Lawyer's Oath
6713 generally
I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines,
I will support the Constitution and obey
the laws as well as the legal orders of
the duly constituted authorities therein;
I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court;
I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, or give aid nor consent to the
same;
I will delay no man for money or malice,
and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion, with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to my clients;
and I impose upon myself these
voluntary obligations without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God.
1. Requirements before admission
to the bar or for practice of law
GRACE – MoR-LAB
- Good moral character
- Resident of the Philippines
- At least 21 years of age
- Citizen of the Philippines
- Evidence of good moral
character (satisfactory)
- Moral turpitude (no charges have
been filed or are pending)
- Roll of attorneys (sign) ,
certificate of license to practice
- Lawyer’s oath
- Academic Requirements
- Bar Examinations (pass)
DOCTRINE/S:
IN RE: SILVERIO BUFFE
Section 7 of R.A. No.
provides for the prohibited acts and
transactions of public officials and
employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits
them from engaging in the private
practice of their profession during their
incumbency. The Section 7 prohibitions
continue to apply for a period of one
year after the public official or
employee's resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except for
the private practice of profession under
subsection (b)(2), which can already be
undertaken even within the one-year
prohibition period.
The Section 7 prohibitions are
predicated on the principle that public
office is a public trust; and serve to
remove any impropriety, real or
imagined, which may occur in
government transactions between a
former government official or employee
and his or her former colleagues,
subordinates or superiors. The
prohibitions also promote the
observance and the efficient use of
every moment of the prescribed office
hours to serve the public.
A distinctive feature of this
administrative matter is Atty. Buffe's
admission that she immediately
engaged in private practice of law within
the one-year period of prohibition stated
in Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713. A
clerk of court can already engage in the
practice of law immediately after her
separation from the service and without
any period limitation that applies to other
prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A. No.
6713. The clerk of court's limitation is
that she cannot practice her profession
within one year before the office where
he or she used to work with. In a
comparison between a resigned, retired
or separated official or employee, on the
one hand, and an incumbent official or
employee, on the other, the former has
the advantage because the limitation is
only with respect to the office he or she
used to work with and only for a period
of one year. The incumbent cannot
practice at all, save only where
specifically allowed by the Constitution
and the law and only in areas where no
conflict of interests exists. This analysis
again disproves Atty. Buffe's basic
premises. By acting in a manner that
R.A. No. 6713 brands as "unlawful,"
Atty. Buffe contravened Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. SC fined Buffe and gave
a stern warning.
NOE LACSAMANA V BUSMENTE:
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states: A lawyer shall not,
directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the
very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded
on public interest and policy. Public
policy requires that the practice of law
be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character.
The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails
to maintain proper standards of moral
and professional conduct. The purpose
is to protect the public, the court, the
client, and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the
Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see
that this purpose is attained.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s
employment in his office ended in 2000
and that Dela Rosa was able to continue
with her illegal practice of law through
connivance with Macasieb, another
member of Busmente’s staff. As pointed
out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed
that Macasieb resigned from his office in
2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to
represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings
and court notices were still sent to
Busmente’s office until 2005. The IBP-
CBD noted that Dela Rosa’s practice
should have ended in 2003 when
Macasieb left.
These facts clearly showed that
Busmnete indeed assisted Dela Rosa in
her illegal practice of law that warranted
his six-month suspension to practice
law.
IN RE: MEDADO
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that, “A lawyer
shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in
the unauthorized practice of law.”
Previous violations of Canon 9 have
warranted the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law. As Medado is
not yet a full-fledged lawyer, the Court
cannot suspend him from the practice of
law. However, the Court see it fit to
impose upon him a penalty akin to
suspension by allowing him to sign in
the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after
receipt of the Resolution and a fine of
Php 32,000.
By not allowing Medado to sign would
be akin to imposing upon him the
ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty
that we have reserved for the most
serious ethical transgressions of
members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show
that this action is warranted. For one,
petitioner demonstrated good faith and
good moral character when he finally
filed the instant Petition to Sign in the
Roll of Attorneys. Note that it was not a
third party who called the Court’s
attention to petitioner’s omission; rather,
it was Medado himself who
acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after
the passage of more than 30 years.
For another, petitioner has not been submitted the following:
subject to any action for disqualification
from the practice of law, Finally, Medado 1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of
appears to have been a competent and Philippine Citizenship;
able legal practitioner, having held
various positions. 2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine
citizenship);
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth
to become a full-fledged member of the 3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
Philippine Bar. While the practice of law the Philippines;
is not a right but a privilege this Court
will not unwarrantedly withhold this 4. Certificate of Re-
privilege from individuals who have Acquisition/Retention of Philippine
shown mental fitness and moral fiber to Citizenship issued by the Bureau of
withstand the rigors of the profession. Immigration, in lieu of the IC;

IN RE: MUNESES 5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of

In a Bar Matter No. 1678, dated
December 17, 2007, Dacanay case, the
Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship
is a requirement for admission to the bar
and is, in fact, a continuing requirement
for the practice of law. The loss thereof
means termination of the petitioner’s
membership in the bar; ipso jure the
privilege to engage in the practice of
law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born
citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are deemed to have re-acquired
their Philippine citizenship upon taking
the oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country and later re-
acquires his Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member
of the Philippine Bar. However, as
stated in Dacanay, the right to resume
the practice of law is not automatic. R.A.
No. 9225 provides that a person who
intends to practice his profession in the
Philippines must apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice.
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications
laid down by the Court for the practice of
law, the OBC required, and
incompliance thereof, petitioner
the IBP-Surigao City
Chapter attesting to his good moral
character as well as his updated
payment of annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for
the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the
MCLE for the 2nd compliance period;
and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008
of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos,
Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program,
University of Cebu, College of Law
attesting to his compliance with the
MCLE.
The petition was thus granted, subject to
the condition that he shall re-take the
Lawyer’s Oath and subject to the
payment of appropriate fees.
2. Law Student Rule/ Student
Practice Rule
- a law student who successfully
completed his 3rd year of the
regular 4-year prescribed law
 curriculum and is enrolled in a
recognized law school’s clinical
legal education program
approved by the SC, may
appear, without compensation, in
any civil, criminal, or
administrative case before any
trial court, tribunal, board or
officer, to represent indigent
clients accepted by the Legal
Clinic of the law school. The
student shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a
member of the IBP duly
accredited by the law school if
he appears in the RTC and
without such supervision if he
appears in an inferior court as an
agent or friend of a party.
- The phrase direct supervision
and control requires the physical
presence of the supervising
lawyer during the hearing
DOCTRINE/S:
CANTIMBUHAN VS CRUZ
A non-member of the Philippine Bar—a
party to an action is authorized to
appear in court and conduct his own
case; and, in the inferior courts, the
litigant may be aided by a friend or
agent or by an attorney. However, in the
Courts of First Instance, now Regional
Trial Courts, he can be aided only by an
attorney.
The permission of the fiscal is not
necessary for one to enter his
appearance as private prosecutor. In the
first place, the law does not impose this
condition. What the fiscal can do, if he
wants to handle the case personally is
to disallow the private prosecutor's
participation, whether he be a lawyer or
not, in the trial of the case. On the other
hand, if the fiscal desires the active
participation of the private prosecutor,
he can just manifest to the court that the
private prosecutor, with its approval, will
conduct the prosecution of the case
under his supervision and control
Further, We may add that if a non-
lawyer can appear as defense counsel
or as friend of the accused in a case
before the municipal trial court, with
more reason should he be allowed to
appear as private prosecutor under the
supervision and control of the trial fiscal.
3. Solicitation of legal services
DOCTRINE/S:
LINSANGAN VS TOLENTINO
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a
lawyer shall not do or permit to be done
any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited
from soliciting cases for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers. Such actuation
constitutes malpractice, a ground for
disbarment. Rule 2.03 should be read in
connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR
which provides that lawyer, shall not for
any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man’s cause. This rule
proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the
solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or
through an agent in order to gain
employment) as a measure to protect
the community from barratry and
champerty. In the case at bar,
complainant presented substantial
evidence (consisting of the sworn
statements of the very same persons
coaxed by Labiano and referred to
respondent’s office) to prove that
respondent indeed solicited legal
business as well as profited from
referrals’ suits. Through Labiano’s
actions, respondent’s law practice was
benefited. Hapless seamen were
enticed to transfer representation on the
strength of Labiano’s word that
respondent could produce a more
favorable result. Based on the
foregoing, respondent clearly solicited
employment violating Rule 2.03, and
Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and
section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. Any act of solicitations constitutes
malpractice which calls for the exercise
of the Court’s disciplinary powers.
Violation of anti- solicitation statues
warrants serious sanctions for initiating
contact with a prospective client for the
purpose of obtaining employment. Thus
in this jurisdiction, the Court adheres to
the rule to protect the public from the
Machiavellian machinations of
unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the
nobility of the legal profession.
DISBARRED.
KHAN, JR VS SIMBILLO
It has been repeatedly stressed that the
practice of law is not a business. It is a
profession in which duty to public
service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily
meant to be a money-making venture,
and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of
a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service
and to the administration of justice
should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.
The following elements distinguish the
legal profession from a business:
(1) A duty of public service, of which the
emolument is a by- product, and in
which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money;
(2) A relation as an “officer of the court”
to the administration of justice involving
thorough sincerity, integrity and
reliability;
(3) A relation to clients in the highest
degree of fiduciary; and
(4) A relation to colleagues at the bar
characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or
dealing directly with their clients.
The solicitation of legal business is not
altogether proscribed. However, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession. If it were made in a modest
and decorous manner, it would bring no
injury to the lawyer and to the bar. Thus,
the use of simple signs stating the name
or names of the lawyers, the office and
residence address and fields of practice,
as well as advertisement in legal
periodicals bearing the same brief data,
are permissible. Even the use of calling
cards is now acceptable. Publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct
imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is
likewise allowable.
DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS
VS BAYOT
Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that “the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru
paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.” The advertisement he
caused to be published is a brazen
solicitation of business from the public.”
It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. The
Supreme Court again emphasized that
best advertisement for a lawyer is the
establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. But because of Bayot’s
plea for leniency and his promise and
the fact that he did not earn any case by
reason of the ad, the Supreme Court
merely reprimanded him.
ULEP VS LEGAL CLINIC
The Legal Clinic is engaged in the
practice of law and such practice is not
allowed. Respondent is composed
mainly of paralegals; the services it
offers include various legal problems
wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to
complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive
functions of lawyers engaged in the
practice of law. Under Philippine
jurisdiction however, the services being
offered by Legal Clinic which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by
paralegals. Only a person duly admitted
as a member of the bar and who is in
good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.
The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and
ENJOIN The Legal Clinic, Inc., from
issuing or causing the publication or
dissemination of any advertisement in
any form which is of the same or similar
tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and
"B" of this petition, and from conducting,
directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by
law or the Code of Professional Ethics
as indicated herein.
4. Attorney’s fees and
compensation for legal services
DOCTRINE/S:
PEOPLE VS ESTEBIA
An attorney's duty of prime importance
is "to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers. The first Canon of the Code of
Ethics enjoins a lawyer "to maintain
towards the Courts a respectful attitude,
not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for
the maintenance of its supreme
importance." By the oath of office, the
lawyer undertook to "obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities."
Adriano as an official member of the bar
and as appointed by the Court as a
counsel de officio is expected "to render
the required service." A lawyer so
appointed "as counsel for an indigent
prisoner", our Canons of Professional
Ethics demand, "should always exert his
best efforts" in the indigent's behalf.
It is true that he is a court-appointed
counsel, he has as high duty to the
accused as one employed and paid by
defendant himself, he must exercise his
best efforts and professional ability in
behalf of the person assigned to his
care to render effective assistance. The
accused defendant expects of him due
diligence, not mere perfunctory
representation.
There should be equal importance to a
defended party whether he is able to
afford the services of a lawyer or not. It
has been said that courts should "have
no hesitancy in demanding high
standards of duty of attorneys appointed
to defend indigent persons charged with
crime." For, indeed, a lawyer who is a
vanguard in the bastion of justice is
expected to have a bigger dose of social
conscience and a little less of self-
interest. Because of this, a lawyer
should remain ever conscious of his
duties to the indigent he defends.
In the present case, counsel's pattern of
conduct, it would seem to us, reveals a
propensity on the part of counsel to
disregard his obligation as counsel de
oficio and of the courtesy and respect
that should be accorded this Court.
For the reasons given, Attorney Lope E.
Adriano is suspended from the practice
of law throughout the Philippines for a
period of one (1) year
RUSTIA V. JUDGE OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF BATANGAS
Both at the common law and under
section 32 of the Code of Civil
Procedure a client may dismiss his
lawyer at any time or at any stage of the
proceedings and there is nothing to
prevent a litigant from appearing before
the court to conduct his own litigation.
(Sec. 34, Code of Civil Procedure.) The
client has also an undoubted right to
compromise a suit without the
intervention of his lawyer.
The clients did nothing that they did not
have a perfect right to do. By appearing
personally and presenting a motion they
impliedly dismissed their lawyer. The
petitioner's contingent interest in the
judgment rendered did not appear of
record. Neither as a party in interest nor
as an attorney was he therefore entitled
to notice of the motion.
As to the second proposition that the
court below could not dismiss the case
after the bill of exceptions had been
approved, it is very true upon such
approval the lower court loses its
jurisdiction over all contentious matters
connected with the issues in the case.
But there is nothing to prevent all of the
parties by agreement to withdraw the bill
of exceptions with the consent of said
court and resubmit the case to the
jurisdiction of the court. That was all that
was done in this case. A valid
agreement between the parties to a
case is the law of the case in everything
covered by the agreement. The
petitioner might have protected his
interests by entering an attorney's lien
under section 37 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
RILLORAZA V. EASTERN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC.
RADA is entitled to attorney’s fees but
the Supreme Court remanded the case
to the court of origin for the
determination of the amount of
attorney’s fees to which the petitioner is
entitled.
Atty. Rilloraza handled the case from its
inception until ETPI terminated the law
firm’s servicesin 1988. Petitioner’s claim
for attorney’s fees hinges on two
grounds: first, the fact that Atty.
Rilloraza personally handled the case
when he was working for SAGA, and
second, the retainer agreement.
Whether there is an agreement or not,
the courts shall fix a reasonable
compensation which lawyers may
receive for their professional services.”
“A lawyer has
the right to be paid for the legal services
he has extended to his client ,which
compensation must be reasonable.” A
lawyer would be entitled to receive what
he merits for his services. Otherwise
stated, the amount must be determined
on a quantum merit basis.”
TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES
UNION-INDEPENDENT V. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
There are 2 commonly accepted
concepts of attorney’s fees, the so-
called ordinary and extraordinary. In its
ordinary concept, an attorney’s fee is
the reasonable compensation paid to a
lawyer by his client for the legal services
he has rendered to the latter. The basis
of this compensation is the fact of his
employment by and his agreement with
the client. In its extraordinary concept,
an attorney’s fee is an indemnity for
damages ordered by the court to be
paid by the losing party in a litigation.
The basis of this is any of the cases
provided by law where such award can
be made, such as those authorized in
Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable
not to the lawyer but to the client, unless
they have agreed that the award shall
pertain to the lawyer as additional
compensation or as part thereof.
It is the first type of attorney’s fees
which private respondent demanded
before the labor arbiter. A claim for
attorney’s fees may be asserted either
in the very action in which the services
of a lawyer had been rendered or in a
separate action. While a claim for
attorney’s fees may be filed before the
judgment is rendered, the determination
as to the propriety of the fees or as to
the amount thereof will have to be held
in abeyance until the main case from
which the lawyer’s claim for attorney’s
fees may arise has become final.
Otherwise, the determination to be
made by the courts will be premature.
Of course, a petition for attorney’s fees
may be filed before the judgment in
favor of the client is satisfied or the
proceeds thereof delivered to the client.
Private respondent was well within his
rights when he made his claim and
waited for the finality of the judgment for
holiday pay differential, instead of filing it
ahead of the award’s complete
resolution.
The P3,000.00 which petitioner pays
monthly to private respondent does not
cover the services the latter actually
rendered before the LA and the NLRC in
behalf of the former. As stipulated in
their retainer’s agreement, the monthly
fee is intended merely as a recoverable by him from his client.
consideration for the law firm’s
commitment to render the services.
There are two kinds of retainer fees a
client may pay his lawyer. These are a
general retainer, or a retaining fee, and
a special retainer. A general retainer, or
retaining fee, is the fee paid to a lawyer
to secure his future services as general
counsel for any ordinary legal problem
that may arise in the routinary business
of the client and referred to him for legal
action. The future services of the lawyer
are secured and committed to the
retaining client. For this, the client pays
the lawyer a fixed retainer fee. The fees
are paid whether or not there are cases
referred to the lawyer. The reason for
the remuneration is that the lawyer is
deprived of the opportunity of rendering
services for a fee to the opposing party
or other parties. In fine, it is a
compensation for lost opportunities. A
special retainer is a fee for a specific
case handled or special service
rendered by the lawyer for a client. A
client may have several cases
demanding special or individual
attention. If for every case there is a
separate and independent contract for
attorney’s fees, each fee is considered a
special retainer. The P3,000.00 monthly
fee provided in the retainer agreement
between the union and the law firm
refers to a general retainer, or a
retaining fee, as said monthly fee covers
only the law firm’s commitment to render
the legal services enumerated in said
agreement.
Whether there is an agreement or not,
the courts can fix a reasonable
compensation which lawyers should
receive for their professional services.
The measure of compensation for
private respondent’s services as against
his client should properly be addressed
by the rule of quantum meruit which
means “as much as he deserves,” which
is used in the absence of a contract, but
Where a lawyer is employed without a
price for his services being agreed
upon, the courts shall fix the amount on
quantum meruit basis.
The criteria found in the Code of
Professional Responsibility are to be
considered, in assessing the proper
amount. These are: TNIS-PCAC2-P
(a) time spent and the extent of services
rendered or required;
(b) novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved;
(c) importance of the subject matter;
(d) skill demanded;
(e) probability of losing other
employment as a result of acceptance of
the proffered case;
(f) customary charges for similar
services and the schedule of fees of the
IBP chapter to which the lawyer
belongs;
(g) amount involved in the controversy
and the benefits resulting to the client
from the services;
(h) contingency or certainty
compensation;
(i) character of the employment, whether
occasional or established; and
(j) professional standing of the lawyer.
NAVARRO v. Solidum, Jr.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent
misled Navarro and Presbitero
regarding the issuance of the postdated
checks. The IBP- CBD also found that
respondent had not been transparent in
liquidating the money he received in
connection with Presbitero’s VOS with
DAR. He was also negligent in his
accounting regarding the registration of
Yulo’s property which was financed by
Navarro.
The IBP-CBD also found that
respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule
16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he failed to properly
account for the various funds he
received from complainants. In addition,
the IBP-CBD found that respondent
violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which
prohibits borrowing money from a client
unless the client’s interest is fully
protected or the client is given
independent advice. Clearly, respondent
had been negligent in properly
accounting for the money he received
from his client, Presbitero. Indeed, his
failure to return the excess money in his
possession gives rise to the
presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the
prejudice of, and in violation of the trust
reposed in him by, the client.
5. Confidentiality & privilege
communications between
lawyers and clients
A. A lawyer shall preserve the secrets
of a prospective client
of
Rule 15.02. A lawyer shall be bound by
the rule on privileged communication in
respect of matters disclosed to him by a
prospective client.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client
to a lawyer are protected by the rule on
privileged communications even if the
prospective client does not thereafter
retain the lawyer or the lawyer declines
the employment. (Reason: To make the
prospective client discuss freely
whatever he wishes with the lawyer
without fear that what he discloses will
not be divulged nor used against him
and for the lawyer to be equally free to
obtain information from such
prospective client.)
B. ROC RULE 130 SECTION 24
Section 24. Disqualification by reason
of privileged communication. — The
following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or
after the marriage, cannot be examined
without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during
the marriage except in a civil case by
one against the other, or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one
against the other or the latter's direct
descendants or ascendants;
(b) An attorney cannot, without the
consent of his client, be examined as to
any communication made by the client
to him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of, or with a view to, professional
employment, nor can an attorney's
secretary, stenographer, or clerk be
examined, without the consent of the
client and his employer, concerning any
fact the knowledge of which has been
acquired in such capacity;
(c) A person authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in
a civil case, without the consent of the
patient, be examined as to any advice or
treatment given by him or any
information which he may have acquired
in attending such patient in a
professional capacity, which information
was necessary to enable him to act in
capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the patient;
(d) A minister or priest cannot, without
the consent of the person making the
confession, be examined as to any
confession made to or any advice given
by him in his professional character in
the course of discipline enjoined by the
church to which the minister or priest
belongs;
(e) A public officer cannot be examined
during his term of office or afterwards,
as to communications made to him in
official confidence, when the court finds
that the public interest would suffer by
the disclosure.
C. CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL
PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND
SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN
AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATION IS TERMINATED.
Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal
the confidences or secrets of his client
except:
(a) When authorized by the client after
acquainting him of the consequences of
the disclosure;
(b) When required by law;
(c) When necessary to collect his fees
or to defend himself, his employees or
associates or by judicial action.
Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the
disadvantage of his client, use
information acquired in the course of
employment, nor shall he use the same
to his own advantage or that of a third
person, unless the client with full
knowledge of the circumstances
consents thereto.
Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without
the written consent of his client, give
information from his files to an outside
agency seeking such information for
auditing, statistical, bookkeeping,
accounting, data processing, or any
similar purpose.
Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the
affairs of a client of the firm to partners
or associates thereof unless prohibited
by the client.
Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such
measures as may be required to prevent
those whose services are utilized by
him, from disclosing or using
confidences or secrets of the clients.
Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid
indiscreet conversation about a client's
affairs even with members of his family.
Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal
that he has been consulted about a
particular case except to avoid possible
conflict of interest.
D. ROC, RULE 138. Attorneys and
Admission to Bar
Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is
the duty of an attorney:
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence,
and at every peril to himself, to preserve
the secrets of his client, and to accept
no compensation in connection with his
client's business except from him or with
his knowledge and approval
E. CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES
FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL
OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
REPOSED IN HIM.
F. REVISED PENAL CODE, ARTICLE
209
Art. 209.Betrayal of trust by an
attorney or solicitor. —
Revelation of secrets. — In addition to
the proper administrative action, the
penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period, or a fine ranging from
200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any attorney-at-law or
solicitor ( procurador judicial) who, by
any malicious breach of professional
duty or of inexcusable negligence or
ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or
reveal any of the secrets of the latter
learned by him in his professional
capacity.
The same penalty shall be imposed
upon an attorney-at-law or solicitor
(procurador judicial) who, having
undertaken the defense of a client or
having received confidential information
from said client in a case, shall
undertake the defense of the opposing
party in the same case, without the
consent of his first client.
G. PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
RULES OF COURT, SECTION 24(d),
Rule 130
SEC.24(d) A minister or priest cannot,
without the consent of the person
making the confession, be examined as
to any confession made to or any advice
given by him in his professional
character in the course of discipline
enjoined by the church to which the
minister or priest belongs
DOCTRINE/S:
REGALA v. Sandiganbayan
The court held that the client identity in
this case is privileged. As a matter of
public policy, a client's identity should
not be shrouded in mystery. This
general rule is however qualified by
some important exceptions:
1) Client identity is privileged
where a strong probability exists
that revealing the client's name
would implicate that client in the
very activity for which he sought
the lawyer's advice.
2) Where disclosure would open
the client to civil liability
3) Where the government's
lawyers have no case against an
attorney's client unless, by
revealing the client's name, the
said name would furnish the
only link that would form the
chain of testimony necessary to
convict an individual of a crime.
The circumstances involving the
engagement of lawyers in the case at
bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the
instant case falls under the first and third
exception.
The attorney-client privilege, as
currently worded in the Rules of Court
provides the disqualification by reason
of privileged communication. Rule 138
of the Rules of Court further emphasizes
the importance of maintaining client
confidence. Furthermore, this duty is
explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity
to client.
HADLUJA V. MADIANDA
The moment complainant approached
the then receptive respondent to seek
legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client
relationship evolved between the two.
Such relationship imposes upon the
lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed
by the ethics of the profession. Among
the burdens of the relationship is that
which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in
this instance, to keep inviolate
confidential information acquired or
revealed during legal consultations. The
fact that one is, at the end of the day,
not inclined to handle the client’s case is
hardly of consequence. Of little moment,
too, is the fact that no formal
professional engagement follows the
consultation. Nor will it make any
difference that no contract whatsoever
was executed by the parties to
memorialize the relationship.
Essential factors to establish the
existence of the attorney-client privilege
communication:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is
sought (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by
the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal
advisor, (8) except the protection be
waived.
As found by the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, the documents shown
and the information revealed in
confidence to the respondent in the
course of the legal consultation in
question, were used as bases in the
criminal and administrative complaints
lodged against the complainant. The
purpose of the rule of confidentiality is
actually to protect the client from
possible breach of confidence as a
result of a consultation with a lawyer.
GENATO V. SILAPAN
The Supreme Court affirmed the
findings and recommendation of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines that
respondent's allegations and disclosures
in the foreclosure case amount to a
breach of fidelity sufficient to warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanction
against him. Respondent's explanation
that it was necessary for him to make
the disclosures in his pleadings failed to
satisfy the Court. The disclosures were
not indispensable to protect his rights as
they were not pertinent to the
foreclosure case. It was improper for the
respondent to use it against the
complainant in the foreclosure case as it
was not the subject matter of litigation
therein and respondent's professional
competence and legal advice were not
being attacked in said case. The Court
stressed that a lawyer must conduct
himself, especially in his dealings with
his clients, with integrity in a manner
that is beyond reproach. His relationship
with his clients should be characterized
by the highest degree of good faith and
fairness. SUSPENDED – 6 MONTHS.
U.S. V. HORN
An attorney may invoke the privilege to
protect the identity of a client or
information regarding a client's fee
arrangements if disclosure would
"convey[ ] information which ordinarily
would be conceded to be part of the
usual privileged communication
between attorney and client." Thus, for
example, the identity of a client is
privileged information if revelation of that
identity would constitute an
acknowledgement of guilt of the offense
that led the client to seek legal
assistance.
The terms "confidential" and
"incriminating" are not synonymous. In
order to qualify for the protection
afforded by the attorney-client privilege,
information regarding client identity or
legal fees must be "in substance a
disclosure of the confidential
communication in the professional
relationship between the client and the
attorney." Neither the identities of Horn's
five clients nor the bare financial details
of their fee arrangements with Horn
satisfy that standard.
The court declines to hold, however,
that the government may interpret the
restriction on a subpoenaed witness's
right to invoke the attorney-client
privilege as license to discount the
privilege entirely when formulating its
request for information. The
presumption of legitimacy that is
accorded to grand jury investigations
does not relieve the government of its
obligation to attempt to prepare a proper
subpoena--to make a reasonable effort
to request only those documents that
are relevant and non-privileged,
consistent with the extent of its
knowledge about the matter under
investigation. The subpoena at issue
here seeks the widest possible range of
privileged information--all information
relating to clients' financial transactions--
by and between a large number of
entities over a lengthy period of time--
over 6 1/2 years. To compel Horn to
present all of that material to the district
court with explanations as to each of the
privileged portions, in the absence of
any good faith effort by the government
to draw a narrow and lawful subpoena,
would constitute an unreasonable and
undue burden upon the subpoenaed
witness.
The government argues, finally, that the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-
client privilege may apply, but that it
need not make the showing required of
it with respect to that exception until the
district court has determined which, if
any, of the documents are privileged.
Whatever the merits of the government's
argument, it does not advance its cause
here. Before Horn can be required to
submit the type of information requested
here to the court, a proper subpoena
would have to be issued. The present
subpoena is invalid and may not be
used for any purpose. Accordingly, Horn
was not required to produce the
requested documents for in camera
inspection by the district court and his
failure to do so does not defeat his
appeal.
U.S. V. DEL CARPIO-COTRINA
The law provides that if a lawyer learns
in the course of representation "that a
client intends prospective conduct that is
criminal," the lawyer "shall reveal
information in order to prevent such
consequences." In addition, the lawyer
must disclose confidential information
when necessary to avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act by the client.
The Court concludes that De Fabio was
required to inform the Court that he had
a firm factual basis for believing that his
client would not appear for trial before
moving for a continuance of the trial
date. Disclosure was necessary to
"avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent
act by the client," and "to prevent a
client from committing a crime,". The
Court does not believe that this holding
creates a conflict for an attorney
between his duties to a client and to the
court. "The duty of a lawyer to his client
and his duty to the legal system are the
same: to represent his client zealously
within the bounds of the law.
6. Conflict of interest in a regular
lawyer-client relationship
DOCTRINE/S:
LIM JR. VS VILLAROSA
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) highlights the need
for candor, fairness and loyalty in all the
dealings of lawyers with their clients.
Rule 15.03 of the CPR aptly provides:
o Rule 15.03 – A lawyer
shall not represent
conflicting interests
except by written consent
of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of
the facts.
There is representation of conflicting
interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to do
anything which will injuriously affect
his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he
will be called upon in his new relation, to
use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their
connection
The rule on conflict of interests covers
not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided but
also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used
Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney
from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client
or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance
thereof, and also whether he will be
called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge
acquire in the previous
employment. The first part of the rule
refers to cases in which the opposing
parties are present clients either in the
same action or in a totally unrelated
case; the second part pertains to those
in which the adverse party against
whom the attorney appears is his former
client in a matter which is related,
directly or indirectly, to the present
controversy
The rule prohibits a lawyer from
representing new clients whose
interests oppose those of a former client
in any manner, whether or not they are
parties in the same action or in totally
unrelated cases.
PORMENTO SR. PONTEVEDRA
Jurisprudence instructs that there is a
representation of conflicting interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to do anything
which will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represents him
and also whether he will be called upon
in his new relation, to use against his
first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection.
Another test to determine if there is a
representation of conflicting interests is
whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the
full discharge of his duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof.
A lawyer is forbidden from representing
a subsequent client against a former
client when the subject matter of the
present controversy is related, directly
or indirectly, to the subject matter of the
previous litigation in which he appeared
for the former client.
Conversely, he may properly act as
counsel for a new client, with full
disclosure to the latter, against a former
client in a matter wholly unrelated to that
of the previous employment, there being
in that instance no conflict of interests.
The only established participation
respondent had with respect to the
parcel of land purchased by
complainant, is that he was the one who
notarized the deed of sale of the said
land. On that basis alone, it does not
necessarily follow that respondent
obtained any information from herein
complainant that can be used to the
detriment of the latter in the ejectment
case he filed.
SAMSON VS ERA
The lawyer-client relationship did not
terminate when the parties entered into
a compromise settlement, for the fact
remained that he still needed to oversee
the implementation of the settlement as
well as to proceed with the criminal
cases until they were dismissed or
otherwise concluded by the trial court.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides
that: "A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts."
Atty. Era thus owed to Samson and his
group entire devotion to their genuine
interest, and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of their rights.
He was expected to exert his best
efforts and ability to preserve the clients’
cause, for the unwavering loyalty
displayed to his clients likewise served
the ends of justice.
Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived
attempt to explain his disloyalty to
Samson and his group, the termination
of the attorney-client relationship does
not justify a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that
of the former client.
The spirit behind this rule is that the
client’s confidence once given should
not be stripped by the mere expiration of
the professional employment. Even after
the severance of the relation, a lawyer
should not do anything that will
injuriously affect his former client in any
matter in which the lawyer previously
represented the client.
Nor should the lawyer disclose or use
any of the client’s confidences acquired
in the previous relation. In this regard,
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly declares that:
"A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him."
The lawyer’s highest and most
unquestioned duty is to protect the client
at all hazards and costs even to
himself.
The protection given to the client is
perpetual and does not cease with the
termination of the litigation, nor is it
affected by the client’s ceasing to
employ the attorney and retaining
another, or by any other change of
relation between them. It even survives
the death of the client.
NAKPIL VS VALDEZ
Representation of conflicting interests
may be allowed only upon full disclosure
of the facts among all concerned
parties, as to the extent of conflict and
probable adverse outcome.
The preparation of claims of the
creditors against the estate is obviously
improper because he had to fight for
one side, the claims he was defending
against for the other side.
The defense that he had already
resigned from the law firm was not
supported by evidence.
His resignation from the accounting firm
only shows that he was absent for quite
some time but returned to work during
the tenure of the litigation of claims.
Thus, he cannot claim ignorance of the
case.
The test of impropriety of representation
of conflicting interests is not the
certainty of such existence but mere
probability for it to exist.
Even though he could have committed
such misconduct not as a lawyer but as
an accountant, the court is not divested
of jurisdiction to punish a lawyer for
misconduct committed outside the legal
field, as the good moral character
requirement is not only a requisite for
entrance to the bar but a continuing
requirement for the practice of law.
A lawyer should always act to promote
public confidence to the legal
profession.
7. Conflict of Interest of Corporate
Lawyers
DOCTRINE/S:
HORNILLA VS SALUNAT
A lawyer engaged as counsel for a
corporation cannot represent members
of the same corporation's board of
directors in a derivative suit brought
against them. To do so would be
tantamount to representing conflicting
interests, which is prohibited by the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
There is conflict of interest when a
lawyer represents inconsistent interests
of two or more opposing parties. The
test is "whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for
an issue or claim, but it is his duty to
oppose it for the other client. In brief, if
he argues for one client, this argument
will be opposed by him when he argues
for the other client." This rule covers not
only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided,
but also those in which no confidence
has been bestowed or will be used.
Also, there is conflict of interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act
which will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represents him
and also whether he will be called upon
in his new relation to use against his first
client any knowledge acquired through
their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof.
SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA
FOUNDATION, INC., vs. ATTY.
RICHARD V. FUNK
The Supreme Court ruled that the
evidence shows
that Hocorma Foundation availed itself
of the legal services of Atty. Funk in
connection with, among others, the
transfer of one of the properties subject
of the several suits that the lawyer
subsequently filed against
the foundation. Indeed,
Atty. Funk collected attorney's fees from
the foundation for such services. Thus,
he had an obligation not to use any
knowledge he acquired during that
relationship, including the fact that the
property under litigation existed at all,
when he sued the foundation.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of
the CPR provides that a lawyer cannot
represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.
An attorney owes his client undivided
allegiance. Because of the highly
fiduciary nature of their relationship,
sound public policy dictates that he be
prohibited from representing conflicting
interests or discharging inconsistent
duties. An attorney may not, without
being guilty of professional misconduct,
act as counsel for a person whose
interest conflicts with that of his present
or former client. This rule is so absolute
that good faith and honest intention on
the erring lawyer's part does not make it
inoperative.
PACANA VS. PASCUAL LOPEZ
The absence of a written contract will
not preclude the finding that there was
a professional relationship between
the parties. Documentary formalism is
not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the
contract may be express or
implied. To establish the relation, it is
sufficient that the advice and
assistance of an attorney is sought
and received in any matter pertinent to
his profession.
PALM VS ILEDAN
Although the information about the
necessity to amend the corporate by-
laws may have been given to
respondent, it could not be considered a
confidential information. The
amendment, repeal or adoption of new
by-laws may be effected by "the board
of directors or trustees, by a majority
vote thereof, and the owners of at least
a majority of the outstanding capital
stock, or at least a majority of members
of a non-stock corporation". It means the
stockholders are aware of the proposed
amendments to the by-laws. While the
power may be delegated to the board of
directors or trustees, there is nothing in
the records to show that a delegation
was made in the present case. Further,
whenever any amendment or adoption
of new by-laws is made, copies of the
amendments or the new by-laws are
filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and attached to the
original articles of incorporation and by-
laws. The documents are public records
and could not be considered
confidential.
It is settled that the mere relation of
attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality. The client
must intend the communication to be
confidential.
In Quiambao v. Bamba, the Court
enumerated various tests to determine
conflict of interests. One test of
inconsistency of interests is whether the
lawyer will be asked to use against his
former client any confidential information
acquired through their connection or
previous employment. The Court has
ruled that what a lawyer owes his former
client is to maintain inviolate the client's
confidence or to refrain from doing
anything which will injuriously affect him
in any matter in which he previously
represented him.
We find no conflict of interest when
respondent represented Soledad in a
case filed by Comtech. The case where
respondent represents Soledad is an
Estafa case filed by Comtech against its
former officer. There was nothing in the
records that would show that
respondent used against Comtech any
confidential information acquired while
he was still Comtech's retained counsel.
Further, respondent made the
representation after the termination of
his retainer agreement with Comtech. A
lawyer's immutable duty to a former
client does not cover transactions that
occurred beyond the lawyer's
employment with the client. The intent
of the law is to impose upon the lawyer
the duty to protect the client's interests
only on matters that he previously
handled for the former client and not for
matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated.
8. Limitations/restrictions of
government lawyers in the
practice of law
Canon 6: THESE CANONS SHALL
APPLY TO LAWYERS IN
GOVERNMENT SERVICES IN THE
DISCHARGE OF THEIR TASKS.
Reason: A lawyer does not shed his
professional obligations upon
assumption of public office.
The term “public officials” includes
elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the career or noncareer
service, including military and police
personnel whether or not they receive
compensation regardless of amount.
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds
a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his
duties as a government official.
However, if said misconduct as a
government official also constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he
may be disciplined by this Court as a
member of the Bar.
DOCTRINE/S:
ALI V. BUBONG
The Code of Professional Responsibility
does not cease to apply to a lawyer
simply because he has joined the
government service. In fact, by the
express provision of Canon 6 thereof,
the rules governing the conduct of
lawyers shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of
their official tasks. Thus, where a
lawyers misconduct as a government
official is of such nature as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or to show
moral delinquency, then he may be
disciplined as a member of the bar on
such grounds. Although the general rule
is that a lawyer who holds a government
office may not be disciplined as a
member of the bar for infractions he
committed as a government official, he
may, however, be disciplined as a
lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a
violation of his oath as member of the
legal profession.
In the case at bar, respondents grave
misconduct, as established by the Office
of the President and subsequently
affirmed by this Court, deals with his
qualification as a lawyer. By taking
advantage of his office as the Register
of Deeds of Marawi City and employing
his knowledge of the rules governing
land registration for the benefit of his
relatives, respondent had clearly
demonstrated his unfitness not only to
perform the functions of a civil servant
but also to retain his membership in the
bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is explicit on
this matter. It reads:
Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government
service shall not use his public position
to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere
with his public duties.
Respondents conduct manifestly
undermined the peoples confidence in
the public office he used to occupy and
cast doubt on the integrity of the legal
profession. The ill-conceived use of his
knowledge of the intricacies of the law
calls for nothing less than the withdrawal The above provision
of his privilege to practice law. prohibits a lawyer
from using his or her
OLAZO V. TINGA public position to: (1)
promote private
Accountability of a government interests; (2)
lawyer in public office advance private
interests; or (3)
Canon 6 of the Code of allow private interest
Professional Responsibility highlights to interfere with his
the continuing standard of ethical or her public duties.
conduct to be observed by government We previously held
lawyers in the discharge of their official that the restriction
tasks. In addition to the standard of extends to all
conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713 government
for government employees, a lawyer in lawyers who use
the government service is obliged to their public offices to
observe the standard of conduct under promote their private
the Code of Professional Responsibility. interests.

Since public office is a public

trust, the ethical conduct demanded
upon lawyers in the government service
Applying these legal precepts
is more exacting than the standards for
to the facts of the case, we
those in private practice. Lawyers in the
find the absence of any
government service are subject to
concrete proof that the
constant public scrutiny under norms of
respondent abused his
public accountability. They also bear the
position as a Congressman
heavy burden of having to put aside
and as a member of the
their private interest in favor of the
Committee on Awards in the
interest of the public; their private
manner defined under Rule
activities should not interfere with the
6.02 of the Code of
discharge of their official functions.
Professional Responsibility.
The first charge involves a violation of
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It imposes the following
restrictions in the conduct of a First, the records do
government lawyer: not clearly show if the
complainant’s sales
A lawyer in the government application was ever brought
service shall not use before the Committee on
his public position to Awards.
promote or advance
his private interests,
nor allow the latter
to interfere with his
public duties. These circumstances
do not show that the
respondent did in any way
promote, advance or use his
private interests in the
discharge of his official duties.
Second, the complainants
allegation that the respondent
orchestrated the efforts to get the
subject land does not specify how the
orchestration was undertaken. What
appears clear in the records is the
uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay
of Miguel Olazo, dated May 25, 2003,
categorically stating that the respondent
had no interest in the subject land, and
neither was he a contracting party in the
transfer of his rights over the subject
land. In the absence of any specific
charge, Olazos disclaimer is the nearest
relevant statement on the respondents
alleged participation, and we find it to be
in the respondents favor.
Third, the other documents
executed by Miguel Olazo, that the
complainant presented to support his
claim that the respondent exerted undue
pressure and influence over his father
(namely: the letter, dated June 22, 1996,
to the DENR Regional Director-NCR;
the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July
12, 1996; and the Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated July 17, 1996), do not
contain any reference to the alleged
pressure or force exerted by the
respondent over Miguel Olazo. The
documents merely showed that the
respondent helped Miguel Olazo in
having his farm lots (covered by the
proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also
showed that the respondent merely
acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated July 17, 1996. We note
that Manuel had no personal
knowledge, other than what Miguel
Olazo told him, of the force allegedly
exerted by the respondent against
Miguel Olazo.
As a rule, government lawyers
are not allowed to engage in the private
practice of their profession during their
incumbency. By way of exception, a
government lawyer can engage in the
practice of his or her profession under
the following conditions: first, the private
practice is authorized by the
Constitution or by the law; and second,
the practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with his or her official functions.
The last paragraph of Section 7
provides an exception to the exception.
In case of lawyers separated from the
government service who are covered
under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7
of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition
is imposed to practice law in connection
with any matter before the office he
used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility echoes this
restriction and prohibits lawyers, after
leaving the government service, to
accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in the said service.
The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the term
intervene which we previously
interpreted to include an act of a person
who has the power to influence the
proceedings. Otherwise stated, to fall
within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the
respondent must have accepted
engagement or employment in a matter
which, by virtue of his public office, he
had previously exercised power to
influence the outcome of the
proceedings.
As the records show, no
evidence exists showing that the
respondent previously interfered with
the sales application covering Manuels
land when the former was still a member
of the Committee on Awards. The
complainant, too, failed to sufficiently
establish that the respondent was
engaged in the practice of law. At face
value, the legal service rendered by the
respondent was limited only in the
preparation of a single document. In
Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., we specifically
described private practice of law as one
that contemplates a succession of acts
of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding ones self to the
public as a lawyer.
In any event, even granting
that respondents act fell within the
definition of practice of law, the available
pieces of evidence are insufficient to
show that the legal representation was
made before the Committee on Awards,
or that the Assurance was intended to
be presented before it. These are
matters for the complainant to prove and
we cannot consider any uncertainty in
this regard against the respondents
favor.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT V.
SANDIGANBAYAN
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in
comprehending first, the meaning of
matter referred to in the rule and,
second, the metes and bounds of the
intervention made by the former
government lawyer on the matter. The
American Bar Association in its Formal
Opinion 342, defined matter as any
discrete, isolatable act as well as
identifiable transaction or conduct
involving a particular situation and
specific party, and not merely an act of
drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the
matter which was the subject of
intervention by respondent Mendoza
while he was the Solicitor General.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the matter or
the act of respondent Mendoza as
Solicitor General involved in the case at
bar is advising the Central Bank, on
how to proceed with the said banks
liquidation and even filing the petition for
its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. In
fine, the Court should resolve whether
his act of advising the Central Bank on
the legal procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is included within the
concept of matter under Rule 6.03.
We hold that this advice given by
respondent Mendoza on the procedure
to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter
contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. ABA
Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as
daylight in stressing that the drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government
or agency procedures, regulations or
laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law are acts which do not fall within the
scope of the term matter and cannot
disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for
the sake of argument that the above act
of respondent Mendoza falls within the
definition of matter per ABA Formal
Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the
said act of respondent Mendoza which
is the matter involved in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 is entirely different from the
matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Again, the plain facts speak for
themselves. It is given that respondent
Mendoza had nothing to do with the
decision of the Central Bank to liquidate
GENBANK. It is also given that he did
not participate in the sale of GENBANK
to Allied Bank. The matter where he
got himself involved was in informing
Central Bank on the procedure
provided by law to liquidate GENBANK
thru the courts and in filing the
necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 in the then Court of First
Instance. The subject matter of Sp.
Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the
same nor is related to but is different
from the subject matter in Civil Case
No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves
the sequestration of the stocks owned
by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied
Bank on the alleged ground that they
are ill-gotten. The case does not involve
the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it
involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied
Bank. Whether the shares of stock of
the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-
gotten is far removed from the issue of
the dissolution and liquidation of
GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated
by the Central Bank due, among others,
to the alleged banking malpractices of
its owners and officers. In other words,
the legality of the liquidation of
GENBANK is not an issue in the
sequestration cases. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the PCGG does not
include the dissolution and liquidation of
banks. It goes without saying that Code
6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to
respondent Mendoza because his
alleged intervention while a Solicitor
General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an
intervention on a matter different
from the matter involved in Civil Case
No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and
bounds of the intervention
contemplated by Rule 6.03. Intervene
means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or
extraneous feature or circumstance . . .
2: to occur, fall, or come in between
points of time or events . . . 3: to come
in or between by way of hindrance or
modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to
occur or lie between two things (Paris,
where the same city lay on both sides of
an intervening river . . .)
On the other hand, intervention is
defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening:
INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that
may affect the interests of others.
There are, therefore, two possible
interpretations of the word intervene.
Under the first interpretation, intervene
includes participation in a proceeding
even if the intervention is irrelevant or
has no effect or little influence.[43] Under
the second interpretation, intervene
only includes an act of a person who
has the power to influence the subject
proceedings. We hold that this second
meaning is more appropriate to give to
the word intervention under Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility
in light of its history. The evils sought to
be remedied by the Rule do not exist
where the government lawyer does an
act which can be considered as
innocuous such as x x x drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws,
or briefing abstract principles of law.
In fine, the intervention cannot be
insubstantial and insignificant.
Originally, Canon 36 provided that a
former government lawyer should not,
after his retirement, accept employment
in connection with any matter which he
has investigated or passed upon
while in such office or employ. As
aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the
phrase which he has investigated or
passed upon resulted in unjust
disqualification of former government
lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its
latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the
prohibition extended only to a matter in
which the lawyer, while in the
government service, had substantial
responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules
further constricted the reach of the rule.
MR 1.11(a) provides that a lawyer shall
not represent a private client in
connection with a matter in which the
lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a public officer or
employee.
It is, however, alleged that the
intervention of respondent Mendoza in
Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and
substantial. We disagree. For one, the
petition in the special proceedings is an
initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be
signed by respondent Mendoza as the
then sitting Solicitor General. For
another, the record is arid as to the
actual participation of respondent
Mendoza in the subsequent
proceedings. Indeed, the case was in
slumberville for a long number of years.
None of the parties pushed for its early
termination. Moreover, we note that the
petition filed merely seeks the
assistance of the court in the liquidation
of GENBANK. The principal role of the
court in this type of proceedings is to
assist the Central Bank in determining
claims of creditors against the
GENBANK. The role of the court is not
strictly as a court of justice but as an
agent to assist the Central Bank in
determining the claims of creditors. In
such a proceeding, the participation of
the Office of the Solicitor General is not
that of the usual court litigator protecting
the interest of government.
Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts
public office, he shall withdraw from the
firm and his name shall be dropped from
the firm name unless the law allows him
to practice law currently.
Reason: To prevent the law firm or
partners from making use of the name
of the public official to attract business
and to avoid suspicion of undue
influence.
If a partner of a law firm had been
appointed as a judge, his name in the
firm should be dropped because he is
no longer allowed to practice law. The
public will be misled if his name will be
retained.
Public officials who cannot practice
law in the Philippines
The following cannot practice law in the
Philippines:
1. Judges and other officials or
employees of the superior court
(Sec 35, rule 138, Rules of
Court);
2. Officials and employees of the
Office of the Solicitor General
(Sec 35, rule 138, Rules of
Court);
3. Government prosecutors;
4. President, Vice President,
members of the cabinet, their
deputies and assistant (Sec 13,
Art VII, 1987 Constitution);
5. Chairmen and members of the
Constitutional Commissions (Sec
2, Art IX, Constitution);
6. Ombudsman and his deputies;
7. Governors, city and municipal
mayors; and
8. Those who by special law are
prohibited from engaging in the
practice of the legal profession.
Public officials with restrictions in
the practice of law
1. Senators and members of the
House of Representatives (Sec
14, Art VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Sanggunian members;
3. Retired justice or judge – within
one year from the date of
retirement, the magistrate cannot
practice law in the particular
court where he performed his
official duties; and
4. Civil Service officers or
employees without permit from
their respective department
heads.
Restrictions in the practice of law on
members of the legislature
1. A lawyer-member of the
legislature is prohibited from
appearing as counsel before any
 courts of justice, electoral
tribunals or quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies. The
prohibition includes the mere
filing of a motion or any pleading.
2. Neither can he allow his name to
appear in such pleading by itself
or as part of a firm name under
the signature of another qualified
lawyer because the signature of
an agent amounts to a signing of
a non qualified senator or
congressman, the office of an
attorney being originally of
agency and because he will, by
such act, be appearing in court
or quasi-judicial agency or
administrative body in violation
of the constitutional restriction.
Restrictions in the Practice of law by
sanggunian members
Under the Local Government Code,
Sanggunian members shall not:
1 Appear as counsel before any
court in any civil case wherein a
local government unit or any
office, agency or instrumentality
of the government is the adverse
party;
2 Appear as counsel in any
criminal case wherein an officer
or employee of the national or
local government is accused of
an offense committed in relation
to his office;
3 Collect any fee for their
appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is
an official; and
4 Use property and personnel of
the government except when the
Sanggunian member concerned
is defending the interest of the
government.
Section 90 of RA 7160 governs the
practice of profession of elective
local officials
Unlike Governors, city mayors and
municipal mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panglungsod or
sangguniang bayan are required to hold
regular sessions only at least once a
week, and since the law itself grants
them the authority to practice their
professions, engage in any occupation
or teach in schools outside session
hours, there is no longer any need for
them to secure prior permission or
authorization from any other person or
office for any of these purposes.
Punong Barangay
On the other hand, a punong barangay
is not forbidden to practice his
profession but he should procure prior
permission or authorization from the
head of his department, as required by
civil service regulations.
A punong barangay who is also a lawyer
should obtain the prior written
permission of the DILG Secretary before
he enters his appearance as counsel for
any party and his failure to comply with
Section 12, rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer to obey
the laws.
Restrictions in the practice of law by
retired justices and judges
As a condition of the pension provided
under RA 910, no retiring justice or
judge of a court of record or any city or
municipal judge during the time that he
is receiving said pension shall appear as
counsel before any court in:
1. Any civil case wherein the
government or any subdivision
 or instrumentality thereof is the
adverse party;
2. Any criminal case wherein an
officer or an employee of the
government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to
his office; or
3. Collect any fees for his
appearance in any administrative
proceedings to maintain an
interest adverse to the
government, provincial or
municipal, or to any of its legally
constituted officers (Sec 1, RA
910)
Canon 15 – A LAWYER SHALL
OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND
LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Canon 15, Rule 15.06 – A lawyer shall
not state or imply that he is able to
influence any public official, tribunal
or legislative body.
DOCTRINE/S:
MADERADA VS MEDIODEA
The appearance of Maderada as
counsel was valid. A party’s right to
conduct litigation personally is
recognized by law. Section 34 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court provides that
when an individual litigates in his own
behalf, he is not considered to be in the
practice of law. Maderada appeared for
herself not for the public and did not
demand payment for it. Therefore, in
doing so, she cannot be said to have
been engaged in the practice of law.
What is prohibited is appearing as
counsel for her co plaintiff. It no longer
follows the raison de etre of protecting
ones own rights.
9. Notarial Law Violations
What are the purposes of Notarial
law?
(a) To promote, serve, and protect
public interest;
(b) To simplify, clarify, and
modernize the rules governing
notaries public; and
(c) To foster ethical conduct among
notaries’ public. (Sec 2, Rule I)
! Notarization should not be treated as
an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. It is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may
act as notaries public. (SPOUSES
VILLANUVA VS BERADIO)
What is the meaning of
“acknowledgement”?
It refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion:
(a) Appears in person before the
notary public and presents an
integrally complete instrument or
document;
(b) Is attested to be personally
known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of
identity as defined by the Rules;
(c) Represents to the notary public
that the signature on the
instrument or document was
voluntarily affixed by him for the
purposes stated in the
instrument or document as his
free and voluntary act and deed,
and, if he acts in a particular
representative capacity, that he
has the authority to sign in that
capacity. (Sec. 1, Rule II)
What is a Jurat?
“Jurat” refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion:
Appears in person before the notary
public and presents an instrument of
document;
Is personally known to the notary public
or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as
defined by the Rules;
Signs the instrument or document or
document in the presence of the notary;
and
Takes an oath or affirmation before the
notary public as to such instrument or
document. (Sec. 6, Rule II)
What is a Notarial Certificate?
A notarial certificate refers to the part of,
or attachment to, a notarized instrument
or document that is completed by the
notary public, bears the notary’s
signature and seal, and states the facts
attested to by the notary public in a
particular notarization as provided for by
the rules. (Sec. 8, Rule II)
The Notarial Certificate shall include the
following:
(a) The name of the notary public as
exactly indicated in the
commission;
(b) The serial number of the
commission of the notary public;
(c) The words “Notary Public” and
the province or city where the
notary public is commissioned,
the expiration date of the
commission, the office address
of the notary public; and
(d) The roll of attorney’s number, the
professional tax receipt number
and the place and date of
issuance thereof, and the IBP
membership number. (Sec. 2,
Rule VIII)
What is a notarial register?
“Notarial register” refers to a
permanently bound book with numbered
pages containing a chronological record
of notarial acts performed by a notary
public. (Sec. 5, Rule II)
What is the meaning of official seal?
“Official seal refers to circular metal
device, two inches in diameter
containing the mark, image or
impression of the name of the
city/province where the commission is
issued and the word Philippines and
notary public’s name on the margin and
the roll of attorney’s number on the face
thereof, with the words “notary public”
across the center, affixed on all papers
officially signed by the notary public.
(Sec. 13, Rule II)
Who is a principal?
Principal refers to a person appearing
before the notary public whose act is
subject of the notarization. (Sec. 10,
Rule II)
What is considered competent
evidence of identity?
Identification of an individual based on:
(a) At least one current identification
document issued by an official
agency bearing the photograph
and signature of the individual;
or
(b) The oath or affirmation of one
credible witness not privy to the
instrument, document or
transaction who each personally
knows the individual and shows
to the notary public documentary
identification. (Sec. 12, Rule II)
! A competent evidence of identity
guarantees that the person
appearing before the notary public is
the signatory to the instrument or
document to be notarized. If the
notary public does not personally
know the signatory, he must require
the signatory to present a competent
evidence of identity. (TUPAL VS
ROJO)
The Notary Public
! A notary public is an individual
authorized by state or local
government to officially witness
signatures on legal documents,
collect sworn statements and
administer oaths.
! The principal function of a notary
public is to authenticate documents.
When a notary public certifies to the
due execution and delivery of a
document under his hand and seal,
he gives the document the force of
evidence. Indeed, one of the
purposes of requiring documents to
be acknowledged before a notary
public, in addition to the solemnity
which should surround the execution
and delivery of documents, is to
authorize such documents to be
given without further proof of their
execution and delivery. A Rule III)
NOTARIAL DOCUMENT IS BY LAW
ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT UPON ITS FACE.
(CAALIM –VERZONILLA VS
PASCUA)
! The function of a notary public is,
among others, to guard against any
illegal or immoral arrangements.
That function would be defeated if
the notary public were one of the
signatories to the instrument. For
then, he would be interested in
sustaining the validity thereof as it
directly involves himself and the
validity of his own act. It would place
him in an inconsistent position, and
the very purpose of the
acknowledgment, which is to
minimize fraud, would be thwarted.
(VILLARIN VS SABATE)
What are the qualifications to be
commissioned notary public?
(1) Must be a citizen of the
Philippines;
(2) Must be over twenty-one (21)
years of age;
(3) Must be a resident in the
Philippines for at least one (1)
year and maintains a regular
place of work or business in the
city or province where the
commission is to be issued;
(4) Must be a member of the
Philippine Bar in good standing
with clearances from the Office of
the Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines;
and
(5) Must not have been convicted in
the first instance of any crime
involving moral turpitude. (Sec. 1,
What is the territorial jurisdiction and
term of a notarial commission?
A person commissioned as notary public
may perform notarial acts in any place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court for a period of two
(2) years commencing the first day of
January of the year in which the
commissioning is made, unless earlier
revoked or the notary public has
resigned under these Rules and the
Rules of Court. (Sec. 11, Rule III)
May the term be renewed?
YES. A notary public may file a written
application with the Executive Judge for
the renewal of his commission within
forty-five (45) days before the expiration
thereof. Failure to file said application
will result in the deletion of the name of
the notary public in the register of
notaries public.
The notary public thus removed from the
Register of Notaries Public may only be
reinstated therein after he is issued a
new commission in accordance with
these Rules. (section 13, Rule 3, ibid.)
Powers and Limitations of Notaries
Public (Sec. 1, Rule IV)
(a) A notary public is empowered to
perform the following notarial
acts:
(1) Acknowledgements;
(2) Oaths and affirmations;
(3) Jurats;
(4) Signature witnessing;
(5) Copy certifications; and
(6) Any other act authorized by
the Rules.
(b) A notary public is authorized to
certify the affixing of a signature
by thumb or other mark on an
instrument or document
presented for notarization if:
(1) The thumb or other mark is
affixed in the presence of the
notary public and of two (2)
disinterested and unaffected
witnesses to the instrument
or document;
(2) Both witnesses sign their own
names in addition to the
thumb or other mark;
(3) The notary public writes
below the thumb or other
mark: “Thumb or other mark
affixed by (name of signatory
by mark) in the presence of
(names and addresses of
witnesses) and undersigned
notary public”; and
(4) The notary public notarizes
the signature by thumb or
other mark through an
acknowledgement, jurat, or
signature witnessing.
(c) A notary public is authorized to
sign on behalf of a person who is
physically unable to sign or make
a mark on an instrument or
document if:
(1) The notary public is directed
by the person unable to sign
or make a mark to sign on his
behalf;
(2) The signature of the notary
public is affixed in the
presence of two disinterested
and unaffected witnesses to
the instrument or document;
(3) Both witnesses sign their own
names;
(4) The notary public writes
below his signature:
“Signature affixed by notary
in presence of (names and
addresses of person and two
[2] witnesses)”; and
(5) The notary public notarizes
his signature by
acknowledgement or jurat
(Sec. 1, Rule IV)
What are the prohibitions imposed by
law on the performance of notarial
commission and what are the
exceptions?
A notary public shall not perform a
notarial act outside his regular place of
work or business; provided, however,
that on certain exceptional occasions or
situations, a notarial act may be
performed at the request of the parties
in the following sites located within his
territorial jurisdiction:
(1) public offices, convention
halls, and similar places
where oaths of office may be
administered;
(2) public function areas in
hotels and similar places for
the signing of instruments or
documents requiring
notarization;
(3) hospitals and other medical
institutions where a party to
an instrument or document is
confined for treatment; and
(4) any place where a party to
an instrument or document
requiring notarization is
under detention.
A person shall not perform a notarial act
if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's
presence personally at the
time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to
the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public
through competent evidence
of identity as defined by
these Rules.
! A notary public should not notarize a
document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to
attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein. A notary
public is duty-bound to require the
person executing a document to be
personally present, to swear before
him that he is that person and ask
the latter if he has voluntarily and
freely executed the same.
(PANTOJA MUMAR VS. FLORES,
2007)
When is a notary public disqualified
from performing a notarial act?
A notary public is disqualified
from performing a notarial act if he:
(1) is a party to the instrument or
document that is to be
notarized;
(2) will receive, as a direct or
indirect result, any
commission, fee, advantage,
right, title, interest, cash,
property, or other
consideration, except as
provided by these Rules and
by law; or
(3) is a spouse, common-law
partner, ancestor,
descendant, or relative by
affinity or consanguinity of
the principal within the fourth
civil degree.
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize – A
notary public shall not perform any
notarial act described in these Rules
for any person requesting such an
act even if he tenders the appropriate
fee specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has
good reason to believe that
the notarial act or transaction
is unlawful or immoral;
 (b) the signatory shows a
demeanor which engenders
in the mind of the notary
public reasonable doubt as to
the former's knowledge of the
consequences of the
transaction requiring a protest and filing or safekeeping
notarial act; and
(c) in the notary's judgment, the
signatory is not acting of his
or her own free will.
SEC. 5. False or Incomplete
Certificate. - A notary public shall
not:
(a) execute a certificate
containing information known
or believed by the notary to
be false.
(b) affix an official signature or
seal on a notarial certificate
that is incomplete.
SEC. 6. Improper Instruments or
Documents. - A notary public shall
not notarize:
(a) a blank or incomplete
instrument or document; or
(b) an instrument or document
without appropriate notarial
certification.
Is there a limit on the fee that a notary
public may charge?
For performing a notarial act, a notary
public may charge the maximum fee as
prescribed by the Supreme Court unless
he waives the fee in whole or in part.
(Sec. 1, Rule V)
Under Sec. 12, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-
SC, effective August 16, 2004 the
following are the prescribed schedule of
fees:
(a) For protest for drafts, bills of
exchange, or promissory notes
for non-acceptance or non-
payment, and for notice thereof,
ONE HUNDRED (P100) PESOS;
(b) For the registration of such
of the same, ONE HUNDRED
(P100) PESOS;
(c) For authenticating powers of
attorney, ONE HUNDRED
(P100) PESOS;
(d) For sworn statement concerning
correctness of any account or
other document, ONE
HUNDRED (P100) PESOS;
(e) For each oath of affirmation,
ONE HUNDRED (P100) PESOS;
(f) For receiving evidence of
indebtedness to be sent outside,
ONE HUNDRED (P100) PESOS;
(g) For issuing a certified copy of all
or part of his notarial register or
notarial records, for each page,
ONE HUNDRED (P100) PESOS;
(h) For taking depositions, for each
page, ONE HUNDRED (P100)
PESOS; and
(i) For acknowledging other
documents not enumerated in
this section, ONE HUNDRED
(P100) PESOS.
Form. What is a Notarial Register?
It is a permanently bound book with
numbered pages containing the
chronological official notarial register of
notarial acts which a notary public shall
keep, maintain, protect and provide for
lawful inspection. (Sec. 1, [a] par. 1, Rule
VI)
Where can you obtain a notarial
register?
At the Office of the Solicitor General
upon request and upon payment of the
cost thereof. The register shall be duly
paged, and on the first page, the
Solicitor General shall certify the number
of pages of which the book consists.
(Sec. 1, Par. 2, Rule VI)
How many notarial register can a
notary public keep?
A notary public shall keep only one
active notarial register at any given time.
(Sec. 1[b], Rule VI)
What notarial acts are required to be
recorded in the notarial register?
SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register.
– requester’s
(a) For every notarial act, the notary
shall record in the notarial
register at the time of the
notarization the following:
(1) The entry number and
page number;
(2) The date and time of day
of the notarial act;
(3) The type of notarial act;
(4) The title or description of
the instrument, document
or proceeding;
(5) The name and address of
each principal;
(6) The competent evidence
of identity as defined by
these Rules if the
signatory is not personally
known to the notary;
(7) The name and address of
each credible witness
swearing to or affirming
the person’s identity;
(8) The fee charged for the
notarial act;
(9) The address where the
notarization was
performed if not in the
notary’s regular place of
work or business; and
(10) Any other
circumstance the notary
public may deem of
significance or relevance.
(b) A notary public shall record in the
notarial register the reasons and
circumstances for not completing
a notarial act.
(c) A notary public shall record in the
notarial register the
circumstances of any request to
inspect or copy an entry in the
notarial register, including the
name, address,
signature, thumbmark or other
recognized identifier, and
evidence of identity. The reasons
of refusal to allow inspection or
copying of a journal entry shall
also be recorded.
(d) When the instrument or
document is a contract, the
notary public shall keep an
original copy thereof as part of
his records and enter in said
records a brief description of the
substance thereof and shall give
to each entry a consecutive
number, beginning with number
one in each calendar year. He
shall also retain a duplicate
original copy for the Clerk of
Court.
(e) The notary public shall give to
each instrument or document
executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a
number corresponding to the
one in his register, and shall also
 state on the instrument or
document the page/s of his
register on which the same is
recorded. No blank line shall be
left between entries.
(f) In case of a protest of any draft,
bill of exchange or promissory
note, the notary public shall
make a full and true record of all
proceedings in relation thereto
and shall note therein whether
the demand for the sum of
money was made, by whom,
when, and where; whether he
presented such draft, bill or note;
whether notices were given, to
whom and in what manner;
where the same was made,
when and to whom and where
directed; and of every other fact
touching the same.
(g) At the end of each week, the
notary public shall certify in his
notarial register the number of
instruments or documents
executed, sworn to,
acknowledged, or protested
before him; or if none, this
certificate shall show this fact.
(h) A certified copy of each month's
entries and a duplicate original
copy of any instrument
acknowledged before the notary
public shall, within the first ten
(10) days of the month following,
be forwarded to the Clerk of
Court and shall be under the
responsibility of such officer. If
there is no entry to certify for the
month, the notary shall forward a
statement to this effect in lieu of
certified copies herein required.
How and when shall a notary public
sign an instrument or document?
In notarizing a paper instrument or
document, a notary public shall:
(a) sign by hand on the notarial
certificate only the name
indicated and as appearing on
the notary's commission;
(b) not sign using a facsimile stamp
or printing device; and
(c) affix his official signature only at
the time the notarial act is
performed.
Official Seal
Every person commissioned as notary
public shall have only one official seal of
office in accordance with the Rules (Sec.
2, Rule VII)
When Official Seal can be affixed?
The official seal shall be affixed only at
the time the notarial act is performed
and shall be clearly impressed by the
notary public on every page of the
instrument or document notarized. (Sec.
2 [b], Rule VII)
What should the notary public do if
his official seal is stolen, lost,
damaged or otherwise rendered
unserviceable?
Within five (5) days after the official seal
of a notary public is stolen, lost,
damaged or other otherwise rendered
unserviceable in affixing a legible image,
the notary public, after informing the
appropriate law enforcement agency,
shall notify the Executive Judge in
writing, providing proper receipt or
acknowledgment, including registered
mail, and in the event of a crime
committed, provide a copy or entry
number of the appropriate police record.
Upon receipt of such notice, if found in (b) Affix an official signature or seal
order by the Executive Judge, the latter on a notarial certificate that is
shall order the notary public to cause incomplete. (Sec. 5, Rule IV)
notice of such loss or damage to be
published, once a week for three (3) What are the grounds to revoke
consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of notarial commission and
general circulation in the city or province administrative sanctions?
where the notary public is (a) The Executive Judge shall
commissioned. Thereafter, the revoke a notarial commission for
Executive Judge shall issue to the any ground on which an
notary public a new Certificate of application for a commission
Authorization to Purchase a Notarial may be denied.
Seal. (Sec. 2 [d], Rule VII) (b) In addition, the Executive Judge
may revoke the commission of,
Notarial Certificates or impose appropriate
administrative sanctions upon,
What should be stated in a notarial any notary public who:
certificate? (1) fails to keep a notarial
The notarial certificate shall register;
include the following: (2) fails to make the proper
(a) the name of the notary public as entry or entries in his
exactly indicated in the notarial register
commission; concerning his notarial
(b) the serial number of the acts;
commission of the notary public; (3) fails to send the copy of
(c) the words "Notary Public" and the entries to the
the province or city where the Executive Judge within
notary public is commissioned, the first ten (10) days of
the expiration date of the the month following;
commission, the office address (4) fails to affix to
of the notary public; and acknowledgments the
(d) the roll of attorney's number, the date of expiration of his
professional tax receipt number commission;
and the place and date of (5) fails to submit his notarial
issuance thereof, and the IBP register, when filled, to
membership number. (Sec. 2, the Executive Judge;
Rule VIII) (6) fails to make his report,
within a reasonable time,
What are the prohibitions imposed by to the Executive Judge
law regarding notarial certificate? concerning the
A notary public shall not: performance of his
(a) Execute a certificate containing duties, as may be
information known or believed by required by the judge;
the notary to be false;
 (7) fails to require the
presence of a principal at
the time of the notarial
act;
(8) fails to identify a principal
on the basis of personal
knowledge or competent
evidence;
(9) executes a false or
incomplete certificate
under Section 5, Rule IV;
(10) knowingly
performs or fails to
perform any other act
prohibited or mandated
by these Rules; and
(11) commits any other
dereliction or act which in
the judgment of the
Executive Judge
constitutes good cause
for revocation of
commission or imposition
of administrative
sanction.
(c) Upon verified complaint by an
interested, affected or aggrieved
person, the notary public shall be
required to file a verified answer
to the complaint. If the answer
of the notary public is not
satisfactory, the Executive Judge
shall conduct a summary
hearing. If the allegations of the
complaint are not proven, the
complaint shall be dismissed. If
the charges are duly established,
the Executive Judge shall
impose the appropriate
administrative sanctions. In
either case, the aggrieved party
may appeal the decision to the
Supreme Court for review.
Pending the appeal, an order
imposing disciplinary sanctions
shall be immediately executory,
unless otherwise ordered by the
Supreme Court.
(d) The Executive Judge may motu
proprio initiate administrative
proceedings against a notary
public, subject to the procedures
prescribed in paragraph (c)
above and impose the
appropriate administrative
sanctions on the grounds
mentioned in the preceding
paragraphs (a) and (b). (Sec. 1,
Rule XI)
! Notaries public must observe with
utmost care and utmost fidelity the
basic requirements in the
performance of their duties,
otherwise, the confidence of the
public in the integrity of notarized
deeds will be undermined. (LEE VS.
TAMBAGO, 2008)
10. The lawyer and the moneys or
properties of clients
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL
HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME INTO HIS PROFESSION.
FIDUCIARY RELATION – The position
of an attorney enables him to put in his
power, and opens him to the temptation
to avail himself, not only of the necessity
of his client, but of his good nature,
liberality and credulity, to obtain undue
advantages, bargains and gratuities.
Dealings with clients are thus
scrutinized in order to make sure that
the attorney derives no advantage
whatsoever from his client for personal
gain.
DOCTRINE/S:

ANGELES V. UY
The relationship between a lawyer
and a client is highly fiduciary; it
requires a high degree of fidelity and
good faith. It is designed "to remove
all such temptation and to prevent
everything of that kind from being
done for the protection of the client."
Thus, Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that
"a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his client that may
come into his possession." Furthermore,
Rule 16.01 of the Code also states that
"a lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or
from the client." The Canons of
Professional Ethics is even more
explicit:
"The lawyer should refrain from any
action whereby for his personal benefit
or gain he abuses or takes advantage of
the confidence reposed in him by his
client.
"Money of the client collected for the
client or other trust property coming into
the possession of the lawyer should be
reported and accounted
for promptly and should not under any
circumstances be commingled with his
own or be used by him."
In the present case, it is clear that
respondent failed to promptly report and
account for the P16,500 he had
received from Norma Trajano on behalf
of his client, Primitiva Del Rosario.
Although the amount had been
entrusted to respondent on December
14, 1998, his client revealed during the
February 10, 1999 hearing that she had
not yet received it. Worse, she did not
even know where it was.
Respondent maintains that on
December 15, 1998 he informed Mrs.
Del Rosario about the payment. He
further avers that he kept the money up
in her instruction, as she had allegedly
wanted "future payments x x [to] be
saved in whole and for them to avoid
spending the same as what had
happened to the past installment
payments x x x." This assertion
allegedly finds support in her answer to
the question of Judge Angeles, who had
asked her whether she had received the
disputed payment: "Hindi po, kasi gusto
[ko] po na mabuo ang pera."
The Court is not persuaded.
Neither are we convinced by the
affidavits of Mrs. Del Rosario and her
son, both of whom affirmed their
intention to have their money in the
safekeeping of respondent. It should be
stressed that he was her counsel and
the compadre of her son. Moreover, the
affidavits were executed after the filing
of this Complaint. As the Office of the
Bar Confidant observed, these
considerations militate against the
credibility of the affiants. In any event,
their affidavits fail to explain adequately
why Mrs. Del Rosario, during the
hearing on February 10, 1999, did not
know where her money was.
The records do not clearly show
whether Attorney Uy had in fact
appropriated the said amount; in fact,
Mrs, Del Rosario acknowledge that she
had received it on February 12, 1999.
They do show, however, that
respondent failed to promptly report that
amount to her. This is clearly a violation
of his professional responsibility.
Indeed, in Aya v. Bigornia, the Court
ruled that money collected by a lawyer
in favor of his clients must be
immediately turned over to them.
In Daroy v. Legaspi the Court held that
"lawyers are bound to promptly account
for money or property received by them
on behalf of their clients and failure to
do so constitutes professional
misconduct."
Verily, the question is not necessarily
whether the rights of the clients have
been prejudiced, but whether the lawyer
has adhered to the ethical standards of
the bar. In this case, respondent has not
done so. Indeed, we agree with the
following observation of the Office of the
Bar Confidant:
"Keeping the money in his possession
without his client's knowledge only
provided Atty. Uy the tempting
opportunity to appropriate for himself the
money belonging to his client. This
situation should, at all times, be avoided
by members of the bar. Like judges,
lawyers must not only be clean; they
must also appear clean. This way, the
people's faith in the justice system
would remain undisturbed."
In this light, the Court must stress
that it has the duty to look into
dealings between attorneys and their
clients and to guard the latter from
any undue consequences resulting
from a situation in which they may
stand unequal. The present situation
calls for the exercise of this duty.
For misappropriating and failing to
promptly report and deliver money they
received on behalf of their clients, some
lawyers have been disbarred and others
have been suspended for six
months.[15] In the present case, the
records merely show that respondent
did not promptly report that he received
money on behalf of his client. There is
no clear evidence of misappropriation.
Under the circumstances, we rule that
he should be suspended for one month.
BAYONLA V. REYES
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires that a lawyer
shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of her client that may come
into her possession. Rule 16.01 of
Canon 16 imposes on the lawyer the
duty to account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the
client. Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 demands
that the lawyer shall deliver the funds
and property of his client when due or
upon demand, subject to the lawyers
lien over the funds, or the lawyers option
to apply so much of the funds as may be
necessary to satisfy the lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to the client.
The canons are appropriate
considering that the relationship
between a lawyer and her client is
highly fiduciary, and prescribes on a
lawyer a great degree of fidelity and
good faith. There is no question that
the money or property received by a
lawyer for her client properly belongs
to the latter. Conformably with these
canons of professional
responsibility, we have held that a
lawyer is obliged to render an
accounting of all the property and
money she has collected for her
client. This obligation includes the
prompt reporting and accounting of
the money collected by the lawyer by
reason of a favorable judgment to his
client.
TAROG V. RICAFORT
Undoubtedly, Atty. Ricafort was required
to hold in trust any money and property
of his clients that came into his
possession, and he needed to be
always mindful of the trust and
confidence his clients reposed in him.
Thus, having obtained the funds from
the Tarogs in the course of his
professional employment, he had the
obligation to deliver such funds to his
clients (a) when they became due, or (b)
upon demand.
Furthermore, Rule 16.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, imposes on
an attorney the positive obligation to
keep all funds of his client separate and
apart from his own and from those of
others kept by him, to wit:
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the
funds of each client separate and apart
from his own and those of others kept
by him.
Atty. Ricafort’s act of obtaining
₱65,000.00 and ₱15,000.00 from the
Tarogs under the respective pretexts
that the amount would be deposited in
court and that he would prepare and file
the memorandum for the Tarogs erected
a responsibility to account for and to use
the amounts in accordance with the
particular purposes intended. For him to
deposit the amount of ₱65,000.00 in his
personal account without the consent of
the Tarogs and not return it upon
demand, and for him to fail to file the
memorandum and yet not return the
amount of ₱15,000.00 upon demand
constituted a serious breach of his
fiduciary duties as their attorney. He
reneged on his duty to render an
accounting to his clients showing that he
had spent the amounts for the particular
purposes intended. He was thereby
presumed to have misappropriated the
moneys for his own use to the prejudice
of his clients and in violation of the
clients’ trust reposed in him. He could
not escape liability, for upon failing to
use the moneys for the purposes
intended, he should have immediately
returned the moneys to his clients.
Atty. Ricafort’s plain abuse of the
confidence reposed in him by his clients
rendered him liable for violation of
Canon 16, particularly Rule 16.01,
supra, and Canon 17, all of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. His acts
and actuations constituted a gross
violation of general morality and of
professional ethics that impaired public
confidence in the legal profession and
deserved punishment.
DALISAY V. MAURICIO
In Parias v. Paguinto, we held that a
lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected from the client.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose, such as for filing fee,
but not used for failure to file the case
must immediately be returned to the
client on demand. Per records,
complainant made repeated demands,
but respondent is yet to return the
money.
The fact that Civil Case No. 00-044 was
already submitted for decision does not
justify his inaction. After agreeing to
handle Civil Case No. 00-044, his duty
is, first and foremost, to enter his
appearance. Sadly, he failed to do this
simple task. He should have returned
complainants money. Surely, he cannot
expect to be paid for doing nothing.
In fine, let it be stressed that the
authority of an attorney begins with his
or her retainer. It gives rise to a
relationship between an attorney and a
client that is highly fiduciary in nature
and of a very delicate, exacting, and
confidential character, requiring a high
degree of fidelity and good faith. If much
is demanded from an attorney, it is
because the entrusted privilege to
practice law carries with it the correlative
duties not only to the client but also to
the court, to the bar, and to the public. A
lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects
the interest of his client; he also serves
the ends of justice, does honor to the
bar, and helps maintain the respect of
the community to the legal profession.
Indeed, law is an exacting goddess
demanding of her votaries not only
intellectual but also moral discipline.
LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO
Rule 16.04 states that A lawyer shall not
borrow money from his client unless the
clients interests are fully protected by
the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he
is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend
money to his client. The only exception
is, when in the interest of justice, he has
to advance necessary expenses (such
as filing fees, stenographers fees for
transcript of stenographic notes, cash
bond or premium for surety bond, etc.)
for a matter that he is handling for the
client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the
lawyers independence of mind so that
the free exercise of his judgment may
not be adversely affected. It seeks to
ensure his undivided attention to the
case he is handling as well as his entire
devotion and fidelity to the clients cause.
If the lawyer lends money to the client in
connection with the clients case, the
lawyer in effect acquires an interest in
the subject matter of the case or an
additional stake in its outcome. Either of
these circumstances may lead the
lawyer to consider his own recovery
rather than that of his client, or to accept
a settlement which may take care of his
interest in the verdict to the prejudice of
the client in violation of his duty of
undivided fidelity to the clients cause.
Rules of Court, Rule 138,Sections 24,
25, and 37
Section 24. Compensation of
attorneys; agreement as to fees. —
An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his
services, with a view to the importance
of the subject matter of the controversy,
the extent of the services rendered, and
the professional standing of the
attorney. No court shall be bound by the
opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses
as to the proper compensation, but may
disregard such testimony and base its
conclusion on its own professional
knowledge. A written contract for
services shall control the amount to be
paid therefor unless found by the court
to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
! No more than a
reasonable compensation
for his services
! A written contract for
services shall control the
amount to be paid unless
it is unconscionable or
unreasonable
Section 25. Unlawful retention of
client's funds; contempt. — When an
attorney unjustly retains in his hands
money of his client after it has been
demanded, he may be punished for
contempt as an officer of the Court who
has misbehaved in his official
transactions; but proceedings under this
section shall not be a bar to a criminal
prosecution.
DOCTRINE/S:
ALMENDAREZ, JR. V. LANGIT
Respondent's failure to turn over the
money to complainant despite the
latter's demands gives rise to the
presumption that he had converted the
money for his personal use and benefit.
This is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional
ethics, impairing public confidence in the
legal profession. More specifically, it
renders respondent liable not only for
violating the Code but also for contempt,
as stated in Section 25, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court:
SEC. 25. Unlawful retention of client's
funds; contempt — When an attorney
unjustly retains in his hands money of
his client after it has been demanded he
may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the Court who has misbehaved
in his official transactions; but
proceedings under this section shall not
be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
The relation of attorney and client is
highly fiduciary, requiring utmost good
faith, loyalty, and fidelity on the part of
the attorney. Respondent miserably
failed in this regard. Instead, he
demonstrated a lack of integrity, care,
and devotion required by the legal
profession from its members. Whenever
a lawyer is no longer worthy of the trust
and confidence of the public, this Court
has the right and duty to withdraw his
privilege as officer of the Court and
member of the Bar.
Section 37. Attorneys' liens. — An
attorney shall have a lien upon the
funds, documents and papers of his
client which have lawfully come into his
possession and may retain the same
until his lawful fees and disbursements
have been paid, and may apply such
funds to the satisfaction thereof. He
shall also have a lien to the same extent
upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments, which he
has secured in a litigation of his client,
from and after the time when he shall
have the caused a statement of his
claim of such lien to be entered upon
the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution,
and shall have the caused written notice
thereof to be delivered to his client and
to the adverse paty; and he shall have
the same right and power over such
judgments and executions as his client
would have to enforce his lien and
secure the payment of his just fees and
disbursements.
11. Acquisition of Properties Subject
of Litigation
DOCTRINE/S:
FORNILDA VS BRANCH
In the instant case, it is undisputed that
the Controverted Parcels were part of
the estate of the late Julio M. Catolos
subject of intestate estate proceedings,
wherein Respondent Amonoy acted as
counsel for some of the heirs from 1959
until 1968 by his own admission
(Comment, p. 145, Rollo); that these
properties were adjudicated to Alfonso
Fornilda and Asuncion M. Pasamba in
the Project of Partition approved by the
Court on 12 January 1965; that on 20
January 1965, or only eight (8) days
thereafter, and while he was still
intervening in the case as counsel,
these properties were mortgaged by
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest to
Respondent Amonoy to secure payment
of the latter's attorney's fees in the
amount of P27,600.00; that since the
mortgage indebtedness was not paid,
Respondent Amonoy instituted an action
for judicial foreclosure of mortgage on
21 January 1970; that the mortgage was
subsequently ordered foreclosed and
auction sale followed where Respondent
Amonoy was the sole bidder for
P23,600.00; and that being short of the
mortgage indebtedness, he applied for
and further obtained a deficiency
judgment. The fact that the transaction
involved falls squarely within the
prohibition against any acquisition by a
lawyer of properties belonging to parties
they represent which are still in suit.
While the Project of Partition was
approved on 12 January 1965, it was
not until 6 August 1969 that the estate
was declared closed and terminated
(Record on Appeal, Civil Case No.
3103, p. 44). At the time the mortgage
was executed, therefore, the
relationship of lawyer and client still
existed, the very relation of trust and
confidence sought to be protected by
the prohibition, when a lawyer occupies
a vantage position to press upon or
dictate terms to harassed client. What is
more, the mortgage was executed only
eight (8) days after approval of the
Project of Partition thereby evincing a
clear intention on Respondent Amonoy's
part to protect his own interests and ride
roughshod over that of his clients. From
the time of the execution of the
mortgage in his favor, Respondent
Amonoy had already asserted a title
adverse to his clients' interests at a time
when the relationship of lawyer and
client had not yet been severed.
The fact that the properties were first
mortgaged and only subsequently
acquired in an auction sale long after
the termination of the intestate
proceedings will not remove it from the
scope of the prohibition. To rule
otherwise would be to countenance
indirectly what cannot be done directly.
ORDONIO VS EDUARTE
In causing the execution of the Deed of
Conveyance during the pendency of the
appeal of the case involving the said
property, he has violated Art. 1491 of
the Civil Code which prohibits lawyers
from "acquiring by assignment property
and rights which may be the object of
any litigation in which they may take part
by virtue of their profession." For having
improperly acquired the subject
property, under the foregoing
circumstances, respondent has violated
not only Art. 1491 of the Civil Code but
also Rule 10 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which provides that
"the lawyer should not purchase any
interest in the subject matter of the
litigation which he is conducting." In so
doing, respondent has manifestly
violated that part of her oath as a lawyer
that she shall not do any falsehood. Not
only that. In preparing the documents
which do not reflect the true transaction,
respondent has likewise violated Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
Rule 10.01. A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; nor shall be mislead or
allow the court to be mislead by any
artifice.
MANANQUIL VS VILLEGAS
The claim that the heirs of Filomena
Zerna have acquiesced and consented
to the assailed lease contracts does not
militate against respondent's liability
under the rules of professional ethics.
The prohibition referred to in Articles
1491 and 1646 of the new Civil Code,
as far as lawyers are concerned, is
intended to curtail any undue influence
of the lawyer upon his client on account
of his fiduciary and confidential
association [Sotto v. Samson, G.R. No.
L-16917, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 733].
Thus, the law makes the prohibition
absolute and permanent [Rubias v.
Batiller, supra]. And in view of Canon 1
of the new Code of Professional
Responsibility and Sections 3 & 27 of
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court,
whereby lawyers are duty-bound to
obey and uphold the laws of the land,
participation in the execution of the
prohibited contracts such as those
referred to in Articles 1491 and 1646 of
the new Civil Code has been held to
constitute breach of professional ethics
on the part of the lawyer for which
disciplinary action may be brought
against him [See Bautista v. Gonzalez,
Adm. Matter No. 1625, February 12,
1990). Accordingly, the Court must
reiterate the rule that the claim of good
faith is no defense to a lawyer who has
failed to adhere faithfully to the legal
disqualifications imposed upon him,
designed to protect the interests of his
client [See In re Ruste, 70 Phil. 243
(1940); Also, Severino v. Severino, 44
Phil. 343 (1923)].
GUEVARA VS CALALANG
It was not professional misconduct or
unethical practice for the respondent to
acquire the rights and interests of his
client to the 439 square meter parcel of
land subject of the administrative
charges because the land was not
involved in the litigation he was
handling. The land was acquired by
Bernabe Flores in an execution sale
conducted to satisfy the judgment
secured in the course of Civil Case No.
2171. The case handled by the
respondent was for damages. In some
jurisdictions, a contract for contingent
fee is even deemed to create a
equitable pro
tanto equitable assignment, or to
transfer an equitable interest in favor of
the attorney in the judgment or the
proceeds of settlement, or to give him a
lien on the judgment or its proceeds (7
Am Jur 2d. 218, p. 173). Even if the
assignment of rights in question is
considered an outright purchase by the
respondent of the subject lot or of the
rights therein, still respondent was not
guilty of breach of professional ethics,
misconduct or malpractice by reason of
said transaction.
MACARIOLA VS ASUNCION
Judge Asuncion did not violate the said
provision. Respondent Judge did not
buy the lot 1184-E directly on the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from
Dr. Galapon who earlier purchased the
lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the
Asuncion bought the lot on March 6,
1965 from Dr. Galapon after the finality
of the decision which he rendered on
June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No 3010 and
his two orders dated October and
November, 1963. The said property was
no longer the subject of litigation. In the
case at bar, Article 14 of Code of
Commerce has no legal and binding
effect and cannot apply to the
respondent. Upon the sovereignty from
the Spain to the US and to the Republic
of the Philippines, Art. 14 of this Code of
Commerce, which sourced from the
Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to
have been abrogated because
whenever there is a change in the
sovereignty, political laws of the former
sovereign are automatically abrogated,
unless they are reenacted by Affirmative
Act of the New Sovereign.
FABILLO VS IAC
Atty. Murillo is entitled to a contingent
fee for his services. Such contingent fee
is not violative of the prohibition in
Article 1491. The contract of services
did not violate said provision of law.
Article 1491 of the Civil Code,
specifically paragraph 5 thereof,
prohibits lawyers from acquiring by
purchase even at a public or judicial
auction, properties and rights which are
the objects of litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their
profession. The said prohibition,
however, applies only if the sale or
assignment of the property takes place
during the pendency of the litigation
involving the client's property. Hence, a
contract between a lawyer and his client
stipulating a contingent fee is not
covered by said prohibition under Article
1491 (5) of the Civil Code because the
payment of said fee is not made during
the pendency of the litigation but only
after judgment has been rendered in the
case handled by the lawyer. In fact,
under the 1988 Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer may have a lien
over funds and property of his client and
may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements. As long as the lawyer
does not exert undue influence on his
client, that no fraud is committed or
imposition applied, or that the
compensation is clearly not excessive
as to amount to extortion, a contract for
contingent fee is valid and enforceable.
12. Doctrine of privilege
communications in pleadings
and privilege speech in
congress
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
ARTICLE VI Section 11:
A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
while the Congress is in session. No
Member shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech
or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
Privilege of Speech and Debate : No
Member shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech
or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
Purpose: It is intended to protect
members of congress against
government pressure and intimidation
aimed at influencing the decision
making prerogatives of Congress and its
members.
The following requirements must be
observed:
1. That the remarks must be made while
the legislature or the legislative
committee is functioning, that is in
session
2. That they must be made in
connection with the discharge of official
duties.
To invoke the privilege of speech, the
matter must be oral and must be proven
to be indeed privileged.
Speech or debate includes a vote or
passage of a resolution, all the
utterances made by Congressmen in
the performance of their functions such
as speeches delivered, statements
made, or votes casts in the halls of
Congress. It also includes bills
introduced in Congress (whether or not
it is in session) and all the other
utterances (made outside or inside the
premises of Congress) provided they
are made in accordance with a
legislative function.
- It is intended to protect members of
congress against government pressure
and intimidation aimed at influencing the
decision‐making prerogatives of
Congress and its members.
- Moreover, a senator‐lawyer cannot be
disbarred or disciplined by the Supreme
Court for statements made during a
privilege speech. The senator‐lawyer’s
privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding
under the Rules of Court.
BETWEEN LAWYER AND CLIENT
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 24
(b): An attorney cannot, without the
consent of his client, be examined as to
any commuicatio ade by the client to
him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of, or with a view to, professional
employment, nor can an attorney's
secretary, stenographer, or clerk be
examined, without the consent of the
client and his employer, concerning any
fact the knowledge of which has been
acquired in such capacity.
III. REQUIREMENTS

1. There must be a lawyer-client
relationship
- The term “lawyer” refers to:
(a). a member of the Philippine Bar in
good standing acting in such a capacity,
whether in active practice or not
(b). non-lawyers allowed by law to
appear as counsel pursuant to section 7
of Rule 118. ( But in localities where
such members of the bar are not
available, the court may appoint any
person, resident of the province and of
good repute for probity and ability, to
defend the accused.)
(c). Non-lawyers who misrepresent
themselves as members of the bar in
order to obtain the confidence of a
person and believed as such by the
latter.
- The relationship maybe created by
mutual consent at the initiative of the
client, or is created by Order of the
Court as in the case of a counsel de
officio.
a). the relationship exists whenever the
client consults with a lawyer in relation
to a matter which needs the professional
services of the lawyer be it for advice or
representation in a future or present
legal action.
b). it does not matter that no fee was
paid, or that the lawyer later refused to
represent the client or that he withdrew
from the action.
c). however the rule does not cover
situations where the lawyer was
consulted merely as a notary
2. There must be a communication by
the client to the lawyer or advice
given thereon by the lawyer.
- The communication must be for the
purpose of creating a lawyer-client
relationship or was given in the course
of such relationship.
- The term communication includes the
following:
a). Any data or information supplied by
the client personally or through
confidential agents, either to the lawyer
or to the lawyer’s employees. This may
have been supplied through any form of
oral or written communication.
b). All documents, objects or thing
delivered to the lawyer except those the
existence and/or contents of which are
or maybe known.
Thus titles to land, contracts, reply-
communications, bank pass books,
dishonored checks, cannot be
considered as confidential.
c). Acts or conduct by the client, such as
physical demonstration of actions or
events, or giving a sample of his
handwriting to show he is not the
falsifier.
d).The advice given by the lawyer to the
client orally or through any mode of
written communication.
e).The identity of the client. As a matter
of public policy a lawyer may not invoke
the privilege and refuse to divulge the
name or identity of the client except in
the situation when the client’s name has
an independent significance such that
disclosure would reveal the client’s
confidences.
- The identity may not be disclosed in
the following situations:
1. where a strong probability exists
that revealing the client’s name
would implicate the client in the
 very activity for which he sought
the lawyer’s advise
2. Where the disclosure would
open the client to civil liability
3. Where the government
prosecutors have no case
against the client and compelling
the lawyer to reveal his client’s
name would furnish the only link
that would form a chain of
testimony necessary to convict
the client of a crime.
4. Where it is the identity of the
client which is sought to be
confidential
5. Those covered by the “Doctrine
of Work Product”. The pleadings
prepared by the lawyer or his
private files containing either
facts and data obtained by him
or resulting from his own
investigation or by any
investigator hired by him; and/or
his impressions or conclusions
whether reduced in writing or
not, about the client or the clients
cause.
The following communications are not
covered and the lawyer may reveal
them:
a). those intended to be made public
b). or intended to be communicated to a
third person
c). intended for an unlawful purpose or
for a future crime or act
d). received from a third person not
acting in behalf or as agent of the client
e). those made in the presence of third
persons
f). those which are irrelevant
g). the effects of a crime as well as
weapons or instruments of a crime.
h). opinions on abstract questions or
hypothetical questions of law
3. The communication was
confidential
4. The consent of the client to the
disclosure was not obtained
IV. Duration and Waiver:
A. The duration is perpetual even after
the lawyer-client relationship has
already ceased.
B. The rule maybe waived by the client
alone, or by his representatives in case
of his death, expressly or by implication.
Exceptions:
1. If he is a party to a case and his
lawyer was called as a witness by his
opponent, by failure of the client to
object to the questions concerning the
privileged communications or having
objected on direct, the client cross-
examines on the privileged
communications.
2. When the client presents evidence on
the privileged communication, the
opposing party may call on the lawyer to
rebut the evidence.
3. When the client calls on the lawyer to
testify on the privileged communication
4. In case of a suit by and between the
lawyer and the client, the rule does not
apply
5. When the lawyer is accused of a
crime in relation to the act of the client
which was the subject of their
professional relationship, he may reveal
the privileged communications to prove
he had nothing to do with the crime.
V. Liability:
If the lawyer, as witness to a case which
does not involve the client, divulges
confidential communication without the
prior consent of the client, he may be
liable criminally, civilly and
administratively.
Rules of Court, Rule 7, Section
3.Signature and address. — Every
pleading must be signed by the party or
counsel representing him, stating in
either case his address which should
not be a post office box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief there
is good ground to support it; and that it
is not interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal
effect. However, the court may, in its
discretion, allow such deficiency to be
remedied if it shall appear that the same
was due to mere inadvertence and not
intended for delay. Counsel who
deliberately files an unsigned pleading,
or signs a pleading in violation of this
Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent
matter therein, or fails promptly report to
the court a change of his address, shall
be subject to appropriate disciplinary
action.
Significance of the Signature of
Counsel:
1. He has read the pleading;
2. That to the best of his
knowledge, information or belief ,
there is good ground to support
it, and
3. It is not interposed for delay.
Cases where a counsel is subject to
disciplinary action:
1. Deliberately files an unsigned
pleading;
2. Signs a pleading in violation of
the Rules;
3. Alleges in the pleading
scandalous or indecent matter or
4. Fails to promptly report to the
court a change of his address
Utterances made in the course of
judicial proceedings, including all kinds
of pleadings, petitions and motions
belong to the class of communication
that are absolutely privileged.
The requirement of materiality and
relevancy is imposed so that the
protection given to individuals in the
interest of an efficient administration of
justice may not be abused as a cloak
from beneath which private malice may
be gratified.
CANON 21- A LAWYER SHALL
PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND
SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN
AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATION IS TERMINATED.
CANON 15, RULE 15.02- A LAWYER
SHALL BE BOUND BY THE RULE ON
PRIVILEGE COMMUNICATION IN
RESPECT OF MATTERS DISCLOSED
TO HIM BY A PROSPECTIVE CLIENT
DOCTRINE/S:
PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
There is no privileged communication
rule to talk about. The privilege applies
only if the information was relayed by
the client to the lawyer respecting a past
crime. The reckoning point is when the
communication was given, not when the
lawyer was made to testify.
The attorney-client privilege cannot
apply in these cases as the facts thereof
and the actuations of both respondents
therein constitute an exception to the
rule.
The announced intention of a client to
commit a crime is not included within the
confidences which his attorney is bound
to respect. Here, the testimony sought
to be elicited from Sansaet as state
witness are the communications made
to him by physical acts and/or
accompanying words of Paredes at the
time he and Honrada were about to
falsify the documents. Clearly, therefore,
the confidential communications thus
made by Paredes to Sansaet were for
purposes of and in reference to the
crime of falsification which had not yet
been committed in the past by Paredes
but which he, in confederacy with his
present co-respondents, later
committed. Having been made for
purposes of a future offense, those
communications are outside the pale of
the attorney-client privilege.
It is well settled that communication
between a lawyer and his client, to be
privileged, must be for a lawful purpose
or in furtherance of a lawful end. The
existence of an unlawful purpose
prevents the privilege from attaching. In
fact, the prosecution of the honorable
relation of attorney and client will not be
permitted under the guise of privilege,
and every communication made to an
attorney by a client for a criminal
purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a
conspiracy which is not only lawful to
divulge, but which the attorney under
certain circumstances may be bound to
disclose at once in the interest of justice.
To prevent a conniving counsel from
revealing the genesis of a crime which
was later committed pursuant to a
conspiracy, because of the objection
thereto of his conspiring client, would be
one of the worst travesties in the rules of
evidence and practice in the noble
profession of law.
GUTIERREZ v. ABILA
The court found that the aforementioned
personal opinions of the defendants in
their answer, expressed in vituperative
and intemperate language, are palpably
devoid of any relation whatever to the
subject of inquiry and have no place in a
pleading.In Anonymous vs. Trenkman et
al, the Court defined the restriction to
the privilege enjoyed by pleadings thus:
The pleadings should contain but the
plain and concise statements of the
material facts and not the evidence by
which they are to be proved. ... If the
pleader goes beyond the requirements
of the statute and alleges an irrelevant
matter which is libellous, he loses his
privilege.
The requirement of materiality and
relevancy is imposed so that the
protection given to individuals in the
interest of an efficient administration of
justice may not be abused as a cloak
from beneath which private malice may
be gratified.
JACOBS VS ADELSON
The absolute privilege
The existence of an absolute privilege
for defamatory statements made during
the course of judicial proceeding has
long been recognized in Nevada. The
absolute privilege can apply to
defamatory statements made in the
context of a judicial proceeding if the
proceeding is contemplated in good faith
and under serious consideration and if
the communication is related to the
litigation.2 Furthermore, statements
made to someone who is not directly
involved in the judicial proceeding will
only be protected by the absolute
privilege if the recipient is “significantly
interested” in the proceeding.3 Here,
Jacobs argued that the statements were
made outside the judicial proceedings to
disinterested persons; therefore, the
statements are unrelated to the litigation
and the absolute privilege does not
apply. Conversely, Adelson argued that
statements made to the media should
be included in the scope of the absolute
privilege rule and that the absolute
privilege does apply because his
statements were made during the
course of the judicial proceeding and
were directly related to the lawsuit. The
Court rejected Adelson’s arguments and
agreed with Jacobs that the absolute
privilege did not apply.
Application of the absolute privilege
in the media context
The Court has never addressed whether
the absolute privilege applies to
statements made to the media;
however, it has held that
communications are not related to
judicial proceedings when made to
someone without an interest in the
outcome. Additionally, the majority of
states have held that communications
made to the media are not protected by
the absolute privilege rule, and the
policy considerations underlying the rule
are not applicable to statements made
to the media. Thus, the statements
made to the media are not subject to
absolute privilege. Here, the statements
were made outside the judicial
proceeding because the Wall Street
Journal does not have an interest, other
than that of an observer. The dissent
argued that the statements are
privileged and that the media and the
public have a significant interest due to
the widespread media coverage of the
underlying litigation. The Court did not
agree and concluded that in order to
determine if there is a significant
interest, the recipient’s legal relationship
to the litigation must be assessed and
not its interest as an observer. Here, the
Wall Street Journal did not have a direct
interest in the outcome of the
proceedings and did not have a legal or
financial interest in the litigation;
therefore, it did not have a significant
interest and Adelson’s statements are
not protected by the absolute privilege
rule.
The conditional privilege of reply
Additionally, Adelson argued that his
statements were privileged because
they were made as a direct response to
Jacobs’ defamatory statements in the
complaint. The conditional privilege rule
allows a limited right to apply for those
who are attacked with defamatory
statements. However, because the
district court declined to consider these
arguments and because the factual
record has not been developed, the
Court declined to address the
applicability of the conditional privilege.
SELBY VS. BURGESS
The Restatement of Torts (Second) §
586 provides:
*900 An attorney at law is absolutely
privileged to publish defamatory matter
concerning another in communications
preliminary to a proposed judicial
proceeding, or in the institution of, or
during the course and as a part of, a
judicial proceeding in which he
participates as counsel, if it has some
relation to the proceeding.
We adopted the principle of § 586 in
Pogue v. Cooper, 284 Ark. 202, 680
S.W.2d 698 (1984). There we held that
absolute privilege attached to
allegations made by an attorney in a
pleading filed with the court, as long as
the statements alleged to be defamatory
were relevant and pertinent to the
issues in the case. We relied heavily on
our earlier decision of Mauney v. Millar,
142 Ark. 500, 219 S.W. 1032 (1920), in
which we recognized the absolute
privilege of an attorney to make
statements in pleadings regardless of
their truth or the existence of actual
malice on the part of the attorney so
long as the statements were relevant
and pertinent to the pleadings.
We have no difficulty extending the
privilege to statements by an attorney
made, as § 586 says, "preliminary to a
proposed judicial proceeding." The
section obviously covers
communications made during
investigation of a claim. Comment e. to
§ 586 is as follows:
As to communications preliminary to a
proposed judicial proceeding the rule
stated in this Section applies only when
the communication has some relation to
a proceeding that is contemplated in
good faith and under serious
consideration. The bare possibility that
the proceeding might be instituted is not
to be used as a cloak to provide
immunity for defamation when the
possibility is not seriously considered.
Although the privilege is absolute where
it applies, we consider it to be a privilege
narrowed closely by the "relevancy" and
"pertinency" requirements, and we note
that while the privilege will prohibit an
attorney from being subject to litigation it
will not make him immune from
professional discipline, see Theiss v.
Scherer, supra, when it is appropriate.
We make no suggestion that any
professional discipline is called for in
this case.
It was correct for the court to find no
liability with respect to the allegations of
statements made by Gary Eubanks, as
the discovery documents showed his
publication of the allegedly slanderous
statement occurred preliminary to or in
the course of litigation, and that the
statements he allegedly made were
relevant and pertinent to that litigation.
REVISED PENAL CODE, ARTICLE
209- Betrayal of Public Trust by an
Attorney or Solicitor –Revelation of
Secrets – In addition to the proper
administrative action, the penalty of
prision correccional in its medium period
or a fine ranging from 200 to 1000
pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon
any attorney- at- law or solicitor who, by
ay malicious breach of professional duty
or of inexcusable negligence or
ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or
reveal any of the secrets of the latter
learned by him in his professional
capacity.
The same penalty shall be imposed
upon any attorney- at- law or solicitor
who, having undertaken the defense of
a client or having received confidential
information from said client in a case,
shall undertake the defense of the
opposing party in the same case,
without the consent of the first client.
DOCTRINE/S:
GMA NETWORK VS. BUSTOS
The disputed news report consists
merely of a summary of the allegations
in the said Petition for Mandamus filed
by the medical examinees making the
same fall within the protected ambit of
privileged communication. GMA and
Vidal cannot be held liable for damages
claimed by respondents for simply
bringing to fore information on subjects
of public concern.
Privileged matters may be absolute or
qualified. Absolutely privileged matters
are not actionable regardless of the
existence of malice in fact. In absolutely
privileged communications, the mala or
bona fides of the author is of no moment
as the occasion provides an absolute
bar to the action. On the other hand, in
qualifiedly or conditionally privileged
communications, the freedom from
liability for an otherwise defamatory
utterance is conditioned on the absence
of express malice or malice in fact. The
second kind of privilege, in fine, renders
the writer or author susceptible to a suit
or finding of libel provided the
prosecution established the presence of
bad faith or malice in fact. To this genre
belongs "private communications" and
"fair and true report without any
comments or remarks" falling under and
described as exceptions in Article 354 of
the Revised Penal Code.
However, the enumeration under the
aforecited Article 354 is not an exclusive
list of conditional privilege
communications as the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of the speech and
of the press has expanded the privilege
to include fair commentaries on matters
of public interest.The news telecast in
question clearly falls under the second
kind of privileged matter.
The statement in the news report falls
within the ambit of privileged
communication. For, although every
defamatory imputation is presumed to
be malicious, the presumption does not
exist in matters considered privileged.
Furthermore, neither the insertion of the
file video constitute malice on the part of
the petitioners. Contrary to the CA's
findings, the identifying character-
generated words "file video" appeared to
have been superimposed on screen,
doubtless to disabuse the minds of
televiewers of the idea that a particular
footage is current. In the words of the
trial court, the phrase "file video" was
"indicated on screen purposely to
prevent misrepresentation so as not to
confuse the viewing public." The trial
court added the observation that "the
use of file footage in TV news reporting
is a standard practice." the absence of
the accompanying character-generated
words "file video" would not
nevertheless, change the legal situation
insofar as the privileged nature of the
audio-video publication complained of is
concerned. In view of the state of things,
the video footage was not libel in
disguise; standing without
accompanying sounds or voices, it was
meaningless, or, at least, conveyed
nothing derogatory in nature.
CUENCO V. CUENCO
The reason for the rule that pleadings in
judicial proceedings are considered
privileged is not only because said
pleadings have become part of public
record open to the public to scrutinize,
but also due to the undeniable fact that
said pleadings are presumed to contain
allegations and assertions lawful and
legal in nature, appropriate to the
disposition of issues ventilated before
the courts for the proper administration
of justice and, therefore, of general
public concern. Moreover, pleadings are
presumed to contain allegations
substantially true because they can be
supported by evidence presented in
good faith, the contents of which would
be under the scrutiny of courts and,
therefore, subject to be purged of all
improprieties and illegal statements
contained therein.
The court concluded that the published
complaint in Civil Case No. 5665,
although considered libelous "per se",
would fall under the protective mantle of
privileged communication. It follows that
its author (defendant Lazaro) cannot be
held liable for its publication.
13. Terminating and establishing
attorney-client relationship
Code of Professional Responsibility,
Canon 20, Rule 20.04
Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid
controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial
action only to prevent imposition,
injustice or fraud.
Code of Professional Responsibility,
Canon 22
CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL
WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY
FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON
NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES.
Code of Professional Responsibility,
Canon 3, Rule 3.03
Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts
public office, he shall withdraw from the
firm and his name shall be dropped from
the firm name unless the law allows him
to practice law currently.
Code of Professional Responsibility,
Canon 15, Rule 15.06
Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or
imply that he is able to influence any
public official, tribunal or legislative
body.
Code of Professional Responsibility,
Canon 18
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL
SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Code of Professional Responsibility,
Rule 19.02
Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received
information that his client has, in the
course of the representation,
perpetrated a fraud upon a person or
tribunal, shall promptly call upon the
client to rectify the same, and failing
which he shall terminate the relationship
with such client in accordance with the
Rules of Court.
ORCINO V. GASPAR
The Supreme Court admonished
respondent to exercise more prudence
and judiciousness in dealing with his
clients and ordered to return to
complainant the amount representing a
portion of his legal fees. The Court ruled
that complainant's words and actions
may have hurt respondent's feelings
considering the work he had put into the
case, but her words were uttered in a
burst of passion. Respondent cannot
leave complainant in the cold
unprotected. Until his withdrawal shall
have been approved, he still remains
the counsel of record and as such he
must do what is expected of him by his
client as well as by the court, that is, to
protect the interests of his client.
LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP; WHILE THE CLIENT
HAS THE ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO
TERMINATE THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATION AT ANY TIME WITH OR
WITHOUT CAUSE, THE RIGHT OF AN
ATTORNEY TO WITHDRAW OR
TERMINATE THE RELATION OTHER
THAN FOR SUFFICIENT CAUSE IS,
HOWEVER, CONSIDERABLY
RESTRICTED. - A lawyer's right to
withdraw from a case before its final
adjudication arises only from the client's
written consent or from a good cause.
A lawyer may withdraw his services
from his client only in the following
instances:
(a) when a client insists upon an unjust
or immoral conduct of his case;
(b) when the client insists that the
lawyer pursue conduct violative of the
Code of Professional Responsibility;
(c) when the client has two or more
retained lawyers and the lawyers could
not get along to the detriment of the
case;
(d) when the mental or physical
condition of the lawyer makes him
incapable of handling the case
effectively;
(e) when the client deliberately fails to
pay the attorney's fees agreed upon;
(f) when the lawyer is elected or
appointed to public office;
(g) other similar cases.
The instant case does not fall under any
of the grounds mentioned. Neither can
this be considered analogous to the
grounds enumerated.
VIRGO V. AMORIN
An attorney-client relationship is said to
exist when a lawyer acquiesces or
voluntarily permits the consultation of a
person, who in respect to a business or
trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer
with a view of obtaining professional
advice or assistance. It is not essential
that the client should have employed the
lawyer on any previous occasion or that
any retainer should have been paid,
promised or charged for; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did
not afterward undertake the case about
which the consultation was had, for as
long as the advice and assistance of the
attorney is sought and received in
matters pertinent to his profession.
There are instances, however, when the
Court finds that no attorney-client
relationship exists between the parties,
such as when the relationship stemmed
from a personal transaction between
them rather than the practice of law of
respondent or when the legal acts done
were only incidental to their personal
transaction.
There are instances, however, when the
Court finds that no attorney-client
relationship exists between the parties,
such as when the relationship stemmed
from a personal transaction between
them rather than the practice of law of
respondent or when the legal acts
done were only incidental to their
personal transaction.
LIM, JR. V. VILLAROSA
WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 97-9865
The next bone of contention was the
propriety of respondent's withdrawal as
counsel for Lumot A. Jalandoni in Civil
Case No. 97-9865 to fulfill an alleged
retainership agreement with the
spouses Jalbuena in a suit by PRC,
through Cristina Lim, against the
Jalbuenas and Delfin (BC I.S. No. 99-
2192). In his December 1, 2000
comment, respondent stated that it was
he who was not notified of the hiring of
Atty. Alminaza as the new counsel in
that case and that he withdrew from the
case with the knowledge of Lumot A.
Jalandoni and with leave of court.
The rule on termination of attorney-client
relations may be summarized as
follows:
The relation of attorney and client may
be terminated by the client, by the
lawyer or by the court, or by reason of
circumstances beyond the control of the
client or the lawyer. The termination of
the attorney-client relationship entails
certain duties on the part of the client
and his lawyer.
Accordingly, it has been held that the
right of an attorney to withdraw or
terminate the relation other than for
sufficient cause is considerably
restricted. Canon 22 of the CPR reads:
Canon 22 — A lawyer shall withdraw his
services only for good cause and upon
notice appropriate in the circumstances.
An attorney may only retire from a case
either by written consent of his client or
by permission of the court after due
notice and hearing, in which event the
attorney should see to it that the name
of the new lawyer is recorded in the
case. 41 A lawyer who desires to retire
from an action without the written
consent of his client must file a petition
for withdrawal in court. 42 He must
serve a copy of his petition upon his
client and the adverse party at least
three days before the date set for
hearing, otherwise the court may treat
the application as a "mere scrap of
paper." 43 Respondent made no such
move. He admitted that he withdrew as
counsel on April 26, 1999, which
withdrawal was supposedly approved by
the court on April 28, 1999. The
conformity of Mrs. Jalandoni was only
presumed by Atty. Villarosa because of
the appearance of Atty. Alminaza in
court, supposedly in his place.
[A client] may discharge his attorney at
any time with or without cause and
thereafter employ another lawyer who
may then enter his appearance. Thus, it
has been held that a client is free to
change his counsel in a pending case
and thereafter retain another lawyer to
represent him. That manner of changing
a lawyer does not need the consent of
the lawyer to be dismissed. Nor does it
require approval of the court.
The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in
fact was not even to substitute for
respondent but to act as additional
counsel. 45 Mrs. Jalandoni's conformity
to having an additional lawyer did not
necessarily mean conformity to
respondent's desire to withdraw as
counsel. Respondent's speculations on
the professional relationship of Atty.
Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no
support in the records of this case.
VENTEREZ V. COSME
Assuming, nevertheless, that
respondent was justified in withdrawing
his services, he, however, cannot just
do so and leave complainants in the
cold, unprotected. The lawyer has no
right to presume that his petition for
withdrawal will be granted by the
court.Until his withdrawal shall have
been approved, the lawyer remains
counsel of record who is expected by
his clients, as well as by the court, to do
what the interests of his clients
require. 25 He must still appear before
the court to protect the interest of his
clients by availing himself of the proper
remedy, for the attorney-client relations
are not terminated formally until there is
a withdrawal of record.
Without a proper revocation of his
authority and withdrawal as counsel,
respondent remains counsel of record
for the complainants in Civil Case No.
981; and whether he has a valid cause
to withdraw from the case, he cannot
immediately do so and leave his clients
without representation. An attorney may
only retire from the case either by a
written consent of his client or by
permission of the court after due notice
and hearing, in which event, the
attorney should see to it that the name
of the new attorney is recorded in the
case. 26Respondent did not comply with
these obligations. Therefore, he remains
the counsel of record for the
complainants in Civil Case No. 981 with
the duty to protect complainants'
interest. Had he made the necessary
inquiries as to the status of the case, he
would have known that he was still the
counsel of record as no entry of
appearance was ever made by another
counsel. It would have been easily
discernible on his part that there was no
change in his status as complainants'
lawyer. As of that time, their client-
lawyer relationship was still subsisting.
Therefore, he would have known that
the Motion for Reconsideration was
denied; and a writ of execution had
been issued under the circumstances.
All told, we rule and so hold that on
account of respondent's failure to
protect the interest of complainants,
respondent indeed violated Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which states that "a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him
liable." Respondent is reminded that the
practice of law is a special privilege
bestowed only upon those who are
competent intellectually, academically
and morally. This Court has been
exacting in its expectations for the
members of the Bar to always uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust
and confidence of the public.
14. Grounds for Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Lawyers
RULE 139-B Disbarment and
Discipline of Attorneys
Section 18.Confidentiality. —
Proceedings against attorneys shall be
private and confidential. However, the
final order of the Supreme Court shall
be published like its decisions in other
cases.
RULE 139-B Disbarment and
Discipline of Attorneys
Section 16.Suspension of attorney by
the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial
Court. 1 — The Court of Appeals or
Regional Trial Court may suspend an
attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in Rule 138, Section
27 2, until further action of the Supreme
Court in the case.
Section 17.Upon suspension by Court
of Appeals or Regional Trial Court,
further proceedings in Supreme Court.
— Upon such suspension, the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court shall
forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court
a certified copy of the order of
suspension and a full statement of the
facts upon which the same was based.
Upon receipt of such certified copy and
statement, the Supreme Court shall
make a full investigation of the case and
may revoke, shorten or extend the
suspension, or disbar the attorney as
the facts may warrant.
RULE 138 Attorneys and Admission
to Bar
Section 27.Attorneys removed or
suspended by Supreme Court on what
grounds. — A member of the bar may
be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willful
appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
RULE 139-BDisbarment and
Discipline of Attorneys
Section 5.Service or dismissal. — If the
complaint appears to be meritorious, the
Investigator shall direct that a copy
thereof be served upon the respondent,
requiring him to answer the same within
fifteen (15) days from the date of
service. If the complaint does not merit
action, or if the answer shows to the
satisfaction of the Investigator that the
complaint is not meritorious, the same
may be dismissed by the Board of
Governors upon his recommendation. A
copy of the resolution of dismissal shall
be furnished the complainant and the
Supreme Court which may review the
case motu propio or upon timely appeal
of the complainant filed within 15 days
from notice of the dismissal of the
complainant.
No investigation shall be interrupted or
terminated by reason of the desistance,
settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of the charges, or failure of
the complainant to prosecute the
same, unless the Supreme Court motu
propio or upon recommendation of the
IBP Board of Governors, determines
that there is no compelling reason to
continue with the disbarment or
suspension proceedings against the
respondent. (Amendment pursuant to
Supreme Court Resolution dated May
27, 1993 re Bar Matter 356).
Section 8.Investigation. — Upon joinder
of issues or upon failure of the
respondent to answer, the Investigator
shall, with deliberate speed, proceed
with the investigation of the case. He
shall have the power to issue
subpoenas and administer oaths. The
respondent shall be given full
opportunity to defend himself, to present
witnesses on his behalf, and be heard
by himself and counsel. However, if
upon reasonable notice, the respondent
fails to appear, the investigation shall
proceed ex parte.
Section 15.Suspension of attorney by
Supreme Court. — After receipt of
respondent's answer or lapse of the
period therefor, the Supreme
Court, motupropio, or at the instance of
the IBP Board of Governors upon the
recommendation of the Investigator,
may suspend an attorney from the
practice of his profession for any of the
causes specified in Rule 138, Section
27, during the pendency of the
investigation until such suspension is
lifted by the Supreme Court.
DOCTRINE/S:
INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH
INSTITUTEVS. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
This is not to say that all convictions of
the crime of homicide do not involve
moral turpitude. Homicide may or may
not involve moral turpitude depending
on the degree of the crime. Moral
turpitude is not involved in every
criminal act and is not shown by every
known and intentional violation of
statute, but whether any particular
conviction involves moral turpitude may
be a question of fact and frequently
depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. While . . . generally but
not always, crimes mala in se involve
moral turpitude, while crimes mala
prohibita do not, it cannot always be
ascertained whether moral turpitude
does or does not exist by classifying a
crime as malum in se or
as malunprohibitum, since there are
crimes which are mala in se and yet but
rarely involve moral turpitude and there
are crimes which involve moral turpitude
and are mala prohibita only. In the case
at bar, the facts on record show that
Micosa was then urinating and had his
back turned when the victim drove his
fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim
then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into
the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to
the victim to stop the attack but was
ignored and that it was while Micosa
was in that position that he drew a fan
knife from the left pocket of his shirt and
desperately swung it at the victim who
released his hold on Micosa only after
the latter had stabbed him several
times. These facts show that Micosa's
intention was not to slay the victim but
only to defend his person. The
appreciation in his favor of the mitigating
circumstances of self-defense and
voluntary surrender, plus the total
absence of any aggravating
circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's
character and intentions were not
inherently vile, immoral or unjust.
FLORES VS. CHUA
The title "Atty." preceding respondent's
name in his son's wedding invitation,
and the signboard outside his office
bearing his name and the words
"Attorney-at-Law" are not evidence
sufficient to convince this Court that
respondent continues in the practice of
law, in violation of this Court's Decision
dated April 30, 1999 that ordered his
disbarment. Neither is the Court swayed
by the complainant's allegations of
respondent's continuous practice of law
based on mere "reports." Without more,
these reports are pure hearsay and are
without evidentiary value.
NAKPILVS. VALDES
Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is
actively practicing both professions. He
is the senior partner of his law and
accounting firms which carry his name.
In the case at bar, complainant is not
charging respondent with breach of
ethics for being the common accountant
of the estate and the two creditors. He is
charged for allowing his accounting firm
to represent two creditors of the estate
and, at the same time, allowing his law
firm to represent the estate in the
proceedings where these claims were
presented. The act is a breach of
professional ethics and undesirable as it
placed respondents and his law firms
loyalty under a cloud of doubt. Even
granting that respondents misconduct
refers to his accountancy practice, it
would not prevent this Court from
disciplining him as a member of the Bar.
The rule is settled that a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for ANY
misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows
him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good
demeanor. [27]Possession of good moral
character is not only a prerequisite to
admission to the bar but also a
continuing requirement to the practice of
law. Public confidence in law and
lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer
should determine his conduct by acting
in a manner that would promote public
confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession. Members of the bar are
expected to always live up to the
standards embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility as the
relationship between an attorney and his
client is highly fiduciary in nature and
demands utmost fidelity and good
faith. [28] In the case at bar, respondent
exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty
to observe candor, fairness and loyalty
in his dealings and transactions with his
clients.
COTTAM v. ATTY. LAYSA
Complaints against lawyers for
misconduct are normally addressed to
the Court. If, at the outset, the Court
finds a complaint to be clearly wanting in
merit, it outrightly dismissed the case. If,
however, the Court deems it necessary
that further inquiry should be made,
such when the matter could not be
resolved by merely evaluating the
pleading submitted, a referral is made to
the IBP for a formal investigation of the
case during which the parties are
accorded an opportunity to be heard. An
ex parte investigation may only be
conducted when respondent fails to
appear despite reasonable notice. The
procedures outlined by the Rules (Rule
139-B, Secs. 3, 5 and 8) are meant to
ensure that the innocents are spared
from wrongful condemnation and that
only guilty are meted their just due.
Obviously, these requirements cannot
be taken lightly. Instant administrative
case is remanded to the IBP for further
proceedings.
15. Judicial clemency and
reinstatement in the practice of
law
DOCTRINE/S:
In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus Diaz.
The Court laid down the following
guidelines in resolving requests for
judicial clemency:
1) There must be proof of remorse and
reformation. These shall include but
should not be limited to certifications or
testimonials of the officer/s or chapter/s
of the IBP, judges or judges
associations and prominent members of
the community with proven integrity and
probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in
an administrative case for the same or
similar misconduct will give rise to a
strong presumption of non-reformation.
2) Sufficient time must have lapsed form
the imposition of the penalty to ensure a
period of reform.
3) The age of the person asking for
clemency must show that he still has
productive years ahead of him that can
be put to good use by giving him a
chance to redeem himself.
4) There must be a showing of promise
(such as intellectual aptitude, learning or
legal acumen or contribution to legal
scholarship and the development of the
legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for
public service.
5) There must be other relevant factors
and circumstance that may justify
clemency.
As applied to the case, Judge Diaz
expressed sincere repentance for his
past malfeasance. He humbly accepted
the verdict of this Court in Alvarez.
Three years have elapsed since the
promulgation of Alvarez. It is sufficient to
ensure that he has learned his lesson
and that he has reformed. His 12 years
of service in the judiciary may be taken
as proof of his dedication to the
institution.
TAN VS. SABANDAL
Time and again, it has been held that
practice of law is not a matter of right. It
is a privilege bestowed upon individuals
who are not only learned in the law but
who are also known to possess good
moral character.
It should be recalled that respondent
worked as Land Investigator at the
Bureau of Lands. Said employment
facilitated his procurement of the free
patent title over the property which he
could not but have known was a public
land. This was manipulative on his part
and does not speak well of his moral
character. It is a manifestation of gross
dishonesty while in the public service,
which cannot be erased by the
termination of the case and where no
determination of guilt or innocence was
made because the suit has been
compromised. This is a sad reflection of
his sense of honor and fair dealings.
Moreover, his failure to reveal to the
Court the pendency of the civil case for
Reversion filed against him during the
period that he was submitting several
petitions and motions for
reconsiderations reveal his lack of
candor and truthfulness.
Although, the term "good moral
character" admits of broad dimensions,
it has been defined as "including at least
common dishonesty." It has also been
held that no moral qualification for
membership is more important than
truthfulness or candor.
16. Affinity and consanguinity as a
basis for disqualification under
Canon 3 section 5(f)
Adopting the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
Supreme Court of the Philippines 2004
CANON 3 - IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper
discharge of the judicial office. It applies
not only to the decision itself but also to
the process by which the decision is
made.
SEC. 5. Judges shall disqualify
themselves from participating in any
proceedings in which they are unable to
decide the matter impartially or in which
it may appear to a reasonable observer
that they are unable to decide the matter
impartially. Such proceedings include,
but are not limited to, instances where
(f) The judge is related by consanguinity
or affinity to a party litigant within the
sixth civil degree or to counsel within the
fourth civil degree; Note: The judge
must so inhibit when such instance of
mandatory inhibition arises: When the
judge is related to the party-litigant or
the counsel.
Impartiality
(also called evenhandedness or fair-
mindedness)
is a principle of justice holding that
decisions should be based on objective
criteria, rather than on the basis of bias,
prejudice, or preferring the benefit to
one person over another for improper
reasons.
DOCTRINE/S:
SIAWAN vs. INOPIQUEZ, JR.
Indeed, although the disqualification of
judges is limited only to cases where the
judge is related to counsel within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, the Rules nonetheless provide
that a judge may, in the exercise of his
discretion, disqualify himself from sitting
in a case for other just and valid
reasons. (Rule 137, §1 of the Rules of
Court.)
Similarly, Rule 3.12 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct provides: A judge
should take no part in a proceeding
where the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. These cases
include, among others, proceedings
where: . .
(f) the judge is related by consanguinity
or affinity to a party litigant within the
sixth degree or to counsel within the
fourth degree; . . . . In every instance the
judge shall indicate the legal reason for
inhibition. Under these provisions,
respondent judge was disqualified from
hearing the petition of his uncle and it
was immaterial that the petition was
meritorious. The purpose of the
prohibition is to prevent not only a
conflict of interest but also the
appearance of impropriety on the part of
a judge.
AGUNDAY vs. TRESVALLES
Respondent judge’s refusal to inhibit
himself from trying the criminal case
with respect to accused Lope Panti, Sr.,
who is the father-in-law of respondent
judges son, constitutes impropriety and
gives rise to suspicion of partiality. To
be sure, respondent judge and accused
Lope Panti, Sr. are not, strictly speaking,
relatives within the meaning of Rule
137, 1 of the Rules of Court.
Nevertheless, the close personal
relations between them as parents of
their respective children, being in our
culture known as magbalaes, should
have cautioned respondent judge to
inhibit himself from the case, lest his
impartiality be placed in doubt. To the
contrary, despite the motion of
complainants counsel seeking the
inhibition of respondent judge, the latter
refused to lay off the case and simply
kept assuring complainants counsel that
the balance of justice will not tilt in the
accuseds favor if it is not warranted. As
a result, respondent judges dismissal of
the complaint against the accused, on a
ground which turned out to be
erroneous, immediately gave rise to the
suspicion that he did so because the
accused was his balae, the father-in-law
of respondent judges son. His failure to
outrightly deny the motion to quash,
despite the fact that it is a prohibited
pleading under the Revised Rule of
Procedure, betrayed his personal
interest. Clearly, he committed a
disservice to the cause of justice.
Judges must, at all times, be beyond
reproach and should avoid even the
mere suggestion of partiality and
impropriety.
Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct provides: A judge shall not
allow family, social, or other
relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of
judicial office shall not be used or lent to
advance the private interests of others,
nor convey or permit others to convey
the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge. In Gallo
v. Cordero, [3] the Court imposed a fine
of P10,000.00 on a judge after finding
that - he not only has shown gross
ignorance of law and procedure but has
also failed to live up to the norm that
judges should not only be impartial but
should also appear impartial. He thus
violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which provides that a judge
should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all
activities.
In the words of Rule 2.01 of that Canon,
A judge should so behave at all times as
to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
In sum and substance, to us in the
Court, the whole incident above
narrated —- the failure of respondent
judge to make a determination whether
the case before him was covered by the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,
with the result that during the
preliminary investigation, he required
the accused to post bail for their
provisional release, his failure to see
that the motion to quash filed by the
accused was based on the ground that
the facts alleged did not constitute a
crime, his erroneous dismissal of the
case on the ground of lack of prior
referral to the Lupon Tagapayapa, and
his refusal to inhibit himself from the trial
of the case because the accused is the
father-in-law of respondent judges son
—- demonstrates beyond doubt, if not
respondent judges lack of acquaintance
with basic elementary principle of law,
his defiance of legal norms which call on
judges to avoid any appearance of
impropriety at all times.
TIGGANGAY vs WACAS
We can grant arguendo that the aunt of
Judge Wacas is married to the uncle of
Dagadag. But such reality is not a
ground for the mandatory inhibition of a
Judge as required under Sec. 118 of
Rule 137, Revised Rules of Procedure,
since there is actually no relation of
affinity between Judge Wacas and
Dagadag. Affinity denotes "the relation
that one spouse has to the blood
relatives of the other spouse." It is a
relationship by marriage or a familial
relation resulting from marriage. It is a
fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in
connection with the institution of
marriage and family relations.
Relationship by affinity refers to a
relation by virtue of a legal bond such as
marriage. Relatives by affinity, therefore,
are those commonly referred to as "in-
laws," or stepfather, stepmother,
stepchild and the like. Affinity may also
be defined as "the relation which one
spouse because of marriage has to
blood relatives of the other. The
connection existing, in consequence of
marriage between each of the married
persons and the kindred of the other.
The doctrine of affinity grows out of the
canonical maxim that marriage makes
husband and wife one. The husband
has the same relation by affinity to his
wife’s blood relatives as she has by
consanguinity and vice versa." Indeed,
"there is no affinity between the blood
relatives of one spouse and the blood
relatives of the other. A husband is
related by affinity to his wife’s brother,
but not to the wife of his wife’s brother.
There is no affinity between the
husband’s brother and the wife’s sister;
this is called affinitas affinitatis." In the
instant case, considering that Judge
Wacas is related to his aunt by
consanguinity in the third degree, it
follows by virtue of the marriage of his
aunt to the uncle of Dagadag that Judge
Wacas is the nephew-in-law of the uncle
of Dagadag, i.e., a relationship by
affinity in the third degree. But Judge
Wacas is not related by affinity to the
blood relatives of the uncle of Dagadag
as they are not his in-laws and, thus, are
not related in any way to Dagadag. In
like manner, Dagadag is the nephew-in-
law of the aunt of Judge Wacas but is
not related by affinity to the blood
relatives of Judge Wacas’ aunt, like
Judge Wacas. In short, there is no
relationship by affinity between Judge
Wacas and Dagadag as they are not in-
laws of each other. Thus, Judge Wacas
is not disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule
137 to hear Election Case No. 40.
It cannot be overemphasized that
Tiggangay, for all his protestations
against Judge Wacas’ impartiality
arising out of the perceived relationship
by affinity between Dagadag and Judge
Wacas, never moved for the inhibition of
Judge Wacas from hearing Election
Case No. 40. We view this fact as a
belated attempt by Tiggangay to get
back at Judge Wacas for the latter’s
adverse ruling in Tiggangay’s electoral
protest. Besides, as aptly put by Justice
Inting, "a litigant cannot be permitted to
speculate upon the action of the court
and to raise objections only after an
unfavorable decision has already been
rendered. In sum, We find nothing in the
records to support a case of impropriety,
much less manifest bias and partiality
against Tiggangay.
WHEREFORE, the instant
administrative complaint against Judge
Marcelino K. Wacas, Presiding Judge of
the RTC, Branch 25 in Tabuk City,
Kalinga, is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
17. Grounds for Voluntary Inhibition
of Judges
A judge shall not sit in any case
wherein;
1. He, his wife or child is
pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor
2. In which he is related to either
party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity or to
counsel within the fourth degree
3. Which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee
or counsel or on which he has
presided in any inferior court
when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review
4. Disqualify himself for just or valid
reasons other than those
mentioned above
Except when; With the written consent
of all party in interest, signed by them
and entered into record.
How to make objection;
The party objecting to the judge’s
competency
1. In writing
2. File with the official his objection
3. State the grounds therefor
The judge in accordance with his
determination of the question of his
disqualification either
1. Proceed
2. Withdraw
In case he proceeds*
His decision shall be forthwith made in
writing and filed with the other papers in
the case, but no appeal or stay shall be
allowed from, or by reason of, his
decision in his favor of his competency
until final judgment in the case.

DOCTRINE/S:
BONIFACIO V. BLTB
Appellants stress that the trial court
should be held disqualified because the
counsel for plaintiffs-appellees had been
a classmate of the trial judge.
Admittedly, this is not a legal ground for
disqualification. To allow it would
unnecessarily burden other trial judges
to whom the case would be transferred.
Ultimately, confusion would result, for
under the rule advocated, a judge would
be barred from sitting in a case
whenever one of his former classmates
(and he could have many) appeared.
Nor have the appellants successfully
shown here that bias distorted the
judgment or conduct of the challenged
trier of the case. That he should
question defense witnesses more
closely than those of the plaintiffs is but
natural, since defendants’ evidence
varies from proof already on record. A
desire to get at the truth is no proof of
bias or prejudice.
QUERY OF EXECUTIVE JUDGE
ESTRADA
It is clear from a reading of the law that
intimacy or friendship between a judge
and an attorney of record of one of the
parties to a suit is no ground for
disqualification. But in Judge Masadao’s
defense he states that: "For Filipinos, in
particular, a sense of gratitude is one
trait which invariably reigns supreme
over any and all considerations in
matters upon which such tender
sentiment may somehow inexorably
impinge. Generally, whoever owes a
debt of favor endeavors to repay the
same in any discernible fashion as soon
as the opportunity therefore energes."
Contending the concept of “Utang na
loob” which is widely used by Filipinos.
Judge Elizaga wants Judge Masadao to
continue the case because “Utang na
loob” cannot be a reason for one judge
to inhibit himself. She states that:
Inhibition is not allowed at every
instance that a friend, classmate,
associate or patron of a presiding judge
appears before him as counsel for one
of the parties to a case. "Utang na loob",
per se, should not be a hindrance to the
administration of justice.
ONG V. BASCO
The Supreme Court stated that the
alleged bias, prejudice, and partiality of
Judge Reyes is based on unfounded
assumptions. Mere suspicion that a
judge is partial is not enough. Petitioner
cannot validly argue that Judge Reyes
acted with bias and partiality simply
because Judge Reyes decided the case
against him. The instant case does not
fall under the instances covered by the
rule on the mandatory disqualification of
judges as enumerated in Section 1,
paragraph 11 of Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court; thus, the issue of voluntary
inhibition is primarily a matter of
conscience and sound discretion on the
part of the judge
18. Extra judicial activities of judges
and justices
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary consists of six
canons to wit: Independence, integrity,
impartiality, propriety, equality, and
competence and diligence.
The issuance of the new code succeeds
the previous Canons of Judicial Ethics
and the Code of Judicial Conduct, but
the latter may still apply in a suppletory
character in case of deficiency or
absence of provisions in the New Code.
Canon 4 and 5 of the new code
discusses the propriety of judges and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!
the showing of equality in administration office and the impartiality and
of justice. independence of the judiciary.

CANON 4 SEC. 7. Judges shall inform themselves

about their personal fiduciary and
financial interests and shall make
PROPRIETY
reasonable efforts to be informed about
Propriety and the appearance of
the financial interests of members of
propriety are essential to the
their family.
performance of all the activities of a
judge.
SEC. 8. Judges shall not use or lend the
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid
prestige of the judicial office to advance
impropriety and the appearance of
their private interests, or those of a
impropriety in all of their activities.
member of their family or of anyone
else, nor shall they convey or permit
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public
others to convey the impression that
scrutiny, judges must accept personal
anyone is in a special position
restrictions that might be viewed as
improperly to influence them in the
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and
performance of judicial duties.
should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct
SEC. 9. Confidential information
themselves in a way that is consistent
acquired by judges in their judicial
with the dignity of the judicial office.
capacity shall not be used or disclosed
for any other purpose related to their
SEC. 3. Judges shall, in their personal
judicial duties.
relations with individual members of the
legal profession who practice regularly
SEC. 10. Subject to the proper
in their court, avoid situations which
performance of judicial duties, judges
might reasonably give rise to the
may:
suspicion or appearance of favoritism or
partiality.
(a) Write, lecture, teach and
participate in activities
SEC. 4. Judges shall not participate in
concerning the law, the legal
the determination of a case in which any
system, the administration of
member of their family represents a
justice or related matters;
litigant or is associated in any manner
with the case.
(b) Appear at a public hearing
before an official body
SEC. 5. Judges shall not allow the use
concerned with matters relating
of their residence by a member of the
to the law, the legal system, the
legal profession to receive clients of the
administration of justice or
latter or of other members of the legal
related matters;
profession.
(c) Engage in other activities if
SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen,
such activities do not detract
are entitled to freedom of expression,
from the dignity of the judicial
belief, association and assembly, but in
office or otherwise interfere with
exercising such rights, they shall always
the performance of judicial
conduct themselves in such a manner
duties.
as to preserve the dignity of the judicial
SEC. 11. Judges shall not practice law
whilst the holder of judicial office.
SEC. 12. Judges may form or join
associations of judges or participate in
other organizations representing the
interests of judges.
SEC. 13. Judges and members of their
families shall neither ask for, nor accept,
any gift, bequest, loan or favor in
relation to anything done or to be done
or omitted to be done by him or her in
connection with the performance of
judicial duties.
SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly
permit court staff or others subject to
their influence, direction or authority, to
ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest,
loan or favor in relation to anything done
or to be done or omitted to be done in
connection with their duties or functions.
SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal
requirements of public disclosure,
judges may receive a token gift, award
or benefit as appropriate to the occasion
on which it is made, provided that such
gift, award or benefit might not
reasonably be perceived as intended to
influence the judge in the performance
of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to
an appearance of partiality.
CANON 5
EQUALITY
Ensuring equality of treatment to all
before the courts is essential to the due
performance of the judicial office.
SECTION 1. Judges shall be aware of,
and understand, diversity in society and
differences arising from various sources,
including but not limited to race, color,
sex, religion, national origin, caste,
disability, age, marital status, sexual
orientation, social and economic status
and other like causes.
SEC. 2. Judges shall not, in the
performance of judicial duties, by words
or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice
towards any person or group on
irrelevant grounds.
SEC. 3. Judges shall carry out judicial
duties with appropriate consideration for
all persons, such as the parties,
witnesses, lawyers, court staff and
judicial colleagues, without
differentiation on any irrelevant ground,
immaterial to the proper performance of
such duties.
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly
permit court staff or others subject to his
or her influence, direction or control to
differentiate between persons
concerned, in a matter before the judge,
on any irrelevant ground.
SEC. 5. Judges shall require lawyers in
proceedings before the court to refrain
from manifesting, by words or conduct,
bias or prejudice based on irrelevant
grounds, except such as are legally
relevant to an issue in proceedings and
may be the subject of legitimate
advocacy.
RULES AND REGULATIONS ON
TEACHING
All judges and court personnel
who wish to engage in the teaching
profession are required to comply with
Supreme Court Circular No. 62-97, and
failure to conform is inexcusable and a
clear violation of the judiciary rules and
regulations, indicating a disregard of the
authority of the Supreme Court.
The following are the rules
required for judges and court personnel
in teaching:
1. Teaching hours shall in no case be
earlier than 5:30 p.m. on regular working
days (Monday through Friday) and 2:30
p.m. on Saturdays;

2. Teaching shall be limited to eight (8)
hours a week, and in no case shall a
judge or court personnel be allowed to
teach more than two (2) hours a day on
a regular working days (Monday through
Friday);
3. Applications for permission to teach
filed by a judge shall be accompanied
by a certification of the Clerk of Court
concerned regarding the condition of the
court docket showing: (a) the number of
pending cases; (b) the number of cases
disposed of within a 3-month period
prior to the start of the semester in their
respective sala; those filed by the court
personnel shall be accompanied by a
favorable recommendation by the
Presiding Judge;
4. Application for permission to teach
shall be subject to approval by the court,
which may deny the same or grant less
than eight (8) hours, depending upon
the applicant's performance record.
REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO
TEACH
Circular No. 50-97
- Applicable to all Justices,
Judges, and personnel
- Must be filed within a reasonable
time before the start of the
school year
- Authority shall be for a period of
one (1) year
- Renewal or grant shall be based
on the performance record of the
applicant
DOCTRINE/S:
Vidal vs. Dojillo, Jr.
“Even if respondent did not intend to use
his position as a judge to influence the
outcome of his brothers election protest,
it cannot be denied that his presence in
the courtroom during the hearing of his
brothers case would immediately give
cause for the community to suspect that
his being a colleague in the judiciary
would influence the judge trying the
case to favor his brother. The fact that
neither complainant nor his counsel
objected to the presence of respondent
during the hearing is immaterial.
Respondent himself should have
refrained from publicly showing his
seemingly active interest and
participation in the case, for he does not
deny that he whispered and passed
notes to his brother’s lawyer during the
course of the hearing.”
Ziga vs. Judge Arejola
“His rationalization that he represented
the heirs as a co-heir and not as
counsel is hair-splitting. The
respondents act of writing pleadings and
defending the rights of his co-heirs
amounts to private practice of law. The
tenor of the letters and pleadings, taken
with his acts of appearing, representing
and defending the rights of the heirs
over the property, show that respondent,
as representative of the heirs, was
defending the latter’s rights over the
disputed property, and these constituted
private practice of law.
It should be clarified that prohibited
private practice of a profession is more
than an isolated court appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding ones
self to the public as a lawyer. It is
evident that the instances when
respondent appeared and represented
his co-heirs are not isolated, thus,
constituting the private practice of the
law profession as contemplated by law.
Under Rule 138, Section 35 of the
Revised Rules of Court, judges are
prohibited from engaging in the private
practice of law or giving professional
advice to clients. This is reiterated in
Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
which enjoins members of the bench to disciplinarily sanctioned as a member of
regulate their extra-judicial activities to the Bar. Judgment in both respects may
minimize the risk of conflict with their be incorporated in one decision or
judicial duties. Rule 5.07 of the Code in resolution.
particular states: Protection of Judiciary Members
from Baseless and Unfounded
A judge shall not engage in the private Administrative Complaints
practice of law. Unless prohibited by the In recognition that some losing litigants
Constitution or law, a judge may engage or disgruntled lawyers file malicious
in the practice of any other profession complaints against Judges or Justices,
provided that such practice will not the supreme court issued A.M. No. 03-
conflict or tend to conflict with judicial 10-01-SC in order to protect the
functions. members of the judiciary.
Dismissal of complaints against
As a Civil Service employee, he cannot Judges and Justices
engage in private practice without the Procedure for dismissal of
written permission from this Court. The complaints against Judges and
public expects him to devote full time to Justices:
his judicial work. As a general rule, the 1. The administrative complaint
appointment or election of an attorney to against any Justice of the
a government office disqualifies him Court of Appeals
from engaging in the private practice of
or Sandiganbayan or any
law. The reason for the disqualification
is that a public office is a public trust, Judge of the lower courts is
and a public officer or employee is filed in connection with a
obliged not only to perform his duties case in court
with the highest degree of responsibility, 2. There is an informal
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency but also preliminary inquiry by the
with exclusive fidelity. The Office of the Court
disqualification is intended to preserve
Administrator
the public trust in a public office, avoid
conflict of interests or a possibility 3. It is shown that the complaint
is clearly unfounded and
19. Grounds for Disciplinary baseless and intended to
proceedings against judges and harass the respondent
justices 4. That the finding that the
complaint is unfounded
Automatic Conversion of Some
should be included in the
Administrative Cases Against
Justices, Judges and Certain Court report and recommendation
Officials as Disciplinary Proceedings of the Office of the Court
Against Them Administrator
In A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC the
administrative case shall also be Procedure for acting on complaints
considered a disciplinary action against against Retiring Judges and
the respondent Justice, judge or court Justices:
official concerned as a member of the 1. The complaint is:
Bar. The respondent may forthwith be a. filed within six months
required to comment on the complaint before the
and show cause why he should not also compulsory
be suspended, disbarred or otherwise
 retirement of a cause why he or she should not
Justice or Judge
b. for an alleged cause
of action that
occurred at least a
year before such
filing;
c. shown prima
facie that it is
intended to harass
the respondent
2. the Office of the Court
Administrator must require
the respondent to file a
comment within ten (10) days
from receipt of the complaint,
and submit to the Court a
report and recommendation
not later than thirty (30) days
from receipt of the comment.
3. The Court shall act on the
recommendation before the
date of compulsory
retirement of the respondent,
or, if it is not possible to do
so, within six (6) months from
such date without prejudice
to the release of the
retirement benefits less such
amount as the Court may
order to be withheld, taking
into account the gravity of the
cause of action alleged in the
complaint.
Sanctions for complainants
1. If the recommendation (of finding
the complaint to be unfounded
and malicious) is approved or
affirmed by the Court, the
complainant may be required to
show cause why he should not
be held in contempt of court.
2. If the complainant is a lawyer, he
may further be required to show
be administratively sanctioned
as a member of the Bar and as
an officer of the court
The following are the grounds for
disciplinary proceedings against
judges and justices:
1. Bribery, direct or indirect bribery
2. Dishonesty and Violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law
3. Gross Misconduct Constituting
Violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct
4. Conviction of a Crime Involving
Moral Turpitude
Instances of moral turpitude:
! Abduction with consent
! Bigamy
! Concubinage
! Smuggling
! Estafa through falsification of a
document
! Attempted bribery
! Theft
! Violation of B.P. 22
Crimes which do not involve moral
turpitude:
! Minor transgressions of law
! Illegal recruitment
! Slight physical injuries and the
carrying of deadly weapon
! Indirect Contempt
5. Immorality
6. Gross Ignorance of the Law or
Procedure
7. Unauthorized Practice of Law
8. Vulgar and Unbecoming Conduct
9. Receiving Additional or Double
Compensation unless specifically
authorized by law
10. Undue Delay in Rendering a
Decision or Order, or in Transmitting
The Records of a Case
DOCTRINE/S:
BELLO VS. DIAZ
In view of the foregoing, we referred this
administrative matter back to the OCA
for re-evaluation, report and
recommendation.
A thorough evaluation of the letter-
complaint reveals that the alleged errors
committed by respondent Judge pertain
to the exercise of his adjudicative
functions. Such errors cannot be
corrected through administrative
proceedings, but should instead be
assailed through judicial remedies. This
has been well-emphasized in the case
of Flores vs. Abesamis, wherein we
held:
As everyone knows, the law provides
ample judicial remedies against errors
or irregularities being committed by a
Trial Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies
against errors or irregularities which
may be regarded as normal in nature
(i.e., error in appreciation or admission
of evidence, or in construction or
application of procedural or substantive
law or legal principle) include a motion
for reconsideration (or after rendition of
judgment or final order, a motion for new
trial), and appeal. The extraordinary
remedies against error or irregularities
which may be deemed extraordinary in
character (i.e., whimsical, capricious,
despotic exercise of power or neglect of
duty, etc.) are, inter alia, the special civil
action of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a
petition for change of venue, as the
case may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy
is that disciplinary proceedings and
criminal actions against Judges are not
complementary or suppletory of, nor a
substitute for, these judicial remedies,
whether ordinary or extraordinary.
Resort to and exhaustion of these
judicial remedies, as well as the entry of
judgment in the corresponding action or
proceeding, are pre-requisites for the
taking of other measures against the
persons of the judges concerned,
whether of civil, administrative, or
criminal nature. It is only after the
available judicial remedies have been
exhausted and the appellate tribunals
have spoken with finality, that the door
to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or
administrative liability may be said to
have opened, or closed.
SINSUAT VS. JUDGE HIDALGO
Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court provides how proceedings for the
discipline of Judges of regular and
special courts and Justices of the Court
of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may
be instituted. It states that proceedings
for the discipline of Judges of regular
and special courts and Justices of the
Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu
proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a
verified complaint, supported
by affidavits of persons who have
personal knowledge of the facts alleged
therein or by documents which may
substantiate said allegations, or upon an
anonymous complaint, supported by
public records of indubitable integrity.
The complaint shall be in writing and
shall state clearly and concisely the acts
and omissions constituting violations of
standards of conduct prescribed for
Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or
the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Under the above-quoted Rule, there are
three ways by which administrative
proceedings against judges may be
instituted: (1) motu proprio by the
Supreme Court; (2) upon verified
complaint with affidavits of persons
having personal knowledge of the facts
alleged therein or by documents which
may substantiate said allegations; or (3)
upon an anonymous complaint
supported by public records of
indubitable integrity.
While the copy of the Motion which the
Attorneys furnished the OCA was
unverified as were their subsequent
letters, the OCA correctly treated them
as anonymous complaint. The Supreme
Court has, on several occasions, been
entertaining complaints of this nature
especially where respondents admitted
the material allegations of the
complainants as in Judge Hidalgo‘s
case.
Anonymous complaints, as a rule, are
received with caution. They should not
be dismissed outright, however, where
their averments may be easily verified
and may, without much difficulty, be
substantiated and established by other
competent evidence.
Here, the motion and letters sufficiently
averred the specific acts upon which
Judge Hidalgo‘s alleged administrative
liability was anchored. And the
averments are verifiable from the
records of the trial court and the Court of
Appeal‘s Decision.
CAMPOS VS. CAMPOS
Only the allegation of Eliseo’s
engagement in the scuffle inside the
chamber of Judge Casals on September
14, 2009 shall be resolved. Anent the
foregoing, this Court is compelled to
once again impose a fine upon Eliseo
for violating Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
when he conducted himself in a manner
not befitting a member of the bar.
However, this Court, on February 8,
2012, in A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, had
already imposed upon Eliseo a fine of
Php20,000.00 for simple misconduct in
causing the issuance of OCT No. P-
28258 in Alistair’s name when the
subject property actually belongs to the
former. The charges of (a) immorality in
engaging in extra-marital affairs; and (b)
dishonesty in executing the Affidavit of
Loss on September 10, 2008, were, on
the other hand, dismissed by the Court
after finding either the evidence of the
complainants as insufficient or the
issues raised being already the subjects
of Eliseo’s pending Petition for the
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
It is worth emphasizing that the instant
disbarment complaint and A.M. No.
MTJ-10-1761 are anchored upon almost
the same set of facts, except that in the
former, the issue of occurence of the
scuffle on September 14, 2009 is raised
as well. This Court does not intend to
punish Eliseo twice for the same acts
especially since they pertain to his
private life and were not actually
committed in connection with the
performance of his functions as a
magistrate before.
In Samson v. Caballero, the Court
emphasized what "automatic conversion
of administrative cases against justices
and judges to disciplinary proceedings
against them as lawyers" means, viz:
This administrative case against
respondent shall also be considered as
a disciplinary proceeding against him as
a member of the Bar, in accordance with
AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This resolution,
entitled "Re: Automatic Conversion of
Some Administrative Cases Against
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and
Special Courts; and Court Officials Who
are Lawyers as Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Them Both as
Such Officials and as Members of the
Philippine Bar," provides:
"Some administrative cases against
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and
special courts; and the court officials
who are lawyers are based on grounds
which are likewise grounds for the
disciplinary action of members of the
Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath,
the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and the Canons of Professional Ethics,
or for such other forms of breaches of
conduct that have been traditionally
recognized as grounds for the discipline
of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the
administrative case shall also be
considered a disciplinary action against
the respondent justice, judge or court
official concerned as a member of the
Bar. x x x. Judgment in both respects
may be incorporated in one decision or
resolution."
The above-cited case suggests the
superfluity of instituting a disbarment
complaint against a lawyer when an
administrative case had been previously
filed against him or her as a magistrate.
Ideally therefore, the instant disbarment
complaint should have been
consolidated with A.M. No. MTJ-10-
1761. However, it is well to note that
Samson v. Caballero was promulgated
by the Court on August 5, 2009
subsequent to the filing of the instant
disbarment complaint on April 6, 2009.
Further, while all the allegations in A.M.
No. MTJ-10-1761 are replicated in the
instant disbarment complaint, the last
issue of engagement in the scuffle is an
addition to the latter. Hence, this Court
shall now resolve the said issue to write
finis to the parties’ bickerings.
All told, Eliseo violated Rule 7.03,
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he conducted
himself in a manner not befitting a
member of the bar by engaging in the
scuffle with his own children in the
chamber of Judge Casals on September
14, 2009 and recklessly expressing his
doubt anent the legitimacy of his son
Alistair during the hearing before the
CBD.
RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT
DATED FEBRUARY 18, 2005 OF A
"COURT PERSONNEL" AGAINST
JUDGE FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR.
Section 1, Rule 140 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides that the
disciplinary proceedings against judges
and justices may be instituted under
either of three ways:
1. By the Supreme Court motu
proprio;
2. upon a verified complaint; or
3. upon an anonymous complaint,
supported by public records of
indubitable integrity.
The instant complaint was instituted
through the last mode. We find the
Evaluation Report of the OCA well-
founded. The evidence, consisting of the
Report of the OCA Investigating Team
tasked to conduct discreet investigation
of the anonymous complaint, supports
the conclusion of Court Administrator
Lock that respondent is administratively
liable for conduct unbecoming a judge.
The Investigating Team personally
heard respondent judge shouting
"punyeta" at his staff and saying, "Sino
si Clinton? Bakla yon." when asked by a
lady looking for the latter. Likewise, he
insulted Jotham Lopez, court interpreter,
by shouting at him, "Animal ka, bakla
ka."
The team had the occasion to talk to
Atty. Francisco H. Escaño, former judge
and now a practitioner before the courts
in Ormoc City. He confided to them that
he "can no longer take his (respondent
judge’s) abuses, arrogance, and
corruption." However, according to
Court Administrator Lock, there is no
evidence to sustain the charge of
corruption.
RE: CECILIA BUTACAN
The Court resolves that upon the
demise of Judge Butacan on July 28,
2005, his heirs are entitled to all gratuity
benefits under R.A. No. 910, to be
reckoned from June 19, 1995, the date
of his appointment as MTCC Judge up
to September 11, 2004 when the CA
Decision affirming the CSC Resolution,
became final and executory.
Judge Butacan was appointed as
Presiding Judge of the MTCC while the
administrative charge against him as
Chief of the Legal Division, CSC
Regional Office No. 2 was pending with
the CSC. Records on hand do not show
whether he divulged the administrative
charge filed against him when he filed
his application for judgeship with the
Judicial and Bar Council. Neither could it
be determined whether his application
was made prior to the filing of the
administrative charges against him in
the CSC. In any event, his appointment
to the judiciary does not erase any
misfeasance which he may have
committed while in the CSC.
In effect, his appointment as MTCC
judge is conditional, that is, subject to
the final determination of the
administrative complaint against him.
And this is where the role of the judiciary
came in. Upon being notified by the
CSC of the conviction of Judge Butacan
for grave misconduct and gross neglect
of duty, the OCA initiated the
corresponding administrative complaint
against Judge Butacan. This step finds
support in Heck v. Santos where the
Court held that while the infraction was
committed before the respondent’s
appointment as judge, the Court may
still discipline him therefor.
However, upon his demise, the
administrative complaint of the OCA had
to be considered closed and terminated.
As it stands therefore, there is no valid
reason why the heirs of Judge Butacan
should not be entitled to gratuity benefits
for the period he rendered service as
MTCC Judge up to the finality of the
CSC Resolution on September 11, 2004
which imposed the penalty of "dismissal
from service with all the accessory
penalties including disqualification from
holding public office and forfeiture of
benefits."
Although the CSC Resolution is dated
April 12, 1996, the penalty of
disqualification from holding public office
and forfeiture of benefits which became
final only on September 11, 2004, may
not be applied retroactively. Accordingly,
Judge Butacan having rendered service
in the judiciary from June 19, 1995 up to
September 11, 2004, he is considered
entitled to any benefits due him under
the law. As of September 11, 2004,
however, Judge Butacan should be
considered terminated from service in
the judiciary as his appointment as
MTCC Judge is deemed conditional
upon his exoneration of the CSC
administrative charges against him.
Forfeiture of benefits under the CA
Decision refers only to benefits arising in
the CSC prior to his appointment in the
Judiciary.
GUEVARRA V. EALA
Lawyer’s oath stated that a lawyer
should support the Constitution and
obey the laws, Meaning he shall not
make use of deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct, grossly immoral
conduct, or be convicted in any crime
involving moral turpitude. In the case at
bar Atty. Eala was accused of
Concubinage, under ART. 334 of the
Revised Penal Code, “ Any husband
who shall keep a mistress in a conjugal
dwelling, or, shall have sexual
intercourse, under scandalous
circumstances, with a woman who is not
his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any
other place, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium
period. Section 2 of ART. XV states that
“Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the state.
Respondent’s grossly immoral conduct
runs afoul of the constitution and the
laws, that he as a lawyer has sworn to
uphold. Hence the court declared Atty.
Jose Emmanul M. Eala DISBARRED for
grossly immoral conduct, violation of his
oath of office, and violation of canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
20. Criminal offenses (RPC) that
may be committed by
judges/justices and lawyers
Dereliction of Duty by Officers
Related to the Administration of
Justice
Art. 204. Knowingly rendering unjust
judgment. — Any judge who shall
knowingly render an unjust judgment in
any case submitted to him for decision,
shall be punished by prision mayor and
perpetual absolute disqualification.
Art. 205. Judgment rendered through
negligence. — Any judge who, by
reason of inexcusable negligence or
ignorance shall render a manifestly
unjust judgment in any case submitted
to him for decision shall be punished by
arresto mayor and temporary special
disqualification.
Art. 206. Unjust interlocutory order.
— Any judge who shall knowingly
render an unjust interlocutory order or
decree shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period and
suspension; but if he shall have acted
by reason of inexcusable negligence or
ignorance and the interlocutory order or
decree be manifestly unjust, the penalty
shall be suspension.
Art. 207. Malicious delay in the
administration of justice. — The
penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon
any judge guilty of malicious delay in the
administration of justice.
Art. 209. Betrayal of trust by an
attorney or solicitor. — Revelation of
secrets. — In addition to the proper
administrative action, the penalty of
prision correccional in its minimum
period, or a fine ranging from 200 to
1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed
upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor
(procurador judicial) who, by any
malicious breach of professional duty or
of inexcusable negligence or ignorance,
shall prejudice his client, or reveal any
of the secrets of the latter learned by
him in his professional capacity.
The same penalty shall be imposed
upon an attorney-at-law or solicitor
(procurador judicial) who, having
undertaken the defense of a client or
having received confidential information
from said client in a case, shall
undertake the defense of the opposing
party in the same case, without the
consent of his first client.
21. Criticisms against the
courts/judges/justices
Code of Professional Responsibility,
Canon 8, Rule 8.01
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in
his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
DOCTRINE/S:
FRANCISCO JR. VS. UERM-MARA
PHILIPPINES CORP.
Counsels can be held in contempt of
court for making false statements in the
pleadings they file[49] tending to
mislead the Court and to degrade the
administration of justice. We cannot see
any deliberate falsehood or
misrepresentation in the aforequoted
statements of Attys. Poblador and
Bretaa. On the contrary, they truthfully
indicated that UEM and MARA were the
former stockholders of UMPC. This is
the clear import of the phrase then
represented by its stockholders MARA
and UEM. This also implied that they
had been replaced as such. Besides,
the ownership structure of UMPC as a
party in this case was never material to
the issue for resolution which is the
issuance of a writ of injunction for the
collection of toll fees. Hence, the Court
was not deceived in any way.
In criticizing a judge's decision, the test
is whether it is done in good faith:
While the Court recognizes a litigant's
right to criticize judges and justices in
the performance of their functions, it is
the cardinal condition of all such
criticism that it shall be bona fide and
shall not spill over the walls of decency
and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand,
and abuse and slander of courts and the
judges (or justices) thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts.
We cannot say that the use of the
adjective insufficiently-informed is
disrespectful, abusive or slanderous.
Besides [it] is well settled that the power
to punish a person in contempt of court
is inherent in all courts to preserve order
in judicial proceedings and to uphold the
due administration of justice. Judges
however are enjoined to exercise such
power judiciously and sparingly, with
utmost restraint, and with the end in
view of utilizing the same for correction
and preservation of the dignity of the
court, and not for retaliation or
vindictiveness.
Therefore, we deny petitioners motion to
cite in contempt for lack of merit.
ASEAN PACIFIC PLANNERS VS. CITY
OF URDANETA
Before we close, notice is taken of the
offensive language used by Attys. Oscar
C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante in
their pleadings before us and the Court
of Appeals. They unfairly called the
Court of Appeals a court of technicalities
for validly dismissing their defectively
prepared petition. They also accused
the Court of Appeals of protecting, in
their view, an incompetent judge.[46] In
explaining the concededly strong
language, Atty. Sahagun further indicted
himself. He said that the Court of
Appeals dismissal of the case shows its
impatience and readiness to punish
petitioners for a perceived slight on its
dignity and such dismissal smacks of
retaliation and does not augur for the
cold neutrality and impartiality
demanded of the appellate court.
Accordingly, we impose upon Attys.
Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B.
Escalante a fine of P2,000 each payable
to this Court within ten days from notice
and we remind them that they should
observe and maintain the respect due to
the Court of Appeals and judicial
officers; abstain from offensive language
before the courts; and not attribute to a
Judge motives not supported by the
record. Similar acts in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and
maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by
others
DOCTRINE/S:
FUDOT VS. CATTLEYA LAND INC.
Contempt is defined as a disobedience
to the Court by setting up an opposition
to its authority, justice and dignity. It
signifies not only a willful disregard or
disobedience of the court’s orders but
such conduct that tends to bring the
authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in
some manner to impede the due
administration of justice.46 Indirect
contempt is one committed out of or not
in the presence of the court that tends to
belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass
the court and justice.
A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer
of the court. Corollary to his duty to
observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and judicial officers is to
support the courts against "unjust
criticism and clamor." His duty is to
uphold the dignity and the authority of
the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not
to promote distrust in the administration
of justice, as it is his sworn and moral
duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential
to the proper administration of justice."
As we held in one case:
It is [the] respondent’s duty as an
officer of the court, to uphold the
dignity and authority of the
courts and to promote
confidence in the fair
administration of justice and in
the Supreme Court as the last
bulwark of justice and
democracy.
As part of the machinery for the
administration of justice, a
lawyer is expected to bring to the
fore irregular and questionable
practices of those sitting in court
which tend to corrode the judicial
machinery. Thus, if he acquired
reliable information that
anomalies are perpetrated by
judicial officers, it is incumbent
upon him to report the matter to
the Court so that it may be
properly acted upon. An
omission or even a delay in
reporting may tend to erode the
dignity of, and the public’s trust
in, the judicial system.
That De La Serna did not report the
matter immediately to the Court suffuses
unshakeable dubiety to his claim that
Mr. Chan had uttered the statements
attributed to him. That De La Serna
brought up the issue of bribery after an
unfavorable decision was issued makes
the allegation all the more a contrived
afterthought, a hastily concocted story
brought to cast doubts on the integrity
not only of Justice Tinga, but also of the
entire Supreme Court.
This is not to say, however, that as an
officer of the court, Atty. De La Serna
cannot criticize the court.67 We have
long recognized and respected the right
of a lawyer, or any person, for that
matter, to be critical of courts and
magistrates as long as they are made in
properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels.
SPOUSES TIONGCO VS. AGUILAR
We do not then hesitate to rule that by
falsely and maliciously insinuating that
this Court did not at all read the petition
in this case, Atty. Tiongco not only
exhibited his gross disrespect to and
contempt for this Court and exposed his
plot to discredit the Members of the First
Division of the Court and put them to
public contempt or ridicule; he, as well,
charged them with the violation of their
solemn duty to render justice, thereby
creating or promoting distrust in judicial
administration which could have the
effect of "encouraging discontent which,
in many cases, is the source of disorder,
thus undermining the foundation on
which rests the bulwark called judicial
power to which those who are aggrieved
turn for protection and relief".
In using in the petition in this case
intemperate and scurrilous words and
phrases against the respondent judge
which are obviously uncalled for and
entirely irrelevant to the petition and
whose glaring falsity is easily
demonstrated by the respondent judge's
decision of favor of Atty. Tiongco and
his wife in their case for recovery of
possession and damages, and by the
dismissal of the instant petition for
failure of the petitioners to sufficiently
show that the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion,
Atty. Tiongco has equally shown his
disrespect to and contempt for the
respondent judge, thereby diminishing
public confidence in the latter and
eventually, in the judiciary, or sowing
mistrust in the administration of justice.
Consequently, Atty. Tiongco has made
a strong case for a serious violation of
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which reads as follows:
CANON 11 — A LAWYER SHALL
OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE
RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND
TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND
SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
This duty is closely entwined with his
vow in the lawyer's oath "to conduct
himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity
to the courts"; his duty under Section 20
(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court "[t]o
observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial
officers"; and his duty under the first
canon of the Canons Professional
Ethics "to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of
the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its
incumbent of the judicial office, but for
the maintenance of its supreme
importance."
CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY
UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE
AND REFRAIN FROM ANY
IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO
INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE
APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING
THE COURT.
Constitution, Article VI,
Section 11
Section 11. A Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than
six years imprisonment, be privileged
from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in
the Congress or in any committee
thereof.
DOCTRINE/S:
RE: BAGABUYO
Lawyers are licensed officers of the
courts who are empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend; and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities and
liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence.[17] Membership in the
bar imposes upon them certain
obligations.[18] Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates a
lawyer to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and [he] should insist on similar
conduct by others. Rule 11.05 of Canon
11 states that a lawyer shall submit
grievances against a judge to the proper
authorities only.
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of
Canon 11 when he admittedly caused
the holding of a press conference where
he made statements against the Order
dated November 12, 2002 allowing the
accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be
released on bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11
when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan
was displaying judicial arrogance in the
article entitled, Senior prosecutor
lambasts Surigao judge for allowing
murder suspect to bail out, which
appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue
of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily.
Respondents statements in the article,
which were made while Crim. Case No.
5144 was still pending in court, also
violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which
states that a lawyer shall not make
public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a
party.
In regard to the radio interview given to
Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule
11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for not
resorting to the proper authorities only
for redress of his grievances against
Judge Tan. Respondent also violated
Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court
and its officer when he stated that Judge
Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a
mahjong aficionado, he was studying
mahjong instead of studying the law,
and that he was a liar.
Respondent also violated the Lawyers
Oath, as he has sworn to conduct
[himself] as a lawyer according to the
best of [his] knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to [his] clients.
22. The lawyer and the [law] firm
DOCTRINE/S:
HILADO VS. DAVID
In order to constitute the relation a
professional one and not merely one of
principal and agent, the attorney must
be employed either to give advice upon
a legal point, to prosecute or defend an
action in the court of justice, or to
prepare and draft, in legal form such
papers as deeds, bills, contracts and
the like. If a person, in respect to his
business affairs or troubles of any kind,
consults his attorney in a professional
capacity with the view of obtaining
professional advise or assistance, and
the attorney voluntarily permits or
acquiesces in such consultation, then
the professional employment must be
regarded as established.
The mere relation of the attorney
and client ought to preclude the
attorney from accepting the
opposite party’s retainer in the
same litigation regardless of
what information was received
by him from his first client.
An information obtained from a client by
a member or assistant of a law firm is
information imparted to the firm.
BARBUCO VS. BELTRAN
However, the original decision of the
IBP that he be suspended from the
practice of law of five (5) years, then
modified to six (6) months was proper.
The fact that the respondent was
involved in a vehicular accident and
suffered physical injuries as a result
thereof cannot serve to excuse him from
filing his pleadings considering that he
was a member of a law firm composed
of not just one lawyer. This is shown by
the receipt he issued to complainant and
the pleadings could have asked any of
his partners in the law office to file the
Appellant’s Brief for him or, at least, to
file a Motion for Extension of Time to file
the said pleading.
Applicable Rules
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the
client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the client’s request for
information.
23. Conduct of lawyer and client in a
lawyer-client relationship

DOCTRINE/S:
PARINAS VS. PAGUINTO
IBP ruling was affirmed by the Court.
The petitioner gave partial payment of
acceptance fee, and P2,500 for filing
fee, to respondent believing that he had
file the annulment case. However it was
found out that it was never filed. This
was in violation of Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility,
wherein the lawyer must account all
money and property collected for and
from the client. Acceptance of money
from a client establishes an attorney-
client relationship and gave rise to duty
of fidelity to client’s cause. In the case
at bar, money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose such as filing fee but
not used for failure to file the case must
immediately be returned to the clienton
demand. It was returned only after an
administrative case was filed against
respondent.
A lawyer should give adequate
attention, care and time to his case. A
lawyer must only accept cases only as
much as he can efficiently handle
otherwise client’s interest suffer. It is not
enough that the lawyer only possess the
qualification but also adequate attention
to the work. The legal profession
demands from a lawyer the vigilance
and attention expected of a good father
of family. Failure to do so, is a violation
of CANON 18 of CPR.
Rule 18.01 provides that a lawyer shall
not undertake a legal service that he is
not qualified to render.
Rule 18.02 provides that a lawyer shall
not handle any legal matter without
adequate preparation. He has duty to
prepare trial with diligence and speed.
Rule 18.03 also provide that a lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence
shall render him liable.
With respect to the Affidavit of Motion to
Withdraw by petitioner and respondent’s
admission of misconduct, a compromise
or withdrawal of charges does not
terminate an administrative complaint
against a lawyer, especially in this case
that a lawyer admitted his misconduct.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest, they are solely for public
welfare.
The respondent, Atty. Oscar Paguinto
was then held to be GUILTY of violation
of Code of Professional Responsibility,
and penalized with six months
suspension from practice of law.
FERNANDEZ VS. NOVERO
His failure to file formal offer of exhibits
constitutes inexcusable negligence as it
was proved that such failure was fatal to
the case of client that it had actually led
to its dismissal. To make matters worst,
he filed the motion for recommendation
beyond the reglementary period,
resulting to the
finality of RTC decision.
Clearly respondent’s act is a violation of
Canon 17, Canon 18, Rule 18.02, Rule
18.03. As in the past jurisprudence,
“Verily, a lawyer owes to the client the
exercise of utmost prudence and
capability in that representation.
Lawyers are expected to be acquainted
with the rudiments of law and legal
procedure, and anyone who deals with
them has the right to expect not just a
good amount of professional learning
and competence but also a whole-
hearted fealty to the clients cause.”
In the case at bar, respondent’s attempt
to evade responsibility by shifting the
blame to client is unacceptable, his 15
years of practice of law should made
him aware that he could easily obtain a
copy of records and stenographic notes
from the court where it was docketed.
While the lawyer owes zeal and
devotion to the interest of his client, he
also has the responsibility of employing
only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client and he
should not allow the latter to dictate the
procedure in handling cases.
The respondent met the penalty of
SUSPENSION from practice of law for
one month, and WARNING that
repetition of the same would be dealt
with excessively.
SOLIDON VS MACALALAD
Rule 18.03 was violated by the
respondent. The quantum of proof in
administrative cases is preponderance
of evidence to which petitioner who has
the burden to discharge met. The mere
failure of the lawyer to perform the
obligations due to the client is
considered per se a violation. The
circumstances that the client was also at
fault does not exonerate a lawyer from
liability for his negligence in handling the
case. Thus, the lawyer bears the duty to
serve client with competence and
diligence and to exert his best efforts to
protect within bounds of law the interest
of his client. In the case at bar, Atty.
Macalalad failed to act as he committed
when he failed to file the required
petition. He cannot now shift the blame
to his client since it was his duty as a
lawyer to communicate with them. The
records revealed that Atty. Solidon tried
his best to reach him prior to filing of the
present disbarment case. Through Ms.
Cabo-Borata, who followed up Atty.
Macalalad, the former only received
from him that “everything was on
process” to which respondent has did
not deny or contradicted. Furthermore,
Rule 16.01 was also violated by
respondent when he did not immediately
account for and promptly return the
money he received from petitioner even
after he failed to render his legal
services within contracted time of
engagement.
Respondent met the penalty of
SUSPENSION and STERN WARNING
DALISAY VS. MAURICIO JR.
A lawyer who received money to handle
a client’s case but rendered no service
at all shall be subject to disciplinary
measure. In the case at bar, respondent
assumed such obligations when he
received the amount of P56,000 from
petitioner. Unfortunately, he had been
remiss in the performance of his duties.
When a lawyer accepts a case, his
acceptance is implied representation
that he possesses the requisite
academic learning skill and ability to
handle case. Although as a lawyer he is
expected to know where to obtain
copies of certificate of title, he did not
take any action despite having paid for
his services. This is tantamount to
abandonment of his duties as lawyer
and taking undue advantage of client.
With respect to the respondent’s
accusation against his client that the
latter falsified documentary evidence,
assuming it is true, this will not
exonerate the respondent. This is in
accordance with Canon 19 and Rule
19.02. Thus, instead of inaction, he
should have confronted complainant
and ask her to rectify her fraudulent
representation. If complainant refuses,
then he should terminate his relationship
with her. But respondent failed to follow
this rule. He has learned of the
falsification long after complainant
terminated their attorney-client
relationship. It was just a result of his
active search for justification of his
negligence. He was just motivated of
vindictiveness.
The authority of an attorney begins with
his or her retainer. It gives rise to a
relationship between an attorney and a
client that is highly fiduciary in nature
and of a very delicate, exacting, and
confidential character, requiring a high
degree of fidelity and good faith. If much
is demanded from an attorney, it is
because the entrusted privilege to
practice law carries with it the correlative
duties not only to the client but also to
the court, to the bar, and to the public.
The Motion for Reconsideration of
respondent was dismissed.
PENA VS. APARICIO
The Investigating Commissioner and the
IBP Board of Governors took against
complainant his failure to attach the
certification against forum shopping to
his complaint and consequently
dismissed his complaint. This Court,
however, disagrees and, accordingly,
grants the petition. However, a remand
of the case to the IBP would unduly
prolong its adjudication.
It would seem that the scenario sought
to be avoided, i.e., the filing of multiple
suits and the possibility of conflicting
decisions, rarely happens in disbarment
complaints considering that said
proceedings are either "taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio, or by IBP)
upon the verified complaint of any
person. Thus, if the complainant in a
disbarment case fails to attach a
certification against forum shopping, the
pendency of another disciplinary action
against the same respondent may still
be ascertained with ease. The Court
previously held that the rule requiring a
certification of forum shopping to
accompany every initiatory pleading,
"should not be interpreted with such
absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective or the
goal of all rules of procedure—which is
to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible. At any rate,
complainant's subsequent compliance
with the requirement cured the
supposed defect in the original
complaint. The records show that
complainant submitted the required
certification against forum shopping on 6
December 2006 when he filed his
Comment/Opposition to respondent's
Motion to Dismiss the present petition.
Respondent does not deny authorship
of the threatening letter to complainant,
even spiritedly contesting the charge
that the letter is unethical. Under Canon
19 and Rule 19.02, a lawyer should not
file or threaten to file any unfounded or
baseless criminal case or cases against
the adversaries of his client designed to
secure a leverage to compel the
adversaries to yield or withdraw their
own cases against the lawyer’s client.
In the case at bar, respondent did
exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule
proscribe. Through his letter, he
threatened complainant that should the
latter fail to pay the amounts they
propose as settlement, he would file and
claim bigger amounts including moral
damages, as well as multiple charges
such as tax evasion, falsification of
documents, and cancellation of
business license to operate due to
violations of laws. The threats are not
only unethical for violating Canon 19,
but they also amount to blackmail.
Blackmail is "the extortion of money
from a person by threats of accusation
or exposure or opposition in the public
prints,…obtaining of value from a
person as a condition of refraining from
making an accusation against him, or
disclosing some secret calculated to
operate to his prejudice." In common
parlance and in general acceptation, it is
equivalent to and synonymous with
extortion, the exaction of money either
for the performance of a duty, the
prevention of an injury, or the exercise
of an influence.
Indeed, the writing of demand letters is
a standard practice and tradition in this
jurisdiction. It is usually done by a
lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent
relationship that he has with his client,
the principal. Thus, in the performance
of his role as agent, the lawyer may be
tasked to enforce his client's claim and
to take all the steps necessary to collect
it, such as writing a letter of demand
requiring payment within a specified
period. However, the letter in this case
contains more than just a simple
demand to pay. It even contains a threat
to file retaliatory charges against
complainant which have nothing to do
with his client's claim for separation pay.
The letter was obviously designed to
secure leverage to compel complainant
to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of
this nature are definitely proscribed by
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Court reversed the IBP ruling and

REPRIMANDED the respondent.