Would Hitler, given his preparations, have welcomed war in 1938?

- The only remedy and one which might appear to us s visionary, lay in the
acquisition of greater living space- a quest which has at all times been the
origin of the formation of states and of the migration of people.
- It is not matter of acquiring population but of gaining space for agricultural
use
- If we did not act by 1943-45, any year could, in consequence of a lack of
reserves, produce the food crisis, to cope with which the necessary foreign
exchange was not available and this must be regarded as a “warning point of
regions”
- Czechoslovakia and Austria would mean acquisition of foodstuff for 5 to 6
million people, on the assumption that the compulsory emigration of 2
million people from Czechoslovakia and 1 million people from Austria was
practicable. The incorporation of these two states with Germany meant, from
the politico-military point of view, a substantial advantage because it would
mean shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of forces for other purposes,
and the possibility of crating new units up to a level of about 12 divisions,
that I, 1 new division per million inhabitants.
- The New York Times reported, on September 27, 1938, Hitler’s words: “we
now come to the last territorial demand I have to make in Europe. In 1919, a
company of mad statesmen tore 2,500,000 Germans away from their
compatriotism.
- The resulting Munich agreement maintained the peace by conceding to Hitler
virtually everything for which he had asked.
- I wish point out first, that I have not conducted any war; second, that for
many years I have expressed my abhorrence of war and, it is true, also my
abhorrence of warmongers, and third, that I am not aware for what purpose I
should wage a war at all.
- Essentially all depends on me, on my existence, because of my political
talents, furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again have the
confidence of the whole German people as I have. There will probably never
again in the future be a man with more authority than I have. My existence is
therefore a factor of great value. But a criminal or a lunatic can eliminate it at
any time.
- The other side presents a negative picture as far as authoritative person is
concerned. There I no outstanding personality in England and France. It is
easy for us to make decisions.
- The probability is still great that the west will not intervene. We must take
the risk with ruthless determination. We are faced with the harsh alternative
of striking or of certain annihilation sooner or later
- We will hold out position in the west until we have conquered Poland. We
must bear in mind our great production capacity. It is much greater than in
1914-18
 - The enemy had another hope, that Russia would become our enemy after the
conquest of Poland.
- I was convinced that Stalin would never accept the English offer. For days
ago I took special step, which led to Russia replying yesterday that she is
prepared to sign. Personal contact with Stalin is established.
- I am only afraid at the last moment some swine or other will yet submit to
me a plan for meditation.
- On may 28 I took very serious measures:
o The increase already announced both o the army and the air force
were on my orders extraordinarily extended and forthwith put into
execution and carried out.
o I ordered the immediate completion of our line of fortifications in the
west.

(2) What are the natural arguments on behalf of the Fall 1938 agreements? Do you
accept them?

- Czechoslovakia. This state is a democracy, that is to say it was founded on

democratic principles. Since the overwhelming majority if the inhabitants of this
state, without being asked their opinion, were compelled one day out of hand to
accept and to adapt themselves to the construction which was manufactured at
Versailles.

- In economic life these seven and half millions are being systematically ruined and
thus devoted to a slow process of extermination.

- The depriving of these people of their rights must come to an end. I already
expressed this clearly in my speech of 22 February. I stated that the Reich would
not tolerate any further oppression and persecution of these three and half million
Germans, and I would ask the statesmen of foreign countries to be convinced that
this is no mere form of words.

- In the course of the seventeenth century in the midst of a period of profound

peace France slowly took away from the old German Reich Alsace and Lorraine. In
1870-1, after severe warfare, which was forced upon her, Germany demanded back
and received these territories.

- Since in Poland a great statesman and patriot was ready to conclude an agreement
with Germany, we forthwith took the matter up and have brought into force a pact
which means more for the peace of Europe than all the speechifying in the temple of
the league of nations at Geneva taken together”

- no European state has done more for peace than Germany, none has made greeted
sacrifices! But it must be understood that at some point even these sacrifices have
their limits, that the national socialist state must no be confused with the Germany
of the Bethmann-Hollweg’s of the hurtling’s.
- I have made this mightiest effort of all times in the service of peace. But in no
circumstances am I willing to look on calmly for ever at a further oppression of
German fellow-countrymen in Czechoslovakia. Mr Benes plays his tactical game he
makes speeches, he wishes to organize negotiations, after the fashion of Geneva he
wishes to clear up the question of procedure and to make little appeasement-
presents. But in the long run that is not good enough! This is no matter of a form of
words: here right is in question and billeted.

- what Germans demands is the right of self-determination which every other

people also possesses they do not want mere phrases.

- my demand is that the oppression of three and half million Germans in

Czechoslovakia shall cease and that its place shall be taken by the free right of self-
determination.

- the new Italian roman reach just as the new Germanic German Reich are in truth
ancient institutions. There is no call to love them: but no power in the world will any
longer remove them.

(3) Are the British or the Germans more responsible for the Munich crisis?

- The Munich arrangement includes certain very valuable provisions which found no
place at all in the godesbergMemorandum, such as the article regarding the right of
option: that is option to leave the territory and pass into Czech territory, provisions
for facilitating the transfer of populations, the supplementary declaration which
provides that all other questions arising out of the transfer of territory are to be
referred to the international commission, and, finally, the one which gives the
Czechs the period of four weeks for the release of the Sudeten Germans from the
army and the police, and for the release of Sudeten German political prisoners
instead of demanding that those things should be done by 1st October.

- we have received from the Czechoslovak government, through their minister in

London, an appeal to help them to raise a loan of 30,000,000 pounds by British
government guarantee.

- I am bound to say that the German line, the line laid down in the map, did take in a
number for areas which could not be called predominantly German in character.

- Munich agreement these plebiscite areas are t be occupied at once by an

international force.

According, there were fears entertained on the side o the Czechs that large areas
might be selected, which would operate to the disadvantage of the Czechoslovaks. In
Munich arrangement it is stated that the plebiscite is to be based on the conditions
of the saar plebiscite.
- What is the remaining position of Czechoslovakia? Not only are they
politically mutilated, but economically and financially, they are in complete
confusion. Their baking, their railway arrangements, are severed and broken,
their industries are curtailed, and the movement of their population is most
cruel. The Sudeten miners, who are all Czechs and whose families have lived
in that area for centuries, must now flee into an area where there are hardly
any mines left for them to work.
- When I think of the fair hopes of a long peace which still lay before Europe at
the beginning of 1933 when Herr Hitler first obtained power, and of all the
opportunities of arresting the growth of the Nazi power such have been
thrown away, when I think of the immense combinations and resources
which have been neglected or squandered, I cannot believe that a parallel
exists in the whole course of history. So far as this country is concerned the
responsibility must rest with those who have the undisputed control of out
political affairs. They neither presented Germany from arming, nor did they
rearm ourselves in time. They quarreled with Italy without saving Ethiopia.
They exploited and discredited the vast instution of the league of nations and
they neglected to make alliances and combinations which might have
repaired precious errors, and thus they left us in the hours of trial without
adequate national defense or effective international security
- You must have diplomatic and correct relations, but there can never be
friendship between the British democracy and the Nazi power, that power
which spurns Christian ethics, which cheers its onward course by a
barbarous paganism, which vaunts the spirit of aggression and conquest,
which derives strength and perverted pleasure from persecution, and uses,
as we have seen, with pitiless brutality the threat of murderous force.
- We advised the Czech government repeatedly to come to terms with the
Sudeten Germans, and when Germany mobilized we uttered no threats, but
we did utter a warning. We warned ther again and again that if as a
consequence of her obligations France engaged in active hostilities against
Germany we were bound to support her.
- If the view which I have been describing is the one to be taken, I think we
must inevitably proceed to the next stage that war is coming, broadly
speaking the democracies against the totalitarian states-that certainly we
must arm ourselves to the teeth, that clearly we must make military alliance
with any other powers whom we can get to work with us, and that we must
hope that we shall be allowed to start the war at the moment that suits us
and not at the moment that suits the other side.
- I do indeed beleve that we ay yet secure peace for our time but I never meant
to suggest that we should do that by disarmament, until we can induce others
to disarm too. Our past experience has shown us only too clearly that
weakness in armed strength means weakness in diplomacy.
- I do not think that at any time there has been a more complete identity of
views between the French government and ourselves than there is at the
present time. Their objective is the same as ours—to obtain the collaboration
of all nations, not excluding the totalitarian states, in building up a lasting
peace for Europe.