of the new information against the accused, without
violating the rule against double jeopardy.

Held: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." A defendant in a criminal case
should be adjudged either guilty or not guilty and thereafter left alone in peace, in the latter case the State being
precluded from taking an appeal. It is in that sense that the right against being twice put in jeopardy is considered as
possessing many features in common with the rule of finality in civil cases. For the accused is given assurance that
the matter is closed, enabling him to plan his future accordingly, protecting him from continued distress, not to
mention saving both him and the state from the expenses incident to redundant litigation. There is likewise the
observation that this constitutional guarantee helps to equalize the adversary capabilities of two grossly mismatched
litigants, a poor and impecunious defendant hardly in a position to keep on shouldering the costs of a suit. As ruled
in Melo vs. People, the rule of identity does not apply "when the second offense was not in existence at the time of
the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first
prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent." Stated differently, if after the first prosecution
"a new fact supervenes" on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and
giving rise to a new and distinct offense, "the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new
offense." There is then the indispensable requirement of the existence of "a new fact [which] supervenes for which
the defendant is responsible" changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together with the facts existing
previously constituting a new and distinct offense. Herein, if the X-ray examination discloses the existence of a
fracture on 17 January 1957, that fracture must have existed when the first examination was made on 10 December
1956. There is, therefore, no new or supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen since the filing
of the original action. The new finding of fracture, which evidently lengthened the period of healing of the wound,
to the very superficial and inconclusive examination made on 10 December 1956. Had an X-ray examination been
taken at the time, the fracture would have certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the delay in healing was
already in existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was caused by the very superficial
examination then made. No supervening fact had occurred which justifies the application of the rule in the case of
Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong, for which reason the general rule of double jeopardy should be applied.

Flores vs. Ponce Enrile [GR L-38440, 20 July 1982] En Banc, Concepcion Jr. (J): 9 concur, 2 concur in result,
2 reserve votes, 1 took no part

Facts: On 19 October 1973, Capt. Rodolfo Magpantay alias "Honorato D. Castro", alias "Rolando Moreno", alias
"Norberto de Ramos"; Corazon R. Serrano, and Atty/ Domingo V. Flores, Jr., and two other "John Does" were
charged before the Military Commission No. 13 with estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and
falsification of commercial documents (Criminal Case MC 13-2). Flores and his co-accused were arraigned on 25
October 1973 and all pleaded not guilty. The case was thereafter set for trial. The presentation of evidence for the
prosecution which started on 25 October 1973 was concluded on 24 January 1974, and the reception of the evidence
for the defendants was set for March 26 and 27, 1974. On 25 March 1974, however, the Secretary of National
Defense, in a memorandum to the Judge Advocate General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, directed the
withdrawal of the charges against Capt. Rodolfo V. Magpantay, et al., from Military Commission No. 13. The next
day, the day scheduled for the reception of the evidence for the defendants, counsel for Magpantay handed to the
Commission the memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense and the letter of the Judge Advocate General,
directing the withdrawal of the case from the Commission. The prosecution deplored the withdrawal of the case,
claiming that they have proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but the Military Commission held
itself to be without discretion on the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) matter. On 28
March 1974, however, the Secretary of National Defense, after a full consideration of all the aspects of the case,
withdrew his previous order and directed the Commission forthwith to proceed with the trial of the accused.
Pursuant thereto, the Military Commission scheduled the continuation of the trial and reception of the evidence for
the defendants to 1 April 1974. Pleading double jeopardy, in that the "Withdrawal Order of the Honorable Secretary
of the Department of National Defense dated 25 March 1974 operates as an acquittal of the accused Flores and a
revocation and reinstatement of the case against the Domingo V. Flores, Jr. constitutes 'double jeopardy", Flores
moved to quash the case against him, but the Military Commission denied his petition to quash. Flores filed the
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. The other accused, Capt. Rodolfo Magpantay, upon the other hand,
started presenting his evidence on 2 April 1974. But, the proceedings were suspended upon the filing of the instant
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense was violated when the Secretary of National Defense withdrew his previous memorandum and directed that
further proceedings be had in the case.

Held: The rule on double jeopardy is contained in Article IV, Section 22 of the 1973 Constitution which provides
that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." It is restated in Article 39 of the
Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as "No person shall, without his consent, be tried a second time for
the same offense; but no proceeding in which an accused has been found guilty by a court-martial upon any charge
or specification shall be held to be a trial in the sense of this article until the reviewing and, if there be one, the
confirming authority shall have taken final action upon the case"; and in Section 70-C of the Manual on Courts
Martial which reads "One who in a competent court has been convicted, acquitted or put in jeopardy in respect to a
real or supposed crime, cannot be further or again pursued for it, unless he waives his right to rely on this
immunity." For double jeopardy to exist, it is essential that the first judgment of conviction or acquittal or dismissal
is final; otherwise, there is no judgment of conviction or acquittal to speak of, and, therefore, the accused can not
claim double jeopardy. Herein, Flores cannot invoke double jeopardy because the order of the Military Commission
13, terminating the hearing on 26 March 1974 pursuant to the Memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense to
the Judge Advocate General and of the letter of the latter to the Commission, is not a final order of acquittal or
dismissal. Under military law, a decision of a military tribunal, be it of acquittal or conviction, or dismissal, is
merely recommendatory and subject to review by the convening authority, the review boards, and the reviewing
authority. It is apparent that in the administration of justice by the military, a military commission acts merely as a
commissioner who takes the evidence and reports thereon to the convening and reviewing authorities with his
recommendation. While the Military Commission 13 may have ordered the termination of the hearing of Criminal
Case MC 13-2, pursuant to the Memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense to the Judge Advocate General,
and the letter of the latter to the Military Commission 13, directing the withdrawal of the charges against Capt.
Rodolfo Magpantay and his co-accused, the order has none of the attributes of a final judgment since it was not
passed upon by the convening and reviewing authorities and confirmed by the President. Although jeopardy had
attached, it has not yet terminated. Being so, the constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense was not violated when the Secretary of National Defense withdrew his previous
memorandum and directed that further proceedings be had in the case, as the action of the Secretary of National
Defense is but a continuation of the proceedings. The constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense is to protect the accused from going through a trial a second time. But,
since the first proceedings has not yet been terminated, there is no second proceeding to speak of, and, therefore, no
double jeopardy

People vs. Milflores [GRs L-32144-45, 30 July 1982] Second Division, Barredo (J): 7 concur

Facts: Early in the morning of 27 November 1967, at about 7:45 a.m., an old man approached the house on 2233
Garrido Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, calling out the name of one of the occupants — Mrs. Javier. Heeding such call,
Florencia Tactay Javier came out of the door and met the caller. The old man handed to her a paper bag containing
some vegetables — pechay, upo and sigarillas — and then left the place. Mrs. Florencia Javier brought the bag into
the house and proceeded to empty the same of its contents. As she did so, however, something inside the paper bag
began emitting smoke and whistling sound, followed moments later by a deafening bomb explosion which caused
death of one, and multiple injuries and wounds to 7 other occupants of the house. Investigations thereafter conducted
by various police agencies led to the arrest of Naño Milflores y Laksa. On 6 December 1967, he was charged with
multiple frustrated murder (Criminal Case 88173) before the Court of First Instance of Manila. In a separate
information filed with the same court on even date, he was likewise charged for murder (Criminal Case 88174).
Milflores was arraigned on said two informations on 14 December 1967 and 23 January 1968, respectively, and
entered pleas of "Not Guilty" to the charges. Later, he moved to quash the information for murder but the same was
denied by the trial court. Thereafter, the two cases were tried jointly, at the conclusion of which the the Court of
First Instance of Manila (Branch XI) rendered the decision of conviction and and sentenced Milflores to
imprisonment of 4 Years, 2 Months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 Years of prision mayor, as maximum,
with the accessory penalties of the law for the crime of multiple attempted murder; and to reclusion perpetua and to
pay the heirs of the victim in the sum of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, for the
crime of murder. Milflores appealed.
Issue: Whether the filing of Criminal Case 88174 placed Milflores under risk of double jeopardy. Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 21 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

Held: The first information for frustrated murder, Criminal Case 88173, does not include among the victims or
offended parties Felicidad Mique, the woman who died and is precisely named as the deceased in the murder case,
Criminal Case 88174. In the sense, therefore, that Milflores was ever in jeopardy in that first case, it is plain to see
that such was impossible or could not have happened. Counsel is thus off tangent in invoking double jeopardy. To
be accurate, the legal error of the prosecution here consists of having filed two separate informations for a single
offense. For there can be no doubt about the fact that since the injuries suffered by the offended parties in Criminal
Case 88173 resulted from the same act allegedly of the accused that caused the death of Felicidad Mique, the victim
in Criminal Case 88174, namely, the explosion of the bomb which according to the prosecution was handed by
Milflores to Florencia Tactay-Javier, the crime for which Milflores could be made to answer is the virtually single
complex offense of murder with frustrated murder pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. There is in law
only one offense because there is only one penalty that can be imposed notwithstanding that the act may in fact
involve a cluster of otherwise separate or distinct offenses. Still, the technical error of the fiscal in filing two
separate informations did not cause Milflores any substantial prejudice at all. In effect, as the proceedings were
actually conducted, it is as if Milflores had been prosecuted and tried under a single information. It would be giving
premium to technicality and sacrificing substantial justice to yield to counsel's contention. Besides, to do so would
result in duplicating what had already been done, the full-dressed trial of the case, with both prosecution and defense
presenting all their respective evidence. But the more untenable aspect of the position of Milflores is that when he
invoked the defense of double jeopardy, what could have been the first jeopardy had not yet been completed or even
began. It is settled jurisprudence in the Court that the mere filing of two informations or complaints charging the
same offense does not yet afford the accused in those cases the occasion to complain that he is being placed in
jeopardy twice for the same offense, for the simple reason that the primary basis of the defense of double jeopardy is
that the accused has already been convicted or acquitted in the first case or that the same has been terminated
without his consent.

People vs. Bocar [GR L-27935, 16 August 1985] Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
Second Division, Makasiar (J): 5 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: On 28 March 1967, the assistant fiscal (Carlos Galman Cruz) for Manila filed before the Court of First
Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial Court) an information against Cesar S. Urbino, Jose Gigante and Serapion
Claudio of the crime of theft, committed as "That on or about October 1, 1965, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, conspiring and confederating together with three others whose true names, identities and
whereabouts are still unknown, and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away the
following property, to wit: Six (6) pieces of dao Veneer 1 Grade Exportable round logs, valued at — P7,104.62 all
valued at P7,104.62 belonging to one JUAN B. BAÑEZ, JR. to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the
aforesaid sum of P7,104.62, Philippine currency. Contrary to law." On 3 May 1967, the three accused, upon
arraignment, pleaded "not guilty." Proceedings were had on 7 July 1967. On said date, Judge Juan L. Bocar (Branch
XVI) conducted a "summary investigation" directing questions to the complainant as well as to the accused. At the
end of the "investigation, " the Judge issued the order dismissing the case, holding that the case is more civil than
criminal. On 12 July 1967, the City Fiscal's Office received a copy of the lower court's order dated 7 July 1967. On
18 July 1967, the private prosecutors in the case filed a "motion for reconsideration"; and on 8 August 1967, the
City Fiscal's Office joined the private prosecutors in their motion for reconsideration. On 9 August 1967, the Court
issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration. A copy of said order was received by the City Fiscal's Office
on 11 August 1967. Hence, the special civil action for certiorari seeking the annulment of the CFI order of 7 July
1967.

Issue: Whether the Judge's dismissal order dated 7 July 1967 constitute a proper basis for a claim of double
jeopardy.

Held: The parties were not placed under oath before they answered the queries of the the Judge. Verily, no evidence
in law had as yet been entered into the records of the case before the Court. The Court's issuance of the questioned
dismissal order was arbitrary, whimsical and capricious, a veritable abuse of discretion which the Supreme Court
cannot permit. Thus, the Judge's dismissal order dated 7 July 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the
same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. The constitutional guarantee is that no person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The Rules of Court clarifies the guarantee as
"Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy. — When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or
the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the
defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of
double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in
the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused. The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it
violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the
remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation
of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy

GALMAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [144 SCRA 43; G.R. NO.72670; 12 SEP 1986]

Facts: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just
landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his
head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino
(whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was
a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn.

President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who joined in
the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.

The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that "the
evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase
with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not
a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private
respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority
report would exclude nineteen of them.

Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.

Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal
cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also
granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a
three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.

But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift
the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majority
denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum
for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them).

Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for
such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process.

However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring
them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's
verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents
committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of
the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.

Held: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should
be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process.

Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no longer around)
affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices
and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacañang
wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacañang
Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by
categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First
Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First
Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take
the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the
reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos
told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his
thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.

The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacañang
Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and
that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the
compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final
outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability.
Pres. Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his
military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos
would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time,
would clear his name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a
procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted,
they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other
witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.

More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two
weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they said
Marcos was in power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the
assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself.
The custody of the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of
proceedings and developments from Malacañang and by Malacañang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan
betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be
denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and
partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored
and disregarded.

The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelmingresources of the government and his
authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases.
"This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall
address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."

Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminalcollusion as to the handling and treatment of
the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by
Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The
courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and
duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to
know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.

There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without
jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no
rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.

Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of
the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision
had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's,
comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately
issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the
respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which
substantively prejudiced the petitioner.

With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.

The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill
the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority
but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution
and their own conscience and honor.
Galman v Sandiganbayan 144 SCRA 392 (1986)
Facts: An investigating committee was created to determine the facts on the case involving the assassination of
Ninoy Aquino. It appears that majority and minority reports showed that they are unconvinced on the participation
of Galman as the assassin of late Sen. Aquino and branded him instead as the fall guy as opposed to the military
reports. Majority reports recommended the 26 military respondents as indictable for the premeditated killing of
Aquino and Galman which the Sandiganbayan did not give due consideration.

The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally preparing a resolution charging the 26 military accused as principal to
the crime against Aquino but was recalled upon the intervention of President Marcos who insist on the innocence of
the accused. Marcos however recommended the filing of murder charge and to implement the acquittal as planned
so that double jeopardy may be invoked later on.

The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of justice against the Sandiganbayan and gross violation of
constitutional rights of the petitioners for failure to exert genuine efforts in allowing the prosecution to present vital
documentary evidence and prayed for nullifying the bias proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-
trial before an impartial tribunal.

Issue: Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from the charges against them.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived of due process and fair opportunity to prosecute
and prove their case which grossly violates the due process clause. There could be no double jeopardy since legal
jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid
plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court that rendered the judgment of acquittal was not
competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect
the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before
the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy.

The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where the authoritarian President ordered the
Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the trial which was undertaken with due pressure to the
judiciary. The court’s decision of acquittal is one void of jurisdiction owing to its failure in observing due process
during the trial therefore the judgment was also deemed void and double jeopardy cannot be invoked. More so the
trial was one vitiated with lack of due process on the account of collusion between the lower court and
Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of the accused.

The denial on the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners by the court was set aside and rendered the decision
of acquittal of the accused null and void. An order for a re-trial was granted.

PEOPLE VS RELOVA
Double jeopardy: Two kinds: 2.Same act:

FACTS:
Respondent herein is the judge who rendered the decision dismissing the petition of the prosecutor to charge Manuel
Opulencia in violation of Municipal ordinance S1 of 1974 for illegal installation of electric wire do reduce electric
consumption for his factory - Opulencia Ice Plant. An information however was filed after almost 9 months. The
responded herein then moved to quash the charges for grounds of prescription, that since the violation is classified as
light felony, only two months is given for prescription.

The lower court granted the motion to quash. The prosecutor then, after the motion was granted, filed another charge
against the respondent company owner, on ground of theft. That according to the prosecutor, illegal installation
which is punishable under the municipal ordinance and theft of electricity punishable under the RPC are different.
ISSEUE:
Whether the dismessal fo the first case can be properly pleaded by the accused in the motion to quash.

HELD:
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense
that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses
ma be based upon the same act or set of facts.

But the protection against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be
different from the offense charged subsequently udner a national statude, provided that both offenses spring from the
same act or set of facts.

The first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates
double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put to jeopardy provided
that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charges is not included or does not icnlude, the crime
charged it he other case. The second sentence applies even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact
that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of the statues. If two charges are based on
one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution under other.

In the case at bar, the Supreme held that the theft of electric current contended by the prosecutor is indeed part of the
offense charged under the municipal ordinance of Batangas, which is the illegal or unauthorized installation of
electrical wiring because immediate physical effect of the installation is the inward flow of electric current into
Opulencia’s ice plant.

The petition is dismissed.

People vs. Relova [GR L-45129, 6 March 1987] First Division, Feliciano (J): 5 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric
Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the
premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by Manuel Opulencia. The
police discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority
from the city government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building" owned by Opulencia.
These electric devices and contraptions wereallegedly "designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of
electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and cold storage] plant." During the
subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he had caused the installation of the
electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the readings of his Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) electric meter." On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the
City Court of Batangas City an information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance 1, Series of 1974,
Batangas City. A violation of this ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a fine "ranging from P5.00 to
P50.00 or imprisonment, which shall not exceed 30 days, or both, at the discretion of the court." Opulencia pleaded
not guilty to the information filed. On 2 February 1976, he filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the
grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered
was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. In an order dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas City
Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light
felony which prescribes 2 months from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the information
was filed by the fiscal more than 9 months after discovery of the offense charged in February 1975. 14 days later, on
20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch
II, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation
to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case 266) before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch II. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976,
alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing
thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. By Order dated 16 August 1976, Judge
Benjamin Relova granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed. A Motion for
Reconsideration was filed but was denied by the Judge in an Order dated 18 November 1976. On 1 December 1976,
the petition for Certiorari and Mandamus was filed in the Supreme Court by the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City
on behalf of the People.

Issue: Whether under the information in case 16443, Opulencia could — if he failed to plead double jeopardy — be
convicted of the same act charged in case 16054, in which he has already been acquitted.

Held: The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an
offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second
offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an
exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the
prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute
such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. The Bill of
Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." The second
sentence of said clause provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits double
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for
the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided
that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not include,
the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same,
owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two
charges are based on one and the same act conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a
prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of
double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the informations
charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense, even if there has
been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case. Thus, where the offenses charged are penalized either by
different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses
charged: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist
between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged under a
municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which
the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 9 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are
the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute. It is perhaps important to
note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The identity of offenses that must be shown need not
be absolute identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense
necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an
attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be
available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the
second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for
offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping
sets of technical elements. Acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a
common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it
were, to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an
enterprising prosecutor can find. It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the
information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed,
amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of
the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an order
sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.

PEOPLE VS. RELOVA [149 SCRA 292; G.R. NO.L-45129; 6 MAR 1987]

FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of
Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of
double jeopardy and denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together
with personnel of Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas
to search and examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They
discovered electric wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city
government and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. Said devices are designed purposely to
lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the plant’s electric meter. The case was dismissed
on the ground of prescription for the complaint was filed nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months
prior to discovery that the act being a light felony and prescribed the right to filein court. On Nov 24, 1975, another
case was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a Batangas
Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and prejudice to City of Batangas in
the amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy.
The Assistant fiscal’s claim is that it is not double jeopardy because the first offense charged against the accused
was unauthorized installation of electrical devices without the approval and necessary authority from the City
Government which was punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the second
offense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code making it a different crime
charged against the 1st complaint against Mr.Opulencia.

Issue: Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to the second offense
charged against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of electricity punishable by a statute
against the Revised Penal Code.

Held: Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense because as tediously
explained in the case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights give two instances or kinds of double jeopardy. The first
would be that “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense and the second sentence
states that “If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another
prosecution for the same act”. In the case at bar, it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will
fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the
same act. It further explains that even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing that the first charge constitutes
a violation of an ordinance and the second charge was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the
two charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall
bar a prosecution under the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy. The fact that Mr. Opulencia
was acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from the same identity as that of
the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.

People vs. City Court of Manila [GR L-36528, 24 Septembe 1987] En Banc, Padilla (J): 10 concur, 1 concur
with reservation, 1 concurs in separate opinion, 1 on leave

Facts: Agapito Gonzales, together with Roberto Pangilinan, was accused of violating Section 7, in relation to
Section 11, Republic Act No. 3060 and Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, in two (2) separate informations
filed with the City Court of Manila on 4 April 1972. On 7 April 1972, before arraignment in the 2 cases, the City
Fiscal amended the information in Criminal Case F-147347 (for violation of Section 7 in relation to Section 11, RA
3060), by alleging that the accused, "conspiring, and confederating together, and mutually helping each other did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously publicly exhibit and cause to he publicly exhibited completed
composite prints of motion film, of the 8 mm. size, in color forming visual moving images on the projection screen
through the mechanical application of the projection equipment, which motion pictures have never been previously
submitted to the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures for preview, examination and censorship, nor duly passed by
said Board, in a public place, to wit: at Room 309, De Leon Building, Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila]."
On the other hand, the information in Criminal Case F-147348 (for violation of Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal
Code) was amended to allege that, on the same date, 16 July 1971, the same accused, "conspiring and confederating
together and actually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and publicly exhibit,
through the mechanical application of movie projection equipment and the use of projection screen, indecent and
immoral motion picture scenes, to wit: motion pictures of the 8 mm. size, in color, depicting and showing scenes of
totally naked female and male persons with exposed private parts doing the sex act in various lewd and lascivious
positions, among other similarly and equally obscene and morally offensive scenes, in a place open to public view,
to wit: at Room 309, De Leon Building Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila]." On 31 May 1972, upon
arraignment, Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both charges. The other accused Pangilinan, was not arraigned as he
was (and he still is) at large. On 26 June 1972, Gonzales filed a motion to quash the informations in the 2 cases, on
the ground that said informations did not charge an offense. The motion was denied on 17 July 1972 and the cases
were set for trial on 7 August 1972. No hearing was held on 7 August 1972, however, as Gonzales moved for
postponement of the trial set on said date and the trial set on 2 other dates. On 15 November 1972, Gonzales moved
for permission to withdraw his plea of "not guilty" in Criminal Case F-147348, without however, Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 11 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) substituting or entering another plea. The Court granted the motion
and reset the hearing of the cases for 27 December 1972. On 27 December 1972, Gonzales moved to quash the
information in Criminal Case F147348 on the ground of double jeopardy, as there was according to him, also
pending against him Criminal Case F-147347, for violation of RA 3060, where the information allegedly contains
the same allegations as the information in Criminal Case F-147348. In an order dated 20 January 1973, the City
Court dismissed the case (Criminal Case F-147348). After the dismissal of Criminal Case F-147348, or on 7
February 1973, in Criminal Case F-147347, Gonzales changed his plea of "not guilty" and entered a plea of "guilty"
for violation of RA 3060. He was accordingly sentenced to pay a fine of P600.00. On 10 February 1973, the People
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 20 January 1973, dismissing Criminal Case F147348. This was
however denied by the court in its order dated 16 March 1973, and in its amended order dated 16 March 1973.
Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether the prosecution under RA 3060, and a similar prosecution under Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal
Code, constitutes double jeopardy.

Held: It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the
second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. All these
requisites do not exist in this case. The two (2) informations with which the accused was charged, do not make out
only one offense. In other words, the offense defined in section 7 of RA 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion
pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures does not include or is not included in the
offense defined in Article 201(3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing the exhibition of indecent and immoral
motion pictures. The two (2) offenses do not constitute a jeopardy to each other. A scrutiny of the 2 laws involved
would show that the 2 offenses are different and distinct from each other. The nature of both offenses also shows
their essential difference. The crime punished in RA 3060 is a malum prohibitum in which criminal intent need not
be proved because it is presumed, while the offense punished in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code is malum
in se, in which criminal intent is an indispensable ingredient. Considering these differences in elements and nature,
there is no identity of the offenses here involved for which legal jeopardy in one may be invoked in the other.
Evidence required to prove one offense is not the same evidence required to prove the other. The defense of double
jeopardy cannot prosper.

Heirs of Tito Rillorta vs. Firme [GR L-54904, 29 January 1988] First Division, Cruz (J): 4 concur

Facts: Accused of killing Tito Rillorta, Andrew Costales, was held guilty only of less serious physical injuries
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500.00. The trial court said the defendant could not be held liable
for homicide because the wound inflicted on the victim was only superficial. The certified cause of death was
pneumonia, and this was obviously induced by the exploratory surgery which was needlessly performed upon him.
In short, the victim had succumbed not to the skin-deep wound that did not affect any vital organ but as a result of
the attending physician's gross incompetence. The heirs of the deceased did not agree. Through their counsel acting
under the direct control and supervision of the provincial fiscal," they filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision notified to them on 23 January 1980. This motion was sent by registered mail on 2 February 1980. It was
denied on 28 February 1980, in an order that was communicated to the private prosecutor on 18 March 1980. On 20
March 1980, a notice of appeal was filed with the trial court under the signatures of the prosecuting fiscal and the
private prosecutor.After considering the opposition to the notice and the reply thereto, Judge Romeo N. Firme
(Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union) dismissed the appeal on 14
April 1980, for tardiness. Both the fiscal and the private prosecutor filed separate motions for reconsideration, but
these were denied on 12 May 1980. The heirs of Tito Rillorta filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether double jeopardy will attach to a judgment which is allegedly tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Held: Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the
defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy." This provision is based on the old case of Kepner v. United
States, where the U.S. Supreme Court, reviewing a decision of the Philippine Supreme Court in 1904, declared by a
5-4 vote that appeal of the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal (or for the purpose of increasing the penalty
imposed upon the convict) would place him in double jeopardy. It has been consistently applied since then in this
jurisdiction. It need only be stressed that if the government itself cannot appeal, much less then can the offended
party or his heirs, who are mainly concerned only with the civil indemnity. The prohibition operates as a "bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information." There is no question that the crime of less serious physical injuries, of which the accused in this case
was convicted, is necessarily included in the offense of homicide. The petitioners argue that double jeopardy will not
attach because the judgment convicting the accused of less serious physical injuries is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion and therefore null and void. This argument is flawed because whatever error may have been committed by
the lower court was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the
decision. This is the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious
the error may be. Infine, thus, however erroneous the order of the respondent court is, and although a miscarriage of
justice resulted from said order, such error cannot now be righted because of the timely plea of double jeopardy.

Cruz vs Enrile
G.R. No. 75983 April 15, 1988
Facts: Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced on October 1, 1986 to test the legality of the continued
detention of some 217 so-called “political detainees arrested in the nine-year span of official martial rule and
committed to the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa. All had been made to stand trial for common crimes before
various courts martial; if any of these offenses had any political color, this had neither been pleaded nor proved. Of
the 217 prisoners, 157 are civilians, and only 26 confirmed as military personnel. One hundred and fifteen (115)
accused had been condemned to die. Forty-six (46) were sentenced to life imprisonment. To nine (9) others were
meted prison terms of from twenty to thirty years; to forty-one (41), prison terms of ten to twenty years; and to three
(3), less than ten years. Presidential amnesty was granted to petitioner Virgilio Alejandrino, yet to this date he
remains a prisoner at the Penitentiary, as to Domingo Reyes, Antonio Pumar, Teodoro Patano, Andres Parado and
Daniel Campus, although they were acquitted of the charges against them, and Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino de
los Santos, who appear to have fully served the sentences imposed on them by the military commissions which
convicted them.
The petitioners urge the Court to declare unconstitutional the establishment of all military tribunals as well as
General Order No. 8 ordaining their creation, and the nullity of all the proceedings had against them before these
bodies as a result of which they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. Their plea is for the grant of a retrial of
their respective cases in the civil courts, where their right to due process may be accorded respect. The writ
of habeas corpus issued on July 31, 1987, two weeks after an amended petition was filed with leave of court,
reiterating the arguments originally pleaded, and setting forth the additional claim that the pronouncement of this
Court of the lack of jurisdiction of military tribunals to try cases of civilians even during martial rule, as declared
in Olaquer, et al. vs. Military Commission No. 34, et al., entitled the petitioners to be unconditionally freed from
detention.
Issue: Whether the establishment of all military tribunals as well as General Order No. 8 ordaining their creation
may be declared unconstitutional
Held: Yes.
In Olaquer, this Court in no uncertain terms affed that —

… a military jurisdiction or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over
civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any
judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
military tribunal concerned (People v. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264, 274 [1975]). For the same reasons, Our
pronouncement in Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2 (L-37364,63 SCRA 546) and all decided cases
affirming the same, in so far as they are inconsistent with this pronouncement, should be deemed abandoned. 16
Such is the statement of the doctrine squarely applicable in these cases.

1. Clearly, no right to relief under Olaquer exists in favor of the 26 petitioners who were admittedly in the military
service. 17 Over them the courts martial yardly exercised jurisdiction. It need only be said that these tribunals were
created precisely to try and decide cases of military personnel, and the validity of General Order No. 8 ordaining
their creation, although repeatedly challenged on constitutional grounds, has as many times been upheld by the
Court, either expressly or impliedly. 18 As to these petitioners, the writ is thus unavailing.
2. Deference to the Olaquer decision impels on the other hand the application thereof to all civilians, without
distinction, who were haled before military tribunals. To be sure, due consideration was given to the submittal that
the doctrine is, or should be declared as, limited in aplicability to “political of fenders,” and not “ordinary crimes”
such as those of which the civilian petitioners were convicted. 18a But distinction should not be set where none were
clearly intended. The issue in Olaquer, as here, is the jurisdiction of courts martial over the persons of civilians, and
not merely over the crimes imputed to them, regardless of which they are entitled to trial by judicial, not executive
or military process. Conformably with this holding, the disposition of these cases would necessarily have, as a
premise, the invalidity of any and all proceedings had before courts martial against the civilian petitioners. There is
all the more reason to strike down the proceedings leading to the conviction of these non-political detainees who
should have been brought before the courts of justice in the first place, as their offenses are totally unrelated to the
insurgency avowedly sought to be controlled by martial rule.
Due regard for consistency likewise dictates rejection of the proposal to merely give “prospective effect”
to Olaquer. No distinction should be made, as the public respondents propose, between cases still being tried and
those finally decided or already under review. All cases must be treated alike, regardless of the stage they happen to
be in, and since according to Olaquer, all proceedings before courts martial in cases involving civilians are null and
void, the court deems it proper to adhere to that unequivocal pronouncement, perceiving no cogent reason to deviate
from the doctrine.
The petition is hereby granted insofar as petitioners Vergilio Alejandrino, Domingo Reyes, Antonio Pumar Teodoro
Patono, Andres Parado, Del Campus, Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino de los Santosare concerned. The Director of
the Bureau of Prisons is hereby ordered to effect the immediate release of the above-mentioned petitioners, unless
there are other legal causes that may warrant their detention.
The petition is DISMISSED as to petitioners Elpidio Cacho, William Lorenzana, Benigno Bantolino, Getulio B.
Braga, Jr., Tomas C. Amarte, Rogelio L. Caricungan, Ernesto Baradiel, Isabelo Narne, Eric F. Pichay, Pablo Callejo,
Russel A. Paulino, Laurel Lamaca, Tirso F. Bala, Calixto Somera, Edulino Lacsina (Draftee), Ronnie A. Celiz,
Elpidio Urbano, Sofronio Galo, Aquilino Leyran, Leopoldo Arcadio, Rolando Tudin, Rosendo I. Ramos, Pacifica
Batacan, Edilberto Liberato, Jimmy C. Realis, Democrito Loraña who are all military personnel.

As to the other petitioners, the Department of Justice is hereby DIRECTED TO FILE the necessary informations
against them in the courts having jurisdiction over the offenses involved, within one hundred eighty (180) days from
notice of this decision, without prejudice to the reproduction of the evidence submitted by the parties and admitted
by the Military Commission. If eventually convicted, the period of the petitioners’ detention shall be credited in their
favor.

The Courts wherein the necessary informations are filed are DIRECTED TO CONDUCT with dispatch the
necessary proceedings inclusive of those for the grant of bail which may be initiated by the accused.

Cruz vs. Ponce-Enrile [GR L-75983, 15 April 1988]; also In RE Habeas Corpus of Usman, et. al. Usman vs.
Secretary of National Defense [GR L-79077]; Gloria vs. Chief of Staff (AFP) [GRs L79599-79600]; In RE
Habeas Corpus of de la Cruz, de la Cruz vs. Gen. Goyena [GR L-79862]; and Jose vs. Director of Prisons [GR
L-80565] First Division, Narvasa (J): 13 concur, 1 filed separate opinion

Facts: Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced in the Supreme Court on 1 October 1986 to test the legality of
the continued detention of some 217 so-called "political detainees" arrested in the nine-year span of official martial
rule and committed to the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa. All had been made to stand trial for common crimes
before various courts martial; if any of these offenses had any political color, this had neither been pleaded nor
proved. Of the 217 prisoners, 157 are civilians, and only 26 confirmed as military personnel. 115 accused had been
condemned to die, 46 were sentenced to life imprisonment, 9 others were meted prison terms of from 20 to 30 years;
41 were given prison terms of 10 to 20 years; and 3 were meted prison terms of less than 10 years. As of the date of
filing of the petitions, the sentences of 68 had become final upon their approval by the Office of the President, 75
cases were pending review in either that Office or before the Board of Military Review, while the appeal or review
of the remaining 73 cases either had been expressly suspended pending the outcome of these petitions, or are simply
not dealt with in the records. Presidential amnesty was granted to Virgilio Alejandrino, yet to this date he remains a
prisoner at the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 12 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Penitentiary, as do Domingo Reyes,
Antonio Pumar, Teodoro Patano, Andres Parado and Daniel Campus, although they were acquitted of the charges
against them, and Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino de los Santos, who appear to have fully served the sentences
imposed on them by the military commissions which convicted them. The petitioners urge the Court to declare
unconstitutional the establishment of all military tribunals as well as General Order 8 ordaining their creation, and
the nullity of all the proceedings had against them before these bodies as a result of which they had been illegally
deprived of their liberty.

Issue: Whether the petitioners’ cases may be retried without subjecting said accused to double jeopardy.

Held: No breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense would result from the retrial of the petitioners' cases, for the simple reason that the absence of
jurisdiction of the courts martial to try and convict the petitioners prevented the first jeopardy from attaching. Valid
previous proceedings are required in order that the defense of double jeopardy can be raised by the accused in the
second prosecution. In fine, the Court holds that the merits of the indictments against all these civilians are solely for
the civil courts to weigh and decide upon after due proceedings. Otherwise stated, they are entitled to the retrial they
have explicitly requested of their respective cases in the civil courts.

PEREZ VS COURT OF APPEALS

DOUBLE JEOPARDY: TWO KINDS:1. SAME OFFENSE:

FACTS:
 Petitioner herein was initially charged with consented abduction in the CFI of Pampanga. The accused pleased not
guilty, but the trial on the merits ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered against Perez.

On appeal, the CA reversed and acquitted Perez of the crime of Consented Abduction.

Subsequent to petitioner’s acquittal, complainant Yolanda Mendoza filed another criminal complaint against Perez,
but this time is for Qualified Seduction.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash involving double jeopardy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not subsequent filing of case in the form of qualified seduction after acquittal to consented seduction
constitutes double jeopardy.

HELD:
No. In the case at bar, the issue posed by the petitioner relates to the identity of the two offenses of Consented
Abduction and Qualified Seduction.

It is true that the two offenses for which the petitioner was charged arose from the same facts. This. however does
not preclude the filing of another information against him if from those facts. two distinct elements, arose.

A single act may be an offense against two statutes and if each statutes requires proof of an additional fact, which
the other does not, and acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution
and conviction under the other.

The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point
of law however closely they may appear to be connected in fact.

The similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction.

1. That the offended part is a virgin
2. That she must be over twelve and under 18 years of age.

Consented Abduction requires that:

1. The taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender.
2. The taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs.

Qualified Seduction requires that:

1. The crime ben committed by abuse of authority, confidence or relationship.

2. The offender has sexual intercourse with the woman.

Que vs. Cosico [GR 81861, 8 September 1989]; also People vs. Martelino [GR 83114] Third Division,
Gutierrez Jr. (J): 3 concur

Facts: The information for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents involving the amount of
P2,120,511.24 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch XVI, on 29 November 1985. The case
was set for arraignment and pre-trial on 31 March 1986. In a motion for postponement dated 24 March 1986, which
was received by the court on 1 April 1986, Atty. Lorenzo E. Coloso, counsel for Bernabe Que and Amelia Que, filed
a motion to postpone the arraignment and pre-trial, and prayed that the date be reset to 8 May 1986. On 31 March
1986, Gualberto Devera, Bernabe Que, Amelia Que, Warren Machado and Paz L. Martelino were arraigned while
the other accused, namely, Antonio Blancaflor, Wilfredo Azarco, Renato Elauria and Amelita Tutica could not be
arraigned because they were still at-large. The court then set a separate trial for some of the accused on 8 May 1986.
On that date, Judge Enrique Suplico directed the prosecution to file its written stipulation of facts with respect to the
US checks with machine copies of the said documents attached thereto, copy furnished all the defense counsel,
within 30 days from 8 May 1986. In turn, the defense counsel were given 10 days from receipt of the stipulation of
facts to file their counter proposal or answer. Upon motion of the City Fiscal, the pre-trial was then reset to 26 June
1986. The setting for 26 June 1986 was, however, postponed to 22 July 1986 due to the motion for postponement
filed by Atty. Lorenzo Coloso. On 22 July 1986, the City Fiscal submitted his proposals for admission of facts,
which was duly received on the same date by the defense counsel. On the same date, the court again directed the
prosecution to furnish machine copies of the 489 US treasury warrants to the accused through counsel within 15
days from the said date, after which the defense counsel shall make their counter proposal within 10 days from
receipt thereof. In the meantime, the date was reset to September 17 and 18, 1986. On 17 September 1986, the
prosecution submitted supplemental proposals for admission of facts. The hearing of September 18, 1986 was reset
to November 10, and 11, 1986 upon request of the prosecution and without objection on the part of the defense
counsel as the prosecution witnesses were in Manila. On 10 November 1986, Judge Enrique P. Suplico issued the
order dismissing the case, in light of the accused's constitutional rights to speedy trial. On 21 November 1986, the
prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration from the order of dismissal. In the meantime, the case was re-raffled
to Judge Rodrigo Cosico, as the former judge was not reappointed after the reorganization of the judiciary. Judge
Cosico in an order dated 22 May 1987, granted the prosecution's motion for reconsideration and caused the case to
be reopened. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by the defense was denied in an order dated 27
November 1987. On 17 December 1987, Paz Martelino filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
praying that the order of Judge Cosico reinstating the case be declared null and void on the ground of double
jeopardy. The Court of Appeals, in its decision dated 22 April 1988, found merit in the petition and set aside Judge
Cosico's order. The People of the Philippines filed the petition to review on certiorari (GR 83114) the decision of the
Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, Bernabe Que and Amelia Que filed a petition for certiorari directly with the Supreme
Court seeking to declare Judge Cosico's orders dated 22 May 1987 and 27 November 1987 as null and void and to
prohibit the judge from further proceeding with Criminal Case C-2152.

Issue: Whether the reinstatement of the criminal case placed the accused in double jeopardy.

Held: Criminal Case C-2152 may be reinstated as no double jeopardy has attached. The rule on double jeopardy is
found in sec. 21, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "No person shall be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." This is complemented by the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended which provides that "When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 17 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) included
in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." Thus, the requisites that must concur for legal
jeopardy to attach are, to wit: 1) a valid complaint or information; 2) a court of competent jurisdiction; 3) the
accused has pleaded to the charge and 4) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or
terminated without the express consent of the accused. The fourth requisite is lacking in the instant case. The case
was dismissed upon motion and with the express consent of the accused. The accused Bernabe Que, Amelia Que
and Paz Martelino invoked their constitutional right to a speedy trial when the prosecution refused to present
evidence until the court had ruled on the motion for inhibition. It was on their oral motion that the lower court
ordered the case to be dismissed. For double jeopardy to attach, the general rule is that the dismissal of the case must
be without the express consent of the accused. Moreover, as held in Bermisa v. Court of Appeals (92 SCRA 136,
141-143 [1979]), "the consent of petitioner to the dismissal constituted a waiver of the constitutional right not to be
prosecuted for the same offense. where a defendant expressly consents to or moves for the dismissal of the case
against him, even if the court or judge states in the order that the dismissal is definite or does not say that the
dismissal is without prejudice to the filing of another information, the dismissal will not be a bar to a subsequent
prosecution of the defendant for the same offense."

Tan vs. Barrios [GRs 85481-82, 18 October 1990] En Banc, Grino-Aquino (J): 12 concur, 1 concurs in
separate opinion, 1 took no part

Facts: On the basis of Proclamation 1081 dated 21 September 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thru
General Order 8 dated 27 September 1972, authorized the AFP Chief of Staff to create military tribunals "to try and
decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them." In General Order 21 dated 30
September 1972, the military tribunals, "exclusive of the civil courts," were vested with jurisdiction among others,
over violations of the law on firearms, and other crimes which were directly related to the quelling of rebellion and
the preservation of the safety and security of the Republic. In General Order 12-b dated 7 November 1972, "crimes
against persons as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code" were added to the jurisdiction of military
tribunals/commissions. Subsequently, General Order 49, dated 11 October 1974, redefined the jurisdiction of the
Military Tribunals. The enumeration of offenses cognizable by such tribunals excluded crimes against persons as
defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. However, although civil courts should have exclusive jurisdiction
over such offenses not mentioned in Section 1 of GO 49, Section 2 of the same general order provided that "the
President may, in the public interest, refer to a Military Tribunal a case falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
civil courts" and vice versa. On 17 April 1975, William Tan (@ Go Bon Ho), Joaquin Tan Leh (@ Go Bon Huat, @
Taowie) and Vicente Tan (@ Go Bon Beng, @ Donge), with 12 others (Luis Tan [@ Tata, @ Go Bon Hoc], Ang
Tiat Chuan [@ Chuana], Mariano Velez, Jr., Antonio Occaciones, Leopoldo Nicolas, Enrique Labita, Oscar Yaun,
Eusebio Tan [@ Go Bon Ping], Alfonso Tan [@ Go Bon Tiak], Go E Kuan [@ Kunga], Marciano Benemerito [@
Marcing, @ Dodong], Manuel Beleta, and John Doe), were arrested and charged in Criminal Case MC-1-67 before
the Military Commission 1, for the crimes of: (1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally-possessed
firearm, penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 1, par. 6 of General Order 49,
for the killing on 25 August 1973 of Florentino Lim of the wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan de Oro City; and
(2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol, caliber .45 SN-1283521 with ammunition, in violation of
General Orders 6 and 7 in relation to Presidential Decree 9. Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan de
Oro City, President Marcos, pursuant to the recommendation of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, withdrew his
earlier order to transfer the case to the civil courts. Hence, the case was retained in the military court. All the
accused were detained without bail in the PC Stockade in Camp Crame. Upon arraignment on 6 May 1975, all the
accused pleaded "not guilty." Manuel Beleta was discharged to be used as a state witness. He was released from
detention on 5 May 1975. Almost daily trials were held for more than 13 months. The testimonies of 45 prosecution
witnesses and 35 defense witnesses filled up 21 volumes of transcripts consisting of over 10,000 pages. On 10 June
1976, a decision entitled "Findings and Sentence," was promulgated by the Military Commission finding 5 of the
accused namely: Luis Tan, Ang Tiat Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 13 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Chuan, Mariano
Velez, Jr., Antonio Occaciones, and Leopoldo Nicolas guilty of murder, where each of them was sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate prison term of from 17 years, 4 months, and 21 days, to 20 years. A sixth accused, Marciano
Benemerito, was found guilty of both murder and illegal possession of firearm, and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death by electrocution. 8 of the accused, namely: Oscar Yaun, Enrique Labita, Eusebio Tan, Alfonso Tan,
Go E Kuan, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh, and Vicente Tan were acquitted of the charges, and released on 11 June
1976. On 17 January 1981, Proclamation 2045 ended martial rule and abolished the military tribunals and
commissions. On 22 May 1987, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs. Military Commission 34,
et al. (150 SCRA 144), vacating the sentence rendered on 4 December 1984 by Military Commission 34 against
Olaguer, et al. and declaring that military commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even during the period of
martial law, over civilians charged with criminal offenses properly cognizable by civil courts, as long as those courts
are open and functioning as they did during the period of martial law. In October 1986, 6 habeas corpus petitions
were filed in the Supreme Court by some 217 prisoners in the national penitentiary, who had been tried for common
crimes and convicted by the military commissions during the 9-year span of official martial rule (G.R. Nos. 75983,
79077,79599-79600, 79862 and 80565 consolidated and entitled Manuel R. Cruz, et al. vs. Minister Juan Ponce
Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA 700). Conformably with the ruling in Olaguer, the Supreme Court in Cruz vs. Enrile (160
SCRA 700), nullified the proceedings leading to the conviction of non-political detainees who should have been
brought before the courts of justice as their offenses were totally unrelated to the insurgency sought to be controlled
by martial rule. On 15 September 1988, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez issued Department Order 226
designating State Prosecutor Hernani Barrios "to collaborate with the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in the
investigation/reinvestigation of Criminal Case MC-1-67 and, if the evidence warrants, to prosecute the case in the
court of competent jurisdiction." On 15 November 1988, State Prosecutor Hernani T. Barrios was designated Acting
City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in lieu of the regular fiscal who inhibited himself. Without conducting an
investigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal Barrios filed on 9 December 1988, in the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de
Oro City two (2) informations for (1) Illegal Possession of Firearm [Criminal Case 88-824]; and (2) Murder
[Criminal Case 88-825] against all the 15 original defendants in Criminal Case MC1-67 including those who had
already died. Criminal Cases 88-824 and 88-825 of the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City, were assigned by raffle to the
sala of RTC Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo. Before issuing warrants for the arrest of the accused, Judge Demecillo
issued an order on 26 October 1988, requiring State Prosecutor Barrios to submit certified copies of "the supporting
affidavits of the previous cases wherever they are now," and of the Supreme Court order "which is the basis of filing
the cases, within 5 days from receipt" of his said order. The State Prosecutor has not complied with that order. On 7
November 1988, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition
praying that the informations in Criminal Cases 88-824 and 88-825, and the order of Judge dated 26 October 1988
be annulled, among others.

Issue: Whether the reprosecution of Tan, et. al. would violate their right to protection against double jeopardy.

Held: The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before military tribunals and commissions during the
ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in
the exercise of his legislative powers, is an operative fact that may not be justly ignored. The belated declaration in
1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences
which occurred long before the Court's decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us from
carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against Tan, et.
al. and their co-accused before the Military Commission. The principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of
the military courts over civilians should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular case
of Tan, et. al., the proceedings were fair, that there were no serious violations of their constitutional right to due
process, and that the jurisdiction of the military Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
commission that heard and decided the charges against them during the period of martial law, had been affirmed by
the Supreme Court (Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years before the Olaguer case arose and
came before the Supreme Court. Because of these established operative facts, the refiling of the information against
Tan, et. al. would place them in double jeopardy, in hard fact if not in constitutional logic. The doctrine of double
jeopardy protects the accused from harassment by the strong arm of the State: "The constitutional mandate is (thus)
a rule of finality. A single prosecution for any offense is all the law allows. It protects an accused from harassment,
enables him to treat what had transpired as a closed chapter in his life, either to exult in his freedom or to be
resigned to whatever penalty is imposed, and is a bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself time-consuming and
expense-producing for the state as well. It has been referred to as 'res judicata in prison grey.' The ordeal of a
criminal prosecution is inflicted only once, not whenever it pleases the state to do so."

People vs. Tiozon [GR 89823, 19 June 1991] Third Division, Davide Jr. (J): 4 concur

Facts: At around 11:00 p.m. of 24 February 1989, Leonardo Bolima y Mesia and his wife were awakened by the
loud knocks on their door. Leonardo opened the door and they saw that the person who was knocking was their
"Pareng Troping", Eutropio Tiozon. Leonardo invited Tiozon, who appeared to be very drunk, to come inside their
house. Once inside their house, Tiozon sat down and the two exchanged pleasantries. Tiozon showed a gun to her
husband and the latter even toyed with it. The two left. 5 minutes later and or after Leonardo's wife heard two
successive gunshots, and heard Tiozon knocking at their door and at the same time informing her that he
accidentally shot Leonardo, "Mare, mare, nabaril ko si Pare, hindi ko sinasadya." Leonardo's wife sought help to
carry Leonardo towards the main road. Some of the neighbors arrived bringing Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 23 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) with them lights. Thereafter, Kalookan policemen arrived and so she caused the arrest
of Tiozon. In an information filed by the Asst. City Prosecutor of Caloocan City on 27 February 1989 with Branch
131 of the Regional Trial Court (Caloocan City) of the National Capital Judicial Region, Eutropio Tiozon y Acid
was charged for violation of Presidential Decree 1866, as amended. Tiozon pleaded not guilty when arraigned on 15
March 1989. Pre-trial was conducted and thereafter the trial court received the evidence for the parties. In a decision
promulgated on 30 June 1989, the trial court found Tiozon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of P.D. 1866
and Murder qualified by treachery and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment; to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Leonardo Bolima the sum of P30,000.00; to reimburse the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as
reasonable expenses for the wake and burial expenses and to pay the costs. According to the trial court, were it not
for its abolition, "the death penalty, the sentence imposable under 2nd pa., Section 1 of PD 1866, as amended",
should have been imposed. On 5 July 1989 Tiozon filed a motion to reconsider the decision which, however, was
denied by the court in its order of 16 August 1989. On 17 August, Tiozon filed a Notice of Appeal.

Issue: Whether prosecution for violation of PD 1866, which is qualified by murder or homicide, bars prosecution for
murder or homicide, in light of the right against double jeopardy.

Held: Section 1 of PD 1866 imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua
"upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any firearm, part of
firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm
or ammunition." It goes further by providing that "if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed." It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense
penalized in Section 1 of PD 1866 because it is a circumstance which increases the penalty. It does not, however,
follow that the homicide or murder is absorbed in the offense; otherwise, an anomalous absurdity results whereby a
more serious crime defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code is absorbed by a statutory offense, which is just
a malum prohibitum. The rationale for the qualification is to effectively deter violations of the laws on firearms and
to stop the "upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed
and manufactured firearms." In fine then, the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise
to separate prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 of PD 1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or
Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one as a bar to the other; or, stated
otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is punished by a special law while
the second, homicide or murder, is punished by the Revised Penal Code.

Icasiano vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 95642, 28 May 1992] En Banc, Padilla (J): 13 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: Acting Municipal Trial Court Judge of Naic, Cavite, Aurelio G. Icasiano, Jr. issed 2 orders of detention dated
18 and 27 November 1986 against Romana Magbago for contempt of court because of her continued refusal to
comply with a fifth alias writ of execution. Magbago filed an administrative complaint dated 17 February 1987 with
the Supreme Court against Judge Icasiano. After evaluating the allegations of the complaint, Icasiano's comment
thereon and the Court Administrator's recommendation, the Supreme Court dismissed the administrative complaint
for lack of merit in an en banc resolution dated 2 February 1988. Meanwhile, on 17 March 1987, Magbago also filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman the same lettercomplaint earlier filed with the Supreme Court; this time, she
claimed violation by Judge Icasiano, Jr. of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, sec. 3 par. [e]) in
TBP-87-00924. After considering Judge Icasiano's answer, in a resolution dated April 1988 Special Prosecutor
Evelyn Almogela-Baliton recommended dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. The recommendation was
approved by then Special Prosecutor/Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales. It appears from the records of the Tanodbayan,
which were forwarded to the Supreme Court, upon order of the Court in connection with this case, that the
resolution dismissing the complaint was released on 14 April 1988. The office of the Tanodbayan received another
complaint from the same Romana Magbago (TBP-87-01546). The exact date of filing of the second complaint is not
stated but the records of the case were allegedly among those transmitted to the then newly created office of the
Ombudsman; unfortunately, the transmitted records did not contain the earlier resolution of dismissal in TBP-87-
00924. Special Prosecutor Nicanor Cruz, Jr. who was assigned to investigate the case (TBP-87-01546) appeared
completely unaware of the earlier case, TBP-87-00924. The corresponding information against Icasiano was
thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case 14563). After said information was filed on 21 March 1990,
Icasiano (as accused) filed a motion for reinvestigation. Icasiano's motion for reinvestigation was denied in the 29
June 1990 resolution, of the Sandiganbayan. Icasiano then moved to quash the information on the grounds, among
others, that the accused shall be placed in double jeopardy in so far as the resolution of the Hon. Supreme Court in
Administrative Case RTJ-87-81. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. A motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. Icasiano filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the resolution of the administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court bars the subsequent filing of a
criminal case against the accused in the Sandiganbayan.

Held: After a closer look at the records of the case, the Court is of the view that the distinction between
administrative and criminal proceedings must be upheld, and that a prosecution in one is not a bar to the other. It is,
therefore, correct for the Sandiganbayan to hold that double jeopardy does no apply in the present controversy
because the Supreme Court case (against Judge Icasiano) was administrative in character while the Sandiganbayan
case also against Judge Icasiano is criminal in nature. When the Supreme Court acts on Constitutional Law II, 2005 (
20 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) complaints against judges or any of the personnel under its supervision and
control, it acts as personnel administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court judging justiciable controversies.
Administrative procedure need not strictly adhere to technical rules. Substantial evidence is sufficient to sustain
conviction. Criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, on the other hand, while they may involve the same
acts subject of the administrative case, require proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To avail of the protection
against double jeopardy, it is fundamental that the following requisites must have obtained in the original
prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; c) a valid arraignment; (d) the defendant
had pleaded to the charge; and (e) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent. All these elements do not apply visa-vis the administrative
case, which should take care of Judge Icasiano's contention that said administrative case against him before the
Supreme Court, which was dismissed, entitled him to raise the defense of double jeopardy in the criminal case in the
Sandiganbayan. The charge against Judge Icasiano before the Sandiganbayan is for grave abuse of authority,
manifest partiality and incompetence in having issued 2 orders of detention against complaining witness Magbago.
Ordinarily, complainant's available remedy was to appeal said orders of detention in accordance with the Rules. It is
only when an appellate court reverses the lower court issuing the questioned orders can abuse, partiality or
incompetence be imputed to the judge. Here no appeal from the questioned orders of the issuing judge (Icasiano)
was taken: instead, administrative and criminal cases were filed against the judge for issuing the orders. It is
precisely for this reason, among other, that the administrative case against Judge Icasiano was dismissed by the
Supreme Court for lack of merit; and yet, it cannot be assumed at this point that Judge Icasiano is not criminally
liable under RA 3019, par. 3(e) for issuing the questioned orders of detention. In fact, the Ombudsman has found a
prima facie case which led to the filing of the information. In any case, the dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first
complaint cannot bar the present prosecution, since double jeopardy does not apply. As held in Cirilo Cinco, et al.
vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, a preliminary investigation (assuming one had been conducted
in TBP-87-00924) is not a trial to which double jeopardy attaches.

People vs. Judge Villarama, 210 SCRA 246 (1992)

FACTS: Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. After the prosecution
rested its case, counsel for private respondent verbally manifested in open court that private respondent was willing
to change his former plea of “not guilty” to that of “guilty” to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, R.A. No.
6425.

Respondent Judge issued an order directing private respondent to secure the consent of the prosecutor to the change
of plea.

The prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense.

Accused filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense, alleging that the
Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a
lesser offense. Respondent judge granted accused’s motion and convicted him guilty beyond reasonable-doubt of the
crime of violation of Section 17, Republic Act No. 6425 thus this instant petition for review.

Counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondent’s change of plea and his conviction to the
lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer open to review otherwise his
constitutional right against double jeopardy will be violated.

ISSUE: W/N accused can invoke double jeopardy?

HELD: NO. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private respondent’s
change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private respondent cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the
more pertinent and applicable provision is that found in Section 7, Rule 117 which states:

Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. —

xxx xxx xxx

However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily
includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances:

(a) . . . ;

(b) . . . ;

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of the offended party;

xxx xxx xxx

Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16
of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended party, i.e., the
state. More importantly, the trial court’s approval of his change of plea was irregular and improper.

PEOPLE VS JUDGE VILLARAMA

Double Jeopardy: requisites
FACTS:
The petitioner herein did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
0/08 grams of Methampethamin Hydrochloride wrapped in aluminum foil, which is a regulated drug.

During the arraignment petitioner plead not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued, and the counsel for the petitioner on that
time, was willing to change the please of not guilty to guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17 RA No
6425, as amended. The trial judge of the lower court granted the plea of guilty to the lesser offense

The prosecutor however, filed Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense on the grounds:
1. the prosecution already rested its case.
2. the possibility of conviction of private responded for the crime originally charged was high because of strong
evidence of the prosecution.
3. the valuable time which the court and the prosecutor had expended would be put to waste.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge erred in convicting private respondent of the lesser offense of violation of section
17, RA No. 6425, as amended, instead of the offense originally charged of violation of Section 16 of the same law,
in view of the absence of a valid change of plea.

HELD:
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to the approval of the court. It usually involves the defendant's pleading
guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of multi-count indictment in return for a lighter
sentence than that for the graver charge.

Section 2: Plea of guilty to a lesser offense - The accused, with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may
be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included
in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary.

A conviction under the plea of guilty to a lesser offense, shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged
for purposes of double jeopardy.

The Supreme Court held that the rules allow such plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence
to establish guilt of the crime charged.

The counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondent's change of plea and his conviction to
the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No 4625, as amended is no longer open to review otherwise his
constitutional right against double jeopardy will be violated.

Such disposition has no basis. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private respondent's
change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private respondent cannot claim this privilege.

Section 7, Rule 117 is more applicable.

However the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily
included the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances..

1. ....,
2. ....,
3. The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and the offended party.

Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16
of RA No 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended party.

Wherefore, the petition is granted.

People vs. Villarama [GR 99287, 23 June 1992] First Division, Medialdea (J): 3 concur

Facts: On 24 August 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, RA 6425, as amended.
The penalty prescribed in the said section is imprisonment ranging from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years and a fine
ranging from P6,000 to P12,000. The information against him reads: "That on or about the 21st day of August, 1990,
in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without the corresponding license or prescription did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control 0.08 grams of Methamphetamin Hydrocloride (Shabu)
wrapped with an aluminum foil, which is a regulated drug. Contrary to law." During the arraignment, Manuel
entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On 21 November 1990, the prosecution rested its case. On 9
January 1991, Manuel's counsel verbally manifested in open court that Manuel was willing to change his former
plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA 6425, as amended. The
said section provides a penalty of imprisonment ranging from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and a fine ranging from
P600 to P4,000 shall be imposed upon any pharmacist, physician, dentist, veterinarian, manufacturer, wholesaler
who violates or fails to keep the records required under Section 25 of the Act; if the violation or failure involves a
regulated drug. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 24 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) That same day, Judge Martin S.
Villarama Jr. issued an order directing Manuel to secure the consent of the prosecutor to the change of plea, and set
the promulgation of decision on 30 January 1991. On said date, the Judge postponed the promulgation of the
decision to 18 February 1991 to give Manuel another opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor. Also, on
the said date, Manuel filed his Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense. On 18 February 1991, the Judge issued
another order postponing the promulgation of decision to 25 February 1991 to give Manuel further opportunity to
secure the consent of the prosecutor. On 20 February 1991, the prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to
Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution already rested its case on 21 November
1990; (2) the possibility of conviction of Manuel of the crime originally charged was high because of the strong
evidence of the prosecution; and (3) the valuable time which the court and the prosecutor had expended would be
put to waste. On 21 February 1991, Manuel filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a
Lesser Offense, alleging therein, among other matters, that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific
period within which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Subsequently, on 25 February 1991,
the Judge rendered a decision granting Manuel's motion. Forthwith, the prosecutor filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision but the same was denied in the order of 13 March 1991. The prosecutor filed the
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rule of Court
applies to the accused's change of plea in the preent case.

Held: Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a
lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than
that for the graver charge. Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings.
However, the law still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter, as provided by Rule
116 of the Rules of Court, Section 2 thereof, which provides that "The accused, with the consent of the offended
party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not
it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court.
No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent to a
conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy." However, the acceptance of an offer to plead
guilty to a lesser offense under the rule is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is
addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court. Herein, Manuel moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense
after the prosecution had already rested its case. In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the
Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised. The trial court
need not wait for a guideline from the Office of the Prosecutor before it could act on the accused's motion to change
plea. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment whether for or against the said motion, it behooves the trial
court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made
his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served. A reading of the disputed
rulings in this case failed to disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Absent any finding on
the weight of the evidence in hand, the judge's acceptance of Manuel's change of plea is improper and irregular.
Further, the provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of both the Fiscal and the offended party is a
condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The right against double jeopardy given to the
accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rule of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party
consent to the accused's change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, Manuel cannot claim this privilege.
Instead, the more pertinent and applicable provision is that found in Section 7 (c), Rule 117 which states that "the
conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the
offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances: xxx (c) the plea of
guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of the offended party." Under the rule,
Manuel could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended
because of the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 25 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) lack of consent of the Fiscal who also
represents the offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial court's approval of his change of plea was
irregular and improper.
People vs. Vergara [GR 101557-5, 28 April 1993] First Division, Bellosillo (J): 3 concur

Facts: On 7 April 1988, 3rd Asst. Provincial Fiscal Luis E. Estiller of Puerto Princesa City filed Criminal Cases
7396 and 7397 for frustrated murder against Leonardo Salde, Sr., Leonardo Salde, Jr., Floresita Salde, Gloria Salde-
Panaguiton and Jojeta Panaguiton for allegedly conspiring together in attacking and taking turns in assaulting the
spouses Teresa and Amado Rubite, by throwing stones at Amado Rubite and hacking him with a bladed weapon,
hitting him on the left fronto-parietal area which would have caused his death in Crimianl Case 8572 (GR 101557),
and by striking Teresa with wood and stones and hacking her with a bolo which would have caused her death in
Criminal Case 8573 (GR 101558). On 3 June 1988, Leonardo Salde, Sr., Leonardo Salde, Jr., Floresita Salde and
Gloria Salde-Panaguiton were arraigned. They all pleaded "not guilty." On 2 August 1988, Jojeta Panaguiton was
also arraigned and likewise entered a plea of "not guilty." On 19 September 1988, when the cases were initially
called for trial, the Prosecuting Fiscal together with counsel for accused jointly moved for the suspension of the
hearing pending the outcome of the motion filed by the accused for reinvestigation of the cases against them, which
Provincial Fiscal Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr., later resolved in their favor. On 12 December 1988, counsel for the
offended parties gave, notice to the Provincial Fiscal of their intention to appeal the latter's resolution to the
Department of Justice. On 2 February 1989, pending appeal to the Department of Justice, Provincial Fiscal Gacott,
Jr., moved for the dismissal of the cases on the ground that the reinvestigation disclosed that spouses Amado and
Teresa Rubite were the real aggressors and that the accused only acted in self-defense. On 9 February 1989, acting
on the motion of the Provincial Fiscal, the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Br. 52, ordered the dismissal of
Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397. Meanwhile, on 1 March 1990, the Secretary of Justice ordered the Provincial
Prosecutor to refile the Informations. Hence, on 6 April 1990, 2 new Informations for frustrated murder against the
same accused were filed by Acting Provincial Prosecutor Clarito A. Demaala (Criminal Cases 8572 and 8573). On
13 May 1991, after pleading "not guilty" to the new Informations, the accused moved to quash on the ground of
double jeopardy, which was opposed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. On 10 July 1991, the trial
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 22 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) court granted the motion and dismissed Criminal
Cases 8572 and 8573. The motion to reconsider the order of 10 July 1991 filed by Acting Provincial Prosecutor
Demaala was denied on 16 August 1991. Amado and Teresa Rubite filed the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether Salde, et. al. gave their express consent to the dismissal of the original Informations; and, whether
the first jeopardy was invalidly terminated.

Held: The right against double jeopardy prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of which he
has previously been acquitted or convicted. The objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest,
assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril and anxiety of a second charge against him
for the same offense. It is undisputed that valid Informations for frustrated murder, i.e., Criminal Cases 7396 and
7397 were filed against Salde, et. al. before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, a court of competent jurisdiction. It
is likewise admitted that Salde, et. al., after being properly arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty. The only question
then remaining is whether the cases against them were dismissed with their express consent. This is hardly what
Saldy, et. al. gave. What they did was merely to move for reinvestigation of the case before the prosecutor. To
equate this with express consent of the accused to the dismissal of the case in the lower court is to strain the meaning
of "express consent" too far. Simply, there was no express consent of the accused when the prosecutor moved for the
dismissal of the original Informations. While it may be true that, as a general rule, all motions should contain a
notice of hearing under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, these cases present an unusual situation where the motion to
dismiss filed negates the necessity of a hearing. Here, it was the public prosecutor himself who after instituting
Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that after a reinvestigation it was found that
"the evidence in these cases clearly tilts in favor of both accused. The spouses Amado and Teresa Rubite were the
aggressors and the accused Salde, Sr. and his co-accused merely defended themselves from the attack of the Rubites.
Consequently, it would be unfair, arbitrary and unjustified to prosecute the accused in the above-entitled case."
Since it was the prosecuting officer who instituted the cases, and who thereafter moved for their dismissal, a hearing
on his motion to dismiss was not necessary at all. It is axiomatic that a hearing is necessary only in cases of
contentious motions. The motion filed in this case has ceased to be contentious. Definitely, it would be to his best
interest if the accused did not oppose the motion. the Rubites, on the other hand, are precluded from questioning the
discretion of the fiscal in moving for the dismissal of the criminal action. Hence, a hearing on the motion to dismiss
would be useless and futile. The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of
hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court
of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of
the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court
which dismissed the complaint, or to appeal from the dismissal order, and not certiorari. Hence, the conditions for a
valid defense of double jeopardy, i.e., (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (b) the first
jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and, (c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that of the
first, all being present in these cases, the defense of double jeopardy must prevail.

Tupaz v. Ulep
GR. No. 127777, October 1, 1999

Facts: State Prosecutor filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City an information against herein
petitioner Petronila C. Tupaz and her late husband, Jose J. Tupaz, Jr., as corporate officers of El Oro Engravers
Corporation for nonpayment of deficiency in corporate income tax for the year 1979 but was later dismissed and
denied upon reconsideration.
Subsequently, the same prosecutor filed two (2) informations before Regional Trial Court (RTC), for the same
alleged non-payment of deficiency of corporate income tax for the year 1979, one was raffled to Branch 105 while
the other to Branch 86. Respondent Judge Ulep issued an order directing the prosecution to withdraw the
information in Branch 86 after discovering that said information was identical to that filed with Branch 105. The
prosecutor withdrew the information and was granted. But later on filed a motion to reinstate the same, stating that
the motion to withdraw information was made through palpable mistake, and the result of excusable neglect—to
which the respondent Judge granted the motion over the objections of the petitioner. Petitioner files this petition
assailing that respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information because the
offense has prescribed and exposed her to double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or not the reinstatement of the criminal information has exposed petitioner to double jeopardy
Held: Supreme Court ruled on the affirmative. The reinstatement of the information would expose her to double
jeopardy. An accused is placed in double jeopardy if he is again tried for an offense for which he has been
convicted, acquitted or in another manner in which the indictment against him was dismissed without his consent. In
the instant case, there was a valid complaint filed against petitioner to which she pleaded not guilty. The court
dismissed the case at the instance of the prosecution, without asking for accused-petitioner’s consent. This
consent cannot be implied or presumed. Such consent must be expressed as to have no doubt as to the
accused’s conformity. As petitioner’s consent was not expressly given, the dismissal of the case must be
regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-filing of the case. Consequently, the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in reinstating the information against petitioner in violation of her constitutionally protected right
against double jeopardy.

TUPAZ V ULEP GR No. 127777, Oct 1, 1999

Facts: June 8, 1990, an information against accused Petronila C. Tupaz and her late husband Jose J. Tupaz, Jr., as
corporate officers of El Oro Engravers Corp., was field for non-payment of deficiency corporate in come tax for the
year 1979 in violation of Sec. 51(b) in relation to Sec. 73 of the 1977 Tax Code. The information was dismissed for
the lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC of Q.C.

January 10, 1991, 2 information were filed before the RTC of Q.C. against spouses for the same alleged non-
payment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979.
Prior to this, petitioner was charged with nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979, which
tax return was filed in April 1980. On July 16, 1984, the BIR issued a notice of assessment. Petitioner contends that
the July 16, 1984 assessment was made out of time.

Petitioner avers that while Sec. 318 and 319 of the 1977 NIRC provide a 5-year period of limitation for the
assessment and collection of internal revenue taxes, BP700, enacted on February 22, 1984, amended the 2 sections
and reduced the period to 3 years to assess the tax liability, counted from the last day of filing the return or from the
date the return is filed, whichever comes later. Since the tax return was filed in April 1980, the assessment made on
July 16, 1984 was beyond the 3-year prescriptive period.

Issue: Whether the government’s right to assess has prescribed.

Held: The shortened period of 3 years prescribed under BP700 is not applicable to petitioner. BP700, effective April
5, 1984, specifically states that the shortened period of 3 years shall apply to assessments and collections of internal
revenue taxes beginning taxable year 1984. Assessments made on or after April 5, 1984 are governed by the 5-year
period if the taxes assessed cover taxable years prior to January 1, 1984. The deficiency income tax under
consideration is for taxable year 1979. Thus, the period of assessment is still 5 years, under the old law. The income
tax return was filed in April 1980. Hence, the July 16, 1984 tax assessment was issued within the prescribed period
of 5 years, from the last day of filing the return, or from the date the return is filed, whichever comes later.

At the outset, it must be stressed that “internal revenue taxes are self-assessing and no further assessment by the
government is required to create the tax liability. An assessment, however, is not altogether inconsequential; it is
relevant in the proper pursuit of judicial and extrajudicial remedies to enforce taxpayer liabilities and certain matters
that relate to it, such as the imposition of surcharges and interest, and in the application of statute of limitations and
in the establishment with tax liens.”

Tupaz vs. Ulep [GR 127777, 1 October 1999] First Division, Pardo (J): 3 concur

Facts: On 8 June 1990, State Prosecutor (SP) Esteban A. Molon, Jr. filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Quezon City, Branch 33, an information against Petronila C. Tupaz and her husband Jose J. Tupaz, Jr., as corporate
officers of El Oro Engravers Corporation, for nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979,
amounting to P2,369,085.46, in violation of Section 51 (b) in relation to Section 73 of the Tax Code of 1977. On 11
September 1990, the MeTC dismissed the information for lack of jurisdiction. On 16 November 1990, the trial court
denied the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration. On 10 January 1991, SP Molon filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, 2 informations (Criminal Cases Q-91-17321 and Q-91-17322), against Jose and Petronila
Tupaz for the same alleged nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979. Criminal Case Q-91-
17321 was raffled to Branch 105, presided over by Judge Benedicto B. Ulep; Q-91-17322 was raffled to Branch 86,
then presided over by Judge Antonio P. Solano. On 25 September 991, both accused posted bail bond in the sum of
P1,000.00 each, for their provisional liberty. On 6 November 1991, the Tupazes filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 86, a motion to dismiss/quash information (Q-91-17322) for the reason that it was exactly the
same as the information against the Tupazes pending before RTC, Quezon City, Branch 105 (Q-91-17321).
However, on 11 November 1991, Judge Solano denied the motion. In the meantime, on 25 July 1993, Jose J. Tupaz,
Jr. died in Quezon City. Subsequently, Petronila C. Tupaz filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
105, a petition for reinvestigation, which Judge Ulep granted in an order dated 30 August 1994. On 5 September
1994, Senior State Prosecutor Bernelito R. Fernandez stated that no new issues were raised in the request for
reinvestigation, and no cogent reasons existed to alter, modify or reverse the findings of the investigating prosecutor.
He considered the reinvestigation as terminated, and recommended the prompt arraignment and trial of the accused.
On 20 September 1994, the trial court (Branch 105) arraigned Petronila Tupaz in Criminal Case Q-91-17321, and
she pleaded not guilty to the information therein. On 17 October 1994, the prosecution filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion for leave to file amended information in Criminal Case Q91-17321 to
allege expressly the date of the commission of the offense, to wit: on or about August 1984 or subsequently
thereafter. Despite opposition of the accused, on 2 March 1995, the trial court granted the motion and admitted the
amended information. Petronilia was not re-arraigned on the amended information, as the amendment was only on a
matter of form. On 5 December 1995, Petronilia filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a
motion for leave to file and admit motion for reinvestigation. The trial court granted the motion in its order dated 13
December 1995. On 15 May 1996, Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86,
a motion for consolidation of Criminal Case Q-91-17322 with Criminal Case Q-91-17321 pending before the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105. On the same date, the court granted the motion for consolidation.
On 20 May 1996, Judge Ulep of Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, granted the motion for withdrawal
of the information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321 and dismissed the case, as prayed for by the prosecution. On 28
May 1996, Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion to reinstate
information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321, stating that the motion to withdraw information was made through
palpable mistake, and was the result of excusable neglect. He thought that Criminal Case Q-91- 17321 was identical
to Criminal Case Q-90-12896, wherein Petronilia was charged with nonpayment of deficiency contractor’s tax,
amounting to P346,879.29. Over the objections of Petronilia, on 6 August 1996, the Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, Branch 105, granted the motion and ordered the information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321 reinstated. On 24
September 1996, Petronilia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration. On December 4, 1996, the trial
court denied the motion. Petronilia filed the special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the reinstatement of the information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321 exposes Petronilia Tupaz
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 26 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) to double jeopardy.

Held: The reinstatement of the information would expose Petronilia Tupaz to double jeopardy. An accused is placed
in double jeopardy if he is again tried for an offense for which he has been convicted, acquitted or in another manner
in which the indictment against him was dismissed without his consent. Herein, there was a valid complaint filed
against her to which she pleaded not guilty. The court dismissed the case at the instance of the prosecution, without
asking for Petronilia’s consent. This consent cannot be implied or presumed. Such consent must be expressed as to
have no doubt as to the accused’s conformity. As Petronilia’s consent was not expressly given, the dismissal of the
case must be regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-filing of the case. Consequently, the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information against Petronilia in violation of her constitutionally
protected right against double jeopardy.

Petronila Tupaz vs Benedicto Ulep

Taxation – Prescriptive Period for Violations against the Tax Code
In April 1980, Petronila Tupaz and her husband filed, in behalf of their corporation, an income tax return. On July
16, 1984, an assessment was issued against the spouses Tupaz demanding payment of P2.3 million in corporate tax
deficiency (note: prescriptive period to issue assessment then was 5 years). No protest was filed by Tupaz within the
30 day prescriptive period. In June 1989, a criminal complaint for violation of the tax code was filed by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) against Tupaz with the Department of Justice (DOJ). Eventually, a special prosecutor
filed an information against Tupaz. Judge Benedicto Ulep heard the case. Tupaz opposed the said criminal
complaint on the ground that it was filed out of time. It was her theory that the crime alleged was committed in 1979
when they failed to pay the correct corporate tax; that the prescriptive period for the government to file criminal
proceedings for violation of the tax code is 5 years, hence, the criminal proceeding filed in 1989 (ten years from
1979) is already filed out of time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the criminal case was filed out of time.
HELD: No. It was filed within the prescriptive period. The prescriptive period to file a criminal case did not begin
to run in 1979 or the time when Tupaz paid the deficient tax amount. It only begun to run when the assessment
became final and unappealable. The assessment was issued on July 16, 1984. Tupaz did not protest so on August 16,
1984, the assessment became final and unappealable. The counting of the 5 year prescriptive period begun on
August 16, 1984 and so the criminal complaint filed with the DOJ in June 1989 is well within the 5 year prescriptive
period. The rationale behind this is that there is no crime to speak of in 1979 when Tupaz failed to pay the correct
tax. The act only became criminal when in 1984, despite demand, she willingly failed to pay the correct tax as
assessed. Nonetheless, Tupaz got a favorable judgment from the Supreme Court based on double jeopardy.

SANVICENTE vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 132081. November 26, 2002 Appeal, Demurrer to Evidence, Finality-of-
acquittal rule
OCTOBER 25, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with homicide for killing the victim Wong after the latter allegedly attempted to rob him of a
large amount of cash which he had just withdrawn from the automatic teller machine. Petitioner filed a demurrer to
evidence after the prosecution adduced its evidence and rested its case. The trial court subsequently dismissed the
case after finding that the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to support the charge against
petitioner.

ISSUE:

Can a judgment of acquittal be challenged on appeal?

RULING:

NO. Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further
prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an
exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his
own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy.

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of
repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the
absolute nature of acquittals is “part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection
of the innocent against wrongful conviction.”

The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is
a need for “repose”, a desire to know the exact extent of one’s liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice
system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury’s leniency,
will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
Nierras vs. Dacuycuy [GRs 59568-76, 11 January 1990] En Banc, Paras (J): 13 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: Peter Nierras, a customer of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, purchased oil products from it.
Simultaneous with the delivery of the products, he issued 9 checks in payment thereof. Upon presentation to the
Philippine National Bank at Naval, Leyte, said checks were dishonored for the reason that his account was already
closed. Thereafter, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation repeatedly demanded of Nierras either to deposit funds for
his checks or pay for the oil products he had purchased but he failed and refused to do either. Nierras was charged
for for estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Cases 4379, 4380, 4381, 4382, 4383,
4384, 4385, 4386 and 4387) and similarly for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa 22
(Criminal Cases 3790, 3791, 3792, 3793, 4085, 4122, 4123, 4124, and 4125). In both sets of criminal cases, Nierras
entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment before the lower court. However, immediately after his plea of not
guilty in these estafa cases, petitioner moved in open court to be allowed to withdraw his plea of not guilty upon his
filing of a motion to quash, which was denied by Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy in a resolution dated 17 September
1981. Nierras filed the petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether Nierras may be held liable for the 9 criminal cases for violation of BP 22, and separately also be
held liable for the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code for the issuance of the same
bouncing checks.

Held: Nierras is charged with 2 distinct and separate offenses, first under Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
and, second, under Article 315, (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code. Deceit and damage are essential elements in
Article 315 (2d) Revised Penal Code, but are not required in BP 22. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check
that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same
without sufficient funds and hence punishable which is not so under the Penal Code. Other differences between the
two also include the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under BP 22 even if he had
issued the same for a pre-existing obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, such
circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 19 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property,
while violation of BP 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire banking system;
(4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se, while those of BP 22 are mala prohibita.
Furthermore, Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 provides that "Prosecution under this Act shall be without
prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code." While the filing of the two sets
of Information under the provisions of BP 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on
estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by Nierras, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense,
because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences
between the elements of an offense in one law and another law, there will be no double jeopardy because what the
rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the 2 offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for
the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the 2
sets of information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy

People vs. Ferrer [GRs L-32613-14, 27 December 1972] First Division, Castro (J): 5 concur, 12 took no part, 1
dissented in a separate opinion

Facts: On 5 March 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against
Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac. On March 10, Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a
preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the
corresponding information. The twice-amended information (Criminal Case 27), recites "That on or about May 1969
to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the
Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of
establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and domination of
an alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the New
People's Army, the military arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines. That in the commission of the
above offense, the following aggravating circumstances are present, to wit: (a) That the crime has been committed in
contempt of or with insult to public authorities; (b) That the crime was committed by a band; and (c) With the aid of
armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity." Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion
Act is a bill of attainder. Meanwhile, on 25 May 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court,
charging Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary investigation was had, an information was
filed. On 21 July 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) Republic
Act 1700 is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof;
and (4) it denies him the equal protection of the laws. Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its
resolution of 15 September 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is
vague and overbroad, and dismissed the informations against the two accused. The Government appealed. The
Supreme Court resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.

Issue: Whether the Anti-Subversion Law partakes of the nature of a Bill of Attainder.

Held: Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be
enacted." A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution
of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to
implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling
legislative usurpation of the judicial function. History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress
unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The
singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a
statute as a bill of attainder. Herein, when the Anti-Subversion Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen
that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4,
against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" is used solely for
definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any
other organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.
Were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as
the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still
has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party
knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with
specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force, deceit, and other
illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power. Further, the statute
specifically requires that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives
of the Party. That is what section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have
been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful
goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the
ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the organization's unlawful
activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives. Even assuming,
however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder.
It is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a
way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. Nor is it enough that
the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of
attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement follows from
the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is
that Congress thereby assumes judicial magistracy, then it must be demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill
of attainder reaches past conduct and that the penalties it imposes are inescapable. Section 4 of Anti-Subversion Act
expressly states that the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed "After the approval of this Act." Only
those who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with, become or remain members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successors or of any subversive association" after 20 June 1957, are
punished. Those who were members of the Party or of any other subversive association at the time of the enactment
of the law, were given the opportunity of purging themselves of liability by renouncing in writing and under oath
their membership in the Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciation shall operate to exempt such
persons from penal liability. The penalties prescribed by the Act are therefore not inescapable.
PEOPLE VS. FERRER 43 SCRA 382
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972

On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of Sec. 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the
respondent Feliciano Co in the CFI of Tarlac. Respondent was an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communists
Party of the Philippines (CPP), an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the
Philippines by means of illegal means for the purpose of establisihing a totalitarian regime. He is an instructor in the
Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the NPA, the military arm of the CPP. Judge Jose C. de
Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the Government
prosecutors to file the corresponding information. Co moved to quash thee information on the ground that the Anti-
Subversion Acts is a bill of attainder.

Anther criminal complaint was filed with the same court, charging the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with
subversion. The above accused were officers and/or ranking leaders of the Kabatasang Makabayan (KM), a
subversive organization as defined in RA 1700. Tayag moved to quash on the ground that the statute is a bill of
attainder.

ISSUE: WON the Acts violates the right to freedom of speech and association?

HELD: Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex port facto law shall be
enacted." A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the
substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of attainder
serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby
forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed
to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is
directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to
stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder.

Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to render it a
bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as officers
or employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to
the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill of
attainder. Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty to
register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such society which fails to register or remains a
member thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku
Klux Klan.

the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force, violence or other illegal means.
Whatever interest in freedom of speech and freedom of association is infringed by the prohibition against knowing
membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to be clearly and
heavily outweighed by the overriding considerations of national security and the preservation of democratic
institutions in his country.

The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Act is similar in many respects to the membership provision of
the Anti-Subversion Act. The former provides:

Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate,
or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member
of, or affiliated with, any such society, group or assembly of persons, knowing the purpose thereof —

Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for
employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his
conviction....

In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs. United States:
It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we are here concerned is not constitutionally protected speech,
and it was further established that a combination to promote such advocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports
to be a political party, is not such association as is protected by the first Amendment. We can discern no reason why
membership, when it constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group engaging in this same forbidden
advocacy, should receive any greater degree of protection from the guarantees of that Amendment.

PEOPLE VS. FERRER [48 SCRA 382; NOS.L-32613-14; 27 DEC 1972]

Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of
1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for
being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances
of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo
Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the
Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial
court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by
pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of
organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and
similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being
although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and
violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger
to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the
CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be
made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7
provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the
renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the
statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.

(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of
judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder,
the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied
retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)

In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to
other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person.

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown thatmembership was acquired with the
intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with
KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a member’s direct participation. Why
is membership punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes
himself party to its unlawful acts.

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act.
The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape
liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis
mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made.

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be
the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE
EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the
enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court
further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition
ofmembership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION
of DEMOCRACY.

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving
circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the
present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membershipis willfully
and knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose.Membership is willfully and knowingly done
by overt acts.

The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the
resolution of the TRIAL COURT.

People vs. Ferrer (48 SCRA 382)

Facts:
On March 10, 1970, a prima facie case was filed against Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance in Tarlac
concerning the Anti-Subversion Act. He was accused of being an officer or a ranked leader of the Communist Party
of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the government of the Philippines by
means of force, violence, deceit, subversion or any other illegal means. Co claimed that the Anti-Subversion Act is a
bill of attainder. On May 25, 1970, Nilo Tayag and five others were also charged in the same court with subversion.
Tayag copied Co’s attack on the law. The court ruled the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and
that it is vague overbroad. Government appealed to the SC as a special civil action for certiorari.

Issues:
Relevant: WoN the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder
Irrelevant: WoN it is vague and overbroad
Irrelevant: WoN it denies the defendants the due process of the law

Held And Ratio:

Relevant: No. Only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group
in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. (US v.
Lovett 328 US 303 1946)
Irrelevant: No. The contention about the word “overthrow” regarding the government (peaceful overthrowing) is
clarified by the provision of the clause: by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion or any other illegal means.
Irrelevant: No. The freedom of expression and freedom of association is superseded by the right of the state to self-
preservation.

Decision: The questioned resolution is set aside.

PEOPLE VS FERRER
BILL OF ATTAINDER

FACTS:
Co-respondents herein were charged in violation of RA 1700 or Anti Subversion Law by instigating, recruiting,
inciting others to rise up and take arms against the Government with the purpose of overthrowing the Government of
the Philippines.

Respondents, who were charged in violations of RA 1700 (Anti Subversion Law) moved to quash the charged and
alleged that the said law is Bill of Attainder.

The Law punishes any person who "knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or
remains a member of the Party or of any other similar "subversive organization.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law in question or the RA 1700/ Anti Subversion Law is a bill of attainder.
HELD:
No.Article 3 Section 22 of the Constitution provides:
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

A Bill of Attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a
legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bill of attainders serves to implement
the principle of separation of powers by confining the legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative
usurpation of the judicial function.

The singling our of a definite class, the imposition of burden on it, and a legislative intent to stigmatise statute as a
bill of attainder.

1. The Supreme Court held that when the act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify
the Communist Party of the Philippines or the member thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simple
to declare the party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the
prohibition.

The term "Communist Part of the Philippines" issues solely for definitional purposes. In fact the act applies not only
to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any organisation having the same purpose and their
successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.

Misolas vs. Panga [GR 83341, 30 January 1990] En Banc, Cortes (J): 11 concur, 1 concurs in result, 2
dissented in separate opinions

Facts: After receiving information from an unidentified informant that members of the New People's Army (NPA)
were resting in a suspected "underground house" in Foster Village, Del Carmen, Pili, Camarines Sur, elements of the
Philippine Constabulary (PC) raided said house in the early morning of 8 August 1987. Three persons were inside
the house, Arnel P. Misolas and two women known by the aliases "Ka Donna" and "Ka Menchie" but the women
were able to escape in the confusion during the raid. The house was searched and the raiders found in a red bag
under a pillow allegedly used by Misolas a .20 gauge Remington shotgun and 4 live rounds of ammunition.
Petitioner was arrested and brought to the PC headquarters. On 4 September 1987, an information charging Misolas
with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under Presidential Decree 1866 was filed by the provincial
fiscal. The information alleged that the firearm and ammunition were used in furtherance of subversion so as to
qualify the offense under the third paragraph of Section 1 of PD 1866. Upon arraignment, Misolas, with the
assistance of counsel de oficio pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. However, a few days later, the same counsel filed
a motion to withdraw the plea on the ground that there was Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) basis for the filing of a motion to quash. Judge Benjamin V. Panga, as Judge of RTC Branch 33, Cadlan,
Pili, Camarines Sur, gave Misolas time to file a motion to quash. Misolas filed a motion to quash on the grounds (1)
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because the information does not charge the proper offense since
from the allegations the offense that may be charged is either subversion or rebellion; and (2) that the trial court had
no jurisdiction over the person of petitioner because of violations of his constitutional rights, i.e, his arrest and the
seizure of the firearm and ammunition were illegal. The judge denied the motion to quash for lack of merit in an
order dated 7 January 1988. Misolas moved for reconsideration, but such was denied on 15 February 1988. Misolas
filed the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether PD 1866 constitutes a bill of attainder.

Held: Misolas objected to PD 1866 on the ground of substantive due process. Established rules of constitutional
litigation would, therefore, bar an inquiry based on the theory that PD 1866 constitutes a bill of attainder. Yet, even
if a challenge on the ground that PD 1866 is a bill of attainder could be appropriately considered, it will still be met
with little success. The Court, in People v. Ferrer, defined a bill of attainder as a legislative act which inflicts
punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder
are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or
otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. This last element, the total lack of court intervention in the finding of guilt
and the determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the most essential. PD 1866 does not possess the
elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. Nowhere in the measure
is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a corresponding punishment. What the decree does is to define the
offense and provide for the penalty that may be imposed, specifying the qualifying circumstances that would
aggravate the offense. There is no encroachment on the power of the court to determine after due hearing whether
the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the offense of illegal possession of firearms has been
committed and that the qualifying circumstance attached to it has been established also beyond reasonable doubt as
the Constitution and judicial precedents require.

Mejia vs. Pamaran (G.R. No. L-56741-42)

Facts:
6 ejectment cases were filed separately in the City Court of Manila by Eusebio Lu against Feliciano F.
Endangan, Josefina Meimban, Teodorico Bontia, Rolando Antillon, Jose Mabalot and Vicente Villamor. All
cases were decided by the City Court of Manila against Endangan, et. al., all of whom appealed in due time to
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, where the cases were raffled to Branch XXVI, presided over by
the Honorable Jose P. Alejandro.

On 12 August 1979, Endangan, Bontia, Antillon, Mabalot, and Villamor entered into a compromise
agreement with Lu whereby the Endangan, et. al. individually received from Lu the sum of P5,000 in
consideration of which Endangan, et. al. agreed to vacate the premises in question and remove their houses
therefrom within 60 days from the date of the execution of the agreement, failing which the appellee shall
have the authority to demolish Endangan, et. al.'s houses with costs thereof chargeable against them. The
compromise agreement was submitted to the court. Josefina Meimban did not join her co-defendants in
entering into the compromise agreement. Up to that stage of the cases.

In July 1979, Meimban went to Court where she met Atty. Mejia who told her that the case has not yet been
decided because there was still one party who has not signed the compromise agreement prepared by Atty.
Doron. Atty. Mejia also remarked that she was surprised why rich people were helping in that case, like a
certain Atty. Lu, a brother of Eusebio Lu, who has been approaching the presiding judge; and then told her
she would help them provided they give P1,000 each for a gift to the Judge

They were able to give partial amount of the money being asked. Atty. Mejia also attempted to bribe the
Tanodbayan Investigator (Christina Corall-Paterno), through intricate gold chain with a pendant hearing an
inscription of letter "C," which the investigator returned through an employee. Corall-Paterno investigated
the complaints of Josefina Meimban and Pilar Bautista against Atty. Aurora Mejia for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On 23 April 1981, the Sandiganbayan, Mejia was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b), Section 3 of RA 3019 and sentenced her to an indeterminate
imprisonment ranging from 4 years and 1 day as minimum to 7 years as maximum, to suffer perpetual
disqualification from public office and to indemnify the victim Josefina Meimban the sum of P1,000.00
representing the money given to her. The Sandiganbayan also found Mejia, in Criminal Case 1989, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b), Section 3 of RA 3019 and likewise sentenced her to an
indeterminate imprisonment ranging from 4 years and 1 day as minimum to 7 years as maximum, to suffer
perpetual disqualification from public office and to indemnify the victim Pilar Bautista the amount of P500
representing the money given to her. Mejia was also ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. Mejia filed a
petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Mejia contended that the proceedings taken by respondent Sandiganbayan in the case at bar is void ab initio.
She argued that only one stage of appeal is available to the petitioner under PD No. 1606 which effectively
deprives her of the intermediate recourse to the Court of Appeals and that in said appeal to this Court, only
issues of law may be raised and worse still the appeal has become a matter of discretion rather than a matter
of right. Petitioner contends this is a denial of the equal protection of the law.

Issue:
WON the accused is denied of due process and the equal protection of the law.

Held:
There is no denial of equal protection of the law. The classification satisfies the test announced by this Court
through Justice Laurel in People v. Vera requiring that it must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. To repeat, the Constitution specifically
makes the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those
who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when
the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, is not necessarily
offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

There is no violation of due process. What is required for compliance with the due process mandate in
criminal proceedings? This Court with Justice Tuason as ponente, succinctly Identified it with a "a fair and
impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense. In criminal proceedings then, due
process is satisfied if the accused is "informed as to why he is proceeded against and what charge he hall to
meet, with his conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity
for him to rebut it and the sentence being implied in accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, of course,
that the court that rendered the decision is one of competent jurisdiction. Thus: This court has had frequent
occasion to consider the requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal procedure, and, generally
speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded
against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to
him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law,
then he has had due process of law.

Mejia v Pamaran; G.R. Nos. L-56741-42; 15 Apr 1988; 160 SCRA 457

FACTS:
Petitioner was found guilty of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for using her position as branch
clerk of court to demand and receive money from the persons involved in certain cases in consideration of a promise
that she will help in getting them a favorable judgment. Under P.D. No. 1606, petitioner is only afforded one stage
of appeal.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioner was denied due process.

RULING:
NO. If an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly
processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be
heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law.

Petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

Mejia vs. Pamaran [GRs L-56741-42, 15 April 1988] En Banc, Gancayco (J): 14 concur

Facts: 6 ejectment cases were filed separately in the City Court of Manila by Eusebio Lu against Feliciano F.
Endangan, Josefina Meimban, Teodorico Bontia, Rolando Antillon, Jose Mabalot and Vicente Villamor. All cases
were decided by the City Court of Manila against Endangan, et. al., all of whom appealed in due time to the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Manila, where the cases were raffled to Branch XXVI, presided over by the Honorable Jose
P. Alejandro (Civil Case 122794 to 122799). On 12 August 1979, Endangan, Bontia, Antillon, Mabalot, and
Villamor entered into a compromise agreement with Lu whereby the Endangan, et. al. individually received from Lu
the sum of P5,000 in consideration of which Endangan, et. al. agreed to vacate the premises in question and remove
their houses therefrom within 60 days from the date of the execution of the agreement, failing which the appellee
shall have the authority to demolish Endangan, et. al.'s houses with costs thereof chargeable against them. The
compromise agreement was submitted to the court. Josefina Meimban did not join her co-defendants in entering into
the compromise agreement. Up to that stage of the cases, the counsel of record of the defendants was Atty. S. G.
Doron. On 22 August 1979, Atty. Modesto R. Espano of the Citizens Legal Assistant Office (CLAO), wrote Atty.
Doron to inform him that Mrs. Meimban has sought the assistance of the CLAO regarding her case, and asked that
the records of the case be sent to him. As a consequence, Atty. Doron filed on 30 August 1979 his motion to
withdraw appearance as counsel for Meimban in Civil Case 122795. While Endangan, Bontia, Antillon, Mabalot
and Villamor, have decided to Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) settle with Lu through
compromise agreement that they signed, Meimban resolved to prosecute her appeal in her own case, Civil Case
122795. When Meimban followed up her case in Branch XXVI of the CFI of Manila and had occasion to talk to
Danilo Buenaventura of that Branch who told her that her case was already submitted for decision. She sought
assistance from the CLAO where she was instructed by Atty. Espano to find out the real status of the case. She
returned to the court sometime in July 1979 and that was when she first came to know Atty. Aurora Mejia who told
her that the case has not yet been decided because there was still one party who has not signed the compromise
agreement prepared by Atty. Doron. Atty. Mejia also remarked that she was surprised why rich people were helping
in that case, like a certain Atty. Lu, a brother of Eusebio Lu, who has been approaching the presiding judge; and then
told her she would help them provided they give P1,000 each for a gift to the Judge, to which she replied she would
broach the matter to her companions. From the court, she went to Atty. Modesto Espano and told the lawyer the case
was not yet submitted. Atty. Espano instructed her to get her papers from Atty. Doron, which she did. Thereafter,
she told Pilar Bautista, daughter of Jose Mabalot, and Gloria Antonio, daughter of Vicente Villamor, about the help
offered by Atty. Mejia. The two said they would think it over as they had already signed something. When she went
to the court to deposit her rentals Atty. Mejia asked her if her companions were agreeable to the suggestion and she
replied she had already told them and that they would consider the matter. On 20 November 1979, Sylvia Dizon y
Resurreccion who loaned Meimban P500 accompanied the latter to the court. She was seated at the corridor near the
door of Atty. Mejia's office which was partially open, and she saw Meimban handed an envelope to Atty. Mejia who
put it inside her desk drawer. On 7 December 1979, the date set for the hearing of the motion to withdraw the
compromise and to file memoranda filed by Pilar Bautista and Gloria Antonio in behalf of their fathers, Atty. Mejia
approached Meimban and said no oppositor might arrive, and asked her if Bautista had brought 1/2 of the P1,000.00.
Bautista placed P600 in an envelope and the two of them, Bautista and Meimban, went to Atty. Mejia's office.
Bautista handed the envelope containing the money to Atty. Mejia who received it. On 3 September 1980, Atty.
Mejia attempted to bribe the Tanodbayan Investigator (Christina Corall-Paterno), through intricate gold chain with a
pendant hearing an inscription of letter "C," (which the investigator returned through an employee, Dante Ramos).
CorallPaterno investigated the complaints of Josefina Meimban and Pilar Bautista against Atty. Aurora Mejia y
Rodriguez for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On 23 April 1981, the Sandiganbayan, in
Criminal Case 1988, found Aurora Mejia y Rodriguez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b),
Section 3 of RA 3019 and sentenced her to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from 4 years and 1 day as
minimum to 7 years as maximum, to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office and to indemnify the victim
Josefina Meimban the sum of P1,000.00 representing the money given to her. The Sandiganbayan also found Mejia,
in Criminal Case 1989, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b), Section 3 of RA 3019 and
likewise sentenced her to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from 4 years and 1 day as minimum to 7 years as
maximum, to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office and to indemnify the victim Pilar Bautista the
amount of P500 representing the money given to her. Mejia was also ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Mejia filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whetehr Presidential Decree is an ex-post facto law.

Held: The contention that Presidential Decree 1606 is contrary to the ex post facto provision of the Constitution is
similarly premised on the allegation that "petitioner's right of appeal is being diluted or eroded efficacy wise." Mejia
alleged that the procedure provided for by the Sandiganbayan are ex post facto and hence all proceedings taken
against her are void ab initio being in violation of the Constitution. It is further argued that only one stage of appeal
is available to Mejia under PD 1606 which effectively deprives her of the intermediate recourse to the Court of
Appeals and that in said appeal to the Supreme Court only issues of law may be raised and worse still the appeal has
become a matter of discretion rather than a matter of right. A more searching scrutiny of its rationale would
demonstrate the lack of persuasiveness of such an argument. The Kay Villegas Kami decision, promulgated in 1970,
supplies the most recent and binding pronouncement on the matter. To quote from the ponencia of Justice Makasiar:
"An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2)
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and
authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the
offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right
for something which when done was lawful, and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection
to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty." Even the most careful scrutiny of the said definition fails to sustain Mejia's claim. The "lawful protection"
to which an accused "has become entitled" is qualified, not given a broad scope. It hardly can be argued that the
mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right to appeal is therein embraced.

WRIGHT vs CA G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994 Extradition, Ex post facto law
OCTOBER 25, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian authorities for indictable crimes in his country.
Extradition proceedings were filed against him which ordered the deportation of petitioner. Said decision was
sustained by the Court of Appeals; hence, petitioner came herein by way of review on certiorari, to set aside the
order of deportation, contending that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty
amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Can extradition treaty be applied retroactively?

RULING:

NO. Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to include all laws of retrospective application, whether civil
or criminal. However, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, citing Blackstone, The Federalist and other early U.S. state
constitutions in Calder vs. Bull concluded that the concept was limited only to penal and criminal statutes.

As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are

1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense when committed; 2) laws which,
while not creating new offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which prescribes greater
punishment for a crime already committed; or, 4) laws which alter the rules of evidence so as to make it
substantially easier to convict a defendant.

“Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation
which affects the substantial rights of the accused.” This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner’s
contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty’s retroactive application with respect to offenses
committed prior to the Treaty’s coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a
criminal procedural statute. “It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense
or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified.”

PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT vs. CA, G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994
 FACTS:

Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, entered into a Treaty of Extradition on
the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days
after both States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty
have been complied with. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the
extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Can an extradition treaty be applied retroactively?

HELD: Applying the constitutional principle, the Court has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal
legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in
petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to
offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against
ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation
nor a criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an
offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was
ratified.

ABELLA V. CSC (2004)

Both the appointing authority and the appointee are the real parties in interest, and both have legal
standing, in a suit assailing a Civil Service Commission (CSC) order disapproving an appointment. Despite
having legal interest and standing, herein petitioner unsuccessfully challenges the constitutionality of the CSC
circular that classifies certain positions in the career service of the government. In sum, petitioner was
appointed to a Career Executive Service (CES) position, but did not have the corresponding eligibility for it;
hence, the CSC correctly disapproved his appointment.

The Facts:
“Petitioner Francisco A. Abella, Jr., a lawyer, retired from the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), now the
Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), on July 1, 1996 as Department Manager of the Legal Services
Department. He held a civil service eligibility for the position of Department Manager, having completed the
training program for Executive Leadership and Management in 1982 under the Civil Service Academy, pursuant to
CSC Resolution No. 850 dated April 16, 1979, which was then the required eligibility for said position.
Two years after his retirement, petitioner was hired by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) on a
contractual basis. On January 1, 1999, petitioner was issued by SBMA a permanent employment as Department
Manager III, Labor and Employment Center. However, when said appointment was submitted to
respondent Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. III, it was disapproved on the ground that petitioner’s
eligibility was not appropriate. Petitioner was advised by SBMA of the disapproval of his appointment. In view
thereof, petitioner was issued a temporary appointment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center,
SBMA on July 9, 1999.

Ruling:

Approval Required for Permanent Appointment

A permanent appointment in the career service is issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to
which the appointment is made in accordance with the provisions of law, the rules and the standards promulgated
pursuant thereto.It implies the civil service eligibility of the appointee. Thus, while the appointing authority has the
discretion to choose whom to appoint, the choice is subject to the caveat that the appointee possesses the required
qualifications.
 To make it fully effective, an appointment to a civil service position must comply with all legal requirements. Thus,
the law requires the appointment to be submitted to the CSC which will ascertain, in the main, whether the proposed
appointee is qualified to hold the position and whether the rules pertinent to the process of appointment were
observed. The applicable provision of the Civil Service Law reads:

“SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and
shall have the following powers and functions:

“(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service, except those of
presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jail guards, and
disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. An
appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties
immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the Commission, if this should take place, without
prejudice to the liability of the appointing authority for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or rules:
Provided, finally, That the Commission shall keep a record of appointments of all officers and employees in
the civil service. All appointments requiring the approval of theCommission as herein provided, shall be submitted
to it by the appointing authority within thirty days from issuance, otherwise, the appointment becomes ineffective
thirty days thereafter.”

Wright vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 113213
August 15, 1994

A paramount principle of the law of extradition provides that a State may not surrender any individual for any
offense not included in a treaty of extradition. This principle arises from the reality of extradition as a derogation of
sovereignty. Extradition is an intrusion into the territorial integrity of the host State and a delimitation of the
sovereign power of the State within its own territory.

Wright v. CA
Gr. No. 113213 Aug. 15, 1994
KAPUNAN, J

Lessons: extradition treaty

Laws: Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

FACTS:

To suppress crimes, Australia and the Government of the Philippines entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the
7th of March 1988. It was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days after both
States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been
complied with. The Treaty adopts a "non-list, double criminality approach" which provides for broader coverage of
extraditable offenses between the 2 countries and embraces crimes punishable by imprisonment for at least 1 year. It
also allows extradition for crimes committed prior to the treaty's date of effectivity, provided that these crimes were
in the statute books of the requesting State at the time of their commission.
Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite “persons wanted for prosecution of the imposition or
enforcement of a sentence in the Requesting State for an extraditable offense." A request for extradition requires, if
the person is accused of an offense, the furnishing by the requesting State of either a warrant for the arrest or a copy
of the warrant of arrest of the person, or, where appropriate, a copy of the relevant charge against the person sought
to be extradited.

The Treaty defined extraditable offenses to include all offenses "punishable under the Laws of both Contracting
States by imprisonment for a period of at least 1 year, or by a more severe penalty." For the purpose of the
definition, the Treaty states that:

(a) an offense shall be an extraditable offense whether or not the laws of the Contracting States place the offense
within the same category or denominate the offense by the same terminology;

(b) the totality of the acts or omissions alleged against the person whose extradition is requested shall be taken into
account in determining the constituent elements of the offense.

On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign Affairs indorsed to the
Department of Justice Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from the Government of Australia to
the Department of Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy seeking to indict Paul Joseph Wright, an
Australian Citizen for:

a. 1 count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958
because he and Herbert Lance Orr's, dishonestly obtaining $315,250 from Mulcahy, Mendelson and Round
Solicitors, secured by a mortgage on the property in Bangholme, Victoria owned by Ruven Nominees Pty. Ltd., a
company controlled by a Rodney and a Mitchell, by falsely representing that all the relevant legal documents
relating to the mortgage had been signed by Rodney and Janine Mitchell

b. 13 counts of Obtaining Properties by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958
because he and Mr. John Carson Craker's received approximately 11.2 in commission (including $367,044 in bonus
commission) via Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd., by submitting 215 false life insurance proposals, and paying premiums
thereon o the Australian Mutual Provident Society through the Office of Melbourne Mutual Insurance, where he is
an insurance agent

c. 1 count of Attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of the Victorian Crimes
Act of 1958 because he and Mr. Craker's attempted to cause the payment of $2,870.68 commission to a bank
account in the name of Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd. by submitting 1 false proposal for Life Insurance to the AMP
Society based on an inexistent policy-holder
d. 1 count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 because he and Mr. Craker's
signed and swore before a Solicitor holding a current practicing certificate pursuant to the Legal Profession Practice
Act (1958), a Statutory Declaration attesting to the validity of 29 of the most recent Life Insurance proposals of
AMP Society and containing 3 false statements

In accordance to Section 5 of PD No. 1069 (September 10, 1990), an extradition proceedings was initiated on April
6, 1993 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Regional Trial Court on June 14, 1993 granted the petition
for extradition requested by the Government of Australian concluding that the extradition could be granted
irrespective of when the offense was committed. The extradition proceeding resulted in an order of his deportation.
The decision was sustained and Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals. Wright filed a
review on certiorari to set aside the order of deportation contending that the provision of the Treaty giving
retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of
the Constitution. Moreover, he argues that the trial court's decision ordering his extradition is based on evidence
that failed to show that he is wanted for prosecution in his country.

ISSUES:

a. Whether or NOT the Regional Trial Court committed an order in granting the extradition proceeding.

b. Whether or NOT enforcement of Article 18 of the Treaty states a prohibition for the retroactive application of
offenses committed prior to the date of its effectivity

c. whether or not such retroactive application is in violation of the Constitution for being an ex post facto law

HELD: AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals and DENY the instant petition for lack of merit

i. NO.

Complying with Article 2, Section 2 of the Treaty, the crimes for which the Mr. Wright was charged and for which
warrants for his arrest were issued in Australia were offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were alleged to
have been committed. The trial court correctly determined the offenses under our penal laws are Articles 315(2) and
183 of the Revised Penal Code on swindling/estafa and false testimony/perjury, respectively.

The provisions of the Treaty was properly complied with. The signature and official seal of the Attorney-General of
Australia were sufficient to authenticate all the documents annexed to the Statement of the Acts and Omissions,
including the statement itself. The last requirement was accomplished by the certification made by the Philippine
Consular Officer in Canberra, Australia.

The relevant provisions merely requires "a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant for the arrest of the
person sought to be extradited.” It does not limited the phrase "wanted for prosecution" to a person charged with an
information or a criminal complaint as it will render the Treaty ineffective over individuals who abscond for the
purpose of evading arrest and prosecution. Moreover, the “Charge and Warrant of Arrest Sheets” shows that he is
not only wanted for prosecution but has absconded to evade arrest and criminal prosecution. Since a charge or
information under the Treaty is required only when appropriate such as in cases where an individual charged before
a competent court in the Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requested State, a charge or a copy thereof is
not required if the offender has already absconded before a criminal complaint could be filed.

ii. YES.

Article 18 states: “ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION

This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the date on which the Contracting States have notified each
other in writing that their respective requirements for the entry into force of this Treaty have been complied with.

Either contracting State may terminate this Treaty by notice in writing at any time and it shall cease to be in force on
the one hundred and eightieth day after the day on which notice is given.”

The first paragraph of Article 18 refers to the Treaty's date of effectivity and the second paragraph pertains to its
termination. There is no prohibition for its retroactive effect.

Furthermore, Article 2(4) of the Treaty unequivocally provides that: “4. Extradition may be granted pursuant to
provisions of this Treaty irrespective of when the offense in relation to which extradition is requested was
committed, provided that:

(a) it was an offense in the Requesting State at the time of the acts or omissions constituting the offense; and

(b) the acts or omissions alleged would, if they had taken place in the Territory of the Requested State at the time of
the making of the request for extradition, have constituted an offense against the laws in force in that state.”

iii. NO.

Calder vs. Bull concluded that the concept of ex post facto laws in our Constitution was limited only to penal and
criminal statutes which affects the substantial rights of the accused. As concluded by the Court of Appeals, the
Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. "It merely provides for the
extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already
committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified."

May 24, 2010

PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT vs. CA, G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994

Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, entered into a Treaty of Extradition on

the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of

the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days

after both States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty

have been complied with. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the

extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Can an extradition treaty be applied retroactively?

HELD: Applying the constitutional principle, the Court has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal

legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in

petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to

offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against

ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation

nor a criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an

offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was

ratified.