Hanns Seidel Foundation Myanmar Shades of Federalism Vol 1

SHADES OF
FEDERALISM
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Volume 1
Federalism and Federation: Putting the Record Straight

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Linguistic Diversity in Plurinational States

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Federalism: A tool for conflict resolution

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Federalism, Democracy and Inclusion: What about the others?

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Self-rule and Shared Rule

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ISBN 978-99971-0-464-9
Publisher © 2017, 50 Shades of Federalism
Dr. Soeren Keil
Canterbury Christ Church University, Politics and IR
North Holmes Road, Canterbury, CT1 1QU, United Kingdom
© 2017, Hanns Seidel Foundation Myanmar Office
Unit 7, Inya Lake Hotel
37 Kaba Aye Pagoda Road, Yangon
Republic of the Union of Myanmar
Tel.: +95 1 66 72 25
Email: myanmar@hss.de
Online: https://southeastasia.hss.de/myanmar
Chairwoman Prof. Ursula Männle, Minister of State (ret.)
Chief Executive Officer Dr. Peter Witterauf
Responsible for Publication Dr. Soeren Keil, Achim Munz
Main Authors Dr. Soeren Keil, Paul Anderson
Authors Prof. Dr. Michael Burgess, Dr. Sean Mueller,
Associate Prof. Allison McCulloch, Dr. Daniel Cetra
Translator U Aung Kyaw Phyo
Layout & Cover Artwork Shaine Phay, Mote Oo
Special Acknowledgement Paul Anderson, the manager of 50 Shades of Federalism
Professor Michael Burgess, who passed away during the completion of
this publication and was a great supporter of the project
Dr. David Bates, the Director of Politics and IR at Canterbury Christ Church
University, who has supported this project
Canterbury Christ Church University, who has provided QR funding to establish
50 Shades of Federalism
Achim Munz, Aung Soe Min, Leander Ketelhodt, Christopher Vollhardt, Mote Oo
All rights, including the right of reproduction, dissemination and translation, reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced in any form (including photocopying, recording, or otherwise) without the written permission of the Hanns Seidel
Foundation or processed using electronic systems, copied or distributed. The copyright for this publication lies with the Hanns
Seidel Foundation. The contributors by named authors do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the publisher.
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Contents
Introduction 2
1. Federalism and Federation: 7
Putting the Record Straight
Michael Burgess
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2. Self-rule and Shared Rule 24
Sean Mueller
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3. Federalism, Democracy and Inclusion: 37

What about the others?
Allison McCulloch
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tjcm;olrsm;twGuf rnfodkY pOf;pm;rnfenf;
4. Linguistic Diversity in Plurinational States 50
Daniel Cetra
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bmompum;qdkif&m rwluGJjym;rI
5. Federalism: A tool for conflict resolution 65
Paul Anderson & Soeren Keil
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2 I Introduction for Shades of Federalism
Introduction for “Shades of Federalism” Volume 1

Discussing and debating federalism, and its many shades, forms and sub-topics, has become an essen-
tial element of the political discourse in Myanmar. Since the move to parliamentary democracy after the
first free elections in 2010, and particularly since the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)
between eight ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and the Tatmadaw in 2015, federalism has become an
intense debate.
The short contributions in this volume look at some of the theoretical aspects in the debate on feder-
alism. They discuss elements such as shared-rule and self-rule, the link to minority rights, linguistic rights’
protection and the potential of federalism to overcome violent conflict. Each paper takes a particular view
on an aspect of federalism, demonstrating its complexity, both in academic and in very practical terms.
In the first paper, Michael Burgess, an eminent authority in the field of federal studies, discusses the
different definitions of federalism and federation, and sheds light into some of the confusion that has
arisen in recent years. In particular, Burgess highlights that these terms have been used more often to
describe new and evolving federations (such as Spain, the United Kingdom and the European Union),
thereby blurring the lines between federalism, decentralisation and devolution. He examines what feder-
alism and federation mean in theory and practice, why the use of term has increased substantially in recent
years and why precision and clear focus are important when discussing federalism.
In the second contribution, Sean Mueller, a Swiss academic, discusses self-rule and shared-rule. These
are major principles that demonstrate the correct application of the federal principle. In short, self-rule
refers to the autonomy of federal units, while shared-rule enables the territorial units to participate in
decisions in the central institutions, usually through their representation in second chambers. There are, of
course, many ways of implementing self-rule and shared-rule, and Myanmar needs to find its own way in
applying these principles in a future federal system.
The third paper looks at the role of “Others” in federal systems. Allison McCulloch, who works as an
academic in Canada, highlights the dangers of federalism and power-sharing. While these institutional
provisions are designed to provide inclusion for certain groups, they can often lead to the exclusion of
other groups, who do not benefit from these institutional arrangements. It is therefore important to con-
sider the role of different minorities and those that might not identify with any group, when designing
federal institutions and implementing power-sharing.
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4 I Introduction for Shades of Federalism
The fourth paper focuses on linguistic diversity and is written by Daniel Cetra, a Spanish academic. It
highlights the challenge of recognising multiple languages both at central and regional levels in multina-
tional states. This can be challenging, expensive and controversial, and it often leads to conflicts between
the majority population and minorities, who quest for the recognition of their language.
This volume is concluded by a paper on federalism and conflict resolution. Anderson and Keil, two UK-
based academics with Myanmar experience, highlight how federalism has become a tool of conflict reso-
lution. However, they demonstrate that the use of federalism in post-conflict societies is often contested
and can lead to new problems. It is therefore important to consider the design of conflict-resolution mech-
anisms within a federal political system.
The papers were first published on the website www.50shadesoffederalism.com – which is a project
at Canterbury Christ Church University in the UK, providing free and precise articles and discussions on
federalism by academics, policy makers and think tank researchers. The project started in October 2017,
and the website has been a huge success – providing policy makers, students and academics alike with free
access to resources on federalism, short and crisp analysis of key issues involved in federal government,
and further information on leading researchers in the field.
The Hanns Seidel Foundation in Myanmar has worked with Canterbury Christ Church University to
translate these pieces into Myanmar language and ensure the accessibility of these papers in the country.
This collection of papers is Volume 1 – further Volumes are planned. Our overall objective is to demon-
strate what federalism is, how it works and what it can offer to Myanmar, both in terms of opportunities,
and in terms of challenges.
Soeren Keil, PhD is Reader in Politics and International Relations at Canterbury

Christ Church University in the UK.
Achim Munz is the Resident Representative of the Hanns-Seidel-Foundation in
Myanmar.
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Soeren Keil, PhD onf ,lauEdkifiH Canterbury Christ Church wuúodkvf?

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Achim Munz onf [ef;qdkif',fazmifa';&Sif;\ jrefrmEdkifiHqdkif&m
Xmaeudk,fpm;vS,ftjzpf wm0efxrf;aqmifaeygonf/
6 I Federalism and Federation: Putting the record straight
1. Federalism
and Federation:
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Putting the record straight
em;vnfrI vGJrSm;aeonfrsm;udk
jyefvnf&Sif;vif; jyifqifjcif;
Michael Burgess (1949-2018) is Emeritus professor of federal studies at the

University of Kent, UK. His interest in federal studies date back to his doctoral
thesis completed in the 1970s. Michael’s research interests straddle a number
of fields, including comparative federalism, the British tradition of federalism,
Canadian constitutional politics and the European Union and European Inte-
gration. He has an extensive publication record, and as well as a number of
published articles and co-edited collections he has singled authored a number
of books, most recently In Search of the Federal Spirit published in 2012.
Michael Burgess (1949 - 2018)onf ,lauEdkifiH University of Kent &Sd zuf'&,f

avhvmrIrsm;qdik &f m *kPx f ;l aqmifygarmu© jzpfonf/ Michael onf 1970 jynfEh pS f
rsm;twGi;f ol\ yg&*lpmwrf;udk a&;om;jyKpkcphJ OfrpS í zuf'&,fqikd &f m avhvmrIrsm;
wGif pdwf 0ifpm;cJo h nf/ Michael onf acwfNydKifzuf'&,fpepfrsm;tm; EdiI ;f ,SOaf vhvm
jcif;? NAdwed Ef ikd if \
H zuf'&,fpepfqikd &f m usiho
f ;kH rItpOftvm? uae'gEdik if \
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tajccHOya'qdkif&m EdkifiHa&;ESihf Oa&myor*¾ESihf Oa&myaygif;pnf;a&;wdkYtygt0if
e,fy,ftrsm;tjym;wGif okawoersm; jyKvkyf&ef pdwf0ifpm;cJhonf/ Michael onf
pmwrf;rsm;pGmudk a&;om;xkwfjyefcJholjzpfNyD; aqmif;yg;rsm;pGmESihf yl;wGJ wnf;jzwfrI
rsm;tjyif pmtkyfrsm;pGmudkvnf; wpfOD;wnf; a&;om;jyKpkcJhum aemufqHk;xkwfjyef
cJhonhf pmwrf;onf 2012 ckESpfwGif xkwfjyefcJhaom zuf'&,f\ oabmobm0udk
&SmazGjcif; pmwrf;jzpfonf/
The study of federalism is a wide ranging subject, both empirically and concep-
tually, because in practice people have different understandings of the terms
federal, federalism and federation. In this short piece I set out the importance
of definitional clarity when discussing the abovementioned terms. Secondly, I
discuss the relationship between liberal democracy and federalism, noting that
a number of values that undergird federal political systems equally fit with
democratic principles. In the final section, I focus on the some of the misun-
derstood aspects of federalism, using the British case as an empirical example.
zuf'&,fpepftm; avhvmjcif;onf vufawGw U iG o

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wwfonfh ½Iaxmift h csKdu
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Oyrmwpfcktjzpf toHk;jyKxm;ygonf/
Introduction
It is now commonplace to observe that about 40% of the world’s population live in states or political
systems that are designated ‘federal’. Among these are these are the United States of America (USA), Can-
ada, Australia, India, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium and Malaysia. But what does it mean to be
‘federal’? What has to exist for states to be ‘federal’?
Terminological Clarification
Federalism derives originally from the Latin term ‘foedus’ that means contract, compact, pact and
agreement which spring from the world of international relations. Today we make an important conceptu-
al distinction between the term ‘federalism’ and that of ‘federation’ (Burgess 2006; Gagnon et al 2015; King
1982). Simply put, federalism animates federation. It is the driving force of federation that is intended to
protect, preserve and promote what we call ‘the politics of difference’, that is, the formal constitutional,
legal and political recognition of and respect for diversity. ‘Diversity’, broadly speaking, refers to cultur-
al-ideological and socio-economic characteristics in societies where they have political salience or in
other words they are expressed politically. By cultural-ideological features we mean a combination of lin-
guistic, religious, nationalist, ethnic, historical, philosophical, territorial and even politico-psychological
distinctions. In contrast, the notion of socio-economic cleavages refers to the distribution and redistribu-
tion of economic resources, social and economic equality and inequality, government investment in infra-
structure, regional development, social class and the overall structure of the economy. It is important to
note that these sorts of social cleavages are present in some combination in all states but that not all of
these cleavage patterns have political salience. Equally, there are varying combinations or patterns among
those cleavages that do have political salience so that the politics of difference and diversity embraces
different differences and diverse diversities in form and content in each state. It is now received wisdom
that the former socio-cultural dimension, considered by itself, is largely to do with ‘identity’ politics and
that conflict issues are generally much less bargainable than those in the latter category of a socio-eco-
nomic nature. In practice of course these sets of cleavages overlap and intermingle to produce unique
constellations of cleavage patterns.
When we turn to look at federations, it is obvious that they are states; they are federal states. We use
the term ‘federal’ to qualify the term ‘state’. But what does the formal description ‘federal state’ mean and
what distinguishes it from formally non-federal states? The answer is both simple and complex. The fed-
ed'gef;
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rsm;twGif; aexdkifMuaMumif; awGU jrif&onfrSm txl;tqef;r[kwfay/ tqdkygEdkifiHrsm;wGif tar&duefjynf
axmifpk (USA)? uae'g? MopaMw;vs? tdE, ´d ? MopBwD;,m;? qGpZf mvef? *smreD? b,fv*f sD,H ESifh rav;&Sm; Edik if w
H Ykd
yg0ifonf/ od&Yk mwGif ]zuf'&,f} jzpfonfqo kd nfrmS tb,fenf;/ ]zuf'&,f} Edik if w
H pfEikd if jH zpf&eftwGuf rnfonf
wdkY&Sd&ef vdktyfoenf;/
a0g[m& toHk;tEIef;qdkif&m &Sif;vif;csuf

zuf'&,fpepfonf EdkifiHwumqufqHa&;e,fy,frS ay:aygufvmNyD; uefx½dkufpmcsKyf? oabmwlpmcsKyf?
pmcsKyf? oabmwlncD suf[k t"dymÜ ,f&&So d nfh vufwifa0g[m&wpfcjk zpfaom ‘foedus’ rS qif;oufvmjcif; jzpf
onf/ ,aeYwGif uREkyf w f tYkd aejzifh ]zuf'&,fpepf} ESihf ]zuf'a&;&Si;f } [lonfh a0g[m&rsm;Mum;&Sd oabmw&m;
rsm;tay: ta&;BuD;onfh ydik ;f jcm;owfrw S rf w I pfcu k kd jyKvkyMf uygonf/ (Burgess 2006 ckEpS ?f Gagnon ESihf tjcm;
yk*¾dKvfrsm; 2015 ckESpf? King 1982 ckESpf)/ tvG,fqdk&aomf zuf'a&;&Sif;udk azmfaqmifonfrSm zuf'&,fpepf
jzpfonf/ zuf'&,fpepfonf]EdkifiHa&;uGJjym;jcm;em;rIrsm;} udk xdef;odrf;? umuG,f? jr§ifhwif&ef &nf&G,fum
zuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;udk armif;ESifonfh wGef;tm;wpf&yfjzpfonf/ qdkvdkonfrSm - rwluGJjym;rItm; w&m;0if? tajccH
Oya'? Oya'aMumif;ESifh EdkifiHa&;t& todtrSwfjyK av;pm;vdkufemjcif;jzpfonf/ tus,ftm;jzifhqdk&aomf
]rwluGJjym;rI} onf EdkifiHa&;t& ta&;ygaom? wpfenf;tm;jzifh EdkifiHa&;t& azmfxkwfonfh ,Ofaus;rIqdkif&m
- t,ltq tawG;tac:rsm;ESihf vlrpI ;D yGm;a&;qdik &f m 0daoovu©Pm&yfrsm;udk &nfòef;onf/ ,Ofaus;rIqikd &f m
- t,ltq tawG;tac:rsm;qdkif&m vu©Pm&yfrsm;[kqdk&mwGif uREkfyfwdkYtaejzifh bmompum;? udk;uG,fonfh
bmom? trsKd;om;a&;? vlrsKd;a&;? ordkif;aMumif;? tawG;tac:? e,fajrESifh EdkifiHa&; pdwf"mwfydkif;qdkif&m uGJjym;
rIrsm;tm; aygif;pyfrIudk qdkvdkonf/ tjcm;wpfzufwGif vlrIpD;yGm;a&; uGJjym;rIrsm;qdkif&m t,ltqqdkonfrSm
pD;yGm;a&;o,HZmwrsm;? vlraI &;ESihf pD;yGm;a&;nDrQrIEiS hf rnDrQrI? tpd;k &\ tajccHtaqmuftOD? a'owGi;f zGUH NzdK;
wdk;wufa&;? vlrIa&;tvTmrsm;ESifh pD;yGm;a&;pepf zGJUpnf;yHkwpfckvHk;&Sd tpdk;&\ &if;ESD;jr§KyfESHrIrsm;tm; cGJa0&efESifh
jyefvnfcGJa0&efwdkYudk &nfòef;ygonf/ ,if;odkYaom vlrIa&;qdkif&muGJjym;rIrsm;onf EdkifiHwdkif;wGif ]aygif;pyfrI
yHpk t
H csKd}U pDjzifh &Sad eaomfvnf; tqdyk guGjJ ym;rIypkH rH sm;wGif Edik if aH &;t& ta&;rygonfrsm;vnf; &Sad eonf/ xdek nf;
wlpGmyif ,if;wdkYteuf EdkifiHa&;t& ta&;ygonfh uGJjym;rIrsm;Mum;wGifvnf; aygif;pyfrI odkYr[kwf yHkpHrsm;onf
trsKd;rsKd;ajymif;vJaeEdik faomaMumifh Edik fiHa&;qdki&f muGJjym;jcm;em;rIEiS fh rwluJjG ym;rIrsm;onf Edik fiH wpfEdkiif Hcsif;
pDtvdkuf yHkpHESifh taMumif;t&mtm;jzifh uGJjym;jcm;em;rIrsm;ESifh uGJjym;rIrsm;udk jzpfay:aponf/ ,cktcgwGif
,cif vlr, I Ofaus;rIqikd &f m ½Iaxmifw h pfcw k nf;udo k mpOf;pm;ygu ,if;onf ]0daoo} Edik if aH &;ESihf rsm;pGmoufqikd f
aeNyD; y#dyu©rsm;onf a,bk,stm;jzifh vlrpI ;D yGm;a&;qdik &f m oabmobm0\ aemufyikd ;f trsKd;tpm;wGif yg0if
onfrsm;uJhodkY n§dEdIif;í&Edkifjcif; ydkrdkenf;yg;avh&Sdonf/ vufawGUwGif tqdkyg uGJjym;rIrsm;onf wpfxyfwnf;
usa&mufaygif;pkum uGJjym;rIyHkpHrsm;wGif xl;jcm;onfh tpDtpOfrsm; ay:aygufvmonf/
uREkfyfwdkYtaejzifh zuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;onf EdkifiHrsm;jzpfonfudkrl tvG,fwul odEdkifonf/ zuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;
onf zuf'&,fEikd if rH sm; jzpfMuonf/ uREkyf w f t Ykd aejzifh ]Edik if }H udk txl;jyKazmfjy&ef ]zuf'&,f} [lonfh a0g[m&
tm; toHk;jyKonf/ odkY&mwGif ]zuf'&,fEdkifiH} [lonfh w&m;0ifazmfjycsufonf rnfonfudk qdkvdkNyD; ,if;onf
w&m;0iftm;jzifh zuf'&,fr[kwo f nfh Edik if rH sm;ESihf rnfoYkd uGjJ ym;oenf;/ tajzonf ½d;k &Si;f ovdk ½Iyaf xG;rIvnf;
&Sdaeonf/ yHkrSeftm;jzifh zuf'&,fEdkifiHwpfEdkifiHqdkonfrSm EdkifiHa&;t& uGJjym;jcm;em;rIESifh rwluGJjym;rIwdkYudk
eral state is usually referred to as a state in which the politics of difference and diversity meet the politics
of recognition so that they are formally incorporated in a written constitution, the legal system and the
political system. And it is vital that these state structures work in practice and not just in theory (Burgess
2006). Some formally federal states, such as the Russian Federation, have all the institutional parapherna-
lia of federal structures but do not in practice work as a federation should work, largely because of its in-
timidation of opposition parties, human rights abuses, rampant corruption and its extremely limited form
of democratisation. In short, it has the shell of a formal federation but it lacks the substance in its opera-
tion. It is, in short, an impostor. In federal states that work, by contrast, the federalism in federation is insti-
tutionalised in such a way that difference and diversity are able to breathe and to express themselves as
a legitimate driving force in the federation.
Federations are therefore complex in seeking always to maintain their ‘federality’, that is, their capac-
ity to sustain federalism in the face of fresh challenges and constant change (Burgess 2012). Invariably it
is the ‘territorial’ principle which has typified most formal federations, like those identified above. The
building blocks of these federations are what we call ‘constituent units’ that are territorially bounded and
contain distinct political communities which together produce something – a federal union of (former)
entities or states and a single people – that is greater than the sum of its parts. But while these are integral
to the federal state, strictly speaking, they are by virtue of an original constitutional agreement sub-states
of the larger federation which may itself create further sub-states out of its own territory. In most cases it
is these constituent units or groups of units that contain the federalism that animates the federation, as
mentioned above. How, then, should we define the federal state? Consider the following simple definition:
a sovereign state distinguished from other such states by the way in which its constituent units are
firmly incorporated in the decision-making processes of the federal government on some constitutionally
entrenched basis. This is a very broad working definition that accurately conveys the sense in which the
constituent parts of the state are related to the larger whole that is the federation. These parts are not
constitutionally subordinate to the federal government but are broadly speaking an integral part of it.
Through a distinct division of powers and competences, they work with the federal government in the main
political institutions of the state while simultaneously operating their own constitutionally guaranteed
governmental systems and public policy processes at sub-state level. This facilitates a wide variety of
federal models each with their own distinctive ways of policy-making and resource allocation in some
form of intergovernmental relations (IGR) that regularly brings together all governments, civil servants and
ministers from the two (in some cases three) levels of decision-making to resolve problems (Poirier et al
2015).
EdkifiHa&;t& todtrSwfjyKum ,if;wdkYtm; pmjzifh a&;om;xm;onfh tajccHOya'? w&m;pD&ifrIpepfESifh EdkifiHa&;

pepfwdkYtwGif; w&m;0if pkpnf;xnfhoGif;xm;onfh EdkifiHwpfEdkifiHudk &nfòef;ygonf/ xdkYjyif tqdkyg EdkifiHawmf
zGpUJ nf;yHrk sm;onf oDt&kd yD ikd ;f wGio f mrubJ ]vufawG}U wGiyf g tvkyjf zpf&ef ta&;BuD;onf (Burgess 2006 ckEpS )f /
Oyrm - ½k&Sm; zuf'a&;&Sif;uJhodkYaom w&m;0iftac:ta0: t& zuf'&,fjzpfcJhonfh EdkifitcsKd H UwGif zuf'&,fyHk
o²meftwGuf vdktyfonfh tifpwDusL;&Sif;qdkif&m taetxm;rsm; &SdMuaomfvnf; vufawGUwGifrl zuf'a&;
&Si;f wpfcw k iG f usifo h ;kH &rnfh vkyif ef;rsm;udk usifo h ;kH jcif;r&Sad y/ ,if;odjYk zpf&jcif;rSm t"dutm;jzifh twdu k tf cHygwD
rsm;tm; Ncdrf;ajcmufjcif;? vlYtcGifhta&;csKd;azmufrIrsm;? tusifhysufjcpm;rIrsm; ysHUESHYaejcif;ESifh tvGefuefYowf
xm;onfh 'Drdkua&pDazmfaqmifrIyHkpHaMumifh jzpfonf/ twdkcsKyftm;jzifhqdk&aomf ,if;onf w&m;0ifzuf'&,f
oGifjyifo²mef&Sdaomfvnf; vnfywfrIwGif tESpfom& r&Sday/ xdkYaMumifh twdktm;jzifhqdkaomf ,if;onf twk
ta,mifrQomjzpfonf/ qefYusifbuftm;jzifh vufawGU wGif tvkyfjzpfaom zuf'&,fEdkifiHrsm;\ zuf'a&;&Sif;
twGif;wGif uGJjym;jcm;em;rIESifh rwluGJjym;rIwdkYudk touf0ifapNyD; zuf'a&;&Sif;tm; w&m;0ifarmif;ESifonfh
wGe;f tm;wpf&yftjzpf xif[yfaponfh enf;vrf;jzifh zuf'&,fpepfukd tifpwDusL;&Si;f twGi;f xnfo h iG ;f xm;onf/
xdkYaMumifh zuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;onf ,if;wdkY\ ]zuf'&,fjzpfrI} udk xdef;odrf;xm;&ef tpOfvkyfaqmif&mwGif
½Iyaf xG;Muonf/ ,if;onf pdeaf c:rItopfrsm;udk &ifqikd jf cif;ESihf tpOftNrJajymif;vJaejcif;wdw Yk iG f zuf'&,fpepfukd
a&&Snfxdef;odrf;xm;Edkifonfh pGrf;&nfudk qdkvdkonf (Burgess 2012 ckESpf)/ jzpfpOftm;vHk;eD;yg;ü txufwGif
cGJjcm;owfrSwfcJhonfh w&m;0ifzuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;udk ]e,fajrqdkif&m} tajccHoabmw&m;jzifh trsKd;tpm; cGJjcm;
cJhygonf/ tqdkyg zuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;\ tajccHtpdwftydkif;rsm;onf e,fajra'ot& ydkif;jcm;xm;onfh ]tpdwf
tydik ;f ,lepfrsm;} jzpfNyD; oD;jcm;Edik if aH &;todik ;f t0dik ;f rsm;yg0ifum ,if;wdu Yk kd pkaygif;vdu k o f nft h cg (,cif) tzGUJ
tpnf;rsm; odkYr[kwf EdkifiHrsm;ESifh vlyk*¾dKvf wpfOD;csif;pDwdkY\ zuf'&,fjynfaxmifpkwpfckudk ay:aygufvmap
onf/ ,if;odkY ay:aygufvmonfh zuf'&,fjynfaxmifpkonf ,if;\ tpdwftydkif;rsm;\ pkpkaygif; yrmPxuf
ydrk Bdk uD;rm;onf/ od&Yk mwGif ,if;wdo Yk nf zuf'&,fEikd if w H pfEikd if \ H ta&;BuD;onfh tpdwt f ydik ;f rsm;jzpfMuaomfvnf;
wdwdusus azmfjy&ygu ,if;wdkYonf rlvzGJUpnf;yHkqdkif&m oabmwlnDcsufyg t&nftaoG;t& ydkrdk BuD;rm;onfh
zuf'a&;&Si;f \ jynfe,f^,lepfrsm; jzpfMuonf/ zuf'a&;&Si;f onf ,if;\ ud, k yf ikd ef ,ferd w d t f wGi;f jynfe,f^
,lepfrsm; xyfrzH efw;D Edik o f nf/ jzpfpOftrsm;pkwiG f txufwiG af zmfjycJNh yD;onft h wdik ;f yif zuf'a&;&Si;f udk touf
0ifaponfrmS zuf'&,fpepfyg0ifaom tqdyk g tpdwt f ydik ;f ,lepfrsm; odrYk [kwf ,lepfrsm;\ tpktzGrUJ sm; jzpfonf/
xdt k cg uREkyf w f t
Ykd aejzifh zuf'&,fEikd if w H pfcu k kd rnfot Ykd "dymÜ ,fziG qhf okd ifoh enf;/ atmufyg ½d;k &Si;f onfh t"dymÜ ,f
owfrSwfcsufudk xnfhoGif;pOf;pm;Munfhyg/
zuf'&,fEikd if q H o kd nfrmS tajccHOya't& tcdik t f rm owfrw S x f m;&Srd t I csKdu U kd tajccHum zuf'&,ftpd;k &\
qH;k jzwfcsufcsrSwaf om vkyif ef;pOfrsm;wGif ,if;\tpdwt f ydik ;f ,lepfrsm;tm; tcdik t f rmaygif;pyf xnfo h iG ;f xm;
jcif;tm;jzifh tjcm;aomEdik if rH sm;ESihf rwlno D nfh tcsKyftjcmtmPmydik f Edik if w H pfEikd if jH zpfonf/ ,if;onf tvGef
us,fjyefí Y tvkyjf zpfaom t"dymÜ ,fziG q hf ckd sufjzpfNyD; Edik if \ H yg0ifonfh tpdwt f ydik ;f rsm;ESihf ,if;wd\ Yk ydrk Bkd uD;rm;
onfh tpkta0;wpfckvHk; (qdkvdkonfrSm zuf'a&;&Sif;) wdkY\ qufpyfaerIudk wduspGm azmfjyay;onf/ tqdkyg
tpdwftydkif;rsm;onf tajccHOya't& zuf'&,ftpdk;&\ vufatmufcH r[kwfbJ us,fus,f jyefYjyefY qdk&ygu
zuf'&,ftpd;k &\ r&Srd jzpf tpdwt f ydik ;f wpfck jzpfonf/ ,if;tpdwt f ydik ;f rsm;onf &Si;f vif;pGm ydik ;f jcm;cGaJ 0xm;
onfh tmPmrsm;ESifh vkyfydkifcGifhrsm;rSwpfqifh EdkifiH\ t"duEdkifiHa&;qdkif&m tifpwDusL;&Sif;rsm;wGif zuf'&,f
tpd;k &ESihf twlwuG vkyaf qmifNyD; wpfNydKifwnf;wGif jynfe,f^,lepftqifw h iG f tajccHOya't& tmrcHcsufay;
xm;onfh ,if;wd\ Yk ud, k yf ikd t
f pd;k &pepfrsm;ESihf jynfoaYl &;&mrl0g'vkyif ef;rsm;udv k nf; vnfywfvyk af qmifonf/
,if;onf trsKd;rsKd;aom us,fjyefYonfh zuf'&,fyHkpHrsm;tm; jyóemrsm;ajz&Sif;&ef qHk;jzwfcsuf jyKvkyfonfh
Before we move away from our principal focus upon federalism and federation, it should also be noted
that federations are not the only states in the world that preserve and protect diversity. This is why we
referred above in the opening sentence to both formal federal states and informal federal political systems
(Burgess 2012). This is a relatively recent distinction in the mainstream literature on comparative federal-
ism and it essentially highlights those formally non-federal states, such as India and Spain, that nonethe-
less still have a written constitutional commitment of sorts together with a practical approach to problems
that are ‘federal’ in everything but the name. Consequently the distinction between the state in theory and
the political system in practice is an important one. Interestingly these case studies are exactly the oppo-
site of the Russian case mentioned above. The multinational United Kingdom (UK) is yet another example
of a formally non-federal state with a proven track record of the protection, preservation and promotion of
sub-state national identity but it does not yet have a formally codified written constitution.
This brief survey of federalism and federation would not be complete without some attention paid to
the question of western liberal democracy that in a sense holds all of the above together. We must ac-
knowledge that there are many forms of democracy and that they play out differently in different contexts.
Most formally federal states have historically been created or have gradually evolved from former imperi-
al structures – as in North and South America and Australasia- or have been created in Europe as a result
of the Second World War or the end of the Cold War. The new federal models of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH) in 1995, Ethiopia in 1995 and Iraq in 2005, each emerging out of traumatic post-conflict crises in-
volving international intervention of varying sorts, we may consider in many important respects to be of a
different kind. But the main point is that with only a few notable exceptions they have been and still are
liberal democracies. What must be emphasised most strongly here is that formal federations and informal
federal political systems can survive only in thriving liberal democracies. The reason for this is that it is
only in such states and systems that the politics of difference and diversity can be constitutionally, legally
and politically guaranteed. After all, this is one of the principal purposes of the formal federation and the
operating practices of federal political systems.
tqifhESpf&yf (tcsKdUaom jzpfpOfrsm;wGif oHk;&yf) rS tpdk;&rsm;? tpdk;&0efxrf;rsm;ESifh 0efBuD;rsm; tm;vHk;udk yHkrSef

twlwuG csdwq f ufay;onfh tpd;k &rsm;Mum;&Sd qufqaH &; (IGR) yHpk t H csKdU jzifh ,if;wd\ Yk oD;jcm;rl0g'csrSwjf cif;ESihf
o,HZmwcGJa0jcif;qdkif&m enf;vrf;rsm;wGif taxmuftuljyKygonf (Poirier ESifh tjcm;aom yk*¾dKvfrsm;? 2015
ckESpf)/
uREkfyfwdkYtaejzifh t"dutm½Hkpl;pdkufrIjzpfaom zuf'&,fpepfESifh zuf'a&;&Sif;rS tjcm;taMumif;t&modkY
ajymif;vJaqG;aEG;jcif;rjyKrDwiG f zuf'a&;&Si;f rsm;onf uÇmay:wGif rwlujJG ym;rIukd xde;f odr;f umuG,af pmifah &Smuf
onfh wpfckwnf;aomEdkifiHrsm; r[kwfaMumif;udkvnf; *½kjyKoihfayonf/ xdkYaMumifh uREkfyfwtaejzif dkY h tzGifh
pmaMumif;wGif w&m;0iftac:ta0:t& zuf'&,f]EdkifiH}rsm;ESifh xdkodkY r[kwfaom zuf'&,f]EdkifiHa&;pepfrsm;}
taMumif;udk txufwiG f azmfjycJjh cif;jzpfonf (Burgess 2012 ckEpS )f / ,if;onf acwfNydKifzuf'&,fpepfrsm;tm;
EdiI ;f ,SOaf vhvmí a&;om;xm;onfh ,aeYacwf pmayrsm;twGi;f tawmftoifh aemufq;kH cGjJ cm;csufwpfcjk zpfNyD;
pmjzifha&;om;xm;onfh zuf'&,foabmw&m;rsKd;&Sdaom tajccHOya'qdkif&muwdu0wfrsm; &Sd½HkrQrubJ
jyóemrsm;udk vufawGcU sOf;uyf&mwGif trnftm;jzifh ]zuf'&,f} r[kwo f nfrv S íJG useft&mtm;vH;k zuf'&,f
jzpfaeonf?h w&m;0iftm;jzihf zuf'&,fr[kwaf om? Oyrm - tdE, ´d ESihf pydew f u Ykd kd txl;ojzifh axmufjyxm;ygonf/
aemufqufwt JG aejzifh Edik if \
H oDt&kd yD ikd ;f ESihf vufawGu U sifoh ;kH onfh Edik if aH &;pepfwMYkd um;wGif cGjJ cm;&ef ta&;BuD;
ygonf/ pdw0f ifpm;zG,rf mS tqdyk g jzpfpOfavhvmcsufrsm;onf txufwiG f azmfjycJNh yD;aom ½k&mS ;Edik if \ H OyrmESihf
twdtusyif qefYusifbufjzpfaeonf/ EdkifiHrsm;pGmyg0ifonfh ,lEdkufwufuif;'rf; (,lau) onf w&m;0if
tac:ta0:t& zuf'&,fEdkifiH r[kwfaomfvnf; jynfe,f^,lepf\ trsKd;om;vu©Pmudk xdef;odrf;? umuG,f?
jr§ifhwifonfh tjcm;Oyrmwpfck jzpfonf/ odkY&mwGif ,lauwGif w&m;0ifOya'jy|mef; owfrSwfxm;onfh pmjzifh
a&;om;xm;aom tajccHOya'r&Sdao;ay/
zuf'&,fpepfEiS hf zuf'a&;&Si;f qdik &f m þtESpcf sKyftcsuftvufrsm;onf txufwiG f azmfjycJo h nfh tcsuf
rsm;tm;vHk;udk twlwuG ydkifqdkifonfh taemufwdkif; vpfb&,f'Drdkua&pDqdkif&mar;cGef;udk *½kjyKjcif;r&Sdygu
jynhpf rkH &I rdS nf r[kwyf g/ uREkyf w f t Ykd aejzifh 'Dru kd a&pDwiG f yHpk rH sm;pGm&SNd yD; ,if;wdt Yk m; rwlno D nfh tajctaersm;wGif
rwlnDonfh enf;vrf;rsm;jzifh azmfaqmifaMumif;udk todtrSwfjyK&ayrnf/ zuf'&,fEdkifitrsm;pk H onf ordkif;
aMumif;t& ajrmuftar&du? awmiftar&duESihf MopaMw;vs - tm&Sww Ykd iG u
f o hJ Ykd ,cifu ya'o&mZfzpUJG nf;yHrk sm;rS
zefwD;wnfaxmifcJhjcif; odkYr[kwf wjznf;jznf;csif; wdk;wufajymif;vJvmcJhjcif; odkYr[kwf 'kwd,uÇmppf\
&v'faMumifh odkYr[kwf ppfat;umvNyD; aemufwGif Oa&myü zefwD;wnfaxmifcJhjcif; jzpfonf/ 1995 ckESpf
abmhpeD;,m;ESihf [mZD*Akd ;D em; (BiH)? 1995 ckEpS f tDo, D ;kd yD;,m;ESihf 2005 ckEpS f tD&wfwd&Yk dS zuf'&,fypkH o H pfrsm;onf
Edik if w H umrS trsKd;tpm;trsKd;rsKd;jzifh Mum;0ifpu G zf ufrrI sm; yg0ifNyD; tqdyk g zuf'&,fypkH w H pfcck sif;pDonf y#dyu©
jzpfpOfrsm; jzpfymG ;NyD;aemuf pdwx f cd ukd zf ,
G jf yóemrsm;rS ay:aygufvmjcif;jzpfNyD; uREkyf w f t Ykd aejzifh ta&;BuD;onfh
tajctaersm;pGmwGif ,if;wdt Yk m; tjcm;trsKd;tpm;wpfct k jzpf ,lqEdik o f nf/ od&Yk mwGif t"dutcsufrmS - ,if;
wdo Yk nf tcsKdaU om odomonfh >cif;csufrsm;rSví JG ,if;wdo Yk nf vpfb&,f'rD u kd a&pDpepfrsm; jzpfcMhJ uNyD; vpfb&,f
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zuf'a&;&Si;f rsm;ESihf w&m;0ifr[kwo f nfh zuf'&,fEikd if aH &;pepfrsm;onf vpfb&,f'rD u kd a&pDpepfrsm; xGe;f um;
aeonfh tajctaewGifom &SifoefEdkifonf[laom tcsufyifjzpfonf/ ,if;odkY jzpf&jcif;taMumif;t&if;rSm
uGJjym;jcm;em;NyD; rwluGJjym;onfh EdkifiHa&;tm; tqdkygEdkifiHrsm;ESifh pepfrsm;wGifom zGJUpnf;yHktajccHOya'? Oya'
aMumif;ESihf Edik if aH &;t& tmrcHcsufay;Edik af omaMumifh jzpfonf/ aemufq;kH taejzifh ,if;onf w&m;0ifzuf'a&;
&Sif;ESifh zuf'&,fEdkifiHa&;pepfrsm;wGif usifhoHk;aeaom tavhtxrsm;\ t"dutajccH&nf&G,fcsufrsm;teuf
wpfcktygt0if jzpfonf/
Federalism and Democracy

So what is it about liberal democracy that chimes so well with federal states and political systems?
The answer lies in democratic theory but for our purposes here we can identify an assortment of values
and principles that are indispensable to the functioning of a healthy liberal democracy. Consider the fol-
lowing: the rule of law; the independence of the judiciary; regular elections of all the main offices of state
by secret ballot embracing all citizens above 18 or 16 years old on the published electoral register; a
competitive political party system; a legitimate opposition to government with the right to replace it; a
viable, functioning local or communal government; and a series of human rights codified in law as a bill or
charter of rights. These liberal democratic principles are of course underpinned by a set of basic human
values which include the unrelenting protection and pursuit of liberty, a public commitment to different
forms of equality and the provision by the state of security and welfare of the person in general.
If we think back to the twin cultural-ideological and socio-economic streams of federalism introduced
above, it takes little thought to appreciate just how far these liberal democratic values and principles allow
the claims of identity politics in particular to breathe and express themselves freely and usually (but not
always) without fear. The basic values inherent in federalism such as human dignity, equality, toleration,
respect, recognition, reciprocity and empathy dovetail neatly with liberal democratic values as do the fed-
eral principles of equal partnership, contract, comity (loyalty), self-rule and shared rule, and autonomy
(Burgess 2012). Pondering this, it is clearly easy to dismiss the historical federal models of the Soviet Union
(USSR), Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia as genuine federations, despite what some American scholars have
argued, because even if they paid lip-service to the federal idea they were not liberal democracies. The
USSR had a so-called ‘Council of Nationalities’ and the Yugoslav federal model of 1974 did nod its head
toward recognition of its six constituent national republics but in practical reality they were authoritarian
military regimes where all the lines of political communication went through the single central party or-
ganisation controlled by a tiny elite.
zuf'&,fpepfESifh 'Drdkua&pD
odq Yk v kd Qif vpfb&,f'rD u kd a&pDonf zuf'&,fEikd if rH sm;? zuf'&,fEikd if aH &;pepfrsm;ESihf tb,haf Mumifh tvGef
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rsm;ESihf tajccHoabmw&m;rsm; pkpnf;rIwpfcu k kd uREkyf w f t
Ykd aejzifh cGjJ cm;owfrw S Ef ikd o f nf/ atmufygwdu Yk kd xnfh
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tpd;k &tm; tpm;xd;k Edik o f nfh tcGit hf a&;&Sad om w&m;Oya'ESihf nDñw G o f nfh twdu k t f cH? vkyif ef;rsm; azmfaqmif
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'Drdkua&pD tajccHoabmw&m;rsm;onf vGwfvyfrItm; tpOfumuG,fapmifha&Smufjcif;ESifh azmfaqmifjcif;?
wef;wlnrD QrIypkH t H rsKd;rsKd;twGuf trsm;jynfo\ l uwdu0wfEiS hf a,bk,stm;jzifh yk*Kd¾ vfwpfO;D csif;pD\ vHNk cHKa&;
ESifh oufomacsmifcsda&;twGuf tpdk;&rS axmufyHhay;jcif;wdkYtygt0if tajccHvlYwefzdk;rsm;jzifh axmufyHhay;
xm;onf/
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Ykd aejzifh txufwiG f rdwq f ufazmfjycJo h nfh zuf'&,fpepf\ ,Ofaus;rIqikd &f m t,ltq
ESihf vlrpI ;D yGm;a&;qdik &f m vrf;aMumif;ESpcf u k kd jyefvnfpOf;pm;Munfyh gu vpfb&,f'rD u kd a&pDwefz;kd rsm;ESihf tajccH
oabmw&m;rsm;onf txl;ojzifh vGwfvyfNyD; trsm;tm;jzifh (odkY&mwGif tNrJwrf;r[kwfbJ) taMumufw&m;
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hJ aYkd om zuf'&,fpepfwiG f yg0ifonfh
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aqmif&u G rf ?I oabmwlnrD ?I tjyeftvSef o[ZmwjzpfrI (opömapmifo h rd )I ? ud, k yf ikd t f yk cf sKyfr?I rQa0tkycf sKyfrEI iS hf
ud, k yf ikd tf yk cf sKyfciG hf [lonfh zuf'&,ftajccHoabmw&m;rsm;onfvnf; vpfb&,f'rD u kd &ufwpf tajccHoabm
w&m;rsm;ESihf pepfwusqufpyfaeonf (Burgess 2012 ckEpS )f / ,if;udk tav;teufxm; pOf;pm;ygu qdAk , D uf
jynfaxmifpk (USSR)? ,l*dkqvm;AD;,m;ESifh csufudkqvdkAufuD;,m;wdkY\ tpOftvm zuf'&,fyHkpHrsm;onf
zuf'&,ft,ltqudk tay:,HrQ xkwaf zmfajymqdak omfvnf; ,if;wdo Yk nf vpfb&,f'rD u kd a&pDrsm; r[kwo f jzifh
tcsKdaU om tar&duefynm&Sirf sm;rS ajymqdck o hJ nfrsm;&Sad omfjim; ,if;wdt Yk m; ppfreS af omzuf'a&;&Si;f rsm;tjzpfrS
&Sif;vif;vG,fulpGm z,fxkwfEdkifonf/ USSR wGif trnfcHrQomjzpfaom ]vlrsKd;pkrsm;qdkif&m aumifpD} &SdcJhNyD;
1974 ckESpf ,l*dkqvm;AD;,m;EdkifiH\ zuf'&,fyHkpHonf ,if;\ tpdwftydkif; trsKd;om;or®wEdkifiH 6 ckudk tod
trSwfjyK&ef oabmwlnDcJhaomfvnf; vufawGUtppftrSefwGifrl ,if;wdkYonf ppftmPm&SiftkyfcsKyfrIrsm;om
jzpfNyD; Edik if aH &;qdik &f m owif;tcsuftvufazmfjyrIukd vlenf;pkwpfprk S xde;f csKyfonfh A[dyk gwD tzGt UJ pnf;wpfck
uom vkyfaqmifonf/
Federalism: A History of Misunderstandings?

Having looked briefly at federalism, federation and liberal democracy, it is useful to our larger purpose
to consider very briefly some of the widely misunderstood aspects of federalism (as most people know it)
and to engage with some familiar criticisms of it that we often read in the British daily press or in the
minds of many politicians who should know better but do not. One way to process these misunderstand-
ings and criticisms is to look at the context in which they are made and at who is making them. In the UK,
federalism as a viable idea and a practical proposition has been woefully overlooked and even scornfully
dismissed as the ‘f’- word. This irrational emotive reaction is not the end-product of a carefully considered
and researched judgement; rather it is the ramblings of a confused and largely politically illiterate media
and population. It is as if this rather silly act of shaving away the letters of the term is an intelligent way
of removing it from the public discourse as somehow unworthy. If we locate the context to the UK state
and to the European Union (EU), it will not surprise us to learn that it has generated much more heat than
light even if we dignify what has passed in the media as some sort of a continuing public debate with an
informed and educated audience. It is rather like saying ‘I do not understand it but I am opposed to it’. The
vast majority of the British population and their politicians do not know their own history. For nearly 150
years the federal idea, federal movements and a genuine albeit elite federal political discourse over the
reorganisation of the British Empire, the Irish Question and membership of the EU has been present in the
British House of Commons, the House of Lords, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and in some wider
government circles (Burgess 1995; Kendle 1989).
Today it is ironic that supporters of the federal idea for the UK have been criticised for wanting to
break up the union while British federalists who advocate a federal Europe are condemned for wanting to
go too far with economic and political integration. But this is really about the point of departure. The fed-
eral idea can be both centralist and decentralist depending upon different circumstances so that what
would be construed as a movement essentially in a decentralising direction for a federal UK would be cast
as a centralist movement in BiH and in the EU. Consequently we can understand why some people find this
confusing. The irony is extended when we recognise that a federal Europe is not about creating a state, let
alone a unitary state, but on the contrary a decentralized union that in current political parlance is neither
fish nor fowl. It is a composite and compound union that contains strong federal, confederal, supranational
and intergovernmental elements. In other words it is centralising in order to recalibrate itself into a more
mature and advanced but decentralised form of union.
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avQmhcsjcif;udk tm;ay;onft h ,ltqvnf; jzpfEikd o f nf/ xdaYk Mumifh zuf'&,f,al utwGuf A[dk csKyfuikd rf aI vQmhcs
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The current EU is clearly the latest institutional expression of the European federal idea but it still has
much to do in terms of institutional reform and democratisation in order to bring it closer to its mass
publics who in the UK do not understand its historical origins and evolution, what it is there for today, how
it works and what public goods it provides for its citizens. Small wonder that offering a referendum to this
electorate, steeped in the slow drip-drip of misinformation and disinformation by the media for over forty
years, have produced such a negative result in June 2016 for both the British and the Europeans. The fed-
eral idea in the UK has never really been a subject of serious informed public debate. It is a political idea
that is easy to misrepresent and demonise and yet it may still be the basis of hope for future generations.
tMum;&Sd tpdwt f ydik ;f rsm; yg0ifonfh pkaygif;xm;aom jynfaxmifpw k pfck jzpfonf/ wpfenf;qd&k ygu ,if;onf
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aeqJjzpfaom tajctae jzpfygonf/
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xif&Sm;ygonf/ odkY&mwGif Oa&myor*¾taejzifh ,if;\ ordkif;aMumif;ZmpfjrpfESifh ay:aygufvmyHk? ,aeYacwf
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vkyfaqmif&ef rsm;pGmvdktyfvsuf &Sdaeao;ygonf/ ,if;odkYaom rD'D,mrsm;rS ESpfaygif; av;q,fcefY tcsuf
tvuftrSm;rsm;ESihf r[kwrf rSeo f wif;rsm; wjznf;jznf;pdr0hf ifaecJjh cif;aMumifh rJqE´&iS rf sm;xHrS qEć, H yl JG usif;y
cJh&mwGif NAdwdoQEdkifiHom;rsm;ESifh wuG Oa&myom;rsm;twGufyg tEkwfoabmaqmifonfh &v'fwpfckudk 2016
ckESpf ZGefvwGif &&SdcJhonf/ ,lau&Sd zuf'&,fqdkif&m t,ltqonf owif;tcsuftvufrsm; tav;teufay;
onfh trsm;jynfolqdkif&m aqG;aEG;jiif;cHkrItaMumif;t&mwpf&yf rnfonfhtcgrQ rjzpfcJhzl;acs/ ,if;onf o½kyf
ouef vGrJ mS ;NyD; raumif;jrif&efv, G u
f al eonfh Edik if aH &;t,ltqwpf&yf jzpfaeonfw h ikd f tem*wfrsKd;qufrsm;
twGuf arQmfvifhcsuftajccHwpfck jzpfaeEdkifao;ygonf/
Further Reading
Burgess, M. 2013. ‘The Penumbra of Federalism: A conceptual reappraisal of federalism,
federation, confederation and federal political systems’ in J. Loughlin, J. Kincaid and W. Swenden
(eds.), Routledge Handbook of Regionalism and Federalism. London and New York: Routledge.
Burgess, M. and A. G. Gagnon. 2010. Federal Democracies. Oxon: Routledge.
Gagnon, A.G., S. Keil and S. Mueller. 2015. Understanding Federalism and Federation. London:
Routledge.
Bibliography
Burgess, M. 1985. The British Tradition of Federalism. London: Leicester University Press.
Burgess, M. 2006. Comparative Federalism Theory and Practice. London and New York:
Routledge.
Burgess, M. 2012. In Search of the Federal Spirit. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kendle, J. E. 1989. Ireland and the Federal Solution: The Debate over the United Kingdom
Constitution, 1870-1921. Kingston & WMontreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
King, P. 1982. Federalism and Federation. Basingstoke. Croom Helm.
Poirier, J., C. Saunders and J. Kincaid. 2015. Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems:
Comparative Structures and Dynamics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Self-rule and
Shared Rule
ukd,fydkiftkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh
rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;
toGifuGJrsm;
ukd,fydkiftkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif; toGifuGJrsm; I 25
Dr. Sean Mueller is Ambizione researcher (funded by the Swiss national Sci-
ence Foundation) and lecturer at the Institute of Political Science, University
of Berne, Switzerland. He obtained his PhD from the University of Kent with a
thesis in decentralisation in the Swiss cantons. His main areas of research are
Swiss and comparative federalism, regionalism, local government, political par-
ties and direct democracy. He has published books with ECPR Press, Routledge
as well as Ashgate, and articles of his have appeared in Publius, Regional & Fed-
eral Studies, Swiss Political Science Review, Journal of Public Policy, Government
& Opposition, and European Political Science Review, amongst others.
Dr. Sean Mueller onf (qGpftrsKd;om;odyÜHazmifa';&Sif;u &efyHkaiG yHhykd;aom)

Ambizione okawoDwpfOD;jzpfNyD; qGpfZmvefEkdifiH&Sd University of Berne rS EkdifiHa&;
odyÜHtifpwDusKwGif uxduwpfOD;vnf; jzpfygonf/ olonf qGpfZmvefEkdifiH\
jynfe,frsm; (cantons) &Sd A[kcd sKyfuidk rf I avQmhcsjcif;taMumif; pmwrf; jzifh University
of Kent rS PhD &&SdcJhonf/ ol\ t"duokawoee,fy,frsm;rSm qGpfZmvef EkdifiHESifh
EdiI ;f &zuf'&,fpepf (Swiss and comparative federalism)? a'oÅ&0g' (regionalism)?
a'oÅ&tpk;d &? Ekid if aH &;ygwDrsm;ESihf wkud ½f u dk a&pDwYdk jzpfMuonf/ olonf ECPR
kd 'f rD u
Press, Routledge ESihf Ashgate wkEYd iS hf pmtkyrf sm; xkwaf 0cJu h m ol\ aqmif;yg;rsm;ukd
Publius, Regional & Federal Studies, Swiss Political Science Review, Journal of
Public Policy, Government & Opposition ESifh European Political Science Review
ponfwkdYwGif azmfjycJhonf/
26 I Self-rule and Shared Rule
Introduction and Definitions
“Self-rule” and “shared rule” are two widely used notions to define, describe and classify federal
political systems. There is wide agreement in the literature that self-rule refers to autonomy and hence the
extent to which sub-national units (Länder, cantons, States, provinces, autonomous communities etc.) are
free in deciding, financing and implementing their own policies. Of course, self-rule can take various forms
as well, namely the power to make public policy decisions that deviate from or even contradict upper-level
standards; the capacity to raise revenue via specific taxation – or not, and thus fuel cross-regional tax
competition; the liberty to accept or refuse federal funding for specific projects; or the ability to implement
national rules according to regional specificities, e.g. make it even harder or easier to register property. In
all this, however, decisions always and exclusively relate to the region’s own territory, which is what the
“self” in self-rule refers to. Shared rule, by contrast, can refer to three radically different manifestations of
territorial power, depending on who exactly is meant by the “sharing with”-component – as we can only
share with someone else, who this other is defines the understanding of shared rule.
Thus, a first understanding of shared rule (e.g. Hooghe et al. 2016) defines it as the extent to which
sub-national units can participate in decisions that concern the whole political community and not just
their region. A good example of this is the German second chamber, the Bundesrat, whereby each of the 16
Land governments is directly represented and whose consent is needed on national legislation affecting
the Länder. Land governments thus have the possibility to formally veto national decisions if they feel their
interests are not sufficiently taken into account. The “other”, in this case, is the national community, and
power is shared with a simple or qualified majority of different regions.
A second, alternative understanding of shared rule refers to horizontal cooperation between constitu-
ent units at the exclusion of the federal government. In Switzerland, for example, there are some 800
treaties between two, several or even all 26 cantons that regulate common standards. This can go as far as
providing for inter-cantonal commissions, for example to rule on the admissibility of diplomas and certifi-
cates. Cantons are said to share their rule by cooperating and providing for common institutions although
these do not involve the federal level. Synonyms for shared rule understood as horizontal cooperation are
regionalisation (if cooperation is confined to only a handful of units) and harmonisation (if it involves all
constituent units). The “other”, in this case, refers to selected co-regions.
ed'gef;ESifh t"dyÜm,fzGifhqkdcsufrsm;
]uk, d yf idk t f yk cf sKyfjcif;} ESihf ]rQa0tkycf sKyfjcif;} wko Yd nf zuf'&,fEidk if aH &;pepfrsm;ukd t"dymÜ ,f zGiq hf &dk ef? azmfjy
&efESifh trsKd;tpm;cGJjcm;&ef wGifus,fpGmtoHk;jyKMuonfh t,ltqESpfck jzpfygonf/ ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfa&; (self-
rule) onf e,fajrtvdu k f ud, k yf idk tf yk cf sKyfprD cH iG &hf jdS cif; (autonomy) tm; &nfòef;NyD; a'oÅ&,lepfrsm; jzpfonfh
jynfe,f (Länder, cantons, States, provinces)? ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfcGifh& vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;wkdYonf ,if;wkdY\ rl0g'
rsm;ESihf pyfvsOf;NyD; qH;k jzwfjcif;? aiGaMu;qdik &f mudp&ö yfrsm;ESihf taumiftxnfazmfjcif;wdYk rnfonfh twkid ;f twm
txd vGwv f yfonfudk qkv d adk Mumif; pmayrsm;wGif us,fjyefpY mG oabmwlnx D m;Muonf/ uk, d yf idk tf yk cf sKyfjcif;wGif
yHpk rH sKd;pHk &SEd idk yf gonf/ qk&d vQif txuftqif\ h pHrsm;rS aoGznf okrYd [kwf qefu Y sifíyif jynforYl 0l g'qkid &f m qH;k jzwf
csufrsm; jyKEkid o f nfh tmPmESihf tcsKdaU omtcGet f aumufrsm; jy|mef;jcif;jzifh 0ifaiG&mS azGEidk pf rG ;f &Sjd cif; - okrYd [kwf
r&Sjd cif;ESihf a'owGi;f tcGet f aumufEiS yhf wfoufNyD; NydKifqidk jf cif;? tcsKdaU om pDru H ed ;f rsm; twGuf zuf'&,ftpk;d &
xHrS &efyakH iGudk vGwv f yfpmG vufccH iG hf okrYd [kwf jiif;y,fEidk cf iG hf okrYd [kwf Ekid if aH wmfu owfrw S faom pnf;rsOf;rsm;ukd
a'oqkid &f mtajctaersm;ESihf uku d n f aD tmif taumiftxnfazmfEidk pf rG ;f ? Oyrm - ykid q f idk rf rI sm;ukd rSwyf w kH if&mwGif
ykdrkdcufcJapjcif; okdYr[kwf ykdrkd vG,fulapjcif;wkdY jzpfMuonf/ okdYaomf ,if;wkdYtm;vHk;wGif qHk;jzwfcsufrsm;onf
tNrJwrf;tm;jzifh oufqidk &f ma'o\ uk, d yf idk ef ,ferd w d rf sm;twGi;f ESiohf m oD;oefo Y ufqidk o f nf/ uk, d yf idk t
f yk cf sKyf
jcif;qkad ompmvH;k &Sd uk, d yf idk q
f o dk nfu ,if;ukd &nfòef;onf/ tjcm;wpfzufwiG f rQa0tkycf sKyfjcif;qko d nfrmS ]…
ESihf a0rQ} onfq&dk mwGif rnfot Yl m;qkv d odk nfudk rlwnfí a'oe,ferd w d q f idk &f m tmPm\ vH;k 0uGjJ ym;jcm;em;aom
yHkpH 3 rsKd;ukd &nfòef;onf/ uREfkyfwkdYonf wpfpHkwpfckukd a0rQygu tjcm;wpfpHkwpfOD;&Sd&rnfjzpfonf/ rQa0
tkycf sKyfjcif;tay: em;vnfoabmaygufjcif;ukd ,if;tjcm;wpfpkH wpfO;D onf rnfojl zpfonfqo dk nfu t"dymÜ ,f
owfrSwfonf/
okjYd zpf&m rQa0tkycf sKyfjcif;ukd yxrqH;k em;vnfoabmaygufjcif; (Oyrm - Hooghe et al. 2016) u a'oÅ&
,lepfrsm;taejzifh ,if;wkdY a'otwGufomru EkdifiHa&;tokdif;t0kdif;wpfckvHk;twGufyg ta&;ygaom qHk;jzwf
csufrsm;wGif yg0ifaqmif&u G Ef idk rf nft h wkid ;f twm[k t"dymÜ ,fziG q hf xdk m;ygonf/ ,if;twGuf Oyrmaumif;wpfck
rSm *smreDEkdifiH\ txufvTwfawmfjzpfaom the Bundesrat jzpfygonf/ ,if;onf jynfe,f (Länder) 16 ckrS
tpkd;&rsm;ukd wkduf½dkufukd,fpm;jyKNyD; Länder rsm; tay: oufa&mufrI&Sdrnfh trsKd;om;Oya'rsm;twGuf ,if;\
oabmwlnDrI&&Sd&ef vkdtyfonf/ xkdYaMumifh jynfe,ftpkd;&rsm;onf tu,fí olwkdY\ tusKd;pD;yGm;rsm;ukd
vHkavmufpGm xnfhoGif;pOf;pm;xm;jcif;r&Sd[k cHpm;&vQif EkdifiHawmftqifhrS qHk;jzwfcsufrsm;ukd w&m;0ifADwkd
tmPmoH;k um y,fcsEkid o f nfh tcGit hf vrf;&So d nf/ þjzpfpOfwiG f ]tjcm;} qko d nfrmS Ekid if w H pf0ef;vH;k rS vlxjk zpfNyD;
rwlnDaoma'orsm;\ omreftrsm;pk okdYr[kwf twkdif;twmowfrSwfxm;aom trsm;pkjzifh tmPmukd rQa0
xm;onf/
rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;ukd 'kwd,taejzifh tjcm;em;vnfoabmaygufyHkrSm zuf'&,ftpkd;&rSvGJí jynfe,f,lepf
rsm;tMum;&Sd a&jyifnDyl;aygif;aqmif&GufrI jzpfonf/ Oyrmtm;jzifh qGpfZmvefEkdifiHwGif jynfe,f 2 ck tMum;?
tcsKdU tMum;ESifh 26 ckvHk; tMum;wGif bHkpHEIef;rsm;ukd xdef;ausmif;aom oabmwlnDcsufaygif; 800 cefY &Sdonf/
,if;wGif jynfe,frsm;tMum; aumfr&Sifrsm;xm;&Sdjcif;txd yg&SdEkdifonf/ Oyrm - 'Dyvkdrmrsm;? todtrSwfjyK
vufrSwfrsm; ay;tyfjcif;twGuf vkyfykdifcGifhwkdY jzpfonf/ zuf'&,ftqifh ryg0ifaomfvnf; jynfe,frsm;onf
yl;aygif;aqmif&u G jf cif;ESihf bHt k ifpwDusL;&Si;f rsm;twGuf yHyh ;dk jcif;wkjYd zifh ,if;wk\ Yd vkyyf ikd cf iG rhf sm;udk rQa0Muonf/
a&jyifnDyl;aygif;aqmif&Gufjcif;taejzifh em;vnfoabmaygufMuaom rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;twGuf tjcm; tac:
ta0:wpfckrSm (tu,fí yl;aygif;aqmif&Gufjcif;onf ,lepftenf;i,ftwGif;wGifom &SdcJYvQif) a'otvkduf
A third and final meaning of shared rule, and probably the one intended by its original creator (Elazar
1987), defines it as the powers and competences of the central government. This stems from the idea that
when regions come together in a federal union, they delegate some powers to the new entity and retain
others in their exclusive jurisdiction (self-rule). Here, shared rule equates to centralisation – power is
shared in the form of a new “other”, i.e. a new, supra-regional government largely beyond the reach of indi-
vidual regions. In the United States, for example, the power to declare war was handed over by the 13
founding States in 1787 to the newly established US Congress (Section 8, paragraph 11).
The Link between these Concepts and Federal Studies
The most encompassing and rigorous study of self-rule and shared rule has been devised by
Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Arjan Schakel and various other collaborators (Hooghe et al. 2016). They
conceive of self-rule and shared rule as the two essential dimensions of what they call the Regional
Authority Index (RAI) and propose a detailed measurement scheme (Table 1). The latest edition of their
dataset covers 81 (quasi-)democracies between 1950 and 2010 and includes all regions with an average
population of at least 150.000. Ever since the creation of the RAI, it has been possible to systematically
compare federal and non-federal systems on all or only selected dimensions of self-rule and/or shared
rule.
The main advantages of this conceptualisation are that, as it builds on formal rules defined in the
constitution or legislation, it provides an externally valid, reliable and transparent image of regional au-
thority. However, the main disadvantage is that informal mechanisms of regional influence – e.g. that ex-
ercised by political parties or exercised via adjudication – remain in the dark. Also, the extent to which
these channels are actually made use of warrants further empirical investigation. For example, given the
authority to co-determine national tax revenue distribution, what alliances are formed between which
regional representatives, and under what conditions are regions able to impose their will against the
central government – i.e. to exercise power in the Weberian sense?
vkyfykdifcGifhrsm;ay;um ykdif;jcm;vkyfukdifjcif; (regionalizaton) [líjzpfNyD; (tu,fí ,lepfrsm;tm;vHk; yg0ifcJh

vQif) nDñw G f o[ZmwjzpfatmifjyKjcif; (harmonisation) [lí jzpfonf/ þudpw ö iG f ]tjcm;olrsm;} qkod nfrmS
a&G;cs,fxm;onfh wGJzufvkyfaqmifaom a'orsm;ukd qkdvkdonf/
rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;\ wwd,ESifh aemufqHk;t"dyÜm,fwpfck - ,if;ukd zefwD;cJhaomol (Elazar 1987) taejzifh
&nf&G,fcJhaomt"dyÜm,f jzpfaumif;jzpfEkdifonfhwpfckrSm A[kdtpkd;&\ tmPmESifh vkyfykdifcGifhrsm;[lí jzpfonf/
,if;t"dyÜm,fonf a'orsm;aygif;pnf;vmNyD; zuf'&,fjynfaxmifpk jzpfvmaomtcgwGif ,if;wkdY\ tmPm
tcsKdU ukd ay:aygufvmaom jynfaxmifpo k Ydk vTaJ jymif;ay;NyD; useftmPmrsm;ukd ,if;wk\Yd oD;oefeY ,fy,ftwGi;f
wGif csefvSyfxdef;odrf;xm;onf (ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif;) [laom t,ltqrS jrpfzsm;cHonf/ þae&mwGif rQa0
tkyfcsKyfjcif;onf A[kdwGif tmPmrsm;pkpnf;jcif;ESifh nDrQaeonf - tmPmukd ]tjcm;} aemufwpfcktoGifjzifh
rQa0jcif; jzpfonf/ qkv d o
dk nfrmS oD;jcm; a'owpfcck sif;pD\ vufvrS ;f rDrx I uf ausmfveG af om? a'otqifx h uf
jrifrh m;onfh tpk;d &topfwpf&yf toGijf zifh jzpfonf/ Oyrmtm;jzifY tar&duefjynfaxmifpw k iG f ppfaMunmEdik af om
tmPmukd 1787 ckESpfwGif jynfaxmifpkukd pwifxlaxmifcJhMuonfh jynfe,f 13 ck wkdYu topfjzpfay:vmaom
tar&duefuGef*&ufokdY vTJajymif;ay;cJhMuonf (tykdif; 8? pmykd'f 11)/
þt,ltqrsm;ESifh zuf'&,favhvmrIrsm;tMum; tcsdwftquf

ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;wkdYESifhywfoufNyD; vTrf;NcHKrIt&SdqHk;ESifh aphaphpyfpyft&SdqHk; avhvm
rIrsm;u Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Arjan Schakel ESifh tjcm;yl;aygif;yg0ifolrsm;u vkyfaqmifcJhMuygonf
(Hooghe et al. 2016)/ olwdkYu ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;wkdYukd a'oqkdif&m tmPmykdifpkd;rI
tòef;udef; (Regional Authority Index - RAI) \ r&Sdrjzpf vkdtyfaomtpdwftykdif;ESpfck[k rSwf,lcJhMuum
tao;pdww f idk ;f wmrI tpDtpOfwpfck (Z,m; 1) ukv d nf; tqkjd yKcJMh uonf/ olw\ Ydk aemufq;kH tBudrx f wk f tcsuf
tvufrsm;pm&if;wGif 1950 ESifh 2010 tMum; (wpfykdif;wpf0uf) 'Drkdua&pDEkdifiH 81 EkdifiHtaMumif; yg0ifNyD;
ysrf;rQtm;jzifh vlOD;a& 150,000 tenf;qHk;&Sdonfh a'orsm;tm;vHk; yg0ifonf/ RAI ukd pwifzefwD;cJhcsdefrSpí
ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh^ okdYr[kwf rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;\ tpdwftykdif;tm;vHk; okdYr[kwf tcsKdU a&G;cs,fxm;aom
tpdwftykdif;rsm;ukd zuf'&,fESifh zuf'&,fr[kwfaom pepfrsm;tMum; pepfwus EdIif;,SOfvmEkdifaponf/
þt,ltq\ t"dutm;omcsufrSm ,if;onf tajccHOya' okdYr[kwf Oya'rsm;wGif jyqdkxm;aom
w&m;0ifyHpk w H us pnf;rsOf;rsm;tay:wGif tajcwnfxm;um a'oÅ&qkid &f mtmPmtwGujf yifyrS ckid v f kH uk;d pm;
Ekid Nf yD; yGiv
hf if;jrifomaom yH&k yd u f dk jzpfay:aponf/ okaYd omf t"dutm;enf;csufrmS a'oÅ& qkid &f m vTr;f rd;k rIrsm;
jyK&eftwGuf Oyrmtm;jzifh EkdifiHa&;ygwDrsm;u usifhoHk;aom okdYr[kwf w&m;pD&ifa&;rSwpfqifh usifhoHk;aom
]yHpk eH nf;us r[kwo f nf}h ,Å&m;rsm;onf arSmif&yd t f wGi;f wGif &Sad eao;jcif;yif jzpfonf/ xkt Yd wl ,if;vrf;aMumif;
rsm;ukd trSew f u,ftoH;k jyKonft h wkid ;f twmESihf ywfoufNyD; xyfrv H ufawGU qef;ppfavhvmrIrsm;jyK&ef vkt d yf
aeayonf/ Oyrmtm;jzifh Ekid if aH wmftcGet f aumuf0ifaiGrsm; cGaJ 0jcif;ukd yl;wGqHJ ;k jzwf&ef tmPmESiyhf wfoufí
rnfonfh a'oÅ&ud, k pf m;vS,rf sm;tMum; r[mrdwrf sm; zGpUJ nf;Muonf? rnfonft h ajctaewGif a'orsm;onf
A[kdtpkd;&ESifh qefYusifNyD; ,if;wkdY\ qE´twkdif; aqmif&GufEkdifonf - qkdvkdonfrSm Weberian yHkpHjzifh tmPmukd
usifhoHk;jcif; - ponfwkdY jzpfonf/
The authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region, from 0 to 18,
Self-rule
which is the sum of the following five dimensions:
The extent to which a regional government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated (from 0
Institutional
= no functioning general-purpose administration at regional level to 3 = non-deconcentrated,
depth
general–purpose, administration not subject to central government veto)
The range of policies for which a regional government is responsible (from 0 = very weak
authoritative competence in a) economic policy; b) cultural-educational policy; c) welfare policy;
Policy scope and d) one of the following: residual powers, police, own institutional set–up, local government
to 4 = authoritative competencies in d) and at least two of a), b), or c) plus authority over
immigration or citizenship)
The extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population (from 0 =
Fiscal
central government sets base and rate of all regional taxes to 4 = regional government sets
autonomy
base and rate of at least one major tax)
The extent to which a regional government can borrow (from 0 = the regional government
Borrowing
does not borrow to 3 = the regional government may borrow without any centrally imposed
autonomy
restrictions)
The extent to which a region has an independent legislature and executive (from 0 = no
Represen-
regional assembly and regional executive appointed by central government to 4 = directly
tation
elected regional assembly and regional executive appointed by it or popularly elected)
Shared rule The authority exercised by a regional government or its representatives in the country as a whole,
from 0 to 12, which is the sum of the following five dimensions:
The extent to which regional representatives co-determine national legislation (from 0 = no
Law making regional representation to 2 = regional representation with veto rights over national laws
affecting their region)
The extent to which a regional government co-determines national policy in intergovernmental

Executive meetings (from 0 = no routine bi- or multilateral meetings between central and regional
control governments to discuss national policies to 2 = routine bi- and multilateral meetings with
binding authority)
The extent to which regional representatives co-determine the distribution of national tax
Fiscal control
revenues (from 0 = no regional consultation to 2 = consultations with veto powers)
Borrowing The extent to which a regional government co-determines subnational and national borrowing
control constraints (from 0 to 2, equivalent to Fiscal Control)
The extent to which regional representatives co-determine constitutional change (from 0 = the
Constitutional
central government or national electorate can unilaterally reform the constitution to 4 = one or
reform
several regional governments or their representatives can veto constitutional change)
a'owGif; aexkdifolrsm;tay: a'oÅ&tpkd;& usifYoHk;aom tmPm? atmufyg twkdif;twm 5 ck

ukd,fykdif tkyfcsKyfjcif;
ukd aygif;jcif;\ &v'frsm;jzpfNyD; 0 rS 18 txd &SdEkdifonf/
a'oÅ&tpk;d &wpf&yftaejzifh A[krd t S mPmrsm; ,m,DvaJT jymif; &&Sx d m;jcif;rsKd;xuf uk,d yf idk pf rD H
tifpwDusL;&Sif; tkycf sKyfykid cf iG hf rnfrQ&So
d nf qko
d nfh twkid ;f twm (0 = a'otqifw h iG f tvkyjf zpfonfh taxGaxG
qkdif&m euf½dIif;rI tkycf sKyfa&;r&Sd rS 3 = A[krd S tmPmrsm; ,m,D &&Sx d m;jcif;rsKd; r[kwb f J A[kt
d pk;d &\ ADwvdk yk yf idk f
cGifhtay: rrSDwnfaom taxGaxGtkyfcsKyfa&;&Sd)
a'oÅ&tpkd;&taejzifh wm0ef&Sdonfh rl0g'trsKd;tpm;rsm; (0 = (u) pD;yGm;a&;rl0g' (c)
,Ofaus;rI - ynma&;rl0g' (*) vlrIzlvHka&;rl0g'ESifh (C) atmufygwkdYteufrSwpfck - <uif;usef
rl0g' twkdif;twm
tmPmrsm;? jynfolY&J? tifpwDusL;&Sif;qkdif&m ukd,fykdifyHkpH? a'oÅ&tpkd;& rS 4 = (C) ESifh (u)
yrmP
(c) okdYr[kwf (*) wkdYteufrS tenf;qHk;ESpfck&Sd vTrf;rkd;Ekdifaom vkyfykdifcGifh tmPmrsm;tjyif
vl0ifrIBuD;Muyfa&;ESifh EkdifiHom; owfrSwfrItay: vkyfykdifcGifh tmPmrsm;)
a'oÅ&tpkd;&wpf&yftaejzifh ,if;e,fedrdwftwGif; aexkdifolrsm;tay: vGwfvyfpGm tcGef
b@ma&;qkdif&m aumufcHEkdifonfh twkdif;twm (0 = a'oqkdif&m tcGefrsm;tm;vHk;twGuf aumufcHrnfhEIef;ESifh
ukd,fykdif pDrHykdifcGifh taumufc&H rnfoh rl sm;ukd A[kt
d pk;d &u owfrw
S f rS 4 = tenf;qH;k t"du tcGet
f rsKd;tpm;wpfck
twGuf aumufcHrnfhEIef;ESifh taumufcH&rnfholrsm;ukd a'oÅ& tpkd;&u owfrSwf)
aiGacs;,ljcif;rsm;ukd
a'oÅ&tpk;d &taejzifY acs;,lEidk of nfh twkid ;f twm (0 = a'oÅ& tpk;d &onf acs;,lEidk jf cif;r&Sd
vGwfvyfpGm ukd,fykdif
rS 3 = A[kdrS uefYowfcsuf wpfpHkwpf&mr&SdbJ a'oÅ&tpkd;&taejzifh acs;,lEkdif)
pDrHykdifcGifh
a'owpfckwGif oD;jcm;vGwfvyfaom vTwfawmfESifh tkyfcsKyfa&;tzGJU wnf&Sdonfh twkdif;twm
(0 = a'oqkid &f m vTwaf wmfr&S?d a'oqkid &f m tkycf sKyfa&;tBuD;tuJudk A[kt
d pk;d &u ceft
Y yfonf
ukd,fpm;jyKrI
rS 4 = wku
d ½f u
kd af &G;aumuf wifajr§mufxm;aom a'oÅ&vTwaf wmfEiS hf ,if;vTwaf wmfu ceft Y yf
aom okdYr[kwf trsm;oabmqE´jzifY a&G;aumufaom a'oqkdif&m tkyfcsKyfa&; tBuD;tuJ)
a'oÅ&tpk;d & okrYd [kwf ,if;\ ud, k pf m;vS,rf sm;u wpfEidk if v
H ;kH twkid ;f twmwGif usifo
h ;kH aom
rQa0 tkyfcsKyfjcif;
vkyyf idk cf iG t
hf mPm? atmufyg twdik ;f twm 5 ck \ aygif;jcif;&v'frsm; jzpfNyD; 0 rS 12 txd &So d nf/
Ekid if aH wmfOya'rsm;ukd a'oÅ& ud,k pf m;vS,rf sm; yl;wGq
J ;kH jzwfonfh twkid ;f twm (0 = a'oÅ&
Oya'jyKjcif; ukd,fpm;jyKrIr&Sd rS 2 = rdrde,fajrrsm;tay: oufa&mufrI&Sdonfh EkdifiHawmfOya'rsm;udk ADwkd
tmPmoHk;ykdifcGifh&Sdonfh a'oÅ& udk,fpm;jyKrI)
tpdk;&tcsif;csif;tMum; aqG;aEG;yGJrsm;wGif EkdifiHawmftqifh rl0g'rsm;ukd a'oÅ&tpkd;&rsm;u
yl;wGJqHk;jzwfonfh twkdif;twm (0 = EkdifiHawmftqifh rl0g'rsm;ukd aqG;aEG;&ef A[kdESifh a'oÅ&
tkyfcsKyfa&;qkdif&m
tpkd;&rsm;tMum;wGif yHkrSef ESpfOD;ESpfzuf okdYr[kwf bufrsm;pGm yg0ifaom tpnf;ta0;rsm;r&Sd
xdef;csKyfrI
rS 2 = pnf;aESmifaom tmPm vkyyf idk cf iG hf yg&Sad om ESpOf ;D ESpzf uf okrYd [kwf bufrsm;pGm yg0ifaom
tpnf;ta0;rsm;&dS)
EkdifiHawmf tcGeftaumuf0ifaiGrsm;ukd cGJjcrf;a&;ESifh pyfvsOf;NyD; a'oÅ& ukd,fpm;vS,frsm;u
b@ma&;qkdif&m
yl;wGJqHk;jzwfonfh twkdif;twm (0= a'oqkdif&m wkdifyifaqG;aEG;rIrsm;r&Sd rS 2 = ADwkdtmPm
xdef;csKyfrI
usifhoHk;Ekdifaom a'oqkdif&m wkdifyifaqG;aEG;rIrsm;)
acs;,ljcif;qkdif&m a'oÅ&tqifEh iS hf Ekid if aH wmftqifh acs;,ljcif;qkid &f m tueft

Y owfrsm;ukd a'oÅ& tpk;d &rsm;u
xdef;csKyfrI yl;wGJqHk;jzwfEdkifonfh twkdif;twm (0 rS 2 txd? b@ma&;qkdif&m xdef;csKyfrIrsm;ESifh nDrQonf)
tajccHOya' jyKjyifajymif;vJrrI sm;ukd a'oÅ&tpk;d &rsm;u yl;wGq J ;kH jzwfEidk o

f nfh twkid ;f twm
tajccHOya' jyKjyif (0 = tajccHOya'ukd jyKjyifajymif;vJ&ef A[kt
d pk;d & okrYd [kwf trsKd;om;vTwaf wmfonf wpfzuf
ajymif;vJa&; owf vkyfaqmifEkdifonf rS 4 = tajccHOya' jyifqifajymif;vJrIukd wpfzGJU okdYr[kwf wpfzGJUxuf
ykdaom a'oÅ&tpkd;&rsm; okdYr[kwf ,if;wkdY\ ukd,fpm;vS,frsm;u ADwkdtmPm oHk;Ekdifonf)
Contemporary Relevance
Self-rule and shared rule capture the essence of federal political systems, namely the extent and na-
ture of vertical power distribution. In theory, four different possibilities are imaginable, namely countries
with both high self- and shared rule, those with low scores on both, and two further options with high
values on one but low scores on the other. In practice, however, only three types of systems are found:
Unitary countries where regions have neither self-rule nor shared rule (for example Cyprus, Luxembourg
or Iceland); systems with high self-rule but rather low shared rule (for example Italy, Bosnia, Canada, or
Mexico) and federations with high values on both dimensions (Germany, Spain, Belgium, the US and Swit-
zerland). It thus emerges that of the two dimensions, shared rule is more often withheld and self-rule more
readily granted. One reason for this could be that while it is one thing to decentralise power to a region
over its own territory and population (and thus hand over a certain degree of responsibility and the duty
to self-finance the new tasks), it is quite another to grant regions a say in national matters which are often
deemed too important for local idiosyncrasies (e.g. defence, macroeconomic policy, social welfare).
However, country-by-country comparisons are needed to reveal precisely why this is the case, and fu-
ture systematic research into the RAI should be able to a) tease out factors that explain cross-regional
variation in the speed and direction of change as well as b) reveal the effects of those differences across
countries, but possibly also across policy areas and/or regions of the same country. For example, it can thus
be conjectured that policy-making follows different trajectories depending on whether the area is an ex-
clusive regional competence or shared by the regional and national government alike, for example where
the national level defines the general framework and the sub-national entities are tasked to implement
these rules. Different degrees of regional authority might also be linked to democratic accountability, ad-
ministrative efficiency and the accommodation of territorially concentrated socio-cultural minorities.
rsufarSmufacwfESifh qDavsmfrI
ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;wkdYonf zuf'&,fEkdifiHa&;pepfrsm;\ tESpfom&jzpfaom txuf
atmuftmPmjzefcY jJG cif;\ oabmobm0ESihf twdik ;f twm ponfudk NcHKiHrk ad om toH;k rsm;onfh t,ltq ESpcf k
jzpfonf/ oDt&dk t D & jzpfEidk af jc av;rsKd;ukd pOf;pm;Ekid yf gonf/ ,if;wkrYd mS uk, d yf idk t
f yk cf sKyfa&;ESihf rQa0tkycf sKyfa&;
jrifjh rifrh m;rm;&Sad omEkid if rH sm;? ESprf sKd;vH;k edryfh g;aomEkid if rH sm;? xkaYd emuf wpfrsKd;wGif jrifhrm;NyD; aemufwpfrsKd;wGif
edrfhyg;aom aemufxyf trsKd;tpm;ESpfckwkdY jzpfMuonf/ okdYaomf vufawGUwGif pepfoHk;rsKd;ukdom awGU&ygonf/
a'oÅ&tqifrh sm;wGif uk, d yf idk t
f yk cf sKyfa&;? rQa0tkycf sKyfa&; ESprf sKd;vH;k r&Sad om wpfjynfaxmifEidk if rH sm; (Oyrm
- qkid ;f y&yfp?f vlZifbwf okrYd [kwf tku d pf vf ef)? uk, d yf idk t
f yk cf sKyfa&;jrifrh m;pGm&Sad omfvnf; rQa0tkycf sKyfa&; enf;yg;
aompepfrsm; (Oyrm - tDwvD? abmhpeD;,m;? uae'g okdYr[kwf ruúqDukd)? ESpfrsKd;vHk;wGif wefzkd;jrifhrm;aom
zuf'&,fjynfaxmifpkrsm; (*smreD? pydef? b,fvf*sD,H? tar&duefjynfaxmifpkESifh qGpfZmvef) wkdYjzpfMuonf/
okjYd zpf&m ,if;twkid ;f twm ESprf sKd;wGif uk, d yf idk t
f yk cf sKyfjcif;ukd ykí d vG,v f ,
G uf u l l ay;avh&NdS yD; rQa0tkycf sKyfjcif;ukrd l
csefvSyfxm;avh&SdaMumif; awGU&onf/ ,if;twGuf taMumif;jycsufwpfckrSm A[kdrS a'owpfckokdY ,if;\ e,f
edrw d Ef iS hf vlxrk sm;tay: vkyyf idk cf iG t hf mPmrsm; ay;tyfjcif; (xkrd w S pfqifh tcsKdaU om vkyif ef;aqmifwm topfrsm;
twGuf uk, d w
f idk af iGaMu;&SmazGaxmufy&hH ef wm0ef0wå&m;rsm; twkid ;f twmwpfct k xd vTJ ajymif;ay;jcif;) onf
wpfrsKd;jzpfNyD; rdrda'owGif; udpörsm;uJhodkY oabmus vkyfaqmifcGifh ray;Ekdifaom wpfEkdifiHvHk;ESifh oufqkdifaom
ta&;BuD;onfhudpörsm; (Oyrm - EkdifiHawmfumuG,fa&;? rufc½kd pD;yGm;a&;rl0g'? vlrIzlvHka&;ponf) wGif a'o
rsm;ukd ajyma&;qkdcGifhay;jcif;rSm aemufwpfrsKd;pOf;pm;zG,f jzpfaomaMumifh jzpfonf/
okdYaomftb,faMumifh ,if;okdYjzpf&onfukd azmfxkwfEkdif&ef EkdifiHwpfEkdifiHESifh wpfEkdifiHcsif; EdIif;,SOfavhvm
rIrsm;jyK&ef vkdtyfygonf/ tem*wfwGif RAI ukd pepfwus okawoejyKrIrsm;onf (u) a'orsm;tMum;
ajymif;vJrIrsm;\ tvsifESifhvm;&m uGmjcm;csufrsm;ukd &Sif;jyEkdifonfh tcsufrsm;ukd azmfxkwfjcif; (c) EkdifiHrsm;
tMum;&Sd xkdYtwl rl0g'e,fy,frsm;tMum;ESifh^ okdYr[kwf EdkifiHwpfck\ a'orsm;tMum;&Sd ,if;jcm;em;rIrsm;\
oufa&mufrIrsm;ukd azmfxkwfjcif;rsm; jyKvmEkdifygonf/ Oyrmtm;jzifh oufqkdif&me,fajronf oD;oefYa'oÅ&
vkyfykdifcGifhtmPmrsm;&Sdjcif; okdYr[kwf A[kdtpkd;&u taxGaxGrlabmifukd owfrSwfum ,if;pnf;rsOf;rsm;ukd
taumiftxnfazmf&ef a'oÅ&tpkd;&rsm;tm; wm0efay;onfh yHkpHjzifh a'oÅ&tpkd;&ESifh A[kdtpkd;&tMum;
tmPmrQa0rIrsm;&Sjd cif; ponfudk rlwnfí rl0g'csrSwjf cif;onf rwlnaD om vrf;aMumif;jzifh oGm;Ekid o f nf/ a'o
qkid &f m vkyyf idk cf iG thf mPmtwkid ;f twmtrsKd;rsKd;onf 'Dru dk a&pDenf;us wm0efcrH ?I pDrt H yk cf sKyfrq
I idk &f m xda&mufrI
ESifh e,fajrt& pkpkpnf;pnf; wnf&Sdaeonfh vlrI,Ofaus;rIt& vlenf;pkrsm;ukd vufcHum vkdufavsmnDaxG
aexkdifEkdifjcif; ponfwkdYESifhvnf; qufpyfaeEkdifonf/
Conclusion
Self-rule and shared rule are two widely used concepts that capture the essence of federal
political systems, namely the extent and nature of vertical power sharing. Self-rule refers to regional
autonomy in decision-making, financing and/or implementation. Shared rule in contrast, can be understood
in three different ways: 1) Regional participation in national decision-making (e.g. Hooghe et al. 2016);
2) Horizontal cooperation between constituent units that excluded the federal government; and 3) The
powers delegated by the regions to the central government (centralisation). The Regional Authority Index
(RAI) is by now the most widely used, reliable and valid measurement of both dimensions.
ed*Hk;
ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;wkdYonf zuf'&,fEkdifiHa&;pepfrsm;\ tESpfom&jzpfaom txuf
atmuftmPm jzefcY jJG cif;\ oabmobm0ESihf twkid ;f twm ponfudk NcHKiHrk ad om toH;k rsm;onfh t,ltqESpcf k
jzpfonf/ uk, d yf idk t
f yk cf sKyfjcif;qko d nfrmS qH;k jzwfjcif;? aiGaMu;qdik &f mudp&ö yfrsm;ESi^
hf okrYd [kwf taumiftxnf
azmfaqmifjcif;wkdYwGif a'otvdkuf ukd,fykdifpDrHcefYcGJ vkyfaqmifEkdifjcif;ukd qkdvkdonf/ tjcm;wpfzufwGifrl rQa0
tkycf sKyfjcif;ukd yHpk o H ;kH rsKd;jzifh em;vnfoabmaygufEidk o f nf (1) Ekid if aH wmftqifh tqH;k tjzwfjyKonfh vkyif ef;pOf
wGif a'oÅ&tqifhrsm;taejzifh yg0ifjcif; (Oyrm - Hooghe et al. 2016)? (2) zuf'&,ftpdk;& rygbJ a'oÅ&
tqifh,lepfrsm; tcsif;csif;tMum; a&jyifnDyl;aygif;aqmif&Gufjcif; (3) a'oÅ&,lepfrsm;rS A[kdtqifhokdY vTJ
ajymif;ay;xm;aom vkyyf idk cf iG t hf mPmrsm; (A[kw d iG f tmPmrsm; pkpnf;jcif;)/ ,cktcgwGif a'oqkid &f m tmPm
ykdifpkd;rI tòef;udef; (Regional Authority Index - RAI) onf ,if;tykdif; ESpfckvHk;ukd ,HkMunfukd;pm;Edkifaom ckdifrm
onfh wkdif;wmrIrsm; jyKvkyf&ef toHk;trsm;qHk;t&mjzpfonf/
Bibliography
- Elazar, Daniel J. 1987. Exploring Federalism. Tuscaloosa, AL:
University of Alabamba Press.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, Arjan H. Schakel, Sandra Chapman

Osterkatz, Sara Niedzwiecki, Sarah Shair-Rosenfield. 2016.
A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance. Volume I: Measuring
Regional Authority. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Data at https://
www.arjanschakel.nl/regauth_dat.html]
- Hueglin, Thomas, and Alan Fenna. 2015. Comparative Federalism: A

Systematic Inquiry. 2nd edition, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Mueller, Sean. 2014. Shared Rule in Federal Political Systems:

Conceptual Lessons from Subnational Switzerland. Publius: The
Journal of Federalism 44(1), 82–108.
3 . Federalism,
Democracy and
Inclusion
zuf'&,fpepf?
'Drdkua&pDESifh
tm;vHk;yg0ifapjcif;
What about
the others?
tjcm;olrsm;twGuf
rnfodkY pOf;pm;rnfenf;
38 I Federalism, Democracy and Inclusion: What about the others?
Allison McCulloch is Associate Professor of Political Science at Bran-

don University, Canada. Her research considers the design of pow-
er-sharing institutions in deeply divided societies. She is the author
of Power-Sharing and Political Stability in Deeply Divided Societies
(Routledge, 2014) and the co-editor of Power-Sharing: Empirical and
Normative Challenges (Routledge, 2017). Her current research consid-
ers how power-sharing and constitutional design can be made more
inclusive of identities beyond the ethnonational divide, with a particu-
lar focus on gender inclusion.
Allison McCulloch onf uae'gEkid if H b&ef'eG w

f uúov
kd rf S Edik if aH &;odyHÜ ynm&yfqidk &f m
wGJzufygarmu©wpfOD;jzpfonf/ ol\ okawoeonf euf½dIif;pGm uGJjym;rIrsm; &Sdae
aom vlt Y zGt
UJ pnf;rsm;&Sd tmPmcGaJ 0aom tifpwD usL;&Si;f rsm;yHpk u
H dk avhvmonf/
olonf ]euf½dIif;pGm uGJjym;rIrsm;&Sdaeaom vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;&Sd tmPmcGJa0rIESifh
EkdifiHa&;wnfNidrfrI (Routledge, 2014)} ukdvnf; a&;om;cJhNyD; ]tmPmcGJa0jcif; -
pHjyKESihf vufawGpU ed af c: rIrsm; (Routledge, 2017)} \ wGzJ ufpmwnf;vnf; jzpfonf/
ol\ vuf&SdokawoerSm vlrsKd;ESifh EkdifiHom;t& ykdif;jcm;jcif;xuf ausmfvGefNyD;
0daoovu©Pmrsm; ykrd ydk g0ifvmEkid af p&ef tmPmcGaJ 0jcif;ESihf tajccHOya'yHpk rH sm;
ukd rnfokdY rnfyHk zefwD;Ekdifrnfukd txl;ojzifh usm;^r qkdif&m yg0ifrIrsm;ukd pl;pkduf
vsuf avhvmonf/
zuf'&,fpepf? 'Drdkua&pDESifh tm;vHk;yg0ifapjcif; - tjcm;olrsm;twGuf rnfodkY pOf;pm;rnfenf; I 39
Two competing perspectives on the role of federalism in divided societies prevail:

accommodation and integration. An accommodationist reading of federalism
suggests drawing subunit boundaries to provide minority groups with self-rule
whereas integrationist forms of federalism argue that units should be designed
to cut across group lines. While these two perspectives offer important insights
on securing democracy in divided societies, they both overlook the effect of
federal design on “others,” that is, groups that face exclusion in the design of
political institutions and in post-conflict governance processes. This contribution
considers the scholarship on federalism and “others” in divided societies, focusing
on gender and sexuality.
uGjJ ym;rIrsm;&Sad eaom vlt Y zGt

UJ pnf;rsm;wGif zuf'&,fpepf\tcef;u@ESihf pyfvsOf;
NyD; tNydKif½IaxmifhtjrifESpfck&Sdygonf/ ,if;wkdYrSm tjcm;olrsm;ukd vufcHum
vku d af vsmnDaxGaexdik jf cif;ESihf aygif;pnf;jcif;wkjYd zpfonf/ vku
d af vsmnDaxG aexkid f
jcif; 0g'Drsm;u vlenf;pkrsm;ukd ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfcGifhay;Ekdif&ef a'oÅ&,lepfrsm;\
e,ferd w d rf sm;a&;qG&J ef tBuHjyKMuNyD; aygif;pnf;jcif;0g'Drsm;url e,ferd w d rf sm;onf
vlrsKd;tkyfpkukd ykdif;jcm;jzwfykdif;oGm;atmif yHkpHxkwfxm;&rnf[k ajymqkdMuonf/
uGjJ ym;rIrsm; &Sad eaom vlt Y zGt
UJ pnf;rsm;wGif 'Dru
kd a&pD ay:aygufvmapa&;twGuf
,if;½IjrifykH ESpcf vk ;kH onf ta&;ygaom ½Iaxmift h jrifrsm;ukd jyoaomfvnf; ,if;wkYd
ESpcf v
k ;kH onf ]tjcm;olrsm;} tay:wGif zuf'&,fypkH \ H oufa&mufru I rdk l owdrrlrb d J
&Sdonf/ ]tjcm;olrsm;} qkdonfrSm EkdifiHa&;tifpwDusL;&Sif;rsm;ukd yHkpHxkwfpOfESifh
y#dyu©vGef tkyfcsKyfrIvkyfief;pOfrsm;wGif yg0ifcGifhr&SdbJ z,f MuOfjcif;cH&onfh tkyfpk
rsm;ukd qkv d o dk nf/ þpmwrf;wGif usm;^r qkid &f m (Gender) ESihf vdiw f rd ;f ñGwrf v I m;&m
(Sexuality) wkdYukd A[kdjyKum zuf'&,fpepfqkdif&m ynm&yfavhvmrIESifh uGJjym;rIrsm;
&Sdaeaom vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;&Sd ]tjcm;olrsm;} taMumif;ukd aqG;aEG;xm;onf/
Introduction
Divided societies are marked by three characteristics that make designing democracy particularly
challenging: they exhibit “a well-entrenched faultline” that has the potential for violence (often ethnicity,
but sometimes also language, national identity and religion) (Guelke, 2012: 29); their politics is affected
by “ethnic seepage” (Horowitz, 2001: 8), that is, political issues tend to cohere around the primary marker
of division, and; they face “a lack of consensus on the framework for the making of decisions” (Guelke, 2012:
32). Two countervailing perspectives dominate the debate over constitutional design and conflict manage-
ment in divided societies. Integration seeks “a single public identity coterminous with the state’s territory”
whereas accommodation encourages “dual or multiple public identities” as well as “equality with institu-
tional respect for differences” (McGarry, O’Leary and Simeon, 2008: 41). Both accommodation and integra-
tion see merit in federalism as a democratic mechanism for managing diversity but recommend different
institutional configurations. A federation inspired by accommodation designs subunits in such a way as to
secure self-rule for minority groups in their own units while maintaining shared rule between groups at
the centre, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgium, and Canada. By contrast, the subunits of integrationist
federations consist of heterogeneous units that cut across group lines where possible. This form of feder-
alism is advocated for its dispersal of power, and thus conflict, away from the ethnic divide and is inspired
by federal practice in such diverse places as the United States and Nigeria (Horowitz 2001).
Scholars continue to actively debate the ability of either form of federalism to manage diversity, to
build trust among contending groups and to create the conditions for stability and democracy in divided
societies (e.g., Hale 2004; Zahar 2013; McGarry and O’Leary 2009; Roeder 2009; Horowitz 2001). Nonethe-
less, while integration and accommodation offer different visions of federal design, they both begin with
the same reference point: ethnic divisions. Consequently, both display an institutional bias in favour of
what might be considered ‘politically relevant’ groups. Groups that do not meet the threshold for political
relevance – either because they are too small, too territorially dispersed or because they do identify with
the dominant ethno-divide – face exclusion during the constitutional design stage and, later, in the pro-
cesses of governance. That is, the inclusion of some groups in the design of institutions entails the exclu-
sion of others. While ethnicity may be the primary cleavage in a divided society, it is not the only way in
which citizens organise their lives. What gets lost when we only focus on one kind of group in the design
of institutions?
ed'gef;
uGJjym;rIrsm;&Sdaeaom vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;wGif 'Drkdua&pDukd yHkpHazmfaqmif&mü txl;cufcJaponfh vu©Pm
3 ck&o dS nf/ ,if;wkw Yd iG f tMurf;zufrrI sm; (wpfcgwpf&H vlrsKd;a&;t&? wpfcgwpf&H bmompum;? Ekid if o H m;0daoo
vu©PmESifh bmoma&;t&) jzpfvmap&ef tvm;tvm&Sdonfh ]ckdifckdifrmrm tjrpfwG,faeNyD;jzpfaom uGJjym;rI
wpfc}k ukd xifxif&mS ;&Sm;awGU jrif&onf(Guelke, 2012 : 29)/ ,if;wk\ Yd Ekid if aH &; ukd ]vlrsKd;a&;t& pdr0hf ifvrT ;f rk;d rI}
rsm;u oufa&mufrI&Sdonf (Horowitz, 2001 : 8) - qkdvkdonfrSm EkdifiHa&;qkdif&m udpö&yfrsm;onf uGJjym;rIrsm;ukd
t"duzefwD;ol teD;w0dkufwGifom jzpfaewwfonf? ,if;wkdYonf ]tqHk;tjzwfjyK&eftwGuf rlabmifwpfck
tay:wGif oabmwlnDrIr&SdbJ jzpfaejcif;} ukd &ifqkdifaeMu&onf (Guelke, 2012 : 32)/ uGJjym;rIrsm;&Sdaeaom
vlt Y zGt UJ pnf;rsm;&Sd tajccHOya'yHpk EH iS hf y#dyu©prD cH efcY aJG &;ESihf ywfoufaom aqG;aEG;jiif;cHrk rI sm;ukd tjyeftvSef
tjrifEpS cf u k vTr;f rk;d onf/ aygif;pnf;jcif;t,ltqu ]Ekid if aH wmf\ e,ferd w d Ef iS hf xyfwjl zpfonfh wpfcw k nf;aom
jynfolY0daoovu©Pm} ukd &SmazGum vkdufavsmnDaxGaexdkifjcif;t,ltqu ]ESpfck okdYr[kwf xkdYxufykdaom
jynfo0Yl ad oovu©Pmrsm;} omru ]jcm;em;rIrsm;ty: tifpwDusL;&Si;f rsm;t& av;pm;rIyg&So d nfh nDrQrI} ukyd g
tm;ay;onf (McGarry, O’Leary and Simeon, 2008 : 41)/ vkdufavsmnDaxGaexkdifjcif;ESifh aygif;pnf;jcif; ESpfck
vHk;wkdYu uGJjym;jcm;em;rIrsm;ukd xdef;ausmif;Ekdifaom 'Drkdu&ufwpf,Å&m;wpfcktjzpf zuf'&,fpepf\ aumif;
usKd;ukd ½IjrifMuaomfvnf; ,if;wkdYtBuHjyKaom tifpwDusL;&Sif;qkdif&m yHkpHrsm;rSm jcm;em;Muonf/ vkdufavsm
nDaxGaexkdifjcif;t,ltqt& wnfaqmufxm;aom zuf'a&;&Sif;wGif abmhpeD;,m;ESifh [mZD*dk;AD;em;?
b,fvf*sD,HESifh uae'gEkdifiHrsm;wGifuJhokdY rwlnDaomtkyfpkrsm;tMum; rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;udk A[kdwGif xm;&Sdum
vlenf;pkrsm;taejzifh ,if;wk\ Yd oufqidk &f me,fajrrsm;wGif uk, d yf idk t f yk cf sKyfa&; &&SEd idk af p&ef a'oqkid &f m e,fajr
,lepfrsm;udk owfrSwfxm;onf/ tjcm;wpfzufwGif aygif;pnf;a&;0g'usifhoHk;onfh zuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;\ a'o
qkid &f m e,fajr,lepfrsm; zefw;D &mwGif jzpfEidk o f rQ tkypf rk sm;ukd ykid ;f jzwfomG ;NyD; uGjJ ym;onfh tkypf rk sm;pGm yg0ifaom
e,fajrrsm; jzpfaponf/ ,if;uJhokdYaom zuf'&,fyHkpHwGif tkyfpkrsm;\ tmPmtpGrf;owådukd jyefYusJapojzifh
y#dyu©enf;um? vlrsKd;a&;t& uGJjym;rIrsm;rS a0;aponf/ ,if;yHkpHukd rwluGJjym;rIrsm;pGm&Sdaom ae&mrsm;jzpf
onfh tar&duefjynfaxmifpkESifh Ekdif*sD;&D;,m;wdkYwGif toHk;jyKonf/ (Horowitz 2001)
uGjJ ym;rIrsm;&Sad eaom vlt Y zGt
UJ pnf;rsm;twGi;f wGif wnfNidrrf EI iS hf 'Dru dk a&pD&adS prnfh tajctaersm; zefw;D
&ef? NydKifqkdifaeaom tkyfpkrsm;tMum; ,HkMunfrIwnfaqmuf&efESifh rwluGJjym;rIrsm;ukd xdef;ausmif;&eftwGuf
zuf'&,fpepf yHpk w H pfrsKd;csif;pD\tpGr;f ukd ynm&Sirf sm; wuf<upGm qufvufaqG;aEG;jiif;ckv H suf&MdS uonf (Oyrm
- Hale 2004 ; Zahar 2013 ; McGarry and O’Leary 2009 ; Roeder 2009 ; Horowitz 2001)/ aygif;pnf;jcif;ESifh
vku d af vsmnDaxGaexkid jf cif; t,ltqrsm;onf zuf'&,fypkH EH iS yhf wfoufNyD; rwlaomtjrifrsm;ukd azmfjyaeMu
aomfvnf; ,if;wkYd ESpcf v k ;kH onf vlrsKd;a&;t& uGjJ ym;rIrsm;[lonfh wlnaD om tuk;d tum;wpfcrk aS eí tpjyKMu
onf/ aemufqufwGJtaejzifh rnfonfwkdYukd ]EkdifiHa&;t& tusKH;0ifaom} tkyfpkrsm;tjzpf owfrSwfEkdifrnf qkd
onfESifh ywfoufNyD; ,if;tjrifESpfckvHk;wGif tifpwDusL;&Sif;qkdif&m bufvkdufrIrsm;ukdvnf; awGU jrif&onf/
Ekid if aH &;t& tusHK;0if&eftwGuf owfrw S cf sufjynfrh jD cif; r&So
d nfh tkypf rk sm; - vlO;D a&enf;vGe;f onft h wGujf zpfap?
e,fajrtvku d f tvGet f rif; jyefu Y sJpmG aexkid af eMuaomaMumifjzpf h ap? tm;aumif;aom vlrsKd;a&;ykid ;f jcm;rIrsm;
twkid ;f rdrw d u Ydk ,
dk rf rd d owfrw S jf cif;r&Síd jzpfap - onf tajccHOya' a&;qGo J nfh tqifEh iS hf aemufyidk ;f tkycf sKyfprD H
onfh vkyfief;pOfrsm;wGif z,fMuOfjcif;cHMu&onf/ tifpwDusL;&Sif;rsm;ukd yHkpHowfrSwf&mwGif tcsKdUaomtkyfpk
rsm;ukd xnfhoGif;jcif;onf tjcm;aomtkyfpkrsm; z,fMuOfcH&jcif;ukd jzpfaponf/ uGJjym;rIrsm; &Sdaeaom vlYtzGJU
tpnf;wpfcw k iG f vlrsKd;onf t"duuGjJ ym;rItaMumif;w&m; jzpfaeEkid af omfvnf; ,if;onf jynforl sm;taejzifh
Conceptual Clarification
The design of democratic institutions, whether for integration or accommodation, displays an institu-
tional bias in favour of territorially concentrated ethnic groups that are of a significant size and which are
capable of disrupting state processes. The inclusion of these dominant groups entails the exclusion of
non-dominant groups, often labelled as “others.” This ‘exclusion amid inclusion dilemma’ (Agarin and Mc-
Culloch 2017) is experienced by at least three kinds of groups:
1. Micro-minorities, i.e., groups which constitute a small proportion of the overall population (often
in the range of 1-5%), either as a result of their relatively recent presence in the polity (such as, migrant
communities), their systemic exclusion from political participation (such as, Roma communities in Eastern
Europe), their limited engagement with the polity (such as, Mennonite and Hutterite communities in North
America), or their territorial distribution across the state (e.g. indigenous communities in settler societies);
2. Non-ethnic minorities, i.e., groups that eschew ethnic labels and seek political participation on
class-based grounds and/or outside of the ethnically defined societal frameworks and thus face entry
barriers into politics that favours predefined ethnic identities;
3. Re-aligned minorities, i.e., groups that define gender, sexuality, and/or able-bodiedness as prima-
ry identities impacting on their opportunities for engagement in political process but which are neglected
in the democratic institutions.
Why Might Others Matter for Federalism?
And How Might Federalism Affect Others?
It might be tempting to dismiss the role of others, arguing that such groups are unlikely to destabilise
state functions. For example, neither gender nor LGBTQ minorities are territorially concentrated nor do
they seek territorial solutions to the problems of exclusion amid inclusion. As Anne Phillips (1995: 15)
notes, “no one really expects women to secede.” Yet, there is an emerging body of literature that suggests
that the design of federations matters for the pursuit of gender and sexual equality. In an important article
synthesising this body of work, Jill Vickers identifies at least 17 possible hypotheses on federal effects on
gender reforms (see Vickers 2013a: 9, Table 1). While this nascent literature continues to offer differing
interpretations of federal effects on others, three questions are particularly salient:
rdrw
d Ydk tcsif;csif;tMum; pkpnf;Muonfh wpfcw
k nf;aom enf;vrf;yHpk H r[kwaf y/ tifpwDusL;&Si;f rsm;ukd yHpk x
H w
k f
&mwGif uREfkyfwkdYonf tkyfpktrsKd;tpm; wpfckwnf;ukdom tm½HkjyKcJhygu rnfonfwkdY qHk;½HI;oGm;Ekdifygoenf;/
t,ltqqkdif&m &Sif;vif;csuf
aygif;pnf;jcif;twGufjzpfap? vkdufavsmnDaxG aexkdifjcif;twGufjzpfap? 'Drkdu&ufwpftifpwDusL;&Sif;
rsm;\ yHpk wH iG f vlO;D a&rsm;jym;um Ekid if aH wmf\ vkyif ef;aqmifwmrsm;ukd taESmift h ,Sujf yKEkid pf rG ;f &Sad om e,fajr
t& pkpkpnf;pnf; wnf&Sdaeonfh vlrsKd;tkyfpkrsm;ukd rsufESmomay;onfh tifpwDusL;&Sif;qkdif&m bufvkdufrIukd
awGU jrif&onf/ ,if;tm;aumif;aom tkyfpkrsm;ukd xnfhoGif;jcif;onf &Hzef&Hcg ]tjcm;olrsm;} [k ac:a0: wHqdyf
uyfjcif;cH&aom tm;raumif;onfhtkyfpkrsm;tm; z,fMuOfjcif;ukd jzpfaponf/ þ ]xnfhoGif;jcif;tMum;rS
z,fMuOfjcif; tusyftwnf;} (Agarin and McCulloch 2017) ukd tenf;qH;k tkypf t k rsKd;tpm; 3 rsKd;wku Yd awGU BuHK
cHpm;Mu&onf/
1/ tvGeaf o;i,faom vlenf;pkrsm; - vlO;D a&pkpak ygif;\ tvGeaf o;i,faom tpdwt f ykid ;f jzpfonfh tkypf k
rsm; (wpfcgwpf&H 1 - 5% twGif;)? EkdifiHtwGif;okdY rMumrDumvurS a&muf&Sdvmjcif;aMumifhjzpfap (Oyrm - a&TU
ajymif;vmaom vlpv k al 0;rsm;)? Ekid if aH &;t& yg0ifaqmif&u G jf cif;rsm;wGif pepfwus z,fMuOfcHxm;&jcif;aMumifh
jzpfap (Oyrm - ta&SU Oa&my&Sd ½dk;rm;vlrsKd;rsm;)? olwkdY\ EkdifiHa&; tkyfcsKyfa&;jzpfpOfESifh txdtawGU enf;jcif;
aMumifhjzpfap (Oyrm - ajrmuftar&du&Sd refEkdEkdufESifh [wfwm½dkufvlrsKd;pkrsm;)? okdYr[kwf EkdifiHwpf0ef; jyefYusJ
aexkdifjcif;aMumifhjzpfap (Oyrm - ueOD;tajccs aexkdifaom vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;&Sd XmaevlrsKd;pkrsm;)/
2/ vlrsKd;tajccHr[kwfaom vlenf;pkrsm; - vlrsKd;trnfwHqdyfukd toHk;rjyKbJ? vlwef;pm;tajccHESifh^
okrYd [kwf vlrsKd;t&owfrw S af om vlt Y okid ;f t0dik ;f rlabmifrsm;\ jyifyrS Ekid if aH &;t& yg0ifciG u hf dk awmif;qko d jzifh
owfrSwfxm;NyD;jzpfaom vlrsKd;0daoorsm;ukd rsufESmomay;onfh EkdifiHa&;twGif;okdY 0ifa&muf&mwGif twm;
tqD;rsm; BuHKawGUae&aom tkyfpkrsm;/
3/ jyefvnfcsdefn§dxm;aom vlenf;pkrsm; - EkdifiHa&;vkyfief;pOfwGif yg0ifEkdif&ef tcGifhtvrf;rsm; xdcdkufc&H
NyD; 'Drkdu&ufwpftifpwDusL;&Sif;rsm;wGif vspfvsL½Ixm;jcif;cH&aom rdrdwkdY\ usm;^r qkdif&m? vdifwdrf;ñGwfrI
qdkif&mESifh^ odkYr[kwf usef;rmoefpGrf;rI ponfwkdYukd rdrdwkdY\ yifr0daoovu©Pmtjzpf owfrSwfxm;aom
tkyfpkrsm;/
tjcm;olrsm;onf zuf'&,fpepftwGuf tb,faMumifh ta&;ygEkdifygoenf;/

zuf'&,fpepfonf tjcm;olrsm;tay: rnfokdY oufa&mufEkdifygoenf;/
tjcm;olrsm;onf EkdifiHawmf\ vkyfief;aqmifwmrsm;ukd rwnfrNidrf jzpfapEkdifjcif;r&Sd[k ajymqkdum
,if;tkyfpkrsm;\ tcef;u@udk jiif;y,f&ef qGJaqmifrI &SdEkdifygonf/ Oyrmtm;jzifh usm;^r qkdif&m (Gender)
tkyfpkrsm;onf vnf;aumif;? LGBTQ vlenf;pkrsm;onfvnf;aumif; e,fedrdwftvkduf pkpnf;aexkdifMujcif; r&Sd
ouJo h Ydk ,if;wko
Yd nf yl;aygif;yg0ifapjcif;rS z,fMuOfc&H jcif; jyóemrsm;twGuf e,fajre,ferd w d q
f idk &f m ajz&Si;f rI
rsm;ukv d nf; &SmazGaejcif; r&Syd g/ trsKd;orD;rsm;onf oD;jcm;cGx J u G af &; vkyaf qmifrnf[k rnfol wpfO;D wpfa,muf
urQ arQmfvifhxm;Murnf r[kwfay} [k Anne Phillips (1995 : 15) ajymqkdouJhodkYyif jzpfonf/ odkYaomf usm;^r
qkdif&mESifh vdifykdif;qkdif&m nDrQrIrsm; &&Sdap&ef twGuf zuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;\ yHkpHonf ta&;ygaMumif; òef;qkdaom
pmayrsm;pGm ay:aygufco hJ nf/ ,if;ESihf pyfvsOf;NyD; aygif;pyfppk nf; zefw;D xm;aom ta&;ygonfh aqmif;yg;wpfcw k iG f
Jill Vickers u usm;^r qkdif&m jyKjyifajymif;vJrIrsm;twGuf zuf'&,f\ oufa&mufrIrsm;taMumif; tenf;qHk;
1. Does federalism constrain or enhance the mobilising potential of others? Some scholars point to
a “federalism advantage.” The claim is that federalism enhances the mobilising potential for others through
“venue shopping,” or the ability to lobby more than one level of government. That is, “if one door is locked,
a number of other doors may be unlocked” (Stockemer and Tremblay, 2015: 607). Yet, the availability of
multiple access points is contingent on federal design. In a study of women and LGBTQ mobilisation in
Belgium, Karen Celis and Petra Meier (2016) found that such advocacy work was constrained by the fact
that accommodationist designs, such as Belgium’s, provide for the exclusive division of competences be-
tween levels, thereby limiting the potential for venue shopping. Mobilisation was further limited by the
replication of the ethno-linguistic divide in civil society. In Belgium, women’s and LGBTQ groups exist pri-
marily within each linguistic community (Celis and Meier, 2016: 7), and there are few opportunities for
them to work collectively. The federalism advantage is thus not always so straightforward.
2. Does federalism produce differential policy impacts for others based on their geographical posi-
tion? The concern here is that as powers are divided and allocated, federations might assign “issues that
are significant to women (such as welfare programs and social policies) to the less powerful and less
well-resourced sub-national governments” (Stockemer and Tremblay 2015). While some federations have
equalisation strategies to minimise differences in outcomes, others do not. Women in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, for example, have very different levels of access to maternal health benefits depending upon which
Entity and which canton they reside in (Women’s Network BiH 2015). The resolution of family law matters,
including custody, child support and protection order enforcement, can also be quite variable depending
on the nature of the federal design (Vickers, 2013b: 58).
3. Does federalism promote or limit the legislative representation of others? Another important line
of inquiry investigates whether federations have greater levels of representation of others than do unitary
states. Either federalism’s multiple access points serve women well by creating a greater number of elect-
ed positions to fill and more opportunities to lobby for gender equality or federalism hinders their access,
relegating women and others to “less important levels of the decision-making process” (Stockemer and
Tremblay, 2015: 609). Stockemer and Tremblay (2015) find that federalism has a moderate effect on repre-
sentation, returning 3-4% more female representatives than unitary states. Here too, results may be con-
tingent on the form federalism takes, with the relationship between federalism and representation not
always clear-cut.
taejzifh jzpfEkdifajc&Sdonfh tEkrme rSef;qcsuf 17 ck ukd azmfjyxm;onf (Vickers 2013 u ; 9, Z,m; 1 ukd Munfh
yg)/ þtajcwnfp pmayrsm;onf tjcm;olrsm;tay:wGif zuf'&,fpepf\ oufa&mufrIrsm;ukd uGJjym; jcm;em;
aom t"dyÜm,fzGifhqkdcsufrsm; ay;&mwGif ar;cGef;oHk;ckrSm txl;owdjyKzG,fjzpfonf/
1/ ]zuf'&,fpepfonf tjcm;olrsm;\ a&GUvsm;oGm;vmEkdifrI tpGrf;udk ydkrkdaumif;rGefapoavm? uefYowf
xde;f csKyfoavm/} tcsKdyU nm&Sirf sm;u ]zuf'&,fpepf\ tm;omcsuf} ukd axmufjyMuonf/ zuf'&,fpepfonf
]ae&ma&G;cs,fjcif;} rSwpfqifh tjcm;olrsm;\ a&GUvsm;oGm;vmEkdifpGrf;ukd odkYr[kwf tpkd;&tqifh wpfqifhxuf
ydrk ídk wkud wf eG ;f awmif;qkEd idk pf rG ;f ukd ykrd adk umif;rGeaf ponf[k qkMd uonf/ qkv d o dk nfrmS ]wHcg;wpfcsyfonf ydwaf eyg
u tjcm;wHcg;rsm;pGmwkdYonf yGifhaeEkdifonf} [lí jzpfonf (Stockemer ESifh Tremblay, 2015 : 607)/ okdYaomf
xdawGUtoHk;jyKEkdifaom ae&mrsm;pGm&Sdjcif; r&Sdjcif;onf zuf'&,fyHkpHay:wGif rlwnfonf/ tqifhrsm;twGif;
oD;jcm;cGJjcm;xm;aom vkyfykdifcGifhtmPmrsm; owfrSwfay;xm;onfh b,fvf*sD,HEkdifiHuJhokdYaom ae&may;
vku d af vsmnDaxGaexkid jf cif;yHpk u H ,if;okYd rl0g'a&;&m wku d w f eG ;f rIvyk if ef;rsm;ukd uefo Y wfxm;NyD; ae&ma&G;cs,f
jcif;twGuf tvm;tvmukd enf;yg;apaMumif; b,fv*f sD,EH idk if w H iG f trsKd;orD;rsm;ESihf LGBTQ rsm;\ a&Gv U sm;oGm;
vmrIukd avhvmcJhonhf Karen Celis ESifh Petra Meier (2016) wkdYu awGU&SdcJhonf/ t&yfbuf vlrItokdif;t0dkif;
rsm;twGi;f wGif vlrsKd; - bmompum;tajccHyidk ;f jcm;rIrsm;ukd xyfrt H oH;k jyKjcif;aMumifh a&Gv U sm;oGm;vmrIrsm;onf
xyfrH uefo Y wfjcif;cH&jyefonf/ b,fv*f sD,EH idk if w H iG f trsKd;orD;rsm;ESihf LGBTQ tkypf rk sm;onf bmompum;tkypf k
wpfckcsif;pDwGif t"dutm;jzifh&SdMuum (Celis ESifh Meier, 2016 : 7) ,if;wkdYtaejzifh wpfpkwpfpnf;wnf;
vkyfaqmifEkdif&ef tcGifhtvrf; enf;yg;vGef;onf/ xkdYaMumifh zuf'&,fpepf\ tm;omcsufqkdonfrSm tNrJwap
&Sif;&Sif;vif;vif; &&SdEkdifonf r[kwfay/
2/ ]zuf'&,fpepfonf yx0Dtaetxm;t& wnf&o dS nfah e&mtay: rlwnfNyD; tjcm;olrsm;twGuf uGjJ ym;
jcm;em;aom rl0g'qkdif&m oufa&mufrIrsm; jzpfapygovm;/} zuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;wGif tmPmrsm;ukd ykdif;jcm;NyD;
cGjJ crf;ay;xm;&m ]trsKd;orD;rsm;twGuf ta&;ygaom udp&ö yfrsm; (vlrzI v l akH &;ESihf vlraI &;qkid &f m rl0g'rsm;ponf)
ukd tmPmenf;yg;NyD; t&if;tjrpfenf;yg;onfh a'oÅ&tpk;d &rsm;} xHoYdk ay;tyfxm;rdrnfudk pd;k &dryf yl efjcif;jzpfonf
(Stockemer ESifh Tremblay 2015)/ &v'ft& jcm;em;jcif;rsm; enf;yg;ap&eftwGuf nDrQapa&; AsL[mrsm;ukd
tcsKdU aomzuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;wGif xm;&SdMuum tcsKdU aomzuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;wGifrl rxm;&SdMuay/ Oyrmtm;jzifh
abmhpeD;,m;ESihf [mZD*;kd AD;em;&Sd trsKd;orD;rsm;wGif rnfonfjh ynfe,f (canton)? rnfonft h zGt UJ pnf;wGif aexkid f
onf qko d nfh tcsuftay: rlwnfNyD; rdcifusef;rma&;qkid &f m cHpm;cGirhf sm;&&Srd I twkid ;f twm rsm;pGmuGmjcm;Muonf
(Women’s Network BiH 2015)/ uav;xdef;odrf;cGifh? uav;yHhykd;axmufyHhrIESifh umuG,fapmifha&SmufrI trdefY
tmPmouf0ifrI ponfwkdYtygt0if rdom;pkqkdif&m Oya'tqHk;tjzwfrsm;onf zuf'&,fyHkpH\ oabmobm0
tay: rlwnfNyD; rsm;pGmajymif;vJrI &Sdonf (Vickers, 2013 c : 58)/
3/ ]zuf'&,fpepfonf tjcm;olrsm;\ Oya'jyKa&;qkdif&m ukd,fpm;jyKrIukd jr§ifhwifygovm; okdYr[kwf
uefo Y wfygovm;/} tjcm;olrsm;ukd uk, d pf m;jyKrI twkid ;f twmonf wpfjynfaxmifpepf Ekid if rH sm;xuf zuf'a&;
&Sif;rsm;wGif ydkrkdrsm;jym;jcif;&Sd? r&Sdukd aemufxyfta&;BuD;aom avhvmrIwpfcku qef;ppfygonf/ a&G;aumufcH
ae&mrsm;pGmESifh usm;^r qkdif&m nDrQrItwGuf wkdufwGef;rIjyK&ef ydkrdkrsm;jym;aom tcGifhta&;rsm;ukd zefwD;ay;
xm;jcif;jzifh zuf'&,fpepf\ wHcg;aygufrsm;pGmwko Yd nf trsKd;orD;rsm;twGuf tusKd;aus;Zl; jzpfxeG ;f apjcif;ESihf
zuf'&,fpepfonf trsKd;orD;rsm;ESifh tjcm;olrsm;ukd ]tqHk;tjzwfjyK&mwGif ta&;ygrIenf;yg;aom tqifhrsm;
ok}Yd avQmhcsjcif;jzifh ,if;wkt Yd aejzifh xdawG&U ,ltoH;k jyKEkid cf iG u hf dk wm;qD;jcif;ESpcf t k euf wpfcck u k kd jzpfapygonf
(Stockemer ESifh Tremblay, 2015 : 609 ) / wpfjynfaxmifEkdifiHrsm;ESifh EdIif;,SOfvQif zuf'&,fEkdifiHrsm;wGif trsKd;
While further empirical inquiry is still needed, it is clear that institutional designs that only focus on
ethnicity – whether to reinforce it or cut across it – tend to obscure the complex ways in which citizens
organise their lives, thereby calling into question their long-term democratic legitimacy.
Conclusion
The design of democratic institutions is often a contentious process and it remains an on-going chal-
lenge to cultivate institutional legitimacy. As Donald Horowitz (1993: 18) has remarked, divided societies
exhibit a “tendency to conflate inclusion in the government with inclusion in the community and exclusion
from government with exclusion from the community.” For this reason, it is important to design institutions
that support democracy for dominant groups, including ethnic minorities. Yet, non-dominant groups – the
others – also deserve recognition, representation and access to democratic decision-making channels.
Even if a federation’s origins are ethnic-specific, this should not preclude bringing gender, sexuality, class
and other non-ethnic identities into the design process. Doing so acknowledges that citizens’ identities are
complex and multi-layered. Reflecting the varied ways in which citizens organise their lives in governing
institutions is likely to enhance institutional legitimacy and stability, qualities that are often in short supply
in divided societies.
orD;uk, d pf m;jyKrI 3-4% ykrd rdk sm;jym;um uk, d pf m;jyKrItay:wGif toift h wifh oufa&mufr&I adS Mumif; StockemerESihf
Tremblay (2015) wku Yd awG&U cSd yhJ gonf/ þae&mwGiv f nf; &v'frsm;onf toH;k jyKonfh zuf'&,fpepf\ yHpk t H ay:
rlwnfaeum zuf'&,fpepfEiS hf ud, k pf m;jyKrItMum;&Sd qufo, G rf rI mS tNrJwrf; &Si;f vif;pGmwnf&adS eonf r[kwyf g/
vufawGUavhvmrIrsm; xyfrHvt kd yfaeao;aomfvnf; vlrsKd;wpfckwnf;tay:wGif pl;pku d of nfh tifpwDusL;
&Sif;qkdif&m yHkpHrsm; (xyfrHtm;jznfhonfjzpfap? ykdif;jzwf&ef vkyfonfjzpfap) onf EkdifiHom;rsm;\ ½IyfaxG;aom
b0aexkdif pkpnf;yHkrsm;ukd rsufuG,fjyKaernfomjzpfNyD; ,if;wkdY\ a&&Snf'Drkdua&pDenf;us w&m;0ifrItay:
ar;cGef;xkwfzG,f jzpfvmaprnfom jzpfonf/
ed*Hk;
'Drkdu&ufwpf tifpwDusL;&Sif;rsm;ukd yHkpHowfrSwfjcif;onf &Hzef&HcgwGif tjiif;yGm;zG,f vkyfief;pOfwpf&yf
jzpfNyD; tifpwDusL;&Sif;qkdif&m w&m;0ifrIukd ysKd;axmif&eftwGuf qufvuf pdefac:rIrsm; &SdaeqJyif jzpfonf/
Donald Horowitz (1993 : 18) rSwcf sufjyKouJo h yYdk if uGjJ ym;rIrsm;&Sad eaom vlt Y zGt UJ pnf;rsm;wGif ]vltY zGUJ tpnf;
twGif;okdY xnfhoGif;jcif;ESifh pDrHtkyfcsKyfrItwGif;okdY xnfhoGif;jcif;ukd wpfckwnf; aygif;pyfxm;ouJhokdY vlYtzGJU
tpnf;twGi;f rS xkwyf ,fjcif;ESihf pDrt H yk cf sKyfrt I wGi;f rS xkwyf ,fjcif;wku Yd v
dk nf; wpfcw k nf; aygif;pyfxm;vko d nfh
qE´} rsm;ukd awGU jrif&onf/ xkdYaMumifhyif vlenf;pk vlrsKd;rsm;tygt0if tm;aumif;aomtkyfpkrsm;twGuf
'Drudk a&pDudk yHyh ;dk rnhf tifpwDusL;&Si;f rsm;ukd yHpk o H wfrw S &f ef ta&;BuD;ygonf/ okaYd omf tiftm;enf;aomtkypf rk sm;
- tjcm;olrsm; - onfvnf; todtrSwjf yKjcif;? uk, d pf m;jyKjcif;? 'Dru dk a&pDenf;us tqH;k tjzwfjyKjcif; tcGit hf a&;
rsm;ukd &&So d ifyh gonf/ tu,fí zuf'a&;&Si;f wpfc\ k rlvrSm vlrsKd;tajccHjzpfcv hJ Qifyif ,if;tcsufonf usm;^
r? vdif? vlwef;pm;tvTmESifh tjcm;aomvlrsKd;r[kwfonfh 0daoovu©Pmrsm;ukd tifpwDusL;&Sif;yHkpHrsm;
owfrw S o f nfh vkyif ef;pOftwGi;f odYk xnfo h iG ;f pOf;pm;jcif;udk rwm;qD;oifah y/ ,if;okYd jyKjcif;jzifh Ekid if o H m;rsm;\
0daoovu©Pmrsm;onf ½IyfaxG;um tvTmrsm;pGm yg0ifEkdifonfukd todtrSwfjyK&m a&mufygonf/ tkyfcsKyfrI
qkid &f m tifpwDusL;&Si;f rsm;wGif Ekid if o H m;rsm; ,if;wk\ Yd b0rsm;ukd pkpnf;onfh enf;vrf;rsKd;pHu k dk jyefvnfo;kH oyf
jcif;onf uGjJ ym;jcm;em;rIrsm; &Sad eaom vlt Y zGt UJ pnf;rsm;wGif &Hzef&cH g awG&U avh r&So d nfh t&nftaoG;rsm;jzpfaom
tifpwDusL;&Sif;qkdif&m w&m;0ifrIESifh wnfNidrfrIwkdYukd ykdrkdaumif;rGefapygonf/
Further Reading
- Choudhry, Sujit. ed. 2008. Constitutional Design in Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation?
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Haussmann Melissa, Marian Sawer and Jill Vickers, eds. 2010.

Federalism, Feminism and Multilevel Governance. Surrey: Ashgate.
- Skogstad, Grace, Martin Pappillon, Keith Banting, and David Cameron, eds. 2013.
The Global Promise of Federalism, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Bibliography
Agarin, Timofey and Allison McCulloch. 2017. Exclusion Stockemer, Daniel and Manon Tremblay. 2015. Federalism
amid Inclusion: Power-Sharing and Non-Dominant and Women’s Representation: Do Federations have more
Minorities. Paper presented at the Joint IPSA Colloquium Women Legislators than Centralized States? Publius:
on Democratization and Constitutional Design in Divided The Journal of Federalism 45, 4: 605-625.
Societies, Nicosia, Cyprus.
Women’s Network BiH, Annual Report on the State of
Celis, Karen and Petra Meier. 2016. Other Identities Women’s Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2014,
in Ethnofederations: Women’s and Sexual Minorities’ Human Rights Paper 7.
Advocacy in Belgium. National Identities. Available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2016.1206068 Vickers, Jill. 2013a. Is Federalism Gendered? Incorporating
Gender into Studies of Federalism. Publius: The Journal
Guelke, Adrian. 2012. Politics in Divided Societies. of Federalism 43, 1: 1-23.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Vickers, Jill. 2013b. Territorial Pluralism and Family-Law
Hale, Henry. 2004. Divided We Stand: Institutional Reform: Conflicts between Gender and Culture Rights in
Sources of Ethnofederal State Survival and Collapse. Federations, North and South. Politikon: South African
World Politics 56, 2: 165-193. Journal of Political Studies 40, 1: 57-82.
Zahar, Marie-Joelle. 2013. A Problem of Trust: Can

Horowitz, Donald. L. 1993. Democracy in Divided
Federalism Silence the Guns? In The Global Promise
Societies. Journal of Democracy 4, 4: 18-38.
of Federalism, eds. Grace Skogstad, Martin Pappillon,
Keith Banting, and David Cameron. Toronto: University
Horowitz, Donald. L. 2001. Ethnic Groups in Conflict 2nd
of Toronto Press.
edition. Berkeley: University of California Press.
McGarry, John and Brendan O’Leary. 2009. Must Pluri-

National Federations Fail? Ethnopolitics 8, 1: 5-25.
McGarry, John, Brendan O’Leary, and Richard Simeon.

2008. Integration or Accommodation? The Enduring
Debate in Conflict Regulation. In Constitutional Design
in Divided Societies, ed. Sujit Choudhry. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Phillips, Anne. 1995. The Politics of Presence: Political
Representation of Gender, Race and Ethnicity. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Roeder, Philip. 2009. Ethnofederalism and the

Mismanagement of Conflicting Nationalisms. Regional
and Federal Studies 19, 2: 203-219.
50 I Linguistic Diversity in Pluranational States
4. Linguistic
Diversity In
Plurinational States
vlrsKd;rsm;pGm ,SOfwGJ
aexdkifonfh EdkifiHrsm;&Sd
bmompum;qdkif&m
rwluGJjym;rI
vlrsKd;rsm;pGm ,SOfwGJaexdkifonfh EdkifiHrsm;&Sd bmompum;qdkif&m rwluGJjym;rI I 51
Daniel Cetrà is a Research Fellow at the Centre on Constitutional Change, Uni-

versity of Edinburgh. His research focuses on nationalism, the politics of lan-
guage, and comparative territorial politics.
Daniel Cetrà onf tD'ifbwfwuúodkvf? zGJUpnf;yHkajymif;vJrIqkdif&m A[dkXme&Sd

okawoeynm&SifwpfOD;jzpfonf/ ol\ okawoersm;onf trsKd;om;a&;0g'?
bmompum;qdkif&mEdkifiHa&;ESifh e,fajra'oqdkif&m acwfNydKifEdkifiHa&;wdkYwGif tm½Hk
pl;pdkufonf/
This article examines the politics of language in plurinational states. First, I

argue that the relationship between language and nationhood is politically
constructed through two broad processes: state nation-building and ‘peripheral’
activism. Second, I present three broad strategies of territorial management to
accommodate the normative and practical issues derived from the politicisation
of languages: self-rule, shared rule, and symbolic recognition. Third, I illustrate
the discussion drawing on the paradigmatic cases of Catalonia and Flanders.
þaqmif;yg;wGif vlrsKd;rsm;pGm ,SOfwGJaexdkifonfh EdkifiHrsm;&Sd bmompum;qdkif&m

EdkifiHa&;udk qef;ppfazmfjyxm;onf/ yxrOD;pGm bmompum;ESifh trsKd;om;oGifjyif
vu©Pm jzpfwnfrIwdkY\ qufpyfrItm; us,fjyefYonfh vkyfief;pOf (2) &yfrSwpfqifh
EdkifiHa&;t& zGJUpnf;xm;jcif;jzpfaMumif; uREkfyftaejzifh ajymMum;vdkygonf/ ,if;
wdkYrSm EdkifiH\ trsKd;om;oGifjyifvu©Pm wnfaqmufjcif;ESifh ]rxifr&Sm;} wuf<u
vIyf&Sm;rIwdkYjzpfonf/ 'kwd,taejzifh bmompum;rsm;tm; EdkifiHa&;qdkif&m
vu©Pmwpf&yftjzpf owfrSwfjcif;rS ay:xGufvmonfh pHwefzdk;qdkif&m udpö&yfrsm;?
vufawGUydkif;qdkif&m udpö&yfrsm;wdkYESifh udkufnDap&eftwGuf e,fajra'oqdkif&m pDrH
cefYcGJrIESifh oufqdkifaom us,fjyefYonfh AsL[m 3 &yfudk wifjyxm;ygonf/ ,if;wdkYrSm
- udk,fydkiftkyfcsKyfjcif;? rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh vu©Pm&yfqdkif&m todtrSwfjyKrIwdkY
jzpfonf/ wwd,taejzifh umwmvdk;eD;,m;ESifh zvef;'g;pfa'orsm;&Sd tjyeftvSef
ajymif;vJoHk;pGJEdkifaom bmompum;qdkif&m taMumif;t&mrsm;Mum;&Sd qufET,f
aom jzpfpOfrsm;udk tajccHum aqG;aEG;rItwGuf Oyrmay;xm;ygonf/
Introduction
Language policy choices are particularly relevant in linguistically diverse plurinational states. Plurina-
tional states are characterised by the presence of at least two territorially distinct communities with a
shared understanding of being a separate political community. Institutionally, states may regulate linguis-
tic diversity in different ways, reinforcing or diffusing disputes between and within groups. Symbolically,
language policies affect the relative status of the different languages within the state and that of their
respective speakers, which is especially important for minority nations built upon linguistic distinctiveness.
This article is structured as follows. First, I argue that the link between language and nationhood is a
relatively recent political construction. I distinguish between two broad processes: state nation-building,
with its functional integration of societies and homogenisation of linguistic diversity; and the subsequent
reaction of ‘peripheral’ cultural and political activists. Second, I present ways in which language policies
can become strategies of territorial management through self-rule, shared rule, and symbolic recognition.
Third, I draw on the cases of Catalonia and Flanders to illustrate that language and nation are linked
through political action, thus showing contrasting ways of regulating linguistic diversity, and comparing
their respective linguistic disputes.
The Politics of Language and Nationalism
The relationship between language and nationhood is politically constructed. Cultural and political
activists mobilise and politicise the ‘raw material’ or linguistic differences available (Harguindéguy and
Cole 2013; Zabaltza 2006). We can identify two broad processes. On the one hand, state nation-building in
Europe has generally sought, with varying degrees of success, to achieve linguistic homogeneity as the
background condition of political integration. Some languages, such as Castilian in Spain and French in
Belgium, were turned into state national language, while others did not. This had normative consequences
for the new state languages came to be associated with modernity and progress while others with anach-
ronism and backwardness (May 2001). The British liberal John Stuart Mill famously invoked this notion of
hierarchy in his defence of the nation-state as the right setting for a representative government: ‘Nobody
can suppose that it is not beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of French Navarre, to be brought into the
current of the ideas and feelings of a highly civilised and cultivated people – to be a member of the French
nationality, admitted on equal terms to all the privileges of French citizenship ... than to sulk on his own
rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own mental orbit, without participation or inter-
ed'gef;
bmompum;qdik &f m rl0g'a&G;cs,frrI sm;tm; bmompum;tm;jzifh rwlujJG ym;rIrsm;&So d nfh vlrsKd;rsm;pGm ,SOw f JG
aexdkifaomEdkifiHrsm;wGif txl;ojzifh toHk;csEdkifonf/ vlrsKd;rsm;pGm ,SOfwGJaexdkifaomEdkifiHrsm;\ vu©Pm&yf
tm; - oD;jcm;Edik if aH &;todik ;f t0dik ;f wpfck jzpfaejcif;udk wlnpD mG em;vnfoabmaygufonfh e,fajrtm;jzifh uGjJ ym;
onfh vlt Y zGtUJ pnf; tenf;qH;k 2 ck &Sad ejcif;[k owfrw S x f m;onf/ tifpwDusL;&Si;f tm;jzifh Edik if rH sm;onf bmom
pum;qdik &f m rwlujJG ym;rItm; enf;vrf;trsKd;rsKd;jzifh xde;f n§Ed ikd Nf yD; tkypf rk sm;Mum;ESihf tkypf rk sm;twGi;f tjiif;yGm;
rIrsm;tm; cdkifrmtm;aumif;ap odkYr[kwf ydkrdk us,fjyefYoGm;aponf/ vu©Pm&yftm;jzifh bmompum;qdkif&m
rl0g'rsm;onf Edik if w H pfEikd if tH wGi;f &Sd rwlnaD om bmompum;rsm;ESihf ,if;bmompum;rsm; toD;oD;udk ajymqdk
Muolrsm;\ qufET,frItajctaetay: oufa&mufrI&SdonfhtwGuf bmompum;qdkif&muGJjym;rIudk tajccH
wnfaqmufxm;onfh vlenf;pkEdkifiHrsm;twGuf txl;ojzifh ta&;ygonf/
þaqmif;yg;udk atmufygtwdkif; zGJUpnf;xm;ygonf/ yxrOD;pGm uREkfyftaejzifh bmompum;ESifh EdkifiHjzpf
wnfrw I Mum;&S
Ykd d qufpyfro I nf rMumao;rDurS ay:aygufvmonfh Edik if aH &;qdik &f m zGpUJ nf;wnfaqmufrw I pfck jzpf
aMumif; ajymMum;vdkygonf/ uREkfyfonf us,fjyefYonfh vkyfief;pOf 2 &yfMum;wGif cGJjcm;owfrSwfxm;ygonf -
EdkifiH\ trsKd;om;a&;oGifjyifvu©Pm wnfaqmufrI? vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;tm; vkyfaqmifcsuftm;jzifh aygif;pnf;
xnfhoGif;jcif;ESifh bmompum;qdkif&m rwluGJjym;rItm; wpfom;wnf;jzpfapjcif;ESifh tvGeftrif; xif&Sm;jcif;
r&Sod nfh ,Ofaus;rIEiS hf Edik if aH &;qdik &f mwuf<uvIy&f mS ;olrsm;\ aemufqufww JG jYHk yefrrI sm; jzpfonf/ 'kw, d taejzifh
uREkfyfonf udk,fwdkiftkyfcsKyfrI? rQa0tkyfcsKyfrIESifh vu©Pm&yfqdkif&m todtrSwfjyKrIwdkYrSwpfqifh bmompum;
qkdif&m rl0g'rsm;tm; e,fajra'oqdkif&m pDrHcefYcGJa&;AsL[mrsm; jzpfvmEdkifaponfh enf;vrf;rsm;udk wifjyxm;
onf/ wwd,taejzifh bmompum;ESihf Edik if w H o
Ykd nf Edik if aH &;qdik &f m vkyif ef;rsm;rSwpfqifh qufpyfaeMuaMumif;udk
Oyrmay;&eftwGuf umwmvd;k eD;,m;ESihf zvef;'g;pfa'orsm;\ jzpfpOfrsm;udk tajccHxm;ygonf/ ,if;odYk jyKvkyf
jcif;jzifh bmompum;qdik &f m rwlujJG ym;rIukd xde;f csKyf&ef rwlno D nfh enf;vrf;rsm;udk jyoNyD; ,if;wd\ Yk oufqikd f
&m bmompum;qdkif&m tjiif;yGm;rIrsm;udk EdIif;,SOfxm;ygonf/
bmompum;qdkif&m EdkifiHa&;ESifh trsKd;om;a&;0g'

bmompum;ESihf Edik if jH zpfwnfrMI um;&Sd qufE, T rf tI m; Edik if aH &;t& wnfaqmufxm;jcif;jzpfonf/ ,Ofaus;rI
ESihf Edik if aH &;qdik &f m wuf<uvIy&f mS ;olrsm;onf ]ukeMf urf;ypön;f rsm;} odrYk [kwf bmompum;qdik &f m uGjJ ym;rIrsm;udk
jyifqifum EdkifiHa&;qdkif&mvu©Pmwpf&yftjzpf owfrSwfonf (Harguindéguy ESifh Cole 2013 ckESpf? Zabaltza
2006 ckEpS )f / uREkyf w f t
Ykd aejzifh us,fjyefo
Y nfv
h yk if ef;pOf ESpcf u k kd cGjJ cm;owfrw
S Ef ikd yf gonf/ wpfzufwiG f Oa&my&Sd
Edik if q
H ikd &f m trsKd;om;oGijf yifvu©Pm wnfaqmufjcif;onf Edik if aH &;qdik &f m aygif;pnf;rI\ aemufct H ajctae
tjzpf bmompum;qdkif&m wpfom;wnf;jzpfwnfrIudk azmfaqmif&ef a,bk,stm;jzifh vkyfaqmifavh&SdNyD;
atmifjrifrItwdkif;twm trsKd;rsKd;&SdcJhonf/ pydefEdkifiH&Sd uufpwDvsHESifh b,fvf*sD,H&Sd jyifopfbmompum;
uJhodkYaom tcsKdUaom bmompum;rsm;tm; EdkifiH\ trsKd;om;bmompum;rsm;tjzpf ajymif;vJowfrSwfcJhaomf
vnf; tjcm;bmompum;rsm;udkrl ajymif;vJowfrSwfcJhjcif; r&Sday/ ,if;onf acwfrDrI? wdk;wufrIwdkYESifh qufpyf
aeonfh EdkifiHawmfbmompum;topfrsm;twGuf pHwefzdk;qdkif&m aemufqufwGJrsm; ay:aygufvmapNyD; tjcm;
bmompum;rsm;onf rzGUH NzdK;rIEiS hf acwfaemufusrIwEYkd iS hf qufpyfaeonf (2011 ckEpS f arv)/ NAdwo d Qvpfb&,f
wpfO;D jzpfaom John Stuart Mill u trsKd;om;Edik if o H nf ud, k pf m;jyKtpd;k &wpfct k wGuf rSeu f efonfh tcif;tusif;
jzpfaMumif; ckcaH jymqd&k mwGif þ,lqcsuftqifq h ifu h kd ajymMum;cJonf h rmS xif&mS ;onf/ - ]b&ufwefvrl sKd;wpfO;D
est in the general movement of the world. The same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish
Highlander as members of the British nation’ (J.S. Mill 2008: 431).
On the other hand, ‘peripheral’ cultural and political activists reacted to this functional integration by
mobilising in favour of their minority languages and cultures. This is not to say that political entrepreneurs
could build anything they like, since there is an interplay between political agency, functional systems, and
popular response. We can identify two key stages: the nineteenth century, when activists first mobilised as
a result of the German romantic notion that language is the defining factor of the nation; and the second
half of the twentieth century, when demands re-emerged with new impetus and within the broader frame
of territorial claims to self-government and processes of decentralisation.
The salience of politics means that the link between language and nationhood is contingent. Nations
and their link with languages are historically situated human constructions. This challenges the Herderian
view that nations are natural, organic language-based entities. The link between language and nationhood
is complex and dynamic (Safran 1999). In fact, the role of language within nationalist projects varies
through space and time. Language may be the national marker and the central goal of collective national-
ist mobilisation. Catalonia provides an example of this at least until recently, when the central goal of
mobilisation has become self-determination. Language may also be the symbol of nationhood without
requiring proficiency in the language, as in the cases of Wales and Ireland. Yet there may be national move-
ments not built around linguistic distinctiveness. This is the case of Scotland, where notions of egalitari-
anism and community are more salient in making the case for national distinctiveness.
Managing Linguistic Diversity in Plurinational States
Politics is not only important in forging and sustaining a link between language and nation, but also
in regulating linguistic diversity. Language policy choices may vary in terms of the degree of institutional-
isation (e.g. which official language(s), if any); the level of policy responsibility (e.g. central government, or
devolved administration, or both); and type of regulation (e.g. accommodationist or integrationist). In lin-
guistically diverse plurinational states, language policies may become strategies of territorial management
odrYk [kwf jyifopfemAm;rS bufpuDvrl sKd;wpfO;D wdt Yk m; jyifopfEdik if o

H m;jzpfjcif;\ tcGix hf ;l rsm;tm;vH;k udk nDrQpGm
cHpm;&NyD; jyifopfvrl sKd; jzpfvm&ef? ,Ofaus;rI rsm;pGm xGe;f um;í tqifjh rifo h nfh yk*Kd¾ vfrsm;tjzpf awG;jrifcpH m;&
aprnfh vrf;aMumif;twGif;odkU ac: aqmifjcif;onf ,if;wdkYtaejzifh twdwfumvrsm;&Sd t½dkif;wpf0ufjzpfonfh
a&S;a[mif;ypön;f jzpfaom ,if;wd\ Yk ajrtay:wGif pdwyf sufvufysuf aexdik &f NyD; uÇmay:&Sd a,bk,sa&Gv U sm;rIwiG f
yg0ifjcif; odkYr[kwf pdwfyg0ifpm;jcif;r&SdbJ rdrd\ pdwftwGif;wGifom vnfywfae&jcif;avmuf tusKd;aus;Zl;
r&S[ d k rnfou l rQ qdv k rd rhf nf r[kwyf g/ a0;vfvrl sKd; odrYk [kwf paumhwvefuek ;f jrifah 'owGif aexdik o f rl sm;taejzifh
NAdwdoQvlrsKd; jzpfvm&eftwGufvnf; tqkdygrSwfcsuftwdkif;yif jzpfonf/ ( J.S. Mill 2008 - 431)
tjcm;wpfzufwiG f tvGet f rif; xif&mS ;jcif;r&Sad om ,Ofaus;rIEiS hf Edik if aH &;wuf<uvIy&f mS ;olrsm;onf ,if;
wdkY\ vlenf;pkbmompum;rsm;ESifh ,Ofaus;rIrsm;twGuf pnf;½Hk;vHIYaqmfjcif;jzifh tqdkyg vkyfaqmifcsufqdkif&m
aygif;pnf;rIukd wkjYH yefco hJ nf/ Edik if aH &;qdik &f m Xmersm;? vnfywfrpI epfrsm;ESihf vlx\ k wkjYH yefrw I oYkd nf tjyeftvSef
qufpyfaeMuojzifh ,if;onf EdkifiHa&;qdkif&m pGefYOD;wDxGifolrsm;taejzifh ,if;wdkY BudKufESpfoufonfht&mudk
yHak zmfEikd of nf[k qdv k jkd cif; r[kwaf y/ uREkyf w f tYkd aejzifh t"dutqifh (2) qifu h kd cGjJ cm;owfrw S Ef ikd yf gonf/ ,if;
wdrYk mS - bmompum;onf vlrsKd;wpf&yf\ t&nftaoG;udk tqH;k tjzwfay;onfh tcsufwpfcsuf jzpfonf[lonfh
*smref½dkreft,ltqaMumifh wuf<uvIyf&Sm;olrsm; yxrqHk;tBudrf pnf;½Hk;vIyf&Sm;cJhonfh 19 &mpkESifh udk,fydkif
tkyfcsKyfrIESifh A[dkcsKyfudkifrIavQmhcsa&; jzpfpOfrsm;&Sd e,fajra'oqdkif&m awmif;qdkrIrsm;\ ydkrdkus,fjyefYonfh
e,fy,ftwGi;f wGe;f tm;opfrsm;jzifh ta&;qdrk rI sm; jyefvnfay:aygufvmonfh 20 &mpk 'kw, d xuf0uftwGi;f wdYk
jzpfonf/
EdkifiHa&;\ ta&;ygrI qdkonfrSm bmompum;ESifh trsKd;om;jzpfwnfrIMum;&Sd csdwfqufrIwdkY\ tajctae
ay: rlwnfonf/ vlrsKd;rsm;ESihf ,if;wd\ Yk bmompum;rsm;ESihf qufpyfaerIwo Ykd nf ordik ;f aMumif;t& wnf&cdS o hJ nfh
vlom;rsm;\ wnfaqmufrIrsm; jzpfMuonf/ ,if;onf vlrsKd;rsm;onf obm0tavsmuf ouf&Sdbmompum;
tajcjyK tzGt UJ pnf;rsm; jzpfMuonf[al om awG;ac:ynm&Sif [m'g\ tjrifEiS hf qefu Y sifaeonf/ bmompum;ESihf
trsKd;om; oGifjyifvu©Pm jzpfwnfrIMum;&Sd qufpyfrIonf ½IyfaxG;NyD; ajymif;vJaeonf (Safran 1999 ckESpf)/
trSepf ifppf? trsKd;om;a&; pDru H ed ;f rsm;twGi;f &Sd bmompum;rsm;\ tcef;u@onf ae&mESihf tcsdeaf y: rlwnfí
trsKd;rsKd;uGJjym;Edkifonf/ bmompum;onf trsKd;om;a&;pnf;½Hk;vIHYaqmfrIwpfckvHk;\ trsKd;om;a&; trSwf
tom;ESihf A[d&k nfreS ;f csuf jzpfEikd o f nf/ umwmvd;k eD;,m;onf rMumao;rDu pnf;½H;k vIy&f mS ;rI\ A[d&k nfreS ;f csuf
onf udk,fydkifjy|mef;cGifh jzpfrvmrDtxd txufyg jzpfpOf\ Oyrmwpf&yf jzpfcJhonf/ a0;vfESifh tdkif,mvefwdkY&Sd
jzpfpOfrsm;wGiu f o
hJ Ykd bmompum;wGif uRrf;usifr&I &dS efrvdb k J bmompum;onf trsKd;om;jzpfwnfr\ I vu©Pm
wpf&yf jzpfEdkifonf/ odkYwdkif bmompum;qdkif&m xl;jcm;xif&Sm;rItay: tajccHxm;jcif; r[kwfonfh trsKd;om;
a&;vIyf&Sm;rIrsm; &SdaeEdkifonf/ paumhwvefEdkifiHonf ,if;jzpfpOfrsKd;jzpfNyD; omwlnDrQ&SdrIESifh vlxkwdkYonf
trsKd;om;a&;qdkif&m xl;jcm;xif&Sm;csuftay: ydkrdk ta&;ygonf/
vlrsKd;rsm;pGm ,SOfwGJaexdkifonfh EdkifiHrsm;&Sd bmompum;qdkif&m rwluGJjym;rItm; pDrHcefYcGJjcif;

EdkifiHa&;onf bmompum;ESifh vlrsKd;wdkYMum;&Sd csdwfqufrIudk wnfaqmuf&efESifh xdef;odrf;&efwdkYwGifom
ta&;BuD;onf r[kwb f J bmompum;qdik &f m rwlujJG ym;rIukd xde;f csKyf&mwGiv f nf; ta&;BuD;onf/ bmompum;
rl0g'qdik &f m a&G;cs,frrI sm;onf pHtavhtxrsm; (Oyrm - tu,fí &Syd gu? ½H;k oH;k bmompum;rsm;) owfrw S o
f nfh
twdik ;f twmrsm;? Edik if aH &;qdik &f mwm0ef (Oyrm - A[dt k pd;k & odrYk [kwf vkyyf ikd cf iG hf vTaJ jymif;ay;xm;onfh tkycf sKyf
a&;Xme? odrYk [kwf ESpcf pk vH;k ) tqifEh iS hf xde;f csKyfrI trsKd;tpm; (Oyrm - aphpyfnEd§ iId ;f a&; odrYk [kwf aygif;pnf;a&;)
to appease the demands of minority nations (Swenden 2013).

There are at least three important components to territorial strategies for managing plurinational
states: self-rule, shared rule, and symbolic recognition (Keating 2001). The first and the third are especial-
ly important when it comes to linguistic diversity. For example, self-rule on cultural and education matters
allows sub-state governments to set up measures to protect their minority languages. As minority nation-
alist parties are usual incumbents in regional offices, they may engage in the linguistic promotion of mi-
nority languages as part of their wider sub-state nation-building initiatives. Shared rule gives minority
nations the capacity to influence key policy decisions that affect their interests on linguistic matters. Sym-
bolic recognition may include different features around two broad aspects: projecting a state image of
diversity (e.g. by recognising more than one national or state language) and recognising the distinctiveness
of the various nations comprising the state (e.g. through asymmetric constitutional arrangements).
The Protection of Minority Languages in the EU
What is the role of the European Union in the management of linguistic diversity? Loughlin and Wil-
liams (2007) suggest that European integration had the potential to benefit minority languages because it
reduced the hegemony of states and their languages and provided new institutional avenues for sub-state
activists. Indeed, the EU discourse emphasises linguistic diversity as a core value of the European project;
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights offers a legal protection to minority languages (article 22); and
European funding supports initiatives of linguistic revitalisation. Minority language groups also benefit
from the protection of the Council of Europe’s Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the Frame-
work Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. However, the potential for linguistic protection
has not fully materialised as the issue remains essentially within the competence area of the Member
States (Kraus 2008). The Charter and the Framework Convention are relevant and legally binding docu-
ments, but they leave the parties a considerable measure of discretion on the implementation of its provi-
sions. Thus, it is still in domestic politics where we should look for key language policies and political de-
bates on language.
wdEYk iS hf pyfvsOf;í trsKd;rsKd;ajymif;vJrI &SEd ikd o f nf/ bmompum;tm;jzifh uGjJ ym;onfh Edik if rH sm;wGif bmompum;qdik &f m
rl0g'rsm;onf vlenf;pk vlrsKd;rsm;\ awmif;qdrk rI sm;udk OD;pm;ay;&eftwGuf e,fajra'oqdik &f m pDrcH efcY rJG AI sL[mrsm;
jzpfvmEdkifonf (Swenden 2013 ckESpf)/
vlrsKd;rsm;pGm ,SOw f aJG exkid o f nfh Edik if rH sm;tm; pDrcH efcY &JG mwGif ta&;ygonft h pdwt f ydik ;f tenf;qH;k 3ck &So
d nf/
,if;wdkYrSm - ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfrI? rQa0tkyfcsKyfrIESifh vu©Pm&yfqdkif&m todtrSwfjyKrIwdkY jzpfMuonf (Keating
2001 ckESpf)/ bmompum;qdkif&m rwluGJjym;rIESifh pyfvsOf;í yxrqHk;tcsufESifh aemufqHk;tcsufwdkYonf txl;
ojzifh ta&;BuD;Muonf/ Oyrmtm;jzifh ,Ofaus;rIESifh ynma&;qdkif&mudpö&yfrsm;tay:wGif udk,fydkiftkyfcsKyfrI
onf a'oÅ&tpd;k &rsm;taejzifh ,if;wd\ Yk vlenf;pkbmompum;rsm;udk umuG,Ef ikd o f nfh tpDtrHrsm; aqmif&u G f
Edik af ponf/ vlenf;pktrsKd;om;a&;ygwDrsm;onf trsm;tm;jzifh a'owGi;f tpd;k &Xmersm;wGif tmPm&&SMd uojzifh
,if;wdt Yk aejzifh ,if;wd\ Yk ydrk u
kd s,fjyefaY om a'oÅ&trsKd;om;oGijf yifvu©Pm wnfaqmufjcif;vkyif ef;rsm;\
tpdwt f ydik ;f taejzifh vlenf;pkbmompum;rsm; jr§iw hf ifa&;udk vkyaf qmifEikd of nf/ rQa0tkycf sKyfro I nf vlenf;pk
vlrsKd;rsm;tm; bmompum;qdik &f m udp&ö yfrsm;ESihf pyfvsOf;í ,if;wd\ Yk tusdK;pD;yGm;rsm;tay: tusKd;oufa&muf
rI&o dS nfh t"durl0g'qH;k jzwfcsufrsm;udk vTr;f rd;k Edik o f nfh pGr;f &nfay;onf/ vu©Pm&yfqikd &f m todtrSwjf yKjcif;wGif
us,fjyefYonfh ½Iaxmifh (2) ckESifh qufpyfaeonfh rwlnDaom oGifjyifvu©Pm&yfrsm; yg0ifEdkifonf/ ,if;wdkYrSm
EdkifiH\ rwluGJjym;onfh ½kyfyHkudk ay:vGifapjcif; (Oyrm / / jynfe,f odkYr[kwf EdkifiHawmf bmompum; wpfckxuf
ydkí todtrSwfjyKjcif;jzifh)? ESifh EdkifiHwGif yg0ifonfh trsKd;rsKd;aomvlrsKd;rsm;\ xl;jcm;xif&Sm;rIudk todtrSwf
jyKjcif; (Oyrm/ / tcsdK;rnD tajccHOya'qdkif&m tpDtpOfrsm;rSwpfqifh) wdkYjzpfonf/
EU &Sd vlenf;pk bmompum;rsm;tm; umuG,fapmifha&Smufjcif;

bmompum;qdik &f m rwlujJG ym;rIukd pDrcH efcY &JG mwGif Oa&myor*¾onf rnfonft h cef;u@wGif yg0ifoenf;/
Loughlin ESifh Williams (2007 ckESpf) wdkYu Oa&myaygif;pnf;rIonf EdkifiHrsm;ESifh ,if;wdkY\ bmompum;rsm;udk
vlrsKd;wpfrsKd;rS vTr;f rd;k tkycf sKyfru
I kd avsmhusapojzifh vlenf;pk bmompum;rsm;udk tusKd;jzpfxeG ;f aprnfh tvm;
tvm&SdNyD; a'oÅ&wuf<uvIyf&Sm;olrsm;twGuf tifpwDusL;&Sif;qdkif&m enf;vrf;opfrsm; axmufyHhay;onf/
trSefpifppfwGif EU \ azmfjycsufonf bmompum;qdkif&m rwluGJjym;rItm; Oa&mypDrHudef;\ t"duwefzdk;
wpf&yftjzpf tav;ay;azmfjyonf/ EU\ tajccHtcGifhta&;rsm;qdkif&m y#dnmOfpmcsKyfwGif vlenf;pkbmom
pum;rsm;tm; Oya't& tumtuG,fay;&ef azmfjyxm;NyD; (yk'fr 22) ESifh bmompum; jyefvnf&Sifoefa&;
twGuf pwifaqmif&u G &f ef Oa&my&efyakH iGrsm;u axmufyahH y;onf/ vlenf;pkbmompum;tkypf rk sm;onf Oa&my
aumifpD\ ]a'owGif; odkYr[kwf vlenf;pkbmompum;rsm;qdkif&m y#dnmOfpmcsKyfESifh vlenf;pkrsm;tm; umuG,f
apmifah &Smufa&;rlabmifoabmwlpmcsKyf} wd\ Yk tumtuG,rf v S nf; tusKd;aus;Zl; &&SEd ikd o f nf/ od&Yk mwGif bmom
pum;qdkif&m umuG,fapmifha&Smufa&; udpö&yfonf tzGJU0ifEdkifiHrsm;\ vkyfydkifcGifhe,fy,ftwGif; &Sdaeao;onfh
twGuf bmompum;qdkif&m umuG,fapmifha&Smufa&; tvm;tvmudk tjynfht0 razmfaqmif&ao;ay (Kraus
2008 ckESpf)/ y#dnmOfpmcsKyfESifh rlabmifoabmwlpmcsKyfwdkYonf qDavsmfrI&SdMuNyD; w&m;Oya't& vdkufem&ef
wm0ef&o dS nfh pm&Gupf mwrf;rsm; jzpfaomfvnf; ,if;\ jy|mef;csufrsm;udk taumiftxnfazmf&mwGif tzG0UJ ifrsm;
taejzifh rdrqd E´tavsmuf tawmftoifh vkyu f ikd Ef ikd af ponf/ xdaYk Mumifh uREkyf w
f t
Ykd aejzifh t"duusaom bmom
pum;qdik &f mrl0g'rsm;ESihf bmompum;taMumif; Edik if aH &;qdik &f m aqG;aEG;jiif;cHrk w I t Ykd wGuf jynfwiG ;f Edik if aH &;wGif
om Munfh½Ioifhayonf/
Language and Nationalism in Catalonia and Flanders
The cases of Catalonia in Spain and Flanders in Belgium are paradigmatic examples of the politics of
language and nationalism in plurinational states and illustrate the key points made above.
Origins
The Catalan and Flemish nationalist movements have been historically built upon language. Cultural
activists in the nineteenth century (but also earlier) led cultural and literary movements influenced by
Romanticism which expressed consciousness and pride for the Catalan and Flemish languages and cul-
tures. The romantic ‘discovery’ of the past and the use of the vernacular constituted a solid base upon
which both political nationalisms would draw their legitimacy. The language issue featured prominently in
the first political demands of the two movements. For example, the report of the ‘Commission of Grievanc-
es’ (1856), the great manifesto of the Flemish Movement, demanded strict equality of French and Dutch,
advocating a future in which every Belgian would be bilingual.
The Catalan and Flemish national movements emerged as responses to (incomplete) state na-
tion-building. The liberals in Spain and Belgium were constructing states that promoted processes of cul-
tural uniformity and chose one language (French in Belgium, Castilian in Spain) to be sponsored and pro-
moted by the state. This fostered a pre-existing diglossia, which meant that there was an unequal
distribution of tasks between the languages. Diglossia is grounded in an unequal conception of the lan-
guages. This is especially noteworthy in Belgium, where Dutch was (and still is) the majority language. Yet,
the liberal French-speaking elite situated French as the high-status language and Dutch was considered a
mere vulgar dialect and identified with poverty and deprivation.
Linguistic Regulation
Catalonia has two main official languages, Catalan and Castilian, while Aranese (a variety of the Occi-
tan language) is also official in the Vall d’Aran area. At the state level, the Spanish linguistic constitutional
design of 1978 gives a prevalent role to the Castilian language as the only state language and the only
language which all Spanish citizens are required to know. The constitution kept the centre monolingual in
Castilian and the Autonomous communities with languages different from Castilian were made officially
bilingual.
umwmvdk;eD;,m;ESifh zvef;'g;pfa'orsm;&Sd bmompum;ESifh trsKd;om;a&;0g'

pyde&f dS umwmvd;k eD;,m;ESihf b,fv*f sD,&H dS zvef;'g;pfw\ Ykd jzpfpOfonfvnf; vlrsKd;rsm;pGm ,SOw f aJG exdik o
f nfh
Edik if rH sm;&Sd bmompum;qdik &f m Edik if aH &;ESihf trsKd;om;a&;0g'udk azmfjyonfh yHrk eS Of yrmrsm; jzpfMuNyD; txuf wGif
azmfjycJhonfh t"dutcsuftvufrsm;udk Oyrm jyoonf/
rlvZmpfjrpfrsm;
umwmvefESifh zvef;rpf trsKd;om;a&;vIyf&Sm;rIrsm;onf ordkif;aMumif;tpOftvmt& bmompum;
tay:wGif tajccHcMhJ uonf/ 19 &mpktwGi;f (ESihf tapmydik ;f umvrsm; twGi;f &S)d ,Ofaus;rIqikd &f m wuf<uvIy&f mS ;
olrsm;onf umwmvefEiS hf zvef;rpfbmompum;rsm;ESihf ,Ofaus;rIrsm;tay: todtrSwjf yKrIEiS hf *kP, f rl wI u Ykd kd
azmfjyonfh Romanticism 0g'\ vTrf;rdk;MoZmoufa&mufaeonfh ,Ofaus;rIESifh pmayqdkif&mvIyf&Sm;rIrsm;udk
OD;aqmifcJhMuonf/ twdwfumv&Sd tqdkygvIyf&Sm;rIrS ]&SmazGawGU&Sdcsuf} ESifh rdcifbmompum; toHk;jyKrIonf
Edik if aH &;qdik &f m trsKd;om;a&;0g'rsm;twGuf ,if;wd\ Yk w&m;0ifrw I u Ykd kd azmfjyrnfh cdik rf monft h ajcwpfcu k kd owf
rSwfxm;ygonf/ bmompum;qdkif&mudpö&yfudk vIyf&Sm;rIESpfcktwGif;&Sd yxrqHk;aom EdkifiHa&;qdkif&m awmif;qdk
rIrsm;wGif xif&Sm;pGm azmfjyxm;ygonf/ Oyrmtm;jzifh zvef;rpfvIyf&Sm;rI\ BuD;rm;onfh aMunmpmwrf;wpfck
jzpfaom ]tjiif;yGm;rI ajz&Si;f a&;aumfr&Si}f \ tpD&ifcpH m (1856 ckEpS )f wGif jyifopfEiS hf 'wfcsfbmompum;wdt Yk m;
wef;wlnDrQ owfrSwfa&;udk awmif;qdkxm;NyD; b,fvf*sD,HEdkifiHom;wdkif; bmompum;ESpfrsKd; ajymqdkMuolrsm;
jzpfvmrnfh tem*wfudk tBuHjyKaeonf/
umwmvefEiS hf zvef;rpftrsKd;om;a&;vIy&f mS ;rIrsm;onf (rjynfph o kH nf)h Edik if \
H trsKd;om;oGijf yifvu©Pm
wnfaqmufjcif;ukd wkHYjyefrIrsm;tjzpf ay:aygufvmcJhMuonf/ pydefESifh b,fvf*sD,HwdkY&Sd vpfb&,frsm;onf
,Ofaus;rIwpfrsKd;wpfpm;wnf;jzpfa&; vkyfief;pOfrsm;udk tm;ay;onfhEdkifiHrsm; wnfaqmufcJhMuNyD; EdkifiHrS
aiGaMu;yHyh ;kd axmufc&H rnfh bmompum;wpfrsKd; (b,fv*f sD,w H iG f jyifopfbmompum;ESihf pydew f iG f uufpwDvsH
bmompum;) udk a&G;cs,fcMhJ uonf/ ,if;onf e*d&k adS eNyD;om;jzpfaom bmompum;tm; ESprf sKd; cGjJ cm;owfrw S f
oHk;pGJrIudk tm;ay;cJhonf/ qdkvdkonfrSm bmompum;rsm;Mum;wGif wm0efcGJa0rIrSm rQwrI r&Sday/ bmompum;
ESpfrsKd;udk cGJjcm;oHk;pGJjcif;tm; bmompum;rsm;tay: wef;wlnDrQrIr&Sdonfh t,ltqwGif tajcwnfcJhjcif;jzpf
onf/ ,if;udk txl;ojzifh b,fv*f sD,EH ikd if w H iG f txift&Sm;awGEU ikd Nf yD; tqdyk g Edik if w H iG f 'wfcsfbmompum; onf
vltrsm;pk oHk;pGJajymqdkonfh bmompum;jzpfcJhonf (jzpfaeqJ jzpfonf)/ odkYwdkif jyifopfbmompum; ajymqdk
onfh vpfb&,ftxufwef;vTmvlenf;pku jyifopfbmompum;udk tqifhtwef; jrifhonfh bmompum;[k
owfrSwfNyD; 'wfcsfbmompum;tm; tqifhtwef; edrfhusonfh a'ooHk;pum;wpfcktjzpf owfrSwfum qif;&J
EGrf;yg;rI? csKdUwJhrIwdkYESifh qufpyfí cGJjcm;owfrSwfxm;onf/
bmompum;qdkif&m pnf;rsOf; pnf;urf;rsm;

umwmvdk;eD;,m;wGif umwmvefESifh uufpwDvsH[lonfh t"du½Hk;oHk;bmompum; 2 ck&SdNyD; Vall d’Aran
a'owGif (atmfpDwef bmompum;rsKd;uGJwpfck jzpfonfh) Aranese onfvnf; ½Hk;oHk;bmompum;jzpfonf/
EdkifiHawmftqifhwGif pydefbmompum;qdkif&m tajccHOya'yHkpH 1978 t& uufpwDvsH bmompum;tm; wpfck
wnf;aom EdkifiHawmfbmompum;ESifh pydefEdkifiHom;rsm;taejzifh od&Sd&ef vdktyfonfh wpfckwnf;aom bmom
pum;tjzpf us,fjyefYonfh tcef;u@udk ay;tyfxm;ygonf/ tajccHOya't& A[kdwGif uufpwDvsHbmom
pum;wpfckwnf;udkom owfrSwfxm;NyD; uufpwDvsH bmompum;r[kwfonfh tjcm;bmompum;rsm; ajymqdk
In contrast, Flanders is officially monolingual (Dutch is the official language) and language was the
main federating criteria in Belgium in 1993. The legislator distinguished in Article 2 between the Flemish,
French, and German-speaking communities. There is no single state language, but rather three official
languages (Dutch, French and German) which are official in different areas of the state. This is usually la-
belled the territoriality principle, according to which only one language group is officially recognised in
each particular territorial unit. The territoriality principle is typically contrasted with the personality prin-
ciple, which defends that territories should endorse institutional bi- or multilingualism (see De Schutter
2008). I tend to find these labels problematic because all rights are territorial in absence of global justice
and because the personality principle is also necessarily instantiated in a particular territory. In practice,
the debate is between official monolingualism and official bilingualism, both implemented territorially.
Main Debates
The fundamental tension in the Catalan and Flemish linguistic disputes is between the willingness of
Catalan and Flemish authorities to integrate newcomers, on the one hand, and the accusation that integra-
tionist policies are discriminatory for the rights of Castilian- and French-speakers, which are the dominant
languages in the rest of the state.
The federalisation of Belgium and other compromises among Belgian political elites have contributed
to reduce the intensity of linguistic conflicts in Belgium, which reached its peak in the 1960s and 1970s.
The place where the linguistic dispute is alive, although attenuated, is the Flemish Periphery of Brussels,
the only place where French-speakers outnumber Dutch-speakers. De jure, some towns around Brussels
are officially monolingual in Dutch with linguistic facilities for French-speakers in administration and ed-
ucation. De facto, they are multilingual and essentially French-speaking. Some French-speaking political
actors, chief among which is the political party DéFI (formerly FDF), argue that this situation discriminates
against their linguistic rights. For them, Flemish authorities, which have full legislative powers on the
linguistic regime of the area, are infringing rights in their efforts to protect Dutch in the area.
In Catalonia, the dispute focuses on education. Aimed at social cohesion and immigrant integration,
the Catalan education system uses Catalan as the only language of instruction in publically funded schools,
while Castilian is taught as a subject. Some political actors, chief among which are the political parties,
Citizens (C’s) and the Popular Party (PP), see this as an illiberal, nationalist imposition that infringes the
aom udk,fydkiftkyfcsKyfcGifh& vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;twGuf ½Hk;oHk;bmompum;ESpfrsKd; owfrSwfxm;onf/

qefYusifbuftm;jzifh zvef;'g;pfonf bmompum;wpfckwnf;om toHk;jyKonfha'ojzpfNyD; ('wfcsf
bmompum;onf ½Hk;oHk;bmompum; jzpfonf) 1993 ckESpf b,fvf*sD,HEdkifiHwGif bmompum;onf zuf'&,f
qdkif&m t"dupHEIef;jzpfonf/ Oya'jy|mef;olonf yk'fr 2 wGif zvef;rpf? jyifopfESifh *smrefpum;ajymqdkaom
todkif;t0dkif;rsm;udk cGJjcm;xm;onf/ wpfckwnf;aom EdkifiHawmfbmompum; [lí r&SdbJ ½Hk;oHk;bmompum; 3
rsKd; ('wfcsf? jyifopfESifh *smref) wdkY&dNS yD; ,if;wdkYonf Edkifi\ H rwlnDonfha'orsm;wGif ½Hk;oHk;bmompum;rsm; jzpf
Muonf/ ,if;udk yHrk eS t
f m;jzifh ]e,fajra'oqdik &f m tajccH oabmw&m;} [k ac:a0:NyD; tqdyk g tajccHoabmw&m;
t& oufqikd &f m e,fajra'oqdik &f m ,lepfwpfck pDwiG f ½H;k oH;k bmompum;wpfcpk u D o
kd m todtrSwjf yKxm;onf/
e,fajra'oqdik &f m tajccHoabmw&m;\ qefu Y sifbufrmS ud, k &f nfu, kd af oG;qdik &f m tajccHoabmw&m;jzpfNyD;
tqdyk g tajccHoabmw&m;wGif e,fajra'orsm;onf tifpwDusL;&Si;f qdik &f m bmompum;ESpcf k toH;k jyKonfph epf
odrYk [kwf bmompum;trsm;tjym; toH;k jyKonfph epfukd axmufcu H sifoh ;kH oifah Mumif; umuG,af zmfjyxm;onf
(De Schutter 2008 ckESpfudk Munfh½Iyg)/ wpfuÇmvHk;qdkif&m w&m;pD&ifrI r&Sdonfhae&mwGif tcGifhta&;rsm;
tm;vH;k onf e,fajra'oESihf oufqikd Nf yD; ud, k &f nfu, kd af oG;qdik &f m tajccHoabmw&m;onf oufqikd &f me,fajr
a'owpfct k wGi;f wGivf nf; ud, k pf m;jyKNyD;jzpfaomaMumifh uREkyf t f aejzifh tqdyk gowfrw S cf sufrsm;onf ½Iyaf xG;
rIrsm; jzpfay:aponf[k xifjrifygonf/ vufawGUwGif jiif;cHkrIonf ½Hk;oHk;bmompum; wpfrsKd;wnf; owfrSwf
a&;ESifh ½Hk;oHk;bmompum;rsm;pGm owfrSwfa&;wdkYMum;wGif jzpfNyD; ,if;wdkYESpfckpvHk;udk e,fajra'otvdkuf
taumiftxnf azmfygonf/
t"du aqG;aEG; jiif;cHkrIrsm;

umwmvefEiS hf zvef;rpfbmompum;qdik &f m tjiif;yGm;rIrsm;&Sd t"duwif;rmrIonf wpfzufwiG f umwmvef
ESihf zvef;rpftmPmydik rf sm;\ vlopfrsm;udk aygif;pnf;xnfo h iG ;f &ef qEÉiS hf aygif;pnf;a&;rl0g'rsm;onf Edik if \ H
usefae&mrsm;&Sd t"dubmompum;rsm; jzpfMuonfh uufpwDvsHESifh jyifopfpum;ajymqdkolrsm;\ tcGifhta&;
rsm;udk cGJjcm;qufqHonf[laom pGyfpGJajymqdkcsuf jzpfonf/
b,fv*f sD,EH ikd if &H dS zuf'&,fazmfaqmifa&;ESihf Edik if aH &;qdik &f m xdyo f ;D vlenf;pkrsm;Mum;&Sd tjcm;aom n§Ed iId ;f
rIrsm;onf 1960 jynfEh pS rf sm;ESihf 1970 jynfEh pS rf sm;wGif tjyif;xefq;kH jzpfco hJ nfh b,fv*f sD,EH ikd if &H dS bmompum;
qdkif&m y#dyu©rsm;\ jyif;xefrIudk avQmhcs&ef taxmuftuljyKcJhonf/ bmompum;qdkif&m tjiif;yGm;rIrsm;
enf;yg;oGm;aomfvnf; touf0ifaeao;onfhae&monf b&yfqJNrdKU\ zvef;rpftpGeftzsm;a'ojzpfNyD; ,if;
ae&monf 'wfcsfpum;ajymqkdol ta&twGufxuf jyifopfpum;ajymqdkol ta&twGufu ydkrdkrsm;jym;aom
wpfckwnf;aomae&m jzpfonf/ Oya't& b&yfqJNrdKU 0ef;usif&Sd tcsKdUaomNrdKUrsm;wGif ½Hk;oHk;bmompum;tjzpf
'wfcsfbmompum; wpfrsKd;wnf;om toH;k jyKNyD; tkycf sKyfa&;ESihf ynma&;wdw Yk iG f jyifopfpum; ajymqdo k rl sm;twGuf
bmompum;qdik &f m taxmuftuljyK ud&, d mrsm; &SMd uonf/ trSepf ifppfwiG f ,if;wdo Yk nf bmompum;rsm;pGm
ajymqdMk uol rsm;jzpfNyD; tajccHtm;jzifh jyifopfbmompum; ajymqdMk uonf/ jyifopfbmompum; ajymqdo k nfh
Edik if aH &;orm;rsm;u tqdyk g tajctaeonf ,if;wd\ Yk bmompum;qdik &f m tcGit hf a&;rsm;udk cGjJ cm;qufqo H nf
[k ajymqdMk uonf/ ,if;wdu Yk kd OD;aqmiforl mS DéFI (,cif FDF) Edik if aH &;ygwD jzpfonf/ ,if;wdt Yk jrifwiG f e,fajr\
bmompum;qdik &f m tpDtpOftay: Oya'jyKa&;tmPmtjynft h 0&Sad om zvef;'g; tmPmydik rf sm;onf tqkyd g
e,fajrtwGi;f &Sd 'wfcsfbmompum;udk umuG,&f ef BudK;yrf;Mu&mwGif tcGit hf a&;rsm;udk csdK;azmufaeMuygonf/
umwmvdk;eD;,m;wGif? tjiif;yGm;rIrsm;onf ynma&;wGif A[dkjyKonf/ vlrIaygif;pnf;a&;ESifh a&TUajymif;
aexdkifolrsm; aygif;pnf;a&;wdkYudk &nf&G,fOD;wnfum umwmvef ynma&;pepfonf jynfolYb@mjzifh aiGaMu;
right of those students wishing to be educated in Castilian. Education is a mostly devolved but partly
shared with the Spanish government, and tensions arose recently around the ruling 31/2010 of the Span-
ish Constitutional Court on the 2006 Catalan Statute of Autonomy and the 2013 Spanish Education Law,
which made the case that Castilian should not only be object of teaching in Catalonia but also a language
of instruction.
Concluding Remarks
In plurinational states characterised by linguistic diversity, strategies of territorial management can

help to accommodate the normative and practical issues derived from the politicisation of languages. The
link between language and nation is endogenous to contingent processes of state nation-building, but
once created it may turn languages into powerful markers of national distinctiveness in different ways.
Devolution processes in the second half of the twentieth century have contributed to strengthening mi-
nority nations’ languages, while the European trend towards minority protection is noteworthy in moving
away from monolingual frames but less significant in its implications.
axmufyHhxm;onfh ausmif;rsm;wGif umwmvefbmompum; wpfckwnf;jzifh oifMum;ydkYcsNyD; uufpwDvsHudkrl

bmom&yfwpfct k aejzifh oifMum;ydcYk sonf/ tcsKdaU om Edik if aH &;orm;rsm;u ,if;onf uufpwDvsH bmompum;
jzifh ynmoifMum;vdkolrsm;\ tcGifhta&;ukd qefYusifonfh vpfb&,frqefaom? trsKd;om;a&;wGef;tm;ay;rI
wpf&yf jzpfonf[k ½IjrifMuonf/ ,if;wdt Yk euf t"duMoZm&So d nfh tzGt
UJ pnf;rsm;rSm Edik if aH &;ygwDrsm;jzpfaom
Citizens (C’s) ESifh Popular Party (PP) wdkYjzpfMuonf/ ynma&;wGif vkyfydkifcGifhtmPmtrsm;qHk; vTJajymif;ay;
xm;aomfvnf; vkyyf ikd cf iG t
hf mPmrsm;udk pydet f pd;k &ESihf cGaJ 0xm;NyD; vwfwavmwGif 2006 umwmvef ud, k yf ikd f
tkyfcsKyfcGifhOya'ESifh 2013 pydef ynma&;Oya'wdkYtay: pydeftajccHOya'qdkif&mw&m;½Hk;\ qHk;jzwfcsuf 31^
2010 ESihf pyfvsOf;í wif;rmrIrsm; ay:aygufvmonf/ tqdyk g qH;k jzwfcsufwiG f umwmvd;k eD;,m;wGif umpwDvsH
bmompum;tm; oifMum;rI taMumif;t&mwpfcktjzpf omrubJ oifMum;ydkYcsonfh bmompum;wpfckvnf;
jzpfoifhaMumif; qHk;jzwfxm;onf/
ed*Hk;csKyf trSmpum;rsm;
bmompum;qdik &f m rwlujJG ym;rIvu©Pm&yfrsm;&Sad om vlrsKd;rsm;pGm ,SOw f aJG exdik o
f nfh Edik if rH sm;wGif e,fajr
a'oqdkif&m pDrHcefYcGJrIonf EdkifiHa&;wGif bmompum;rsm; yg0ifywfouf&mrS ay:aygufvmonfh pHEIef;qdkif&mESifh
usifo
h ;kH rIqikd &f m jyóemrsm;udk ajz&Si;f &ef taxmuftuljyKEdik o
f nf/ bmompum;ESihf Edik if w
H \ Ykd Mum;&Sd qufpyfrI
onf Edik if \
H trsKd;om;oGijf yifvu©Pm&yfrsm; wnfaqmufjcif;twGuf twGi;f usonfh taMumif;&if; wpfcsuf
jzpfonf/ odkY&mwGif tqdkygqufpyfrIudk ay:aygufapNyD;onfESifh wpfNydKifeuf ,if;onf bmompum;rsm;tm;
trsKd;om;a&;qdkif&m xl;jcm;xif&Sm;rI\ tm;aumif;aomoauFwrsm;tjzpfodkY enf;trsKd;rsKd;jzifh ajymif;vJEdkif
onf/ ESpfq,f&mpk\ 'kwd,xuf0uf umvtwGif;&Sd vkyfydkifcGifhtmPm vTJajymif;ay;onfh jzpfpOfrsm;onf
vlenf;pkvlrsKd;rsm;\ bmom pum;rsm;udk cdkifrmtm;aumif;ap&ef taxmuftuljyKcJhNyD; Oa&my\ vlenf;pk
tumtuG,af y;a&;odYk OD;wnfonfh a&Gv U sm;rIonf bmompum;wpfcw k nf;om toH;k jyKonfah bmifrsm;twGi;f
rS xGufcGm&mwGif *½kjyKavmufaomfvnf; ,if;\ oufa&mufrIrsm;onf xdkrQavmuf ta&;rygay/
64 I Further Reading
Linguistic Diversity in Pluranational States
- Cardinal, L. and Sonntag, S.K. (eds.) (2015) State Traditions and Language
Regimes, McGill-Queen’s University Press.
- Kymlicka, W. and Patten, A. (eds.) (2003) Language Rights and Political Theory,
Oxford University Press.
- Laitin, D. (1992) Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa,

Cambridge University Press.
-Liu, A. H. (2011) ‘Linguistic Effects of Political Institutions’, The Journal of Politics,

73:1, pp. 125-139.
- Van Parijs, P. (2011) Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World, Oxford
University Press
Bibliography and Governance, University of Wales Press, pp. 57-

De Schutter, H. (2008) ‘The Linguistic 103.
Territoriality Principle—A Critique’, Journal of May, S. (2001) Language and Minority Rights:
Applied Philosophy, 25:2, pp. 105-120. Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language,
Routledge.
Harguindéguy, J.B.P., and Cole, A.
‘Ethnolinguistic Mobilizations in Europe. An Mill, J.S. (2008) ‘Of nationality, as connected with
Introduction’, Regional and Federal Studies, representative government’, in J.S. Mill On Liberty and
23:1, 1-6. Other Essays, Oxford University Press, pp. 427-434.
Keating, M. (2001) Plurinational Democracy: Safran, W. (1999) ‘Nationalism’, in Fishman, J. (ed.)

Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era, Handbook of language & ethnic identity, Oxford
Oxford University Press. University Press, pp. 77-93.
Kraus, P. A. (2008) A Union of Diversity: Swenden, W. (2013) ‘Territorial strategies for
Language, Identity and Polity-Building in managing plurinational states’, in Routledge
Europe, Cambridge University Press. Handbook of Regionalism and Federalism, Abingdon–
Loughlin, J. and C.H. Williams (2007) New York: Routledge.
‘Governance and Language: The Intellectual Zabaltza, X. (2006) Historia de las Lenguas y los
Foundations’, in C.H. Williams (ed.) Language Nacionalismos, Gedisa Editorial.
5. Federalism:
zuf'&,fpepf
A tool for conflict resolution
y#dyu© ajz&Sif;a&;twGuf
enf;vrf;wpfckavm
66 I Federalism: A tool for conflict resolution
Paul Anderson is a PhD Candidate and sessional lecturer in Politics and

International Relations at Canterbury Christ Church University. His main
research interests include: federalism, conflict resolution, nationalism and
the constitutional politics of plurinational states.
Soeren Keil is Reader in Politics and International Relations at Canterbury

Christ Church University. His research focuses on territorial autonomy, the
Western Balkans, EU enlargement and new federal models. He currently
serves as an advisor to the peace processes in Myanmar and Syria.
aygvftif'gqefonf PhD Candidate wpfOD;jzpfNyD; Canterbury Christ Church

wuúokdvfwGif EkdifiHa&;ESifh EkdifiHwumqufqHa&; bmom&yfukd ykdYcsol uxduwpfOD;
vnf; jzpfygonf/ ol\ okawoeqkdif&m e,fy,frsm;rSm z,f'&,fpepf? y#dyu©
ajz&Sif;jcif;? trsKd;om;a&;0g'ESifh vlrsKd;rsm;pGm pkaygif;aexkdifaom EkdifiHrsm;\
tajccHOya'qkdif&m EkdifiHa&;wkdY jzpfygonf/
Zdk&efukdif;vfonf Canterbury Christ Church wuúokdvfwGif EkdifiHa&;ESifh EkdifiHwum

qufqHa&; bmom&yfrsm;ukd ydkYcsol wGJzufygarmu©wpfOD; jzpfygonf/ ol\ okaw
oeqkdif&mwGif pl;pkdufonfh e,fy,frsm;rSm e,fajrqkdif&m ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfcGifh?
taemufabmfvfuefa'orsm;? Oa&myor*¾csJUxGifjcif;ESifh zuf'&,fyHkpHopfrsm;wkdY
jzpfMuygonf/ vuf&SdwGif olonf jrefrmEkdifiHESifh qD;&D;,m;EkdifiHwkdY&Sd Nidrf;csrf;a&;
vkyfief;pOfrsm;wGif tBuHay;yk*¾dKvftjzpf aqmif&Gufvsuf &Sdygonf/
zuf'&,fpepf - y#dyu© ajz&Sif;a&;twGuf enf;vrf;wpfckavm I 67
Federalism has become increasingly used as a tool of conflict resolution

in the post-Cold War era. This contribution discusses the rationale in
using federalism as a tool of peace-building, conflict resolution and
democratisation in deeply divided, ethnically heterogeneous and post-
conflict societies. In doing so, it is highlighted how federalism can serve
as an acceptable and viable solution for different ethnic groups because
of its emphasis on autonomy and territorial integrity. The contribution also
demonstrates that federalism is not able to solve all problems in ethnically
heterogeneous societies and that further research is needed in order to
understand the conditions in which federalism can be used to end conflict
and bring peace and democracy to divided countries.
ppfat;acwfveG f umvrsm;wGif zuf'&,fpepfudk y#dyu© ajz&Si;f &ef enf;vrf;wpfck

tjzpf ykrd dk toH;k jyKvmMuygonf/ euf½iId ;f pGm uGjJ ym;aeaom? vlrsKd;t& uGjJ ym;jcm;em;
rIrsm; &Sad eaom y#dyu©veG f vlt Y zGt
UJ pnf;rsm;wGif Nidr;f csrf;a&;wnfaqmufjcif;? y#d
yu©ajz&Sif;jcif;ESifh 'Drkdua&pDpepfxlaxmifjcif;twGuf enf;vrf;wpfcktjzpf
zuf'&,fpepfukd toHk;jyKMuonfh taMumif;&if;ukd ,ckpmwrf;wGif aqG;aEG;xm;yg
onf/ ,if;odkY aqG;aEG;&mwGif zuf'&,fpepfonf ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfykdifcGifhESifh e,fajr
a'ot& *kPo f u d m© &Srd w
I t
Ydk ay: txl;tav;xm;ojzifh ,if;onf rwlnaD omvlrsKd;
tkyfpkrsm;twGuf vufcHEkdifzG,f? vufawGU jzpfEkdifzG,f enf;vrf;tajzwpfck rnfodkY
jzpfEkdifyHkukd xif&Sm;atmif azmfjyxm;ygonf/ zuf'&,fpepfonf vlrsKd;t& uGJjym;
jcm;em;rIrsm; &Sdaeaom vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;&Sd jyóemrsm; tm;vHk;ukd ajz&Sif;Ekdifrnf
r[kwfaMumif;ESifY uGJjym;rIrsm;&Sdaeaom EkdifiHrsm;wGif y#dyu©rsm; tqHk;owf&ef?
Nidrf;csrf;a&;ESifh'Drkdua&pDukd azmfaqmifEkdif&eftwGuf rnfonfhtajctaersm;
atmufwGif zuf'&,fpepfukd toHk;jyKEkdifrnfukd em;vnfoabmaygufapa&; xyfrH
avhvmrIrsm; jyKvkyf&ef vkdtyfaMumif;ukdvnf; ,ck pmwrf;u azmfjyxm;ygonf/
Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increased use in federalism as a tool of con-
flict resolution. In recent years, the nature of conflict has changed, as evidenced by the prolifera-
tion of civil wars and conflicts rooted in ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity (Kaldor 2012).
These ‘new wars’ have thus necessitated the development of new tools for managing and resolving
ethnocultural conflicts. Federalism is one such tool, able to satisfy the aspirations and demands of
both minority and majority groups: giving minority groups (limited) control over their own eco-
nomic, political and social affairs, while also sustaining the territorial integrity of the extant state.
As most violent conflicts are intrastate conflicts — fought between different groups within one
country (rather than between different countries) — the potential of federalism to facilitate the
accommodation of differences, protect minority groups, prevent territorial disintegration and
maintain political stability, has rendered it one of the international community’s preferred conflict
ameliorating strategies (Monteux, 2006: 164).
This paper will outline why federalism has become an important tool of conflict resolution. We
will begin by defining federalism and giving a brief overview of the rationale behind its use in
post-conflict societies. Second, we will draw upon some concrete examples to illustrate the prom-
inence of federalism in bringing peace and stability to war-torn countries. In the penultimate
section, we will examine some of the limitations of approaching federalism as a tool of conflict
resolution. The conclusion will demonstrate that further empirical and theoretical research is
needed in order to fully understand the conditions in which federalism can contribute to
peace-building and conflict resolution.
Conceptual Clarification
Federalism, in the words of Ronald Watts (2008: 8) ‘refers to the advocacy of multi-tiered gov-
ernment combining elements of shared rule and regional self-rule’. Watts, in the same vein as
Preston King (1982) and Michael Burgess (2006), interprets federalism as a normative term, a
philosophical and ideological principle to be differentiated from federation which denotes the
‘tangible institutional reality’ of a federal state (Burgess, 2006: 285). Moreover, Watts, following
Daniel Elazar (1987), places emphasis on both the shared and self-rule elements of federations.
Self-rule refers to the (territorial) autonomy granted to the regions, Länder, states, provinces or
cantons. Shared-rule, on the other hand, denotes the ability of the sub-national governments to
participate in, influence and make decisions at the centre.
The rationale behind federalism is manifold. According to William Livingston (1956: 1), ‘feder-
ed'gef;
ppfat;acwf NyD;qHk;csdefrSpí zuf'&,fpepfukd y#dyu©ajz&Sif;a&;enf;vrf;wpfcktjzpf ykdrkdtoHk;jyKvmMu
onf/ y#dyu©rsm;\ oabmobm0 ajymif;vJvmcJYonfukd rMumrDESpfrsm;twGif;u jynfwGif;ppfrsm;? vlrsKd;a&;?
bmoma&;ESihf bmompum;qkid &f m rwlujJG ym;rIrsm;wGif tajccHonfh y#dyu©rsm; jyefyY mG ;vmonfh taxmuftxm;
rsm;t& awGU jrif&onf (Kaldor 2012)/ vlrsKd;a&;ESifh ,Ofaus;rIqkdif&m y#dyu©rsm;ukd xdef;odrf;ajz&Sif;Ekdifa&;
enf;vrf;opfrsm; wDxiG &f mS azG&ef ,if; ]ppfyo JG pfrsm;} u vkt d yfvmaponf/ zuf'&,fpepfonf vuf&dS Edik if aH wmf
\ e,fajrqkdif&m aygif;pnf;nDñGwfrIukd wnfwHhapNyD; vlenf;pkrsm;ukd ¤if;wkdY\ pD;yGm;a&;? EkdifiHa&;ESifh vlrIa&;
qkid &f m udprö sm;wGif (tueft Y owfjzif)h pDryH idk cf iG rhf sm;ay;onf?h vlenf;pkomru vlrsm;pkrsm;\ arQmfvifch sufrsm;?
vkv d m;rIrsm;ukd jznfq h nf;ay;Ekid o
f nfh enf;vrf;wpfck jzpfonf/ tjyif;xefq;kH aom y#dyu©trsm;pkonf jynfwiG ;f
y#dyu©rsm; - (EdkifiHrsm;tMum; wkdufcdkufMujcif;xuf) EkdifiHwpfEkdifiHtwGif;&Sd rwlnDaom tkyfpkrsm;tMum;
wku d cf u
dk f Mujcif; - jzpfMuojzifh rwljcm;em;rIrsm;ukd vufcu H m vku
d af vsmnDaxGaeEkid jf cif;? vlenf;pk tkypf rk sm;ukd
umuG,fjcif;? e,fajrrsm;NydKuGJjcif;ukd umuG,fjcif;? EkdifiHa&;t& wnfNidrfrIudk xdef;odrf;jcif; ponfwkdYtwGuf
taxmuftuljyKEdkifrnfh tvm;tvm&Sdonfh zuf'&,fpepfonf EkdifiHwumvlYtzGJUtpnf;\ ykdrkdESpfoufaom
y#dyu©avQmhcsa&;AsL[mrsm;teuf wpfckjzpfvmcJhonf (Monteux, 2006 : 164)/
zuf'&,fpepfonf tb,faMumifh y#dyu©ajz&Si;f a&;twGuf ta&;ygaom enf;vrf;wpfck jzpfvmcJo h nfudk
,ckpmwrf;wGif tusOf;azmfjyxm;onf/ þpmwrf;wGif zuf'&,fpepfudk t"dyÜm,fzGifhqkdjcif;ESifh y#dyu©vGef
vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;wGif zuf'&,fpepfukd toHk;jyKMuonfh aemufuG,frStaMumif;&if;ukd tusOf;tm;jzifh NcHKiHk
&Sif;vif;jcif;wkdYjzifh pwifygrnf/ xkdYaemuf ppfab;'PfoifhNyD; EkdifiHrsm;wGif Nidrf;csrf;a&;ESifh wnfNidrfrIukd azmf
aqmif&mü zuf'&,fpepf\ ta&;ygyHu k dk jyo&ef ckid v f kH aom Oyrmrsm;ukd toH;k jyKygrnf/ 'kw, d aemufq;kH ykid ;f wGif
y#dyu©ajz&Sif;a&;enf;vrf;wpfcktjzpf zuf'&,fpepfukdtoHk;jyK&mü awGU BuHK&aom tuefYtowftcsKdUukd
avhvmygrnf/ ed*Hk;wGif Nidrf;csrf;a&;wnfaqmufjcif;ESifh y#dyu©ajz&Sif;jcif;ukd zuf'&,fpepftaejzifh yHhykd;ay;
Ekdifonfh tajctaersm;ukd jynfh0pGm em;vnfoabmayguf&ef vufawGUt&ESifh oDtkd&Dt& okawoeavhvm
rIrsm; xyfrHjyKvkyf&ef vkdtyfaMumif; azmfjyxm;ygonf/
oabmw&m;a&;&m &Sif;vif;csuf
Ronald Watts (2008 ; 8) \ tqkdt& zuf'&,fpepfqkdonfrSm rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh a'otvdkuf ukd,fykdif
tkycf sKyfjcif;wk\
Yd tpdwt f ykid ;f rsm;ukd aygif;pyfxm;aom tqifrh sm;pGm yg&So d nfh tpk;d &yHpk u d ydk gonf/ Preston
H dk qkv
King (1982) ESifh Michael Burgess (2006) wkdYESifh tvm;wl Watts uvnf; zuf'&,fjynfaxmifpk\ ]vufqkyf
vufuidk f jyoEkid af om tifpwDusL;&Si;f qkid &f m vufawGt U ajctae} ukd uk, d pf m;jyKonfh zuf'a&;&Si;f (Burgess,
2006 ; 285) qkdonfESifh jcm;em;ap&eftwGuf zuf'&,fpepfukd pHESifhqkdifaom tac:ta0:wpfck? 'óeduaA'
qkdif&mESifh t,ltqqkdif&mrlwpfcktjzpf t"dyÜm,fzGifhqkdxm;ygonf/ xkdYtjyif Daniel Elazar (1987) uJhokdYyif
Watts onfvnf; zuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;\ rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif; tpdwftykdif;rsm;tay: txl;jyK
cJyh gonf/ uk, d yf idk t
f yk cf sKyfjcif;qko d nfrmS a'orsm;? jynfe,frsm;? c½dik rf sm;okYd ay;tyfxm;aom (e,f ajrqkid &f m)
ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfcGifhukd qkdvkdonf/ tjcm;wpfzufwGifrl rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif;qdkonfrSm jynfe,f? a'otpkd;&rsm;
taejzifh A[kdwGif yg0ifaqmif&GufEkdifpGrf;? vTrf;rkd;EkdifpGrf;ESifh tqHk;tjzwfrsm; jyKEkdifpGrf;wkdYukd &nfòeff;onf/
zuf'&,fpepfukd toHk;jyKMuonfhtaMumif;&if;rsm;rSm rsm;jym;ygonf/ William Livingston (1956 ; 1) \
alism, like most institutional forms, is a solution of, or an attempt to solve, a certain kind of prob-
lem of political organization’. In some states, federalism is chosen as an instrument of good gov-
ernance, an organising principle where sovereign polities rescind some of their sovereignty in
order to pool resources and become part of a larger network. These countries, predominantly
mononational states such as Australia, Germany and the USA, are, according to Alfred Stepan
(1999), ‘coming together’ federations. The second category of federations put forward by Stepan is
‘holding together’ federations; the heading under which most plurinational states fall, including,
inter alia, Belgium, Ethiopia, Bosnia, Iraq, and Nepal. This category also includes states that have
used elements of federalism such as the provision of autonomy in order to manage pre-existing
diversity (such as Spain and the United Kingdom). It is these ‘holding together’ federations, which
often face ethnic conflict (and in some cases violence) and hence employ federalism as a tool of
conflict resolution.
Nancy Bermeo (2002) writes of the ‘peace preserving’ characteristics of federalism, underlining
that it isolates conflicts, peacefully accommodates minority groups and ensures a democratic re-
sponse to ethnocultural tensions. In the absence of such democratic institutions, the alternatives
would be either inhumane responses such as genocide and ethnic cleansing, or secession, parti-
tion or further conflict, and as McGarry and O’Leary (2009) point out, these options serve only to
further worsen ethnic tensions.
As Hannum (2004: 395) points out, federalism is often considered the optimal choice in het-
erogeneous and post-conflict societies because it appeases both the majority and minority com-
munity. The self-rule and shared rule aspects of federalism ensure that sub-national groups have
significant, and in some cases extensive, sovereign control over specific policy areas, such as lan-
guage and education policy, while also ensuring that such groups are, through the shared rule
mechanisms, able to influence and participate in the decision making processes at the centre. For
the central government, the institutionalisation of a federal system can help curtail the secession-
ist demands of regional separatists. Modern history is testament to the growing challenge of se-
cessionism in modern politics, yet the use of federalism, while it has been unsuccessful in com-
pletely removing secessionist challenges from plurinational states, has succeeded in preventing
territorial disintegration. In short, the ability of federalism to divide power among different people
while sustaining the external borders of the extant state make it an attractive tool of conflict res-
olution.
tqkdt& ]zuf'&,fpepfonf tjcm;tifpwDusL;&Sif;yHkpHrsm;uJhokdYyif EkdifiHa&;tzGJUtpnf;\ jyóemtrsKd;tpm;

wpfckukd ajz&Sif;onfh enf;vrf;wpfck okdYr[kwf ajz&Sif;&ef tm;xkwfrIwpf&yf} jzpfygonf/ t&if;tjrpfrsm;ukd
pkpnf;Ekdif&efESifh ykdrkdBuD;rm;aom uGef&ufwpfck\ tpdwftykdif;jzpfvmap&eftwGuf tcsKdUEkdifiHrsm;wGif tcsKyf
tjcmtmPm ykid pf ;dk aom tpk;d &rsm;onf ,if;wk\ Yd tcsKyftjcmtmPmukd y,fzsufvyk af qmifonfh zGpUJ nf;rIqidk &f m
rlwpfcjk zpfaom zuf'&,fpepfukd aumif;rGeaf om tkycf sKyfr\ I enf;vrf;wpfct k jzpf a&G;cs,fMuygonf/ ,if;Ekid if H
rsm;? trsm;tm;jzifh MopaMw;vs? *smreDEiS hf tar&duefjynfaxmifpw k Ykd uJo
h aYdk om vlrsKd;wpfcw k nf;&Sod nfh Edik if rH sm;
onf Alfred Stepan (1999) \ tqkt d & ]rdrq d E´t& vma&mufaygif;pnf;xm;Muaom} zuf'a&;&Si;f rsm; jzpfMu
ygonf/ Stepan wifjyvmaom zuf'a&;&Sif;'kwd,tkyfpkrSm ]pnf;aESmifxdef;xm;aom} zuf'a&;&Sif;rsm;jzpfNyD;
,if;tkyfpkxJwGif b,fvf*sD,H? tDoD,kd;yD;,m;? abmhpeD;,m;? tD&wfESifh eDaygponfh vlrsKd;trsm;tjym;&Sdaom
EkdifiHrsm; yg0ifMuonf/ þtkyfpktwGif;wGif BudKwif&SdaeESifhonfh uGJjym;jcm;em;rIrsm;ukd xdef;odrf;udkifwG,f&ef
twGuf (pydeEf iS hf ,lEu dk w
f ufuif;'rf;uJo Y )Ydk uk,
d yf idk t
f yk cf sKyfciG ahf y;jcif; ponfh zuf'&,fpepf\ tpdwt f ykid ;f rsm;udk
toH;k jyKxm;onfh Ekid if rH sm;vnf; yg0ifonf/ þ ]pnf;aESmifxed ;f xm;aom} zuf'a&;&Si;f rsm;wGif vlrsKd;a&;y#dyu©
(ESihf wpfcgwpf&H tMurf;zufrrI sm;) ukd BuHKawGU MuNyD; y#dyu©rsm;ukd ajz&Si;f &eftwGuf zuf'&,fpepfudk enf;vrf;
wpfcktjzpf toHk;jyKMuonf/
Nancy Bermeo (2002) uvnf; zuf'&,fpepf\ ]Nidr;f csrf;a&;ukd xde;f odr;f Ekid af om} *kP&f nfrsm;taMumif;
a&;om;cJhNyD; txl;ojzifh zuf'&,fpepfonf y#dyu©rsm;rS a0;apjcif;? vlenf;pkrsm;ukd Nidrf;csrf;pGmvufcHum
vkdufavsmnDaxG aexkdifEkdifjcif;? vlrsKd;ESifh ,Ofaus;rIqkdif&mwif;rmrIrsm;ukd 'Drkdua&pDenf;us wHkYjyefrI aocsm
apjcif; ponfwkdYudk jzpfapaMumif; azmfjycJYonf/ ,if;okdYaom 'Drkdua&pDtifpwDusL;&Sif;rsm; r&SdcJYygu tjcm;
jzpfEkdifzG,frSm vlom;rqefaom wkHYjyefrIrsm;jzpfonfh vlrsKd;wHk;owfjzwfrIrsm;ESifh vlrsKd;&Sif;vif;rIrsm;jzpfap?
EkdifiHawmfrS cGJxGufjcif;? oD;jcm;ykdif;jcm; &yfwnfjcif; odkYr[kwf aemufxyf y#dyu©rsm;jzpfap jzpfvmEkdifonf/
McGarry ESifh O’Leary (2009) wkdY axmufjyonfh twkdif;yif ,if;jzpfpOfrsm;onf vlrsKd;a&;wif;rmrIrsm;ukdom
xyfqifh wkd;yGm;apayvdrfYrnf/
Hannum (2004 ; 395) axmufjyonfh twkdif;yif zuf'&,fpepfonf vlrsm;pkudkomru vlenf;pkukdyg
auseyfapaomaMumifh uGjJ ym;jcm;em;rIrsm;&Sad om y#dyu©veG f vlt Y zGt UJ pnf;rsm;twGuf taumif;qH;k a&G;cs,fr[ I k
owfrSwfMuonf/ bmompum;ESifh ynma&;qkdif&m rl0g'ponfh tcsKdUaom rl0g'qdkif&m e,fy,frsm;wGif a'o
qkdif&mtkyfpkrsm;taejzifh ododomom us,fjyefYaom tcsKyftjcmtmPmjzifh vkyfukdifEdkifcGifh&Sdap&ef zuf'&,f
pepf\ ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif; tpdwftykdif;rsm;u aocsmaponf/ wpfcsdefwnf;rSmyif ,if;
tkyfpkrsm;onf A[kdwGif jyKvkyfaom tqHk;tjzwfjyKonfh vkyfief;pOfwGif yg0ifaqmif&GufEkdif&efESifh vTrf;rkd;Ekdif&ef
twGuf rQa0tkycf sKyfjcif; ,Å&m;rSwpfqifY vkyaf qmifEikd o f nf/ zuf'&,fpepfwpfct k wGuf tifpwDusL;&Si;f rsm;
wnfaqmufjcif;onf a'otvku d f cGx
J uG af &;orm;rsm;\ cGx J u G af &;awmif;qkrd rI sm;ukd wm;qD;&mwGif A[kt d pk;d &
twGuf taxmuftul jzpfapEkid o f nf/ acwfopfEidk if aH &;wGif cGx J uG af &;0g'\ BuD;xGm;vmaom pdeaf c:rItwGuf
acwfopf orkid ;f onf oufaoyif jzpfonf/ okaYd omf zuf'&,fpepfudk usifo h ;kH jcif;onf vlrsKd;rsm;pGm&Sad om Ekid if H
rsm;ü cGJxGufa&;qkdif&m pdefac:rIrsm;ukd t<uif;rJhz,f&Sm;Ekdifjcif; r&SdcJhaomfvnf; e,fy,frsm;NydKuGJrnfhta&;
umuG,fwm;qD;&mwGif atmifjrifrIrsm; &SdcJYonf/ twkdqkd&vQif zuf'&,fpepfonf vuf&Sdwnf&Sdaeaom EkdifiH
wpfEidk if \
H e,ferd wd rf sm;ukd xde;f odr;f vsuf rwlnaD omolrsm;tMum;wGif tmPmukd cGjJ crf;Ekid o f nfh tpGr;f &So d jzifh
,if;ukd y#dyu©ajz&Sif;a&;twGuf qGJaqmifrI&Sdaom enf;vrf;wpfck jzpfaponf/
Case Studies
In the post-Cold War era, a number of countries have adopted federal features in their consti-
tutional frameworks in order to deal with diversity and the resulting conflicts. These include Bel-
gium (1993), Russia (1993), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), Ethiopia (1995), South Africa (1996),
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2001), Iraq (2005) and Nepal (2015), amongst others.
Furthermore, ongoing debates about federalism, decentralization and the provision of territorial
autonomy for certain ethnic groups in countries as diverse as Ukraine, Syria, Myanmar and Libya
highlight the contemporary relevance of the federal idea. While not all of these countries have
faced violent conflict, what they all have in common is deep-rooted diversity, i.e. the existence of
multiple ethnic groups on the territory of the state, and a resulting need to manage this diversity
that goes beyond the traditional model of liberal democracy. Hence, federalism as an idea that
ensures self-rule (i.e. autonomy for territorially concentrated ethnic groups) and shared-rule (the
inclusion of different ethnic groups in the decision-making processes of the country) has featured
prominently as a mechanism of diversity management. What is more, the provision of autonomy
has been a key demand of groups that have previously fought for independence and secession,
such as the Serbs in Bosnia, the Albanians in Macedonia or the Chin and Karen in Myanmar.
In some of these countries international actors (such as the UN, NATO or the EU) have played
an important role in the introduction of federal institutional mechanisms. For example, Bosnia and
Herzegovina has been described as a country in which federalism has been “imposed” (Keil 2013),
while Iraq, too can be considered as a case in which international actors provided important input
into the federal debate (Danilovich 2014). Likewise, as a result of international involvement, the
arrangements for the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (2003) and Sudan (2005) included
secession provisions which delineated institutional procedures, including a specific time limit, for
the constituent parts of the states to become independent.
Various countries around the world have used federalism or elements of decentralisation in
order to deal with ethnic conflicts. In some of these countries, the use of federalism has contrib-
uted to peace-building and brought an end to violent conflict (for example in Bosnia, South Africa,
Macedonia and Nepal). In other cases, federalism has been less successful. The ongoing violence
and increased competition among ethnic groups over territory and natural resources in Ethiopia,
Nigeria and Iraq have intensified because of the introduction of decentralised structures that have
resulted in new distribution conflicts (Erk, 2014: 546). Some federal arrangements have included
secession clauses, such as in Sudan and Serbia-Montenegro. While not always a success, what
jzpfpOfavYvmrIrsm;
ppfat;acwfvGefumvwGif EkdifiHtcsKdUwkdYonf rwluGJjym;rIrsm;ESifh ,if;wkdY\ aemufqufwGJy#dyu©rsm;ukd
ukdifwG,fajz&Sif;Ekdif&eftwGuf zGJUpnf;yHktajccHOya'qkdif&m rlabmifrsm;wGif zuf'&,f0daoovu©Pmrsm;ukd
xnfhoGif; toHk;jyKcJhMuonf/ ,if;EkdifiHrsm;wGif b,fvf*sD,H (1993)? ½k&Sm; (1993)? abmhpeD;,m;ESifh [mZD*dk;
bD;em; (1995)? tDo, D ;kd yD;,m; (1995)? awmiftmz&du (1996)? ,cif ,l*q kd vyf jzpfcahJ om rufq'D ;dk eD;,m;
or®wEkid if H (2001)? tD&wf (2005) ESihf eDayg (2015) wkYd yg0ifonf/ xkt Yd jyif rwlno D nfh tajctaersm;&So d nfh
,lu&def;? qD;&D;,m;? jrefrmESifh vpfAsm;wdkYuJhodkYaom EkdifiHrsm;wGif zuf'&,fpepf? A[kdcsKyfukdifrI avQmhcsjcif;ESifh
tcsKdU aom vlrsKd;pkrsm;twGuf e,fajrtvku d f uk, d yf idk t
f yk cf sKyfciG hf ponfwt Ykd ay: qufvufjiif;cHk aqG;aEG;rIrsm;
&Sdaejcif;wkdYonf rsufarSmufacwftajctaewGif zuf'&,ft,ltq\ qDavsmfrIukd xif&Sm;ay:vGifaponf/
,if;EkdifiHrsm;tm;vHk;wkdYwGif jyif;xefaom y#dyu©rsm; BuHKawGUcJh&onf r[kwfaomfvnf; ,if;wkdYtm;vHk;wGif &Sd
onfh wlnaD omtcsufwpfcrk mS euf½iId ;f pGmtjrpfw, G af eaom uGjJ ym;jcm;em;rIrsm;yifjzpfonf/ qkv d o dk nfrmS Ekid if H
\ e,fajr e,ferd w d t
f wGi;f wGif vlrsKd;tkypf rk sm;pGm wnf&adS erIEiS hf &v'ftjzpf ,if;uGjJ ym;jcm;em;rIrsm;ukd udik w f ,G f
Ekid &f eftwGuf vpfb&,f'rD u dk a&pD\ tpOftvmykpH x H uf ausmfveG af om wpfpw kH pf&mukd vkt d yfcsufyif jzpfonf/
xkaYd Mumifh zuf'&,fpepfonf uk, d yf idk tf yk cf sKyfjcif; (qkv d odk nfrmS e,fajrt& pkppk nf;pnf; wnf&adS eaom vlrsKd;
tkypf rk sm;twGuf ud, k yf idk t
f yk cf sKyfciG )hf ESihf rQa0tkycf sKyfjcif; (rwlnaD om vlrsKd;tkypf rk sm;ukd wkid ;f jynf\ qH;k jzwf
csufjyKonfh vkyfief;pOfwGif yg0ifatmif xnfhoGif;jcif;) udk aocsmaponfh t,ltqwpfcktaejzifh rwluGJjym;
rIrsm;ukd pDrHcefYcGJjcif;qkdif&m ,Å&m;wpfcktjzpf xif&Sm;onf/ xkdYtjyif ukd,fykdiftkyfcsKyfcGifhonf abmhpeD;,m;&Sd
qmhbfrsm;? rufqD'dk;eD;,m;&Sd t,fvfab;eD;,ef;rsm; okdYr[kwf jrefrmEkdifiH&Sd csif;ESifh u&ifrsm;ponfh ,cifu
vGwfvyfa&;ESifh cGJxGufcGifhrsm;twGuf wkdufyGJ0ifcJhaom tkyfpkrsm;\ t"duawmif;qdkcsuf jzpfcJhonf/
,if;wkt Yd euf tcsKdaU omEkid if rH sm;wGif zuf'&,ftifpwDusL;&Si;f ,Å&m;rsm;ukd rdwq f uf&mwGif (ukvor*¾?
aewkd; okrdY [kwf Oa&myor*¾ponfh) EkdifiHwumZmwfaumifrsm;onf ta&;ygaom tcef;u@rS yg0ifaeonf/
Oyrmtm;jzifh abmhpeD;,m;ESihf [mZD*;kd bD;em;onf zuf'&,fpepfudk ]jyifyrS jy|mef;} ay;cJo Y nfh Edik if wH pfct
k jzpf
owfrSwfcH&NyD; (Keil 2013)? tvm;wlyif tD&wfEkdifiHjzpfpOfonfvnf; zuf'&,fqdkif&m aqG;aEG;jiif;cHkrIrsm;wGif
EkdifiHwumZmwfaumifrsm;u ta&;ygaom taxmuftyHhrsm; jyKcJhonfh jzpfpOfwpfcktjzpf owfrSwfEkdifonf
(Danilovich 2014)/ xkdYtwlyif EkdifiHwum\ yg0ifywfoufrIaMumifh qmbD;,m;ESifh rGefwDeD*½dk;jynfaxmifpk
(2003) ESihf ql'ef (2005) wk\ Yd Ekid if aH wmf zGpUJ nf;yHrk sm;wGif Ekid if aH wmf\tpdwt f ykid ;f rsm;taejzifh oD;jcm;vGwv f yf
a&;&,lEidk &f ef vkt d yfonfh wdusaomtcsdet f ykid ;f tjcm;tygt0if tifpwDusL;&Si;f qkid &f mvkyif ef;pOfrsm;ukd wdus
pGm azmfjyxm;onfh cGJxGufcGifh jy|mef;csufrsm; yg0ifvmcJYonf/
uÇmwpf0ef;&Sd EkdifiHrsKd;pHkwkdYwGif vlrsKd;pky#dyu©rsm;ukd ajz&Sif;&eftwGuf zuf'&,fpepfudk okdYr[kwf A[kd
csKyfuidk rf aI vQmhcsjcif;\ tpdwt f ykid ;f rsm;udk toH;k jyKaecJMh uonf/ ,if;wkt Yd euf Ekid if t H csKdU wGif zuf'&,fpepfudk
toHk;jyKjcif;onf Nidrf;csrf;a&;wnfaqmufjcif;ESifh jyif;xefMurf;wrf;aom y#dyu©rsm;ukd tqHk;owfa&;wkdYudk
taxmuftyHh jzpfapcJo h nf (Oyrm - abmhpeD;,m;? awmiftmz&du? rufqD 'd;k eD;,m;ESihf eDayg)/ tcsKdaU om jzpfpOf
rsm;wGifrl zuf'&,fpepfonf atmifjrifrI enf;yg;cJhonf/ tDoD,dk;yD;,m;? Ekdif*sD;&D;,m;ESifh tD&wfwkdYwGif vuf&Sd
jzpfyGm;aeaom tMurf;zufrIrsm;ESifh vlrsKd;pkrsm;tMum; e,fajrESifh obm0o,HZmwrsm; ykdifqkdifcGifhtay:
tm;NydKifrrI sm; ydrk tkd m;aumif;vmcJo h nf/ taMumif;rSm A[kcd sKyfuidk rf aI vQmhcsxm;aom zGpUJ nf;yHrk sm; pwiftoH;k jyKcJh
ojzifh cGaJ 0jcif;qkid &f m y#dyu©opfrsm; ay:aygufvmcJah omaMumifh jzpfonf (Erk, 2014 ; 546)/ tcsKdaU om zuf'&,f
qkid &f m tpDtrHrsm;wGif - Oyrmtm;jzifh ql'efEiS hf qmbD;,m; - rGew f eD *D ½d;k ponfww Ydk iG f - cGx
J uG af &; jy|mef;csufrsm;
ongoing debates about federalism in post-conflict societies highlight, is the strong link between
the introduction of democratic governance and the potential to overcome legacies of large scale
violence. The current debate in Myanmar, which resulted in a peace agreement and a commitment
to the introduction of federalism in August 2016, demonstrates this point.
The Limits of Federalism

It is an illusion to assume that federalism will be able to solve all problems in deeply divided
societies, especially those that have endured violent ethnic conflict. Challenges to territorial in-
tegrity and calls for secession will not disappear despite commitments to federalism, as demon-
strated in well-established democracies such as Canada, Spain and the United Kingdom as well as
in new federations in post-conflict societies, including Bosnia, Ethiopia and Iraq. This is because in
post-conflict countries mutual trust, willingness to cooperate and the political motivation for
compromise are relatively low amongst political elites representing different ethnic groups. As
Burgess (2012) has argued, the key to successful federal democracy in these countries lie in the
evolution of a federal political culture. In addition, notwithstanding the commitment of federalism
to deepening democratic procedures in divided societies, the consolidation of democracy has been
difficult to achieve. Bosnia and Iraq are examples where federal power-sharing has been imple-
mented, but the consolidation of democracy has hitherto been unsuccessful. Furthermore, post-
war societies face additional reform needs in order to deal with the results of long-term conflict.
These include dealing with reconciliation, economic reconstruction, refugee return, demilitarisa-
tion and societal reintegration. Finally, what has become evident in recent years is that in order for
federal, democratic structures to take root and function in deeply divided post-conflict states,
these institutional arrangements need to be flexible and be able to adapt to shifting policy de-
mands and preferences amongst the different groups. The abovementioned time limits in Sudan
and Serbia-Montenegro regarding secession, as well as asymmetrical arrangements in Iraq and
Bosnia, to name only two, can be seen as examples of this need for inbuilt flexibility. Contemporary
debates in Libya, Syria and Ukraine underline this need for flexible solutions in a world of ever
more complex conflict; there can be no ‘one size fits all’ approach to federalism in post-conflict
societies.
xnfo h iG ;f xm;onf/ tNrJwrf;atmifjrifrI &&So

d nf r[kwaf omfvnf; 'Dru dk a&pDenf;us tkycf sKyfru
I dk pwiftoH;k jyK
jcif;ESifh yrmPBuD;rm;aom tMurf;zufrIrsm;\tarGukd ausmfvTm;Ekdifrnfh tvm;tvmrsm;tMum;wGif tm;
aumif;aom tcsdwt f quf&o dS nfudk y#dyu©veG f vlt
Y zGt
UJ pnf;rsm;&Sd zuf'&,fpepfqikd &f m vuf&dS aqG;aEG;jiif;ckrH I
rsm;u xif&Sm;jyqkdaeonf/ Nidrf;csrf;a&; oabmwlnDcsufESifh zuf'&,fpepfukd pwiftoHk;jyK&ef uwdu0wf
&v'frsm;ukd 2016 ckESpf Mo*kwfvwGif ay:xGef;apcJhonfh jrefrmEkdifiH&Sd vuf&Sd aqG;aEG;rIrsm;onf ,if;tcsufukd
azmfjyaeygonf/
zuf'&,fpepf\ tuefYtowfrsm;
euf½dIif;pGm uGJjym;aeaom vlYtzGJUtpnf;rsm;? txl;ojzifh jyif;xefaomvlrsKd;a&;y#dyu©rsm;ukd umv
Mum&Snf awGU BuHKcHpm;cJ&h aom vlt Y zGt UJ pnf;rsm;&Sd jyóemrsm;tm;vH;k ukd zuf'&,fpepfu ajz&Si;f ay;Ekid rf nf[k
,lqjcif;rSm vufawGUrqefaom txifrSm; tjrifrSm;om jzpfonf/ aumif;pGmtajcusNyD;aom 'Drkdua&pDEkdifiH
rsm;jzpfonfh uae'g? pydeEf iS hf ,lEu dk w f ufuif;'rf;wkt Yd jyif abmhpeD;,m;? tDo, D ;dk yD;,m;ESihf tD&wfwYdk tygt0if
y#dyu©veG v f t Yl zGt UJ pnf;rsm;&Sd zuf'a&;&Si;f topfrsm;wGif awGU jrif&onft h wdik ;f zuf'&,fpepftay: uwdu0wf
rsm; &Sad e½Hrk Qjzifh e,fajrrsm; wpfpw k pfpnf;wnf; wnf&EdS idk rf u I dk pdeaf c:rIrsm;ESihf cGxJ uG af &; awmif;qkrd rI sm;wko Yd nf
aysmufu, G o f mG ;rnf r[kwaf y/ ,if;okYd jzpf&jcif;rSm y#dyu©veG Ef idk if rH sm;&Sd rwlnaD om vlrsKd;tkypf rk sm;ukd uk, d pf m;
jyKonfh EkdifiHa&;xdyfoD;rsm;tMum;wGif tjyeftvSef,HkMunfrI? yl;aygif;aqmif&GufvkdaomqEÉSifh tay;t,l
tavQmhtwif; jyKvky&f ef Ekid if aH &;qE´wo Ydk nf twkid ;f twmwpfct k xd enf;yg;aeaomaMumifh jzpfonf/ Burgess
(2012) ajymqko d uJo h yYdk if ,if;Ekid if rH sm;wGif atmifjrifaom zuf'&,f'rD u dk a&pD ay:aygufvma&;twGuf t"du
usaom aomhcsufrSm zuf'&,fEkdifiHa&;,Ofaus;rI jzpfay:ajymif;vJwkd;wufvmrIyif jzpfonf/ xkdYtjyif uGJjym;
aeaom vlt Y okid ;f t0dik ;f rsm;twGi;f 'Dru dk a&pD vkyx f ;kH vkyef nf;rsm; tjrpfw, G af pa&; zuf'&,fpepftay: uwd
u0wfrsm; &Sad eaomfvnf; 'Dru dk a&pDcidk rf matmifjyKjcif; ponfwrYkd mS atmifjrif&ef cufcaJ eqJyif jzpfonf/ abmh
peD;,m;ESifh tD&wfwkdYonf zuf'&,ftmPmcGJjcrf;a&;ukd taumiftxnfazmfEkdifcJYaomfvnf; 'Drkdua&pD ckdifrm
apa&; ,ckwidk af tmif ratmifjrifao;onfh om"ursm; jzpfMuonf/ xkt Yd jyif ppfyu JG mvvGef vlt Y zGt UJ pnf;rsm;
onf umv&Snfy#dyu©rsm;\ &v'frsm;ukd ajz&Sif;Edkif&eftwGuf aemufxyf jyKjyifajymif;vJa&; vkyfaqmif&ef
vkdtyfcsufrsm;ESifhvnf; &ifqkdifMu&onf/ ,if;wkdYwGif jyefvnfaygif;pnf;a&;? pD;yGm;a&;qkdif&m jyefvnf wnf
aqmufjcif;? 'kuo © nfrsm; jyefvnf0ifa&mufvmjcif;? ppfwyfjzKwford ;f jcif;ESihf vlt Y okid ;f t0dik ;f twGi;f odYk jyefvnf
aygif;pnf;jcif; ponfwkdYukd ukdifwG,fvkyfaqmifjcif;rsm; yg0ifonf/ aemufqHk;taejzifhqkd&vQif rMumrD ESpfrsm;
twGi;f u oufaoxif&mS ;cJo h nfrmS euf½iId ;f pGm uGjJ ym;aeaom y#dyu©veG Ef idk if rH sm;wGif zuf'&,f? 'Dru dk a&pDqidk &f m
wnfaqmufyHkrsm; tjrpfwG,fNyD; ouf0ifvIyf&Sm;Ekdif&efrSm ,if;tifpwDusL;&Sif;qkdif&m pDpOfxm;&SdrIrsm;onf
jyKvG,jf yifv, G &f NdS yD; rwlnaD om tkypf rk sm;tMum;wGif ajymif;vJaeaomrl0g'qkid &f m awmif;qkcd sufrsm;? ESpo f uf
vkv d m;csufrsm;ESihf vku d af vsmnDaxG ajymif;vJEidk pf rG ;f &S&d ef vkt d yfaMumif;yif jzpfygonf/ txufwiG f azmfjyxm;
cJhaom cGJxGufjcif;ESifh ywfoufNyD; ql'efEkdifiHESifh qm;bD;,m; - rGefwDeD*½dk;wkdYwGif xm;&Sdonfh tcsdeftuefYtowf
rsm;? EkdifiHESpfcka&G;NyD; azmfjy&vQif tD&wfESifh abmhpeD;,m;wkdY&Sd xyfwlrnDaom pDrHxm;&SdrIrsm;ukd jyKvG,ajymif f ;
vG,f&SdrI xnfhoGif;wnfaqmufxm;&ef vkdtyfcsuf\ Oyrmrsm;tjzpf ½IjrifEkdifygonf/ ykdrkd½IyfaxG;vmaeaom
y#dyu©rsm;jzifh jynfhESufaeonfh uÇmBuD;wGif jyKvG,fjyifvG,f&Sdaom ajz&Sif;yHkenf;vrf;rsm; vkdtyfvmyHkESifh
y#dyu©vGefEkdifiHrsm;twGuf zuf'&,fpepfukd csOf;uyf&mwGif tajctaeaygif;pHkukd enf;vrf;wpfrsKd;wnf;jzifh
csOf;uyfEidk o f nfyh pkH [ H í l r&Sad Mumif;ukd vpfAsm;? qD;&D;,m;ESihf ,lu&de;f wk&Yd dS rsufarSmufacwf aqG;aEG;jiif;cHrk rI sm;u
jyoaeygonf/
Conclusion
The contemporary debates on federalism as a tool of conflict resolution have ensued from the
changing pattern of conflict in the post-Cold War era. The modern world is composed of a medley
of ethnoculturally diverse states and the need for recognition and inclusion of the ineradicable
fact of diversity has become ever more prevalent. The ability of federalism to satisfy, at least to
some extent, the demands of both minority and majority groups has increased the popularity of
federalism as a method to manage diversity and competing nation-building projects within a
democratic framework. Federalism has become increasingly more important in resolving violent
conflicts, contributing to peace building and promoting democratic governance. However, as we
have seen, federalism is not a panacea to the many intractable challenges that deeply divided,
ethnically heterogeneous and post-conflict countries encounter. As federalism becomes an ev-
er-more prominent tool of conflict resolution, it is imperative to enhance the extant theoretical
and empirical research on the contemporary federal idea. The proliferation of these new federal
models to deal with the complex challenges of the twenty first century, underlines the need for
originality and flexibility in our approach to conflict resolution.
ed*Hk;
ppfat;acwfvGefumv&Sd ajymif;vJvmaeaom y#dyu©yHkpHrsm;aMumifh zuf'&,fpepfukd y#dyu© ajz&Sif;a&;
enf;vrf;wpfct k jzpf toH;k jyK&ef rsufarSmufacwfaqG;aEG;jiif;cHrk rI sm; ay:aygufvmcJ&h jcif; jzpfygonf/ acwfopf
uÇmonf vlrsKd;ESihf ,Ofaus;rIt& rwlujJG ym;rIrsm;pGm &So d nfh Ekid if rH sm;pGmjzifh zGpUJ nf;wnf&u dS m z,f&mS ;azsmufzsuf
í r&Ekid af omtcsuf jzpfonfh ,if;rwlujJG ym;rIrsm;ukd todtrSwjf yK&efEiS hf aygif;pyfxnfo h iG ;f &ef vktd yfcsufonf
,cifuxuf ydkrdkxif&Sm;vmcJhygonf/ zuf'&,fpepfonf tenf;qHk;taejzifh twkdif;twmwpfcktxd vlenf;pk
rsm;omru vlrsm;pkrsm;\ vkv d m;csufrsm;ukyd g jynf0h auseyfapEdik pf rG ;f &So d jzifh rwluGjJ ym;rIrsm;ESihf 'Dru dk &ufwpf
rlabmifrsm;twGi;f rS Ekid if x H al xmifa&; tNydKiftqkid v f yk af qmifrrI sm;ukd xde;f odr;f vkyaf qmifEidk &f ef enf;vrf;wpfck
tjzpf vlBudKuf ykrd rkd sm;vmcJyh gonf/ zuf'&,fpepfonf jyif;xefaom y#dyu©rsm;ukd ajz&Si;f &mwGi?f Nidr;f csrf;a&;
wnfaxmifjcif;ESihf 'Dru dk &ufwpftyk cf sKyfa&;jr§iwYf if&mwGif ykrd dk ta&;ygvmcJyh gonf/ okaYd omf uREfyk w f Ydk awGU jrifc&YJ
onfhtwkdif;yif zuf'&,fpepfonf euf½dIif;pGm uGJjym;aeaom? vlrsKd;pkrsm;pGm uGJjym;pGm yg&Sdaeaom y#dyu©vGef
EkdifiHrsm; awGU BuHKae&onfh udkifwG,fxdef;csKyf&ef cufcJaom pdefac:rIrsm;pGmwkdYtwGuf tvHk;pHkaoma&m*gukd
aysmufapEkdifonfh ewfaq;wpfzHk r[kwfay/ zuf'&,fpepfonf y#dyu©ajz&Sif;a&; enf;vrf;wpfcktjzpf ykdrkd
xif&Sm;vmonfESifhtrQ acwfopfzuf'&,f t,ltqtay:wGif vuf&SdoDtkd&DESifh vufawGU qkdif&m okawoe
avhvmrIrsm;xyfí rGrf;rHvkyfaqmif&ef tvGefta&;BuD;ygonf/ y#dyu©ajz&Sif;&eftwGuf uREfkyfwkdY csOf;uyfrI
rsm;jyK&mwGif uk, d yf ikd t
f awG;tjrifrsm;ukd oH;k jcif;? jyKvG,f jyifv, G &f jdS cif;wkYd vkt d yfaMumif;ukd ESpq f ,fw h pf&mpk\
½Iyaf xG;ayGvvD aS om pdeaf c:rIrsm;ukd &ifqidk af jz&Si;f Ekid &f eftwGuf þokYd zuf'&,fypkH t H opf rsm;jym;pGm ay:ayguf
vmjcif;u xif&Sm;apygonf/
Further Reading
- Anderson, L. (2013), Federal Solutions to Ethnic Problems:

Accommodating Diversity. Oxon and New York: Routledge.
- Brancati, D. (2009), Peace by Design. Managing Intrastate Conflict

through Decentralization, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Burgess, M. (2012), In Search of the Federal Spirit - New Theoretical

and Empirical Perspectives in Comparative Federalism, Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press.
- Burgess, M. and J. Pinder (Eds.) (2007), Multinational Federations.

Abingdon and New York: Routledge.
- Keil, S. and P. Anderson (forthcoming), ‘Decentralization as a Tool of

Conflict Resolution ‘in E. Hepburn and K. Detterbeck (eds.) Handbook of
Territorial Politics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Bibliography
Bermeo, N. (2002), ‘The Import of Institutions’, Journal Keil, S. (2013), Multinational Federalism in Bosnia and
of Democracy, 13 (2), 96-110. Herzegovina, Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate.
Burgess, M. (2012), In Search of the Federal Spirit: King, P. (1982), Federalism and Federation. London:
New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives in Croon Helm.
Comparative Federalism. Oxford: Oxford University
Livingston, W. S (1956), Federalism and Constitutional
Press.
Change. Westport CT: Greenwood Press Publishers.
Burgess, M. (2006), Comparative Federalism: Theory
and Practice, Abingdon and New York: Routledge. McGarry, J and B. O’Leary (2009), ‘Must Pluri-national
Federations Fail?’ Ethnopolitics, 8(1), 2-25.
Danilovich, A. (2014), Iraqi Federalism and the Kurds
– Learning to Live Together, Abingdon and New York: Monteux, C. (2006) ‘Decentralisation: The New
Routledge. Delusion of Ethnic Conflict Regulation?’ International

Journal on Multicultural Societies, 8(2), 162-1825.
Elazar, D. J (1987), Exploring Federalism. Tuscaloosa:
Stepan, A. (1999), ‘Federalism and democracy: beyond
University of Alabama Press.
the US model’, Journal of Democracy, 10 (4), 19-34.
Hannum, H. (2004), ‘Territorial Autonomy: Permanent
Watts, R. L (2008), Comparing Federal Systems, third
Solution or Step towards Secession¿’ in A. Wimmner,
edition, Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
R. Goldstone, D. Horrowitz, U. Joras and C. Schetter.
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283.
Kaldor, M. (2012), New and Old Wars: Organised

Violence in a Global Era, third edition, Cambridge:
Polity.

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SHADES OF

Federalism and Federation: Putting the Record Straight

Linguistic Diversity in Plurinational States

Federalism: A tool for conflict resolution

Federalism, Democracy and Inclusion: What about the others?

Self-rule and Shared Rule

Publisher © 2017, 50 Shades of Federalism

Dr. Soeren Keil

Canterbury Christ Church University, Politics and IR

North Holmes Road, Canterbury, CT1 1QU, United Kingdom

© 2017, Hanns Seidel Foundation Myanmar Office

Unit 7, Inya Lake Hotel

37 Kaba Aye Pagoda Road, Yangon

Republic of the Union of Myanmar

Chairwoman Prof. Ursula Männle, Minister of State (ret.)

Chief Executive Officer Dr. Peter Witterauf

Responsible for Publication Dr. Soeren Keil, Achim Munz

Main Authors Dr. Soeren Keil, Paul Anderson

Authors Prof. Dr. Michael Burgess, Dr. Sean Mueller,

Associate Prof. Allison McCulloch, Dr. Daniel Cetra

Translator U Aung Kyaw Phyo

Layout & Cover Artwork Shaine Phay, Mote Oo

Special Acknowledgement Paul Anderson, the manager of 50 Shades of Federalism

Professor Michael Burgess, who passed away during the completion of

this publication and was a great supporter of the project

University, who has supported this project

Canterbury Christ Church University, who has provided QR funding to establish

1. Federalism and Federation: 7

Putting the Record Straight

2. Self-rule and Shared Rule 24

ukd,fydkiftkyfcsKyfjcif;ESifh rQa0tkyfcsKyfjcif; toGifuGJrsm;

3. Federalism, Democracy and Inclusion: 37

zuf'&,fpepf? 'Drdkua&pDESifh tm;vHk;yg0ifapjcif; -

4. Linguistic Diversity in Plurinational States 50

vlrsKd;rsm;pGm ,SOfwGJaexdkifonfh EdkifiHrsm;&Sd

5. Federalism: A tool for conflict resolution 65

Paul Anderson & Soeren Keil

zuf'&,fpepf - y#dyu©ajz&Sif;a&;twGuf enf;vrf;wpfckavm

Introduction for “Shades of Federalism” Volume 1

zuf'&,fpepf toGifrsm; - twGJ (1) - rdwfquf

Soeren Keil, PhD is Reader in Politics and International Relations at Canterbury

Soeren Keil, PhD onf ,lauEdkifiH Canterbury Christ Church wuúodkvf?

Michael Burgess (1949-2018) is Emeritus professor of federal studies at the

Michael Burgess (1949 - 2018)onf ,lauEdkifiH University of Kent &Sd zuf'&,f

zuf'&,fpepftm; avhvmjcif;onf vufawGw U iG o

a0g[m& toHk;tEIef;qdkif&m &Sif;vif;csuf

EdkifiHa&;t& todtrSwfjyKum ,if;wdkYtm; pmjzifh a&;om;xm;onfh tajccHOya'? w&m;pD&ifrIpepfESifh EdkifiHa&;

tqifhESpf&yf (tcsKdUaom jzpfpOfrsm;wGif oHk;&yf) rS tpdk;&rsm;? tpdk;&0efxrf;rsm;ESifh 0efBuD;rsm; tm;vHk;udk yHkrSef

Federalism and Democracy

Federalism: A History of Misunderstandings?

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Burgess, M. and A. G. Gagnon. 2010. Federal Democracies. Oxon: Routledge.

King, P. 1982. Federalism and Federation. Basingstoke. Croom Helm.

Dr. Sean Mueller onf (qGpftrsKd;om;odyÜHazmifa';&Sif;u &efyHkaiG yHhykd;aom)

Introduction and Definitions

The Link between these Concepts and Federal Studies

vkyfykdifcGifhrsm;ay;um ykdif;jcm;vkyfukdifjcif; (regionalizaton) [líjzpfNyD; (tu,fí ,lepfrsm;tm;vHk; yg0ifcJh

þt,ltqrsm;ESifh zuf'&,favhvmrIrsm;tMum; tcsdwftquf

The extent to which a regional government co-determines national policy in intergovernmental

a'owGif; aexkdifolrsm;tay: a'oÅ&tpkd;& usifYoHk;aom tmPm? atmufyg twkdif;twm 5 ck

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- Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, Arjan H. Schakel, Sandra Chapman

- Hueglin, Thomas, and Alan Fenna. 2015. Comparative Federalism: A