(28) Miranda vs Sandiganbayan

FACTS:
The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda then the mayor of Santiago City,
Isabela, under preventive suspension for six months from 25 July 1997 to 25 January
1998 for alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Subsequently, then
Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro filed a Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman.
Vice Mayor Navarro contended that Mayor Miranda committed the felony of usurpation
of authority or official functions. Mayor Miranda asserted that he reassumed office on
the advice of his lawyer and in good faith. He also averred that, on the day he
reassumed office, he received a memorandum from DILG Undersecretary Manuel
Sanchez instructing him to vacate his office and he immediately complied with the
same. Notably, Mayor Miranda’s counter-affidavit also stated that he left the mayoralty
post after “coercion” by the Philippine National Police.
ISSUE:
Whether or not good faith may be invoked by the petitioner.

HELD:
The court is not a bit persuaded by the posture of the petitioner that he reassumed
office under an honest belief that he was no longer under preventive suspension.
Petitioner’s pretense cannot stand scrutiny. Petitioner’s own affidavit
states.Petitioner’s excuse for violating the order of preventive suspension is too flimsy
to merit even a side-glance. He alleged that he merely followed the advice of his
lawyer. If petitioner and his counsel had an iota of respect for the rule of law, they
should have assailed the validity of the order of suspension in court instead of taking
the law into their own hands.
(31) Nazareno vs. City of Dumaguete
· Agustin R. Perdices won over incumbent Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo for the
mayoralty post. He was to assume office on June 30, 2001.
· Before Perdices’ assumption, Remollo made fifteen (15) promotional appointments, and
seventy-four (74) original appointments for various positions in the city government.
· July 2, 2001: Remollo dishonored the appointments made by Remollo.
· Leah M. Nazareno, et al, filed with the RTC of Dumaguete City a Petition for Mandamus,
Injunction and Damages against the City of Dumaguete, represented by Mayor Remollo.
· Aug. 1, 2001: Director Abucejo of the Civil Service Commission Field Office (CSCFO)
invalidated and revoked the questioned appointments as they were issued in violation of the
guidelines set forth by the CSC.
· Aug. 3, 2001: RTC issued a writ of prelim injunction against the City Government pending
the final adjudication of the case. The court reversed Director Abucejo’s on the ground that the
questioned appointments may only be invalidated by the Regional Office upon
recommendation by the CSCFO.

· City of Dumaguete claimed that Director Abucejo’s decision already became final after
petitioner’s failed to move for reconsideration of the same. They moved for the dismissal of the
injunction case. RTC denied the motion to dismiss but agreed with the finality of the decision. It
permanently lifted the preliminary injunction
· Nazareno et al, appealed to the CA. The appeal was denied and dismissed by the court.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the petition for injunction filed by Nazareno et al. is premature? YES!
HELD/RATIO:
· Nazareno et al. prematurely filed the injunction because there was still no invalidation of
their appointments. The filing was only prompted by Mayor Perdices’ announcement that he
was dishonoring the appointments made by former mayor Remollo. The invalidation only took
place on August 1, 2001.
· After the invalidation, they could still file an appeal with the CSC Regional Office. Thus, they
had ample administrative remedies under the law to protect their rights but they chose to go
straight to the regular courts.
· The Court refused to rule on the validity of the appointments since it was the subject of a
separate petition for review before the Court of Appeals.
(30)
Ombudsman vs andutan jr

FACTS:
Pursuant to the Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those occupying political
positions to vacate their positions, Andutan resigned from the DOF as the former Deputy
Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the DOF.
Subsequently, Andutan, et al. was criminally charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence
Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents,
and violations RA 3019. As government employees, Andutan et al. were likewise
administratively charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official
Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The criminal and
administrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax Credit
Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among others. The Ombudsman found the respondents
guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. Having been separated from the service, Andutan was
imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves, retirement and other benefits and
privileges, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement and/or reemployment in any
branch or instrumentality of the government, including government owned and controlled
agencies or corporations. The CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman,
ruling that the latter “should not have considered the administrative complaints” because:
first, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 provides that the Ombudsman “may not conduct the
necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes
that x x x [t]he complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or
omission complained of”; and second, the administrative case was filed after Andutan’s
forced resignation
ISSUES:
Whether the Ombudsman has authority to institute an administrative complaint against a
government employee who had already resigned.
HELD:
No. The Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan
because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed. It is irrelevant,
according to the Ombudsman, that Andutan had already resigned prior to the filing of the
administrative case since the operative fact that determines its jurisdiction is the
commission of an offense while in the public service. The SC observed that indeed it has
held in the past that a public official’s resignation does not render moot an administrative
case that was filed prior to the official’s resignation. However, the facts of those cases are
not entirely applicable to the present case. In the past cases, the Court found that the
public officials – subject of the administrative cases – resigned, either to prevent the
continuation of a case already filed or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one. Here, neither
situation obtains. First, Andutan’s resignation was neither his choice nor of his own doing;
he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998,
while the administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one year and two
months after his resignation. What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to
resign more than a year before the Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him.
If the SC agreed with the interpretation of the Ombudsman, any official – even if he has
been separated from the service for a long time.
(32)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and ROLANDO PLAZA

FACTS:
Private respondent, Rolando Plaza, is a member of the Sanguniang Panlungsod of
Toledo City, Cebu with a salary grade 25. He was charged in the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, or the Auditing Code of the
Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received.
Private respondent then questioned the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over the offense charged. Private respondent contends that he should
not fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as he does not belong the salary
grade 27 and that his violation is not among those enumerated by law to be
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan even if the offender is below salary grade 27.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of
the Auditing Code of the Philippines committed by a public official below salary grade
27.

HELD:
Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of the Auditing
Code of the Philippines committed by a public official below salary grade 27.
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined
at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the
offense. The case having been instituted on March 25, 2004 the provisions of Republic
Act No. 8249 shall govern.

Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by RA No.
8249. Among those enumerated are members if the Sangunuiang Panlungsod. In
connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or
felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in
relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
 (34) cayetano vs monsod
In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
His appointment was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Monsod’s appointment
was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does not qualify for he failed to meet
the Constitutional requirement which provides that the chairman of the COMELEC should
have been engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.
Monsod’s track record as a lawyer:

1. Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.

2. Immediately after passing, worked in his father’s law firm for one year.
3. Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and held various
positions in various foreign corporations.
4. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local corporations
until 1986.
5. In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC. What constitutes
practice of law?
HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in
most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation
work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what is
loosely described as business counseling than in trying cases. In the course of a working
day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving
different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually
perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. By no means will most of this
work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who
specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer
to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counseling, advice-giving,
document drafting, and negotiation.
(35)
Quinto V. COMELEC

COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso
facto resigned from their positions.

FACTS:

Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of
candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied
the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.

HELD:

NO.

In the Fariñas case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally,
the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of
the equal protection clause.

However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter
dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didn’t squarely challenge Sec. 66.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a
valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement – that it must be germane to
the purpose of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote
one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is
further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the
danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the
welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to
the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty
because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether
they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be
considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is
absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in
the political world.

The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non partisan in
character, whether they be in the national, municipal or brgy. level. Congress has not shown a compelling
state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.
(38) pablico vs villapando

Facts:

An administrative complaint was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan

against then Mayor Alejandro Villapando of San Vicente, Palawan for abuse of authority
and culpable violation of the Constitution for entering into a consultancy agreement with
Orlando Tiape, a defeated mayoralty candidate. Complainants argue that this amounted
to appointment to a government position within the prohibited one-year period under
Article IX-B, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

In his answer, Villapando invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the Department of Justice
dated August 21, 1992, stating that the appointment of a defeated candidate within one
year from the election as a consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government
office or position as prohibited by the Constitution.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found respondent guilty and imposed on him the penalty
of dismissal from service. The Office of the President affirmed the decision. Vice-mayor
Pablico took his oath as municipal mayor in place of Villapando.

The Court of Appeals declared the decisions of the SP and OP void, and ordered Pablico
to vacate the office.

Issue:

May local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President validly impose the penalty
of dismissal from service on erring elective local officials?

Held:
It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited provision that the penalty of dismissal
from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a court of
law. Thus, in Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al., we held that “[t]he Office of the President
is without any power to remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested
in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the aforequoted
Section 60.”

Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, however, adds that – “(b) An elective local official may be removed
from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article [The grounds
enumerated in Section 60, Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper court
or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
other.” The disciplining authority referred to pertains to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the President.

As held in Salalima, this grant to the “disciplining authority” of the power to remove
elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that
prepared the Rules and Regulations.
(42) csc vs pacheco

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner,v.MINERVA

M.P. PACHEO, Respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

Pacheo was a Revenue Attorney IV, Assistant Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue(BIR) in Revenue Region No. 7 (RR7), Quezon City. The BIR issued Revenue Travel Assignment
Order (RTAO)No. 25-2002, ordering the reassignment of Pacheo as Assistant Chief, Legal Division from
RR7 in Quezon City to RR4 in San Fernando, Pampanga.

Pacheo questioned the reassignment through her Letter addressed to Rene G. Banez, then
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR). She considered her transfer from Quezon City to Pampanga as
amounting to a constructive dismissal.

Pacheo appealed to the CSC where the latter granted the same. However, the CSC held that rules and so
holds that the withholding by the BIR of her salaries is justified as she is not entitled thereto since she is
deemed not to have performed any actual work in the government on the principle of no work no pay.
Still not satisfied, Pacheo moved for reconsideration..

Undaunted, Pacheo sought recourse before the CA via a petition for review. The CA reversed the CSC
decision, stating that Pacheo was constructively dismissed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Pacheo was constructively dismissed and entitled to
backwages

HELD: No.
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee's prior
consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or a scheme to
lure him away from his permanent position, or when it is designed to indirectly terminate his service, or
force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the
tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service.
The CSC, through the OSG, contends that the deliberate refusal of Pacheo to report for work either in
her original station in Quezon City or her new place of assignment in San Fernando, Pampanga negates
her claim of constructive dismissal.

Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an employees security of tenure,
which is assured by the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Civil Service
Rules and Regulations. Security of tenure covers not only employees removed without cause, but also
cases of unconsented transfers and reassignments, which are tantamount to illegal/constructive
removal.
(43) csc vs cruz

THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. RICHARD G. CRUZ, Respondent.

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

The respondent, Storekeeper A of the City of Malolos Water District (CMWD), was charged with grave
misconduct and dishonesty by CMWD General Manager (GM) Nicasio Reyes. He allegedly uttered a
false, malicious and damaging statement (Masasamang tao ang mga BOD at General Manager) against
GM Reyes and the rest of the CMWD Board of Directors (Board); four of the respondent subordinates
allegedly witnessed the utterance. The dishonesty charge, in turn, stemmed from the respondent act of
claiming overtime pay despite his failure to log in and out in the computerized daily time record for
three working days.

GM Reyes preventively suspended the respondent for 15 days. Before the expiration of his preventive
suspension, however, GM Reyes, with the approval of the CMWD Board, found the respondent guilty of
grave misconduct and dishonesty, and dismissed him from the service.

The CSC found no factual basis to support the charges of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The CSC,
however, found the respondent liable for violation of reasonable office rules for his failure to log in and
log out. It imposed on him the penalty of reprimand but did not order the payment of back salaries.

Both the CMWD and the respondent elevated the CSC ruling to the CA via separate petitions for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA dismissed the CMWD petition and this ruling has lapsed to
finality. Hence, the issue of reinstatement is now a settled matter. The CA ruled in the respondent favor
on the issue of back salaries.
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is entitled to back salaries after the CSC ordered his reinstatement to his
former position in consonant with the CSC ruling that he was guilty only of violation of reasonable office
rules and regulations?
HELD: Petition lacks merit.

The issue of entitlement to back salaries, for the period of suspension pending appeal, of a government
employee who had been dismissed but was subsequently exonerated is settled in the Court jurisdiction.
The Court starting point for this outcome is the "no work-no pay" principle public officials are only
entitled to compensation if they render service. It is excepted from this general principle and awarded
back salaries even for unworked days to illegally dismissed or unjustly suspended employees based on
the constitutional provision that "no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law"; to deny these employees their back salaries amounts to
unwarranted punishment after they have been exonerated from the charge that led to their dismissal or
suspension.
(47) romualdez marcos vs comelec
FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she
studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her
college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban.
Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to
work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives.
In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte
and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they
lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte
for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte
and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with
the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which
she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte
despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of
law when her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond
with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law
does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
Facts: (48) lonzanido vs comelec

Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in terms
1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the 1995 election was
protested and was eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and void on the ground of
failure of elections.

On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated the
mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ of execution it issued. Juan Alvez, Lonzanida’s
opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term.

In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent, Efren Muli,
filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already served three consecutive
terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner.

The COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification.

The private respondent maintained that the petitioner’s assumption of office in 1995 should be
considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years
until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.
Issues:
1. WON petitioner’s assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998
may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for
elective local government officials.
2. WON COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after petitioner was
proclaimed winner.
Held:
1. NO. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that
he has fully served three consecutive terms.
After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final
judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous
proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be
deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been
repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all
and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board
of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the
election protest. Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to
March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive
winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that
Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.

2. NO. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC that the proclamation or the assumption of office of
a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest
the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits.
Penera vs. Commission on Elections, et al. (49)
G.R. No. 181613
25 November 2009

Facts:
On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the COMELEC’s decision to
disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for
engaging in election campaign outside the campaign period, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).
Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a candidate at the time of the supposed
premature campaigning, since under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC
to use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No.
9369, one is not officially a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
Issue:
Whether or not Penera’s disqualification for engaging in premature campaigning should be reconsidered.
Holding:
Granting Penera’s motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court En Banc held that
Penera did not engage in premature campaigning and should, thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty
candidate. The Court said –

(A) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision (or “the assailed Decision”) considered a
person who files a certificate of candidacy already a “candidate” even before the start of the campaign
period. This is contrary to the clear intent and letter of Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, which
states that a person who files his certificate of candidacy will only be considered a candidate at the start of
the campaign period, and unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon
the start of such campaign period. Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for
acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other words, election
offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the campaign
period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be
so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but to apply it. The forum for examining the
wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not the Court but the Legislature.

( 50) Aldovino VS COMELEC

FACTS:
Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-
2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan
issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said
suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the
functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought
by herein petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive
terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional limit.
ISSUE:
WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?

RULING:
NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-
term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).

The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in
contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term
was not interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon
B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilo’s disqualification.
(51) MIRIAM DEFENSOR – SANTIAGO versus FIDEL RAMOS (253 SCRA559)

Facts:The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May 1992 election. In
her Motion on the 16th day of August in the year 1995, reiterated in her comment of the 29th of August
of the same year, protestant Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the remaining precincts of
the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed computed.The
Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the protestant and protestee to submit their
respective memoranda. Hence, this petition.
Issue:Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and academic by her
election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on the 30th of June
in the year 1995.
Held:YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned or considered
withdrawn as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of
the duties and functions thereof.The protestant abandoned her “determination to protest and pursue
the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.Moreover, the
dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to
the results of the 1992 presidential elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of
the nation during this period of national recovery.Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the
protestant to inform the PET within 10 days if after the completion of the revision of the ballots from
her pilot areas, she still wishes to present evidence. Since DS has not informed the Tribunal of any such
intention, such is a manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so.

(52) ara tea vs comelec

FACTS:Lonzanida and Antipolo ran for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in 2010. Rodolfo fileda petition
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) to disqualify Lonzanida and todeny due course or
to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanidawas elected, and had served,
as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms. The COMELEC Second Division
cancelled Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy. Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc remainedpending during said elections. Lonzanida and Aratea garnered the
highest number of votes andwere proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor, respectively.Vice-Mayor elect
Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor. Subsequently, the COMELEC En Banc disqualified
Lonzanida from running for Mayorbased on two grounds: (1), Lonzanida had served as Mayor for more
than three consecutiveterms without interruption; and (2) Lonzanida had been convicted by final
judgment of tencounts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Second-placer Antipolo
intervened and claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayorbecause Lonzanida ceased to be a
candidate when the COMELEC Division ordered thecancellation of his certificate of candidacy and
the striking out of his name from the list ofofficial candidates.Aratea asserted that Antipolo could not be
proclaimed as the winning candidate. Hereasoned that since Lonzanida’s disqualification was not yet
final during election day, the votescast in his favor could not be declared stray. Lonzanida’s subsequent
disqualification resulted ina permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-elected
Vice-Mayor wasmandated to succeed as Mayor.
ISSUE:Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the OEC, or made a false material
representation under Section 78 of the OEC that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab
initio.Whether the second-placer or the Vice-Mayor elect should succeed as Mayor in this case.
RULING:The Court ruled that Lonzanida was disqualified under Sec. 78 of the OEC. It also heldthat
Antipolo, the "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificateof candidacy
was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes forLonzanida were stray
votes. Thus, Antipolo actually garnered the highest number of votes for theposition.
(53) paglaum vs comelec
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May
2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-
lists.

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court
now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated
cases. The new guidelines are as follows:

I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations,
(2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in

“well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who
lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have
a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
(55) Jalosjos v. COMELEC Case Digest [G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012]
FACTS:

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian
citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother
in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He
then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.

He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality
of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was
eventually granted by the ERB.

A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the
MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's
decision.

On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay
Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A.
9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local government code.

COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial
candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil.
COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his
domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

RULING:

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a
resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the
requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to
reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following
guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that
domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.

It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the
residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he
effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of
eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his
domicile by operation of law and by choice.

When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is
evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his
Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued
a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos
forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has
since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his
domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would
violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.

The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely
been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion.
Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community
to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if
it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house
where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has
proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a
fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders,
including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of
Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.

While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this
does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or
wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.

Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The
Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his
qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.

Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.
(57) makalintal vs pet

Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or
Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”

Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.

The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SC’s decision dismissing the
former’s petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.

Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does
not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the
grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or
Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not PET is constitutional.

Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:

Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art
VII of the 1987 Constitution, they “constitutionalized what was statutory.” Judicial power granted to the
Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication,
the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to
decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into
effect.
No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which
provides that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.” The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of
electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves
a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of
law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an
exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2),
Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals)
of the Constitution.
(58)
FRIVALDO VS COMELEC

Posted by kaye lee on 10:58 PM

G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time.
The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the
ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was
naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law
era.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under
Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by
actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the
laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him
and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA
No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
(61) amora vs comelec

FACTS:
Petitioner Amora filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol. At that time, Amora
was the incumbent Mayor of Candijay and had been twice elected to the post in 2007 and in 2007.
Olandria, one of the candidates for councilor in the same municipality, filed before the COMELEC a
Petition for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria alleged that Amoras COC was not properly sworn
contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. Olandria pointed out that, in executing his COC, Amora merely presented his Community Tax
Certificate (CTC) to the notary public, Atty. Oriculo Granada (Atty. Granada), instead of presenting
competent evidence of his identity. Consequently, Amoras COC had no force and effect and should be
considered as not filed.

Amora countered that:

1. The Petition for Disqualification is actually a Petition to Deny Due Course or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. Effectively, the petition of Olandria is filed out of time;

2. Olandrias claim does not constitute a proper ground for the cancellation of the COC;

3. The COC is valid and effective because he (Amora) is personally known to the notary public, Atty.
Granada, before whom he took his oath in filing the document;

4. Atty. Granada is, in fact, a close acquaintance since they have been members of the League of
Muncipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, for several years; and

5. Ultimately, he (Amora) sufficiently complied with the requirement that the COC be under oath.

The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Amora from running for
Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.

ISSUE: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding Olandria's claim that an
improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification.

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

POLITICAL LAW Election Law; Certificate of Candidacy

In this case, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandrias claim that an improperly sworn COC is
equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification. Not by any stretch of the imagination can we
infer this as an additional ground for disqualification from the specific wording of the Omnibus Eleciton
Code in Section 68, which reads:

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on any of the grounds for disqualification as
enumerated in the foregoing statutory provisions. Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective
notarization is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Yet, the COMELEC would uphold that
petition upon the outlandish claim that it is a petition to disqualify a candidate "for lack of qualifications
or possessing some grounds for disqualification."

Another red flag for the COMELEC to dismiss Olandrias petition is the fact that Amora claims to
personally know the notary public, Atty. Granada, before whom his COC was sworn. In this regard, the
dissenting opinion of Commissioner Larrazabal aptly disposes of the core issue. He said that accordind to
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice:

Section 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers to an act in which an individual
on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument or document.

Therefore, competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the affiant is personally known
to the Notary Public, which is the case herein.

In this case, contrary to the declarations of the COMELEC, Amora complied with the requirement of a
sworn COC. He readily explained that he and Atty. Granada personally knew each other; they were not
just colleagues at the League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, but they consider each other as
distant relatives. Thus, the alleged defect in the oath was not proven by Olandria since the presentation
of a CTC turned out to be sufficient in this instance.

GRANTED.
(64) poe vs arroyo

December 01, 2010

Facts: During the May 10, 2004 Presidential Elections, Arroyo was declared as the candidate who
garnered the most number of votes for the presidency while FPJ followed in the second place. July 23,
2004 FPJ filed an election protest at the Presidential Electoral Tribunal contesting the votes of Arroyo.
On December 14, 2004, the Protestant died in the course of his medical treatment at St. Luke’s Hospital.

Issue: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the
latter’s presidential protest case?

Held: NO.Rule 14. Election Protest.

Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the
second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President,
as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within
thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
Since in this case, no real parties such as the vice-presidential aspirants in the 2004 elections, have come
forward to intervene, or to be substituted for the deceased protestant, the petition must be dismissed.
SHARE

(65) llamanazares vs comelec

FACTS:
The petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe- Llamanzares also known as Grace Poe- Llamanzares wishes
to run as the President of the Republic of the Philippines. However, petitions were made by Estrella
Elamparo to deny due course or cancel the COC of Poe-Llamanzares for the reason that the latter is not
a natural-born citizen on the account of the fact that she is a foundling. In addition, Elamparo stated that
Poe-Llamanzares even assuming that the latter is a natural-born citizen she has deemed to lost the same
when the she became a naturalized American citizen, according to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship
must be continuous from birth.
ISSUE: For the purpose of Civil Law-
Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe- Llamanzares is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines?
HELD:
The presumption of a natural-born citizenship of the foundlings stems from the presumption that their
parents are nationals of the Philippines. Adopting the legal principles of international laws from 1930
Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on stateliness is rational and reasonable and consistent in
the Philippine Constitution’s regime of Jus saguinis. Moreover, the SC clearly stated that the COMELEC
cannot reverse the judicial precedent as it was reserved to the court. In line with this, the Supreme
Court ruled that Poe is qualified to be a candidate for President on May 2016. The court likewise stated
that Poe-Llamanzares, being a foundling is a natural-born citizen based on 1. Circumstantial evidence, 2.
Legislation and 3. Generally Accepted principle of other laws.
(66) riso vidal vs comelec
Facts:

In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder
and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007,
however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to
former President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights.

In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of the
disqualification cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the results.

In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this
time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec stating that
Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on
Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC).

The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek
public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M.
Arroyo.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second
highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of
Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

Issue:

May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the crime of
plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office?

Held:

Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording
of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is
likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by former President
Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred that former
President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and
to hold public office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her
intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the
President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive
clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by
final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress.

xxxx

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules,
and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the
Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President
may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a
final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there
was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act
of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.