ALEXANDER GERARD

AN ESSAY O N GENIUS
1774

EDITED BY
BERNHARD FABIAN

WILHELM FINK VERLAG MÜNCHEN

 INTRODUCTION

"This is one of the most entertaining works we have lately met with. The
design is new; the subject is curious and interesting; the investigation is
pursued with great accuracy and penetration; and the expression is per-
spicuous and elegant. On these grounds, we venture to promise much pleasure
from this work to such readers as have learned to think." This eulogy set the
tone for a lengthy article in the Monthly Review for January, 1775.1 The
book which was accorded such unrestrained praise had, with a London and
Edinburgh imprint, appeared in September of the preceding year. 2 It bore
the title An Essay on Genius, and came from the pen of Alexander Gerard,
professor in King's College, Aberdeen.
To the "thinking" reader whom the reviewer had in mind, Gerard's can
hardly have been an unfamiliar name. Some fifteen years before, he had
made a reputation as an aesthetician with An Essay on Taste, published in
1759. The work had been awarded "an honorary premium, being a gold
medal with a suitable device and inscription" by the "Select Society of
Edinburgh for the encouragement of Arts, Sciences, Manufactures, and Agri-
culture". In itself this was not a high distinction, since "silver medals with a
proper device and inscription" were proposed for "the best printed and most
correct Book", the "best imitation of English Blankets", and the "best hogs-
head of Strong Ale", 3 The real reward lay in the fact that a second and
third edition were called for, 4 and that translations appeared in France and
Germany. 5 An Essay on Taste pervasively established itself as one of those
1
LII (1775), 1—9; for further reviews see Appendix B, p. 458.
2
Gentleman's Magazine, XLIV (1774), 434.
3
"An Account of the Select Society of Edinburgh", Scots Magazine, XVII
(1755), 126—130; see also X X (1758), 43—46.
4
The second (duodecimo) edition appeared in 1764, the third (octavo) edition in
1780. An American edition came out in 1804, The complex physical bibliography of
the work has been treated by Walter J. Hippie, Jr., in the introduction (pp. xxiv-
xxvii) to his facsimile reprint of the third edition (Gainesville, 1963).
5
The French translation (Essai sur le goût. . .) was published in 1766. In the
catalogue of the Bibliothèque Nationale it is listed as octavo, in that of the British
Museum as duodecimo. The German translation (Versuch über den Geschmack. . .)
appeared also in 1766 ("Breslau und Leipzig, bey Johann Ernst Meyer"). Kayser's
Bücherlexikon (I, 2, p, 341) lists another edition ("Breslau: Gosokorsky"). The
translation is said to be by Karl Friedrich Flögel, a then well-known writer on
aesthetics and philosophy; see J. G. Meusel, Lexikon der vom Jahr 1750 bis 1800
verstorbenen teutschen Schriftsteller, III (Leipzig, 1804), 395 f., and K. H . JÖrdens,
Lexikon deutscher Dichter und Prosaisten, I (Leipzig, 1806), 551—557, with a précis
of Gerard's Essay on p. 553.

IX
valuable contribution» to the "science of human nature" which were then, in
increaiing numbers, being made from Edinburgh and Aberdeen.
The new work came from a man who could look back on a successful
carccr. 6 Born in 1728, Gerard rose from comparative obscurity to the chair
of divinity in King's College, Aberdeen. At the age of sixteen, he graduated
as Master of Arts from Marischal College — certainly, as one of his biogra-
phers noted, "at a period sufficiently early to entitle him to the character of
precocious genius". 7 Four years later he was a licensed preacher of the Church
of Scotland and, in 1752, he became professor of natural philosophy in
Marischal College. When he received his award from the Edinburgh Society
he had also distinguished himself as an educational reformer. In his Plan of
Education in the Marischal College and University of Aberdeen (1755) he
suggested for his College a modern system along Baconian lines to supplant
the old scholastic and pseudo-Aristotelian training. This won him further
international recognition. In Germany, where his Essay on Taste was as well
received and as highly esteemed as in Britain, 8 it was felt that a trans-
lation would contribute "viel Nützliches zur Beförderung der Erkenntniß". 9
The next step in Gerard's career came in 1760, when he was appointed
professor of divinity in Marischal College and also minister of the Greyfriars
Church in Aberdeen. Later he resigned both these offices to succeed Lumisden
in the theological chair of King's College, in which position he continued till
1795, when, at the age of sixty-seven, he died on his birthday.
In this last period, when Gerard taught divinity at King's, the Essay on
Genius took final shape. The book, as we shall see, was in the making for a
long time. The Essay on Taste had been written quickly, but the new work
apparently required more extensive reading and more probing thinking.
Though some theological writings appeared after it, the Essay on Genius was
the crowning achievement of a man who proceeded "in omnigena doctrina
comparanda incredibili industria [et] diligentia singulari". 10 As his contem-
poraries saw him, Gerard was not so much a dazzling genius as a clear and
orderly mind — "langsam am Stecken und Stabe der Erfahrung fortschrei-
tend", to use a phrase of his admirer Kant. 11 Though a theoretician of inven-
tion, he seemed to lade "the imagination requisite for making discoveries in
science". His knowledge appeared "the reward of labour", and his attain-
6
For biographical accounts, see especially DNB, VII, 1089—1090, and Cham-
bers's Biographical Dictionary of Eminent Scotsmen (cd. London, 1869), H, 96—98.
7 deserve a different place among these pioneer thinkers and, perhaps, stand
Chambers, op. cit., p. 96.
8
The Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, for instance, praised the book highly.
"Nodi nie ist nadi den ersten Gründen des Geschmacks so tiefsinnig geforscht wor-
den, als von diesem Verfasser." (VÎI, 2, 1768, p. 276).
9
Alexander Gerards Gedanken von der Ordnung der Philosophischen Wissen-
schaften. . . (Riga, 1770), p. 4.
,0
Epitaph, quoted from William Kennedy, Annals of Aberdeen. .. . (London,
1818), II, 349.
11
Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, § 58.
XI XXXIX
ments were considered "solid rather than brilliant". 12 But these were thought
minor limitations. Gerard was known for his remarkably wide range of
interests — from natural philosophy to theology and literary criticism —
and for his capability, by intense study, "of becoming master of almost any
subject". Even if he did not show "any remarkable vigour of mind" he still
had "great rectitude of judgement". All these qualities, major and minor, went
into the Essay on Genius. The result of almost two decades of reading and
thinking, the book was to become the sum and substance of what, about 1770,
could be said on the vexing question of the nature of genius: an achievement,
like all of Gerard's work, perhaps more solid than brilliant, but certainly the
best-considered and most carefully wrought contribution to the literature on
a subject which engaged the attention of practically the whole period from
1750 to 1800.
II
Gerard's Essay on Genius would seem to be a comparative late-comer in the
efflorescence of works on genius during the seventeen-fifties and seventeen-
sixties. In date of publication it was preceded by William Sharpe's Disser-
tation on Genius (1755), Edward Young's Conjectures on Original Composi-
tion (1759), William Duff's Essay on Original Genius, and Its Various Modes
of Exertion in Philosophy and the Fine Arts (1767), and James Beattie's The
Minstrel; or, The Progress of Genius (1771; 1774) — to name but the more
prominent titles. Thus, among the heralds of original genius, Gerard would
seem to have raised his voice at a moment when the historically important
pronouncements had already been made and when it had become difficult
to say something novel on a new phenomenon. This may be true, if the
history of the concept is traced in terms of publication dates. However, in his
preface Gerard stated that "the first part [was] composed, and some
progress made in the second part, so long ago as the year 1758". 13 This, if
true, would make him one of the earliest writers on the subject and almost
reverse the traditional history of the Genielehre. For what might be consider-
ed as a summary of established doctrines when written in or shortly before
1774 must appear as new and "original" if written or at least conceived in
the seventeen-sixties or even in the late seventeen-fifties. Gerard would then
out as their precursor.
12
From the "opinion of Dr. Gerard's intellectual powers" in the Encyclopedia
Britannica, Supplement to the Third Edition (Edinburgh, 1801), 697—701. G. D.
Henderson draws attention to the fact that "the adjective which his admirers ap-
plied to his work was 'ingenious'." "A Member of the Wise Club", Aberdeen Univer-
sity Review, XXIV (1936-1937), 5.
13
Essay on Genius, p. iii.
 Fortunately the generis of the Essay on Genius can be traccd in some detail
in the hitherto unpublished minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society.' 4
With this group Gerard was affiliated for many years, and the Essay on
Genius is closely linked with its activities. The Aberdeen philosophers could,
and did, follow the growth of Gerard's thought almost month by month, so
that the proceedings of their club furnish the clue to the origin and progress
of the Essay on Genius. Much of what Gerard had to say found its way into
print only after having been subjected to the scrutiny of this handful of men
whose "philosophical" interests extended to almost any conceivable subject.
I.ike some other famous members, Gerard regarded their sessions as a trial
ground for new ideas.
[t was the second Scottish society which furthered Gerard's work. 15 If the
Essay on Taste owed its existence to the prize proposed by the Edinburgh
Society, which thought of itself as a kind of Scottish Academy set up for the
express purpose of stimulating the intellectual revival of the North, the
Essay on Genius was called forth by the comparatively secluded Aberdeen
group. Much smaller than the Edinburgh Society, it was less ambitious,
decidedly private in character, and even prone to reticence. But it was
extremely lively, and it counted among its members some of the best minds
Scotland could then boast of. Over the years this surprisingly homogeneous
association ("which the vulgar and uninitiated denominated the Wise
Club*16) had, in the words of a friend and admirer of its members, "the
happiest effects in awakening and in directing that spirit of philosophical
research, which has reflected so much lustre on the north of Scotland". 17
The Aberdeen Society was established early in 1758,18 its original members
being John Gregory, David Skene, Robert Trail, George Campbell, John
u
The following account is based on the "Original Minutes of the Philosophical
Society of Aberdeen", Aberdeen University Library, MS. 539 (by permission of the
University Library, King's College, Aberdeen). Portions of the manuscript have
been transcribed by various scholars, notably by Martha Jane Cauvel, The Critic,
"Blest with a Poet's Fire": Alexander Gerard's Interpretation of Genius, Taste, and
Aesthetic Criticism (unpubl. diss. Bryn Mawr College, 1962).
15
See Margaret Lee Wiley, "Gerard and the Scots Societies", University of Texas
Studies in English (1940), 132—136.
16
Works of the Late John Gregory, M. D.: To which is Prefixed an Account of
the Life of the Author [by A. F. Tytler] (Edinburgh, 1788), Í, 40.
17
William Forbes, An Account of the Life and Writings of James Be at tie (Edin-
burgh, 1806), I, 35.
18
For accounts of its history see James McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy, Bio-
graphical, Expository, Critical, from Hulcheson to Hamilton (London, 1875),
Forbes, op. cit., and James Valentine, "A Society of Aberdeen Philosophers One
Hundred Years Ago", Macmillan's Magazine, VIII (1863), 436—444. Recent sketches
include those by Margaret Lee Wiley (see note 15), Martha Jane Cauvel (see
note 14), Lloyd F. Bitzer in his edition of Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric (Car-
bondale, 111., 1963), pp. xi-xiii; I have not seen D. D. McElroy, The Literary Clubs
and Societies in Eighteenth-Century Scotland (unpubl. diss., 1951—1952, Edinburgh
University Library).
XII
Stewart, and Thomas Reid." Though not one of the founding members,
Gerard was admitted among the first clcctcd members in March, 1758. Before
the first meeting an elaborate body of rules was drawn up, regulating the
details of business and pleasure. It provided for an assembly "twice every
Month, in the Room appointed for that End, upon the Second & Fourth
Wedensdays of the Month". The sessions were to begin "precisely half an
Hour after Five" and "Close half an Hour after Eight" (rule 1). During that
time the "Entertainment" was expected "not to exceed eighteen pence a
Head" (rule 4), and for this money, it was stipulated, "any member may take
a Glass at a By table when the President is in the Chair, but no Healths shall
be drunk during that Time" (rule 3). At any event, the members were to
"leave the Meeting Room at ten" (rule 4).
The austerity of these arrangements provided the setting for the meetings,
which were held with striking regularity. A continuous record of the sessions
is extant from January 12, 1758, to March 12, 1771. As for the manner of
proceeding, it was agreed that each meeting "shall begin with a Discourse or
Dissertation by the Member who is then to enter upon the Office of Presi-
dent, not exceeding half an hour in length, the Subject and Design of it being
intimate at a previous Meeting. And if any Member shall fail to give his
Discourse or send it in "Writing at the time appointed, without a Reasonable
Excuse, the President being Judge, he shall forfeit half a Crown for the Use
of the Society" (rule 13). A further agreement was that "after the Discourse
is read any Member in his Order shall have access to make his Observations
in a free but candid and friendly Manner. But Criticisms upon Style,
Pronounciation, or Composition are to be avoided as Forreign to the Design
of the Society" (rule 14).
Hearing a discourse and subjecting it to expert criticism was, however, not
the only object of these gatherings. The next rule made provision for another
activity: "After the Observations on the Discourse are finished, or when
there is no Discourse as soon as the Meeting is Constitute, the President may
Propose some Question which he thinks proper for the Consideration of the
Society, and if one third of the Meeting consent, it shall be entred into a
Book in Order to be discussed at some future Meeting" (rule 15). Generous
as this regulation appears, the scope of the subject-matter was definitely
limited. Rule 17 stated that "the Subject of the Discourses and Questions
shall be Philosophical, all Grammatical, Historical, and Philological Discus-
sions being conceived to be forreign to the Design of this Society".
Genius was among the early "Questions" proposed for discussion. It is
listed as number 18 in the extant list (the total being 126) and was first
suggested by John Farquhar, a divine, who was admitted with Gerard, at
the meeting of April 22, 1758.20 As entered by the secretary it reads: "In the
19
For the respective biographies, see DNB.
20
John Farquhar is the least known of the members. H e was a minister at Nigg.
His sermons were edited after his death by George Campbell and Alexander Gerard
XXXIX
P«rfection of what Faculty d o « Genius consist? Or if in a Combination of
Faculties, what are they?" It is difficult to determine whether this gave a
hint to Gerard or whether he had already in mind a discourse on genius when
he was asked to lecture. 2 ' At any rate, the question he himself contributed does
not anticipate his future topic: "What are the Proper Subjects of Demon-
strative Reasoning?" When Farquhar's question was due for discussion in
November, 1758, it was recorded that "the 18 Question was passed over
as Mr. Gerard had taken it for the Subject of his last Discourse". The list
itself contains a note to the same effect: the question was "superceded".
Gerard's first lecture was on "The Nature and Variety's of Genius". As
the Society's minutes contain nothing beyond this bare statement, it would
be idle to speculate about the contents of the discourse.22 The title implies a
general survey of the subject, and the talk would appear to have included
materials which later found their way into Part I (headed "Of the Nature of
Genius") and Part II (called "Of the general Sources of the Varieties of
Genius"). In view of the fact that Gerard was to direct his attention to the
imagination as the decisive criterion of genius a second discourse, given by
John Farquhar only one session later, should not be overlooked. It was called
"Some Observations on the Imagination" (August 23, 1758). Again, nothing
is known about the contents of Farquhar's lecture. But one feels inclined to
assume some sort of relation between the views advanced by Farquhar and
by Gerard. That Farquhar supplied Gerard with certain basic concepts and
approaches is suggested by the Essay on Genius itself. Farquhar's original
perspective — that genius may be related to one or several faculties of the
mind — is retained in such chapter headings as that of Part I, Section ii: "To
what Faculty of the Mind, Genius properly belongs."
After one further discourse, in which he "intended to prosecute his former
Subject of Imagination" (May 30, 1759), John Farquhar turned to other
topics, leaving the exploration of the "Province and Criterion of Genius"
and appeared early in the 1770's: Sermons on Varions Subjects, Second edition
(London, 1773). A third and fourth edition came out in 1778 and 1792. The editors'
introduction concludes with the statement: "A good judge will not be at a loss to
discern in the preacher an eminent clearness of apprehension, correctness of taste, a
lively imagination, and delicate sensibility to all the finest feelings of which human
nature is susceptible" (1773, I, v).
21
In the "Advertisement" to the Essay on Genius Gerard stated that he "entered
on that investigation [of genius] immediately after finishing his former work [the
Essay on Taste] " (p. iii).
22
The original members had concurred that "the Society shall have three Books,
one to Record the Discourses, wherein every Discourse shall be recorded unless for
special Reasons the Author desire the Contrary, and every Member shall record
or Cause record his own Discourse. Another Book shall be kept for the Questions
and a third for the Rules and Minutes of the Society and Annual Accounts of the
Societys Money" (rule 16), Of these, only the second and the third are still available
(MS. 539). The highly important first book does unfortunately not seem to survive
except for certain fragments.
XIV
to Gerard. From the end of 1758 onwards it was Gerard's exclusive subject.
Several members of the Society gave a series of discourses on one topic, but
Gerard was the only speaker to confine himself to a single field of inquiry.
His next discourse was in May, 1759, but nothing is recorded about its title
(May 8). In the subsequent address, delivered in November, he "was to give
a Discourse. . . in Continuation of his former Subject upon Genius" (October
16, 1759). Obviously, everybody had by now accepted genius as the habitual
subject with Gerard. The entries become tantali2ingly short. In May, 1760,
there seems to have been another talk (January 22, 1760), and in January of
the following year Gerard again "designed to continue his former subject"
(December 9, 1760).
The year 1761 was apparently a difficult one. Gerard's work made slow
progress. An abstract which he had agreed to make of the debate on the
relation of the ideas of cause and effect was, with fatiguing monotony, report-
ed "not ready" for months and months. Since this question comes under
the heading "association of ideas", the delay, perhaps, reflects Gerard's
continued struggle with a problem whidi also had a bearing on the Essay on
Genius, Moreover, Gerard desired (on August 11, 1761) "a change of the
month in which he was to discourse; as the month of May was inconvenient
for him". The speech he gave in December, 1761, was once more "in con-
tinuation of his former discourses on Genius" (November 24), but this time
the abstract was not immediately committed to the "book of discourses";
instead, "the inserting of it was delayed at his desire, in regard the subject
was not finished" (December 8). This shows the book in progress, and Gerard
struggling with ideas. Seldom did a member of the Society decline entering
an abstract for the same reason.
The difficulties seem to have lasted till 1764, if the minutes can be inter-
preted that way. 23 The abstract of the debate was not finally inserted into
the book until 1765, though the rough draft of this "piece of service out of
his turn" was ready by November 9, 1762. Two sessions later, he was to
discourse, as the standard phrase was, "in continuation of his former subject"
(November 23), but this and the preceding lecture obviously remained under
revision for several months. In January, 1763, Gerard was elected President
of the Society, after the office had become an annually rotating one. When
he resigned, the minutes are at long last more copious; "Dr. Gerrard in con-
formity to the laudable custom already introduced, read a discourse at leav-
ing the chair, on the manner in which association is influenced by the causes
of the passions" (January 10, 1764). Again, "the meeting agreed to delay the
inserting this discourse for the reason suggested by the Dr. at reading his last
discourse". What this reason was remains unknown. The former discourse
had been given a year before. It was "upon the effect to the passions on the
associations of our ideas" (December 13, 1763), and then as later Gerard
23
For Gerard's own account of his difficulties, see below, pp. iíif.
XXXIX
"having desired that the inserting of his discourse might be delayed for a
reason communicated to the society, the said desire was agreed to".
Though these discourses have at first sight nothing to do with genius, they
still form part of Gerard's inquiry into "the general Sources of the Varieties
of Genius". Section iii of Part II treats "Of the Influence of the Passions on
Association". This is the first time that one of Gerard's lectures is identical in
topic with a chapter of the published book. Gerard, then, in conformity with
his statement in the "Advertisement", treated Part I and portions of Part II
in 1758. The intricate psychological analysis of genius followed in 1763 and
1764, after some struggle with an unruly and recalcitrant subject. Three
lectures, including that of October 23, 1764, were condensed into less than
forty pages of the book. Only two months later, in December, 1764, "Dr.
Gerard read his discourse on the principles of association". This was to
bccomc the subsequent Section iv of Part II. Gerard was on his way — but
the end was not yet in sight. The meeting agreed, again in a standard phrase,
"to delay the inserting it, untill the subject is finished" (December 11). A last
inference is, perhaps, permitted. Gerard may have thought that his reflections
on genius had readied a publishable state. At any rate, Thomas Reid was the
only member before Gerard to decline inserting abstracts — "in regard he
proposed soon to send it to the press along with the other discourses whidi
he had read before the society" (October 11, 1762).
From 1764 onwards Gerard was one of the most regular and punctual
contributors to the discourses. Having found "the month of December
inconvenient for his discoursing" (March 12, 1765), he lectured, on Septem-
ber 10, 1765, in "Continuation of his former Subject, upon Genius" (August
13, 1765). The talk was to be followed by another before being committed
to the book of discourses (September 10, 1765). This was given in October,
1766, and the entries in the book were made accordingly. With exasperating
shortness the minutes list a new lecture ("in continuation of the former") for
September, 1767; it must have been on some topic which reappeared between
Sections v and ix of Part II of the Essay, for on September 13, 1768, there
came another lecture which corresponds to the final Section x: " O n the
varieties of Judgement Sc their influence on Genius". Thus the contents of
roughly the first three hundred pages of the published work had been com-
municated to the Society by 1768. In the next year Gerard apparently gave
two discourses, one in September and another on November 14, 1769, "on
the kinds of genius". This is the title of Part III. Most probably he gave, as
he had done in his very first talk, a survey of the subject, which was to be
followed by a more detailed treatment of individual topics.
Concurrently with his lectures Gerard added two more questions to the
Society's list of topics for debates. They suggest not only his aesthetic con-
cerns at the time but also the direction his thought was taking. In January,
1768, he desired to know "Whether Poetry can be justly reckoned an imita-
XVI
tivc art; 6t if it can, in wlutl rcspects?"''4 Hi* own answer to this problem,
which is a sort of refinement upon the Aristotelian position, was given in an
appendix to the third edition of his Essay on Taste (1780). The other question
is more directly related to the Essay on Genius and foreshadows significant
trends in later eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century critical thought on
the factors influencing the growth of genius. As entered on December 12,
1769, it reads: "Whether any account can be given of the causes, why great
Geniuses have arisen at the periods which have been most remarkable for
them, and why they have frequently arisen in clusters?" 25 Obviously the
debates of the Society were to supplement Gerard's lectures in which he
attempted a systematic analysis of what constituted genius, but avoided a
discussion of whence and why genius arose. H o w he wanted to correlate the
two aspects is once again a matter for speculation. The regular minutes of the
proceedings break off in 1771 after recording another lecture in November,
1770. Further discourses were given on November 12, 1771 ("a continuation
of his former Discourses"), and on November 10,1772.26 No notes are preserv-
ed for the next year, so that there is no way of ascertaining whether Gerard
"continued" or finished his subject after "it was proposed that the present
situation of the Club should be considered" in view of the frequent absence
of members from meetings and the delay in preparing abstracts (December,
1772; January 12, 1773). At any rate, Gerard had nearly reached his goal:
the Essay on Genius was published in 1774.
Ill
This account of its genesis places the Essay on Genius in proper perspective.
The book was not, as might be supposed, written with an eye on every recent
development in aesthetics and literary criticism. From beginning to end it
was the result of independent labour, stimulated no doubt by the comments
of discerning friends, yet uninfluenced by active communication with other
writers on the same subject. The absence of any reference to similar works
has become a standard observation on the part of modern critics, and has
commonly been seen as detracting from Gerard's merits. The implication
always is that Gerard failed in one of the elementary duties of a scholar: to
keep abreast with recent publications. Against this charge Gerard must be
defended. He was neither negligent nor did he lag behind. The truth is that
he developed the important concepts by himself (which included discussion
24
No. 94.
25
N o . 104, On February 26, 1771, Gerard suggested another topic: "Whether
national characters depend upon physical or moral causes, or whether they are
influenced by both" (no. 114).
XXXIX
in the Aberdeen Society) and that he held die most "advanced" position
among the contemporary analysts of genius.
The claim to priority is one which has to be settled especially between
Gerard and William Duff, whose Essay on Original Genius came out seven
years earlier. Duff, a minister, had then just been transferred from Glen-
bucket to Petercultcr, both in Aberdeenshire. 27 Thus the two men lived in
close vicinity and may even be supposed to have met. On the important
aspects of the problem of genius they held views of such striking similarity
that one of them would seem to have influenced the other, and at first sight
Gerard may appear to have learned from Duff. The available evidence,
however, points in the other direction. When Duff wrote his treatise,
Gerard's Essay on Taste containing a most significant chapter, called "Of the
Connexion of Taste with Genius", 29 had been available for several years and
with it certain seminal ideas that were to reappear in Duff's and Gerard's
essays. As early as 1759, Gerard had declared that the imagination was of
fundamental and supreme importance in the psychological make-up of
genius. According to his view, a lively and vigorous imagination characteriz-
ed the man of genius as well as the man of taste. Taste, he held, "though
itself a species of sensation, is, in respect of its principles, justly reduced to
imagination". On the other hand, he regarded taste "as an essential part, or
as a necessary attendant of genius". And, finally, he was convinced that "the
first and leading quality of genius is invention, which consists in a great
extent and comprehensiveness of imagination, in a readiness of associating
the remotest ideas that are any way related". 29
Even a casual perusal of Duff's Essay shows that its whole argument re-
volves precisely around these ideas. "Imagination and Taste," Duff pointed
out, were "two material ingredients in the composition of Genius. The former
we have proved to be the most essential ingredient, without which Genius
cannot exist; and that the latter is indispensably necessary to render its
productions Elegant und Correct". 30 Such a pronouncement could be made
by anybody who so rearranged Gerard's ideas as to make genius, instead of
taste, the central concept. When Duff offered this explanation of genius
Gerard, as is indicated by the Minutes, had arrived at far more subtle insights.
By 1767, he had finished most of Part II of the Essay on Genius, which in
the ingenuity of its deductions must have seemed, and indeed was, vastly
superior to the assertions of Duff. Apart from a strongly primitivistic bias
26
Some additional minutes are preserved on separate sheets, These do not seem
to have formed part of the extant book.
22
See DNB, VI, 131f.
28
In view of Gerard's statement in the "Advertisement" (see p. iii), this chapter
is here treated as an integral part of Gerard's analysis of genius.
29
Essay on Taste, ed. Walter J. Hippie, Jr., pp. 144, 163. Here and elsewhere the
text of 1780 is essentially the same as that of 1759.
30
Essay on Original Genius, ed. John L. Mahoney (Gainesville, 1964), pp. 63f.
XVIII
Gerard could not have learned anything f rom Duff which ho did not already
know. Gerard, who elaborately documented his study, would have been too
scrupulous not to acknowledge any debt. But there was nothing to acknowl-
edge on his part. 31
Edward Young's possible claim to notice in the Essay on Genius can even
more readily be dismissed. His was not, in the strict sense of the word, a
study of genius at all. The Conjectures were not so much an explanation of
what genius was and how genius worked as a declaration of intellectual
independence. To the contemporary reader they must have represented a
late phase of the controversy over the ancients and moderns rather than an
early stage of the inquiry into those "principles and faculties of human
nature" which constituted genius. True, Young's letter reflected new interests
and a change of emphasis; its foremost concern, however, was not to under-
stand the geniuses of the past, but to call forth the geniuses of the future, to
promise a new life to letters, and to sketch a vision of the graces and glories
to come. H o w little Young had to offer by way of penetrating analysis can
perhaps be seen from the slight impression which the tract made on Johnson,
who was obviously not at all struck by the novelty of its ideas.32 Were it not
for Young's glowing enthusiasm, which kindled the intellectual fire of a new
generation, especially in Germany, one might, for the substance of the argu-
ment, turn to Fitzosborne's Letters on Several Subjects of 1748.33 There was
not only a great diversity of intention between Gerard and Young but also a
decisive lag on the part of Young, who still held some ideas of the seventeen-
forties, while Gerard's were those of the seventeen-sixties. Besides, the Essay
on Taste with its section on genius had been submitted to the Edinburgh
Society long before the appearance of the Conjectures.34 Young, then, could
contribute nothing to the formation of the Essay on Genius.
Apart from this priority Gerard's approach itself was superior. As the
Minutes disclose, he and his friends handled their subjects in a truly "philo-
sophical" spirit. The question from which Gerard started was posed in terms
as neutral as possible, and from the Essay on Genius it can be seen that
Gerard conducted his inquiry without preconceived ideas. While other
writers on genius took a partisan point of view — Young's slighting refer-
ences to Swift may serve as an example — h e neither held partial opinions nor
advocated one-sided doctrines. He explained rather than proclaimed. H e had
31
Duff in turn warned the reader not to expect "originality" everywhere in his
book: "A casual coincidence of sentiment will sometimes happen, where not the least
imitation was intended" (p. xii).
32
"Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides," James Bos well, Life of Johnson, ed.
George Birkbeck Hill, V (Oxford, 1964), 269. See however, Samuel Richardson's
letter of May 24, 1759, in Monthly Magazine, XL VI I (1819), 135.
33
"Sir Thomas Fitzosborne", Letters on Several Subjects (London, 1748), pp. 5—8
(Letter II).
34
On the genesis of the Conjectures, see especially Alan D. McKillop, "Richard-
son, Young, and the Conjectures", Modern Philology, XXII (1925), 391—404.
XXXIX
no complaint» to make about the scarcity of contemporary geniuses, no edict
to issue for the future, no favour to bestow upon schools and movements,
and no questions to raise about the admission of particular authors to the
ranks of genius. He was not involved in the controversy over the ancients
and moderns. He did not feel oppressed, like Young, by the splendour of the
ancients, nor did he lament the inferiority of the moderns. Above all, he kept
clear of the contemporary worship of the inspired bardic poet. Even if he
wanted to discover why great geniuses had arisen at certain periods he did
not declare, like Duff, "that original Poetic Genius will in general be dis-
played in its utmost vigour in the early and uncultivated periods of Society,
which are particularly favourable to it; and that it will seldom appear in a
very high degree in cultivated life". 35 Gerard's was not the narrow "en-
thusiastic" view of genius which figured so prominently in his time.36 Rather,
he developed a broad concept of genius, which embraced ancient and modern
genius, included diverse kinds of genius, and comprehended whatever mani-
festations of it were visible to an acute observer.
In defining his notion of genius Gerard was the first to arrive at a theory
with distinctively modern features. The term genius, as is well known, was
at the time quickly losing that older, traditional meaning which it had carried
for the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.37 Genius was no longer, as
it still was for Nathan Bailey, "a Man's Nature, Fancy, or Inclination", 38
but came to denote, beyond talent, that superior and, indeed, unique mental
power which the word in its modern acceptation suggests. The significant
redefinition was the work of the seventeen-fifties and seventeen-sixties, and
every writer on the subject contributed in some measure to it. The process,
however, was a complex one, and each writer, including Young and Duff,
was "progressive" in different ways. Only with Gerard does one get the
impression that the borderline has been crossed at all decisive points.
Gerard's concept of "a man endowed with superior faculties", as Johnson
defined genius in 175 5,39 should first of all be seen against the background of
William Sharpe's Dissertation upon Genius, which appeared in the same year
35
Op. cit., p. xviii.
3i
Among others shared by his protégé James Beattie.
37
Apart from the standard work by M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp:
Romantic Theory and the Criticai Tradition (New York, 1953), the best general
account is still Paul Kaufmann, "Heralds of Original Genius", Essays in Memory of
Barrett Wendell (Cambridge, Mass., 1926), pp. 191—217, to be supplemented by
R. S. Crane's remarks in Philological Quarterly, VI (1927), 168—169, by Logan
Pearsall Smith, "Four Romantic Words", in: Words and Idioms: Studies in the
English Language (ed. London, 1957), pp. 95—114, and by Margaret Lee Wiley,
"Genius: A Problem in Definition", Texas Studies in English, no. 16 (1936), 77—83.
Earlier phases in France are studied by Hubert Sommer, "A propos du mot 'génie'",
Zeitschrift für Romanische Philologie, LXVI (1950), 170—201.
38
Universal Etymological English Dictionary (London, 1721).
39
Dictionary, s. v. genius.
XXI XXXIX
a» Johnson's Dictionary.™ Conveniently for the historian, Sharpc marks the
initial phase in the study of genius. He was not aware of any predecessor in
the field and thought of his inquiry as "a disquisition upon so novel and
extraordinary a subject". Like Young and Gerard after him, he felt — not-
withstanding such early inquiries as Addison's Spectator no. 160 — that he
was treating the subject extensively for the first time. Conveniently, too,
Sharpe's sole intention was that of exploding a doctrine which he considered
as detrimental to a true understanding of genius: the assumption that genius
was innate. Advocating an older concept of genius as mental power in gener-
al, Sharpe held that there were "degrees of distinction herein very observable",
and this observation led him to deny that genius was a gift of nature at all.
"The point I have in view," he emphatically declared, "is, to prove, that
Genius, or Taste, is not the result of simple nature, not the effect of any cause
exclusive of human assistance, and the vicissitudes of life; but the effect of
acquisition in general."
This idea, so strongly opposed by Sharpe, was to become the central tenet
in the developing philosophy of genius. In fact, both in England and in
France the Genielehre proceeded from the assumption that genius was definite-
ly the product of "simple nature". An author, therefore, may be said to
qualify as a new theoretician of genius in proportion as he was anti-Sharpean
or, if he was a Frenchman, anti-Helvétian. 41 No direct reply was needed, of
course, and indeed was hardly ever made. But the position had to be succinct-
ly stated, and to Gerard goes the credit for having set forth this axiom for
the first time. Only two or three years after Sharpe's Dissertation upon
Genius he jotted down in his early reflexions on taste and genius: "Diligence
and aquired abilities may assist or improve genius: but a fine imagination
alone can produce it." 42 This was, in terms as unobtrusive as possible, the
decisive move towards the recognition of genius as a given phenomenon.
Not that Gerard considered it as something incomprehensible. He was
convinced that it could be explained and should be inquired into — a convic-
tion that gave his Essay on Genius its raison d'être. But he stated incontest-
ably that genius was an irreducible "principle" of human nature, something
that could not be resolved into the components of an ordinary mind, and
something that could neither be learned nor acquired.
The incidental nature of Gerard's statement should not obscure its im-
portance. It is the cornerstone upon which the Essay on Genius rests. That
Gerard felt no necessity to refute the Sharpean position at any length is of
40
The full title of this rare book is: A Dissertation upon Genius: Or, an Attempt
to shew, That the Instances of Distinction, and Degrees of Superiority in the human
Genius are not, fundamentally, the Result of Nature, hut the Effect of Acquisition
(London, 1755). The author was Curate of Leaden Rooding, Essex. Quotations are
from pp. 1 and 6.
41
For the French developments, see Herbert Dieckmann, "Diderot's Conception of
Genius", Journal of the History of Ideas, II (1941), 151—182.
42
Op. cit., p. 165.
little moment, The issue was alive when the Essay on Taste was written: but
there it was only of marginal interest. By 1774, however, it had lost much
of its vitality, for Gerard's early view had come to be generally accept-
ed. He could confine himself to a disparaging remark on those ("even some-
times judicious writers") who confounded genius "with mere capacity". 43
Readers conversant with the subject would, in coming across this passage,
probably recall that Duff had already elaborated upon Gerard's early note. 44
Only in Germany, where the debate was still timely and current in the late
scventeen-seventies, can an extended treatment of the question be traced in
Jacob Friedrich Abel's lecture before the Military Academy in Stuttgart.
His Rede über das Genie was wholly devoted to the question: "Werden
große Geister geboren oder erzogen und welches sind die Merkmale dersel-
bigen?" 45
Gerard's advanced position is perhaps best revealed in contrast to that of
Young, who presented, in his Conjectures, that well-known though awkward
distinction between "infantine" and "adult" genius. Of these, only the latter
was a genius in the proper sense of the word, while the former, exemplified
by Swift, rather resembled the man of capacity in that he needed learning as
his "Nurse, and Tutor". 4 4 This resumed a point made by Addison about half
a century earlier, yet it added practically nothing to the emerging new
concept. 47 Young, it is true, was all in favour of "adult" genius, but his vision
was still blurred by contemporary issues, and his concept had not attained
maturity. Gerard's, however, was, to adapt Young's words, an "adult"
concept, despite its rudimentary outline. It was neither tentative nor in any
respect derivative.
By acknowledging the innateness of genius, Gerard avoided what was
perhaps the most obvious pitfall in the contemporary analysis of genius. But
there were other dangers threatening from the opposite direction. While the
Sharpean theoreticians, with ill-directed pedagogical ambitions, thought
their task easier than it actually was, another group tended to overrate the
difficulties. For them genius was something superhuman, and they knelt in
self-abasement before the shrines of a quasi-divinity, murmuring ritualistic
formulas instead of uttering critical pronouncements. "With regard to the
Moral world, Conscience, with regard to the Intellectual, Genius, is that God
within," said Young, quoting from Seneca: "Sacer nobis inest Deus", and
adding from Cicero: "Nemo unquam vir magnas fuit, sine aliquo afflatu
Divirto*.** Or, to give another example from John Gilbert Cooper, who
43
See below, pp. 7 and 35.
44
See Duff, op. cit., pp. 3ff.
45
In his new edition (Marbach a. N., 1955), Walter Müller-Seidel points out
several connections with Gerard.
46
(London, 1759), pp. 31, 32.
47
See Spectator, 160.
48
Op. cit., pp. 30f., 27. Elsewhere Young writes: "Genius has ever been supposed
to partake of something Divine." (p. 27).
XXIII XXXIX
published his Letters concerning Taste in the same year as Sharpc his Disser-
tation: "By poctical Genius, I don't mean the mccr talent of making Verses,
but that glorious Enthusiasm of Soul, that fine Frenzy, as Shakespear calls
it, rolling from Heaven to Earth, from Earth to Heaven, which, like an able
Magician, can bring every Objcct of the Creation in any Shape whatever
before the Reader's Eyes." 49
Due to its historical aftermath in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, this sort of Geniekult, a crude revival of the old inspirational view
of the poet, 50 has frequently passed for the genuine Genielehre. But it should
not be overlooked that such a ceremonial reverence of the enthusiastic state
of mind (with its concomitant primitivism) precluded a satisfactory inquiry
into the nature of genius. If Sharpe's view resulted in a pedagogical fallacy,
the religion of genius, as practised by Young and others, was likely to produce
a theological fallacy. It substituted a celebration of the divine origin of
genius for a philosophical theory based on observable data.
Ever since ancient aesthetic theory, the production of a work of art had
been attributed to some combination of "nature" and "art", the first term
designating the creative endowment of the artist, the second a collective body
of learning independent of the individual creative effort. Conventionally,
all neoclassical theories stressed the element of "art", while relegating, with
due modesty, the element of "nature" to the sphere of the Je-ne-sais-quoi.
When Young and others called for originality, they emphasized the element
of "nature" by displacing that of "art" from the distinguished position it had
held. Despite the apparent novelty of their propositions, they thought within
the traditional frame of reference. They merely reversed the order of the
two elements so radically as to make no-learning almost a prerequisite of the
genuine creative achievement. In the process the old Je-ne-sais-quoi assumed
the name of genius. Thus genius continued to be something mysterious and
strangely protean. It was almost negatively defined, like the hidden power
which staunch neoclassicists refused to analyse. However impressive the cry
for the spontaneous effusions of "nature", it made but a scant contribution to
the knowledge of genius. Too much of the finest not only in poetry but also
in music and painting remained outside the narrow confines of the doctrines
of the powers of "nature". Samuel Johnson's anti-Ossianic criticism, "Sir, a
man may write such stuff for ever, if he would abandon his mind to it",51
was more than a confession of conservatism; it was a protest against primi-
tive and artless nature.
49
Letters concerning Taste (London, 1755), p. 101. The poem exhibiting, to
Cooper's view, this "fine Frenzy" in a superlative degree was Akenside's Pleasures
of Imagination (1744).
50
For the background see Courtland D. Baker, "Certain Religious Elements in the
English Doctrine of the Inspired Poet during the Renaissance", ELH, VI (1939),
300—323.
51
Boswell, Life, IV (1934), 183.
 The seemingly traditional position which Gerard took in the Essay on
Genius thus appears as an act of moderation in the face of a primitivistic bias
in poctics and philosophical anthropology. His remark that "diligence and
acquired abilities may assist or improve genius" is as much a plea for the
recognition of "art" in works of genius as his insistence on the innateness of
genius is a vindication of "nature". In keeping with the new tendencies in
critical thought he argued for the priority of "nature" at the same time that
he was aware of an element of "art" which could not be slighted or ignored
in a comprehensive analysis of genius.52 While others attempted an overthrow
of accepted doctrines, Gerard seems to have conceived of his task as one of
reorganisation. His redistribution of emphasis went hand in hand with a
careful weighing of the several components which, according to Farquhar's
initial suggestion, made up genius. The result was a more penetrating insight
into the nature of genius and a more catholic appreciation of its genera than
the "enthusiastic" critics could achieve.53
Gerard's place among the theoreticians of genius is best revealed by his use
of the biological analogy which, at the time, made its distinctive appearance
in aesthetic theory and which is best known from Young, who persistently
tried to elucidate the essence of genius by referring it to unconscious pro-
cesses.54 "An Original * Young explained — with especial success to his Ger-
man disciples, past and present — "may be said to be of a vegetable nature;
it rises spontaneously from the vital root of Genius; it grows, it is not
51
The best comment on Gerard's concept of genius is perhaps no. 899 of Kant's
"Reflexionen zur Anthropologie": "Genie ist nicht etwa ein Daemon, der Einge-
bungen und Offenbahrungen ertheilt. Man muß sonst manches gelernt oder formlich
und methodisch studirt haben, wenn genie einen Stof haben soll, genie ist auch nicht
eine besondere [méthode] Art und Qvelte der Einsicht; sie muß iederman können
mitgetheilt und verstandlich gemacht werden. Nur daß genie darauf komt, wozu
talent und Fleis nicht bringen würde; wenn aber die vorgegebenen Erleuchtungen
amant obscurum und sich gar nicht beym Licht wollen besehen und prüfen lassen,
wenn sie auf keine faßliche Idee auslaufen: so schwärmt die Einbildung, und, weil
das product Nichts ist, so war es auch gar nicht aus dem genie entsprungen, sondern
Blendwerk." Gesammelte Schriften, Akademieausgabe, XV, i, (Berlin, 19Í3) 393,
Though Kant makes no reference to Gerard, the reflection may have been inspired
by his reading of the Essay on Genius, The editor assigns it to the same period as
no. 949, in which Gerard is mentioned (XV, i, 420).
63
Gerard, it is true, was inclined "to reckon it impossible that ever an high degree
of genius should be unaccompanied with something of that elevation and warmth
of imagination, which we term enthusiasm" (sec below, p. 67); but he gave a
psychological, not a "theological", explanation of the enthusiastic state of mind,
and he speaks of it with an unmistakable detachment. Again, it is useful to compare
Kant's reflections (nos. 812, 854, 908, and especially 921).
54
N o extensive study of the rôle of analogies in eighteenth-century criticism has
yet been made. The best account is M. H . Abrains, "Archetypal Analogies in the
Language of Criticism", University of Toronto Quarterly, X V I I I (1948—1949),
313—327, summarized in Abrams's The Mirror and the Lamp.
XXIV
madvn.M The introduction of this archetypal analogy of vegetative life is
Frequently, but wrongly, assumed to have opened up the correct approach
to the phenomenon of artistic creation and furnished the proper clue to its
understanding. In fact, Young's doctrines came dangerously close to a new
obscurantism in aesthetics. Going beyond the rehabilitation of "nature"
(now seen as the power of "growing" or "procreating"), he added the image
of the "magician" to that of the vegetative nature of genius, and thus linked,
the production of an original work of art not only to sub-rational processes
but also to unregulated operations and even to mysterious occurrences.
Adapting an idea of Addison's — that a genius stood up as "the Prodigy of
Mankind" 56 — Young held that genius was "the Power of accomplishing
great things without the means generally reputed necessary to that end",
and he alleged that "a Genius differs from a good Understanding, as a Magi-
cian from a good Architect; That raises his structure by means invisible; This
by the skilful use of common tools". 57 This idea (in a rudimentary form also
present in John Gilbert Cooper 58 ) illustrates the extremes to which the cult of
genius could go. Genius was more than a vegetative organism sprouting from
the soil of the irrational; it was an occult phenomenon.
Gerard employed the same vocabulary, but to a different effect. Since he
finished the first part of his Essay on Genius in 1758, the claim must be
advanced on his behalf of having invented the vegetative analogy.59 H e
seems to have been the first to see and to characterize the transforming power
and the self-regulative operations of genius. As early as the Essay on Taste
he admitted that there was something inexplicable in genius and that the
workings of the imagination exhibited a sort of magical force:
As the magnet selects, from a quantity of matter, the ferruginous particles which
happen to be scattered through it, without making an impression on other sub-
stances; so imagination, by a similar sympathy, 60 equally inexplicable, draws out
55
Op. cit., p. 12.
56
Spectator, 160.
57
Op. cit., p. 26.
58
See note 49.
59
The term "nature" as employed throughout the eighteenth century suggested
frequent comparisons between natural phenomena and works of genius. A good
example is furnished by Pope's criticism of Homer: "Our author's work is a wild
paradise, where if we cannot see all the beauties so distinctly as in an ordered
garden, it is because the number of them is infinitely greater." In the same context
Pope writes about Homer himself: "Perhaps the reason why common Criticks are
inclined to prefer a judicious and methodical genius to a great and fruitful one, is,
because they find it easier for themselves to pursue their observations through an
uniform and boundless walk of Art, than to comprehend the vast and various
extent of Nature." (Works, ed. William Warburton [London, 1751], VI, 358). Thus
"vegetative" analogies were not so radically new about 1760 as is generally sup-
posed, though a new emphasis is clearly discernible at the time.
60
For a discussion of this concept, see Walter Jackson Bate, "The Sympathetic
Imagination in Eighteenth-Century English Criticism", ELB, X I I (1945), 144—164.
XXXIX
 from t lie whole compass of nature such ideas tts we have occasion for, without
nttomiing to any others; and yet presents them with as great propriety, as if all
possible conceptions had been explicitly exposed to our view, and subjected to
our choicc.
At first, these materials may lie in a rude and indigested chaos: but when we
attentively review them, the same associating power which formerly made us
sensible of their connexion, leads us to perceive the different degrees of that
connexion; by its magical force ranges them into different species, according to
these degrees; disposes the most strongly related into the same member; and sets
all the members in that position which it points out as the most natural. Thus,
from a confused heap of materials, collected by fancy, genius, after repeated
reviews and transpositions designs a regular and well-proportioned whole. . . .
Thus genius is the grand architect which not only chuses the materials, but
disposes them into a regular structure. 61
To the perceptive reader it must be obvious that Gerard, despite such con-
cessions, cannot be placed with the radical theorists of genius. If, on the one
hand, he refers to the workings of genius in terms of sub-rational processes,
he employs, on the other, the very image of the architect which Young reject-
ed as inapplicable to genius. Gerard, then, as an exponent of mid-eighteenth-
ccntury ideas held an intermediate position. The "natural" qua irrational
component of genius is present in his theory, but it is nicely balanced by the
recognition of some "rational" element. For the image of the architect
suggests, besides grandeur of conception, perspicuity of design.
The Essay on Genius substituted the image of the plant for that of the
magnet. It would be wrong to interpret this transition as one from mechanism
to organicism. In Gerard's day magnetism was so complex a phenomenon
that no easy equation with a mechanistic concept is possible. But undoubtedly
the vegetative analogy was felt to be more suggestive in an age that had
turned from the contemplation of the majesty of the cosmos to the observa-
tion of the minuter objects in physical nature. While Shaftesbury's revival
of the demiurgic analogy interpreting the artist, in almost Sidneyan terms, as
an alter deus62 seems appropriate for the age of Newtonian physics, Gerard's
likening of genius to the plant reflects, with corresponding fidelity, the
dawning of the era of Linndan botany (the Pbilosopbia Botânica appeared in
1751, the Species Plantaram in 1753).63 Refining upon his early reflections
Gerard now explained that
61
Op. cit., pp. 163f., 166.
62
Characteristics, ed. John M.Robertson (London, 1900), I, 135f. The passage is,
especially by German critics, often interpreted as anticipating Romantic views. But
this is hardly so. The term "plastic nature" refers back to the seventeenth century
(see William B. Hunter, "The Seventeenth Century Doctrine of Plastic Nature",
Harvard Theological Review, XLIII [1950], 197—213), instead of pointing for-
ward to Coleridge's "esemplastic power".
63
For the emergence of new scientific interests in the later eighteenth century
(also reflected, incidentally, in Gerard's frequent references to Priestley) sec Henry
Guerlac, "Newton's Changing Reputation in the Eighteenth Century", in: Carl
Becker's Heavenly City Revisited, ed. Raymond O. Rockwood (Ithaca, N. Y., 1958),
pp. 3—26.
XXVI
the operations of genius in forming ils design*, are of a more pcrfcct kind than
the operations of art or industry in executing (hern, A statuary conceives all the
parts of his work at once, though when he comes to execute it, he can form only
one member at a time, and must during this interval leave all the rest a shapeless
blodt. An architect contrives a whole palace in an instant; but when he comes to
build it, he must first provide materials, and then rear the different parts of the
cdificc only in succession. But to collect the materials, and to order and apply
them, are not to genius distinct and successive works. This faculty bears a greater
resemblance to nature in its operations, than to the less perfect energies of art.
When a vegetable draws in moisture from the earth, nature, by the same action
by wbich it draws it in, and at the same time, converts it to the nourishment of
the plant: it at once circulates through its vessels, and is assimilated to its
several parts. In like manner, genius arranges its ideas by the same operation,
and almost at the same time, that it collects them. . . . Thus imagination is no
unskilful architect; it collects and chuses the materials; and though they may at
first lie in a rude and undigested chaos, it in a great measure, by its own force,
after repeated attemps and transpositions, designs a regular and well-proportion-
ed edifice.64
The analogy, it should be noted, is almost exclusively intended to convey a
simultaneity of conception and execution (or, rhetorically speaking, of inven-
tion and disposition) for which there was no equivalent in the realms of art
and craft. The consummate perfection of vegetative nature was to suggest
the idea of superior co-ordination and complete organisation rather than the
idea of unconscious growth and instinctive production. 65 Nature and genius
were, in accordance with the old formula, beyond the reach of art.
In this perspective the resemblance between the vegetative concepts of
Young and Gerard is a superficial one. Young was inclined to mysticism: he
took refuge in enchantment and invisible powers. Gerard, on the other hand,
aimed at a synthesis: "nature" and "art" he set against each other. In the
Essay on Taste the "magical force" of genius was counterbalanced by its
"grand architecture". Now, in an emphatic restatement of this early position,
the vegetative operation of genius is again contrasted with the concept of the
imagination as "no unskilful architect", and the final product of genius is ,
compared not to some biological entity — a tree or an animal — but to "a
regular and well-proportioned edifice". Thus in Gerard's view growing and
making are not mutually exclusive, and both life and artifice are recognized
64
Below, pp. 63—65.
66
While the analogy was taken very seriously by the Romantics, writers like
Kant made use of it in contriving playful witticisms for the lecture room: "Das
Genie scheint audi nach der Verschiedenheit des Nationalschlages und des Bodens,
dem es angeboren ist, verschiedene ursprüngliche Keime in sich zu haben und sie
verschiedentlich zu entwickeln, Es sdilägt bei den Deutschen mehr in die Wurzel, bei
den Italiänern in die Krone, bei den Franzosen in die Blüthe und bei den Engländern
in die Frucht." Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, § 59 (Gesammelte Schriften,
VII, 226). This idea is prefigured in reflection no. 977 (XV, i, 427f.), added in
phase<p, after Kant had read Gerard; an earlier version (no. 738; àV, í, 325) does
not employ the analogy.
XXXIX
ar being present in a work of genius. The biological analogy is given its due,
but the technological analogy is not rejected. In the famous eighteenth-cen-
tury mode Gerard appears to have steered "betwixt the extremes of doctrines
seemingly opposite" and formed "a temperate yet not inconsistent system". 66
IV
Gerard himself regarded his study of the nature and workings of genius as
a contribution to the "science of human nature". H e conceived of himself as
a member of that large, though loosely defined, group of eighteenth-century
philosophers who thought that mental and moral phenomena would lend
themselves to the same kind of exacting inquiry to which the physical world
had been subjected by natural science. The term links such diverse produc-
tions as the Essay on Genius and the Essay on Man," and it establishes a
common ground for the philosophy of genius as expounded by Gerard and
the philosophy of medicine as taught by the fashionable physician Dr.
George Cheyne. 68 It recalls Hume's "experimental reasoning concerning
matter of fact and existence" 69 and brings to mind Hutcheson's "attempt to
introduce a mathematical calculation into subjects of Morality". 70 Of course,
the Essay on Genius contains none of the wild speculations which resulted
from sanguine hopes based on fanciful premises. But it cannot be overlooked
that "science" plays an important part in it.
First of all, Gerard's method was "scientific". N o t that he intended to
demonstrate that something like genius existed. This was a matter of fact,
one of the elementary data which could, in true Scottish fashion, be verified
only by common sense and general experience. Here Gerard was in the same
position as Duff, who began by observing that the phenomenon of genius
"must have occurred to every one who has surveyed, with an ordinary degree
of attention, the unequal distribution of natural talents among mankind". 7 1
Then came the first really scientific procedure — "to collect such a number
of facts concerning any of the mental powers, as will be sufficient for deduc-
66
The same modus operandi is discernible in the Essay on Taste, which opens with
»he statement: "A fine taste is neither wholly the gift of nature, nor wholly the
offcct of art."
67
Sec Pope's "Design" prefixed to the poem.
48
Sec An Essay on Regimen: Together with Five Discourses, Medical, Moral, and
Philosophical (London, 1740).
^ 6 9 "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding", Philosophical Works, ed.
Thomas Hill Green and Thomas Hodge Grose (cd. Aalen, 1964), IV, 135.
70
Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (London, 1725),
title-page.
71
Op. cit., p. 3.
XXVIll
ing conclusions concerning them, by a just and regular induction*. Needless
to say, Gerard had the time-honoured Baconian ideal before him; he naively
trusted this to be the infallible method in dealing with phenomena that were
"almost universally regarded as anomalous and inexplicable". 73
But any inductive process presupposed a criterion by which to recognize
genius. The question "What is genius?" had to be answered, before facts
could be collected and conclusions be drawn. Again, no proof was possible;
instead, common opinion was once more appealed to for establishing "so
clear a case" that no dissenting vote could be voiced. Gerard realized that
there was "a difficulty in determining the province of genius, which arises
from the natural intricacy and mutual connexion of the intellectual powers".
Besides, he found his difficulty "increased by the confused application of
names". 73 This remark suggests that, before deciding on a definition of genius,
he had surveyed the field from a psychological and a philosophical point of
view, as these were then understood, and that he had found the old faculty
psychology and the new polemic philosophy of genius both wanting in
applicability. The criteria with which they worked seem to have appeared
too loose or too narrow.
Gerard's definition of genius — advanced after some perfunctory clearing
of the ground — is surprisingly simple: "Genius is properly the faculty of
invention "n To readers familiar with the ecstatic raptures of the Geniekult
this must have come as an unusually sober message, and it has been taken by
modern readers for a somewhat old-fashioned doctrine. "Faculty" is, indeed,
reminiscent of bygone efforts to cope with problems of psychology, while
"invention" seems to indicate a traditional approach, especially in an author
who quotes from Quintilian so frequently as Gerard. At first sight, there is
nothing new in this definition, nothing remotely so provocative as Young's
distinction between "the well-accomplished Scholar, and the divinely-inspir-
ed Enthusiast". 75
However, Gerard had no intention of making emotional appeals or of
capturing his reader by an intellectual surprise. H e simply wanted to furnish
an explanation for the phenomenon of genius in the widest sense. In judging
his criterion one must bear in mind that he was one of the last advocates of
the science of human nature to view science and the arts as complementary
fields of activity. In an age that increasingly focused its attention on the
poet as the genius, Gerard tried to retain a broad perspective and to devise a
72
Essay on Genius, pp. 3, 4; see also p. 16f. Rule 17 of the Society provided:
"Philosophical Matters are understood to comprehend, Every Principle of Science
which may be deduced by Just and Lawfull Induction from the Phenomena either of
the human Mind or of the material World; All Observations 8c Experiments that
may furnish Materials for such Induction."
73
Ibid., p. 7.
74
Ibid., p. 8.
75
Op. cit., p. 54.
XXIX
forniu]« that iliiicloscd, in one word, what Homer and Newton had in
common. And obviously the terni invention alone was comprehensive enough
to designate that faculty "by means of which a man is qualified for making
new discoveries in science, or for producing original works of art". 76
Two things are notable about Gerard's basic formula. First, the restrictive
use of the word original. In view of the almost universal agreement among
his contemporaries that originality was the distinctive attribute of genius
("original genius" being a term in its own right), the absence of this word not
only from the title of Gerard's study but also from the very definition of
genius is indeed striking. It can hardly be accounted for by the existence of
Duff's Essay on Original Genius. Gerard had made his discoveries by himself
and would have employed the term, had he found it useful. But the fact is
that he already avoided it in the Essay on Taste, where his definition, in
slightly different form — "the first and leading quality of genius is inven-
tion "77 — made its initial appearance. The real reason for Gerard's self-im-
posed restriction seems to have been the word original itself. In its compara-
tively complicated history it had come to mean all things to all critics, and
there was a considerable variety of theories about the foundations and
manifestations of originality. 78 In addition, the discussion had for the most
part been centred on literature and, as in the case of wit, a strong subjective
element was frequently involved. The term, then, was both over-worked in
the field of literature and, due to many connotations, slightly inappropriate
for scientific genius. Hence the almost paradoxical situation that an "origi-
nal" contribution to the study of genius in general could best be made by
substituting another term for this ambiguous and enigmatic word.
The other noteworthy feature of Gerard's definition is the precedence
which scientific genius takes over "genius for the arts", as Gerard liked to
call it. That "new discoveries in science" are listed first could be taken as an
insignificant stylistic detail, but it is hardly that. It is, rather, an indication of
the decisive rôle which scientific genius played in the shaping of Gerard's
concept. Not only does it receive the same attention as genius for the arts,
but it is also responsible for the emphasis which Gerard lays on "invention".
In some parts of the study invention is the rhetorical inventio?9 Primarily,
however, invention means the act of discovery, as this was traditionally
understood in the various branches of science. Though Gerard exploits the
full spectrum of the word's meaning, it is this scientific tinge that is most
noticeable throughout the book. More than any other analyst of genius,
Gerard approached his subject with the great achievements of science in mind,
76
Below, p. 8.
77
Op. cit., p. 163.
78
See Elizabeth L. Mann, "The Problem of Originality in English Literary
Criticism, 1750—1800", Philological Quarterly, X V I I I (1939), 97—118.
79
See, for instance, pp. 60ff.
XXXI XXXIX
above all thai of Newton, who looms as large as Homer and Shakespeare in
the Essay on Genius.
However unusual such a juxtaposition may appear in the age of Two
Cultures, it had nothing extraordinary about it when Lessing wrote
Das Alter wird uns stets mit dem Homer beschämen,
Und unsrer Zeiten Ruhm muß Newton auf sich nehmen,
Zwei Geister gleich an Groß', und ungleich nur im Werk,
Die Wunder ihrer Zeit, des Neides Augenmerk, 80
and Samuel Johnson uttered his conviction "that, had Sir Isaac Newton
applied to poetry, he would have made avery fine epic poem". 81 In fact, all
of the pre-Romantic analysts of genius supposed that genius for the arts and
genius for science were similarly constituted and that all differences between
the two were of secondary importance. Even if, as in Kant's Kritik der
Urteilskraft, Newton and Homer were not treated as two minds "ungleich
nur im Werk", 32 the concept of scientific genius always served as a sort of
check on the concept of artistic genius and vice versa. The total dissociation
of the two and the elevation of the poet to unique pre-eminence was a
product of Romantic thought and responsible for such extravagant views
of poetic genius as those set forth by Coleridge and Shelley. In this respect,
Gerard's Essay on Genius may be regarded as the antithesis to the Biographia
Literaria and the Defence of Poetry. Harsh as it may sound, Gerard affirmed
that "the more important relations of things" were explored by science and
philosophy, while "the more trivial relations, . . . naturally adapted to
amusement and pleasure", were reserved for the arts.83
In view of the Romantic exaltation of the artist and especially of the poet,
Gerard's particular interest in the scientist serves as a useful reminder that
the whole concept of modern genius originated, at least in England, in
seventeenth-century science.34 The first original geniuses were those scientists
who threw off the fetters of Aristotelian physics and thereby asserted, in the
eyes of their contemporaries, their intellectual independence. Many of the
later ideas about genius can be traced back to rhe new image of the scientist
which developed after the foundation of the Royal Society and which was,
in glowing colours, drawn by its first historian:
Invention is an Heroic thing, and plac'd above the reach of a low, and vulgar
Genius. It requires an active, a bold, a nimble, a restless mind: a thousand diffi-
culties must be contemn'd, with which a mean heart would be broken: many
80
"Aus einem Gedicht an den Herrn M**", Gesammelte Werke, ed. Paul Rilla,
I (Berlin, 1954), 189f.
81
Life, V, 35.
82
Gesammelte Schriften, V, 308—309.
33
See below, pp. 33If.
84
The best general study is Richard Foster Jones, Ancients and Moderns: A
Study of the Rise of the Scientific Movement in Seventeenth-Century England (ed.
St. Louis, 1961).
 attempt» muit be made to no purpose: mudi Treasure muit sometimes be scatter'd
without any return: much violcnccj and vigor of thoughts must attend it: some
irregularities, and excesses must be granted it, that would hardly be pardon'd
by the severe Rules of Prudence. All which may persuade us, that a large, and
an unbounded mind is likely to be the Author of greater Productions, than the
calin, obscure, and fetter'd indeavors of the Mechanics themselves.95
There were, indeed, few features to be discovered in the original genius of the
late eighteenth century which his ideal forerunner did not exhibit a century
earlier. His was the active and vigorous mind that Gerard came to describe
in the terms of a new psychology, and his was the freedom from the rules of
prudence that Young was to find an infallible mark of genius. His pursuit
was invention, and his stature was above that of ordinary mortals. In an age
that still cherished the ideal of greatness the scientist was the last hero after
the heroic age had come to a close, and the first original genius before the
Romantic age began.86
Early attempts to transplant this concept from the field of science to that
of literature were made in the seventeenth century. 07 In most cases the cham-
pions of the untrammeled exertion of modern genius drew explicit parallels
between science and literature, and they saw no reason why the overthrow
of Aristotelian physics should not be followed by an overthrow of Aristo-
telian poetics. The last in this succession of rebels was Edward Young, who
claimed Bacon as his patron and expected England to produce original works
of art because there had already been original inventions in science.08 But
despite his references to Newton, Young had no clear idea of what scientific
genius was, and to the reader of the Conjectures Bacon remains a shadowy
background figure worshipped at a distance. Young failed to integrate the
concepts of scientific and artistic genius, and that is why the Conjectures
mark at once the inconspicuous end of the Querelle and the spectacular
beginning of the intemperate cult of the self-adulating poetic genius.
When seen against this background, Gerard's definition presents itself as
the result of rudimentary "scientific" procedures. It does not, in the first
85
Thomas Sprat, History of the Royal Society (1667), ed. Jackson I. Cope and
Howard Whitmore Jones (St. Louis, 1958), p. 392.
86
There is no wholly satisfactory study of the seventeenth-century scientist. See,
however, G. N. Clark, Science and Social Welfare in the /4ge of Newton (Oxford,
1949); Lewis S. Feuer, The Scientific Intellectual: The Psychological & Sociological
Origins of Modern Science (New York and London, 1963); Moody E. Prior,
"Bacon's Man of Science", in: Roots of Scientific Thought: A Cultural Perspective,
ed. Philip P. Wiener and Aaron Noland (New York, I960), pp. 382—389; Ernest
Lee Tuveson, Millenium and Utopia: A Study in the Background of the Idea of
Progress (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1949).
87
Richard Foster Jones, "Science and Criticism in the Neo-Classical Age of
English Literature", in: The Seventeenth Century: Studies in the History of English
Thought and Literature from Bacon to Pope: By Richard Foster Jones and Others
Writing in his Honor (Stanford, 1951), pp. 41—74.
88
Op. cit., pp. 69, 76.
XXXIII XXXIX
place, neglect the origins of the modern concept of genius. By making inven-
tion the criterion, it preserves, neatly and ingeniously, the heritage of the
seventeenth century. Though the Essay on Genius has no section which could
be called a historical survey of the subject (in 1758, this was hardly possible,
since the old rise-and-progress formula was exhausted and the new histori-
cal approach just about to be discovered), Gerard's pragmatic collection of
examples in the quasi-historical fashion of Hume time and again recalls the
heroic age of seventeenth-century science. There are not only frequent
mentions of Newton, but also generous quotations from Bacon, references to
Boyle, and even occasional sidelights on Halley as a poet. All this counter-
balances the otherwise heavy reliance on Pliny, Cicero, and Quintilian, whidi
might give the impression that Gerard, according to the old dichotomy, was
a champion of the ancients.89
Furthermore, Gerard's definition aimed at being inclusive. Nothing would
serve the purpose that did not do justice to scientific as well as to artistic
genius. Throughout his study Gerard tries to reduce the two varieties to the
same principles and to refer their operations to the same processes of the
mind, and he never gives his reader the feeling that the scientist is unduly
subordinated to the artist, nor the artist to the scientist. Genius for the arts
and genius for science are treated, with scrupulous attention to their peculiar-
ities, as parallel phenomena, while their differences are accounted for as
variant combinations of the same faculties. Thus Gerard achieved the very
balance which the Romantics lacked and which gave rise to their nostalgic
vision of a reunion of science and poetry. 90
Finally, Gerard's definition had the advantage of being flexible, since the
term invention was capable of different adaptations. If to the pioneer scien-
tist of the seventeenth century it had held the twofold promise of heroism
and of originality, to Gerard it presented the double aspect of discovery and
production. In his initial explanation of genius the first aspect was meant to
characterize the achievement of scientific genius, while the second applied to
that for the arts. Though at first these words seem to convey nothing but
their ordinary meaning, they are nevertheless subtly suggestive. Discovery
presupposes a static concept of nature. Whatever is discovered has already
been there and remained unnoticed until being detected and brought to light.
Such was Newton's discovery of the law of gravitation — a unique insight
into the structure of reality. Nothing had been produced in the sense of being
created; a pre-existent truth had merely been disclosed as the result of search
and inquiry. N o matter what modern opinion has to say about scientific
89
It should be noted that most of the quotations from ancient authors furnish
"examples" for the inductive process.
90
See, for instance, Wordsworth's preface to the second edition of the "Lyrical
Ballads", Poetical Works, ed. E. de Selincourt, II (Oxford, 1944), 396f. Friedrich
Schlegel entertained similar ideas.
discovery, this was an axiom in classical physics and an undisputed view in
Gerard's day.
To the literary historian this theory of discovery bears a close resemblance
to the neoclassical assumptions about literature. According to the represent-
ative critics of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, literary
genres were in a similar way "discovered*. Thus Homer's invention was the
discovery of the epic, and if, in Pope's famous phrase, nature and Homer
were the same,91 the laws of the epic were inherent in nature in much the
same manner as was the law of gravitation. Hence the concept of invariable
canons, and hence the prescriptive authority of rule and reason. To conceive,
as Gerard did, of the literary work as a "production" in the strict sense of
the word is to take an anti-neoclassical view. It is to assume that the artistic
invention is brought into existence by an act of creation. The work of art is
made, fabricated, composed, engendered — in short, anything but found or
discovered.
It is idle to speculate whether or not Gerard was a Romantic theorist of
literature. The important thing is the double aspect of what he simply called
invention. If "discovery" is not confined to science, and "production" not
reserved for the arts (and there is no reason to believe that Gerard should
have insisted on a strict separation), 92 his definition gains in applicability. It
works in a neoclassical environment, and it need not be modified to suit the
Romantics. It can remain the same, whether a closed world is postulated or
an infinite universe, and it will hold good no matter if "nature" is a static
order or a dynamic process.
V tual power or an invigorating principle, as is indicated by another remark
Gerard's most distinctive contribution to the science of human nature was
made in the rigorous psychological analysis to which he subjected the phenom-
enon of genius. In fact, his orientation towards contemporary psychology
gives the Essay on Genius a unique place among the eighteenth-century stud-
ies of the subject. Though Gerard was certainly not the first to realize the
inadequacy of any inquiry into the nature and workings of genius which
ignored the psychological side of the problem, none of the other theoreticians
was so fully aware of the paramount importance of the psychological
approach. While their views of the psychology of genius, including those of
Duff, bear the mark of random achievement and incidental discovery,
Gerard's essay is a detailed and systematic exploration. H e maintains a
91
Essay on Criticism, 11, 134f,
92
On p. 27, for instance, occurs the following definition: "Invention is the
capacity of producing new beauties in works of art, and new truths in works of
science." See also an interesting passage in Duff's Essay (pp. 94f.), in which "inven-
tion" and "creation" are juxtaposed.
XXXV XXXIX
cwinUiciu point ol view throughout his analysis, ami his aim was to resolve a
complex menial activity into elementary functions, Gerard's method remain-
ed the same as it had been in the Essay on Faste, In the earlier work he had
tried to resolve taste "into its simple principles" (i.e. into several basic
"senses") and explained the "formation of Taste" from the "union and
improvement" of these. Now he proceeded to derive the "nature and varie-
ties" of genius "from the simple qualities of the h u m a n mind". 93
There are certain incongruities in Gerard's terminology which indicate
something of the difficulties he encountered. The psychological vocabulary of
the time was, despite several innovations, comparatively limited, and Gerard
was evidently forced to make a choice between calling genius a "power" and
a "faculty", though what he wanted to describe was neither the one nor the
other in the traditional and technical senses of these words. Thus, in the very
same chapter, genius is "one of the intellectual powers, . . . distinguishable
from the rest" as well as "the faculty of invention". 94 The present-day reader
will readily pass over such discrepancies, but for the contemporary student
more important issues were involved. Kant, for instance, one of Gerard's
most careful readers, called this view into question: "Genie ist nicht, so wie
Gerard will, eine besondere K r a f t der Seele (sonst würde sie ein bestimmt
obiect haben), sondern ein prineipium der Belebung aller anderen Kräfte
durch ideen der obiecte, welche man will. Erfindung setzt eine Belebung der
Erkenntniskrafte voraus, nicht blos die schärfung der Lernfähigkeiten. Aber
diese Belebung muß durch die Erzeugung einer idee auf einen Zwek gerichtet
seyn; sonst ist es nicht Erfindung, sondern zufallige Entdekung." 95 It made,
indeed, some difference whether genius was thought of as a separate intellec-
of Kant's: "Geist ist das prineipium der Belebung (der Talente, Seelenkräfte)
durch ideen (also einer zwekmäßig belebten Einbildungskraft)." 96 N o t only
was the hierarchy of the mental powers involved, but at stake were radically
different philosophical and psychological concepts. However, what is im-
portant is not so much the difference of opinion between Gerard and Kant as
the fact that Gerard's pioneer efforts in analysing genius were beset with
problems and that the solutions he presented were not the only conceivable
ones.97
If Kant pointed out a possible flaw in Gerard's argument, he also called
attention to a most relevant feature of Gerard's theory. As an invigorating
93
Below, p. 4.
94
Below, p. 6, also p. 5: . . what it is that properly constitutes Genius as
distinguished from our other intellectual powers."
93
Reflection no. 949 (XV, i, 420).
96
Reflection no. 942 (ibid., p. 418).
97
Kant's objection was anticipated by a reviewer in the Edinburgh Review and
Magazine, II (1774), 589.
principle — in Kant's sense — genius brings into play all powers of the
human mind, It is not confined to one or two separate faculties but it is, as it
were, the result of a subtle interplay of many powers brought to a maximum
efficiency. Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, this concept formed
the basis of Gerard's argument. Even if he called genius a special power or
faculty, he held what might be called a functional view of genius. The
absence of the appropriate holistic terms is easily noted, but cannot be charg-
ed against Gerard. The necessary psychological apparatus was not yet at
his disposal. Thus he merely insisted, rather negatively, on the essential
inseparability of the powers of the human mind. "However distinct in
themselves", it seemed to him, they were "generally complicated in their
energies." This was especially true of genius: "It receives assistance from them
all." 98 Here Gerard's use of the vegetative analogy reveals its ultimate
significance. It suggested the holistic model according to which he could
work out, for the Essay on Genius, a scheme of the interdependence of the
mental powers.
Gerard's theory of genius presupposed a late stage in the disintegration of
the traditional faculty psychology which had obtained in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries and on which most of the speculations concerning the
inventive and creative process had been based. 99 Originally, as is well known,
the exponents of faculty psychology distinguished a number of powers held
to be located in separate parts of the brain and thought to perform clearly
definable functions, the sequence of which constituted the cognitive act. Each
of these powers was accorded its proper sphere and mode of operation, and
each was set off against the others by a rigid departmentalization. The
difficulties resulting from these assumptions, and especially from that of the
strict division of the mental powers, were manifold and responsible for the
substitution of more flexible schemes which became current in the eighteenth
century. After the common sense, formerly the first of the internal senses,
had lost its technical significance in psychology, a tripartite scheme prevailed,
including reason, memory, and the imagination, whose "lower" functions
were gradually given the name of fancy. 100 Bridging the older division of
external and internal senses, a second scheme gained widespread acceptance
— the hierarchy of the senses, the imagination, and reason. It provided the
theoretical foundation for Addison's Spectator essays on the pleasures of
the imagination and for Akenside's didactic poem (in which the "faculties of
98
Below, pp. 5 and 6.
99
Convenient summaries will be found in Murray W. Bundy's studies, particularly
in "'Invention' and 'Imagination* in the Renaissance", Journal of English and Ger-
manic Philology, X X I X (1930), 535—545; see also Grahame Castor, Pléiade Poetics:
A Study in Sixteenth-Century Thought and Terminology (Cambridge, 1964).
ido Though Gerard does not insist on a distinction between fancy and imagina-
tion, fancy is generally the word he uses in "pejorative" contexts.
X X X V I IX X X I X
moral perception" were substituted for Addison's "understanding"101), and
it bccame the starting-point for Gerard's analysis of taste.102
The development of the new scheme was accompanied by a reconsideration
of the office of the mental powers. In the process the traditional barriers
broke down, and the provinces of reason and imagination began, by tradi-
tional standards, to overlap. Reason was credited with certain functions
which were habitually held to be performed by the imagination, while the
imagination was sometimes thought to act in a quasi-rational capacity. 103
Utterances like William Melmoth's that good sense was right reason arising
"from a sort of intuitive faculty of the soul, which distinguishes by immediate
perception" 104 became frequent, and there was, about the middle of the
century, a general awareness that the powers of the mind merged in
their functions. In his Essay on Taste Gerard summed up the new attitude
by referring to the triad of the senses, the imagination, and the rational
and moral faculties as a generally accepted one on which he felt com-
pelled to make a negative comment: "It must be owned, that the vulgar
divisions of our faculties are generally superficial and inaccurate. Our mental
operations, though of all things the most intimately present to us, are of such
a subtile and transitory nature, that, when they are reflected on, they in a
great measure elude our view, and their limits and distinctions appear
involved in obscurity and confusion." 105 In other words, faculty psychology
had become obsolete and was to be supplanted by more appropriate concepts.
For the purpose of his analysis Gerard retained some of the old divisions,
so that the Essay on Genius can easily give the impression of having been
written along traditional lines. There is no denying that Gerard, in obvious
analogy to certain procedures in chemistry, tried to arrive at elemental
constituents. Thus, the senses were declared to be "ultimate and original prin-
ciples"™ and the human mind was reduced to a small number of basic
intellectual powers. For the inquiry into the nature of genius Gerard thought
that, besides the senses, three powers had to be taken into consideration:
memory, imagination, and judgement. 107 A survey of their "proper offices"
led him to the conclusion that genius originated in an active, fertile, and
regular imagination. But though imagination was indispensable in the forma-
tion of genius, Gerard did not regard it as the exclusive source of genius.
"Mere imagination," he asserted at a crucial point of his argument, "will
not constitute genius. . . . As fancy has an indirect dependence both on sense
101
The Pleasures of Imagination (London, 1744), p. 5.
102
Essay on Taste, p. 143.
103
See, for instance, an early controversy in John Dennis, Critical Works, ed.
Edward Niles Hooker (Baltimore, 1943), II, 285.
104
Letters on Several Subjects (note 33), pp. 128L
185
Essay on Taste, p. 143.
104
Ibid., p. 145.
187
See below, p. 27.
and memory, from which it reçoives the first elements of all its conceptions,
so when it exerts itself in the way of genius, it has an immediate connexion
with judgement, which must constantly attend it, and correct and regulate
its suggestions. This connection is so intimate, that a man can scarce be said
to have invented till he has exercised his judgement." 108 This demonstrates
perfectly Gerard's departure from the traditional divisions of faculty psychol-
ogy in search of that "natural" principle of superior synthesis which he
thought was operative in genius.
In devising this concept of the fusion of several powers in the exertions
of genius, Gerard once more followed a via media. It will be recalled that
John Farquhar, who first put the problem of genius before the Aberdeen
Society, suggested an alternative: genius consisted either in the perfection of
one faculty or in a combination of several. Gerard bridged this alternative
by making imagination the central power on which genius depended, and
assigning contributory functions to the others. In fact, the Essay on Genius
carries Farquhar's suggestion in either way to its most detailed implications.
On the one hand it offers a most penetrating analysis of the imagination, and
on the other it traces every single "influence" on the imagination. The book,
as it were, radiates in both directions from the centre of Farquhar's question.
It furnishes the most complete answer to it.
In Gerard's theory of the imagination little was left of the predominantly
negative rôle which this "lowest" of the intellectual powers had generally
played in the critical systems of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. To
Gerard it did not, as it did to Bacon, "submit the shows of things to the
desires of the mind"; 109 nor was it merely, as Hobbes thought, "decaying
sense".110 The imagination which Gerard — together with what he termed
"the generality of mankind" 111 — regarded as the inventive power proper
had passed through practically all the stages of positive eighteenth-century
re-definition. 112 It had gained the ascendency over reason, so that the latter,
108
Ibid., pp. 36, 37. In support of his assertion Gerard quotes Quintilian, III,
iii, 5—7. Gerard's holistic notion is best revealed when this and other passages
(e.g., pp. 63ff.) are contrasted with Duff's traditional version of the inventive
process. To Gerard invention and disposition as the common exertion of imagination
and judgement are an indivisible process; to Duff they are distinct acts successively
performed by imagination and judgement. See op. cit., pp. 70f.
109
Advancement of Learning, Book II (De Augmentis, II, 13).
110
Leviathan, I, ii.
111
Below, p. 31.
112
A good example of the late eighteenth-century view of the imagination is
furnished by John Aikin: "Hitherto all is simple and natural, and poetry so far from
being the art of fiction, is the faithful copyist of external objects and real emotions.
But the mind of man cannot long be confined within prescribed limits; there is an
internal eye constantly stretching its view beyond the bounds of natural vision, and
something new, something greater, more beautiful, more excellent, is required to
gratify its noble longing. This eye of mind is the imagination — it peoples the world
with new beings, it embodies abstract ideas, it suggests unexpected resemblances, it
XXXVIII
despite "the appcarancc of an inventive power", 113 followed in the footsteps
of the imagination. 114 There are, it is true, a number of cautionary remarks
about the dangerous cffccts of an ill-disciplined imagination, but these sound
a more traditional note. The decisive point is that Gerard held the imagina-
lion in its workings to be unbounded as well as independent of the percep-
tions of sense and the recollections of memory. While earlier critics had seen
in the imagination an essentially reproductive power, Gerard insisted that,
even in its simplest exertions, it was genuinely creative. "It does not," he
explained, "like memory, professedly copy its ideas from preceding percep-
tions of sense, nor refer them to any prior archetype. It exhibits them as
independent existences produced by itself. It may be questioned, whether, in
some very peculiar cases, its power extends not even to the formation of a
simple idea."115 Thus Gerard was, as Kant immediately realized, among the
first late eighteenth-century proponents of the new concept of the imagination
as "productive Einbildungskraft". 115
creates first, and then presides over its creation with absolute sway. Not less
accurately and philosophically, than poetically, has our great Shakespeare described
this faculty in the following lines.
The Poet's eye in a fine phrenzy rolling
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven,
And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the Poet's pen
Turns them to shape, and gives to aery nothing
A local habitation and a name."
Essays on Song-Writing: With a Collection of Such English Songs as Are Most
Eminent for Poetical Merit . . . (ed. London, 1774), pp. 6f. See also Gerard's Essay
on Genius, p. 30. The Shakespearean concept of the imagination was then almost a
conventional conceit reinforced, it would seem, by the Lucretian motif of "extra
processit longe flammantia moenia mundi" (De Rerum Natura, I, 72—73).
113
114
Below, p. 33.
"Even in science," Gerard thought, "where relations are what we want to
discover, judgment cannot search out or bring into view, the perceptions that are
to be compared. They must be suggested by some other power" (below, pp. 32f.).
On the one hand, Gerard's notions may seem fanciful; on the other, they are not
so radically different from what a modern scientist tells the layman about the
making of scientific discoveries; see P. B. Medawar, "Imagination and Hypothesis",
Times Literary Supplement, October 25, 1963, pp. 849—850, as well as Thomas
S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, 1962).
115
Below, p. 29.
114
Immanuel Kant's Menschenkunde oder philosophische Anthropologie: Nach
handschriftlichen Vorlesungen herausgegeben von Fr. Ch. Starke (Leipzig, 1831), pp.
107f.: "Gerard, ein Engländer, sagt, die größte Eigenschaft des Genies sey die pro-
ductive Einbildungskraft; denn Genie ist vom Nachahmungsgeiste am meisten
unterschieden, so daß man glaubt, der Nachahmungsgeist sey die größte Unfähigkeit,
sich dem Genie zu nähern. Das Genie gründet sich also nicht auf die reproductive
Einbildungskraft, sondern auf die productive und eine fruchtbare Einbildungskraft
in Hervorbringung der Vorstellungen giebt dem Genie vielen Stoff, darunter zu
wählen. Dieses Productionsvermögen wird eingetheilt in die willkührliche und un-
willkürliche Imagination. Die willkührliche besieht darin, daß der Mensch die
XXXIX
 It ii difficult to determine when exactly in the history of critical thought
the transition took place from the concept of a reproductive imagination to
that of a productive imagination. There seem to have been several "advances"
at different times. One phase, however, is clearly discernible, and to this
the Essay on Genius belongs. Most of the late eighteenth-century Scottish
writers on genius and related subjects were of the same opinion as Gerard.
They were so thoroughly agreed on this point that the creative imagination
can almost be said to have been an axiom in the aesthetics and philosophical
anthropology of the Scottish School. William Duff — to take a writer who
preceded Gerard in date of publication — succinctly expressed the tenet
when he said that the imagination was "enabled to present a creation of its
own". 177
Since such statements are often taken to imply a Romantic attitude to-
wards the imagination, it must be emphasized that the Scottish theory is
essentially different from the later dogma of Coleridge and Shelley. For
Gerard and his fellow philosophers the inventive process was characterized
not by the unrestricted play of a sovereign imagination but by an intimate
fusion of imagination and judgement. "Though genius be properly a com-
prehensive, regular, and active imagination," explained Gerard, "yet it can
never attain perfection, or exert itself successfully on any subject except it
be united with a sound and piercing judgment." 116 Similarly, Duff declared
with regard to imagination, judgement, and taste that only "by their union
[could] the full perfection of Genius" be attained. 11 ' I n a broader perspec-
tive, the Scottish writers advocated a middle position between the neoclas-
sicists and theRomantics. 120 Both theories set the imagination in opposition to
judgement. While the neoclassicists assigned to the imagination a limited
though adequate rôle under the control of judgement, 121 which was the organ
of truth, the Romantics exalted the imagination as a vehicle of "higher" truth
and gave reason (qua judgement) a subordinate position. The resulting anti-
thesis made it difficult to present a satisfactory analysis of genius (both
artistic and scientific) on the basis of either one of these theories. Gerard and
the Scottish writers avoided, at least in principle, the issue by coupling the
assumption of a creative imagination, in which they differed f r o m the
Thätigkeiten seiner Imagination nach Belieben ausüben, sich Bilder darstellen und
verschwinden lassen, sie nach seinem Belieben machen kann. Die unwillkührliche
heißt die Phantasie, und ob zwar viele Schriftsteller beide verwechseln, so giebt doch
schon der Redegebrauch Anlaß, sie zu unterscheiden."
117
Op. cit., p. 7.
118
Below, p. 71.
™ Op. cit., p. 20.
120
See M. A. Goldberg, "Wit and the Imagination in Eighteenth-Century
Aesthetics", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XVI (1957—1958), 503—509.
m
See Donald F. Bond, "Distrust" of Imagination in English Neo-Classicism",
Philological Quarterly, XIV (1935), 54—69, and "The Neo-Classical Psychology
of the Imagination", ELH, JV (1937), 245—264.
XL
neocluûcii», with that of a union between imagination and judgement, m
which they can, in retrospect, he disiinguiahed from the Romantics. Gerard's
concept, then, would seem to be a historically relevant configuration of ideas
between rival theories.
VI
The argument of the Essay on Genius was aptly summarized by a contem-
porary German reviewer: "Ein vortreffliches Buch! Der Gang ist dieser:
Genie äußert sich vornehmlich durch Erfindung, diese entsteht durch Einbil-
dungskraft, diese wiederum hängt ab von der Ideenverbindung, daher aus-
führlich von dieser Materie, und so schon, daß dieß Werk hierüber ein Haupt-
buch ist. Die mehresten Beyspiele sind aus Shakespear genommen." 122 This is
not so much a restatement of the contents of the book as an epitome of the
successive stages in the formation of Gerard's thought and a synopsis of the
way in which he conducted his "scientific" inquiry. From establishing the
criterion for genius he proceeded to discovering the source of genius and
finally to analysing the nature of the mental processes upon which it depend-
ed.
It is particularly in the transition from the second phase to the third that
Gerard's claim to a "scientific" approach reveals itself. He was not satisfied
with demonstrating that, as he said, genius arose from the imagination; he
also wanted to show how it arose f r o m the imagination. That is to say,
Gerard's programme was completed not by his referring genius to the imagi-
nation as the inventive faculty but by his explaining the workings of the
imagination, both in general and in the special type of mind called genius.
Traditionally, everything that was lawless, undisciplined, and chimerical in
the productions of the human mind had been said to be the product of the
imagination. Gerard's theory was established in opposition to the opinion
that this faculty was "capricious and unaccountable". His basic assumption
was that, contrary to popular belief, the imagination was "subject to establish-
ed laws". 123
There was no necessary connection between the concept of a creative
imagination and that of invariable "laws" governing the productive mental
processes. William Duff, for instance, despite striking similarities between
his theory of genius and that of Gerard, hardly went beyond the statement
that "Genius and Imagination are one and the same thing". 124 His analysis
of the operations of the imagination remained vague. In his view it was
rambling, volatile, accurate, just, exact, vivid, extensive, vigorous, plastic,
122
Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek: Anhang zu dem fünf und zwanzigsten bis
sechs und dreyßigsten Bande, Zwcyte Abteilung, n. d., p. 1091.
923
Below, p. 70.
124
Op. cit., p. 23.
XLI
 irregular, vehement, cntluisiastic — in slum, anything but subjcct to definable
laws,124 Thus, Gerard's fusion of the two concepts must be regarded as a
spécial feature of tbc Essay on Genius and as an original contribution to the
study of the subject. Nobody before hini had tried to explain genius in the
same "scientific" manner.
Gerard's ideas on this point were fully developed when he started his
inquiry. Their genesis can, however, be followed in the Essay on Taste in a
section dealing with the dependence of taste upon the imagination:
Imagination is first of all employed in presenting such ideas, as are not attended
with remembrance, or a perception of their having been formerly in the mind.
This defect of remembrance, as it prevents our referring them to their original
sensations, dissolves their natural connection. But when memory has lost their
real bonds of union, fancy, by its associating power, confers upon them new ties,
that they may not lie perfectly loose, ranges them in an endless variety of forms.
Many of these being representations of nothing that exists in nature, 126 whatever
is fictitious or chimerical is acknowledged to be the offspring of this faculty, and
is termed imaginary. But wild and lawless as this faculty appears to be, it
commonly observes certain rules, associating chiefly ideas which resemble, or arc
contrary, or those that are conjoined, either merely by custom, or by the connec-
tion of their objects in vicinity, coexistence, or causation. It sometimes presumes
that ideas have these relations, when they have them not; but it generally
discovers them, where they are; and by this means becomes the cause of our
most important operations. 127
In one word: Gerard's laws of the imagination were those established by the
associationists, whose doctrines determined the philosophy and literary
theory of the age so decisively that "it may be questioned, indeed, whether
any philosophical or psychological doctrine has since permeated critical
thought in so great a degree". 120
Apart from its intrinsic merits the associationist psychology held a special
promise to the scientists of human nature, and this appears to be one of the
main reasons why Gerard introduced it into his analysis of genius. Gerard
intended to explain genius from "the simple qualities of the human mind". 129
By simple he obviously meant the pure and elementary. What the association-
ists claimed as their discovery was the fundamental and supreme law by
125
See ibid., pp. 9, 33, 47, 58, 97.
126
This appears to be Gerard's First pronouncement on the "productive" imagi-
nation.
127
Op. cit. (ed. London, 1759), pp. 167f. Later Gerard made major revisions in
this chapter.
128
Walter Jackson Bate, From Classic to Romantic: Premises of Taste in Eight-
eenth-Century England (ed. New York, 1961), p. 96. In addition to this basic
study see Gordon McKenzie, Critical Responsiveness: A Study of the Psychological
Current in Later Eighteenth-Century Criticism> University of California Publica-
tions in English, vol. 20 (Berkeley a n d Los Angeles, 1949); William K. Wimsatt,
jr., and Cleanth Brooks, Literary Criticism: A Short History (New York, 1957),
Part II, chapter 14; Ralph Cohen, 1 Association of Ideas and Poetic Unity", Philo-
logical Quarterly, X X X V I (1957), 465—474.
129
Below, p. 4.
XLII
which the mind was organized and governed, Ii was probably David Hume
who put forward this claim in its most pithy and trendiant form in his
Treatise of Human Nature. There are, he hold, "principles of union or cohe-
sion among our simple ideas, and in the imagination supply the place of that
inseparable connexion, by whidt they arc united in our memory. Here is a
kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have as
extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as
various forms". 130 Thus associationism pronounced the uniform validity of
"attraction" throughout the realms of matter and mind, and thus fulfilled
the promise which Newton had made in his Opticks for the advancement of
the study of human nature. 131 With the principle of association the "Bounds
of Moral Philosophy" had, in the eyes of the eighteenth-century philosophes,
been enlarged to the same extent as those of natural philosophy by the law
of gravitation. Since the Scots above all others had made the perfection of
moral philosophy along these lines the aim and object of their endeavours, 132
any study of the phenomena of the mind which claimed to be definitive could
hardly ignore this basic law of anthropology. Gerard's contribution was the
application of associationism to the study of genius. And that is why his
book is at once a work on genius and, as the German reviewer nicely put it,
a sort of "Hauptbuch" of the associationist doctrines.
The precise intellectual affiliations of the Essay on Genius are difficult to
establish. There is much in it that was common knowledge at the time. It
has been surmised that Gerard went back to Aristotle and that he adopted
the Greek philosopher's classification of the categories of association. 133 Yet it
seems more reasonable to consider Gerard as a disciple of Hume, whose
Treatise he referred to several times as a source. Hume was not himself a
member of the Aberdeen group, but the Society was intimately familiar with
his ideas, and his writings were frequently discussed in their meetings.134 In
March, 1763, when Gerard was struggling with the associationist aspects of
his study, Thomas Reid wrote to Hume;
Your Friendly adversaries Drs Campbell 8c Gerard as well as Dr Gregory
return their compliments to you respectfully. 135 A little Philosophical Society
here of which all the three are members, is much indebted to you for its entertain-
130 « a Treatise of H u m a n Nature" (I, iv), Philosophical Works, I, 321.
131
Quety 31 (ed. New York, 1952), p. 405.
132
See Gladys Bryson, Man and Society: The Scottish Inquiry of the Eighteenth
Century (Princeton, 1945).
133
Sir William Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, ed. H. L. Mansel
and John Veitch (ed. Edinburgh and London, 1859), II, 230—232.
134 "The society . . . during its early years gravitated in a distant orbit round
Hume." S. A. Grave, The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense (Oxford, 1960),
P- 135
1.
The accent is definitely on "friendly". Hume had seen Gerard's Essay on
Taste through the press. See John Nichols, Literary Anecdotes of the Eighteenth
Century . . I I (London, 1812), 326.
XLIII
 ment. Your company would, although wc arc all good Christians, be more
acceptable than that of Saint Athanasius. And since we cannot have you upon
the bench, you are brought oftener than any other man to the bar, accused and
defended with great zeal but without bitterness,136
This should suffice as an indication of Gerard's philosophical heritage.
The ways in which Gerard adapted Hume's ideas and worked out the
assoei ationist premise need not be dealt with in detail. They are immediately
apparent from the treatise itself. It should, however, be noted that his
revision of faculty psychology in conjunction with the associationist theory
of the imagination made it possible to explain all varieties of genius. In the
first place, the empirically observable differences could be attributed to
various combinations of the intellectual powers. According to the kind and
degree of "assistance" which the imagination received from memory or from
judgement, several types of genius could be distinguished. Simultaneously> the
"differences in the turn and construction of the imagination" 137 permitted
further divisions. There were, as Gerard recognized, a number of associating
principles, and the temporary predominance of one, or the permanent pre-
valence of another, accounted for diverse manifestations of genius. A given
"turn" of genius corresponded to a particular constellation of the associating
principles, and in many ways the "construction" of the imagination (con-
ceived in mechanistic terms)138 was the ultimate rationale in Gerard's theory
of genius.
This approach imparted to Gerard's theory a precision which none of the
other studies had and which could hardly be attained again by proceeding
from the same assumptions. Apart from many observations upon particular
kinds of genius, such as genius for poetry, painting, or science, Gerard was
able to answer a question that engaged the attention of practically all the
writers on genius. If genius was the acme of man's mind, the perfection of
his powers, was there a universal genius? Young, Duff, and Kant, too, ven-
tured an opinion on this point, and their answers tended to be negative. Kant
believed that a genius was principally different from what he called "ein
allgemeiner Kopf" and that a genius was "nicht sowohl von großem Um-
fange des Geistes, als intensiver Große desselben".139 Duff was doubtful: "An
universal genius is a very extraordinary phenomenon." 140 And Young bluntly
affirmed: " . . . as for a general Genius, there is no such thing in nature." 141
Granted his axioms, Gerard's answer was superior. Though cautiously for-
136
MS. letter (dated 18 March, 1763) in the possession of the Royal Society of
Edinburgh. In part printed in, and quoted from Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y.
T. Greig (Oxford, 1932), I, 376f.
1,7
Below, p. 358.
138
See Walter J. Ong, "Psyche and the Geometers: Aspects of Associationist
Critical Theory", Modern Philology, X L I X (1951—1952), 16—27.
139
Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, § 59 (Gesammelte Schriften, VII,
226).
740
Op. cit., p. 149.
141
Op. cit., p. 84.
XLIV
mulated and equally negative, it was based on a collection of data and
inductively reasoned: "It seems . . . to be the common, though not strictly
the universal, law of human nature, that genius fits the person who is endued
with it, for invention in some one particular art, or particular science."143 If
this was the result of observation, Gerard was also in a position to explain
the phenomenon. As he saw it, every kind of genius presupposed a special
structure of the imagination and a peculiar combination of the intellectual
powers. Since there were no universal structures or combinations, universal-
ity of genius was, consequently, an impossible concept. In this and similar
ways Gerard's systematic approach scored many advantages over those of
Duff, Young, and others — apart from the fact that Gerard could claim
priority for his ideas.
Whenever Gerard wanted to illustrate the mode of operation of the asso-
ciating principles or the influences of habit and passion on them, he took his
examples from Shakespeare. Shakespearean dramatic characters were gener-
ally adduced if Gerard felt the need of laying bare the more complicated
functions of the mind. Shakespeare — throughout the eighteenth century
"an illustrious instance of the force of unassisted Genius" 143 — was thus
among Gerard's foremost sources in the more general sections of the work,
and the Essay on Genius became, in the skilful hands of its author, a
pioneer effort in Shakespearean criticism. The application of the laws of
association to the study of Shakespeare's dramas in search for a clue to
difficult features in characters and poetic language is usually credited to
William Richardson, whose Philosophical Analysis and Illustration of Some
of Shakespeare's Remarkable Characters appeared in the same year as
Gerard's study.144 But Gerard preceded him, and since he has not yet found
the place he deserves among the eighteenth-century students of Shake-
speare,145 this is perhaps the occasion to finally antedate the genesis of
Shakespeare idolatry to the time when Gerard delivered his lectures to the
Aberdeen Philosophical Society.
If much has been said in praise of Gerard, it should not be overlooked that
his work was also severely criticized by some of his contemporaries. In gener-
al, the early reviews were favourable, and many of his readers seem to have
been struck with what the Critical Review called "a beautiful and plausible
theory of the nature of genius", by means of which Gerard had "reduced the
142
Below, p. 434.
143
Sharpe, Dissertation upon Genius, p. 114.
144
See Robert Witbeck Babcock, The Genesis of Shakespeare Idolatry, 1766—
1799: A Study in English Criticism of the Late Eighteenth Century (ed. N e w York,
1964), pp. 155fF., and Earl R. Wasserman, "Shakespeare and the English Romantic
Movement", The Persistence of Shakespeare Idolatry: Essays in honor of Robert W.
Babcock, ed. Herbert M. Schueller (Detroit, 1964), pp. 77—103.
T4S
The omission of Gerard from Babcock's study was first pointed out by Marga-
ret Lee Wiley, "A Supplement to the Bibliography of 'Shakespeare Idolatry'", Stud-
ies in Bibliography, IV (1951—1952), 164—166.
XLV
various and ccccntric operations of genius to a regular system, and investigated
the œconomy of the natale comes with a degree of precision almost equal to
what can be displayed in subjects the most obvious to enquiry". 146 A native
Scottish critic, however, found Gerard's book less satisfactory. The Edin-
burgh Magazine and Review began by saying that "in this treatise, the author
lays claim to nothing of that original genius, and to none of those brillant
discoveries, which distinguish the writings of an Aristotle, a Locke, and a
Hume. He pursues a less splendid and more humble career, and, following
closely in the tract of his predecessors, in the metaphysical walk, endeavours
so to combine and illustrate their observations as to establish his own par-
ticular doctrine". And continuing for several pages of plain summary, honest
criticism, and condescending disapprobation, the reviewer came to the
conclusion that Gerard, despite "acuteness and patience in thinking", was
not infrequently "guilty of laying down his observations in too general
terms", and was therefore "obliged to modify and restrict them in other parts
of his work". 147
The greatest critical onslaught came when, towards the end of the century,
a phalanx of anti-associationist critics was formed. Psychology-riddcnthough
the later eighteenth century was, a number of writers denied the critical
relevance and the philosophical validity of the associationist premise, and
quite naturally they would rebel against a theory of genius that was so
openly founded on associationism as was the Essay on Genius. Although a
minority report, the argument against associationism as a reliable basis for
criticism was advanced by such writers as Thomas Reid, a member of the
Aberdeen group, who had been preceded by another notable writer, Edmund
Burke.148 None of these, however, took issue with Gerard. The attack on him
was reserved for William Belsham, who published "Observations on Genius"
in his Essays, Philosophical, Historical, and Literary (1789).149 Belsham was
not in direct opposition to the philosophy and psychology of association;
what he objected to was — interestingly enough — the triteness of Gerard's
argument. His criticism is worth quoting at length:
What is Genius? A certain writer of respectable abilities, who has treated this
subject according to the too general practise of his countrymen, with much parade
of systematic investigation, has composed a volume of five hundred pages, in
answer to this enquiry; and if we may confide in the positive determination of
Dr. Gerard, Genius is only another word for Invention: and having thus ascer-
tained the import of the term, lie tells us, what I should suppose few persons are
ignorant of, that Imagination is that power of the mind to which Invention must
he principally referred; and, as if this was a doubtful point, he expatiates largely
upon it, and establishes and enforces it, by all the powers of reason and eloquence.
146
X X X V I I I (1774), 329, 241.
147
II (1774), 588, 597.
148
See Martin Kallich, "The Argument against the Association of Ideas in
Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics", Modern Language Quarterly, XV (1954), 125 136.
149
On Belsham, see McKenzie, op. cit.
XL VI
Imagination, however, heilig at length demons!rated in all the forms of logic,
to he that 1 acuity which is the immediate source of Invention, the learned Profes-
sor enters into a minute analysis of those general laws of association, whidi
produce the several modifications of whidi the imagination is susceptible. We
are informed, with an air of mysterious gravity, t h a t the imagination does not
act at random in associating ideas; but that there are certain qualities or relations
of ideas, whidi fit them for being associated; and the author, after Mr. Hume,
resolves those relations into resemblance, contrariety, vicinity, co-existence, &c.
and we arc told that habit, and the passions also, have an extensive influence on
the associating principle. We are next amused with an account of the modifica-
tions of the associating principles, and many other abstruse metaphysical dis-
quisitions whidi seem to me very slightly connected with the main subject, and
which, in my opinion, have been much more happily and satisfactorily discussed,
though with much less ostentation of knowledge, by Locke, Hartley, and Hume.
I see not, for my own part, what light is thrown upon the question relative to
the nature of Genius, by a long and tedious analysis of the faculty of association,
whidi operates in perfect conformity to the same general laws in all men,
whether they are possessed or not of any extraordinary powers of imagination
or Genius. . . . I am of opinion that Dr. Gerard has totally mistaken the nature of
Genius. 150
With all his expertise in demolition Belsham was not able to advance a
theory of genius whidi could, on different assumptions, compete with
Gerard's. "The fact is," Belsham was forced to concede, "that Genius is a
term, like many others, too complex to admit of a regular or precise defini-
tion." H e could contribute a number of valuable suggestions, but to advance
the proposition that "by Genius, I mean an eminent and uncommon degree
of capacity, including that assemblage or aggregate of mental qualities,
usually associated with it"1-51 was not to offer a genuine alternative to
Gerard's argument. The Essay on Genius, though declared high-flown Scot-
tish nonsense, could hardly be removed from the position it had meanwhile
gained.
VII
The final judgement to be passed on Gerard is determined by the point of
view from which his work is surveyed. The Essay on Genius must appear to
contain an old-fashioned, quasi-neoclassical, and ill-contrived argument, if
the standards for assessing the merits of Gerard are derived from Coleridge
and Shelley, on the presupposition that whatever happened in aesthetic
theory between 1750 and 1790 was a mere preparation for that august mo-
ment when the first of the Romantic poets made their entrance on the
literary scene. But it is also possible to see the Romantic movement as the
ultimate stage of a tradition in disintegration and to regard its concept of
the imagination (being the organ for ascertaining and apprehending the
150
Essays, Philosophical, Historical, and Literary (London, 1789), pp. 383f., 385.
151
Ibid., pp. 389, 399.
XL VI I
"higher" and "essential" truths) as a deviation from the course of European
thought. This approach may take away some of the splendour with which
the Romantic "revival" is surrounded, but the loss is compensated for by
considerable gain. The iate eighteenth century is re-instated as a period in
its own right, as a period to which the Romantics were profoundly indebted,
and also as one with its own critical assumptions and standards.
From this vantage point Gerard's book appears as a superb essay in
synthesis. It is a model exposition of what, given the insights and convictions
of the p e r i o d , could be said on one of its f o r e m o s t aesthetic a n d philosophic
problems. It reflects the preoccupation of the age with psychological analysis
and it gives expression to new analogic modes of thinking. It preserves the
origins of the modern concept of originality at the same time that it holds
together, in almost classical poise, tendencies of thought and emotion which
later were to develop in opposite directions. Like all attempts at balance and
inclusion it lacks, perhaps, some of the lustre which more one-sided arguments
frequently have. But it is, and it will remain, the best late eighteenth-cen-
tury English study of genius. At any rate, we have Kant's word for it: "Die-
ses Wort [Genie] wird sehr gemißbraucht, und hat Veranlassung zu Unter-
suchungen gegeben, die sehr vergeblich sind, und durch die man es ganz genau
zu entziffern gesucht hat, was man damit meint. Gerard, ein Engländer, hat
vom Genie geschrieben, und darüber die besten Betrachtungen angestellt,
obgleich die Sache sonst auch bei anderen Schriftstellern vorkommt." 152