Analysis
Summary: The Transatlantic
Trends Key Findings Report sum-
marizes the Turkish story in 2008.
Recent conversations about the
results in Ankara and Istanbul
suggest some intriguing observa-
tions and open questions. The
key divide in the Turkish debate is
between those who remain
attached to the active and
“balanced” AKP foreign policy
and those who wish to set more
deliberate priorities, looking east
or west. Many in Europe are
weighing the Turkish case in light
of past enlargement experience,
with a sense that process and
momentum are likely to outweigh
public reservations. As almost half
of Turkish respondents favored
a unilateral approach to interna-
tional issues, it is worth asking
whether Turkish perspectives are
not closer to those most often
ascribed to in Washington.
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Turkey and Transatlantic Trends:
How Distinctive?
by Dr. Ian O. Lesser*
WASHINGTON — For the last few
years, the findings from GMF’s Transat-
lantic Trends have included a significant
Turkey story. For the most part, this has
been a narrative about growing public
suspicion toward international part-
ners. This core story has not changed
substantially with the 2008 results. The
findings of Transatlantic Trends suggest
that Turks remain inward looking, if
not xenophobic, and inclined toward
unilateralism in foreign affairs. Turk-
ish perceptions of global challenges are
broadly in the transatlantic mainstream,
but in other respects, Turkey looks less
European and perhaps more American
in its policy preferences—an ironic
result in light of continued, highly
negative views of the United States.
The Transatlantic Trends Key Findings
Report (see www.transatlantictrends.org)
summarizes the Turkish story in 2008.
Recent conversations in Ankara and
Istanbul on the results suggest some
intriguing observations and open
questions.
Echoes from a polarized society
This year, for the first time, Transatlan-
tic Trends asked some basic questions
about religiosity in Turkey, with a view
toward understanding the implications
on Turkish foreign policy preferences.
As it turns out, religiosity does not
appear to have a significant influence
*
Dr. Ian O. Lesser is a senior transatlantic fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). The views expressed
here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF.
on perceptions of international actors
and issues. It does, however, make a
big difference in Turks’ perceptions of
Turkey. The 18 percent of Turks who
self-identified themselves as “never”
praying five times a day (admittedly a
rough and ready measure) are much
cooler toward today’s Turkey than
their more observant counterparts.
This will hardly be surprising news to
observers of the Turkish scene. But the
finding is reinforced in other areas.
Turks are, for example, just as inclined
as Europeans to see Turkey as cultur-
ally distinctive from the West, and
distinctive enough to call into question
whether Turkey fits into the West at all.
Discussions with a wide range of of-
ficial and unofficial Turks underscore
the deepening polarization affecting
Turkish society. The immediate crisis
of the closure case against the rul-
ing Justice and Development Party
(AKP) may have passed, but Turkey’s
post-verdict debate about the future
of the country and its foreign policy
choices is now even more pointed and
polarized. Moreover, the debate is only
partly about the question of secular-
ism in governance and daily life. As
many observers have noted, there
are now much sharper divisions and
resentments concerning the role of the
media, the private sector, and the state
in an economy that still depends heav-
Analysis
ily on the government as a customer and source of credit.
In foreign policy, the divisions are equally striking. Lack of
forward motion in Turkey’s EU candidacy has coincided
with the rise of a nationalistic and sovereignty-conscious
outlook among many Turkish elites. These views now paral-
lel those current in Turkish public opinion, where attitudes
toward NATO and the United States remain the most
negative on both sides of the Atlantic, and views of Europe
remain mixed at best. To be sure, important actors within
the Turkish establishment do not share this perspective and
remain attached to a Western-oriented and multilateral
strategy for Turkey.
The key divide is not really between pro-Western elements
and “Eurasianists” looking toward Russia and Central
Asia. As Transatlantic Trends makes clear, Turkish attitudes
toward Russia had cooled even before the crisis in Georgia
(the survey was conducted in June 2008), and a more asser-
tive Russian policy around the Black Sea and the Mediter-
ranean poses clear risks for Turkey. Rather, the key divide in
the Turkish debate is between those who remain attached to
the active and “balanced” AKP foreign policy—a policy that
includes but gives no overwhelming priority to relations
with Europe and the United States—and those who wish to
set more deliberate priorities, looking east or west. From the
perspective of public opinion, there has also been a potent
third way of inward-looking nationalism, and this is fully
reflected in the survey findings.
Contradictions in European views of Turkey
As with last year’s Transatlantic Trends results, there is an
unusual facet to European public attitudes on the question of
Turkish membership in the European Union. Not surprising-
ly, a majority of Europeans are unfavorable toward Turkish
membership. But a substantial majority also believe that
Turkey will ultimately join the European Union. Clearly,
many Europeans who dislike the idea of Turkish membership
also feel it is inevitable. In discussing this finding with Turk-
ish audiences, several explanations are offered. It might
simply be that Europeans are taking the long view and
accounting for flux in the evolution of Europe as well as
Turkey. More likely, many in Europe are weighing the Turkish
case in light of past enlargement experience, with a sense that
process and momentum are likely to outweigh public
reservations. Or it may be a statement about the perceived
2
democratic deficit in European decision-making (“we may
object, but in the end, Brussels will do as it likes...”). The
likelihood that Turkish accession will face critical public
referenda is not necessarily reflected in these responses.
Turkish audiences rightly voiced interest—and skepticism—
about the implications of this apparently encouraging result
for Turkey’s membership prospects.
More like the United States?
It would surprise and perhaps dismay many Turks to learn that
Turkish public attitudes may be more in line with the United
States than Europe in several respects. The survey shows that
publics on both sides of the Atlantic express very similar public
policy concerns, with economic security increasingly promi-
nent. Yet, with almost half the Turkish respondents favoring a
unilateral approach to international issues, it is worth asking
whether Turkish perspectives are not closer to those most often
ascribed to Washington. Certainly, a go it alone posture would
be eccentric in Europe. On questions of hard security, includ-
ing national sovereignty and homeland security, Turkish stra-
tegic culture often seems in closer alignment with the United
States than with Europe’s preference for soft power and diffuse
sovereignty. Admittedly, this can slip into strategic caricature.
But the contrasts are worth pondering as Turkey faces harder
foreign policy choices, and as public opinion weighs ever more
heavily in Turkish strategy—a point of clear convergence with
realities on both sides of the Atlantic.
Dr. Ian O. Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, GMF
Dr. Lesser is a GMF senior transatlantic fellow in Washington, DC,
where he focuses on Mediterranean affairs, Turkey, and international
security issues. Prior to joining GMF, he was a public policy scholar
at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Dr. Lesser
is also president of Mediterranean Advisors, LLC, a consultancy
specializing in geopolitical risk.
About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpar-
tisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated
to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between North
America and Europe. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany, on
the 25th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, as a permanent memorial to
Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides
of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF
has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade,
Ankara, and Bucharest.