Comparative Foreign Policy

Comparative Foreign
Policy

1990 Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

Loughborough University

1
 Comparative Foreign Policy

Table of Contents

Table of Contents ........................................................................................................... 1

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 2

Understandings about Iraqi invasion of Kuwait ............................................................. 3

Analysis of Saddam Hussein’s reasons for the invasion ................................................ 9

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 12

References .................................................................................................................... 13

Introduction

Iraq, similar to the remaining countries in the eastern Arab world, was formed after
World War I out of territories that had belonged to the defunct Ottoman Empire. The
British installed a king of the new country Faysal ibn Hussein of the Hashemite family
of Mecca, in what is now Saudi Arabia. The British had supported the Hashemites
during World War I as leaders of an Arab revolution against the Ottoman Empire, who
were allies with Germany. There was a large Kurdish minority in the northern part of
the country, near the borders with Turkey and Iran. The Kurds are an ethnically and
linguistically different people, Muslim but not Arab, who are found not only in
northern Iraq but also in southeastern Turkey and northwestern Iran (McDowall, 1999).
The majority Arab population was split between a Sunni Muslim minority and a Shiite
Muslim majority. From the time of Faysal until today, the political elite of the country
has been disproportionately Sunni Muslim. Holding the country together in the
absence of an established bureaucracy was a difficult task, and Faysal relied heavily on
British military forces and administrators. By the mid-1970's, a civilian party official
named Saddam Hussein, who was responsible for internal security affairs, emerged as
the real power in the regime (Sluglett, 1958). In 1979, AlBakr, whose health had been
2
 Comparative Foreign Policy

in decline for some years, resigned as president and Saddam succeeded him. After
coming to power, Saddam ordered the execution of 22 high-ranking Ba'th Party
officials accused of plotting against him Saddam Hussein reached the presidency at a
time of great ferment in the politics of the Middle East. Egypt, the largest Arab state
and leader of the Arab world, had just signed a peace treaty with Israel and had been
ostracized by the other Arab states. The purpose of the study is to further understand
about the Gulf war in 1990 as analyzing Saddam’s decision to invade Kuwait.

Understandings about Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

Based on these late military successes and its steadfastness in resisting earlier Iranian
offensives, Saddam Hussein's regime claimed victory in the war However, Iraq achieve
nothing after the fight. On contrary, the war even left Iraq with economic instability
and disruptions. Meanwhile, on the other hand, the sales of Kuwaiti from their oil
production had been increasing since 1982 (Fahd, 1991). And after the war of Iraq with
Iran, the revenue from oil production of Kuwait along with other Gulf aid forms, were
ended after the war. Was over. As the result, it left Iraq with a huge debt burden
accounted at $80 billion ($40 billion to the Gulf states, and $40 billion to other
governments and private creditors) (Freedman and Karsh; Clawson,; Baram and
Rubbin , 1993). In addition, during the Iran-Iraq War Baghdad initiated a large-scale
economic privatization and liberalization system, which ended up mostly profit close
friends of the regime. The unintended results of this program included high levels of
unemployment, inflation, and shortages in basic necessities as well as increasingly
visible economic inequality (Chaudhry, 1991). As these economic difficulties became
more visible, Iraq turned into the Arab world, through common diplomacy, and not
through not saber-rattling, resulted in the establishment of the Arab Cooperation
Council, a loose government council including Jordan, North Yemen, Iraq, and Egypt
with the aim of promoting economic integration and exchanges of the members
(Priess, 1996; Ryan, 1998).

3
 Comparative Foreign Policy

The border issue was suggested in various meeting occasions; sometimes by Iraq, and
sometimes by Kuwait (Al-Bazzaz, 1993). As Iraq’s economic difficulties grew, signs of
political discontent within Iraq also emerged, more and more signs of coups within the
country appeared as eight hundreds of high-ranking officers were forced to retire as
well as increasing suspicions from Saddam Hussein (Baram, 1996) along with fail coup
attempts and assassination plans (Freedman and Karsh, 1997). Nonetheless, the fall of
the Soviet Union's Eastern European empire in 1989 further increased Saddam's fears
about his own regime also the US effort to overthrow the Iraqi regime (Baker, 1991;
Woodward, 1999). Saddam's then corncern over the conspiracy of international
threats against him and his rulings (Al-Samara'I, 1997). This conspiracy, in Saddam's
view, involved not only the United States, but also the Gulf states and Israel as Al-
Samara'i reports in the 1990 suggested the plans to attack on Iraqi biological, nuclear,
and chemical weapons facilities (Al-Bazzaz, 1993). As the conspiracy began to unfold,
Saddam concerns over his hold of power also raise (Freedman and Karsh, 1991).

As Saddam and his regime came by early 1990 to see their problems as emerging from
the machinations of foreign enemies, Iraq’s foreign policy became increasingly
aggressive and hostile (Bengio, 1992) along with the excuses to invade Kuwait started
to appeared as in 1990, Iraq first stated that Kuwait borrowed $10 billion from Iraq
(Freedman and Karsh, 1991) or the claim over Kuwaiti oil production policies the UAE.
It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when Saddam Hussein decided to invade Kuwait. Saad
al-Bazzaz reports on a series of meetings beginning in mid-June 1990 that formulated
the plan for the invasion. Two plans were set out, one calling for the occupation of the
border area with Kuwait and two Kuwaiti islands and the other calling for the complete
occupation of Kuwait. It was only on July 29, 1990, according to al-Bazzaz, that Saddam
decided to implement the second plan. Other sources place the decision slightly earlier
in 1990. Wafiq al-Samara'i told the producers of the BBC/PBS documentary The Gulf
War that he thought the decision was made in April 1990, though he did not offer any
direct evidence supporting this claim.
4
 Comparative Foreign Policy

As regards to the invasion decision, it was stated that in May 1990, Saddam Hussein
announced to the former head of the Iranian National Security Council at the time,
Hassan Ruhani, that a particular event would soon happen in the Gulf and Iran
should not interpret as directed against it (New York Times, 1991). On the other hand,
it was argued in other studies that the decision of Saddam was taken in March 1990
(Al-Jabbar, 1991). There are no certain timing recorded as when Iraq invaded Kuwait
in 1990. However, it was certain that the decision was taken when Saddam
acknowledged of the conspiracy against his rulings. The linkage in the first half of 1990
between Saddam Hussein coming to the conclusion that a conspiracy was happening
aimed at undermining him, the change in the tone and rhetoric of Iraqi foreign policy,
and the decision to invade Kuwait is extremely strong. The sense that circumstances
had turned against the regime, and that something had to be done quickly to reverse
the negative trend, is clear in comments by Saddam and those close to him after the
invasion of Kuwait. The decision to invade Kuwait happened so fast that even Taha
Yasin Ramadan, Iraq's deputy prime minister at the time was even concerned over the
war as he suggested that the country hadn’t prepared the battle situation and other
surroundings conditions. However, everyone was scared to criticize the decision by
Saddam Hussein in his presence, even under the acknowledgment of the decision
being taken under severe pressures (Quandt and Sciolino, 1991).

In addition, the Ba'th Party apparatus circulated an analysis to ranking party members
in February 1991 that admitted that the leadership was forced to take a quick decision
to invade Kuwait because of the pressures it was under, even though all necessary
preparations for the confrontation had not been made in accordance to Al-Bazzaz.
With the Iraqi regime feeling threatened and looking to break out of what it saw as an
increasingly constricting set of domestic, regional and international circumstances,
Kuwait beckoned as an inviting target. The military balance between Kuwait and Iraq

5
 Comparative Foreign Policy

was overwhelmingly favorable to Baghdad. Various Iraqi governments in the past had
made claims that Kuwait should be part of Iraq. AlSamara'i reports that Tariq Aziz told
Saddam and the rest of the leadership that tensions between Kuwait and the other
Arab monarchies in the Gulf would limit the amount of opposition that Iraq would face
within the region. Aziz also, according to al-Samara'i, said that any American reaction
would take a substantial amount of time to organize, giving Iraq room to maneuver
and consolidate its hold on Kuwait (McCartney and McCartney, 2015). Baghdad saw
the prospects for victory as reasonable; the costs of not acting, and allowing the
conspiracy against the regime to continue, were seen as high.

As the result to such reasons, the decision to invade Kuwait was made somewhere in
the 1990. In the two weeks before the invasion, Saddam practiced tactical deceptions
in order to retain the element of surprise. The Iraqi media, which had ridiculed Kuwait
for months, adopted a much softer tone as Saddam allowed the American ambassador
to Iraq, April Glaspie, to leave a meeting with him with the impression that the crisis
was winding down. Meanwhile, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King Fahd of
Saudi Arabia also had the same impression after a series of contacts with Saddam. Iraq
agreed to an Egyptian-Saudi proposal for a meeting between high-ranking
representatives of Kuwait and Iraq, held in the Saudi city of Jidda (Freedman and Karsh,
1991). According to al-Samara'i, shortly after the air war began Saddam ordered Ali
Hassan al-Majid, his cousin and son-in-law whom he appointed military governor of
Kuwait, to prepare for the destruction of the Kuwaiti oil wells and other Kuwaiti
installations,an indication that he was at least entertaining the prospect that he could
not hold on to Kuwait. With his original strategy revealed as badly flawed, Saddam
might have been expected to reassess the costs and benefits of remaining in Kuwait
and to seek out a diplomatic solution. However, he did not, Saddam's own rhetoric
changed about this time, from claims that Iraq would win a military confrontation (or
at least not lose), to assertions that withdrawal from Kuwait would not bring to an end
the real cause of the war – the perceived international conspiracy against his regime
6
 Comparative Foreign Policy

(Romano and Gurses, 2014).

After the invasion of Kuwait, the Iraqi government justified its action by claiming that
Kuwait was legitimately part of Iraq (its "19th province"), broken off from Iraq by
British colonialism (Haass, 2010). The Iraqi claim is based on the fact that the Ottoman
Empire never given its claim to Kuwait, considering it part of the province of Basra. The
League of Nations mandate, which established the state of Iraq, referred to it as being
composed of the former Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. Therefore,
in the Iraqi logic, Kuwait should have been part of Iraq from the beginning. In 1938,
the Hashemite monarchy declared the claim, but did not act upon it. In 1961, upon
Kuwait's independence from Great Britain, the Iraqi government of Abd al-Karim
Qasim revived the claim, and moved troops toward the border. Great Britain
immediately sent troops to defend Kuwait, and a number of Arab states that were
opposed to Iraq on other grounds also sent troops to support Kuwaiti independence.
Ironically, it was the Ba'thist regime that formally recognized Kuwaiti independence by
sending an Iraqi ambassador to the country. The area around what is now Kuwait City
has been under the control of the Al Sabah family, the ruling family of Kuwait, since
the 18th century.

At times, when it served their purposes, they would accept Ottoman officials in the
city and fly the Ottoman flag. But the Al Sabah rulers would also expel those Ottoman
officials and conduct direct relations with other powers if that served their purpose.
Kuwaitis argue that the ability to make and keep international agreements is a sign of
independence, and thus take the 1899 agreement with the British as a sign that Kuwait
was, in reality, independent of the Ottoman Empire before there was any thought of a
state of Iraq. In 1913, British and Ottoman representatives initialed a draft agreement
in which London recognized Ottoman formal sovereignty over Kuwait in exchange for
an Ottoman declaration that Kuwait was an autonomous district of the empire and an
Ottoman promise of non-interference in Kuwaiti internal affairs (Hanish, 2013). That

7
 Comparative Foreign Policy

agreement, invoked by the Iraqis during the Gulf War, was never ratified, as it was
overtaken by World War I and the subsequent dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.
Legal questions aside, the best test for whether Kuwaitis think that Kuwait is part of
Iraq is how they reacted to various Iraqi claims. In 1938 there seemed to be some
popular sentiment in Kuwait for union with Iraq, on Pan-Arab and anti-British grounds.
By 1961, Kuwait's oil wealth was well-established, and public support for its
independence was high. There was little public support in Kuwait for the Iraqi claim
then. In 1990, no prominent or even semi-prominent Kuwaiti was willing to serve in
the Iraqi occupation authority. There was considerable popular resistance within
Kuwait to the Iraqi occupation. Again,setting legal questions aside, it seems clear that
a substantial portion of Iraqi opinion holds that Kuwait should be part of Iraq, and that
it was only through British colonial manipulation that Kuwait retained its
independence.

In addition, in term of the United States involvement with the regime, there is no
evidence of a concerted American policy to destabilize the Iraqi regime in 1989-90.
Important members of Congress questioned whether the American "tilt" toward Iraq
during the Iran-Iraq War should be continued, and Saddam's increasingly bellicose
rhetoric in early 1990 was criticized by American officials. However, the Bush
Administration, in both its diplomatic contacts with Baghdad and its public statements,
emphasized that it wanted a cooperative relationship with Baghdad. But the
characteristic trait of paranoids is to create enemies where none existed. Saddam
Hussein certainly fits the bill.

As regard to Iraq use chemical weapons against the coalition; while subsequent
investigations by U.N. weapons inspectors in Iraq established that Iraq was closer to
developing nuclear weapons in 1990 than was generally thought, it seems that Iraq
did not have a nuclear capacity during the Gulf War. However, Iraq had a clearly
8
 Comparative Foreign Policy

established chemical weapons capability. Iraqi chemical weapons had been used
against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, and against the Iraqi Kurdish city of Halabja in
1987, after it had been briefly occupied by Iranian forces. There is evidence that Iraq
armed missile warheads with VX nerve gas in the period leading up to the coalition
attack in January 1991. Iraq launched missile attacks, armed with conventional
warheads, on Israel, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain during the fighting.

Analysis of Saddam Hussein’s reasons for the invasion

Regards to the reasons why Iraq invaded Kuwait; they’re still remains uncertain and
critical to many studies. There have been suggestions stated that the Kuwait invasion
was fit within their generic explanations for war. Some, however argued that the fight
between Iraqi and Kuwaiti was because of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and his
personality including his ambition, aggressiveness and proclivity, both political and
personal, to violence. It can’t be denied that his personality in one hand is constant
factor that lead to the conflict along with his critical power position in Iraqi politics. In
addition, Saddam appeared to have past experience and ability to deal and retreat in
front of superior group. The invasion of Kuwait was non arguable, a demonstration of
Saddam as an ambitious and conflict leader of Iraq. Saddam notion of the Arab world
leader as well as his temper and the idea of Kuwaiti dissent and stand against him was
in fact considered as a major factor of the fight. However, “was Saddam personality
alone enough to trigger the battle with the Kuwait” is the question that is concerned
by many scholars.

Thus, another approach was considered in order to analyze further the reason of Iraqi
invasion by looking at the domestic political economy of the countries. Researchers
suggested that due to the rising difficulties of the economy and the economic situation
of Iraq, the decision to invade Kuwait was considered as a quick grab and access to the
9
 Comparative Foreign Policy

financial resources of Kuwait by Saddam’s regime. Furthermore, the attack was also
an attempt to alleviate, improve and control the political and economic crisis (Al-
Bazzaz, 1993). As the result, the attack on Kuwait in this case was considered due to
domestic economic motivations.

Others have also suggested other thesis for the invasion on Kuwaiti as Kuwait is a weak
country therefore it’s an easy target for Iraq to invade and take over. Beside, the
country’s rich oil resources can not only helps with Iraq’s economy but also helps with
Saddam’s desire to rule the Arab World, tighten up his leadership and the oil would
help him to advance Iraq’s position in the Middle East, getting Saddam to be one step
closer in achieving his aim of regional leadership. Beside, Saddam was also aware of
the power and position the country held at the time as no regional power could stop
the fight as Iran was freeze after the country own conflict with Iraq, and regards to
other Arab countries, they were either cooperated with Iraq and Saddam or didn’t
want to get involve in the attack and afraid. On the other hand, the support of the
United State and the Policies had shown that the US favored Saddam and the Iraqi
over Kuwaiti. As the US Policy of reassurance had led Saddam to the idea and
consideration that the US would not take and strong actions or have arduous attitude
towards Saddam decision. This so called "offensive realist" is explicable for the
invasion on Kuwait, nevertheless, had existed for awhile due to the military preference
over the countries advantages since at the time, both of the US and Arab countries
valued Iraq more than Kuwait because of the better benefits offered by the country.
Therefore, the consequences of the Kuwaiti invasion were not strongly imposed on
Iraqi by the United States and the Arab region. In addition, Iraq also held a key position
in the fight against Iran during the time as the Iranian revolution was new and
ostensibly poised to sweep through the Middle East. As the result, Saddam
understood Iraq’s position and what the country had to offer; in which are more
assuring to Saddam to take the decision of invading Kuwait (Musallam, 1996).

10
 Comparative Foreign Policy

Nonetheless, it was argued by different researchers that the decision taken by Saddam
was relied on a plain favourable cost benefit reasoning however, others suggested
that it would have been easier and more understandable for Saddam to wait for two
or more years to invade Kuwait as Saddam’s nuclear program would have been able
to provide him with nuclear weapons thus, Iraq would have gain more power and
position in the Middle East region, create more fear for the opposers of the country
and the conflict over Kuwait could have been more simple (Mylroie, 1993).

It is clear regards to the importance of Saddam and his personality towards the war
on Kuwait however, the analysis arise from is that whether his decision was more
affected by his ambitions or his conspiratorial view on politics as Saddam believed on
the rise of threats against his hold of power and his regime. Saddam considered the
economic insatiability was not just simply as an issue of inappropriate policies and
incorrect methods or systems but as a conspiracy against him (Karsh and Rautsi, 1991).
Therefore, in order to strengthen his domestic and regional position, it appears that
the war on Kuwait was Saddam method to tighten his hold of power as based on the
analysis regards to the resources and the strategy of the fight against Kuwaiti; it wasn’t
a long planned and well thought military plan it was rather to what in considerations
was Saddam’s reaction to the threatening and the fear of circumstances. It was the
sense of losing his power and the idea of treats mounting both internationally and
domestically caused him to take decisions and actions before things fall apart.
Therefore, the war on Kuwaiti was Saddam’s attempt to deal with his psychological
circumstances as the exaggerated the issues around him and consider them as threats
or coups against him and his hold of power. Saddam’s perceptions of threat were
critical in forming his decision (Foster and Mayer, 1991).

In addition to the fear of losing his leadership and position, Saddam on the other hand
was also aware of the advantages and benefits that arise from the war with Kuwait.
On one hand, it would ensure his power and on the other hand, it would also be an

11
 Comparative Foreign Policy

expansion to his regime and for Iraq, helping Saddam to achieve his hope of becoming
the leader of the Middle East. Saddam fear of losing power also didn’t control him
entirely. He understood the threats of using non-conventional weapons during the
fight with Kuwait in accordance to the US warnings over the matter (Campbell et. al.,
1991)

As the result, it can be difficult to understand and analyze the actions of Saddam on
invading Kuwait and bear the risks as well as not retreating after facing the
disagreements from superior force. Saddam’s decision can only be understood by
resolving Saddam’s sense of the threats psychologically, his needs to ensure his
leadership of the country and his fear of losing power as well as desire of absolute
control over the Arab world and his regime. Only in such explanations that researchers
can come to conclusions and understands regards to Saddam’s decision of invading
Kuwait.

Conclusion

In conclusion. Saddam Hussien is a dictator and a greedy leader who desires total
control and power of the Arab countries who often considered himself as the soul and
leader of the region. In addition, the victory of Iraq over Iran has further promoted his
confident and power as well as his hallucination of absolute power and senses of
importance. He then further himself as the righteous and destined leader therefore
the rejection of Kuwair to agree with Iraq’s requirements of access to Kuwaitian
territory and rising oil price were considered as a disrespect to his power and honor
and a defiance to is leadership. It resulted into his determination to wage war with
Kuwait and show his power to the Arab countries in order to start his conquer.

Furthermore, the attack on Kuwait was also a statement for saddam to streghten his
power with Iraq. The drawn-out previous war had exhausted Iraq resources and
economy thus the unhappiness and weariness of Iraqi people and army can lead to
12
 Comparative Foreign Policy

revolt and resistance against his leadership combining with the fright of the uprising
of the majority Shi’a Muslims. As the result, in order to gain more control over the
situation and legitimize his position, Saddam decision to invade Kuwait is to empower
the Iraqi and enhance his relations with the people, promoting the economy situation.

References

Bahgat, G. (1997). Beyond Sanctions: Us Policy Toward Iraq. International Relations,

13(4), pp.57-68.

Baram, A. and Rubin, B. (1997). Iraq's road to war. 1st ed. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Bluth, C. (2004). The British road to war: Blair, Bush and the decision to invade
Iraq. International Affairs, 80(5), pp.871-892.

Botman, S. and al-Khalil, S. (1991). Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq. The
History Teacher, 24(2), p.252.

Campbell, J., Miller, J. and Mylroie, L. (1991). Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the
Gulf. Foreign Affairs, 70(2), p.197.

Capitanchik, D. (1991). Ba’th v. Ba’th: the conflict between Syria and Iraq 1968–
1989. International Affairs, 67(2), pp.375-375.

Chaudhry, K. (1991). On the Way to Market: Economic Liberalization and Iraq's

Invasion of Kuwait. Middle East Report, (170), p.14.

Foster, J. and Mayer, T. (1991). Fascism in Iraq; Imperialism and the Tyranny of
Saddam Hussein. Monthly Review, 43(6), p.33.

Freedman, L. and Karsh, E. (1994). The gulf conflict 1990-1991. 1st ed. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Gunter, M. (1999). The Kurdish predicament in Iraq. 1st ed. New York: St. Martin's
Press.

13
 Comparative Foreign Policy

Evans, G. (1991). The Kuwait crisis: basic documents. International Affairs, 67(3),
pp.620-621.

Haass, R. (2010). War of Necessity, War of Choice. 1st ed. Council on Foreign
Relations.

Hanish, S. (2013). The 1990 Gulf Crisis: Political Realism Applied. Journal of
International Relations and Foreign Policy, 1(1), pp.1-16.

Karsh, E. and Rautsi, I. (1991). Why Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Survival, 33(1),
pp.18-30.

Kienle, E. (1990). Ba'Ath V. Ba'Th. 1st ed. London: Tauris.

King, J. (2004). The invasion of Kuwait. 1st ed. Chicago, IL: Raintree.

McCartney, J. and McCartney, M. (2015). America's war machine. 1st ed. Macmillan.

Musallam, M. (1996). Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 1st ed. London [u.a.]: British Academic
Press.

Mylroie, L. (1993). Why Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Orbis, 37(1), pp.123-134.

Priess, D. (1996). Balance-of-threat theory and the genesis of the gulf cooperation
council: An interpretative case study. Security Studies, 5(4), pp.143-171.

Quandt, W. and Sciolino, E. (1991). The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for
Power and the Gulf Crisis. Foreign Affairs, 70(5), p.203.

Quandt, W. and Kienle, E. (1991). Ba'th V. Ba'th: The Conflict between Syria and Iraq,
1968-1989. Foreign Affairs, 70(5), p.204.

Romano, D. and Gurses, M. (2014). Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the
Middle East. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ryan, C. (1998). Jordan and the rise and fall of the Arab Cooperation Council. 1st ed.
14
 Comparative Foreign Policy

Stansfield, G. (2000). The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis, by

Michael M. Gunter. Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, 34(01), pp.124-125.

15