Categorization. The necessary and sufficient conditions model and the prototype theory.

Categorization is a fundamental trait of humans and perhaps of all animals.

To distinguish between edible and poisonous plants, meaning to put them into
categories, was an early and imperative task for plant eaters, for example.
An important human method of categorization is naming. The process by
which we establish categories and sort stimuli into the established categories
is clearly complex and at this time largely unknown. Several different theories
have been established and vie for recognition.

Stimulus dimensions available for classification are either taken to be continuous

(e.g., color) or discrete (four-sided vs. three-sided figures). The structure
of categories is either overlapping (hue and chroma) or nonoverlapping
(color and shape). In the former case perfect categorization is difficult or
impossible while in the latter it is likely. The accuracy of response in categorization
experiments is fundamentally either deterministic, meaning equal
stimuli result in an equal categorization, or probabilistic: the response of the
observer is always based on a (more or less informed) guess. It is obvious that
already the stimulus is usually probabilistic. In case of visual stimuli, for
example, light is reflected probabilistically off the surface of the object as well
as off the eye’s cornea, and once the remaining stimulus enters the eye, there
is probabilistic activity at all levels of the vision system. Most categorization
theories therefore treat categorization data in terms of variability.

Among the theories of category access (what process shapes our category
decisions) are those of the necessary and sufficient condition (NSC), the
prototype theory, and, related to it, the exemplar theory. According to NSC,
categories are described by a series of necessary and sufficient conditions, and
the observer tests the sample to see of it meets these conditions. In some situations
(e.g., separating squares from triangles), NSC is clearly applicable, but
in many others, it is not (e.g., it is difficult to define the necessary and sufficient
conditions for a letter symbol to represent an a). The prototype theory
proposes a (kind of Platonic) prototype for a category whereby objects are
classified by their resemblance to the prototype. It implies that we only have
the prototype stored in memory and that determining resemblance to it is a
cognitive task. It simply delegates the critical categorization to another
process. (Rolf)

Categorization The Classical Theory offers an equally compelling model of categorization

(i.e., the application of a concept, in the psychological sense; see note 8). In
fact, the model of categorization is just the ontogeny run backwards; that is, something
is judged to fall under a concept just in case it is judged to fall under the features
that compose the concept. So, something might be categorized as falling under
the concept CHAIR by noting that it has a seat, back, legs, and so on. Categorization on
this model is basically a process of checking to see if the features that are part of a
concept are satisfied by the item being categorized. As with the general model of
concept acquisition, this model of categorization is powerful and intuitively appealing,
and it's a natural extension of the Classical Theory.
(Eric)

According to the classical

theory, a concept is defined by a set of features that are necessary and sufficient conditions
of its application. For example, a shape is a triangle if and only if it has three sides.
Unfortunately, such tight definitions are rare outside mathematics, and are hard to find
for ordinary concepts such [DOG] and [CHAIR], let alone for more abstract concepts
such as [BEAUTY] and [JUSTICE]. Accordingly, many psychologists, philosophers,
and other cognitive scientists have maintained that concepts are prototypes that specify
typical features rather than necessary and sufficient conditions. Something is a dog, for
example, if it matches many of the typical features of dogs such as having fur and four
legs. But something can still be a dog if it lacks a typical feature. On the classical view
of theories, categorization is a deductive process of reasoning with necessary and sufficient
conditions, but on the prototype view categorization is an inductive process of finding
the best match between the features of an object and those of the closest prototypes.
An alternative view of concepts is that they do not consist of general features but
rather of stored examples. People who have observed many dogs have their observations
stored in memory, and they categorize new objects as dogs based on these exemplars.
(Henri)

In the previous section, I presented the prototype theory for concepts. Even if prototype
theory fares much better than the Aristotelian theory of necessary and sufficient conditions
in explaining how people use concepts, the theory does not explain how such prototype
effects can arise as a result of learning to use concepts. The theory can neither
account for how new concepts can be created from relevant exemplars, nor explain how
the extensions of concepts are changed as new instances of the same category are learned.
(Henri)

THE title of this book is intentionally ambiguous. In one of its senses,

'linguistic categorization' refers to the process by which people, in
using language, necessarily categorize the world around them. Whenever
we use the word dog to refer to two different animals, or describe
two different colour sensations by the same word, e.g. red, we are
undertaking acts of categorization. Although different, the two entities
are regarded in each case as the same.
Categorization is fundamental to all higher cognitive activity. Yet
the seeing of sameness in difference raises deep philosophical
problems. One extreme position, that of nominalism, claims that sameness
is merely a matter of linguistic convention; the range of entities
which may be called dogs, or the set of colours that may be described
as red, have in reality nothing in common but their name. An equally
extreme position is that of realism. Realism claims that categories like
DOG and RED exist independently of language and its users, and that the
words dog and red merely name these pre-existing categories.
(John)

the Aristotelian model of categories assumed a perfect

correlation between attributes within a category. On the Aristotelian
view, by knowing the category to which a thing belongs, one knows
with complete certainty that certain attributes will co-occur; these are
the attributes that are necessary conditions for category membership.
Experience tells us, however, that such perfect correlations are rare.
There are cups with no handles (Chinese cups), birds which don't fly
(penguins), cats without tails (Manx cats), chairs which aren't for
sitting on (dentist's chairs), and so on.
(John)

The substance of the criticism6 appears to be that prototype

theory fails to constrain, in a principled way, the range of possible
senses that a lexical item may have; that, consequently, prototype
accounts tend to be purely descriptive, rather than explanatory

(John)

If there do exist categories which are structured according to the

assumptions of the classical theory—i.e. categories which are defined
in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, which exhibit clear-cut
boundaries, and which permit only two degrees of membership (i.e.
member and non-member)—then ODD NUMBER and EVEN NUMBER are
surely amongst them.
(John)

Aristotelian principles,
i.e. the categories have necessary and sufficient conditions for
membership, such that the relevant experts are competent to say
whether, and on what grounds, any particular instance is or is not a
member of the category.

(John)

In the traditional view, the meaning of, say lemon', is given by specifying a conjunction
of properties. For each of these properties, the statement lemons have the
property F is an analytic truth; and if Pi, P2, • • •, P„ are all the properties in the conjunction,
then 'anything with all of the properties Pt,..., P„ is a lemon' is likewise an
analytic truth.
(Eric)

Necessary and sufficient conditions do not seem to be available for any but a
very small set of concepts. Most people cannot produce them for most of the concepts
they employ; philosophers have generally failed to produce them even after
nearly a century of concerted reflection; and they do not seem to be generally available
for the familiar concepts of even so developed a science as biology
(Eric)

these typicalities are highly correlated with 'family resemblance', or the degree
to which a member of a concept shares properties shared by other members, properties,
however, that may not be shared by all members, nor even be remotely defining
of the concept. Thus, [made of wood] and [has four legs] contribute highly to
family resemblance among chairs, but are obviously not necessary conditions, much
less defining ones for [chair] (pp. 39-41). The necessary and sufficient conditions
of the Classical View simply do not appear to play a role in peoples' actual acts of
categorization.
(Eric)

2. The Classical Theory of Concepts

2.1. Concepts and Definitions
In one way or another, most theories of concepts can be seen as reactions to, or
developments of, what is known as the Classical Theory of Concepts.7 The Classical Theory
holds that most concepts—especially lexical concepts—have definitional
structure. What this means is that most concepts encode necessary and sufficient
conditions for their own application.8 Consider, for example, the concept BACHELOR.
According to the Classical Theory, we can think of this concept as a complex mental
representation that specifies necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a
bachelor. So BACHELOR might be composed of a set of representations such as is NOT
MARRIED, is MALE, and is AN ADULT. Each of these components specifies a condition that
something must meet in order to be a bachelor, and anything that satisfies them
all thereby counts as a bachelor. These components, or features, yield a semantic
interpretation for the complex representation in accordance with the principles of a
compositional semantics.

(Eric)

3. The Prototype Theory of Concepts

3.1. The Emergence of Prototype Theory
During the 1970s, a new view of concepts emerged, providing the first serious alternative
to the Classical Theory. This new view—which we will call the Prototype
Theory—was developed, to a large extent, to accommodate the psychological data
that had proved to be so damaging to the Classical Theory. It was the attractiveness
of this new view, as much as anything else, that brought about the downfall of the
 Classical Theory.

(Eric)
According to the Prototype
Theory, most concepts—including most lexical concepts—are complex representations
whose structure encodes a statistical analysis of the properties their
members tend to have.34 Although the items in the extension of a concept tend to
have these properties, for any given feature and the property it expresses, there may
be items in the extension of a concept that fail to instantiate the property. Thus
the features of a concept aren't taken to be necessary as they were on the Classical
Theory. In addition, where the Classical Theory characterized sufficient conditions for
concept application in terms of the satisfaction of all of a concept's features, on the
Prototype Theory application is a matter of satisfying a sufficient number of features,
where some may be weighted more significantly than others. For instance, if BIRD is
composed of such features as FLIES, SINGS, NESTS IN TREES, LAYS EGGS, and so on, then
on the Prototype Theory, robins are in the extension of BIRD because they tend to have all
of the corresponding properties: robins fly, they lay eggs, etc. However, BIRD also
applies to ostriches because even though ostriches don't have all of these properties,
they have enough of them.
(Eric)

The Prototype Theory also has an attractive model of concept acquisition—in fact,
much the same model as the Classical Theory. In both cases, one acquires a concept
by assembling its features. And, in both cases, it's often assumed that the features
correspond to sensory properties. The main difference is that on the Prototype
Theory, the features of a concept express statistically prominent properties. So on the
Prototype Theory the mechanism of acquisition embodies a statistical procedure. It
doesn't aim to monitor whether various properties always co-occur, but only whether
they tend to. Of course, to the extent that the Prototype Theory inherits the empiricist
program associated with the Classical Theory, it too faces the problem that most
concepts resist analysis in sensory terms. The trouble with empiricism, remember,
isn't a commitment to definitions but a commitment to analyzing concepts in purely
sensory terms. If LIE was a problem for Locke, it's just as much a problem for prototype
theorists. Assuming they can articulate some plausible candidate features, there
is still no reason to think that all of these can be reduced to a sensory level. This is
true even for their stock examples of concepts for concrete kinds, concepts like BIRD or
FRUIT

(Eric)

Probably the most attractive aspect of the Prototype Theory is its treatment of
categorization. Generally speaking, prototype theorists model categorization as a
similarity comparison process that involves operations on two representations—one
for the target category and one for an instance or an exemplar. (For ease of expression,
we'll frame the discussion in terms of instances only, but the same points go for
exemplars as well.) On these models, an instance is taken to be a member of a category
just in case the representation of the instance and the representation of the
category are judged to be sufficiently similar.
(Eric)

The Classical Theory

Most concepts (esp. lexical concepts) are structured mental representations that encode a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions for their application, if possible, in sensory or perceptual
terms