"The Orthodox Church of Greece", in: Lucian Leustean (ed.

), Eastern Christianity and the Cold War,

1945-91, London/New York: Routledge, 2010, 253-270

16 The Orthodox Church of Greece

Vasilios N. Makrides

Introduction
With regard to the Cold War period, the history of the Orthodox Church of
Greece (OCG), its institutional body as well as its numerous unofficial forms
expressed through various organizations, groups and movements, exhibits
some particular features.
Firstly, soon after the end of the Second World War, Greece became the
site of a serious conflict for political control between the Greek Government
of National Unity, supported by the British, and the communist partisans of
the 'National People's Liberation Army' (Ethnikos Laikos Apelejiherotikos
Stratos) (ELAS), who were active in the Resistance against the Axis occupa-
tion forces. The Treaty of Varkiza (1945) between the two sides remained
ineffective and subsequently the country was ravaged by a dramatic Civil War
(1946-49), ending with the defeat of the communist side and numerous com-
munists seeking refuge in Eastern Bloc countries. The Civil War traumas were
catastrophic for Greece, which had already been seriously wounded during
the Second World War. This holds true for the OCG as well, which had to
pay a high price (destruction of church buildings, murder of clerics, etc.).
Fearing antireligious communist policies and being aware of the religious
persecution in the Soviet Union, the OCG allied from the start with the anti-
communist side. This explains, in turn, the anti-church orientations and
actions of the Greek communists. Anti-communism was the salient and
dominant feature of the OCG in the decades to come, although, while not
sharing its militant antireligious spirit, isolated Orthodox clerics of all ranks
remained close to the communist side during the Resistance and later periods.
Secondly, during the Cold War most countries with a predominant Ortho-
dox Church or with a minority Orthodox Church in Eastern, East Central
and South Eastern Europe were behind the Iron Curtain. In this respect, the
OCG remained the sole predominant one in a country attached politically,
economically, militarily and intellectually to the West, the Ecumenical Patri-
archate of Constantinople and the Orthodox Church of Cyprus being special
cases. Yet Greece's multifaceted attachment to the West, followed by an
inevitable emulation of Western patterns of development, should not be
254 Vasilios N. Ma/aides
overstated. Greece was never a typical Western country. In spite of this
wholesale dependence, Greek popular and religious culture was never fully
pro-Western. On the contrary, anti-Western elements played a dominant role.
Anti-Westernism has been, after all, a conspicuous feature of Greek Orthodox
culture for many centuries. It is for this reason that the OCG basically kept its
historical religious and cultural ties to the sister Orthodox Churches behind
the Iron Curtain during the Cold War. It showed compassion and under-
standing for their ordeals after the Revolution of October 1917. 1 Needless to
say, such strong ties did not exist to Western Churches, a fact underlining the
historical significance of the 'Orthodox Commonwealth ' and its modern
transformations, especially with regard to pan-Orthodox communication,
understanding and collaboration. 2 Thus, despite the political and military
divisions established in Cold War Europe, aspects of such pan-Orthodox
orientation and togetherness kept coming to the surface.
Thirdly, regardless of these pan-Orthodox ties, various sources of tension
between the OCG and the Orthodox Churches in the Eastern Bloc countries
existed throughout this period. This issue has a long history going back to the
persisting tensions between Constantinople and Moscow or, more generally,
between Byzantine-Greek and Slavic (especially Russian) Orthodoxy. The
same holds true for the twentieth century. 3 Despite their fundamental anti-
religious stance, the communist regimes preferred in many cases to use the
respective Orthodox Churches for their own sake. Thus, skilfully, yet carefully
and diplomatically, they exploited the traditional Slavic Orthodox claims as
opposed to the Greek Orthodox ones for the extension of their own sphere of
influence, for example, concerning the issue of primacy in the Orthodox
world. Such an instrumentalization did not go unnoticed by the OCG, which
generally took a defensive stance in supporting its own rights, as well as those
of other sister, Greek-controlled churches, particularly that of the Patriarchate
of Constantinople. Thus, no matter how strong its ties to the Orthodox
Churches behind the Iron Curtain were, the OCG clearly remained a staunch
defender of traditional Greek Orthodox rights. This happened despite the fact
that issues of dissension existed even within the Greek-controlled Orthodox
Churches themselves, such as between the OCG and the Patriarchate of
Constantinople.

Church, state and politics

From a Cold War perspective, relations between the OCG and state/politics
fall into two main periods. The first begins in 1945 and ends in 1974, char-
acterized by the strong alignment of church and state in various phases for
the effective defence against the perceived communist threat. The second
lasted from 1974 to 1991, when church-state relations slowly but gradually
entered a phase of enhanced tension and when the position of the political
Left was subsfantfalfy upgraclecl in the country, particularly with the advent
of Socialists to power in 1981.
 The Orthodox Church of Greece 255
Starting with the first period, this began with the Civil War, in which
church and state collaborated most closely in eliminating a potential com-
munist takeover in Greece. The consequences of this war were to subsequently
haunt Greek politics for several decades. The OCG supported the government
army and the afflicted population, both materially and spiritually. Archbishop
Damaskinos (1941-49), who, after the Second World War, also served as
Regent and Prime Minister, was a seminal ecclesiastical and political figure at
that time. 4 His overall relations with the Left were definitely broken after the
Second World War. Metropolitans, who were friendly towards the communist-
controlled Resistance, faced a variety of disciplinary measures. The gap between
the church and the communists was thus made unbridgeable. 5 During the
Civil War, Damaskinos issued official encyclicals condemning the fraternal strife,
but clearly dissociating the church from the communist side and supporting
with religious arguments the fight of the National Greek Army against the
so-called 'Democratic Army of Greece', supported by the communists. 6
When Patriarch of Moscow Aleksii I (1945-70) sent a letter of protest to
Archbishop Damaskinos in July 1948 regarding the executions of communists
in Greece, the latter replied with a justification of the decisions of the Greek
military courts. Further, such a protest was rejected as a clear intervention of
the Soviet Union into Greek affairs. 7 It is no wonder that after the end of the
Civil War, both state and church came much closer together in articulating
the future ideology of the country and forming a crucial anti-communist front
in all domains, from army to education.
After the catastrophic decade of the 1940s, the 1950s appeared as a unique
chance to completely rebuild Greece and make a fresh beginning, with regard
to its church too. 8 The wholesale support given by the USA through the
Marshall Plan between 1948 and 1953 to Greece's reconstruction did not
pertain to material aid alone. It sealed the belonging of the country to the
Western Alliance (Greece joining the NATO in 1952) and the strengthening
of the anti-communist front in South Eastern Europe. Although there was
some friction between church and state regarding church property in 1952, 9
their overall strong ideological connection was left untouched. This is evident
in the Constitution of 1952, which was heavily influenced by the previous
socio-political conditions and was conservative in many respects, particularly
regarding basic human rights. Among other things, Orthodox Christianity,
the 'prevailing religion' in Greece, was given special rights and privileges that
factually rendered it a state religion. Any proselytism or action against it by
other religions was categorically prohibited. The systematic and official pro-
motion of the ideology of 'Helleno-Christian Civilization' was deemed neces-
sary, obviously because it was regarded as instrumental for fighting the spread
of communism.
After the death of Damaskinos in 1949, the new Archbishop Spyridon
(1949-56), who had previously been involved in the major struggles of Greek
irredentism as Metropolitan in Epirus; also played a catalytic role in the anti;.
communist struggle. He undertook many activities for the reconstruction of
 256 Vasilios N. Makrides
Greece (rebuilding destroyed churches, pet1t1ons to international organiza-
tions helping the repatriation of the Greek children who were taken by the
communists from Greece to various Eastern Bloc countries, etc.). He also
supported materially the families afflicted by the Civil War. He showed great
interest in other national issues in the 1950s, especially regarding Cyprus and
its aspired political union with Greece. 10 Additionally, he supported the
homogenization of the OCG through the elimination of dissidents in its
ranks. To this end, he relied on the force of the state. In 1951, major and, at
times, violent attacks were launched against the Old Calendarists, who sepa-
rated themselves from the OCG in 1935 on the grounds of the calendar
reform. This action was aimed at bringing them back to the OCG, but drove
the whole movement underground. Yet soon afterwards civil authorities rea-
lized the ineffectiveness of repressive measures, and resorted only to occa-
sional harassments of the Old Calendarists, despite the opposite requests and
protests of the church authorities. 11
State measures against the Greek communists and other sympathisers of
the political Left in the 1950s were more than harsh. They ranged from sur-
veillance, imprisonment and exile to systematic persecution, social dis-
crimination and execution. The Communist Party of Greece was already
prohibited in 1948 (Law 504) as being a pawn of Soviet interests and from
then on went underground. This period witnessed a great surge of anti-
communism, in which the OCG was heavily involved. It orchestrated its own
anti-communist propaganda with a variety of activities, from publications to
catechetical work among communist prisoners. It also voiced its protest
against Soviet policies and actions, such as Archbishop Dorotheos's (1956-57)
condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. 12
Despite the massive and repressive anti-communist efforts by both state
and church, minor left political units (e.g. the 'United Democratic Left'
party), independent factions and activists of varied provenance including
communists managed to survive. They enabled the dissemination of related
ideas among the Greek population (mainly working class people and uni-
versity students), which remained attractive options and continued to spread.
Moreove1~ some Greek politicians, including Prime Minister Nikolaos Plasti-
ras, were in favour of a policy of reconciliation and forgiveness, although this
had caused a negative reaction from several church hierarchs who remained
profoundly attached to anti-communism. 13 The response of the Holy Synod
to these developments was to reinstate Metropolitans Ioakeim of Koz<:mi and
Antonios of Ileia in 1956, who were earlier deposed because of their partici-
pation in the communist-controlled Resistance. There were even some mar-
ginal attempts to forge an 'Orthodox Christian Socialism' specifically destined
for Greece, yet without success.
The social appeal of communism and the vision for an eventual Left gov-
ernmentwere notcurbedby repressive measures, but became even·· stronger
from the early 1960s onward. This went hand-in-hand with the gradual rise of
anti-Western and anti-American sentiments among the Greek population.
 The Orthodox Church of Greece 257
The reaction of the anti-communist side was thus a matter of time. It emerged
in the form of the military Junta, known as the 'Colonels' regime', between
1967 and 1974, which came to power claiming to save the country from an
imminent capitulation to communism, whose ideology had even infiltrated
the church. This period did not only witness various persecution measures
against left citizens and communists, but also against all kinds of dissidents.
The OCG was seriously affected by the new regime, which, through the
help of specially-appointed Holy Synod, elected Ieronymos as the new Arch-
bishop (1967-73). Ieronymos was a well-educated clergyman and Professor of
Canon Law at the University of Thessaloniki. He was previously involved in
the ideological anti-communist struggle and had served as the Palace cha-
plain. During the 1950s and the early 1960s he was repeatedly considered to
be a candidate for the archbishopric, although such plans never materialized.
Archbishop Ieronymos attempted to ameliorate the OCG on the basis of his
own vision and accomplished significant measures in the social service of the
church, the social image and the education of the clergy. 14 On an ideological
level, this period witnessed a strong alignment between state and church,
accompanied by the political control of the church and its use for propaganda
reasons and anti-communist rhetoric. The widespread official slogan of this
time 'Greece of Greek Christians' attests to this. Yet, it was a period full of
contradictions, problems and tensions within the OCG itself, not lastly
because of the clean-up of the clergy that Archbishop Ieronymos enforced
and the church's control and manipulation by the Junta. Similar problems
appeared in the inter-Orthodox and inter-Christian relations of the OCG. For
example, Archbishop Ieronymos was involved in the attempted deposition of
the Archbishop of Cyprus (1950-77) and President of the Republic of Cyprus
(1960-77) Makarios III in 1972-73, initiated by three Cypriot bishops and
supported by the Junta. The plan was ultimately ineffective due to protests
from the wider Orthodox world, but it was the first step in creating the
Cyprus problem in 1974. 15 Furthermore, the OCG refused to participate in
the Fourth General Assembly of the World Council of Churches in Stock-
holm (July 1968) because this organization criticized the Colonels' regime as
violating human rights. However, Archbishop Ieronymos was not totally
submissive to the will of the Junta and voiced his concerns and protests. 16 Yet,
the otherwise close relationship between the church and the Junta was proven
detrimental to the church itself both during, and especially after, the military
regime.
With the restoration of democracy in 1974, which coincided with the
Turkish invasion and partition of the island of Cyprus, considerable changes
took place in Greek politics. The 'Third Hellenic Republic' also affected the
church, initiating the second period of relations between the OCG and state
from the Cold War perspective. Most importantly, it signalled the beginning
of a looser relationship between church and state and the gradual liberal-
ization· of Greek society, particularly il1 terms of religious freedom, individual
conscience and the rights of religious minorities. Such changes are evident in
258 Vasilios N. Makrides
the Constitution of 1975, ratified by a right-wing government, which
remained in different phases in power from 1974 until 1981. Other legislation,
such as the law of 1979 regarding 'automatic divorce', pointed to the political
will to loosen bonds with the church. The same policy was more intensively
continued under the regime of the Socialists (1981-89), the first one of its
kind in Greece, which passed related legislation (on civil marriage, etc.), at
times causing serious conflicts with the church, such as in 1987 regarding the
nationalization of church and monastic property. 17 In fact, the Socialists'
intention was to separate church and state administratively, a plan that did
not materialize.
The post-1974 period witnessed not only the overall upgrading and legit-
imation of the Left in Greek political history, it also led to the gradual heal-
ing of the Civil War wounds and lifted their traumatic consequences in terms
of Greek national unity. The Communist Party of Greece, which witnessed in
1968 a serious internal split leading to a spin-off party, was again legalized in
1974, while left parties were again allowed to participate in general elections,
sometimes in the form of broader left coalitions. This process was given a
strong impetus by the foundation of the Socialist Party of PASOK (Panellinio
Sosialistiko Kinima) in 1974, whose power immensely increased in the next
years, before coming to power in 1981. The Socialists abolished previous anti-
communist discrimination, rehabilitated communist Resistance fighters and
their activities, used neutral language to describe these events, and finally
enabled the repatriation of Greek communists who had been living since the
1950s in Eastern Bloc countries. This radical change in Greek politics went
further as communists even managed to participate in the government. Spe-
cifically, in 1989 a short-lived coalition was formed between a right-wing
party and a left-wing coalition, including communists, in the wake of accu-
sations of financial and other scandals committed by the Socialists. Such a
development was completely unthinkable a few decades earlier. After a period
of political insecurity and short-lived governments, the right-wing con-
servatives came to power from 1990 until 1993, a period that coincided with
the break-up of the Soviet Union.
Bearing this situation of political change in mind, it is obvious that anti-
communism was not the driving force that characterized Greek politics after
1974. On the contrary, anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism, because of the
US-controlled Junta and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, grew stronger,
despite Greece's full adhesion to the European Economic Community in
1981. Such tendencies were observed even among right-wing conservatives. In
1974 Greece withdrew from the military structure of NATO because of the
Cyprus problem, but rejoined the alliance in 1980. The conservatives initiated
a new phase of relations to Eastern Bloc countries through various initiatives
(e.g., Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis's visits to the Soviet Union
and Yugoslavia). Anti-Western and anti-American sentiments reached a peak
during the Socialist governmerit, whiCh had exploited them to secure its vic-
tory in 1981. This situation, however, proved to be a tenacious source of
 The Orthodox Church of Greece 259
tensions, although without any significant repercussions, between Greece and
its Western allies at the time, a fact that led Samuel Huntington to call Greece
'an anomaly, the Orthodox outsider in Western organizations'. 18
These developments had an impact upon the OCG too. Archbishop Ser-
apheim (1974-98), although initially appointed by a counter-coup led by
General Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis, managed to survive numerous poli-
tical governments after the restoration of democracy, becoming the most
long-lived Archbishop in the history of the Greek state. Showing a more
popular and pragmatic rather than an intellectual and elitist profile and
having experienced the tribulations of the Civil War himself, he was ready to
go ahead and seek reconciliation. Anti-communism never became a dominant
feature of the OCG's orientations and policies during this period, although
the support of the sister Orthodox Churches behind the Iron Curtain did
remain on its agenda. All of this bestowed a novel religious legitimation upon
left ideas and visions. In the 1980s there were even some unofficial attempts
among intellectuals (the 'Neoorthodox movement') at dialogue between
Orthodox Christianity (as differentiated from Western Christianity) and
Marxism/communism. Although the results were not significant, this devel-
opment shows a considerable change of orientation in bringing together these
two traditions that were earlier considered fully incompatible. In addition,
despite attempts at loosening the church-state bond and concomitant tensions
in the 1980s, Archbishop Serapheim managed to retain the OCG's influence
in society in various ways. 19 After all, the often proclaimed separation
between church and state was never effected. Yet the whole situation of
church-state relations was about to change after the end of Cold War and the
new opportunities arising for Greece and the OCG in the former Eastern Bloc
countries, where Orthodox Christianity had historically strong footholds.

Church structure and organization

Perhaps the most important issue that affected the OCG in the Cold War
period was its relation to some independent, semi-monastic organizations of
clerics and lay people, known as 'brotherhoods of theologians'. The best-
known among them was Zoi (Life), founded in 1907, which in the 1930s and
1940s developed into a powerful body with numerous affiliated societies and
units, as well as with broad social appeal and close connections to the intel-
lectual and political world of the country (e.g. during the dictatorship of
Prime Minister Ioannis Metaxas, 1936-41 ), including the Palace. Although
initially aimed at the spiritual improvement of its members and internal mis-
sion, Zoi was in a position to exert considerable influence and pressure upon
the church hierarchy and even to determine church politics. It is thus no
wonder that Zoi had many opponents, not only from the higher echelons of
the church, but also outside it. Existing evidence suggests that Zoi eventually
intended· to bring the church ·leadership under control and consequently to
realize its own vision for the OCG. Archbishop Chrysanthos (1938-41), for
260 Vasilios N. Makrides
example, had good relations with Zoi and was supported by the whole
movement, such as in the extensive welfare activities during the Second World
War. 20 But his opponent and successor, Archbishop Damaskinos, kept rather
cold relations with the entire movement, although Zoi, with its network,
played a crucial role in the anti-communist campaign during the Civil War. 21
In the 1950s the overall power and growth of Zoi reached its peak. It was
able to play an important role in church affairs, in crucial national issues
(regarding Cyprus), and in ideological matters against communism. It could
have also been part of an envisioned new 'Christian Democratic Party' in
Greece after the Civil War, but the plan did not succeed. Yet diverging views
and orientations within the entire movement and its affiliated societies gra-
dually led to internal differentiation and growing dissatisfaction and dissen-
sions. As a result, a parallel movement named Sotir (Saviour) emerged in
1959-60 after a split, which meant a serious blow to the brotherhood's influ-
ence. In addition, numerous influential members subsequently quitted Zoi
following an independent path and even criticizing the organization and its
strategies. Despite these drawbacks, Zoi still managed to retain enough of its
power and exert its influence on church and politics in various ways, for it
enjoyed the support of many sympathisers throughout the country. Persons
affiliated with such organizations systematically orchestrated the accusations
brought against the elected Archbishop Iakovos on the grounds of his alleged
moral transgressions that finally led to his resignation soon after his election
in 1962. 22 In addition, some of the Colonels in the military regime were ear-
lier ideologically influenced by Zoi and Sotir, while their regime was hailed by
both as guaranteeing Greece's protection from the communist threat. It was
no surprise to see Archbishop Ieronymos appointed by the Junta, a person
closely involved with the Zoi movement in the past. Of the 29 metropolitans
elected during his leadership, some came directly from the ranks of Zoi and
one from those of Sotir, while most of the others were sympathetic towards
both brotherhoods. It becomes obvious that during this period the old dream
of Zoi to bring the official church under control was realized. 23
The restoration of democracy brought radical changes. Maintaining cold
relations with these organizations, Archbishop Serapheim attempted to limit
their influence and to reorganize the church without external interference. In
1974 he deposed thirteen metropolitans, previously appointed by Archbishop
Ieronymos. But Serapheim's final goal was to neutralize the influence of
independent organizations, which he was able to realize to a large degree.
After all, these brotherhoods mainly followed in the post-1974 period a policy
of accommodation and survival in spite of their rather cool relations with
most church hierarchs. 24 Obviously, they had no other option, for their power
and influence had considerably waned. In some cases, though, as in the
church-state conflicts of the 1980s, collaboration between these organizations
and the official church for common purposes was not unusual, despite mutual
tensiofls: Critieisrrt of and tesistafice to official church policies from indepen;;
dent movements did not completely disappear during the Serapheim era. Such
 The Orthodox Church of Greece 261
phenomena originated not only from the brotherhoods' milieu, but also from
various Orthodox rigorist/fundamentalist movements of varied provenance
and orientation, which criticized the official church's conventionalism, its lack
of prophetic spirit and the adoption of modernizing and secularizing trends.
Such reactions remained a tenacious source of problems and tensions in the
church structure, as have later been seen in the 1990s. 25
Several Greek metropolitans and particularly Augoustinos Kantiotis
(1967-2000) of the Diocese of Florina, Eordaia and Prespes were always very
close to the Orthodox rigorists and fully shared their critique of church and
society. Metropolitan Kantiotis, who was renowned for his fervour and mili-
tancy, founded his own Orthodox brotherhood named Stavros (Cross).
Although the older brotherhoods were gradually pushed out of the limelight
after 1974, other independent Orthodox organizations emerged, which played
vital roles in church politics. The most important among them was Chrysopigi
(Golden Springs). Three of its founding and most influential members were
elected metropolitans by Archbishop Serapheim in the 1970s. They had been
associated with the Zoi movement, but then distanced themselves from it.
One of them, Christodoulos Paraskevaidis, later became Serapheim's succes-
sor in the Archbishopric (1998-2008). Thus, despite problems and tension,
the official church and these independent organizations cannot be completely
separated from one another, since there were many channels of communication,
contact, mutual influence and eventual cooperation between them.
All in all, the Cold War period was vital for the overall evolution of the
OCG. Despite existing problems and deficits, church-state relations mani-
fested a series of positive developments, such as the Constitutional Charter of
the Church of Greece of 1977, having the validity of a state law, in which the
autonomy of the church was stressed more than previously. The church was
no longer a pawn to the will of a powerful, centralized state, while church-
state relations were articulated on the basis of the principle of synallilia, i.e.
their reciprocity, mutual assistance and interdependence. The OCG was
able to improve its structure and overall profile with regard to other issues,
such as organizing its internal mission under the auspices of the organization
Apostoliki Diakonia (Apostolic Service). Founded in 1936, this became active
particularly after the Second World War, developed steadily in a variety of
domains (Sunday Schools, catechetical work, publications, external mission,
etc.) and was able to counterbalance the overwhelming influence of the
aforementioned brotherhoods. Special care was taken for the education of
clerics either at university level or in higher ecclesiastical seminaries. This was
a matter in which the OCG always lagged behind, but the whole situation
presented signs of improvement from the late 1970s onward. For example, in
1946 only 1.4 per cent of priests had a university degree in theology, 26 while
in 1980 this percentage was significantly higher (c. 16 per cent). 27
The Cold War period brought not only significant developments in the
structure oftlie offieial church, but alSo in Orthodox religious life and spiri..:
tuality in general. A clear example of this pertains to monasticism, which had
262 Vasilios N. M akrides
gone through a difficult phase in the modern Greek state since the nineteenth
century. After 1945, this had to do with steadily declining number of monks
and nuns, as well as with low levels of literacy among them. A classic example
is the population of the Athonite monastic community, which faced a gradual
decline in its number until 1971. Since then it was grown, while the fall of the
Eastern Bloc led to easier manning of the historical Slavic monasteries. In
addition, the level of literacy among the monks changed significantly, since
many newcomers, including those from foreign countries, had at times an
excellent background in many disciplines beyond theology. Disappointed by
the conventionalism of the official church and the brotherhoods, many Greeks
began a quest for Orthodox monasticism and its spiritual sources (e.g. the
renewal of the tradition of the 'spiritual fathers'). Such a rediscovery became
attractive in the 1980s, even to many professed atheists of Marxist/communist
provenance. Greek communists, aside from their ideology, entertain a 'special
relationship' to Greek Orthodoxy, participate in Orthodox ritual life and
recognize Orthodoxy's diachronic significance in Greek history. This turn to
monastic and generally Orthodox spirituality was enhanced by the crisis of
the modern capitalist system, its consumerist and materialist spirit and the
effects of globalization, which were especially felt in Greek society after 1974.
The fall of the Eastern Bloc and the end of 'great ideologies' intensified the
quest for Orthodox spirituality. 28

Inter-Orthodox and inter-Christian relations

Regarding inter-Orthodox relations, the historical cleavage between the Greek
and the Slavic-controlled Orthodox Churches has been significant. The Greek
side sought, on the one hand, to contribute to pan-Orthodox solidarity, yet,
on the other hand, was never willing to give up the traditional privileges of its
side, especially regarding the Greek-controlled Patriarchates of Con-
stantinople, Alexandria and Jerusalem. The OCG did not officially partici-
pate in the Pan-Orthodox conference of 1948 in Moscow, nor did other
Greek-controlled Churches and, most notably the Patriarchate of Con-
stantinople. Organized in the aftermath of the Second World War and in a
period of a 'friendlier stance' towards the Russian Orthodox Church by the
late Stalin regime, the conference was interpreted by the Greek side as an
attempt to undermine the position and the authority of the Patriarchate of
Constantinople by enhancing the significance of the Patriarchate of Moscow.
Such an instrumentalization of the Russian Orthodox Church by the Soviets
was known to the West, which, in turn, actively supported the Patriarchate of
Constantinople. The election of Patriarch Athenagoras I of Constantinople in
1948, who was previously Archbishop of North and South America (1930-
48), was strongly supported by US President Harry S. Truman. His election
can be interpreted as a strategic move to enhance the significance of Con-
stantiiiople~ iii the Easteni Orthodox world and thus fo counterbalance Soviet
designs regarding the Patriarchate of Moscow. 29
 The Orthodox Church of Greece 263
Undoubtedly, the instrumentalization of the church for political purposes
was a real fact in the communist world at the time. Another example was
evident in the reactions of the Russian, Romanian and Bulgarian Orthodox
Churches and their condemnation of the pogrom against the Greek Orthodox
population of Istanbul (6-7 September 1955). This was the most serious step
towards the destruction of the Greek community there and had numerous
negative consequences for the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Behind this
action of pan-Orthodox solidarity by the Slavic side, however, another poli-
tical objective was hidden, quite plausible in the context of the Cold War. The
protest was also aimed at loosening the bonds between Greece, Greek-
controlled Orthodoxy and the Western Alliance, particularly because the
latter had done nothing to protect the Greek side during the pogrom and, in
addition, showed a compromising stance on the Cyprus issue. 30
Inter-Orthodox tension can also be observed in the Mount Athos monastic
community, which, although in Greece, remains under the direct jurisdiction
of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. There exist Russian, Bulgarian,
Romanian and Serbian establishments on Mount Athos, which had histori-
cally been supported by their respective political and church authorities. But,
firstly after the October Revolution and later in the Cold War period, the
situation changed dramatically, leaving these establishments in a condition of
gradual decay. The respective communist regimes for understandable reasons
did not subsidise these monasteries any longer neither with money nor with
monks. At the same time, there were attempts to change the status of the
monastic community in favour of its Slavic residents. Such plans were espe-
cially supported by Russian and Bulgarian monks during the German occu-
pation of Greece. 31 During the Cold War period the Soviet Union and its
allies supported the traditional Slavic arguments for the internationalization
of Mount Athos and the deprivation of Greek control. On the Greek side, by
contrast, there was widespread suspicion out of political reasons towards the
admission of new monks from communist Eastern and South Eastern Europe.
Greek political and ecclesiastical authorities, especially in the 1950s, feared
the 'double identity' of such monks and potential subversive activities, caus-
ing reactions from the other side; for example, when some Romanian monks
sent to Mount Athos were denied entrance in 1953. However, the official cel-
ebrations of the millennium of the foundation of the Monastery of Megisti
Lavra (Mount Athos) in 1963 were attended by representatives of all Ortho-
dox Churches, while Patriarch Athenagoras announced concrete measures for
the amelioration of the Mount Athos condition including the recruitment of
monks, both Greek and foreign. Although still facing obstacles and bureau-
cratic hindrances, in the following years limited permission was given to
Slavic Orthodox Churches to send new monks to Mount Athos, as in 1966 for
Bulgarians and Russians. Yet these churches reacted when new measures by
the Greek government were imposed; for example, the Russian Orthodox
Church to a legislative decree ofl969 promulgated by the Colonels' regime
and extending the powers of the civil Governor of Mount Athos. 32
264 Vasilios N. Makrides
Tension existed not only with regard to Slavic Orthodox Churches at the
time, but also between Athens and Constantinople. Despite ethnically being
almost identical churches, their solidarity and congruence must not be taken
for granted, especially because of the perplexed situation of their overlapping
ecclesiastical jurisdictions. The main tension in the Cold War period appeared
because of a new Constitutional Charter of the Church of Greece, ratified
under Archbishop Ieronymos in 1969. The Patriarchate of Constantinople
considered this as a violation of important clauses of the Patriarchal Tome of
1850 concerning the autocephaly of the OCG and of the Patriarchal and
Synodal Act of 1928 concerning the 'New Lands', i.e. the dioceses in the
Greek state remaining under the spiritual jurisdiction of Constantinople, but
'temporarily' administered by the OCG. The resulting conflict, in which even
several Greek metropolitans turned against Archbishop Ieronymos, was one
of the causes finally leading to his resignation. 33
In most cases though, the OCG showed solidarity during this period with
the Patriarchate of Constantinople on issues related to the wider Orthodox
world and supported its actions. The OCG was involved in inter-Orthodox
endeavours and dialogues with its own representation. But again it kept a
close cooperation with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which, in turn,
often relied on the expertise of Greek theologians. This holds true for the first
three pan-Orthodox conferences that took place in Rhodes in 1961, 1963 and
1964 respectively in the long way towards the still expected convocation of the
'Great and Holy Council of the Orthodox Church'. The same is true for the
pan-Orthodox theological congress organized in Athens in 1976, the first
having taken place again there back in 1936. In addition, the OCG supported
the Patriarchate of Constantinople on issues related to pan-Orthodox unity
and problems resulting from Slavic ambitions. It condemned the unilateral
autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Macedonia in 1967, whose canonical
status still remains unsettled. The OCG was very sensitive to this issue and
condemned 'Macedonian' priests crossing the borders to Greece and exercis-
ing propaganda in these areas, as a report of the Metropolitan of Kastoria,
Dorotheos, in 1965 indicates. 34 Furthermore, the OCG endorsed the position of
the Patriarchate of Constantinople and refused to recognize the autocephaly
of the 'Orthodox Church in America' in 1970. 35
Another aspect of inter-Orthodox contacts can be observed with respect to
theological education. Given the problems of theological education in Eastern
Bloc countries, the role of a free Orthodox country like Greece with a solid
theological educational establishment was considerably enhanced. Orthodox
clerics or lay people of varied provenance were able to study theology in
Greece, naturally, as long as permission could be obtained from communist
authorities. For countries with a more 'liberal' communist face (e.g. Yugosla-
via), this was easier. Several Serb clerics (Amfilohije Radovic, Atanasije
Jevtic, Artemije Radosavljevic, Irinej Bulovic) made their graduate theologi-
cal studies in Greece, while they were to play a crucial role as bishops later in
the 1980s and 1990s in the national mobilization of the Serbian Orthodox
 The Orthodox Church of Greece 265
Church. 36 Having familiarized themselves with the Greek language and
theology, they kept their ties to Greece and acted as catalysts for the rap-
prochement between the two Orthodox peoples in the 1990s. Relations
between the OCG and the Serbian Orthodox Church were very close during
this period, as demonstrated by the mutual visits of church prelates, not lastly
because of the problems surrounding the contested autocephaly of the
Orthodox Church of Macedonia. 37
Finally, inter-Orthodox contacts remained a reality for various Orthodox
groups 'in the margins', which were forced at times to seek wider cooperation
and solidarity, not lastly because of their opposition to the canonical Ortho-
dox Churches. This holds true for Orthodox rigorists or fundamentalists. For
example, a faction of the Greek Old Calendarists sought in the 1960s to
contact the Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia (ROCOR) with regard
to the consecration of a bishop. 38 In general, Greek Old Calendarists mana-
ged to entertain contacts with respective groups in Cyprus, Romania and
Bulgaria. Cooperation among these dissident Orthodox groups, especially
through their dependencies abroad, better enabled them to voice their protests
against their opponents in church and state, for example, by criticizing the
subservience of their respective church leadership to the political regimes,
whether communist or not.
Inter-Christian relations of the OCG during the Cold War period were
closely connected to those undertaken by the Patriarchate of Constantinople.
Despite initial reservations, the OCG was a founding member of the World
Council of Churches (WCC) in Amsterdam 1948 and continued to participate
actively in the Ecumenical Movement (in Evanston 1954, New Delhi 1961,
etc.). 39 The Orthodox Churches from Eastern Bloc countries only became
members of the wee from 1961 onwards, after a period of initial criticism.
Greek theologians significantly contributed to the development of the Ecu-
menical Movement, particularly Professors of Theology Hamilcar Alivizatos
(1887-1969) and Nikos Nissiotis (1925-86). Alivizatos served as the General
Secretary of the Saint Paul Festival Committee commemorating the 1,900-
year anniversary of the coming of the Apostle Paul to Greece (15-30 June
1951 ), an inter-Christian event of great significance for the OCG. In the fol-
lowing years, the OCG participated in all major theological dialogues in
cooperation with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, such as with the Angli-
can Church, the Old Catholics and the Lutheran Church of Germany. On
the other hand, it undertook its own inter-Christian initiatives, such as the
'Consultation of the Christian Churches on combating famine' in Athens
in 1985. 40
Another side of inter-Christian relations concerns the Roman Catholic
Church, which appeared to be more problematic. During the Cold War
period there could have been some congruence between the anti-communism
of the OCG and that of the Vatican. 41 Traditional Orthodox anti-Westernism
and Roman Catholic phobia remained, however, more dominant and influ;.;
ential in Greece at the time. When the Greek state intended to establish
266 Vasilios N. Makrides
diplomatic relations with the Vatican in the 1950s, the OCG kept an adamant
negative stance and refused to cooperate. Among the reasons mentioned were
the role of Uniatism as a propaganda means and the alleged traditional
designs of the Roman Catholic Church against Greek Orthodoxy. 42 Despite
continuing reactions on the part of the OCG, the Greek state established
diplomatic relations with the Vatican in 1979. The same negative stance was
kept by the OCG towards the 'dialogue of love' that was initiated by Patri-
arch Athenagoras and Pope Paul VI, which included, a meeting in the Holy
Land in January 1964, the simultaneous lifting of the 1054 anathemas by
both sides on 7 December 1965, and the exchange of visits in the summer of
1967. The OCG criticized once more this rapprochement, while traditional
Orthodox fears vis-a-vis the Roman Catholics resurfaced. 43 Despite this atti-
tude, the OCG, along with Constantinople, participated in the official dialo-
gue with the Roman Catholic Church that started in 1980. The ecumenical
endeavours and initiatives of the OCG, together with those of the Patriarchate
of Constantinople, found their most severe critics in Greece among many
monks of Mount Athos (especially those in the Monastery of Esphigmenou),
the Old Calendarists and various other rigorist/fundamentalist groups. 44
This attests again to various trends, currents and orientations existing
within the OCG, which is not a monolithic system. Such a variety of options
characterized the OCG during the entire Cold War period.

Conclusion
Analysis of the OCG in the Cold War period has shown its multiform evo-
lution as well as the articulation of its particular characteristics in the wake of
both internal and external developments. Despite its alliances and inter-
Orthodox cooperation, the OCG managed to preserve its independence and
make decisions based upon its own criteria and experience. Although in the
beginning it strongly allied itself with the anti-communist camp and the
Greek state, anti-communism ceased to be its most salient feature in later
decades. Despite its critical stance, the OCG kept its relations with the
Orthodox Churches behind the Iron Curtain in many ways. In addition, its
close collaboration with the state did not mean its complete subservience to
the will of the political authorities. Characteristically enough, the policies of
the OCG were not completely harmonious even with those of the Patriarchate
of Constantinople on a number of issues, although they represented two eth-
nically almost identical churches and had common interests, attesting to the
independent course that the OCG took during the Cold War period.

Archives45
The Historical Archive of the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, Athens
The GeheraJArchives of the Gfi~~ek State, Athens
The Historical Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry, Athens
 The Orthodox Church of Greece 267
Publications
Ekklisia (Church)46
Ephimerios (Parish Priest)47
Theologia (Theology)48
Ekklisiastiki Alitheia (Ecclesiastical Truth)49

Population
1951: 7,472,559 Orthodox believers out of 7,632,801 total population
1991: 10,264,156 total population50

Congregations
1943: 2,878 monks on Mount Athos 51
1946: 7, 150 clergy52
1988: 9,682 clergy; 53 1,255 monks on Mount Athos 54
1992: 1,301 monks on Mount Athos 55

Religious leaders
Title: Archbishop of Athens and All Greece

Damaskin os (Papandreou) (1891-1949), 1941-49

Spyridon (Vlachos) (1873-1956), 1949-56
Dorotheos III (Kottaras) (1888-1957), 1956-57
Theoklitos II (Papayiannopoulos) (1890-1962), 1957-62
Iakovos III (Vavanatsos) (1893-1984), 1962
Chrysostomos II (Chatzistavrou) (1880-1968), 1962-67
Ieronymos (Kotsonis) (1905-88), 1967-73
Serapheim (Tikas) (1913-98), 1974-98

Political leaders
Konstantinos Karamanlis (1907-98), Prime Minister, 1955-63, and 1974-80;
President, 1980-85 and 1990-95
Alexandros Papagos (1883-1955), Prime Minister, 1952-55
Georgios Papandre ou (1888-1968), Prime Minister, 1944-45 and 1963-65
Andreas Papandre ou (1919-96) Prime Minister, 1981-89 and 1993-96
Nikolaos Plastiras (1883-1953), Prime Minister, 1945, 1950 and 1951-52
Konstantinos Tsatsos (1899-1987), President, 1975-80
Christos Sartzetakis (1929-), President, 1985-90
268 Vasilios N. Malo-ides
Notes
A. M. Papadopoulos, 1 1:.,/(k/isia tis Ellados enanti thenwton panorthodoxou
endiaferonlos kata ton eikosto aiona (The Church of Greece vis-a-vis Panortho-
dox Issues during the Twentieth Century), Thessaloniki, 1975, pp. 155-60.
2 Ibid., pp. 161-77.
3 S. Keleher, 'Orthodox Rivalry in the Twentieth Century: Moscow versus
Constantinople', Religion, State and Society, 1997, vol. 25, pp. 125-37.
4 Y. N. Karayiannis, I Ekkli.sia apo tin Katochi ston Emfvlio (The Church from the
German Occupation to the Civil War), Athens: Proskinio, 2001, pp. 17-76.
5 Ibid., pp. 77-104.
6 Y. N. Karayiannis, Ekklisia kai krato.s 1833-1997. l.storiki epi.skopi.si ton .sche.seon
tou.s (Church and State 1833-1997. A Historical Overview of their Relations),
Athens: To Pontiki, 1997, pp. 203-4; D. Koukounas, 1 Ekklisia tis E/lados 1941-
2007. Apo ton Darna.skino st on Christodou/o (The Church of Greece 1941--2007.
From Damaskinos to Christodoulos), Athens: Metron, 2007, p. 53.
7 Karayiannis, 200 l, p. 158.
8 P. Hammond, The Waters of /vlarah: The Pre.sent State of the Greek Church,
London: Rockliff, 1956.
9 Karayiannis, 1997, pp. l 08-10
10 Y. T. Printzipas and Y. N. Karayiannis, Ekkli.sia lwi E//ini.smo.s apo to 1821 eos
simera. lstoriki epi.skopisi (Church and Hellenism from 1821 to the Present. A
Historical Overview), Athens: Proskinio, 2005, pp. 125-28; Koukounas, 2007, pp.
55-65.
11 K. Ware, 'Old Calendarists' in R. Clogg (ed.), Minorities in Greece: A~pects of a
Plural Society, London: Hurst, 2002, (pp. l-23), pp. 14-15.
12 Koukounas, 2007, p. 73.
13 Karayiannis, 1997, pp. I 03-5
14 Nikodimos, Metropolitan of Attica and Megaris, leronymo.s Kotsoni.s. 0 Archie-
pi.skopo.s ton apo.stolikon oramati.smon (leronymos Kotsonis. The Archbishop with
an Apostolic Vision), Athens: Spora, 1990, pp. 293--98, 313-29 and 409-53.
15 Karayiannis, 1997, pp. 159--76; Printzipas and Karayiannis, 2005, pp. 151-60.
16 Karayiannis, 1997, pp. 222-25.
17 Karayiannis, 1997, pp. 189-96.
18 S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,
London: Touchstone, 1998, p. 162.
19 Karayiannis, 1997, pp. 177--96.
20 V. N. Makrides, 'The Greek Orthodox Church and Social Welfare during the
Second World War' in R. Clogg (ed.), Bearing Giji.s to Greeks: Humanitarian Aid
to Greece in the 1940.s, Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp.
148-68.
21 Karayiannis, 2001, pp. 105-28; V. N. Makrides, 'Orthodoxy in the Service of
Anticommunism: The Religious Organization Zoe during the Greek Civil War' in
P. Carabott and T. D. Sfikas (eds.), The Greek Civil War: Es.says on a Conflict of
Exceptiona/i.sm and Silences, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004, pp. 159-74.
22 Karayiannis, 1997, pp. 129-37; Koukounas, 2007, pp. 83-89.
23 A. Giannakopoulos, Die Theologen-Bruder.schajien in Griechenland, Frankfurt/
Main: Peter Lang, 1999, pp. 311-27, 332-40.
24 Ibid., pp. 340--47.
25 Karayiannis, 1997, pp. 196-200
26 D. Savramis, Die .soziale Ste/lung des Prie.ster.s in Griechen/and, Leiden: Brill,
1968, p. 80.
27 K. Ware, 'The Church: A Time ofTransition' in R. Clogg (ed.), Greece in the
1980.s, London: Macmillan, 1983, (pp. 208-30), p. 217.
 The Orthodox Church of Greece 269
28 V. N. Makrides, 'The Orthodox Church and the Post-War Religious Situation in
Greece', in W.C. Roof; J.W Carroll and D. A. Roozen (eds.), The Post-War
Generation and Establishrnent Religion: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, Boulder:
Westview Press, 1995, pp. 225-42.
29 Karayiannis, 2001, pp. 239-52.
30 S. J. Vryonis, The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom of September
6-7, 1955, and the Destruction of the Greek Community of Istanbul, New York:
Greekworks.Com, 2005, pp. 453-57.
31 Karayiannis, 2001, pp. 261-65.
32 E. A. de Mendieta, Mount Athos: The Garden of the Panaghia, Berlin: Akademie-
Verlag, 1972, pp. 144-52.
33 Y. T. Printzipas, Oi mega/es kriseis stin Ekklisia. Pente stathmoi stis scheseis tis
Ekklisias tis El/ados kai tou Oikoumenikou Patriarcheiou (The Big Crises in the
Church. Five Landmarks in the Relations between the Church of Greece and the
Ecumenical Patriarchate), Athens: Proskinio, 2004, pp. 97-109 and 172-81.
34 Karayiannis, 1997, pp. 208-11.
35 Papadopoulos, 1975, pp. 141-55.
36 K. Buchenau, Kiimpfende Kirchen. Jugoslawiens religiose Hypothek, Frankfurt/
Main: Peter Lang, 2006.
37 I. M. Chatziphotis, Archiepiskopos Serapheim 1913-1998. Martyries kai tekmiria
(Archbishop Serapheim 1913-98. Testimonies and Documents), Athens: Ellinika
Grammata, 1998, pp. 355-94.
38 Ware, 2002, pp. 16-17.
39 Papadopoulos, 1975, pp. 91-107. On the Orthodox involvement in the Ecumeni-
cal Movement, see also A. Basdekis (ed.), Orthodoxe Kirche und Okumenische
Bewegung. Dokumente - Erkliirungen - Berichte 1900-2006, Frankfurt/Main &
Paderborn: Otto Lembeck & Bonifatius, 2006.
40 Chatziphotis, 1998, pp. 115-80.
41 Karayiannis, 2001, pp. 221-38.
42 Koukounas, 2007, pp. 70-71.
43 Papadopoulos, 1975, pp. 77-78; Karayiannis, 1997, pp. 204-6.
44 V. N. Makrides, 'Aspects of Greek Orthodox Fundamentalism', Orthodoxes
Forum, 1991, 5, pp. 49-72; V. N. Makrides, 'L' "autre" orthodoxie: courants du
rigorisme orthodoxe grec', Social Cornpass 2004, 51, pp. 511-21.
45 The Historical Archive of the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece (Athens) is
the most valuable source of information on the history of the OCG. In addition,
there exist metropolitan, parish and monastic archives. Some archival material on
the history of the OCG including the Cold War period has been published so far.
See T. A. Stragkas, Ekklisias El/ados istoria ek pigon apseudon 1817-1967 (His-
tory of the Church of Greece from Truthful Sources), 3rd ed., vols. 1-7, Athens
2001. See also Holy Synod of the Church of Greece (ed.), Ai Synodikai Engyklioi
(The Synodal Encyclicals), vol. 2 (1934-56 ), Athens: Apostoliki Diakonia, 1956;
vol. 3 (1957-67) and vol. 4 (1968-71), Athens: Apostoliki Diakonia, 2000; vol. 5
(1972-81) and vol. 6 (1982-95), Athens: Apostoliki Diakonia, 2001.
46 The biweekly official bulletin of the OCG since 1923.
47 A biweekly review since 1952.
48 A scholarly theological quarterly review since 1923.
49 The biweekly newspaper of the OCG since 1975.
50 Questions on religious affiliation were omitted in the censuses after 1951.
National Statistical Service of Greece, Athens, Population Census of 1951 and
Population Census of 1991.
51 R: Qoth6ni, Paradise Within Reach· Monasticism and Pilgrimage on MtAt/zos,
Hetsiriki:.I-Idsinki University Press,·· 1993, p. 31.
52 Savramis, 1968, p. 75.
270 Vasilios N. Makrides
53 T. Stavrou, 'The Orthodox Church of Greece', in P. Ramet (ed.), Eastern Chris-
tianity and Politics in the Twentieth Centwy, Durham: Duke University Press,
1988, (pp. 183-207), p. 206.
54 G. Mantzaridis, 'Die neueste Statistik aus dem HI. Berg Athos', Orthodoxes
Forum, 1997, 11, (pp. 169-72), p. 172.
55 Ibid.