SALAZAR, Justin Heinrich P.

PROPRIETY Sec. 4 -6
NOT PARTICIPATE IN CASES WHERE HE MAY BE IMPARTIAL
Section 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any member of their
family represents a litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.

■ To prevent the violation of Canon 3: Impartiality

■ Right to have a Speedy, Impartial Public trial (Article III, Section 14(2))

■ Every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge (Gutierrez
vs. Santos, 2 SCRA 249)

■ Rule 137, Rules of Court

This rule rests on the principle that no judge should preside in a case in which the judge is not wholly
free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision
and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to fairness and integrity. The
purpose is to preserve the people’s faith and confidence in the courts of justice. [ABA (2007)].

GUTIERREZ VS. JUDGE SANTOS

G.R. No. L-15824, MAY 30, 1961
DIZON, J.
Facts:
A complaint against Ricardo M. Gutierrez was filed with the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications alleging that the former had illegally constructed dams, dikes and other obstructions
across navigable waters, waterways, rivers and communal fishing grounds located in Pampanga.
Gutierrez moved for the dismissal of said complaint but was denied. He went to the CFI and filed a
petition for prohibition against said secretary. The case was assigned to Judge Arsenio Santos.

Thereafter, one of the respondents in said case moved for the disqualification of Judge Santos on the
ground that the latter had acted as counsel for fishpond owners, like Gutierrez, in an administrative
investigation in involving the same or at least similar issues and properties, and had expressed views in
the course of said investigation prejudicial or adverse to the contention of the respondents. It was
granted. Gutierrez went to the SC.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Santos should inhibit himself.

Ruling:
The SC ruled in affirmative. Due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. Moreover, second only to the duty of rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in
a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the integrity of the Judge. No judge
shall preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent.

In this case, the opinion expressed by Judge Santos in a letter addressed by him as counsel for
Manuel Borja and others to the then Secretary of the Interior might, some way or another, influence his
decision in the case at bar. Therefore, the SC dismissed the petition and upheld the disqualification of
Judge Santos.

RULE 137
Disqualification of Judicial Officers
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he,
or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has been presided in any inferior court when
his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or
valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

Section 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. — If it be claimed that an
official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in
writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon
proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of
his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in the
case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own
competency, until after final judgment in the case.

NOT ALLOW THE USE OF HIS RESIDENCE BY OTHER LAWYERS

Section 5. Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a member of the legal profession
to receive clients of the latter or of other members of the legal profession.
■ The rationale for this section is the same as that of Section 3.

■ It is grossly improper for a judge to meet with a litigant at his home and to frequent the
karaoke bar owned by such litigant, enjoying the use thereof for free (J. King & Sons v.
Hontanosas (2004).
J. KING & SONS COMPANY V. JUDGE HONTANOSAS
Facts:

Complainant alleges that it is the plaintiff in a case pending before the RTC presided over by respondent.
Respondent issued an Order granting the application for writ of preliminary attachment. An urgent
motion to discharge and lift writ of preliminary attachment was filed by defendants before the
respondent and on the same day, respondent issued an Order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment.
Said Order was issued sans proper notice and hearing as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Respondent approved defendants’ counter-bond despite knowledge that the bonding company’s
Supreme Court Clearance was not valid and the maximum net retention of the bonding company had a
deficiency. At a meeting in his house, respondent asked Rafael King to match defendants’ offer to pay
P250,000.00 so that the Order of July 5, 2002 will be reconsidered formally if a motion for
reconsideration is filed by complainant. Respondent’s favorite hang-out is the karaoke music lounge of
Metropolis Hotel owned by herein complainant, and he uses said facilities "gratis et amore."

Held:

We agree with the Investigating Justice’s finding that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law
for not holding a full-blown hearing on the motion to lift attachment and for violating the three-day
notice rule.

Respondent acted with indecent haste in immediately holding a hearing on the motion to lift
attachment filed only a few minutes before said hearing, in considering the same submitted for
resolution, and in issuing the order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment and approving the counter-
bond, all on the same day without giving complainant the opportunity to be heard on the matter.

It is has been oft repeated that judges cannot be held to account or answer criminally, civilly or
administratively for an erroneous judgment of decision rendered by him in good faith, or in the absence
of fraud, dishonesty or corruption. However, it has also been held that when the law violated is
elementary, a judge is subject to disciplinary action. The principles of due notice and hearing are so basic
that respondent’s inability to accord a litigant their right thereto cannot be excused. In this case, we
believe that respondent’s actuations reek of malice and bad faith. Thus, we find respondent guilty of
gross ignorance of the law for violating the three-day notice rule and failing to give herein complainant
due notice and the opportunity to be heard on the matter

As to the matter of the approval of the counter-bond, respondent utterly failed to exercise due care in
examining the supporting papers. The respondent should know the basic requirements before
approving a surety bond or a judicial bond such as counter-bond.

It is indeed grossly improper for respondent to meet with a litigant at his home and to frequent the
karaoke bar owned by such litigant, enjoying the use thereof for free. Respondent thereby received
benefits from a litigant appearing in his court. Respondent’s defense that his wife offered to pay but the
management of the karaoke bar did not allow her to do so, is feeble. The testimonies of the waiters at
said bar are quite clear that respondent’s wife would sign the order slips, but no payment was ever
given by respondent or his wife. Respondent should have insisted on paying, especially considering that
complainant has a total of three cases pending before his court. By entertaining a litigant in his home
and receiving benefits given by said litigant, respondent miserably failed to live up to the standards of
judicial conduct.

Insistence on personal integrity and honesty as indispensable qualifications for judicial office reflect an
awareness in the legal profession of the immensity of the damage that can be done to the legal order by
judicial corruption

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Section 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and
assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to
preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

■ Article III , Section 4 Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.

■ While judges are not expected to live a hermit-like existence or cease functioning as citizens of
the Republic, they should remember that they do not disrobe themselves of their judicial office
upon leaving their salas.

In the exercise of their civil liberties, judges should be circumspect and ever mindful that their
continuing commitment to upholding the judiciary and its values places upon them certain
implied restraints to their freedom. A judge was admonished for the appearance of engaging in
partisan politics when he participated in a political rally sponsored by one party, even though he
only explained the mechanics of block voting to the audience [ABA (2007)].

■ The use of expletives and display of unbecoming behavior through sarcastic comments are
frowned upon by the Court. (In Re Judge Acuna)

Re: Anonymous Complaint Against Judge Edmundo T. Acuna, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan
City, Branch 123
28 July 2005
Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS:

Concerned citizens of the lower court filed an anonymous letter to the Office of the Court Administrator
reporting the alleged malpractices of Judge Edmundo Acuna. Among these are his regular use of
expletives and insulting terms such as 1. Putris, 2. Anak ng pating, 3. Putang Ina, 4. Pogi, beauty, 5.
Tulungan nyo naman ako, hirap na hirap na ko., 6. Mali ka na naman and his constant berating and
embarrassment of people in front of others. It was also reported that he conducted trials and filed
decisions for five criminal cases while he was on official leave from the 15th of August to the 15th of
September 2001.
The respondent contended that these allegations were exaggerated and the only purpose of which is to
harass him, and that part of his odd behaviours that may seem unacceptable to his colleagues were
brought about by his mourning due to the loss of his son which was amplified by the poor performance
ratings of his staff. Although he did admit to using such offensive terms, respondent averred that these
were not directed to anyone in particular. He also stated in his defense that while he was issued an
Authority to Travel dated 14th of August 2011 to travel to Canada, he still presented evidence on his
entries in the daily time records that he was not yet on leave from the 15th to the 21st of August 2011.
He thus had the right and duty to come to court as the case may be.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent’s behaviour and issuance of decisions while on official leave are
subject to disciplinary actions.

HELD:

Yes. The Court held that the use of such expletives is improper for the lauded office of a magistrate of
the law. As the public expects more from such a high and respectable office, the same level of
expectation is also placed upon the person who holds it to uphold its respectability and be conscious of
his acts in order to maintain its honourability. A judge is expected to be temperate, patient and
courteous in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiability of the judiciary. As
held in Ignacio and Valenzuela, a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all activities, to which herein respondent is guilty of.

Furthermore, the Court agrees with the Investigating Judge that overzealousness to work is not a shield
from administrative liability for the dire consequences that may effect from the result of his decisions
and orders issued while he was supposed to be on official leave.

As Judge Acuna was found guilty of impropriety, he is reprimanded and is sternly warned that repetition
of the same will be dealt with more severely.