InThe
THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
27 The Middle East and
NEWS
Africa
32 The World
September 2015
State Department photo
Treasury Secretary Jack Lew (left), Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz (center), and Secretary of State John Kerry appear before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee at a hearing on the Iran nuclear deal on July 23.
Congress Considers Iran Deal
T
he Senate’s top two Democrats are split on supporting
the nuclear deal reached by Iran and six world powers
in July, but with Democratic support solidifying behind
the agreement over the past month, it appears unlikely
that Congress will be able to block the White House from
implementing the deal.
Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) announced his
support for the deal Aug. 24, saying he will do “everything in
his power” to defend it. But Senate Democratic Whip Charles
Schumer (N.Y.) said in an Aug. 7 statement that he would
vote against the deal because of what he perceived as “serious
weaknesses” in it.
Iran and the six powers, known collectively as the P5+1
(China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States), reached the July 14 agreement after 20 months of
negotiations.
In an Aug. 4 speech at American University, President Barack
Obama said that the deal “cuts off all of Iran’s pathways to a
bomb” and contains the “most comprehensive inspection and
verification regime ever negotiated” to monitor Tehran’s nuclear
activities (see pages 28-29). In return, Iran will receive relief
38 The United States
and the Americas
from U.S., EU, and UN nuclear-related sanctions.
Congress has until Sept. 17 to review the deal and decide
if it will vote on a resolution of approval or disapproval. A
congressional vote to disapprove the deal would prevent the
president from waiving certain sanctions on Iran that the
United States committed to waiving as part of the agreement.
(See ACT, June 2015.)
Passage of a resolution of approval or disapproval requires a
simple majority. Overriding a presidential veto, which Obama
ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2015
has said he will exercise if Congress votes down the deal,
requires a two-thirds majority in the House and Senate.
As of Aug. 31, 29 Democrats and two independents have
publicly said they would support the agreement, three shy
of the 34 necessary to sustain a veto in the Senate. Of the 15
remaining Senate Democrats, two have opposed the deal,
Schumer and Robert Menendez (N.J.), and the other 13 have
not publicly indicated their position. None of the 54 Senate
Republicans have endorsed the deal.
If implementation of the deal proceeds according to schedule,
Iran and the P5+1 will begin taking steps to implement their
respective commitments in October.
continued on page 30
27
 Key Elements of the Iran Nuclear Deal

T
he nuclear deal reached between Iran and six world powers (China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United
States, collectively known as the P5+1) on July 14 restricts Iran’s nuclear program and increases monitoring
and transparency requirements in return for relief from nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the United
States, the European Union, and the UN Security Council.
The following is a summary of the key elements of the agreement.

•  For 10 years, number of operating centrifuges reduced to 5,060 IR-1 machines; total number
for that period is 6,104 IR-1 machines.
•  Excess centrifuges (over 13,000) dismantled and stored under International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) monitoring.
•  For 15 years, level of uranium enrichment capped at 3.67 percent uranium-235.
Enrichment
•  For 15 years, enrichment only at Natanz.
•  For 10 years, no production of additional IR-1 centrifuges.
•  Between years 11 and 13, Iran can replace IR-1 machines with the equivalent capacity of IR-6
and IR-8 machines and limits lasting to years 14-15.
•  For 15 years, the stockpile kept under 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent-enriched uranium in total
(all forms).
Uranium
•  Excess enriched uranium sold, shipped abroad for storage, or diluted to natural uranium
Stockpile levels.
•  Uranium oxide and scrap material enriched up to 20 percent fabricated into fuel for Tehran
Research Reactor, blended down, or shipped out.
•  Converted to research facility for stable isotope production with Russian cooperation.
Fordow •  1,044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades will remain here; 328 for production, and the remaining
machines idle.
•  For 15 years, no introduction of uranium at the facility.
•  For 8.5 years, Iran may conduct research with uranium on a single IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8
Advanced centrifuge at Natanz.
Centrifuge
•  After 8.5 years, Iran may test up to 30 IR-6 and 30 IR-8 machines.
Research and
Development •  After 8 years, manufacture up to 200 IR-6 and 200 IR-8 centrifuges without rotors.
•  For 10 years, review and approval by Joint Commission (composed of P5+1, EU, and Iran for
a total of 8 voting members) required for changes to the research and development plan.
•  Remove and disable the original core of the Arak reactor.
•  Replace the core of the Arak reactor to reduce weapons-grade plutonium output, certified by
the Joint Commission.
•  For 15 years, no reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.
Arak Reactor •  Permanent commitment to ship out spent fuel and not to reprocess spent fuel.
•  For 15 years, no new heavy-water reactors in Iran.
•  For 15 years, no accumulation of heavy water in Iran.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2015

•  Construction of hot cells or shielded glove boxes of certain specifications subject to approval
of the Joint Commission.
•  By October 15, 2015, Iran fully implements “roadmap” agreed with IAEA on “possible military
dimensions” of past Iranian activities.
•  For 10 years, approval by the Joint Commission working group required for purchase of
Monitoring and dual-use materials.
Verification •  For 25 years, continuous monitoring of Iranian uranium mines and mills.
•  For 20 years, continuous monitoring of Iranian centrifuge production facilities.
•  For 15 years, Joint Commission oversight of IAEA access requests to inspect undeclared
sites.
•  Permanent prohibition of certain weaponization-related activities.
28
Monitoring and •  Implementation and eventual ratification of an additional protocol to Iran’s safeguards
Verification agreement.
(continued) •  Permanent implementation of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its
safeguards agreement.
•  For 25 years, Joint Commission will hold quarterly meetings, or by request, to oversee the
deal.
•  Dispute resolution mechanism within 35 days; 15 day dispute resolution mechanism within
the Joint Commission, with optional 15 day ministerial review and/or arbitration opinion
Joint from a 3-member panel, followed by 5-day review of the arbitration opinion. If no resolution
Commission and complaining party sees action as “significant non-performance,” the unresolved issue
can be treated as grounds to cease performing commitments in whole or part; complaining
party will notify UN Security Council.
•  If there is noncompliance, any party can go to the UN Security Council to put sanctions back
in place by vetoing a resolution calling for the continuance of sanctions.
•  UN Security Council Resolution 2231 endorsing the deal outlines termination of all previous
resolutions targeting Iran’s nuclear program—1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803
(2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010)—on “Implementation Day.”
•  For 10 years, sanctions subject to “snapback” by veto of a resolution calling for the
UN Sanctions
continuation of suspension.
•  After 10 years, United Nations will cease to be seized of Iran’s nuclear file.
•  For 5 years, the heavy arms embargo will remain in place.
•  For 8 years, the ballistic missile restrictions will remain in place.
•  Cease the application of economic sanctions against Iran’s oil and banking sector allowing
Iranian banks and companies to reconnect with international systems.
•  Remove designation of certain entities and individuals.
•  Allow for licensed non-U.S. entities that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person to engage
in activities with Iran permitted under the deal.
•  Allow for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft to Iran.
•  Allow for license for importing Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs into United States.
U.S. Sanctions
•  United States takes appropriate measures to address laws at state or local level preventing
full implementation of the deal; United States will actively encourage officials to adhere to
requirements of the agreement.
•  For 8 years after “Adoption Day”, or sooner if IAEA concludes that all nuclear activity in Iran
remains peaceful, United States will seek legislative action to terminate or modify nuclear
related sanctions.
•  U.S. sanctions on Iran targeting human rights, terrorism and missile activities remain. 
•  United States can impose additional sanctions for non-nuclear issues (terrorism, human
rights, etc.).
•  Terminate all provisions of the EU regulation related to Iran’s nuclear program.
ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2015

•  Includes financial and banking transactions; transactions in Iranian rial; provision of U.S.
banknotes to Iranian government; access to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication; insurance services; termination of efforts to reduce Iran’s crude oil and
petrochemical product sales; investment; transactions with Iran’s energy and shipping sector;
trade in gold and other precious metals; trade with Iran’s automotive sector.
EU Sanctions •  Removes individuals and entities designated under sanctions.
•  EU refrains from reintroducing sanctions terminated under the deal (Iran views any
reintroduction as grounds to cease performing its commitments).
•  EU refrains from policy intended to adversely affect normalization of economic relations with
Iran.
•  For 8 years after Adoption Day or until the finding of the IAEA broader conclusion, EU arms
embargo and restrictions on transfer of ballistic missiles remain.
29
 continued from page 27
THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
A Better Deal?
Some lawmakers opposing the deal, including Menendez, argue
that a stronger deal is possible. In an Aug. 18 speech at Seton
Hall University announcing his opposition, Menendez said
the United States could still get a better deal by leaving the
November 2013 interim agreement in place and strengthening
sanctions to put more pressure on Iran to further reduce its
nuclear program.
But in an Aug. 23 e-mail to Arms Control Today, an official
from a European country involved in the negotiations dismissed
the argument that the P5+1 can return to the negotiating table.
He said it is “ludicrous for the U.S. Congress to think Europe
will meekly follow Washington” and impose harsher sanctions
if the deal is rejected. He said it is “even more ludicrous” to
assume that Iran will be willing to re-engage in talks after the
international community endorsed the deal.
The UN Security Council unanimously endorsed the
agreement on July 21 in a resolution that laid the groundwork
for lifting UN sanctions when the deal is implemented and
set up a mechanism for reimposing sanctions if Iran violates
its commitments.
The European official said that the deal is the “best chance to
rein in Iran’s nuclear program.” Washington’s “credibility is on
the line,” he said, and a rejection of this deal could “damage the
prospects of future negotiations with Iran.”
Inspector Access
Other members of Congress say they oppose the deal because
it is not strong enough. Schumer pointed to the inspections
regime, which he says should give “anytime, anywhere” access
to inspectors, as a reason to oppose the deal.
Under the terms of the agreement, inspectors from the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will continuously
monitor some of Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran is required to
provide them with access to all declared nuclear sites in as little
as two hours.
Iran also is to implement and then ratify the additional
protocol to its safeguards agreement, which, among other
things, allows the IAEA to request access to any area, including
ARMS CONTROL TODAY September 2015
Dean Calma/IAEA
Tero Varjoranta (left), the top safeguards official at the
International Atomic Energy Agency, and Yukiya Amano, the
agency’s director-general, attend a special meeting of the
IAEA Board of Governors on Iran on August 25 in Vienna.
30
military sites, to investigate evidence of illicit nuclear
activities. In these cases, Iran can take some steps to protect
sensitive information.
As an additional measure to ensure that Iran complies with
any IAEA request for access to an undeclared site, the nuclear
deal gives Iran and the IAEA 14 days to work out an access
arrangement to allow inspectors to visit a site. If Tehran and the
agency are unable to do so, a commission set up under the deal
will have seven days to consider the access request and issue a
decision.
The commission is made up of eight members representing
the P5+1 countries, Iran, and the European Union. Five of
the eight members must agree for the commission to issue a
decision on access.
If Iran does not implement the commission’s ruling within
three days, any of the P5+1 countries can go to the Security
Council to reimpose sanctions. Thus, under this process,
inspectors would be granted access within 24 days.
U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz said in a July 22 interview
with Politico that it is “essentially impossible” for Iran to clean
up illicit activities involving nuclear materials with any degree
of confidence during the time before IAEA inspectors are
able to visit a site. As part of its technical work to support the
negotiations, the Energy Department conducted experiments
with uranium and “unsuccessfully probed the limits of trying to
clean it up” within 24 days, Moniz said.
Another reason for confidence in the deal’s ability to
constrain Iran is the monitoring and verification regime it
establishes, Moniz said. Under that regime, he said, Iran would
have to replicate an entire nuclear supply chain to pursue an
illicit program, and only “one weak link” is needed to indicate
undeclared nuclear activities.
Information Delivered
An IAEA press release announced that Iran had submitted
information on Aug. 15 to answer questions and provide
information for the agency’s investigation into Iran’s past
work that is suspected of having been related to nuclear
weapons development.
Iran maintains that its nuclear program is entirely peaceful.
The Aug. 15 deadline for the submission of information by
Iran was established in a July 14 Iran-IAEA agreement that
is separate from the deal between Iran and the P5+1, but the
text of that deal says sanctions relief is dependent on Iran’s
cooperation with the IAEA probe.
At a special Aug. 25 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors
to discuss monitoring and verification of Iran’s adherence
to that deal in Iran and request funding for carrying
out the measures, IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano
said that Tehran provided “explanations in writing, and
related documents, for the clarification of past and present
outstanding issues.”
Under the Iran-IAEA agreement, the agency has until Sept. 15
to evaluate the information recently provided by Iran and ask
additional questions. Iran will have until Oct. 15 to respond.
By Dec. 15, the IAEA aims to complete its assessment of the
past Iranian activities allegedly related to nuclear weapons
development. —KELSEY DAVENPORT
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