You are on page 1of 156

PAGE 2 & 3

Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS consti supremacy


G.R. NO. 122156
FEB. 3, 1997

Doctrine: A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation—it
is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. Since the
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute
and contract.

FACTS: The Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in pursuant to the privatization program
of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). In a close bidding held participated only by petitioner, a
Filipino corporation and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm. Pending the declaration of Berhad as the winning
bidder/strategic partner of MHC, petitioner matched the former’s bid prize per share followed by a tender of
manager’s check as Bid Security, but the GSIS refused to accept both.
The petitioner invokes that the sale to Berhad is in contravention to Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution “Filipino first policy” since MHC become a part of the national patrimony and economy. Respondent
argue that the subject provision is not selfexecutory and requires implementing legislation.

ISSUE: Is respondent’s argument proper?

RULING: No. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy , if a law or contract violates any norm of the
Constitution, that law or contract, whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered
into by private persons for private purposes, is null and void and without any force and effect. Since the
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute
and contract. Adhering to the said doctrine, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly
written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of
the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the
fundamental law of the land.

Political Law
PEOPLE V. PERFECTO abrogation of SPC
G.R. NO. L-18463
OCT. 4, 1922

Doctrine: Branch of public law that deals with the organization and operations of the governmental organs of the
State and defines its relations with the inhabitants of the territory. It is a general principle of the public law that
on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.

FACTS: On September 7, 1920, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto published an article in the newspaper La Nacion regarding
the disappearance of certain documents in the Office of Fernando M. Guerrero, the Secretary of the Philippine
Senate. The said article suggested that the difficulty in finding the perpetrators was due to an official concealment
by the Senate since the missing documents constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the
investigation of oil companies. This resulted to a case being filed against Mr. Perfecto for violation of Article 256
of the Penal Code. He was found guilty by the MTC and upheld by CFI of Manila. Mr. Perfecto filed an appeal
in the SC to dismiss the case on the ground that Article 256 was not in force anymore.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied in the
case at bar?

RULING: No, the Court held that with the change of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American,
it means that the invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article
256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court
emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political
relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force
and cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.

MACARIOLA V. ASUNCION abrogation of code of commerce


114 SCRA 77
Doctrine: The provision of the Code of Commerce incapacitating judges and justices and other public officers
from engaging in business is part of Political Law. Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the
nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with
respect to engaging in business; hence, political in essence.

FACTS: Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the CFI of Leyte; with acts unbecoming a
judge when the latter purchased a property which was previously the subject of litigation on which he rendered
decision. Respondent and his wife were also members of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. to
which their shares and interests in said property were conveyed. According to the petitioner, respondent allegedly
violated various provisions of the law, among others, Article 14, par. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce by
associating himself as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte. Respondent judge contended that said provision is made inapplicable upon the transfer of sovereignty.

ISSUE: Is the said provision still binding?

RULING: No. It is the Court’s view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of
Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political
law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices
and judges. It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations,
administrative law including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public
officers and employees with respect to engaging in business; hence, political in essence.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the
Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because
where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with
those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act
of the new sovereign.

Consequently, it has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent.

Effectivity and Rules of Construction

DE LEON V. ESGUERRA plebiscite


(1987)

Doctrine: the 1987 Constitution became effective on Feb. 2, 1987, when the plebiscite was held, and not when
the results were announced.

FACTS: Alfredo de Leon won as barangay captain and other petitioners won as councilmen of barangay Dolores,
Taytay, Rizal. On February 9, 1987, De Leon received a memo antedated December 1, 1986 signed by OIC Gov.
Benhamin Esguerra designating Florentino Magno, as new captain by authority of minister of local government
and similar memo signed designating new councilmen, all signed only on February 8, 1987. It is the petitioner’s
position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987, respondent OIC Governor no
longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors. Respondent contends that the memo
was signed prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, i.e. the proclamation of its ratification on February
11, 1987.

ISSUE: Whether the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date that the plebiscite for its
ratification was held or whether it took effect on February 11, 1987, the date its ratification was proclaimed per
Proclamation No. 58 of then President Corazon C. Aquino

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the 1987 Constitution became effective on Feb. 2, 1987, when the
plebiscite was held, and not when the results were announced. Therefore, the power no longer existed upon
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.

INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

FRANCISCO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2 impeachments in 1 yr


(2003)

FACTS: Francisco challenged the filing of a Second Impeachment Complaint within the same year against SC
Chief Justice Davide, Jr., on the ground that it was barred by Art. XI, Section 3 (5) of the Constitution that “no
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”
The House Committee on Justice that the 1st impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to
dismiss the same on for being insufficient in substance. The Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent
to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months
and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint the second impeachment complaint was lodged accompanied
by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the HoR.
Since the first impeachment complaint never made it to the floor for resolution, respondent HoR concludes that
the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have
been violated as the impeachment complaint had not been initiated since the House of Representatives, acting as
the collective body, has yet to act on it. Opposing petitioners on the other hand interpreted the word “initiate” to
mean the filing of the complaint.

RULING: The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, and gave the following rules for the interpretation of the
Constitution:
1) Verba legis—whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed.
2) Ratio legis et anima—the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the
framers.
3) Ut magis valeat quam pereat—the Constitution has to be interpreted as a whole.
The Court pried the Constitutional Convention Records to ascertain the intent of the framers of the Constitution.
The framers also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning and intended “initiate” to mean the filing of the
verified complaint to the Committee on Justice of the Lower House.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY


194 SCRA 317

Doctrine: The Court in construing a constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption and the evils if any sought to be prevented or remedied; A doubtful provision will be examined in the
light of the history of the times and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was formed.

FACTS: President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet,
their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their
primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring
that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution. CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase
“unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be
appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: does the prohibition in Section 13, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their
deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under
Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B

RULING: No. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers.
One should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished and the evils sought to be prevented or remedied.
A doubtful provision shall be examined in light of the history of the times and the conditions and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The framers sought to prevent the practice of holding multiple offices
or positions in the government during the Marcos regime that soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials
who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment.

PREAMBLE

RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO, RE: HOLDING OF RELIGIOUS RITUALS AT THE


HALLS OF JUSTICE BUILDING IN QUEZON CITY
AM NO. 10-4-19-S
MARCH 7, 2017

Facts: Valenciano wrote several letters to former Chief Justice Renato S. Puno, complaining about the holding
of masses during lunch break at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice. He claimed that the religious
icons placed there, the electric organ and other items related to the celebration of masses therein violated the
separation of the constitutional provision on the separation of the Church and State. He also claimed, among
others, that the choir rehearsals disturbed the other employees and that the other employees could no longer attend
to their personal necessities as they cannot go to the lavatories which are located near the basement.

Issue: Whether the holding of masses violates the constitutional principle of separation of church and state as
well as the constitutional prohibition against appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion.

Ruling: No. the State still recognizes the inherent right of the people to have some form of belief system, whether
such may be belief in a Supreme Being, a certain way of life, or even an outright rejection of religion. Our very
own Constitution recognizes the heterogeneity and religiosity of our people.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it
means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest
principles of morality. Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and
1987 Constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption
of church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in
public schools.

Article I: The National Territory

REAGAN V. COMMISSIONER
30 SCRA 968

MP: Bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the Military Bases Agreement of 1947 remain
part of Philippine territory.

FACTS: William C. Reagan, a civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical assistance to
the United States Air Force in the Philippines. He disputed the payment of the income tax assessed on him by
respondent CIR on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the United States Marine
Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga. It is his contention that in
legal contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power
to tax.

ISSUE: Is the US military bases in the Philippines still part of Philippine Territory?

RULING: Yes. A state is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become
impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its
jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American
armed forces by virtue of the Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory

PEOPLE V. GOZO
53 SCRA 476

Facts: Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which is within
the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the Mayor’s Office and some
neighbors, she demolished the house standing thereon without acquiring the necessary permits and then later on
erected another house. She was then charged by the City Engineer’s Office for violating a municipal order which
requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in
violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative
jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign country.

ISSUE: Is the US military bases in the Philippines still part of Philippine Territory?

RULING: Yes. The precise reason why the Philippine Government could cede part of its authority over these
bases to the US was the fact that they were part of the Philippine territory over which the Government exercised
sovereign control.

MAGALLONA V. ERMITA
655 SCRA 476

FACTS: The petitioners assailed the constitutionality of R.A. 9522 (the Baseline Law), alleging that it reduced
Philippine territory, opened Philippine waters landward of the boundaries drawn up in the Treaty of Paris to
passage by all vessels and aircraft, and consequently undermined Philippine sovereignty and national security.

RULING: The Court upheld the law’s constitutionality, finding that the drawing of the baselines from the
archipelago’s outermost islands and drying reefs was merely in compliance with the Philippines’ obligations
under UNCLOS. As to the conversion of internal waters to archipelagic waters, the Court emphasized that the
Philippines would still exercise sovereignty over archipelagic waters—subject only to the right of innocent
passage and the right of passage through sea lanes. The Philippines maintains the sui generis character of our
archipelagic waters as equivalent to the internal waters of continental coastal states. In other words, the landward
waters embraced within the baselines determined by RA 9522, i.e., all waters around, between, and connecting
the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.
MOST REV PEDRO ARIGO V. SCOTT SWIFT
GR 206510
SEPT 16, 2014

FACTS: In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting
in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the Tubataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) was committed
while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said
officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be
one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court
over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling. During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice
Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in
violation of R.A. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article
31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically,
warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Article 31 of the UNCLOS creates
an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State
regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.

Article 31 Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government ship operated
for non-commercial purposes The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the
coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-
commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the
territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.

Further, respondents argued that they did not participate to UNCLOS therefore not covered by such.

ISSUE: Are the respondents correct?

RULING: No. The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different
zones of the sea which are: (1) internal waters; (2) territorial sea; (3) contiguous zone; (4) exclusive economic
zone; and (5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending
on where the vessel is located.

Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty, subject to
the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial
sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. The court ruled that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that
the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea.

The South China Sea Arbitration: Philippines v. China, July 12, 2016 (FOR REPORTING)

Concept of Auto Limitation


PEOPLE VS. GOZO
G.R. NO. L-36409
OCTOBER 26, 1973

FACTS: Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which is within
the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the Mayor’s Office and some
neighbors, she demolished the house standing thereon without acquiring the necessary permits and then later on
erected another house. She was then charged by the City Engineer’s Office for violating a municipal order which
requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in
violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative
jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign country.

ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?

HELD: Yes. By the Agreement, the Philippine Government merely consents that the United States exercise
jurisdiction in certain cases. This consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy or expediency. The
Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or
divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the
United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine
Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States
Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the
exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the
lot located within the US Naval Base.

Magallona, et. al. vs. Ermita


G.R. No. 187167
August 16, 2011
FACTS: The petitioners assailed the constitutionality of R.A. 9522 (the Baseline Law), alleging that it reduced
Philippine territory, opened Philippine waters landward of the boundaries drawn up in the Treaty of Paris to
passage by all vessels and aircraft, and consequently undermined Philippine sovereignty and national security.

RULING: The baselines are set to define the sea limits of a state, be it coastal or archipelagic, under the UNCLOS
III regime. By setting the baselines to conform to the prescriptions of UNCLOS III, RA 9522 did not surrender
any territory, as petitioners would insist at every turn, for UNCLOS III is concerned with setting order in the
exercise of sea-use rights, not the acquisition or cession of territory. And let it be noted that under UNCLOS III,
it is recognized that countries can have territories outside their baselines. Far from having a dismembering effect,
then, RA 9522 has in a limited but real sense increased the country’s maritime boundaries.
Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the
extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-
based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce
customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the
living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).

Archipelagic Doctrine
Magallona, et. al. vs. Ermita
G.R. No. 187167
August 16, 2011
FACTS: same as above

RULING: It is defined as all waters, around between and connecting different islands belonging to the Philippine
Archipelago, irrespective of their width ordimension, are necessary appurtenances of its land territory, forming
an integral part of the national or inland waters, subject to the exclusive sovereignty of the Philippines. The
recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity
prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their own
maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’
territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.

Concept of the State


LAUREL VS. MISA
G.R. NO. L-409
JANUARY 30, 1947

Dctrione: Characteristics of Sovereignty: Permanent; Exclusive; Comprehensive; Absolute; Indivisible;


Inalienable; and Imprescriptible

FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered to the
enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to
the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty
over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic.

ISSUE: Is the contention correct?

RULING: No. The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his
government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the Philippine
government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either subsisting or eliminated
and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasn’t suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended.
Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of government, there is no such change since the
sovereign – the Filipino people – is still the same. What happened was a mere change of name of government,
from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines.

State Immunity from Suit

LANSANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. NO. 102667
FEBRUARY 23, 2000
Doctrine: Where the public official is sued in his personal capacity, the doctrine of state immunity will not apply,
even if the acts complained of were committed while the public official was occupying a public position.

FACTS: Private respondents General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) thru its president, Jose Iglesias were
allegedly awarded a verbal contract of lease in 1970 to occupy a portion of Rizal Park by the National Parks
Development Committee (NPDC), a government initiated civic body engaged in the development of national
parks. After the EDSA Revolution, petitioner Lansang, the new Chairman of the NPDC, sought to clean up Rizal
Park. Petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the
premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park. The notice was signed by Iglesias, allegedly to
indicate his conformity to its contents but later on claimed that he was deceived into signing the notice.

GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the RTC against the petitioner but it was dismissed, ruling
that the complaint was actually directed against the state which could not be sued without its consent. The CA
ruled to the contrary.

ISSUE: Is the suit deemed to be a suit against the state?

RULING: The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts
done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where
satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive
act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff.

Lansang was sued not in his capacity as NPDC Chairman but in his personal capacity. It is evident from the
complaint that Lansang was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from
Rizal Park, thus, the case was not deemed a suit against the State.

AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA (Commissioner of Public Highways)


G.R. NO. L-26400
FEBRUARY 29, 1972

FACTS: This involves an action for the recovery of the value of the property taken by the government and
converted into a public street without payment of just compensation. The defendant said that the case was
premature, barred by prescription, and the government did not give its consent to be sued.

ISSUE: Is the contention proper?

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Victoria Amigable, the property owner, despite her failure to file
his claim with the Auditor General, and said that suit may lie because the doctrine of State immunity cannot be
used to perpetrate an injustice.

CITY OF CALOOCAN VS. JUDGE ALLARDE


G.R. NO. 107271
SEPTEMBER 10, 2003

Doctrine: The rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure or garnishment does not apply when the funds
sought to be levied under execution are already allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money
judgment against the government. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial
processes.

FACTS: In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan, through an ordinance, abolished the position of Assistant
City Administrator and 17 other positions. The affected employees assailed the legality of the abolition. The CFI
in 1973 declared the abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the
payment of their back-wages and other emoluments. The City Government appealed the decision but such was
dismissed. When the City Mayor refused to sign the check intended for Santiago’s payment, Judge Allarde
ordered the Sheriff to garnish the funds of the City of Caloocan. The order was questioned by the City contending
their public funds are beyond the reach of garnishment.

ISSUE: Is the City’s contention correct?

RULING: No. The rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure or garnishment does not apply when the
funds sought to be levied under execution are already allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the
money judgment against the government. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by
judicial processes. In the instant case, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed an ordinance,
allocating the amount as payment for respondent Santiago’s back salaries plus interest. Thus this case fell squarely
within the exception from immunity from suit.

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE VS. RAMOS


G.R. NO. 159402
FEBRUARY 23, 2011

MP: Immunity has not been upheld in its favor whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of
government but was essentially a business.
FACTS: Spouses David and Elisea Ramos discovered that a portion of their land in Baguio City was being used
as part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by Air Transportation Office
(ATO). The Spouses Ramos agreed to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO for consideration,
which ATO failed to pay. In an action for collection of money against ATO, the latter invoked Proclamation No.
1358 whereby it reserved certain parcels of land, including then subject portion herein, for the use of the Loakan
Airport. They asserted that RTC did not have any jurisdiction to entertain the action without the State’s consent.
The RTC and CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: Can the ATO be sued without the State’s consent?

RULING: YES. An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own
enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. However, the need to
distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one
performing proprietary functions has arisen. The juridical character of ATO is an agency of the government
without performing a purely governmental or sovereign function but is instead involved in the management and
maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign
capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State immunity from suit. The obligation of ATO to Spouses Ramos
might be enforced against CAAP.

Article II: Declaration of Principles and State Policies

Legal Value of Article II


TONDO MEDICAL V. CA
527 SCRA 746 (2007)

Doctrine: While as a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not
require future legislation for their enforcement, some provisions have already been categorically declared by the
Supreme Court as non selfexecuting.

Facts: The Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) was launched by DOH in 1999, which provided five areas of
general reform. One in particular was the provision of fiscal autonomy to government hospitals that implements
the collection of socialized user fees and the corporate restructuring of government hospitals. The petitioners
alleged that the implementation of the aforementioned reform had resulted in making free medicine and free
medical services inaccessible to economically disadvantage Filipinos. Thus, they alleged that the HSRA is void
for violating the following constitutional provisions: Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II among others.

ISSUE: W/O the HSRA is void for violating various provisions of the Constitution 2.

RULING: No. As a general rule, the provisions of the constitution are considered self-executing, and do not
require future legislation for their enforcement. However, some provisions have already been categorically
declared in various cases by this Court as non selfexecuting. These provisions, which merely lay down a general
principle, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as non selfexecuting and, therefore, cannot give
rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.

Bases Conversion and Development Authority vs. Commission on Audit


580 SCRA 295

FACTS: In 1992, Congress approved Republic Act (RA) No. 7227 creating the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority (BCDA). Pursuat to said law, the Board adopted a compensation and benefit scheme for
its officials and employees which included a P10,000 year-end benefit granted to each contractual employee,
regular permanent employee, and Board member. The COA disallowed said grant stating that the grant of year-
end benefit to Board members was contrary to a DBM circular. The BCDA claims otherwise and ratiocinated the
granting of year-end benefit is consistent with Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the Constitution.

RULING: The Court is not impressed. Article II of the Constitution is entitled Declaration of Principles and State
Policies. By its very title, Article II is a statement of general ideological principles and policies. It is not a source
of enforceable rights. In Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals,24 the Court held
that Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In that case, the Court held
that “Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the
Constitution—specifically, Sections 5 x x x and 18—the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be
non-self-executing.”

Fundamental Principles and State Policies

TAÑADA VS. ANGARA


G.R. NO. 118295
MAY 1997
Doctrine: The provisions of Art. II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through
the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable rights, but guidelines for legislation. They are used by the
judiciary as aids or guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review.

FACTS: Senate Resolution No. 97, which ratified the World Trade Organization Agreement, was challenged, on
the ground that it violates Article II, Section 19 (which mandates the development of a self-reliant and independent
national economy) and Article XII, Sections 10 and 12 of the 1987 Constitution (embodying the “Filipino First”
policy). The World Trade Organization (WTO) requires the Philippines to place nationals and products of
member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products.

ISSUE: Does the WTO agreement violate Art. II Sec. 19 of the Constitution?

RULING: No the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement does not violate Sec. 19, Art. II, nor Secs. 10
and 12, Art. XII, because the said sections should be read and understood in relation to Secs. 1 and 13, Art. XII,
which require the pursuit of a trade policy that “serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements
of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity”. The provisions of Art. II are not intended to be self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable rights,
but guidelines for legislation. The reasons for denying cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad
constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and lack of judicial authority to
wade into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy-making.

PAGE 4

Legaspi vs. CSC


G.R. No. L-72119
May 29, 1987

MAIN POINT: Section 28 of Article II is not self-executory.


FACTS: Valentin Legaspi invokes his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern in a special civil
action for mandamus against the CSC pertaining to the information of civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed
as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. The standing of the petitioner was challenged by the Solicitor General
of being devoid of legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of government employees for failure of petitioner
to provide actual interest to secure the information sought.

ISSUE: Whether Section 28 of Article II is self-executing.

RULING: No. The policy of full public disclosure is enunciated in Section 28 complements the right of access to
information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the
people to demand information. The provision, however, is not self-executory.

Oposa vs. Factoran,


G.R. No. 101083
July 30, 1993

Main point: The right to a healthful environment asserted in Section 16 was deemed by the Court to be an enforceable right
without need for further legislation.

Facts: The Petitioners of this case filed the action in behalf of their children questioning the Timber License Agreements
entered into by the government and private lumber corporations. They allege that continuous issuance of such licenses
would cause environmental damage so grave that their children and the children of their children are unable to enjoy the
wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
The Respondent-judge of this case dismissed this case on grounds of lack of cause of action of the Petitioners and that it
would impair obligations and contracts contrary to the Constitution.

Issue: Whether the right to a healthful environment is an enforceable right.

Ruling: Yes, the right to a healthful environment asserted in Section 16 was deemed by the Court to be an enforceable right
without need for further legislation. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration
of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the
civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. The right to a balanced and healthful
ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. A denial or violation of that right by
the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.

Imbong vs. Ochoa


G.R. No. 204819, G.R. No. 204819,
April 8, 2014 (right to life as a natural law)
MAIN POINT: The right to life of the unborn is founded on natural law and is self-executing further provides the
unmistakable basis and intent to accord it the status of a constitutional right.

FACTS: R.A. 10354, Otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act Of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by the congress on Dec. 21, 2012. Challenges from various sectors of the society, including the church as a
whole, started to raise their contention on the constitutionality of the said Law. The 14 petitioners and 2 petitioner-in-
intervention assails the constitutionality of the RH law on grounds that it violates the right to life, right to health, right to
protection against hazardous products, and right to religious freedom and right to free speech.

ISSUE: Whether the protection of the life of the unborn under Artice II, Section 12 is self-executory.

RULING: Yes, the protection of the life of the unborn under Artice II, Section 12 is a self-executing provision because: (1)
It prevents Congress from legalizing abortion; from passing laws which authorize the use of abortifacients; and from passing
laws which will determine when life begins other than from the moment of conception/fertilization; (2) It prevents the
Supreme Court from making a Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ruling in our jurisdiction; and (3) It obligates the Executive
to ban contraceptives which act as abortifacients or those which harm or destroy the unborn from conception/fertilization.
Article II, Section 12 is, thus, a direct, immediate and effective limitation on the three great branches of government and a
positive command on the State to protect the life of the unborn.

Espina vs. Zamora


G.R. No. 143855
September 21, 1010

MAIN POINT: Sections 9, 19 and 20 of Article II are not self-executing.

FACTS: RA 8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000, which expressly repealed RA 1180 which
absolutely prohibits foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business. The former now allows them to do under
four categories enumerated in the Act. The petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 8762 on grounds that it violates
section9, 19 and 20 of article II of the 1987 constitution which enjoins the state to place the national economy under the
control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization, and full employment, and
protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade policies.

ISSUE: Whether Sections 9, 19 and 20 of Article II are self-executory.

RULING: No, Sections 9, 19 and 20 of Article II are not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot
give rise to a cause of action in the courts.\

Section 1. Philippines as a Democratic and Republican State

Functions of Government

Bacani v. NACOCO
100 PHIL 468 (1956)
MAIN POINT: Constituent functions of the government. Constituent functions are those which constitute the very bonds
of society and are compulsory in nature. On the other hand, ministrant functions are those that are undertaken only by way
of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional.

FACTS: Leopoldo Bacani and Mateo Matoto were court stenographers assigned in a court in Manila. During the pendency
of a particular case in said court, counsel for one of the parties, National Coconut Corporation or NACOCO, requested said
stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Bacani et al complied
with the request and sent 714 pages and thereafter submitted to said counsel their bills for the payment of their fees. The
National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said transcripts at the rate of P1
per page.
However, in January 1953, the Auditor General required Bacani et al to reimburse said amounts on the strength of a circular
of the Department of Justice. It was expressed that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment
of the fees in question. Bacani et al counter that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. NACOCO set up as a defense that the NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of
section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the stenographers’ fees under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a government entity.

RULING: No. The term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative
Code refers to that government entity through which the functions of the government are exercised as an attribute of
sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political authority is made effective whether they be
provincial, municipal or other form of local government. These are what we call municipal corporations. They do not include
government entitles which are given a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government and which are
governed by the Corporation Law, such as the National Coconut Corporation. Their powers, duties and liabilities have to
be determined in the light of that law and of their corporate charters. They do not therefore come within the exemption
clause prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court
The Supreme Court also noted the constituent functions of the government. Constituent functions are those which
constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature.
On the other hand, ministrant functions are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of
society, and are merely optional. The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public
charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry.

ACCFA v. CUGCO
30 SCRA 649 (1969)

Main point: The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the
functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and
initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals," continue to lose their well-defined
boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet
the increasing social challenges of the times.

Facts: The ACCFA or the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration as a government agency created
under Republic Act No. 821, as amended. Its administrative machinery was reorganized and its name changed to
Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) under the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844). On the other hand, the
ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers' Association (AWA), hereinafter referred to as the
Unions, are labor organizations composed of the supervisors and the rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the ACCFA
(now ACA).
The two parties entered into a collective bargaining agreement that was allegedly not implemented by
ACCFA. Thus, the Union conducted strikes and filed a complaint against ACCFA with the Court of Industrial Relations.
The CIR ruled in favor of the Union. ACA challenges the Jurisdiction of Court of Industrial Relations to entertain the
petition of Unions for certification election on ground that ACA is engaged in governmental functions. The Unions join
issue on single point contending ACA forms proprietary functions.

Issue: 1. Whether or not the ACCFA is a government entity


2. Whether the constituent-ministrant criterion in governmental functions is still valid.

Ruling: 1. Yes. It is a government entity. The implementation of the land reform program of the government according to
Republic Act No. 3844 is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function; and for that purpose Executive Order
No. 75 has placed the ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration together with the other member agencies, the
personnel complement of all of which are placed in one single pool and made available for assignment from one agency to
another, subject only to Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, position classification and wage structures.
2. The conceptual definitions of constituent and ministrant function are still acceptable. However, the growing complexities
of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic,
not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called
upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private
individual or group of individuals," continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that
the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times.

PVTA v. CIR
65 SCRA 416 (1975)

MAIN POINT: Government to provide for general welfare. Government entrusted to be responsible for coping with social
and economic problems with commensurate power of control over economic affairs: live up to commitment of promoting
general welfare through state action.
FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services in
excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them overtime compensation in accordance
with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Their prayer was for the differential between the amount actually paid to them and the
amount allegedly due them. Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration would predicate its plea for the reversal
of the order complained of on the basic proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising
governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.

ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.
RULING: YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government has become
obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing
for a distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the present time:
“The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government
obsolete.”

The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant consideration.
There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such, the petitioner can rightfully
invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case. The objection of private respondents with its overtones of the
distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does
not necessarily follow, that just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary functions, that the
labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner
does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.

A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the differentiation that exists. If as
a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not
have required private respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is
paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such an objection
based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.

PHHC v Court of Industrial Relations


150 SCRA 296

Main point: The PHHC formerly known as the NHC was established as an "instrumentality of government to
accomplish governmental policies and objectives and extend essential services to the people," performs governmental
and not proprietary functions.

Facts: The PHHC entered into a program in which the participants were assigned to work on canals and roads. This
programs were based on the agreement by the Philippine Government with the World Food Program. The pay for the
participants was .50 per day which was below minimum wage.
The program was then suspended prompting an action to be filed by the participants with the CIR. The PHHC contends that
the CIR does not have jurisdiction over them as they are a government owned and/or controlled corporation performing
governmental functions.

Issue: Whether or not the PHHC is a GOCC performing governmental function.

Ruling: Yes, the PHHC is a GOCC performing governmental functions. Housing has been found to be a governmental
function since housing is considered an essential service. We note that since 1941 when the National Housing Commission
(predecessor of PHHC, which is now known as the National Housing Authority [NHA]) was created, the Philippine
government has pursued a mass housing and resettlement program to meet the needs of Filipinos for decent housing. The
agency tasked with implementing such governmental program was the PHHC. These can be gleaned from the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 648, the charter of said agency.

Spouses Fontanilla v. Hon. Maliaman


GR Nos. 55963
February 27, 1991

Main point: Since it (NIA) is a corporate body performing non- governmental functions, it now becomes liable for
the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee.

Facts: A truck owned by the National Irrigation Administration bumped a bicycle ridden by the son of the Spouses
Fontanilla causing his death. The said truck was driven by Hugo Garcia, a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation
Administration who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as
such regular driver of respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of
vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration authorities.
The Spouses now claim for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fee pursuant to Article 2176 and 2180 of the New
Civil Code of the Philippines. The NIA avers that it cannot be held liable for the damages because it is an agency of the
State performing governmental functions and driver Hugo Garcia was a regular driver of the vehicle, not a special agent
who was performing a job or act foreign to his usual duties. Hence, the liability for the tortious act should. not be borne by
respondent government agency but by driver Garcia who should answer for the consequences of his act.

Issue: Whether or not the NIA is a government corporation performing governmental function thus making it not liable for
damages

Ruling: No, it is considered a trade and not a government activity. The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of
the government exercising proprietary functions. Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality
and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now
becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this particular
case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages.

VFP v. Reyes
483 SCRA 526 (2006)

MAIN POINT: Public Office – the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is vested with some portion of sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. Office (distinguished from employment
or contract) – the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign
functions of the government, for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereign function of the country, either
legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit.

FACTS: Petitioner Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP) is a corporate body organized under Republic Act No.
2640. Sometime in August 2002, petitioner received a letter from Undersecretary of the Department of National Defense
(DND) to conduct Management Audit of VFP pursuant to RA 2640, where it stated that VFP is under the supervision and
control of the Secretary of National Defense. Petitioner complained about the broadness of audit and requested suspension
until issues are threshed out, which was subsequently denied by DND. As a result, petitioner sought relief under Rule 65
assailing that it is a private non-government corporation.

ISSUE: Whether or not veterans federation created by law is a public office, considering that it does not possess a portion
of the sovereign functions of the government and considering further that, it has no budgetary appropriation from DBM and
that its funds come from membership dues.
RULING: Yes, petitioner is a public corporation. In Laurel v. Desierto, public office is defined as the right, authority and
duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions
of the government, to be exercised for the benefit of the public.

In the instant case, the functions of VFP – the protection of the interests of war veterans which promotes social justice and
reward patriotism – certainly fall within the category of sovereign functions. The fact that VFP has no budgetary
appropriation is only a product of erroneous application of the law by public officers in the DBM which will not bar
subsequent correct application. Hence, placing it under the control and supervision of DND is proper.

Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan
499 SCRA 375 (2006)

MAIN POINT: AFP-RSBS – a GOCC and its funds are in the nature of public funds. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
offenses committed by presidents, directors, trustees or managers of GOCCs. What charges to file, and who are to be charged
are matters addressed to the discretion of the Ombudsman.

FACTS: Jose S. Ramiscal Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and Jesus Garcia were charged with
Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The Information alleged that Ramiscal,
et. al. misappropriated and converted the amount of P250,318,200.00 for their personal use from the funds of AFP-RSBS.
Ramiscal filed with the Sandiganbayan an “Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of Information and to Defer Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest.” He argued, that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case because the AFP-RSBS is a private
entity. The said Urgent Motion was later adopted by Alzaga and Satuito. The Urgent Motion was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. Ramiscal, et. al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution issued, the Sandiganbayan sustained
Ramiscal, et. al.’s contention that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. Hence, it reconsidered its earlier Resolution and ordered
the dismissal of their criminal case. Upon denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, the prosecution filed the present special
civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the AFP-RSBS is not a government entity.
Held: No, the AFP-RSBS is a government entity. It was created by Presidential Decree 361. Its purpose and functions are
akin to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the system that manages the retirement and pension funds of those in
the military service. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police are expressly
excluded from the coverage of The GSIS Act of 1997. Therefore, soldiers and military personnel, who are incidentally
employees of the Government, rely on the administration of the AFP-RSBS for their retirement, pension and separation
benefits. Its enabling law further mandates that the System shall be administered by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines through an agency, group, committee or board, which may be created and organized by him and subject
to such rules and regulations governing the same as he may, subject to the approval of the Secretary of National Defense,
promulgate from time to time. Moreover, the investment of funds of the System shall be decided by the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the approval of the Secretary of National Defense. The funds of the AFP-RSBS,
except for the initial seed money, come entirely from contributions and that no part thereof come from appropriations. While
it may be true that there have been no appropriations for the contribution of funds to the AFP-RSBS, the Government is not
precluded from later on adding to the funds in order to provide additional benefits to them. The above considerations indicate
that the character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest. As such, we hold that the same is a
government entity and its funds are in the nature of public funds.

Alzaga v. Sandiganbayan
505 SCRA 848 (2006)

MAIN POINT: The character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest thus the same is a
government entity and its funds are in the nature of public funds.

FACTS: October 7, 1999, there was a case filed against the petitioners regarding alleged irregularities which attended the
purchase of four lots in Tanauan, Batangas by the AFP-RSBS. Being vice presidents and assistant vice president of the
AFP-RSBS, the petitioners claim that they are not under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan since AFP-RSB is a private
entity.

ISSUE: WON AFP-RSBS is a government entity.

RULING: Yes. Considering that the character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest and its
funds are in the nature of public fund, it is indeed a government entity.

Javier v. Sandiganbayan
599 SCRA 324 (2009)
MAIN POINT: Notwithstanding that petitioner came form the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB, the law
invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so that the purpose of the government is
achieved. Petitioner is a public officer.
FACTS: Javier was the private sector representative in the National Book Development Board (NBDB), which was created
by R.A. 8047, otherwise known as the “Book Publishing Industry Development Act.” R.A. No. 8047 provided for the
creation of the NBDB, which was placed under the administration and supervision of the Office of the President. The NBDB
is composed of eleven (11) members who are appointed by the President, five (5) of whom come from the government,
while the remaining six (6) are chosen from the nominees of organizations of private book publishers, printers, writers, book
industry related activities, students and the private education sector.
Petitioner was appointed to the Governing Board for a term of one year. During that time, she was also the President of the
Book Suppliers Association of the Philippines (BSAP). She was on a holdover capacity in the following year. On September
14, 1998, she was again appointed to the same position and for the same period of one year. Part of her functions as a
member of the Governing Board is to attend book fairs to establish linkages with international book publishing bodies. On
September 29, 1997, she was issued by the Office of the President a travel authority to attend the Madrid International Book
Fair in Spain on October 8-12, 1997. Based on her itinerary of travel, she was paid P139,199.00 as her travelling expenses.
Unfortunately, petitioner was not able to attend the scheduled international book fair.

ISSUE: Whether or not Javier is a public officer.


RULING: Yes. A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is
a public officer.

Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB, the law invested her with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so that the purpose of the government is achieved. In this case,
the government aimed to enhance the book publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national development.
Hence, the fact that she was appointed from the public sector and not from the other branches or agencies of the government
does not take her position outside the meaning of a public office.

The Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the Anti Graft Law, which provides that a “public
officer” includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified
or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government. Thus, pursuant to the
Anti Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected or appointed to a public office. Petitioner was appointed by
the President to the Governing Board of the NDBD.

Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code defines a “public officer” as any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular
election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government
of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent,
or subordinate official, of any rank or classes.

MIAA v. CA
495 SCRA 591 (2006)

MAIN POINT: MIAA is an instrumentality of the government vested with corporate powers and government functions.
FACTS: MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable years
1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624 million. The City of Parañaque, through its City
Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of
Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax
delinquency.

MIAA filed a petition sought to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and
auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings. The City of Parañaque contended that Section 193 of the Local
Government Code expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of “government-owned and-controlled corporations”
upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Thus, MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are
exempt from real estate tax.

MIAA argued that Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The government cannot tax itself. The reason
for tax exemption of public property is that its taxation would not inure to any public advantage, since in such a case the tax
debtor is also the tax creditor.

ISSUE: Whether MIAA is an instrumentality of the government and not a government owned and controlled corporation
and as such exempted from tax.

RULING: MIAA is not a government owned and controlled corporation, for to become one MIAA should either be a stock
or non stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation for its capital is not divided into shares. It is not a non stock
corporation since it has no members.
MIAA is an instrumentality of the government vested with corporate powers and government functions. Under the civil
code, property may either be under public dominion or private ownership. Those under public dominion are owned by the
State and are utilized for public use, public service and for the development of national wealth. When properties under
public dominion cease to be for public use and service, they form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

Philippine Society v. COA


534 SCRA 112 (2007)
MAIN POINT:
FACTS: The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred years ago by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted
on January 19, 1905, by the Philippine Commission. The petitioner, at the time it was created, was composed of animal
aficionados and animal propagandists. The objects of the petitioner, as stated in Section 2 of its charter, shall be to enforce
laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or the protection of animals in the Philippine Islands, and generally, to do
and perform all things which may tend in any way to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare. The
petitioner was initially imbued under its charter with the power to apprehend violators of animal welfare laws. In addition,
the petitioner was to share one-half (1/2) of the fines imposed and collected through its efforts for violations of the laws
related thereto. Subsequently, however, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a portion of the fines
collected for violation of animal-related laws were recalled by virtue of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 148. An audit team
from COA wanted to conduct an audit survey but petitioner refused saying that it is a private corporation and not a public
one.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a private corporation.

RULING: Yes. A reading of petitioner’s charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any agency of the
State, unlike government-owned and -controlled corporations. No government representative sits on the board of trustees
of the petitioner. Like all private corporations, the successors of its members are determined voluntarily and solely by the
petitioner in accordance with its by-laws, and may exercise those powers generally accorded to private corporations, such
as the powers to hold property, to sue and be sued, to use a common seal, and so forth. It may adopt by-laws for its internal
operations: the petitioner shall be managed or operated by its officers “in accordance with its by - laws in force.”
The employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by the Social Security System at the latter’s initiative, and not
through the Government Service Insurance System, which should be the case if the employees are considered government
employees. This is another indication of petitioner’s nature as a private entity.

Serana v. Sandiganbayan
542 SCRA 224 (2008)

MAIN POINT: While the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part
specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by
express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.

FACTS: Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the UP-Cebu. She was appointed by then President
Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and
ending on December 31, 2000. On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC
the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the
Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed
renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President. The renovation of Vinzons
Hall Annex failed to materialize.
The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA
sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently filed a complaint
for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman found probable cause
to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa and filed the case to the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner moved
to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or
over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied with finality.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a public officer with Salary Grade 27?

RULING: Yes. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even if she does not have a salary grade 27, as
she is placed there by express provision of law. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan
with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed
out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of
law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606
Compensation is not an essential element of public office. It is merely incidental to the public office. Delegation of sovereign
functions is essential in public office. An investment on an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer. The administration of UP is a
sovereign function of the State.

Shipside Inc v. CA
GR 143377
Feb 20, 2001
MAIN POINT: While public benefit and public welfare, particularly, the promotion of the economic and social
development of Central Luzon, may be attributable to the operation of the BCDA, yet it is certain that the functions
performed by the BCDA are basically proprietary in nature—the promotion of economic and social development of Central
Luzon, in particular, and the country’s goal for enhancement, in general, do not make the BCDA equivalent to the
Government; The BCDA is not a mere agency of the Government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions.

FACTS: OCTs were issued in favor of Rafael Galvez over four parcels of land. Lots 1 and 4 were conveyed by Galvez to
Mamaril, who later sold the same Order declaring his OCT null and void. Lepanto sold Lots 1 and 4 to herein petitioner.

Galvez filed a Motion for Reconsideration against the Order declaring his OCT null and void. The motion was denied. On
appeal, the CA ruled in favor of the Republic and issued a writ of execution. The order was not executed. After twenty-
five long years, the Sol Gen filed a complaint for revival of judgment and cancellation of titles. Petitioner contends, among
others, that plaintiff is not the real party in interest but the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) since the real
property covered by the Torrens titles sought to be cancelled, allegedly part of Camp Wallace (Wallace Air Station), were
under the ownership and administration of the BCDA under Republic Act No. 7227. Thus the BCDA, a government entity,
owns the real property, is the real party in interest.

ISSUE: Whether the BCDA is performing governmental functions.


RULING: No. It may not be amiss to state at this point that the functions of government have been classified into
governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. While public benefit and public welfare, particularly, the
promotion of the economic and social development of Central Luzon, may be attributable to the operation of the BCDA,
yet it is certain that the functions performed by the BCDA are basically proprietary in nature. The promotion of economic
and social development of Central Luzon, in particular, and the country’s goal for enhancement, in general, do not make
the BCDA equivalent to the Government. Other corporations have been created by government to act as its agents for the
realization of its programs, the SSS, GSIS, NAWASA and the NIA, to count a few, and yet, the Court has ruled that these
entities, although performing functions aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, are not government-function
corporations invested with governmental attributes. It may thus be said that the BCDA is not a mere agency of the
Government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions.

PVTA v. CIR
GR L-32052
July 25, 1975

MAIN POINT: Government to provide for general welfare. Government entrusted to be responsible for coping with social
and economic problems with commensurate power of control over economic affairs: live up to commitment of promoting
general welfare through state action.
FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services in
excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them overtime compensation in accordance
with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Their prayer was for the differential between the amount actually paid to them and the
amount allegedly due them. Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration would predicate its plea for the reversal
of the order complained of on the basic proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising
governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.

ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.

RULING: YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government has become
obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing
for a distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the present time:
“The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government
obsolete.”

The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant consideration.
There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such, the petitioner can rightfully
invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case. The objection of private respondents with its overtones of the
distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does
not necessarily follow, that just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary functions, that the
labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner
does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.

A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the differentiation that exists. If as
a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not
have required private respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is
paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such an objection
based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.

Rosas v. Montor
GR 204105
October 14, 2015
MAIN POINT:
FACTS: Two Iranian Nationals arrived in the Philippines and stayed in Cebu before proceeding to Japan. They were denied
entry in Japan and was sent back to the Philippines due to fraudulent passports and lack of visa. Rosas, the Senior
Immigration Officer, issued an exclusion order against the two. Montor, an employee, filed a complaint in the OMB stating
that the petitioner anomalously handled the case by not charging deportation, considering that the aliens were potential
threats to our national interest.

ISSUE: WON petitioner's act of releasing and excluding the two Iranian nationals without initiating any case for violation
of immigration laws is valid.

RULING: No. Petitioner had the duty under the law to oversee the filing of criminal actions and deportation proceedings
against the 2 and not merely excluding them. Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its
territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. In the Philippines, aliens may
be expelled or deported from the Philippines on grounds and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the PIA of
1940, as amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto.

People v. Perfecto
43 Phil 887
MAIN POINT:
FACTS: On September 7, 1920, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto published an article in the newspaper La Nacion regarding the
disappearance of certain documents in the Office of Fernando M. Guerrero, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate. The
article of Mr. Perfecto suggested that the difficulty in finding the perpetrators was due to an official concealment by the
Senate since the missing documents constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil
companies. This resulted to a case being filed against Mr. Perfecto for violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code. He was
found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Mr. Perfecto filed an appeal
in the Supreme Court to dismiss the case on the ground that Article 256 was not in force anymore.

ISSUE: Whether Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated by the change of Spanish to American Sovereignty
over the Philippines?

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court acquitted him, holding that the particular article, of the said Code had been
automatically abrogated, being political in nature, upon the advent of American sovereignty. Furthermore, Article 256 of
the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of government.
The gulf which separates this article from this spirit which inspires all penal legislation of American origin, is as wide as
that which separates a monarchy from a democratic republic like that of the Unite States. Punishment for contempt of non-
judicial officers has no place in a government based upon American principles. The American system of government is
calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the
individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic
punishment for contemptuous remarks.

Vilas v. City of Manila


229 US 345
MAIN POINT: While there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of inhabitants of ceded territory, and an
abrogation of laws in conflict with the political character of the substituted sovereign, the great body of municipal law
regulating private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler. The court held that
only the governmental functions that are not compatible with the present sovereignty are suspended.

FACTS: Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183, petitioner Vilas is the creditor of
the City. After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action to recover the sum of money owed to him by the city. The City of
Manila that incurred the debts has changed its sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to the US \by the Treaty of
Paris and its contention now is founded on the theory that by virtue of the Act No. 183 its liability has been extinguished.

ISSUE: Whether or not the change of the sovereignty extinguishes the previous liability of the City of Manila to its creditor?

RULING: No. The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the municipal corporation
organized under the former sovereign. The new City of Manila is in a legal sense the successor of the old city. Thus the new
city is entitled to all property and property rights of the predecessor corporation including its liabilities. The court held that
only the governmental functions that are not compatible with the present sovereignty are suspended. Because the new City
of Manila retains its character as the predecessor of the old city it is still liable to the creditors of the old City of Manila.

Laurel v. Misa
77 Phil 856
MAIN POINT:

FACTS: Petitioner Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus, asserting that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy
giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and
penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in
the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that
there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUE: Whether or not enemy occupation has the effect of suspending the allegiance of a Filipino citizen during the period
of said occupation.

RULING: NO. A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which
consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign. As decided by the court in cases, the
absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or
sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de
jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. It remains vested in the legitimate government. What may be suspended is
the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes
temporarily to the occupant. The political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government
and citizens, are suspended in abeyance during military occupation.

De Jure and De Facto Government

Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh


75 PHIL 113 (1945)

Main point: Being a de facto government, judicial acts done under its control, when they are not political in nature,
to the extent that they effect during the continuance and control of said government remain good.

Facts: Co Kim Cham had a pending case that was filed during the period of Japanese occupation. He filed a petition of
Mandamus, in which he is requesting for the judge of the lower court to continue the proceedings in the Court of First
Instance in Manila. But Judge Arsenio P. Dizon refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings of the said case
since the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by General Douglas MacArthur invalidating and nullifying the judicial
proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines, in the absence of an enabling law, the lower courts have no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts while the government is under the
occupation of the Japanese.

Issue: 1. Whether or not the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines under the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid.
2. Whether or not the proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur in which he declared “that all laws, regulations
and processes of any of the government in the Philippines are null and void” has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts
and proceedings of the said courts.

Ruling: 1. Yes, the judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The government, during the Japanese
occupation being de facto government, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of justice of
those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid. Those not only judicial but also legislative
acts of de facto government, which are not of a political complexion, are remain valid after reoccupation of a territory.
2. No, the proclamation does not invalidate the judgment and judicial proceedings. And applying the principles for the
exercise of military authority in an occupied territory, President McKinley, in his executive order to the Secretary of War
of May 19,1898, said in part: "Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately
operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private
rights of person and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they
are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in
practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals,
substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the
present occasion. The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of justice may, if they accept the
authority of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land as between man and man under the
supervision of the American Commander in Chief."

In re Letter of Associate Justice Puno


210 SCRA 588

Main point: The government under President Cory Aquino was a de jure government because it was established by
authority of the legitimate sovereign, the people. It was a revolutionary government established in defiance of the 1973
Constitution.
Facts: Associate Justice Puno seeks clarification and correction of his seniority ranking with the Court of Appeals. Based
on the records, he was first appointed as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on 1980 and took oath for the position
on 1982. On 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court.
On 1986, due to the EDSA revolution, the entire government including the Judiciary was reorganized. A screening
committee was created by virtue of Executive Order 33.6
The Screening Committee recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the new Court of Appeals and
assigned him the rank of number eleven (11) in the roster of appellate court justices. When the appointments were signed
by President Aquino on 28 July 1986, petitioner’s seniority ranking changed, however, from number eleven (11) to number
twenty six (26).
Justice Puno then alleged that the change in ranking was a mere “inadvertence” by the President, otherwise, it would run
contrary to Executive Order 33. The Court granted the request of Justice Puno but the other affected Justices filed for a
motion of reconsideration. They alleged that petitioner could not claim reappointment because the courts where he had
previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.

Issue: Whether the government under Cory Aquino and the Freedom Constitution a de jure government.

Ruling: Yes, because it was established by authority of the legitimate sovereign, the people. It was a revolutionary
government established in defiance of the 1973 Constitution. President Aquino as head of then revolutionary government,
could disregard or set aside such precedence or seniority in ranking when she made her appointments to the reorganized
Court of Appeals in 1986.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 104768
July 21, 2003

Main point: Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant
and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.


Facts: The Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 1. The
PCGG was primarily tasked to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, relatives and
associates. Major General Josephus Q. Ramas was among the associates investigated by the AFP Board.8
Following an investigation and findings against Major General Ramas, the PCGG filed a case against him and confiscated
his property that were allegedly part of the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos.
The Sandiganbayan declared illegality of the search and seizure of the confiscated items therefore inadmissible in evidence.
This is important to the PCGG as the said items comprise most of the evidence of the petitioners against the private
respondents.
The Petitioner emphasizes that the raid which led to the seizure of the confiscated items were done 5 days after the success
of the EDSA revolution. It is of the contention of the Petitioner that on such time the 1973 Constitution was withheld
operation. Moreover, the petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning
2 February 1987.

Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was operative under Cory Aquino’s revolutionary government.

Ruling: No. We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect
during the interregnum. During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because
there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the
sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration,
almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.

Sovereignty

People v. Gozo
53 SCRA 476 (1973)

Main point: The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine
territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein.


Facts: The accused bought a house and lot located inside the United States Naval Reservation within the territorial
jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the house and built another one in its place, without a building permit from
the City Mayor of Olongapo City, because she was told by an assistant in the City Mayor's office, as well as by her neighbors
in the area, that such building permit was not necessary for the construction of the house.
Later, the City Engineer's Office
with the police force of Olangapo City apprehended the carpenters working on the house. Gozo was then investigated and
charged with the violation of Ordinance 14 of the Municipality which requires a permit from the municipal mayor for the
construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 14 is applicable to the accused on the notion that her construction on the naval base
leased to the American Forces.

Ruling: The Ordinance No. 14 is valid and applicable to the accused. As was so emphatically set forth by Justice Tuason
in Acierto2:
"By the (Military Bases) Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the
United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or
expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory
or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States
Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not
only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of
their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the
second from the express provisions of the treaty."
Tanada v. Angara
272 SCRA 18
Main point: The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain
restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations
and
(2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.
By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which
are considered to be automatically part of our own laws.


Facts: The current petition questions the World Trade Organization agreement for violating mandates of the 1987
Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy controlled by Filipinos. The petitioners also argues
that in agreeing to the WTO agreement intrudes with the powers of both the Congress and the Supreme Court. In sum, the
Petitioners claim that the WTO impairs to the sovereignty of the Philippines.
The said WTO agreement was ratified by then-president Ramos which was focused mainly in creating an administrating
body for international trade and tariff. It requires its signatories to place nationals and products of member-countries on the
same footing as Filipinos and local products.

Issue: Whether or not sovereignty is impaired by the WTO agreement.

Ruling: Yes, however, it does not make the WTO agreement unconstitutional. While sovereignty has traditionally been
deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily
agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution
did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be
automatically part of our own laws.
The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the
picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by
treaty stipulations.

Section 2. Generally Accepted Principles of International Law


Treaties and Agreements

Agustin v. Edu
88 SCRA 195

Main point: The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character (a generally
accepted principle of international law that is to be made part of the law of the land).


Facts: Letter of Instruction No. 299 was issued by then President Marcos which directs motor vehicle owners, among others,
to “have at all times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible
reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors.”
The Petitioner in this case owns a Volkswage Beetle that is already equipped with blinking lights and aft, which could serve
as early warning device in case of emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instruction 299. He alleges that LOI 299 "clearly
violates the provisions and delegation of police power” and that it was "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory,
nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society."

Issue: Whether or not LOI 299 prescribing the use of early warning devices is unconstitutional.

Ruling: It is not unconstitutional. It must be noted that LOI 299 was made pursuant to the ratification of the Philippines
with the Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals. It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found
in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land." The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It
is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda
stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing


GR No. 65366
October 25, 1983

Main point: The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of
international law, it should be a part of the law of the land.


Facts: JBL Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit to hold a peaceful march and rally starting from
Luneta to the gate of the United States Embassy. The City of Manila did not act on the request for a permit prompting the
petitioner to file an action for mandamus. In their response, the respondents stated that they have denied the permit for
security reasons.
The issue brought to the Supreme Court, who initially decided against the petitioners stating that granting the permit would
be in violation of an ordinance of the City of Manila.

Issue: Whether or not the denial of the permit valid and constitutional

Ruling: The denial of the permit was with legal basis and consistent with the Constitution. The Philippines is a signatory
of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961. The second paragraph of the Article 22 reads: "2. The
receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion
or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. " That being the case, if
there were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment
of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy.

Tanada v. Angara
272 SCRA 18 (1997)

Main point: The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain
restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations
and
(2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.
By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which
are considered to be automatically part of our own laws.


Facts: The current petition questions the World Trade Organization agreement for violating mandates of the 1987
Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy controlled by Filipinos. The petitioners also argues
that in agreeing to the WTO agreement intrudes with the powers of both the Congress and the Supreme Court. In sum, the
Petitioners claim that the WTO impairs to the sovereignty of the Philippines.
The said WTO agreement was ratified by then-president Ramos which was focused mainly in creating an administrating
body for international trade and tariff. It requires its signatories to place nationals and products of member-countries on the
same footing as Filipinos and local products.

Issue: Whether or not sovereignty is impaired by the WTO agreement.

Ruling: Yes, however, it does not make the WTO agreement unconstitutional. While sovereignty has traditionally been
deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily
agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution
did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be
automatically part of our own laws.
The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the
picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by
treaty stipulations.

Bayan v. Zamora
GR 138570
October 10, 2000

Main point: As long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to
be taken equally as a treaty. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and
binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of
the Constitution.

Facts: This is a consolidation of cases questioning the Visiting Forces Agreement between the Philippines and the United
States of America. The VFA was created pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty after the RP-US Military Base Agreement
has expired. It was ratified on 1998 by the then-president Estrada.

Petitioners contend that the “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed into the Philippines only by a treaty
that is duly concurred in by the Senate and ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that
purpose and is recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. Since the Government were not able to concur with the
stated requisites, the Petitioners contend that the accepting the terms of the VFA is violative of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the VFA is violative of the Constitution

Ruling: No, it is not violative of the Constitution. It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an
executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long
as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a
treaty. Moreover, for as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself
further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the
Constitution.

With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the exchange of notes between the
Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the principles
of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution,
declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.

Bayan v. Romulo
GR 159618
Feb 1, 2011

MAIN POINT: Executive agreements do not require legislative concurrence for their validity.

FACTS: The US Ambassador Francis Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note 0470 to the DFA proposing the terms
of the Non-surrender Bilateral Agreement between the Philippines and the US. Via Exchange of Notes BFO-028-
03, the Philippines, through Sec. Ople, agreed and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy
Note and put in effect the Non-surrender Agreement with the US government.

The Non-surrender Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as persons of the Philippines and the
US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.

Petitioners argue that the Exchange of Notes BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding an agreement,
that it cannot partake the nature of a treaty without being ratified by the Senate. Hence, unconstitutional. On their
part respondents counter that the agreement being in the nature of an executive agreement does not require Senate
concurrence or its efficacy.

ISSUES: Whether the agreement is valid.

HELD: Yes.

Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement


The terms “exchange of notes” and “executive agreements” have been used interchangeably, exchange of notes
being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action.29 On the other
hand, executive agreements concluded by the President “sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at
other times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’” Be it viewed as the Non-
Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to be bound––is a
recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international written contract among nations.

Senate Concurrence Not Required


International agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive
ratification; or (2) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative
concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties.

Petitioner foists the applicability to the instant case of Adolfo, holding that an executive agreement through an
exchange of notes cannot be used to amend a treaty.

Indeed, an executive agreement that does not require the concurrence of the Senate for its ratification may not be
used to amend a treaty that, under the Constitution, is the product of the ratifying acts of the Executive and the
Senate. The presence of a treaty, purportedly being subject to amendment by an executive agreement, does not
obtain under the premises. Considering the above discussion, the Court need not belabor at length the third main
issue raised, referring to the validity and effectivity of the Agreement without the concurrence by at least two-
thirds of all the members of the Senate. The Court has, in Eastern Sea Trading, as reiterated in Bayan, given
recognition to the obligatory effect of executive agreements without the concurrence of the Senate.

PAGE 5

Equal Standing of International Law and Municipal Law

Lim v. Executive Secretary


GR 151445
April 11, 2002

FACTS: Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the armed forces of
the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-1” on January 2002. The
Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense
Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951.

Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. Partylists Sanlakas and Partido Ng Manggagawa
as residents of Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by the operations filed a petition-in-intervention.

The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is based only on a fear of future violation of
the Terms of Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of fact specifically
interpretation of the VFA whether it is covers "Balikatan 02-1” and no question of constitutionality is
involved. Moreover, there is lack of locus standi since it does not involve tax spending and there is no proof of
direct personal injury.

ISSUE: W/N the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper.

HELD: NO. Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of
a new petition.

Interpretation of Treaty
The VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that “Balikatan 02-1,” a
“mutual anti-terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise,” falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or
allowable activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and
the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities—as opposed to combat itself—such as the one
subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.

The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates that US exercise participants may
not engage in combat "except in self-defense." ." The indirect violation is actually petitioners' worry, that in
reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is actually a war principally conducted by the United States government, and that the
provision on self-defense serves only as camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise. A clear
pronouncement on this matter thereby becomes crucial. In our considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA
allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory. Under the salutary proscription stated
in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.

International Law vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws


Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our obligations arising from international agreements.
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: “Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the
law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the
municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international
law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislation.”

From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the
principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must
be performed by them in good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the provisions
of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."

Ichong v. Hernandez: “provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a


subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State”

Gonzales v. Hechanova: “our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it
conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.”

The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited / from engaging in an offensive
war on Philippine territory.

Shangri-La v. Developers
GR 159938
March 31, 2006

MAINPOINT: Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the
requirement of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the
apparent clash is being decided by a municipal tribunal. Withal, the fact that international law has been made
part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in
the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international
law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments

FACTS: At the core of the controversy are the “Shangri-La” mark and “S” logo. Respondent DGCI claims
ownership of said mark and logo in the Philippines on the strength of its prior use thereof within the country. It
was able to register the said logo with the Bureau of Patents.

On the other hand, the Kuok family owns and operates a chain of hotels with interest in hotels and hotel-related
transactions since 1969. As far back as 1962, it adopted the name “Shangri-La” as part of the corporate names of
all of its companies around the world which the Kuok Family owned.

Petitioners filed with the BPTTT a petition praying for the cancellation of the registration of the “Shangri-La”
mark and “S” logo issued to respondent DGCI on the ground that the same were illegally and fraudulently obtained
and appropriated for the latter’s restaurant business. They also filed in the same office Inter Partes Case No.
3529, praying for the registration of the same mark and logo in their own names.

The CAs Decided against petitioner holding that:


Albeit the Kuok Group used the mark and logo since 1962, the evidence presented shows that the bulk use of the
tradename was abroad and not in the Philippines (until 1987). While the Paris Convention protects internationally
known marks, R.A. No. 166 still requires use in commerce in the Philippines for two months. Accordingly, and
on the premise that international agreements, such as Paris Convention, must yield to a municipal law, the question
on the exclusive right over the mark and logo would still depend on actual use in commerce in the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in refusing to consider that petitioners are entitled to protection under both R.A.
No. 166, the old trademark law, and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property;

HELD: The new Intellectual Property Code (IPC), undoubtedly shows the firm resolve of the Philippines to
observe and follow the Paris Convention by incorporating the relevant portions of the Convention such that
persons who may question a mark (that is, oppose registration, petition for the cancellation thereof, sue for unfair
competition) include persons whose internationally well-known mark, whether or not registered, is identical with
or confusingly similar to or constitutes a translation of a mark that is sought to be registered or is actually
registered.37

However, while the Philippines was already a signatory to the Paris Convention, the IPC only took effect on
January 1, 1988, and in the absence of a retroactivity clause, R.A. No. 166 still applies.38 Under the prevailing
law and jurisprudence at the time, the CA had not erred in its decision.

The apparent conflict between the two (2) was settled by the Supreme Court in this wise—
“Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the
requirement of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as
the apparent clash is being decided by a municipal tribunal. Withal, the fact that international law has
been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over
national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries,
rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments.

Consequently, the petitioners cannot claim protection under the Paris Convention. Nevertheless, with the double
infirmity of lack of two-month prior use, as well as bad faith in the respondent’s registration of the mark, it is
evident that the petitioners cannot be guilty of infringement.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.


Petition granted, assailed decision and resolution set aside. Complaint for infringement dismissed.

Philip Morris, Inc. v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation


GR 158589
June 27, 2006

MAIN POINT: True, the Philippines’ adherence to the Paris Convention effectively obligates the country
to honor and enforce its provisions as regards the protection of industrial property of foreign nationals in
this country. However, any protection accorded has to be made subject to the limitations of Philippine laws.
Hence, despite Article 2 of the Paris Convention which substantially provides for the rights and privileges
of nationals of member-countries and while no domicile requirement in the country where protection is
claimed shall be required, foreign nationals must still observe and comply with the conditions imposed by
Philippine law on its nationals.

FACTS: Petitioner Philip Morris, Inc. a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Virginia, USA, is
the registered owner of the trademark MARK VII for cigarettes. All are evidenced by Trademark Certificate of
Registration. On the other hand, Fortune Tobacco Corporation, a company organized in the Philippines,
manufactures and sells cigarettes using trademark MARK.

Philip Morris, Inc. filed a complaint for trademark infringement and damages against Fortune Tobacco
Corporation. The complaint was dismissed by the RTC Pasig City. On appeal to the CA affirmed the trial court’s
decision. With the motion for reconsideration denied in the CA, the petitioners filed a petition for review with the
Supreme Court.

In support of their contention respecting their right of action, petitioners assert that, as corporate nationals of
member-countries of the Paris Union, they can sue before Philippine courts for infringement of trademarks, or for
unfair competition, without need of obtaining registration or a license to do business in the Philippines, and
without necessity of actually doing business in the Philippines. To petitioners, these grievance right and
mechanism are accorded not only by Section 21-A of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 166, as amended, or the Trademark
Law, but also by Article 2 of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,otherwise known as
the Paris Convention.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners, as Philippine registrants of trademarks, are entitled to enforce trademark
rights in this country

HELD: No. Petition denied.

True, the Philippines’ adherence to the Paris Convention effectively obligates the country to honor and enforce
its provisions as regards the protection of industrial property of foreign nationals in this country. However, any
protection accorded has to be made subject to the limitations of Philippine laws. Hence, despite Article 2 of the
Paris Convention which substantially provides for the rights and privileges of nationals of member-countries and
while no domicile requirement in the country where protection is claimed shall be required, foreign nationals
must still observe and comply with the conditions imposed by Philippine law on its nationals.

Considering that R.A. No. 166, as amended, specifically Sections 2 and 2-A thereof, mandates actual use of the
marks and/or emblems in local commerce and trade before they may be registered and ownership thereof acquired,
the petitioners cannot, therefore, dispense with the element of actual use. Their being nationals of member-
countries of the Paris Union does not alter the legal situation.

Recognition of Foreign Judgments

Mijares v. Ranada
GR 139325
April 12, 2005
MAINPOINT: The Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary
estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it
beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over
Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is Section7(b)(3), involving “other actions not
involving property.” The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees.

FACTS: Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights violations
during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos
amounting to roughly 1.9 Billion U.S. Dollars in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations
of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of
Appeals.

As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the enforcement of
the Final Judgment, paying Php 410.00 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, Section 7(b) where the value
of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging
the non-payment of the correct filing fees. The Regional Trial Court of Makati dismissed the Complaint stating
that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court
ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign
judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was 472 Million Philippine pesos, which Petitioners had not paid.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee?

RULING: Yes, but on a different basis—amount merely corresponds to the same amount required for “other
actions not involving property”.

The Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of the
total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The Petitioner’s Complaint was lodged against
the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However,
the Petitioners erred in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it is so
capable. Section 33 of Batasang Pambansa 129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter
pertains to an assertion of rights over property or a sum of money. But here, the subject matter is the foreign
judgment itself. Section 16 of Batasang Pambansa 129 reveals that the complaint for enforcement of judgment
even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. Thus, the
Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimations but at the same
time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of
Rule 141. What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign
judgments is Section7(b)(3), involving “other actions not involving property.”

Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that it was an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation corresponds to the same amount required for “other actions not involving property.” The
petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of discretion for respondent judge
to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Soft Law
Pharmaceutical v. DOH
GR 173034
October 9, 2007

MAINPOINT: The subsequent WHA Resolutions specifically prohibiting advertisements and promotions
of breastmilk substitutes have not been adopted as domestic law. Such Resolutions do not form part of
customary international law. Instead, they may constitute “soft law” or non-binding norms, principles and
practices that influence state behavior (such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).

FACTS: This case concerns a petition challenging the validity of a Department of Health (DOH) Administrative
Order (RIRR), claiming that it contained provisions, including a ban on the advertising of breastmilk substitutes,
that were not constitutional and went beyond the scope of the law it was supposed to implement (Milk Code).
The Milk Code gave effect to the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code
adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA). The WHA had since adopted several Resolutions to the effect
that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected.

ISSUES: 1) W/N the pertinent int’l agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law of the land and
may be implemented by DOH through the RIRR.
2) W/N the RIRR is in accord with int’l agreements
HELD: Yes. The Court considered whether certain international instruments are part of the law of the Philippines.
The Court noted that the CRC does not contain specific provisions regarding the use or marketing of breastmilk
substitutes. Instead, the relevant provisions are contained in the ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions. The
ICMBS had been transformed into domestic law through local legislation, the Milk Code, and consequently it is
the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in the Philippines, and not the ICMBS per se. However, the
Milk Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising of breastmilk substitutes,
but instead created the Inter-Agency Committee to regulate such advertising. By contrast, the subsequent WHA
Resolutions specifically prohibiting advertisements and promotions of breastmilk substitutes have not been
adopted as domestic law. Moreover, such Resolutions do not form part of customary international law. Instead,
they may constitute “soft law” or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior (such
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).

On the issue of whether the the RIRR is in accordance with the Milk Code, the Court found that sections 4(f) and
11 (prohibition on the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes) and 46 (providing for administrative
sanctions that are not found in the Milk Code) went beyond the DOH’s authority and contravened the Milk Code,
and were therefore null and avoid. The Court found that the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are consistent with
the Milk Code. Finally, the Court dismissed the petitioner’s argument that the RIRR is unnecessary and
oppressive, and offensive to the due process clause of the Constitution insofar as it amounts to a restraint of trade,
because trade must be subjected to some form of regulation for the public good and public interests must trump
business interests.

Article 2, UN Charter
Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with
the following Principles.

The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in
good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.
All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present
Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking
preventive or enforcement action.

The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with
these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter Vll.

Doctrine of Incorporation
Doctrine of Transformation

SOJ v. Lantion
GR 139465

*In the Philippines, statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they conflict with the Constitution.

FACTS: Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the
U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note containing
a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States. On the same day petitioner
designate and authorized a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the
afore stated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting
copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment
on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for
the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government
must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a
treaty.

RULING:The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our
Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the
government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to
the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under
generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy
of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as
applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior
to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty
may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the
land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict
with the constitution

Philip Morris v. CA
GR 91332
July 16, 1993

*While international law is made part of the law of the land, it does not imply primacy of international law over
national law.

FACTS Philip Morris, Inc. and two other petitioners are ascribing whimsical exercise of the faculty conferred
upon magistrates by Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court when respondent Court of Appeals lifted
the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier had issued against Fortune Tobacco Corporation, from manufacturing
and selling “MARK” cigarettes in the local market. Banking on the thesis that petitioners’ respective symbols
“MARK VII”, ‘MARK TEN”, and “MARK”, also for cigarettes, must be protected against unauthorized
appropriation.

All petitioners are not doing business in the Philippines but are suing on an isolated transaction, They Invoked
provisions of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property. As corporate nationals
of member-countries of the Paris Union, they can sue before Philippine courts for infringement of trademarks, or
for unfair competition, without need of obtaining registration or a license to do business in the Philippines, and
without necessity of actually doing business in the Philippines.

Philip Morris and its subsidiaries filed the complaint for infringement and damages against Fortune Tobacco
before the Pasig Regional Trial Court (RTC) for manufacturing and selling cigarettes bearing the trademark
“Mark” which is identical and confusingly similar to Philip Morris trademarks. The said act was dismissed.
Hence, this petition at bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been an invasion of plaintiffs’ right of property to such trademark or trade name.

RULING: No. There is no proof that any of petitioner’s products which they seek to protect from any adverse
effect of the trademark applied for by defendant, is in actual use and available for commercial purposes anywhere
in the Philippines.

A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that actual use in commerce in the Philippines is a pre-
requisite to the acquisition of ownership over a trademark or a trade name.

In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not engaged in business in the
Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage can be suffered by them not to mention the foremost
consideration heretofore discussed on the absence of their “right” to be protected.

Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement of
actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being
decided by a municipal tribunal. Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land
does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under
the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal,
not superior, to national legislative enactments.

Vinuya v. ROMULO
GR 162230
MAINPOINT: Under international law, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within
the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a
claim on the individual’s behalf. When this happens, in the eye of the international tribunal, the State is
the sole claimant. Therefore, the State is the sole judge to decide whether its protection in favor of those
petitioners will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It is a discretionary power
and the exercise of which may be determined by consideration of a political or other nature.

FACTS: Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered
with the SEC for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines
during the WWII. They claim that they were “comfort women” at that time and have greatly suffered because of
that.

In 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG and requested
assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of
the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines. However, the officials declined on that ground that the individual
claims had already been satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the
bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956 between Japan and the Philippines. The petitioners argue that the general
waiver of claims made by the Philippine government in the Treaty of Peace with Japan is void because the comfort
women system constituted a crime against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture. The same was prohibited under
the jus cogens norms from which no derogation is possible. Thus, such waiver was a breach against the
government’s obligation not to afford impunity for crimes against humanity.

In addition, they claim that the Philippine government’s acceptance of the apologies made by Japan as well as
funds for the AWF were contrary to international law.

ISSUES: Was the refusal of the Executive Department to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan valid?

RULING: Yes, it was valid. It has the exclusive prerogative for such determination. So much so, the Philippines
is not under any international obligation to espouse petitioner’s claim. Given the extraordinary length of time that
has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion, the Executive Department had the ample time to assess the foreign
policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the
petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further
steps are appropriate or necessary.

Under international law, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal
system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf.
When this happens, in the eye of the international tribunal, the State is the sole claimant. Therefore, the State is
the sole judge to decide whether its protection in favor of those petitioners will be granted, to what extent it
is granted, and when will it cease. It is a discretionary power and the exercise of which may be determined by
consideration of a political or other nature.

Moreover, in the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligation of the Philippines, the petitioners
failed to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jis cogens prohibitions at the time the
Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes in an erga omnes
obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.

Petition is dismissed

Saguisag v. ES
GR 212426

MAINPONT: The admission and presence of U.S. military and civilian personnel in Philippine territory
are already allowed under the VFA, the treaty supposedly being implemented by EDCA. What EDCA has
effectively done, in fact, is merely provide the mechanism to identify the locations in which U.S. personnel
may perform allowed activities pursuant to the VFA. As the implementing agreement, it regulates and
limits the presence of U.S. personnel in the country.

FACTS: The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) is an exclusive agreement that gives US troops,
planes and ships increased rotational presence in Philippine military bases and allows the US to build facilities to
dtore fuel and equipment there. It was signed against the backdrop of the Philippines maritime dispute with China
over West Philippine Sea.

The US embassy and DFA exchanged diplomatic notes confirming all necessary requirements for the agreement
to take force. The agreement was signed on April 2014. The president (PNOY) ratified the same on June 2014. It
was not submitted to congress on the understanding that to do so was no longer necessary.
Petitions for certiorari were filed before the Supreme Court assailing the constitutionality of the agreement. Herein
petiotioners now contend that it should have been concurred by the senate as it is not an executive agreement.
The Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 105 expressing a strong sense that in order for EDCA to be valid and
binding, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and concurrence.

ISSUE: W/N the EDCA between the Philippines and the US is constitutional.

HELD: Yes. The admission and presence of U.S. military and civilian personnel in Philippine territory are
already allowed under the VFA, the treaty supposedly being implemented by EDCA. What EDCA has
effectively done, in fact, is merely provide the mechanism to identify the locations in which U.S. personnel may
perform allowed activities pursuant to the VFA. As the implementing agreement, it regulates and limits the
presence of U.S. personnel in the country.

Indeed, in the field of external affairs, the President must be given a larger measure of authority and wider
discretion, subject only to the least amount of checks and restrictions under the Constitution. The rationale behind
this power and discretion was recognized by the Court in Vinuya v. Romulo, 619 SCRA 533 (2010), cited earlier.
Section 9 of Executive Order No. 459, or the Guidelines in the Negotiation of International Agreements and its
Ratification, thus, correctly reflected the inherent powers of the President when it stated that the DFA “shall
determine whether an agreement is an executive agreement or a treaty.” Accordingly, in the exercise of its power
of judicial review, the Court does not look into whether an international agreement should be in the form of a
treaty or an executive agreement, save in cases in which the Constitution or a statute requires otherwise. Rather,
in view of the vast constitutional powers and prerogatives granted to the President in the field of foreign affairs,
the task of the Court is to determine whether the international agreement is consistent with the applicable
limitations.

Bayan v. DND Sec. Gazmin


GR 212444
(Consolidated case: SAGUISAG yung sa taas )

Section 3. Civilian Supremacy and AFP Role

IBP v. Zamora
338 SCRA 81 (2000)

MAINPOINT: The deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of
the police force. The real authority in these operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution and
not with the military. What is in here is mutual support and cooperation between the military and the
civilian authorities, not a derogation of civilian supremacy. Wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed.

FACTS: The President ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of
crime prevention and suppression. On January 17, 2000, the IBP filed the instant petition to declare the
deployment of Philippines Marines unconstitutional thus null and void alleging that no emergency situation would
justify the employment of soldiers for law enforcement work and that the same is in derogation of Article II
Section 3 of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the joint visibility patrols violate the Constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy
over the military

HELD: The calling of the Marines, in this case, constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian
enforcement and that it does not contravene Section 3, Article II of the Constitution. The limited participation of
the Marines is evident in the LOI itself which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines’
authority. The deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police
force. The real authority in these operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution and not with the
military. What is in here is mutual support and cooperation between the military and the civilian authorities, not
a derogation of civilian supremacy. Wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed.

Kulayan v. Tan
675 SCRA 482 (2012)

MAINPOINT: The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President.
An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified
by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

FACTS: Three members from the ICRC were kidnapped in the vicinity of Patikul, Sulu. The 3 were seized by 3
armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group. The governor of Sulu issued
Proclamation No. 1 Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. It invoked Sec 465 of
the LGC, which bestows on the provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during a man-
made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the PNP and Civilian Emergency Force to set up
checkpoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrest, and other actions necessary to ensure public
safety.

Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and thus
null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole
authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic
and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law to
create civilian armed forces under his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own
private army

ISSUE: W/N a Governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a president.

HELD: It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President
of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is
granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to
exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became
known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.

While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 339 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority
is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The
net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the
ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President
must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military
operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command
of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his.

Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces
at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared
a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The
calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another
official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section
465 of the Local Government Code.

Alih v. Castro
GR 69401
June 23, 1987

MAINPOINT: The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga at the time in question did not excuse the non-
observance of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. At the time of the “zona”,
the petitioners were merely suspected of the mayor’s slaying and had not been in fact investigated. Every person
is entitled due process. The respondents defied the precept that “civilian authority is at all times supreme over
the military” so clearly proclaimed in the Constitution.

FACTS: The respondents raided the compound occupied by the petitioners in Zamboanga City in search of loose
firearms, ammunition and other explosives. Petitioners pray to recover the articles seized from them and
respondents be enjoined from using the same against them since they did not have a warrant to search the
compound when they seized said articles, thus constituting an illegal search.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts done by the respondents are violative of the Bill of Rights.

HELD: The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga at the time in question did not excuse the non-
observance of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. At the time of the “zona”,
the petitioners were merely suspected of the mayor’s slaying and had not been in fact investigated. Every person
is entitled due process. The respondents defied the precept that “civilian authority is at all times supreme over the
military” so clearly proclaimed in the Constitution. The respondents simply by-passed civil courts which had the
authority to determine whether or not there was probable cause to search the petitioners’ premises. It follows that
as the search of the petitioners’ premises was violative of the Constitution, all the firearms and the ammunition
taken from the raided compound are inadmissible as evidence in any of the proceedings against the petitioners.

Section 4. Duty of Government to the People

People v. Tranquilino Lagman


GR L-45892
MAINPOINT: The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go
against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the
Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an
army to the will of the citizens would be to make thisduty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient
men who volunteer to enlist therein.

FACTS: Appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violationof section 60 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. Itis alleged that these two appellants, being
Filipinos and having reached the ageof twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the
military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, even though they had been required to do so.
The two appellants were duly notified to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military
service but still did not register up to the date of the filing of the information.Appellants argue that they did not
register because de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Lagman also
has a father to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed. The Court of First Instance
sentenced them both to one month and one day of imprisonment, with the costs.

ISSUE: WON the National Defense Law was constitutional by virtue of Section 2, Article II of the Constitution
which states that: SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this
duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.

HELD: YES. Decision of CFI affirmed. The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military
service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith.
The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the
organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should
there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. In US cases, it was stated that the right of the
Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State; and, that a
person may be compelled by force to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance
of being shot down in its defense.What justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether
actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The circumstances of the appellants
do not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because they can obtain
the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act
No. 1).

People v. Primitivo De Sosa


GR L-45893
July 13, 1938

MAINPOINT: The National Defense Law, insofar as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go
against the constitution, but in the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to
defend the State cannot be performed except through an army, and to leave the organization of an army to the
will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there would be no sufficient
men who volunteer to enlist therein.

FACTS: The appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of Sec. 60 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law for being Filipinos having been reached the age
20 years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of
April of the said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so. The Court of First Instance
of Bataan sentenced each of the appellants one month and one day of imprisonment with the cost.

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is unconstitutional.

RULING: The Constitutionality of said law was upheld. The appellants do not deny the facts, but they alleged
in defense that they have not registered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a
mother and a brother to support and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military leanings,
and does not wish to kill or be killed. Under Sec. 2 of Article II of the Philippine Constitution, “The defense of
the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to
render personal military or civil service.” The National Defense Law, insofar as it establishes compulsory military
service, does not go against the constitution, but in the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the
Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army, and to leave the organization of an
army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there would be
no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. It was also held by the court that the right of the Government
to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its
duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen.

Citing the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts, the court said that, without violating he Constitution, a person may
be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious
or political convictions, to take place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot
down in its defense. In US vs. Olson, it was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due process
of the law since in its just sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment. These justify that
compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more
effective, in case of need. The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse
them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists,
they can ask for deferment in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary
allowance to attend to these family responsibilities.

PD No. 1706, The National Service Law, Aug 8, 1980

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1706 August 8, 1980


PROVIDING FOR COMPULSORY NATIONAL SERVICE FOR FILIPINO CITIZENS AND
AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBER ONE, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT" FOR THE PURPOSE

WHEREAS, Section 2, Article II of the Constitution provides that: "The defense of the state is a prime duty of
the government and the people, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render
personal military or civil service";
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article V of the same Constitution provides, among others, among others, that it is the
duty of the citizen to contribute to his country's development and welfare and to cooperate with the duly
constituted authorities in the attainment and preservation of a just and orderly society;

WHEREAS, Commonwealth Act Number One, as amended, makes it obligatory for all citizens to render military
service;

WHEREAS, to serve the urgent needs of a developing country such as the Philippines, at present and in the
foreseeable future, it is equally vital to enhance respect for the law and lawfully constituted authorities and provide
for, promote and develop civic consciousness and participation as it is to insure national defense preparedness;

WHEREAS, the citizens of our country, particularly its youth, as the most valuable resource of our nation, need
to be motivated, trained, developed, organized, mobilized and utilized in regard to their responsibilities as citizens
particularly their commitment to civic welfare, their respect for the law and lawfully constituted authorities and
the fulfillment of their military or civil obligations;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree that:

Section 1. This Decree shall be known as "The National Service Law."

Section 2. National service shall be obligatory for all citizens of the Philippines. As used in this decree, "National
service" shall consist of three main programs namely: civic welfare service, law enforcement service; and military
service.

Section 3. Each citizen shall render national service in any of the three main programs stated in Section 2 of this
decree or a combination thereof: Provided, That such service shall be credited in his favor for the purpose of
fulfilling educational requirements established by law.

Section 4. The terms "military service" and "military training" referred to in Commonwealth Act Number One,
as amended, shall mean "national service" and "training for national service", respectively, as herein defined.

Section 5. The Minister of National Defense, in coordination with the Ministers of Human Settlements, Education
and Culture, and Local Government and Community Development, shall issue rules and regulations to implement
this Decree, subject to the approval of the President.

Section 6. All provisions of Commonwealth Act Number One, as amended, laws, orders, rules and regulations,
or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.

Section 7. This Decree takes effect immediately.


Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of August, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.

Section 5. Maintenance of Peace and Order

Kilosbayan v. Morato
246 SCRA 540 (1995) and MR 250 SCRA 130

FACTS: As a result of the decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona) invalidating the
Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corp. (PGMC) on the ground that it had been made in violation of the charter of the PCSO, the
parties entered into negotiations for a new agreement that would be “consistent with the latter’s [PCSO] charter .
. . and conformable to this Honorable Court’s aforesaid Decision.” As a result, the parties signed an Equipment
Lease Agreement (hereafter called ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to
PCSO. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million.

A suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract
of Lease nullified in the first case. The PCSO and PGMC filed separate comments in which they question the
petitioners’ standing to bring this suit.

The Kilosbayan, Inc. is an organization described in its petition as “composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors,
priests, nuns and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal.” Its trustees
are also suing in their individual and collective capacities as “taxpayers and concerned citizens.” The other
petitioners (Sen. Freddie Webb, Sen. Wigberto Tañada and Rep. Joker P. Arroyo) are members of Congress suing
as such and as “taxpayers and concerned citizens.”

Respondents question the right of petitioners to bring this suit on the ground that, not being parties to the contract
of lease which they seek to nullify, they have no personal and substantial interest likely to be injured by the
enforcement of the contract. Petitioners on the other hand contend that the ruling in the previous case sustaining
their standing to challenge the validity of the first contract for the operation of lottery is now the “law of the case”
and therefore the question of their standing can no longer be reopened.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

HELD: NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a
departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually
involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by
theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this
case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue
actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future
action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law
at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or
transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free
in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a
different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING
is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate
issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

On the other hand, the question as to “real party in interest” is whether he is “the party who would be benefitted
or injured by the judgment, or the ‘party entitled to the avails of the suit.’’’

Petitioners invoke the following Principles and State Policies set forth in Art. II of the Constitution:

The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of
the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. (§5)

The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. (§12)

The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism,
and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. (§13)

These are not, however, self executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the
courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.

Thus, while constitutional policies are invoked, this case involves basically questions of contract law. More
specifically, the question is whether petitioners have a legal right which has been violated.

In actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real parties are those who are parties to the
agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of
the contracting parties. These are parties with “a present substantial interest. But petitioners do not have such
present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit.

Kulayan v. Tan
675 SCRA 482 (2012)
MAINPOINT: The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An
exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the
invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

FACTS: Three members from the ICRC were kidnapped in the vicinity of Patikul, Sulu. The 3 were seized by 3
armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group. The governor of Sulu issued
Proclamation No. 1 Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. It invoked Sec 465 of
the LGC, which bestows on the provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during a man-
made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the PNP and Civilian Emergency Force to set up
checkpoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrest, and other actions necessary to ensure public
safety.

Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and thus
null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole
authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic
and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law to
create civilian armed forces under his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own
private army Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires,
and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President
sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic
and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law to
create civilian armed forces under his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own
private army.

ISSUE: W/N a Governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a president.

HELD: It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President
of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is
granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to
exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became
known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.

While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 339 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority
is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The
net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the
ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President
must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military
operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command
of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his.

Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces
at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared
a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The
calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another
official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section
465 of the Local Government Code.

Section 6. Separation of Church and State

United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc v. Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc
674 SCRA 92 (2012)

MAINPOINT: The SC ruled that the matter at hand is not purely an ecclesiastical affair. BUCCI has the power
under the law to effect disaffiliation such that it should be given legal consequence and granted
recognition. UCCP and BUCCI, being corporate entities and grantees of primary franchises, are subject to the
jurisdiction of the SEC in matters that are legal and corporate. The Court owes recognition to BUCCI’s decision
as it concerns its legal right as a religious corporation to disaffiliate from another religious corporation via
legitimate means is a secular matter well within the civil courts purview.

FACTS: Petitioner United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCP) is a religious corporation duly
organized under the laws of the Philippines. It is a confederation of incorporated and unincorporated self-
governing Evangelical churches of different denominations, devised for fellowship, mutual counsel and
cooperation. Respondent Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI), is likewise a religious corporation
with a personality separate and distinct from UCCP. Private respondents are members of BUCCI.
UCCP has 3 governing bodies: the General Assembly, the Conference and the Local Churches. BUCCI belonged
to the Cebu Conference Inc. (CCI) and enjoyed a peaceful co-existence until late 1989 when BUCCI constructed
a fence that encroached upon the right of way allocated by UCCP for CCI. The General Assembly attempted to
settle the dispute and rendered a decision in favor of CCI. This triggered a series of events, which further increased
enmity and led to the formal break-up of BUCCI from UCCP. Consequently, BUCCI filed its Amended Article
of Incorporation and By-Laws, which provided for and affected its disaffiliation from UCCP. SEC approved the
same. UCCP filed a complaint before SEC to reject the same but SEC dismissed UCCP’s petition. CA affirmed
SEC, hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: W/N the separation of BUCCI from UCCP is valid.

HELD: YES. SEC defended the right of BUCCI to disassociate itself from UCCP in recognition of its
constitutional freedom to associate and disassociate. SEC also pointed out that since UCCP used the fact of
BUCCI’s disaffiliation to consolidate its claim over the property subject of unlawful detainer case against BUCCI
before the RTC, UCCP cannot now deny the validity of said disaffiliation. The SC ruled that the matter at hand
is not purely an ecclesiastical affair. BUCCI has the power under the law to effect disaffiliation such that it should
be given legal consequence and granted recognition. UCCP and BUCCI, being corporate entities and grantees
of primary franchises, are subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC in matters that are legal and corporate. The Court
owes recognition to BUCCI’s decision as it concerns its legal right as a religious corporation to disaffiliate from
another religious corporation via legitimate means is a secular matter well within the civil courts purview.

Section 7. Independent Foreign Policy

Lim v. Executive Secretary


GR 151445
April 11, 2002
MAINPOINT: The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates that US exercise
participants may not engage in combat "except in self-defense." In our considered opinion, neither the MDT nor
the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory.

FACTS: Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the armed forces of
the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-1” on January 2002. The
Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense
Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The exercise
is rooted from the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush

Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. Partylists Sanlakas and Partido Ng Manggagawa
as residents of Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by the operations filed a petition-in-intervention.

The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is based only on a fear of future violation of
the Terms of Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of fact specifically
interpretation of the VFA whether it is covers "Balikatan 02-1” and no question of constitutionality is involved.

*****************************
Granted that “Balikatan 02-1” is permitted under the terms of the VFA, what may US forces legitimately do in
furtherance of their aim to provide advice, assistance and training in the global effort against terrorism? The
indirect violation is actually petitioners’ worry, that in reality, the United States government, and that the
provision on self-defense serves only as camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise.

ISSUE: May American troops actually engage in combat in Philippine territory?

HELD: The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates that US exercise
participants may not engage in combat "except in self-defense." In our considered opinion, neither the MDT nor
the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory. Under the salutary
proscription stated in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.

In the same manner, both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties
and international agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the 1987
Constitution. The present Constitution contains key provisions useful in determining the extent to which foreign
military troops are allowed in Philippine territory. Thus, in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is
provided that:

SEC. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
xxx xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount
consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-
determination.

SEC. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear
weapons in the country.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
PAGE 6
Saguisag v. ES, GR 212426 & Bayan v. DND Sec. Gazmin
GR 212444

Main Point: Foreign policy indeed includes security alliances and defense cooperation among states. In the
conduct of negotiations and in the implementation of any valid and binding international agreement, Article II of
the Constitution requires: Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. . . . . Section 7. The State shall pursue
an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be national
sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination.

FACTS: The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) is an executive agreement that gives U.S.
troops, planes and ships increased rotational presence in Philippine military bases and allows the U.S. to build
facilities to store fuel and equipment there. It was signed against the backdrop of the Philippines' maritime dispute
with China over the West Philippine Sea.

The US embassy and DFA exchanged diplomatic notes confirming all necessary requirements for the agreement
to take force. The agreement was signed on April 2014. President Benigno Aquino III ratified the same on June
2014. It was not submitted to Congress on the understanding that to do so was no longer necessary.

Petitions for Certiorari were filed before the Supreme Court assailing the constitutionality of the agreement.
Herein petitioners now contend that it should have been concurred by the senate as it is not an executive
agreement. The Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 105 expressing a strong sense that in order for EDCA to be
valid and binding, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and concurrence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EDCA between the Philippines and the U.S. is constitutional.

RULING: YES. The EDCA is an executive agreement and does not need the Senate's concurrence. As an
executive agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to implement.

Petitioners contend that the EDCA must be in the form of a treaty duly concurred by Senate. They hinge their
argument under the following Constitutional provisions:
Sec. 21, Art. VII: “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
2/3rds of all the Members of the Senate.”
Section 25, Article XVIII: “ xxx Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed
in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate xxx ”

The President, however, may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, if
(a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely
aims to implement an existing law or treaty

In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading: Executive Agreements


are defined as international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national
policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature.

Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. The right
of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has
been confirmed by long usage.

The Visiting Forces Agreement – a treaty ratified by the Senate in 1999 – already allowed the return of US troops.
EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose, and framework of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA. The
practice of resorting to executive agreements in adjusting the details of a law or a treaty that already deals with
the presence of foreign military forces is not at all unusual in this jurisdiction.

In order to keep the peace in its archipelago and to sustain itself at the same time against the destructive forces of
nature, the Philippines will need friends. Who they are, and what form the friendships will take, are for the
President to decide. The only restriction is what the Constitution itself expressly prohibits. EDCA is not
constitutionally infirm. As an executive agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it
purports to implement.

Petition is DISMISSED.

Section 8. Freedom from Nuclear Weapons

Bayan v. Zamora
GR 138570
October 10, 2000

Main Point: In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in
the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification.

Facts: This is a consolidation of cases questioning the Visiting Forces Agreement between the Philippines and
the United States of America. The VFA was created pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty after the RP-US
Military Base Agreement have expired. It was ratified on 1998 by the then-president Estrada.

Petitioners contend that the “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed into the Philippines only
by a treaty that is duly concurred in by the Senate and ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose and is recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.1 Since the
Government were not able to concur with the stated requisites, the Petitioners contend that the accepting the terms
of the VFA is violative of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the VFA is violative of the Constitution

Ruling: No, it is not violative of the Constitution. Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken
by the head of the state or of the government, as the case may be, through which the formal acceptance of the
treaty is proclaimed. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly
believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or
concurrence, to the ratification.

With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the exchange of notes between
the Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under
the principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article
II of the Constitution,[46] declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and
amity with all nations.

Section 9. Social Order

Section 10. Social Justice

Calalang v. Williams
70 Phil 726

Main Point: Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular conception may atleast be approximated.

Facts: Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court
this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents.

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works
and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing
along the following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.

Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the
measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national
roads.

As a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers
in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

The petitioner avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding
the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.

Issues: Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding
the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people

Ruling: No. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards
any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational
and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers
and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the
state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the
greatest number."

Section 11. Personal Dignity and Human Rights

Section 12. Family Life; Mother; Unborn

Roe v. Wade
410 US 113 (1973)

Main Point: The Court finds that an abortion statute that forbids all abortions except in the case of a life saving
procedure on behalf of the mother is unconstitutional based upon the right to privacy. However, it does allow for
regulation and proscription of abortion when the statute is narrowly tailored to uphold a compelling state interest,
such as the health of the mother or the viable fetus. The court declined to address the question of when life begins.

Facts: In order to obtain legal abortion, Norma McCorvey, aka Jane Roe, went to Dallas, Texas and falsely
asserted that she have been raped. However, this scheme failed as there was no records of the allegations of rape.
She then attempted to obtain illegal abortion however the site where the abortion could have been made was
already shut down by the police.

She sought the advice of lawyers who filed a case with the courts to allow the abortion even though it is not
medically advised. This is contrary to the laws of Texas which generally disallows abortion except in cases of
saving the life of the mother.

Issue: Whether or not the mother can terminate the life of an unborn child or stated differently can the State have
invaded the right of the mother in prohibiting abortion

Ruling: The US Supreme Court found that the abortion laws of the State of Texas is violative of the right to
privacy of the mother. They stated that is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.

It must be noted that the US Supreme Court did not decide on the justiciability of abortion because the mother in
this case have already given birth to the child, rendering the issue moot and academic.

Meyer v. Nebraska
262 US 390 (1922)

Main Point: That the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens,
physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be
respected.
Facts: Meyer, while an instructor in Zion Parochial School in Nebraska, taught the German language to his
students which included 10-year old Raymond Parpat. Later this was discovered by the Hamilton County General
charging him with violation of the Siman Act2.

Meyer was convicted and fined. They upheld the Siman Act as a proper response to "the baneful effects" of
allowing immigrants to educate their children in their mother tongue, with results "inimical to our own safety."

The Petitioner then brought to the Supreme Court of the United States the question of the validity of the Siman
Act.

Issue: Whether or not the Siman Act is unconstitutional or stated differently was the State of Nebraska allowed
to enact such a piece of legislation

Ruling: The Supreme Court of America ruled in favor of Meyer. Mere knowledge of the German language
cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful. Heretofore it has been commonly looked upon as helpful and desirable.
His right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the
liberty of the amendment.

That the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally
and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection
of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those born with English on the
tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but this
cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the Constitution—a desirable end cannot be promoted by
prohibited means.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters


262 US 510 (1925)

Main Point: The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty to
choose the appropriate preparation for their children.

Facts: A law in Oregon was filed compelling children of the age between eight to sixteen to attend public schools.
The said law provides for a few exceptions not including children that attending schools such as the Society of
Sisters.

Further, the parents of the children allege that the said law infringes to the right of the parents to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control.

Issue: Whether or not the law violates the right of the parents to the upbringing of the education of their children.

Ruling: The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty interests and has no
reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state.

The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of the appellees’
schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty to
choose the appropriate preparation for their children.

Wisconsin v. Yoder
40 LW 4476 (1972)

Main Point: The State's interest in universal education is not totally free from a balancing process when it
impinges on other fundamental rights.

Facts: Three Amish students from different families stopped attending school because of the religious belief of
their parents. One of the fathers of the children was convicted for this while the others were fined.

Under Amish church standards, higher education was deemed not only unnecessary for their simple way of life,
but also endangering to their salvation. These men appealed for exemption from compulsory education under the
basis of these religious convictions. They sincerely held to the belief that the values their children would learn at
home would surpass the worldly knowledge taught in school.

Issue: Whether or not the State can penalize the family of the students because of disallowing their children to
go to school due to their religious beliefs
Ruling: The State cannot penalize the family members. The State's interest in universal education is not totally
free from a balancing process when it impinges on other fundamental rights, such as those specifically protected
by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the
religious upbringing of their children.

The State's claim that it is empowered, as parens patriae, to extend the benefit of secondary education to children
regardless of the wishes of their parents cannot be sustained against a free exercise claim of the nature revealed
by this record, for the Amish have introduced convincing evidence that accommodating their religious objections
by forgoing one or two additional years of compulsory education will not impair the physical or mental health of
the child, or result in an inability to be self-supporting or to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship,
or in any other way materially detract from the welfare of society.

Ginsberg v. New York


390 US 629 (1968)

Main Point: The State has power to adjust the definition of obscenity as applied to minors, for even where there
is an invasion of protected freedoms, "the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond
the scope of its authority over adult”.

Facts: Ginsberg was found guilty of selling “girlie” magazines to minors. Under New York Law it was illegal to
willfully sell to a minor under 17 any picture which depicts nudity, is harmful to minors and any magazine which
taken as a whole is harmful to minors.

Ginsberg argued before the court that the State of New York did not have the power to classify two different sets
of the population in regards to obscene material and that it was an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.

Issue: Whether or not the State can protect minors from the obscene material or stated otherwise, was there
deprivation of liberty of the minors in regulating the obscene materials

Ruling: The court rejected Ginsberg’s argument that New York had deprived minors of their liberty. The court
found that it was well within the state’s power to protect minors and that just because the material is not classified
as obscene to adults it may still be regulated with minors.

The State has power to adjust the definition of obscenity as applied to minors, for even where there is an invasion
of protected freedoms, "the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its
authority over adult”.

Orceo v. COMELEC
GR 190779
March 26, 2010

Main Point: Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding moments among family members. Families
are entitled to protection by the society and the State under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They are
free to choose and enjoy their recreational activities. These liberties, petitioner contends, cannot be abridged by
the COMELEC. In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Solicitor General, states that it adheres to the
aforementioned state policies, but even constitutional freedoms are not absolute, and they may be abridged to
some extent to serve appropriate and important interests.

Facts: Petitioner, in a petition for certiorari questions the validity of Resolution No. 8714 insofar as it provides
that the term firearm includes airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations, which results in their coverage by the gun
ban during the election period this year.

Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding moments among family members. Families are entitled to
protection by the society and the State under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They are free to choose
and enjoy their recreational activities. These liberties, petitioner contends, cannot be abridged by the COMELEC.
Thus, petitioner contends that Resolution No. 8714 is not in accordance with the State policies State policies in
these constitutional provisions:
Art. II, Sec. 12.; Art. XV, Sec. 1.; and Art. II, Sec. 17.

Issue: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations
in the term “firearm” in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 8714.

Ruling: NO. The COMELEC’s intent in the inclusion of airsoft guns in the term “firearm” and their resultant
coverage by the election gun ban is to avoid the possible use of recreational guns in sowing fear, intimidation or
terror during the election period. An ordinary citizen may not be able to distinguish between a real gun and an
airsoft gun. It is fear subverting the will of a voter, whether brought about by the use of a real gun or a recreational
gun, which is sought to be averted. Ultimately, the objective is to ensure the holding of free.
However, the replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and airguns are excluded from the term “firearm” in
Resolution No. 8714.

Imbong v. Ochoa
GR 204819
April 8, 2014

Main Point: The RH Law does not violate the right of an unborn child as guaranteed in S12, A2. The question
of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided without proper hearing and
evidence. The framers of the Constitution intended “conception” as “fertilization” and protection is given upon
“fertilization.” Not all contraceptives are ban. Only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum are prohibited.
The intent of the framers was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure that would allow abortion. The
IRR redefinition of abortifacient in S4a of the RH Law is violative of S12, A2. S7 of the RH Law which excludes
parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage is
anti-family and is violative of S12, A2.

Facts: Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as
the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), challengers from various sectors of
society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional
disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the
controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention.

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the right to life of an
unborn child

Ruling: The RH Law does not violate the right of an unborn child as guaranteed in S12, A2. The question of
when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided without proper hearing and evidence.
The framers of the Constitution intended “conception” as “fertilization” and protection is given upon
“fertilization.” Not all contraceptives are ban. Only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum are prohibited.
The intent of the framers was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure that would allow abortion. The
IRR redefinition of abortifacient in S4a of the RH Law is violative of S12, A2. S7 of the RH Law which excludes
parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage is
anti-family and is violative of S12, A2.

Orceo v. COMELEC, GR 190779, March 26, 2010


Same as above

Section 13. Vital Role of Youth


Basco v. PAGCOR
197 SCRA 252

Main Point: Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Therefore, for PD 1869 to be
nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful
and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those
who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such
a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail.

Facts: Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter -
PD 1869, alleging that the same is "null and void" for being "contrary to morals, public policy and public order,"
monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy", and is violative of the equal protection clause and local
autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and
Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and
Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: PD 1869 null and void for being contrary to morals, public policy and public order

Ruling: No. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified,
it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and
equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who
petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a
declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The
dismissal of this petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation
considering the issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles
on social justice, role of youth and educational values" being raised, is up for Congress to determine.

Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. COA


GR 177131
June 7, 2011

Main Point: The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created in order to
implement a State policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution, which reads:
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional
mandate, comes within the class of public corporations defined by paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code

Facts: In this petition, the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) seeks that the COA be prohibited from
implementing its Decision and its Resolution to conduct an annual financial audit of the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards xxx. Which states that the BSP was created
as a public corporation under Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 460 and
Republic Act No. 7278

The BSP sought reconsideration of the COA Resolution believing that the case laws has been superseded by RA
7278. Thereby weakening the cases conclusion that the BSP is a government-controlled corporation Also, the
Government, like in other GOCCs, does not have funds invested in the BSP. That BSP is not an entity
administering special funds. It is not even included in the DECS National Budget. x x x
And that It may be argued also that the BSP is not an agency of the Government.

Issue: Whether BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the COAs audit jurisdiction.

Ruling: YES. The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created in order to
implement a State policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution, which reads:
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional
mandate, comes within the class of public corporations defined by paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code which
reads: Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose created by law; their personality
begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law; and governed by the law which creates it, pursuant
to Article 45 of the same Code.

Section 14. Role of Women and Equality of Men and Women

Section 15. Right to Health


Imbong v. Ochoa

Main Point: The RH Law does not violate S15. It does not do away with RA 4729 (Regulation of Contraceptive
Drugs and Devices) and RA 5921 (Regulation of Pharmacy) – laws that prohibit the sale and distribution of
contraceptives without prescription,

Facts: Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it requires the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential
medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite risks of getting diseases
gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray that the status quo
under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives without
the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.

Issue: Whether RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the right to Health

Ruling: The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its
mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives
it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution
of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices
and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that
contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

PAGE 7

Section 16. Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology

Oposa v. Factoran
224 SCRA 792 (1993)

Main Point: Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. The right
to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the
same gives rise to a cause of action.

Facts: The Petitioners of this case filed the action in behalf of their children questioning the Timber License
Agreements entered into by the government and private lumber corporations. They allege that continuous issuance
of such licenses would cause environmental damage so grave that their children and the children of their children
are unable to enjoy the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly
blessed with.

The Respondent-judge of this case dismissed this case on grounds of lack of cause of action of the Petitioners and
that it would impair obligations and contracts contrary to the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the Petitioners have a legal standing to file the case against the Secretary of Environment.

Whether there is an injured right of the Petitioners to have a cause action in this case

Ruling: Yes, they have a cause of action. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others
of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and
harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.

Anent the second issue, there exist as legal right injured by the grant of TLAs. The complaint focuses on one
specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners
— the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect
or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.

LLDA v. CA
231 SCRA 292 (1994)

Main Point: In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial
body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and
desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.

Facts: Task Force Camarin of Caloocan filed a letter-complaint with the LLDA seeking to stop the operation of
the 8.6 hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Caloocan due to the harmful effects of said dumpsite to the
residents and water in the said area. The LLDA acted on the said complaint and found that the continuous dumping
of garbage in the dumpsite would lead to harmful effects to the people of Caloocan.

The LLDA ordered the Caloocan City Government to stop dumping in the site. Originally, the city followed the
order of the LLDA but later the city dumped garbage in the site again due to inability of the LLDA, the members
of Barangay Camarin and the City Government of Caloocan to settle regarding the matter.
Following this, the LLDA issued a cease and desist order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from
continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin Area. The Regional Trial Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing the cease and desist order. On appeal, the Court decided that the LLDA
has no power to issue such an order.

Issue: Whether or not the LLDA has authority and power to issue an order which is injuctive in nature

Ruling: The LLDA has authority and power to issue such cease and desist order. As a constitutionally guaranteed
right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared
policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them."

While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it
by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied
in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the
LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless"
paper agency.

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented
precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other
inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or
propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which
Solar has taken, which of course may take several years.

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under the
circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory
laws.

LLDA v. CA
251 SCRA 42 (1995)

Main Point: Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy (This is contrary
to the idea that the LGUs surrounding the Laguna de Bay are the ones that have jurisdiction over the area.)
geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of the region with
due regard to the inter-generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth.

Facts: The LLDA, pursuant to its charter, sent notices to the concerned owners of the illegally constructed
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures within
10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected. In response to this, the affected fishpen
owners filed for injuction against the LLDA.

Temporary Restraining Orders were issued against the LLDA barring them to continue with the demolition of the
fishpens and fishcages. The reason for granting the TROs is the lack of jurisdiction of the LLDA with regards the
Laguna de Bay. The Regional Trial Court is on the belief that the ones with authority as regards the Laguna de
Bay are the Local Government Units in the said area.

Issue: Whether or not the LLDA authorized to issue notices and eventually perform demolition of fishpens in the
Laguna de Bay area.

Ruling: Yes, the LLDA is authorized to do such acts. Laguna de Bay cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts
of management policies where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific
portions of the lake water. The garbage thrown or sewage discharged into the lake, abstraction of water therefrom
or construction of fishpens by enclosing its certain area, affect not only that specific portion but the entire 900
km² of lake water. The implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water resource management policy,
therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay.

Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy geared towards the protection,
conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to the inter-generational
use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen
this need when they passed this LLDA law — the special law designed to govern the management of our Laguna
de Bay lake resources.

MMDA v. Residents of Manila Bay


GR No. 171947
December 18, 2008
Main Point: Government agencies may be compelled by mandamus to enforce environmental laws and/or
promote the protection of the environment.

Facts: The residents of Manila Bay filed for madamus against the MMDA on reason that the water quality of the
Manila Bay have fallen below the acceptable standards set by law, specifically, those stated under the Philippine
Environmental Code. They seek to order that all defendants, now petitioners, to clean up Manila Bay and restore
the quality of its waters.

The Petitioners, groups of government agencies, allege that the action for mandamus shall not be allowed and
that it is improper to file for one against their offices.

Issue: Whether or not the Petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to clean and rehabilitate the Manila Bay

Ruling: Yes, the may be compelled through mandamus. While the implementation of the MMDA's mandated
tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law
exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial
discipline describes as “continuing mandamus,” the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue
directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction
or indifference. (Note that the concept continuing madamus have been already included in the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases.)

Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. The Province of Aklan


674 SCRA 555 (2012)

Main Point: The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national government agencies in the
maintenance of ecological balance, and requires them to secure prior public consultation and
approval of local government units for the projects described therein.

Facts: Boracay Foundation, Inc. filed a petition for an issuance of a writ of mandamus suspending the
implementation of a land reclamation project along the foreshores of Barangay Caticlan in the Province of Aklan
based on the ground that the classification of the project was incorrect leading to the failure to perform a full
Environmental Impact Assessment as required by law and that there was a failure for proper, timely and sufficient
public consultation.

Claiming that tourist arrivals to Boracay would reach 1 million in the future, respondent Province of Aklan
planned to expand the port facilities at Barangay Caticlan, Municipality of Malay. Respondent Province considers
the instant petition to be premature; thus, it must necessarily fail for lack of cause of action due to the failure of
petitioner to fully exhaust the available administrative remedies even before seeking judicial relief.

Issue: Whether there was a lack of prior consultation and approval required by law

Ruling: Yes. The Court found that there was a lack of prior consultations and prior approval required by law
when the ECC was issued. The Court therefore issued a writ of continuing mandamus suspending the
implementation of the project and requiring, inter alia, the DENR-EMB RVI to make a proper study and the
Province of Aklan to submit the appropriate report and to secure approvals from local government units and hold
proper consultations with NGOs, other stakeholders and sectors concerned.

C&M Timber v. Alcala


GR 111088
June 13, 1997

Main Point: The policy is contained in Art. II, 16 of the Constitution, which commands the State to protect and
promote the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature. There is therefore no merit in petitioner’s contention that no new policy can be applied to existing licenses.

Facts: Petitioner’s Timber License Agreement No. 106 was cancelled in 1984 pursuant to a presidential directive
banning all forms of logging in the area. Filipinas Loggers Development Corporation (FLDC), requested a timber
concession over the same area covered by petitioner’s TLA 106 and it was granted by then President Marcos,
granting them TLA No. 360. TLA 360 was also cancelled on the ground that in spite of the suspension order dated
June 26, 1986, said concessionaire has continued logging operations in violation of forestry rules and regulations.

Petitioner now in this case wants to have their TLA No. 106 reinstated but the same was denied because it failed
to protect its rights for more than two (2) years until it opposed reinstatement of FLDCs TLA. Petitioner claims
that the denial of its petition, because of a new policy consideration on forest conservation and protection,
unmistakably implied from the Presidents handwritten instruction, as stated in the resolution of June 7, 1993 of
the Office of the President, would deny it the due process of law. Petitioner points out that there is no total log
ban in the country

Issue: Whether no new policy can be applied to existing licenses


Ruling: No. The President’s order of denying the petitioner of the reinstatement of its TLA was prompted by
concerns expressed by the then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources that said reinstatement may
negate the efforts to enhance conservation and protection of our forest resources. There was really no new policy
but, as noted in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc., a mere reiteration of a policy of conservation and protection. The
policy is contained in Art. II, 16 of the Constitution, which commands the State to protect and promote the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. There is
therefore no merit in petitioner’s contention that no new policy can be applied to existing licenses.

MMDA v. Residents of Manila Bay


GR No. 171947
December 18, 2008

Main Point: Government agencies may be compelled by mandamus to enforce environmental laws and/or
promote the protection of the environment.

Facts: The residents of Manila Bay filed for madamus against the MMDA on reason that the water quality of the
Manila Bay have fallen below the acceptable standards set by law, specifically, those stated under the Philippine
Environmental Code. They seek to order that all defendants, now petitioners, to clean up Manila Bay and restore
the quality of its waters.

The Petitioners, groups of government agencies, allege that the action for mandamus shall not be allowed and
that it is improper to file for one against their offices.

Issue: Whether or not the Petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to clean and rehabilitate the Manila Bay

Ruling: Yes, the may be compelled through mandamus. While the implementation of the MMDA's mandated
tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law
exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial
discipline describes as “continuing mandamus,” the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue
directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction
or indifference. (Note that the concept continuing madamus have been already included in the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases.)

Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. The Province of Aklan


674 SCRA 555 (2012)

Main Point: The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national government agencies in the
maintenance of ecological balance, and requires them to secure prior public consultation and
approval of local government units for the projects described therein.

Facts: Boracay Foundation, Inc. filed a petition for an issuance of a writ of mandamus suspending the
implementation of a land reclamation project along the foreshores of Barangay Caticlan in the Province of Aklan
based on the ground that the classification of the project was incorrect leading to the failure to perform a full
Environmental Impact Assessment as required by law and that there was a failure for proper, timely and sufficient
public consultation.

Claiming that tourist arrivals to Boracay would reach 1 million in the future, respondent Province of Aklan
planned to expand the port facilities at Barangay Caticlan, Municipality of Malay. Respondent Province considers
the instant petition to be premature; thus, it must necessarily fail for lack of cause of action due to the failure of
petitioner to fully exhaust the available administrative remedies even before seeking judicial relief.

Issue: Whether there was a lack of prior consultation and approval required by law

Ruling: Yes. The Court found that there was a lack of prior consultations and prior approval required by law
when the ECC was issued. The Court therefore issued a writ of continuing mandamus suspending the
implementation of the project and requiring, inter alia, the DENR-EMB RVI to make a proper study and the
Province of Aklan to submit the appropriate report and to secure approvals from local government units and hold
proper consultations with NGOs, other stakeholders and sectors concerned.

Paje v. Casino
GR 207267
Feb 3, 2015
Main Point: The writ of kalikasan is principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude
that transcends political and territorial boundaries. A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged
defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities,
but must also provide a causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in
the issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules.

Facts: The DENR, issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate for a proposed coal-fired power plant at
Subic, Zambales to be implemented by RP Energy. Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators (Casiño
group) filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan against RP energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR
secretary on the ground that actual environmental damage will occur if the power plant project is implemented
and that the respondents failed to comply with certain laws and rules governing or relating to the issuance of an
ECC and amendments thereto.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and invalidated the ECC . Both the DENR and
Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing error in invalidating the ECC and its amendments, arguing that the
determination of the validity of the ECC as well as its amendments is beyond the scope of a Petition for a Writ
of kalikasan; while the latter claim that it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan.

Issue: Whether the CA was correct in denying the petitioner’s writ of Kalikasan on the ground that it did not
prove that there was an actual violation or threat to the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology

Ruling: Yes. The Casiño Group failed to substantiate its claims that the construction and operation of the power
plant will cause environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated under the writ of kalikasan. On the other
hand, RP Energy presented evidence to establish that the subject project will not cause grave environmental
damage, through its Environmental Management Plan, which will ensure that the project will operate within the
limits of existing environmental laws and standards.

A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must
not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at least, a reasonable
connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation
of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules.
Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the proper forum with due
regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted relative to the
aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or irregularities in the issuance of
the ECC.

International Service v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia


GR 209271 and GR 209430

Main Point: As the matter never went beyond the field testing phase, none of the foregoing tasks related to
propagation were pursued or the requirements therefor complied with. Thus, there are no guaranteed after-effects
to the already concluded Bt talong field trials that demand an adjudication from which the public may perceivably
benefit. Any future threat to the right ,of herein respondents or the public in general to a healthful and balanced
ecology is therefore more imagined than real.

Facts: The instant case arose from the conduct of field trials for "bioengineered eggplants," known as Bacillus
thuringiensis (Bt) eggplant (Bt talong. Bt talong contains the crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium Bt, which
produces the CrylAc protein that is toxic to target insect pests. The Cry1Ac protein is said to be highly specific
to lepidopteran larvae such as the fruit and shoot borer, the most destructive insect pest to eggplants.

Greenpeace, MASIPAG and individual respondents filed a petition for writ of kalikasan and writ of continuing
mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO). They alleged
that the Bt talong field trials violate their constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology considering that Bt
talong is presumed harmful to human health and the environment, and there is no independent, peer-reviewed
study on the safety of Bt talong for human consumption and the environment. Further, they contended that since
the scientific evidence as to the safety of Bt talong remained insufficient or uncertain, and that preliminary
scientific evaluation shows reasonable grounds for concern, the precautionary principle should be applied and,
thereby, the field trials be enjoined. The Court issued the Writ. Hence, this motion for reconsideration by the
petitioners contending that the Writ should be dismissed on the ground of mootness as the same was filed only a
few months before the two-year permit expired and when the field testing activities were already over.

Issue: Whether the filing of the Writ of Kalikasan no longer presents a justiceable controversy
Ruling: Yes. The Court grants the motions for reconsideration on the ground of mootness. Therefore, it was
improper for the Court to resolve the merits of the case which had become moot when it was filed only a few
months before the two-year permit expired and when the field testing activities were already over. All told, with
respondents' petition for Writ of Kalikasan already mooted by the expiration of the Biosafoty Permits and the
completion of the field trials subject of these cases, and with none of the exceptions to the mootness principle
properly attending, the Court grants the instant motions for reconsideration and hereby dismisses the aforesaid
petition.

Section 17. Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports

Guingona v. Carague

Main Point: While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to
"assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and retain its
rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction
and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power
to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.

Facts: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service)
and P155.3 Billion as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00

Petitioners as Senators, seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177,
and P.D. No. 1967, which authorized he automatic appropriation for debt service. The petition also seeks to
restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees. They alleged that the
appropriation of P85 billion violates the constitutional provision that the State shall assign the highest budgetary
priority to education (Sec. 5, Article 14).

Issue: Is the appropriation of P86 billion in the P233 billion 1990 budget violative of Section 5, Article14 of the
Constitution?

Ruling: No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to
"assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and retain its
rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to
respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.

The amount of P29,740,611,000.008 set aside for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports is the highest
budgetary allocation among all department budgets. This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional
mandate according highest priority to education. Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not
without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service
our enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the previous administration. It is not only a
matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy
is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated
to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.

Philconsa v. Enriquez:
S5, Art14 which provides for the highest budgetary priority to education is merely directory.

Main Point: Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, is merely directory.

Facts: The 1994 Budget appropriated P86,323,438,000.00 for debt and appropriated only P37,780,450,000.00
for the Department of Education Culture and Sports. Petitioners urged that Congress cannot give debt service the
highest priority in the GAA of 1994 because under the Constitution it should be education that is entitled to the
highest funding. They invoke Section 5(5), Article XIV.

Issue: Is the appropriation violative of Section 5, Article14 of the Constitution?

Ruling: No. Citing the decision in the case of Gungona v. Carague, here this Court held that Section 5(5), Article
XIV of the Constitution, is merely directory, thus: While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Constitution, Congress is mandated to "assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that
teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and
other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment
of other state policies or objectives.

Section 18. Labor Protection


PNB v. Dan Padao
GR 180849
November 2011

Main Point: While it is an employers basic right to freely select or discharge its employees, if only as a measure
of self-protection against acts inimical to its interest, the law sets the valid grounds for termination as well as the
proper procedure to be followed when terminating the services of an employee.

Facts: Dan Padao was hired by PNB as a clerk at its Dipolog City Branch and was ultimately promoted to the
position of Loan and Credit Officer IV. A certain Sih Wat Kai complained to COA that questionable loans were
reportedly being extended to select bank clients. COA investigated and confirmed that the collateral provided in
numerous loan accommodations were rossly over-appraised. The credit standing of the loan applicants was also
fabricated, allowing them to obtain larger loan portfolios from PNB. PNB suffered losses.

Padao was then administratively charged and was accused of having presented a fraudulently positive evaluation
of the business, credit standing/rating and financial capability of the loan applicants. Padao over-appraised the
collateral of the loan applicants. Padao was dismissed by PNB for gross and habitual neglect of duties. The
Executive Labor Arbited found Padao’s dismissal to be valid. Padao appealed to the NLRC, which, reversed and
set aside the ELA Decision and declared Padaos dismissal to be illegal.

Issue: Whether Padao was dismissed with just cause as provided for by the Labor Code

Ruling: Yes. The Court reinstated the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter. Thus, in cases of regular
employment, the employer is prohibited from terminating the services of an employee except for a just or
authorized cause. n this case, Padao was dismissed by PNB for gross and habitual neglect of duties under Article
282 (b) of the Labor Code. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties, while
habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending on the
circumstances.

JMM Promotion v. CA
GR 120095
Aug 5, 1996

Main Point: Protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the welfare and social
justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat
to the government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or
overseas.

Facts: Due to the death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, former President Cory Aquino ordered a total ban against the
deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations. The ban was rescinded after leaders of
the overseas employment industry promised to extend full support for a program aimed at removing kinks in the
system of deployment. Thus, the Secretary of Labor and Employment issued Department Order No. 28, creating
the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC) which issued orders establishing guidelines on the training,
testing certification and deployment of performing artists abroad and the issuance of Artist's Record Book (ARB),
a necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the POEA

These orders were assailed by the petitioners as the orders allegedly 1) violated the constitutional right to travel;
2) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due
process of law, and the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and "in gross violation of the
constitutional right... to life liberty and property."
Issue: Whether the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement does not enhance the public welfare or was
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably

Ruling: No. The Court ruled that the Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order
related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power. In
any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates government to extend the fullest
protection to our overseas worker as embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution.

Protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone.Under the welfare and social justice
provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the
government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas.

PASEI v. Drilon
(1988)
Main Point: What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent,
just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because
it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to
insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home.

Facts: The petitioner, a firm engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for
overseas placement, challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1 of the DOLE, in the
character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF
FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Specifically, the measure is assailed for discrimination against males or females; that it does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is violative of the right
to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and
not executive, in character.

Issue: Whether the assailed order is int the nature of police power; whether the suspension does not enhance the
protection for Filipino female overseas workers

Ruling: It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. There is no question
that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not
confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on substantial
distinctions. The Court understood the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment.
The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary
sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to
provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent.
We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary
relief prayed for.

Section 19. Self-Reliant and Independent National Economy

Garcia v. BOI
191 SCRA 288 (1990)

Main Point: By submitting its application and amended application to the BOI for approval, the investor
recognizes the sovereign prerogative of our Government, through the BOI, to approve or disapprove the same
after determining whether its proposed project will be feasible, desirable and beneficial to our country. In sum,
it is the BOI who has the “final choice” and such choice shall embody the national interest of the State.

Facts: This case seeks annulment of the decision of the Board of Investors and Department of Trade and Industry
to transfer a proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from
naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas. The alleged reason for the transfer was the insurgency
and unstable labor situation in Bataan. The presence in Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot
owned by the Pilipinas Shell Corporation was another consideration. The BOI and DTI approved of the request
for transfer on the reasoning that since they are the investors they have the “right of choice” as to where they shall
invest or put up a plant.

The congressmen of Bataan vigorously opposed the transfer of the proposed petrochemical plant to Batangas. At
a conference of the Taiwanese investors with President Aquino and her Secretary of Defense and Chief of Staff
of the Army, the President expressed her preference that the Bataan petrochemical plant be established in Bataan.

Issue: Whether or not the BOI and DTI acted in grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the plant
from Bataan to Batangas without considering national interest.

Ruling: The Court holds and finds that the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer
of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only
to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in the investor all other circumstances to the
contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advantage to the government has been shown by this transfer.

Neither under the 1987 Constitution nor in the Omnibus Investments Code is there such a 'right of final choice.'
In the first place, the investor's choice is subject to processing and approval or disapproval by the BOI. By
submitting its application and amended application to the BOI for approval, the investor recognizes the sovereign
prerogative of our Government, through the BOI, to approve or disapprove the same after determining whether
its proposed project will be feasible, desirable and beneficial to our country. In sum, it is the BOI who has the
“final choice” and such choice shall embody the national interest of the State.

Tanada v. Angara
272 SCRA 18 (1997)

Main Point: The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not necessarily
rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor
mendicancy in the international community.

Facts: The current petition questions the World Trade Organization agreement for violating mandates of the 1987
Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy controlled by Filipinos. The said WTO
agreement was ratified by then-president Ramos which was focused mainly in creating an administrating body
for international trade and tariff. It requires its signatories to place nationals and products of member-countries
on the same footing as Filipinos and local products.

Because of the placing of the local Filipino products alongside foreign goods, the petitioners deem this unfair to
the economy of the Philippines as the products may not be at par with the produce of other country.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutional mandate for the development of a self-reliant and independent national
economy controlled by Filipinos violated by the WTO agreement.

Ruling: The Constitution does not rule out foreign competition. The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and
independent national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services.
It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community.

The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without discrimination cannot be struck
down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members.
Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on equality and reciprocity, the fundamental law encourages
industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby demonstrating a clear policy against
a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can
compete with the best in the foreign markets.

The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it
contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with a total proscription of
foreign competition.

It shall also be noted that the WTO agreement also protects weaker economies and protects developing countries
such as the Philippines.

Association of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v. PCA


GR 110526
Feb 10, 1998

Main Point: Free enterprise does not call for removal of "protective regulations."

Facts: The Philippine Coconut Authority issued a resolution which declares that it will no longer require those
wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply to it for a license or permit as a condition for engaging in such
business.

Petitioner filed this petition to invalidate PCA’s Resolution and the certificates of registration issued under it on
the ground that the resolution in question is beyond the power of the PCA to adopt, and to compel said
administrative agency to comply instead with the mandatory provisions of statutes regulating the desiccated
coconut industry, in particular, and the coconut industry, in general.

Issue: Whether the resolution is null and void for being an undue exercise of legislative power by an
administrative body

Ruling: Yes. The resolution allows not only the indiscriminate opening of new coconut processing plants but
the virtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure whereby, forsaking controls theretofore placed in its
keeping, the PCA limits its function to the innocuous one of "monitoring" compliance by coconut millers with
quality standards and volumes of production. In effect, the PCA would simply be compiling statistical data on
these matters, but in case of violations of standards there would be nothing much it would do.

The PCA invokes a policy of free enterprise that is "unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary
bureaucratic red tape" as justification for abolishing the licensing system. There can be no quarrel with the
elimination of "unnecessary red tape." That is within the power of the PCA to do and indeed it should eliminate
red tape. Its success in doing so will be applauded. But free enterprise does not call for removal of "protective
regulations." Thus, the petition is granted.

Pharmaceuticals v. Duque
Oct 9, 2007
Free enterprise does not call for the removal of protective regulations.

Main Point: The framers of the constitution were well aware that trade must be subjected to some form of
regulation for the public good. Public interest must be upheld over business interests. As held in Association of
Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, the Court declared that "free enterprise does
not call for removal of ‘protective regulations’." x x x It must be clearly explained and proven by competent
evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade.

Facts: Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of E.O.
51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional
and go beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued by President Cory Aquino under the
Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to
give effect to Art 11 of the Int’l Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by the
World Health Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted
for breastmilk substitutes.

In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR. The defense of the DOH is that the RIRR implements not only the
Milk Code but also various international instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition. It is respondents'
position that said international instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may
implement them through the RIRR.

Issue: Whether the RIRR is unreasonable and oppressive

Ruling: No. The definition in the RIRR merely merged together under the term "milk company" the entities
defined separately under the Milk Code as "distributor" and "manufacturer." The RIRR also enumerated in
Section 5(w) the products manufactured or distributed by an entity that would qualify it as a "milk company,"
whereas in the Milk Code, what is used is the phrase "products within the scope of this Code." Those are the only
differences between the definitions given in the Milk Code and the definition as re-stated in the RIRR.

Since all the regulatory provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the
Court sees no harm in the RIRR providing for just one term to encompass both entities. The definition of "milk
company" in the RIRR and the definitions of "distributor" and "manufacturer" provided for under the Milk Code
are practically the same. The Court is not convinced that the definition of "milk company" provided in the RIRR
would bring about any change in the treatment or regulation of "distributors" and "manufacturers" of breastmilk
substitutes, as defined under the Milk Code.

Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 (4(f) advertising, promotions of formula are prohibited; Sec 11, prohibitions for
advertising breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young children up to 24 months, and Sec 46, sanctions
for advertising) the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of
the Milk Code, constituting reasonable regulation of an industry which affects public health and welfare and, as
such, the rest of the RIRR do not constitute illegal restraint of trade nor are they violative of the due process clause
of the Constitution.

Section 20. Role of Private Sector

Marine Radio Communications Association of the Philippines v. Reyes


191 SCRA 205

Main Point: The mandate recognizing the indispensable role of the private sector" is no more than an
acknowledgment of the importance of private initiative in building the nation. However, it is not a call for official
abdication of duty to citizenry.

Facts: The Department of Transportation and Communications (DTC) unveiled an P880-million maritime coastal
communications system project, designed to "ensure safety of lives at sea (SOLAS) through the establishment of
efficient communication facilities between coast stations and ship stations and the improvement of safety in
navigational routes at sea." It was set out to provide, among other things, ship-to- shore and shore-to-ship public
corresponding, free of charge.

The petitioners are also operators of "shore-to-ship and ship-to-shore public marine coastal radio stations, and are
holders of certificates of public convenience duly issued by the NTC. Petitioners, through their lawyer, Atty.
Cabigao, wrote a letter to the Secretary of DTC holding that the DTC cannot compete in the business of public
correspondence, and rely on the provisions of Section 20, of Article II, of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether the project of DTC of providing free public correspondence would put into serious doubt the
viability of the entire marine radio communications industry

Ruling: No. The Constitution does not bar the Government from undertaking its own initiatives, especially in
the domain of public service, and neither does it repudiate its primacy as chief economic caretaker of the nation.
There can hardly be any valid argument against providing for public corresponding, free of charge. It is
compatible with State aims to serve the people under the Constitution, and certainly, amid these hard times, the
State can do no less.

The petitioners cannot legitimately rely on the provisions of Section 20, of Article II, of the Constitution, to defeat
the act complained of. The mandate "recognizing the indispensable role of the private sector" is no more than an
acknowledgment of the importance of private initiative in building the nation. However, it is not a call for official
abdication of duty to citizenry.

Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. The Province of Aklan


674 SCRA 555 (2012)

Main Point: Section 1 of PD 1586 intends to implement the policy of the state to achieve a balance between
socio-economic development and environmental protection, which are the twin goals of sustainable
development. It stresses that this can only be possible if a comprehensive and integrated environmental
protection program is adopted where all the sectors of the community are involved, i.e., the government and the
private sectors.

Facts: Boracay Foundation, Inc. filed a petition for an issuance of a writ of mandamus suspending the
implementation of a land reclamation project along the foreshores of Barangay Caticlan in the Province of Aklan
based on the ground that the classification of the project was incorrect leading to the failure to perform a full
Environmental Impact Assessment as required by law and that there was a failure for proper, timely and sufficient
public consultation. On the other hand, respondent claimed that tourist arrivals to Boracay would reach 1 million
in the future, thus having the need to expand the port facilities at Barangay Caticlan, Municipality of Malay.

It is clear that both petitioner and respondent Province are interested in the promotion of tourism in Boracay and
the protection of the environment, lest they kill the proverbial hen that lays the golden egg. At the beginning of
this decision, we mentioned that there are common goals of national significance that are very apparent from both
the petitioners and the respondents respective pleadings and memoranda. The parties are evidently in accord in
seeking to uphold the mandate found in Sections 16 and 20 of Article II, Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Whether the respondent should have had secured the approval of the private sector as well

Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that respondent should secure approvals from local government units and hold
proper consultations with non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders and sectors concerned. Thus,
petition is partially granted ordering the respondent to comply with the requirements of prior of public
consultation and approval.

Section 21. Promotion of Comprehensive Rural and Agrarian Policy

Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Margarito Teves, et al


GR 176579 June 28, 2011
(See Dissent of Abad- Section 21 is not self-executing, thus need for CARL)

Main Point: (With regard to Abad’s Dissent and Sec 21) A constitutional provision is self-executing if it fixes the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed such that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. On the other hand, if the provision needs a supplementary or enabling legislation, it is
merely a declaration of policy and principle, which is not self-executing. Parenthetically, there have been several
occasions in the past where Congress provided supplementary or enabling legislation for constitutional
provisions that are not self-executing. To name just some: the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

Facts: In this petition by petitioner, a PLDT stockholder, he seeks to annul the sale of the 46% PTIC equity or
111,415 shares of stock to Metro Pacific on the ground that it violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which limits foreign ownership of a public utility company to 40% of its capital. Gamboa claims that
since PTIC is a PLDT stockholder, the sale of the 46% of its equity is actually an indirect sale of 6.3% PLDT
equity or 12 million shares of stock. This would increase First Pacifics equity in PLDT from 30.7% to 37%, and
concomitantly increase the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 64.27%.

Petitioner seeks primarily the interpretation of the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. He
prays that this Court declare that the term capital refers to common shares only, and that such shares constitute
the sole basis in determining foreign equity in a public utility. Petitioner further asks this Court to declare any
ruling inconsistent with such interpretation unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to the total common shares
only or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares) of
PLDT, a public utility

Ruling: Yes. Considering that common shares have voting rights, which translate to control, as opposed to,
preferred shares, which usually have no voting rights, the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the
election of directors, then the term “capital” shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in
the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In
short, the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can
vote in the election of directors.

To construe broadly the term “capital” as the total outstanding capital stock, including both common and non-
voting preferred shares, grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the Constitution that the “State shall develop
a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.” A broad definition
unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which necessarily equates to control of the
public utility.

Section 22. Promotion of Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities

Section 23. Community-Based Private Organizations

Section 24. Vital Role of Communications

PLDT v. NTC
190 SCRA 717

Main Point: Article II, Section 24 of the 1987 Constitution, recognizes the vital role of communication and
information in nation building. It is likewise a State policy to provide the environment for the emergence of
communications structures suitable to the balanced flow of information into, out of, and across the country.

Facts: Rep. Act No. 2090, was enacted, otherwise known as "An Act Granting Felix Alberto and Company,
Incorporated, a Franchise to Establish Radio Stations for Domestic and Transoceanic Telecommunications." Felix
Alberto & Co., Inc. (FACI) was the original corporate name, which was changed to ETCI. Alleging urgent public
need, ETCI filed an application with NTC (for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
(CPCN) to construct, install, establish, operate and maintain a Cellular Mobile Telephone System and an Alpha
Numeric Paging System in Metro Manila and in the Southern Luzon regions, with a prayer for provisional
authority to operate Phase A of its proposal within Metro Manila. An order was issued by the NTC granting such
application.

This was opposed by PLDT on the following grounds: (1) ETCI is not capacitated under its legislative franchise
to operate a systemwide telephone or network of telephone service; (2) ETCI lacks the facilities needed for the
successful operation of the proposed cellular mobile telephone system; (3) PLDT has itself a pending application
with NTC to install and operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System for domestic and international service not
only in Manila but also in the provinces and that under the "prior operator" or "protection of investment" doctrine,
PLDT has the priority or preference in the operation of such service; and (4) the provisional authority, if granted,
will result in needless, uneconomical and harmful duplication, among others.

Issue: Whether the NTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting provisional authority to ETCI

Ruling: No. The decisive considerations are public need, public interest, and the common good. Those were the
overriding factors which motivated NTC in granting provisional authority to ETCI. A modern and dependable
communications network rendering efficient and reasonably priced services is also indispensable for accelerated
economic recovery and development. To these public and national interests, public utility companies must bow
and yield. It is a step in the right direction towards the enhancement of the telecommunications infrastructure, the
expansion of telecommunications services in, hopefully, all areas of the country, with chances of complete
disruption of communications minimized. It will thus impact on, the total development of the country's
telecommunications systems and redound to the benefit of even those who may not be able to subscribe to ETCI.
Section 25. Local Economy

Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. v. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al.


GR 180050
12 April 2011
(Section 25 as part of IRR of LGU provision on local autonomy)

Main Point: Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local
autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be
liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results.

Facts: Petitioners aver that they are taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte. They allege
that the creation of the Dinagat Islands as a new province is an illegal act of Congress and unjustly deprives the
people of Surigao del Norte a large chunk of its territory, IRA and rich resources from the area. They also claim
that the creation is not valid because it failed to comply with the population and land area requirement. They
pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only, failing to
comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC, that it should have an
average annual income of P20,000,000.00, a continuous territory of at least 2,000 sq.km and a population of at
least 250,000. The RA 9355 was declared unconstitutional.

The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat, filed a motion for reconsideration
and raised the following: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section
461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or
more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the
Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.

Issue: Whether the Dinagat Province is exempt from land area requirement, thus validating the constitutionality
of RA 9355

Ruling: Yes. With respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3)
indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are
provided for. But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or
more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450
of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This
exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the
LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to
provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater
likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in
most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was
expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was
inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article
9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC
– and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article
9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

This interpretation finds merit when we consider the basic policy considerations underpinning the principle of
local autonomy.

PAGE 8

Pamatong vs. COMELEC

MAINPOINT: What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable
right.

FACTS: When the petitioner filed COC,the COMELEC disqualified him even after he filed motion for
reconsideration for the reason that he could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or isnot nominated or supported
by a political party with national constituency. He argued that, despite having proven his qualification and
capacity to run he was deprived of his right to “equal access to opportunities for public service,” citing Article 2,
Section 26 of the Constitution, and that the COMELEC was indirectly amending the Constitution in this manner.

ISSUES: Whether the COMELEC’s refusal violated such right to equal access to opportunities for public service.
RULING: No. The provisions under Article 2 are generally not-self executing. As such, section 26, along with
the other policies in the article, does not convey any judicially enforceable rights. What is recognized in Section
26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows
such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language
of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

Neri v Senate
FACTS: Petitioner Romulo L. Neri appeared before respondents Senate Committees on Accountability
of Public Officers and Investigations, Trade and Commerce, and National Defense and Security (respondent
Committees) to testify anent the National Broadband Project (NBN Project) awarded by the DOTC to
Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE). Petitioner disclosed that COMELEC Chairman
Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million to approve the project, he informed President Arroyo of this
bribe and the latter instructed him not to accept it. However, petitioner refused to answer questions on:
(a) WON President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) WON she directed him to prioritize it,
and (c) WON she directed him to approve it. Petitioner invoked executive privilege for not answering
the questions.

ISSUE: WON there is a valid claim of executive privilege and WON such privilege trumps Congress’
power to inquire in aid of legislation

RULING: Yes, There is a valid claim of executive privilege. The Court ruled that such claim is highly
recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution
to the President such as the area of military and foreign relations. The communications elicited by the
3 questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. Also, the right of Congress or any
of its committee to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people’s right to
public information. The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people’s
right to information.

Wilson P. Garcia v. Finance Secretary Teves

***Note: WILSON P. GARCIA vs. TEVES IS NOT EXISTING. ONLY WILSON P. GAMBOA vs.
TEVES
FACTS: Wilson P. Garcia, a stockholder of PLDT, filed a petition to nullity of the sale of PLDT shares of stock
of PTIC by the government of the Republic of the Philippines to MPAH, an affiliate of First Pacific Company
Limited which is a foreign company. Accordingly, this violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40 percent.
Petitioners-in-intervention join petitioner Wilson Gamboa x x x in seeking, among others, to enjoin and/or
nullify the sale by respondents of the PTIC shares to First Pacific or assignee. Petitioners-in-intervention claim
that, as PLDT subscribers, they have a stake in the outcome of the controversy x x x where the Philippine
Government is completing the sale of government owned assets in PLDT, unquestionably a public utility, in
violation of the nationality restrictions of the Philippine Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner, as citizens, has the requisite locus standi.

RULING: Yes. Since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves matters of transcendental public
importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi. When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of
a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and,
therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.

MAINPOINT: when the issue concerns a public right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement
of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner
is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result of the action.
Pollo v Chairperson Katrina David

MAINPOINT: Section 28, Article II of the Constitution provides: Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed
by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.

FACTS: Petitioner a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC and also the OIC of the Public
Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the “MamamayanMuna Hindi Mamaya Na” program of the
CSC.2. CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David received letter-complaint addressed to respondent which was
marked “Confidential” saying that the head of the “MamamayanMuna Hindi Mamaya Na” was serving as a
lawyer to accused government employees who have a pending case with the CSC. Chairperson formed a team of
four with background in (IT), and issued a memo to conduct an investigation and “to back up all the files in the
computers found in the MamamayanMuna and PALD divisions.” The files were examined by the CSC’s Office
for Legal Affairs. It was found that most of the files assigned to and being used by the petitioner, were draft
pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases, usually for respondents facing charges in the CSC or
other tribunals. petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of “fishing
expedition” when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer.

ISSUE: Is the contention of the petitioner valid?

RULING: No. The constitutional guarantees of privacy and reasonable search are unavailing against audit
inspections or internal investigations for misconduct, as here, of electronic data stored ingovernment-owned
property such as computing, telecommunication, andother devices issued to civil servants. The statutory rule and
the CSCregulation implements the State policies, as expresslyprovided in the Constitution, of ensuring full
disclosure of all government transactions involving public interest,maintaining honesty and integrity in the public
service, and preventing graft and corruption. Section 28, Article II of the Constitution provides:
“Subject toreasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implementsa policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest”

PS Bank V. Senate Impeachment Court

MAINPOINT: The framers of the 1987 Constitution still recognized that bank accounts are not covered by either
the right to information under Section 7, Article III or under the requirement of full public disclosure under
Section 28, Article II. Unless the Bank Secrecy Act is repealed or amended, the legal order is obliged to conserve
the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank deposits.

FACTS: The subject matter of the subpoenas issued by the Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court are 5 foreign
deposit accounts with petitioner, all allegedly in the name of Renato C. Corona.
PSBank alleges it received a subpoena requiring the former to testify and bring original and certified true copies
of, among others, 5Foreign Currency Deposit Accounts in the name of Chief Justice Corona. PSBank filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to nullify and set aside the Resolution of respondent, which granted
the requests for subpoena ducestecumadtestificandum requiring them to testify and produce before the
impeachment Court documents relative to the foreign currency accounts that were alleged to belong to then SC
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona because of RA No. 6426 which provides for the absolute confidentiality of foreign
currency deposits.

ISSUE: Is the contention of the petitioner valid?

RULING: objections have been raised as to the absolute terms of the confidentiality that RA No. 6426 guarantees
by claims that the Court in several cases has relaxed or liberalized the application of the rule. According to
proponents, the secrecy guaranteed by the law has steadily declined: while the general rule facially appears to be
secrecy, the voluminous exceptions have, in substance, created a rule of exceptions. Despite this position, the
article significantly recognizes that jurisprudence of the Court points to the other direction. In short, the article at
the same time admits that bank secrecy remains the general rule.
Because of the Bank Secrecy Act, the confidentiality of bank deposits remains a basic state policy in the
Philippines. Subsequent laws, including the AMLA, may have added exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act, yet the
secrecy of bank deposits still lies as the general rule. The framers of the 1987 Constitution still recognized that
bank accounts are not covered by either the right to information under Section 7, Article III or under the
requirement of full public disclosure under Section 28, Article II. Unless the Bank Secrecy Act is repealed or
amended, the legal order is obliged to conserve the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank deposits.

In Re: Production of Court Records, 14 February 2012

MAINPOINT: Judicial Privilege refers only to matters that are part of the internal deliberations and actions of
the Court in the exercise of their adjudicatory functions and duties of Justices and are recognized as confidential.
This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government to protect the independence
of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Judicial power.

One overriding limitation on Judicial Privilege is that it can be invoked only if the information arose from the
performance of official adjudicatory functions of Members of the Judiciary. Judicial Privilege refers only to
matters that are part of the internal deliberations and actions of the Court in the exercise of their adjudicatory
functions and duties of Justices and are recognized as confidential.

Another limitation is the need to carefully weigh and calibrate its exercise when it clashes
with express constitutional rights and principles, such as freedom of expression,freedom of the press, the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern, and the State policy of full disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest ********

Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 PHIL 660 (1918-1919)

MAIN POINT: The legislative body can delegate power to local government if it is necessary.
FACTS: This case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by
the provincial officials of that province. The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board
thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore
of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action
was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved
by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity
of this section of the Administrative Code. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as
follows: Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him an approved by the provincial board.

ISSUES: Whether or not Section 2145 of the administrative code constitutes undue delegation. Whether
or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.

RULING: No. It is known that legislative power must remain where the people have lodged it.
However, there are two exceptions to this rule: (1) by immemorial practice legislative power may be
delegated to local governments; (2) the constitution itself might in specific instances allow delegation of
legislative power. In this case, the former exceptional rule is applied. An exception to the general rule
sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to
local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro,
to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board. Who but the provincial governor
and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge
"when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As officials charged with
the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to
select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune
of being in a backward state? Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful
delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
No. Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. The Court have the opinion
that, action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty
without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and
that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary
servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate
exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section
2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. This is the true ruling of the court.

Antipolo v NHA

FACTS: Virgilio Yuson acquired a lot from Antipolo Realty Corp, which he paid on an instalment basis but due
to the failure of Antipolo corp to develop the subd on which the lot was situated made yuson stop paying, however
when the issue was addressed to resume such payment Virgilio decline to which resulted the recinding of contract
and forfeiture of the paid instalment made thus Yuson brought the dispute to NHA. NHA reinstated the contract
to sell but Antipolo filed MR that NHA had no jurisdiction over such since it was already lodge in the regular
courts.

ISSUE: Whether NHA has jurisdiction over the controversy?

RULING: YES. It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform
adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial
authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor
Relations Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for special competence
and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character
and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and
clogged.

PITC v Angeles

FACTS: The controversy springs from the issuance by the PITC of Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-
01, applications to the PITC for importation from the People's Republic of China requiring trade balancing
requirements on which Remington and Firestone failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export credits
equivalent to the value of their importations so further import applications were withheld by petitioner PITC from
private respondents, such that the latter were both barred from importing goods from PROC. They specifically
asserts that the questioned Administrative Order is an undue restriction of trade, and hence, unconstitutional, They
likewise argue that PITC is not empowered to issue the Administrative Order because no grant of such power was
made under the Trade Protocols of 1989, 1990 or 1991.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid delegation of powers to PITC to issue administrative order?

RULING: YES. Executive power is vested in the Executive Department,35 and it is for the latter to delegate the
exercise of such power among its designated agencies. In sum, the PITC was legally empowered to issue
Administrative Orders, as a valid exercise of a power ancillary to legislation.
However it was found out that the Administrative order failed to comply with the requirement to be valid such as
its publication in the official gazette.
Antitiw vs Zamora

FACTS: The ratification of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras mandating the Congress to enact organic acts pursuant to section 18 of article X
of the Constitution. Thus, by virtue of the residual powers of President Cory Aquino she promulgated E.O 220
creating CAR. Then the congress enacted R.A 6766, an act providing for organic act for the cordillera autonomous
region, a plebiscite was cast but was not approve by the people. The court declared that E.O 220 to be still in force
and effect until properly repealed or amended. Later on February 15, 2000, President Estrada signed the General
Appropriations Act of 2000 (GAA 2000) which includes the assailed special provisions, then issued an E.O 270
to extend the implementation of the winding up of operations of the CAR and extended it by virtue of E.O 328.
The petitioners seek the declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of the special provisions of RA 870 (GAA2000)
directing that the appropriation for the CAR shall be spent to wind up its activities and pay the separation and
retirement benefits of all the affected members and employees. Petitioners posit that the questioned paragraph in
the 2000 GAA had the effect of abolishing the CAR

ISSUE: Whether the CAR was abolished with the reduction of its budgetary allocation?

RULING: No. The CAR was not abolished, as concluded by petitioners, with the reduction of its budgetary
allocation; what took place was only a discontinuance of its programs and activities. In fact, E.O. No. 328, the
implementing rule of the questioned Special Provisions,provides only for the deactivation of the CAR bodies
upon the lapse of its operational period as provided in the E.O.

Even assuming that the limitation on the CAR's budget had the effect of abolishing certain offices, the authority
of Congress to do so cannot be denied and should be recognized. Except for such offices as are created by the
Constitution, the creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function. Insofar as the legislative power in
this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it is supreme; When in the exigencies of government, it
is necessary to create and define duties the legislative branch has the discretion to determine whether additional
offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be attached to and become ex-oficio duties of existing
offices. The concept of separation of powers presupposes mutual respect by and between the three departments
of the government. Therefore, the implementation of E.O. No. 220 is an executive prerogative while the sourcing
of funds to support the CAR's activities is within the province of the legislature. Absent any grave abuse of
discretion, the Court cannot correct the acts of either the Executive or Congress in respect to the policies
concerning the CAR.
SEC v. Interport 567 SCRA 354

FACTS: The Board of Directors of IRC approved a MOA with GHB. It is alleged herein that a press release
announcing the approval of the agreement was sent to the PSE through facsimile and the SEC, but the facsimile
machine of the SEC could not receive it. However, the SEC received reports that the IRC failed to make timely
public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing
this material insider information. For this reason, the SEC required the directors to appear before the SEC to
explain the alleged failure to disclose material information as required by the Rules on Disclosure of Material
Facts. Unsatisfied with the explanation, the SEC issued an order finding that the IRC violated the Rules in
connection with the then Old Securities Act when it failed to make timely disclosures of its negotiations with
GHB. In addition, the SEC found that the directors of IRC entered into transactions involving IRC shares in
violation of the Revised Securities Act.

The case reached the CA and said court ruled in favor of the respondents and effectively enjoined the SEC
from filing any criminal, civil or administrative cases against respondents. In its resolution, the CA stated that
since there are no rules and regulations implementing the rules regarding disclosure, insider trading or any of the
provisions of the Revised Securities Act, the SEC has no statutory authority to file any suit against respondents.
The CA, therefore, prohibited the SEC from taking cognizance or initiating any action against the respondents for
the alleged violations of the Revised Securities Act.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SEC has authority to file suit against respondents for violations of the RSA.

RULING: The Revised Securities Act does not require the enactment of implementing rules to make it binding
and effective. The provisions of the RSA are sufficiently clear and complete by themselves. The requirements are
specifically set out and the acts which are enjoined are determinable. To rule that absence of implementing rules
can render ineffective an act of Congress would empower administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by
delaying the implementing rules. Where the statute contains sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent (as
in this case, the RSA) there should be no impediment as to its implementation.

MAINPOINT: It is well established that administrative authorities have the power to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given statute and to effectuate its policies, provided such rules and regulations conform
to the terms and standards prescribed by the statute as well as purport to carry into effect its general policies.
Nevertheless, it is undisputable that the rules and regulations cannot assert for themselves a more extensive
prerogative or deviate from the mandate of the statute. Moreover, where the statute contains sufficient standards
and an unmistakable intent, as in the case of Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, there should be no
impediment to its implementation.

PAGE 9

Valid delegation
Requisite of a valid delegation

Agustin vs. Edu


GR No. L-49112
Doctrine of the Case: The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of power, the legislature must set defined standards. In the case
at bar the clear objective is public safety.
Facts: Letter of Instruction No. 299 was issued by then President Marcos which directs motor vehicle owners,
among others, to “have at all times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting
of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors.”

Included in its provisions is the authorization to the Land Transportation Commissioner to require every motor
vehicle owner to procure from any and present at the registration of his vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early
warning device, as d bed of any brand or make chosen by mid motor vehicle. Also, the said LOI authorizes the
Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate such rule and regulations as are appropriate to effectively
implement this order.

The Petitioner allege that there exists undue delegation of legislative power in the issuance of the said LOI.

Issue: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power to the Land Transportation Commissioner
in the issuance of the assailed LOI

Ruling: There is none. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative
power is equally without any support well-settled legal doctrines. In the Reflector Law clearly, the legislative
objective is public safety.

Public safety, in this case, provides for a sufficient standard which need not be included or specified in the
wordings of the law itself.

Free Telephone Workers vs. Min. of Labor


108 SCRA 757
Doctrine of the Case: The delegation to The Minister of Labor of the power to assume jurisdiction in a
labor dispute likely to effect the national interest or to certify the same to the NLRC for arbitration does
not constitute an undue delegation of legislative powers.
Facts: In 1981, there was an ongoing labor dispute between the Free Telephone Workers Union (the Union) and
the Philippine Long Distance Company. Eventually, the Minister of Labor (Blas Ople) assumed jurisdiction over
the issue pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code. The Union assailed the provisions of Article 264 as it averred
that it is an undue delegation of power by Congress to the Minister of Labor. They averred that by granting
discretion to the Minister of Labor to whether or not refer a labor dispute for compulsory arbitration to the National
Labor Relations Commission, it also effectively granted the Minister to make or unmake the law on free collective
bargaining.

Issue: Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of power.

Ruling: No. In the first place, this issue is not yet ripe for adjudication as the Minister of Labor was yet to take
on the entirety of the case. There is still no ground to rule that there is an unconstitutional application of the law.

The Union failed to make out a case of undue delegation of legislative power. There could be, however, an
unconstitutional application. For while the Constitution allows compulsory arbitration, it must be stressed that the
exercise of such competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental principle and state policy that the state should
afford protection to labor. But as to whether or not there is an unconstitutional application of the law, that is yet
to be determined since the Minister of Labor has not yet made a factual determination of the labor dispute in issue.

There is no undue delegation in this case. The law in issue is complete and it set a sufficient standard. The law
cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to “strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest.”

Guingona Jr. vs. Carague


196 SCRA 221 (1991)
Doctrine of the Case: Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid,
necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain
by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. Hence, in this case the questioned laws are complete
in all their essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.
Facts: The budget appropriated for the Department of Education Culture and Sports was increased substantially
following the enactment of two Presidential Decrees.

The Petitioners allege the illegality and unconstitutionality of the said increase as the said automatic
appropriations under the Presidential Decree as they have not originated from the Congress as required for by the
Constitution. They also assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation,
otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount
appropriated for the debt service.

Issue: Whether or not the substantial increase brought by the automatic appropriation from two Presidential
Decrees are valid.

Ruling: Yes. The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms and
conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.

The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that
the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the
principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as
guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor
as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt payment and/or
advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the country.

Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature
of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided
in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing.
The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or
indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international
markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive
implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury.

Complete in Itself/ Completeness Test

Araneta vs. Gatmaitan


101 PHIL 328
Doctrine of the Case: In so far as the protection of fish fry or fish eggs is concerned the Fisheries Act is
complete in itself leaving only to the Secretary of Agriculture Natural Resources the promulgation of rules
and regulations to carry into effect the legislative intent.
Facts: Executive Order 22 was issued by the President to prohibit the usage of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area.
This Executive Order was subsequently amended by more Executive Orders made for the same purpose.

A group of Otter trawl operators took action into court praying and enjoining the Secretary of Justice from the
enforcement of the said Executive Order. The operators further argue that the said Executive Orders are
unconstitutional for being invalid exercise of legislative power.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed Executive Orders unconstitutional for being invalid exercise of legislative
power

Ruling: The Executive Orders are valid and constitutional. There are laws which grant authority to the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources to regulate or ban fishing by trawl and since the Agriculture and Natural
Resources is one of the Executive Department, the President has control over it.

The exercise of the President of such authority cannot be considered as an undue delegation of legislative power.
As already held by this Court, the true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and the conferring
of authority or discretion as to the execution of law consists in that the former necessary involves a discretion as
to what the law shall be, while in the latter the authority or discretion as to its execution has to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.

In the law, there was (1) a declaration of an unlawful act, (2) an authorization to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to pose restrictions on the unlawful act and identification of violators and (3) a penalization of
such unlawful act. Hence, there is a complete law which leaves it to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources the promulgation of rules and regulations to carry into effect the legislative intent.

Marcos v. CA
278 SCRA 843
Doctrine of the Case: The Central Bank Act is the penal law which defined the crimes which allegedly were
committed by Imelda Marcos. The C.B. Circulars concerned merely spelled out the details of the offense.
Hence, there is no undue delegation of power because the law and the circulars are complete in itself.

Facts: Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued which bans residents, firms, associations and corporations from
maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without permission from the Central Bank and violating the
provisions under the circular would constitute a criminal offense under Section 34 of R.A. No.265, as amended
(the Central Bank Act).
Imelda Marcos was charged for violating Central Bank Circular No. 960, hence, several informations were filed
against her.

During the pendency of the cases, C.B. Circ. 1318 and C.B. Circ. 1353 were issued which basically allowed
residents, firms, associations and corporations to maintain foreign exchange accounts abroad but the circulars
have a saving clause excepting from the circular pending criminal actions involving violations of C.B. Circ. 960.

Marcos filed a Motion to Quash the informations filed against her based on the new circulars. The RTC denied
the Motion so did the CA hence the appeal. Marcos averred that C.B. Circ. 960, as well as the Central Bank Act
(which allowed the Central Bank to issue circulars) is an undue delegation of legislative power because the said
law allowed the Central Bank to legislate (define crimes) penal laws and determine penalties therefor.

Issue: Whether or not the CB Circular 960 is incomplete and therefore constitute an undue delegation of
legislative power.

Ruling: No. There is no undue delegation. The Central Bank Act is the penal law which defined the crimes which
allegedly were committed by Imelda Marcos. The C.B. Circulars concerned merely spelled out the details of the
offense. These circulars are mere administrative regulations and not the penal laws itself alleged to have been
violated by Marcos. This is still the rule on the matter and, in the instant case, the Central Bank Act defined the
offense and its penalty while the questioned circular merely spelled out the details of the offense.

Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board


GR No. 157870
Doctrine of the Case: The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify the qualification standards,
as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the
Constitution.
Facts: This case questions the constitutionality of Section 36(g) of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drug Act of 2002 as well as COMELEC Resolution which requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office.

Among the many allegations of the petitioner, the one that relates to this topic is that they allege that it provides
for an additional qualification for a candidate for public office contrary to what is required and mandated by the
Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the Congress can enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in
addition to those laid down by the Constitution.

Ruling: No. Section 36(g) is declared unconstitutional by the Court. The Congress cannot validly amend or
otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a
constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution. A candidate for senator needs only to meet the
qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3)
literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need
not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate.

Pacific Steam Laundry vs. LLDA


GR No. 165299
Doctrine of the Case: Despite the implied power of an agency to impose penalties, the same is still bound
by limitations that may be found in the law itself. Otherwise, an undue delegation of legislative power exist.
Facts: The Pacific Steam Laundry was investigated by the LLDA for environmental violations. During the course
of the investigation, the LLDA found that untreated wastewater generated from petitioner’s laundry washing
activities was discharged directly to the San Francisco Del Monte River. In addition to this, it was discovered that
the petitioner did not comply with certain environmental licenses and clearances. This prompted an action by the
LLDA against the Petitioner.

In the same action, the LLDA ordered PSL to pay a daily penalty for the pollution they have caused. This daily
penalty was reckoned from the time of the commencement of the hearing of the case.

The Petitioner question the authority of the LLDA to order the payment of the daily penalty. They allege that it
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and that it has no statutory basis.

Issue: Whether or not there is a statutory basis for the imposition of penalty by the LLDA and if there is, does it
constitute an undue delegation of legislative power.

Ruling: Yes. Though not express, the LLDA is impliedly allowed to impose penalties. This is following its its
express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the
Laguna Lake region.

As regards it being an undue delegation of legislative power, the Court ruled that there is none. The LLDA’s
power to impose fines is not unrestricted. In this case, LLDA investigated the pollution complaint against
petitioner and conducted wastewater sampling of petitioner’s effluent. It was only after the investigation result
showing petitioner’s failure to meet the established water and effluent quality standards that LLDA imposed a
fine against petitioner.

Fixes a Standard/Sufficient Standard Test

People vs. Rosenthal


GR No. L-46076
Doctrine of the Case: “Public Interest” in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer
in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits.
Facts: Rosenthal and Osmena were charged, in two cases, violations of the Act 2581 or the Blue Sky Law. The
said law regulates the offering and sale of securities to protect the public from fraud.

Section 5 of the said law imposes upon the Insular Treasurer the mandatory duty to examine the statements and
documents thus filed and the additional duty to make or cause to be made, if deemed advisable by him, a detailed
examination of the affairs of the applicant. Section 5 also provides the following: (1) "whatever the said Treasurer
of the Philippine Islands is satisfied, either with or without the examination herein provided, that any person,
partnership, association or corporation is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided
for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership, association or corporation a certificate
or permit reciting that such person, partnership, association or corporation has complied with the provisions of
this Act, and that such person, partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to offer
the securities named in said certificate or permit for sale"; (2) that "said Treasurer shall furthermore have
authority, whenever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or permit", and that (3)
"an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary
of Finance."

The appellants question the said law and asserts its unconstitutionality on grounds that no standard or rule is fixed
in the Act which can guide said official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be
issued, thereby making his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result that, legislative
powers being unduly delegated.

Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient standard set by the law in the power imposed to the Internal Treasurer.

Ruling: Yes. The SC held that “public interest” in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer
in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits.

Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission is invalid because the stated criterion is
uncertain. Again, the criterion is the public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general
reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations. The purpose of the Act, the requirement
it imposes, and the context of the provision in question show the contrary. . . ”

Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA


166 SCRA 533
Doctrine of the Case: The sufficient standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino
workers to "fair and equitable employment practices.
Facts: The widow of a Chief Officer of M/V Eastern Polaris sued Easter Shipping Lines for damages following
the death of his husband in Tokyo, Japan. The claim is based, among others, on Memorandum Circular No. 2 of
the POEA.

Memorandum Circular No. 2 provide, among others, for death benefits and burial expenses for the death of
overseas workers while on duty. This is pursuant to a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic
shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.

Eastern Shipping Lines contend the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 for being violative of the principle
of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the
said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion
which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

Issue: Whether or not the POEA is in any authority to validly issue Memorandum Circular No. 2.

Ruling: Yes. As to authority, EO 797 confers authority to issue such memorandum to the POEA.

As regards to the substantive contents of the said memorandum, the validity of the memorandum cannot be denied.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to
do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited
as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is
discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."

Tablarin vs. Gutierrez


152 SCRA 730
Doctrine of the Case: The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority
by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract.
Facts: The petitioners of this case sought admission into colleges of medicine. However, they did not successfully
pass or did not actually take the National Medical Admission Test required by the Board of Medical Education.
This test requirement was made by the Board of Medical Education pursuant to Section 5 of RA 2382.

The Petitioners allege that Section 5 of RA 2382 offended the constitutional prohibition of undue delegation of
legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board of
Medical Education.

Issue: Whether or not there is lack of sufficient standard in RA 2382 which renders it to be an invalid and
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.

Ruling: No. The Court believes and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959
Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same
Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the non-delegation principle.

The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency
like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract.

The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The
standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of
the act considered as a whole.

Conference v. POEA
243 SCRA 666
Doctrine of the Case: The Congress may constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to the administrative agency. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to
the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with
the standards prescribed by the law.
Facts: Petitioner, Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., is an incorporated association of licensed
Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies who hire and recruit Filipino
seamen for and in behalf of the irrespective foreign ship-owner-principals, seek to annul Resolution No. 01, series
of 1994, of the Governing Board of the POEA and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05.
The petitioners contended that POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting
death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamenworking in ocean-going vessels; only Congress can.

Governing Board Resolution No. 1: the POEA Governing Board resolves to amend and increase the compensation
and other benefits as specified under Part II, Section C, paragraph 1 and Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers

Issue: Whether or Not the POEA can promulgate rules by virtue of delegation of legislative power.

Ruling: Yes. The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA based on impermissible
delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly contented by the public respondents, brushed aside by this
Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA.

The governing Board of the Administration (POEA) shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).

To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence
to provide the required direct and efficacious not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be
expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.

While the making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter
may constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation
and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate
situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity
with the standards prescribed by the law.

That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely further amended the previous
Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitable
employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No. 797 can no longer be disputed.

Osmena vs. Orbos


220 SCRA 253
Doctrine of the Case: A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which the legislative purpose may be carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may either be express or implied. If the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.
Facts: Section 8 of PD No. 1956 is being assailed of its constitutionality for being violative of the prohibition
against undue delegation of legislative power. The assailed provision confers authority upon the Energy
Regulatory Board to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which
the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to protect the local consumer by
stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional
amounts to augment the resources of the Fund.

Issue: Whether or not the authority granted to the ERB through Section 8 of PD No. 1956 valid and constitutional

Ruling: Yes. The Court found Section 8 of PD No. 1956 free of any impediment. To avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters
of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to
repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public
agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the
criterion by which the legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard
may either be express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though
does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered
as a whole.

The standard, as the Court has already stated, may even be implied. In that light, there can be no ground upon
which to sustain the petition, inasmuch as the challenged law sets forth a determinable standard which guides the
exercise of the power granted to the ERB. By the same token, the proper exercise of the delegated power may be
tested with ease. It seems obvious that what the law intended was to permit the additional imposts for as long as
there exists a need to protect the general public and the petroleum industry from the adverse consequences of
pump rate fluctuations.
Viola v. Alunan
277 SCRA 409
Doctrine of the Case: Congress can delegate the power to create positions such as these has been settled
by decisions upholding the validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the President of the Philippines
to create,abolish or merge offices in the executive department
Facts: Viola, as a barangay chairman, filed a petition for prohibition challenging the validity of the Art III, Sec.1-
2 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay
Officers insofar as they provide for the election of first, second, and third vice presidents and for auditors for the
National Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters.

He contended that the questioned positions are in excess of those provided in the LGC Sec.493 which mentions
as elective positions only those of the president, vice president, and five members of the board of directors in each
chapter at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels and thus the
implementing rules expand the numbers in the LGC in violation of the principle that implementing rules and
regulations cannot add or detract from the provisions of the law they are designed to implement.

Issue: Whether or not the additional positions in question have been created without authority of law

Ruling: No. The creation of additional positions is authorized by Sec. 493 of the LGC which in fact requires –
and not merely authorizes – the board of directors to “create such other positions as it may deem necessary for
the management of the chapter”. To begin with, the creation of these positions was actually made in the
Constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng mga barangay which was adopted by the First Barangay National
Assembly.

There is no undue delegation of power by Congress in this case. SC decisions have upheld the validity of
reorganization statutes authorizing the President of the Philippines to create, abolish, or merge offices in the
executive management.

While the board of directors of a local chapter can create additional positions to provide for the needs of the
chapter, the board of directors of the National Liga must be deemed to have the power to create additional
positions not only for its management but also for that of all the chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and
metropolitan political subdivision levels. Otherwise the National Liga would be no different from the local
chapters. The fact is that Sec. 493 grants the power to create positions not only to the boards of the local chapters
but to the board of the Liga at the national level as well.

Abakada vs. Ermita


469 SCRA 1
Doctrine of the Case: In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or
not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the
hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the
legislature.
Facts: Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 particularly
Sections 4, 5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC). These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation
of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following
conditions have been satisfied, to wit:

. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006,
raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds
two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or

(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1
½%).

Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive
authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. They further
argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services and cannot be included within the
purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon
merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the
President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions
precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance
will make the recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance
can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately,
it is the President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.
Issue: Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1
and 2 of the Constitution.

Ruling: No. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a
law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when
it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy
that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.

Beltran v. Secretary of Health


476 SCRA 168
Doctrine of the Case: In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or
not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the
hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other
appointee or delegate of the Legislature. Except as to matters of detail that may be left to be filled in by
rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards, an act
of the Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or
definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it.
Facts: RA 7719 (National Blood Services Act) was enacted in 1994, seeking to provide an adequate supply of
safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. Section 7 thereof
provided for the phase-out of all commercial blood banks within 2 years after its effectivity.

The Act was passed after studies showed that blood transfusions could lead to transmission of diseases, and that
blood sold by persons to commercial blood banks are three times more likely to have blood transfusion
transmissible diseases than those donated to the Philippine National Red Cross.

Petitioners, comprising the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks assail
the constitutionality of RA 7719 on the ground among others that it is an improper and unwarranted delegation
of legislative power. According to petitioners, the Act was incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature, and
the latter failed to fix a standard to which the Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of his
functions. Petitioners also contend that the two-year extension period that may be granted by the Secretary of
Health for the phasing out of commercial blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act constrained the Secretary
to legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of legislative power.

Issue: Whether or not section 7 of R.A. 7719 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power

Ruling: No. Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear
from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and
has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks
in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health
in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of
blood through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the
Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.

The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of
said Act. Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for commercial
blood banks shall be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 “based on the result of a careful study
and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety.” This power to ascertain the existence of facts and
conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a period of extension for said phase-out can be delegated by
Congress. The true distinction between the power to make laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by
the fact that the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall
be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.

Bayan v. Ermita
488 SCRA 226
Doctrine of the Case: B.P. 880 provides a precise and sufficient standard—the clear and present danger
test stated in Sec. 6(a); The reference to “imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil” in Sec. 6(c)
substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard.
Facts: Three petitioners are involved in this case: the first is Bayan, second are the 26 invidual petitioners Jess
del Prado et al and third is the Kilusang Mayo Uno, all of who are recognized as taxpayers and official residents
who allege themselves to be staging a peaceful mass assembly when police forces under the rule of BP 880
forcible and violently dispersed them much to their dismay, which incurred their members injuries and arrest.

These groups of concerned citizens are attesting that such manner of dispersal of abiding by “no permit, no rally”
policy, and that delegation of powers in the local government, specifically by the Mayor Lito Atienza, in the said
dispersal were unconstitutional, as well as the implementation of BP 880 itself. They seek to stop such policies
of ruthless dispersal, as it violates their basic right to freedom of expression, redress of grievances and most of all
their right to peaceably assemble.

Issue: Whether or not B.P. 880 which delegates powers to the Mayor provides clear standards

Ruling: Yes. As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard –
the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6 (a). The reference to “imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil” in Sec. 6 (c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent
Mayor has the same power independently under Republic Act No. 7160 is thus not necessary to resolve in these
proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments.

The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be
struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some
police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does
not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner
of assemblies. Far from being insidious, “maximum tolerance” is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government.
The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally “permits” is valid because it is subject to the
constitutionally-sound “clear and present danger” standard.

Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima


562 SCRA 251
Doctrine of the Case: "Public interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare" and
"simplicity, economy and welfare" may be considered as sufficient standards even if the law itself does not
provide for the standards.
Facts: Republic Act 9335 was enacted. The said law is intended to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation
of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.

The Petitioners, among others, assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President
as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC
officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%,
the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been
delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an
unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9335, insofar as granting the President the power to fix revenue targets, constitutional
and valid

Ruling: RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and
the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Thus, it is valid and constitutional.

Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the
BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee and stated in
the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing submitted by the President to Congress. Thus, the
determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the
DBCC.

Also, the Court have recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest," "justice and equity,"
"public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare."

Filling in the Details

Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas


242 SCRA 192
Doctrine of the Case: Court considers that Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public office as
that term is used in the law of public officers. It is essential to note that none of the “changes in
organization” introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or necessarily involved the termination
of the relationship of public employment between the Commission and any of its officers and employees.
Facts: Fernandez was then the Director of the Office Personnel and Audit of the CSC. He was transferred to
Region V. Another guy, Director Delima, was reassigned to Region III. Petitioner argue that Resolution No. 94-
3710 of the CSC effected the “abolition” of public offices, something which may be done only by the same
legislative authority which had created those public offices in the first place. Moreover, they complained violation
of due process, that there was a constructive illegal dismissal as a result of their being transferred; and that this
was a demotion.
Issue: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710 to the
extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection
and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research and Development Office]

Ruling: Yes. The Court considers that Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public office as that term
is used in the law of public officers. The objectives sought by the Commission in enacting Resolution No. 94-
3710 were described in that Resolution in broad terms as “effect[ing] changes in the organization to streamline
[the Commission’s] operations and improve delivery of service.” These changes in internal organization were
rendered necessary by, on the one hand, the decentralization and devolution of the Commission’s functions
effected by the creation of fourteen (14) Regional Offices and ninety-five (95) Field Offices of the Commission
throughout the country, to the end that the Commission and its staff may be brought closer physically to the
government employees that they are mandated to serve.

Chiongbian vs Orbos
245 SCRA 253
Doctrine of the Case: A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied.
Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject
as that of the challenged legislation.
Facts: This case questions the validity of the Organic Act creating the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
Particularly and related to the topic, the petitioners allege that the Organic Act gives undue authorization to the
President to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard
for the exercise of the power delegated.

The Solicitor General argues that the “merging” may be considered as an executive act and not one that is
legislative.

Issue: Whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative in character, as petitioners contend, or
whether it is executive in character, as respondents claim it is, and, in any event, whether Art. XIX, §13 is invalid
because it contains no standard to guide the President's discretion

Ruling: There is no abdication of legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge
administrative regions. The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the
President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous
legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President
as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the
administration of local governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should
have regional offices.

As regards the sufficiency of standards, the Court ruled that there exist a sufficient standard to render the grant of
authority to be valid. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied. Nor
need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that
of the challenged legislation,

With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy
underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to
wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent
with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction
of the public business." Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions were established in accordance with
this policy, it is logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to "merge [by administrative determination]
the existing regions" in view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now constituting the
Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of
administrative regions.

Rodrigo vs. Sandiganbayan


309 SCRA 661
Doctrine of the Case: Congress however may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to
fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law for the reasons stated above.
Nevertheless, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
(a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Facts: In a previous decision, the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner mayor and
his co-accused. Although Sec. 4 a. of PD 1606, as amended, did not expressly include the position of Municipal
Mayor as among those within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, such position is embraced in the catch-all
provision of Sec. 4 a. (5). And in the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, although it did not
specify the Grade accorded to the position of Municipal Mayor, the DBM, in accordance with the said law,
prepared an Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades where the position of Municipal
Mayor was assigned Salary Grade 27 and, hence, covered under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Here,
petitioners, in their motion for reconsideration, alleged that the authority of the DBM is an undue delegation of
legislative powers, determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Further, the same was limited to the
preparation of the Index, where an enacted law is required for its adoption.

Issue: Whether or not the preparation of an Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades
invalid for done on the basis of undelegated legislative power.

Ruling: It is both valid and justified. The reason Congress delegated the administration of the Compensation and
Position Classification System to the DBM is precisely to relieve itself of this cumbersome task, leaving to the
DBM the preparation of the Index to fill in the details. Indeed, this is the very rationale for the delegation of
powers by the legislature to administrative agencies. With their specialized knowledge, administrative agencies
are more up to tasks involving their expertise. Through delegation, Congress may devote more time to address
other pressing matters.

Moreover, Congress may be slow to act on matters requiring continuous decision. With the growing complexity
of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the
legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts. It must be clarified that what Congress delegated
to the DBM is the administration of the Compensation and Position Classification System, and, with it the
assignment of Salary Grades . not the determination of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. When the DBM
assigns a position a certain Salary Grade, it does so pursuant to its authority under R.A. No. 6758. That by such
allocation the official comes under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is only incidental
to the exercise of such authority. R.A. No. 6758 is not an undue delegation of legislative powers.

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated, or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestats delegata
non delegari potest. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not
only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting
immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. Congress however
may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement
or administration of a law for the reasons stated above. Nevertheless, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

Tondo Medical vs. Court of Appeals


GR No. 167324, July 17, 2007
Doctrine of the Case: The Administrative Code grants the President the power to reorganize the Office of
the President in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his or her office to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency
Facts: Petitioner claims that Executive Order No. 1023 is void on the ground that it was issued by the President
in excess of his authority. They maintain that the structural and functional reorganization of the DOH is an
exercise of legislative functions, which the President usurped when he issued Executive Order No. 102.

Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 102 is unconstitutional.

Ruling: It is constitutional. The Administrative Code grants the President the power to reorganize the Office of
the President in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his or her office to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. To remain effective and efficient, it must be capable of being shaped and
reshaped by the President in the manner the Chief Executive deems fit to carry out presidential directives and
policies.

Furthermore, the DOH is among the cabinet-level departments enumerated under Book IV of the Administrative
Code, mainly tasked with the functional distribution of the work of the President. Indubitably, the DOH is an
agency which is under the supervision and control of the President and, thus, part of the Office of the President

Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of the President to issue. The President
did not usurp any legislative prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the Presidents
constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative
Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.

Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary


677 SCRA 408 (2012)

3
Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health
Doctrine of the Case: The abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially
created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing
"delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.
Facts: On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13),
abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and transferring its functions to the Office of the
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative
and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).

Finance Secretary Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint for grave misconduct against Pichay, Jr.,
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent
members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, due to the purchase by the LWUA of 445k shares of stock of Express
Savings Bank, Inc.

Pichay was ordered by Executive Secretary Ochoa, Jr. to submit their respective written explanations under oath.

Pichay filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that a same case is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman

Issue: Whether E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for abrogating unto an administrative office a quasi-judicial function
through and E.O. and not through legislative enactment by Congress.

Ruling: No, because the President has a Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under
E.O. 292. The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and
efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner
he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of
the President.

Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the
ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative authority
to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.

Arroyo v. DOJ
681 SCRA 181 (2012)
Doctrine of the Case: View that to discharge its duty effectively, the Constitution endowed the COMELEC
with special features which elevate it above other investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the
government. Hence, the issuance of a Joint Order by the DOJ and COMELEC is valid.
Facts: On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting
a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and
manipulation cases

In its Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007
senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated. It
recommended that Petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, GMA, and Mike Arroyo be subjected to preliminary
investigation for electoral sabotage and manipulating the election results.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of
the Joint Panel.

Issue: Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 "Creating and Constituting a Joint DOJ-COMELEC
Preliminary Investigation Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections Electoral
Fraud and Manipulation Cases" is constitutional the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional body.

Ruling: Yes. In view of the foregoing disquisition, we find no impediment for the creation of a Joint Committee.
Under the Joint Order, resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall still
be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. This shows that the Comelec,
though it acts jointly with the DOJ, remains in control of the proceedings. In no way can we say that the Comelec
has thereby abdicated its independence to the executive department.

Undue Delegation of Legislative Power

People vs. Vera


GR No. L-45685
Doctrine of the Case: No dispensation by non obstante of or to any statute, or part thereof, should be
allowed; but the same should be held void and of no effect, except a dispensation be allowed of in such
statute.
Facts: The accused in this case applied for and was granted with probation under Act No 4221, “An Act
Establishing Probation for Persons, Eighteen Years of Age or Above, Convicted of Certain Crimes by the Courts
of the Philippine Islands; Providing Probation Officers Therefor; And For Other Purposes."

The private prosecutors sought nullification of the grant of probation by stating that Act No. 4221 is an undue
delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces.

Particularly, the private prosecutors assail Section 11 of the said law which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary
of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall
be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.

Issue: Whether or not Section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitute undue delegation of legislative power

Ruling: Section 11 of Act No. 422 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the
provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.

In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether
the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing
was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.

In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of their discretionary power to
determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces? What standards are fixed
by the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not,
by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the
exercise of their discretionary power.

The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If
the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not
susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the
provincial boards.

US v. Barrias
11 Phil 327 (1908)
Doctrine of the Case: The doctrine of non-delegation of powers is basedon the maxim of "potestas delegata
non potest delegari" which means what has been delegated cannot inturn be delegated. The doctrine rests
on the ethical principle that a delegated power constitutes not only aright but a duty to be performed by
the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment actingimmediately upon the matter and not
through the inter ening mind of another.
Facts: In 1904, Congress, through a law, Act No. 1136, authorized the Collector of Customs to regulate the
business of lighterage. Lighterage is a business involving the shipping of goods by use of lighters or cascos (small
ships/boats). The said law also provides that the Collector may promulgate such rules to
implement Act No. 1136. Further, Act No. 1136 provides that in case a fine is to be imposed, it should not exceed
one hundred dollars. Pursuant to this, the Collector promulgated Circular No. 397.

Meanwhile, Aniceto Barrias was caught navigating the Pasig River using a lighter which is manually powered by
bamboo poles (sagwan). Such is a violation of Circular No. 397 because under said Circular, only steam powered
ships should be allowed to navigate the Pasig River. However, in the information against Barrias, it was alleged
that the imposable penalty against him should be a fine not exceeding P500.00 at the discretion of the court – this
was pursuant to Circular No. 397 which provides:

For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less
than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.

Barrias now challenged the validity of such provision of the Circular as it is entirely different from the penal
provision of Act. No. 1136 which only provided a penalty of not exceeding $100.

In this court, counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of Circular No. 397 on the ground that if the acts of
the Philippine Commission bear the interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law, they are
void, as constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power.

Issue: Whether or not the authority conferred to the Collector to promulgate said Circular constitutes an invalid
delegation of legislative power

Ruling: Yes. A law authorizing the Collector to impose penalties for violations of his rules is invalid, as
vesting in him upon a power exclusively lodged in Congress. The Collector cannot exercise a power exclusively
lodged in Congress. Hence, Barrias should be penalized in accordance to the penalty being imposed by Act No.
1136. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the legislature to make
laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the
state has located the authority, there it must remain; and by that constitutional agency alone the laws must be
made until the Constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high
prerogative has been entrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which
the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for
those to which alone the people have seen fit confide this sovereign trust.

This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty
to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment

United States vs. Panlilio


28 Phil 608
Doctrine of the Case: The orders of an administrative officer or body issued pursuant to a statute have the
force of law but are not penal in nature and a violation of such order is not an offense punishable by law
unless the statute expressly penalizes such violation.
Facts: The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantine of animals suffering from
dangerous communicable or contagious disease and sentencing him to pay a fine of 40 pesos with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The accused, however, contends that the facts alleged in the information constitutes a violation of Bureau of
Agriculture and not a violation of Act No. 1760.

Issue: Whether or not the accused may be held liable or penalized for violation of a Bureau of Agriculture order

Ruling: No. There is nowhere in Act No 1760 that penalizes the violation of orders issued by the Bureau of
Agriculture.

In relation to the discussion in this topic, if a person violates an order by an implementing agency and the law in
which the order is based upon does not provide for penal sanctions, the violator cannot be held criminally liable.
To allow such will be an overreach of the authority delegated to such body by the statute.

Note: No undue delegation was discussed in this case.

People vs. Maceren


79 SCRA 450
Doctrine of the Case: The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare
what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of
the penalty provided for in the law itself.
Facts: The accused of this case resorted to electro fishing by using a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment.
They are held liable for violation of RA 5440 or the Fisheries law.

In their defense, the accused raised that usage of electricity in fishing is not obnoxious and they cannot be held
liable under the said law as it is not specifically stated as a violation by the said law. However, in 1967, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a resolution prohibiting electro fishin in all waters of the
Philippines.

The accused questions the said resolution on grounds of invalid exercise of judicial power by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Issue: Whether or not the resolution prohibiting electro fishing valid

Ruling: No. The resolution and its subsequent amendments are illegal and invalid and constitutes an undue
delegation of power. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. Thus, this
makes the questioned resolutions devoid of any legal basis.

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an
offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law
itself.

Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law have the force of law. As he
exercises the rule-making power by delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should not transcend
the bound demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be improperly exercising
legislative power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body.

People vs. Dacuycuy


173 SCRA 90
Doctrine of the Case: An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative
authority to the courts exists in cases where discretion is conferred upon said courts. It is clear, however,
that when the courts are said to exercise a discretion, it must be a mere legal discretion which is exercised
in discerning the course prescribed by law and which, when discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow.
Facts: Republic Act No. 4670, or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, is being contended by the
Respondent for being unconstitutional. Violators of the said law are penalized with imprisonment wherein the
duration is left solely to the discretion of the Court.

Petitioner counters that the discretion granted therein by the legislature to the courts to determine the period of
imprisonment is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue delegation of legislative power. It is
contended that the prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power is concerned only with the delegation
of power to make laws and not to interpret the same. It is also submitted that Republic Act No. 4670 vests in the
courts the discretion, not to fix the period of imprisonment, but to choose which of the alternative penalties shall
be imposed.

The trial judge ruled sustaining the Petitioner's contention on his theory that "the principle of separation of powers
is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length of sentence or amount of fine between designated
limits in sentencing persons convicted of crime

Issue: Whether or not the provision wherein the duration of imprisonment is left solely to the discretion of the
Court unconstitutional.

Ruling: Yes. It is unconstitutional. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period
of imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority.
The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit
of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from one
minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a
duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case, does violence to the rules on separation of
powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative powers. This time, the presumption of constitutionality has
to yield.

Cebu Oxygen Acytelene vs. Drilon


176 SCRA 24
Doctrine of the Case: Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
Facts: RA No. 6640 was passed that made for an increase in the minimum wage. The Sec. of Labor issued the
pertinent rules implementing the provision of the Republic Act. Section 8 provided in sum that the implementing
rules prohibit the employer from crediting anniversary wage increases under a collective bargaining agreement
against such wage increases mandated by the Republic Act. The petitioners argue that this provision is null and
void on the ground that it unduly expands the provsions of the said law.

Issue: Whether or not an Implementing Order of the Sec. of Labor and Employment can provide for a prohibition
not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement

Ruling: No. It is not valid. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640, do not prohibit the crediting of CBA
anniversary wage increases for purposes of compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. The implementing rules
cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated by the law. Administrative regulations adopted under
legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be
for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded by such
regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. Thus petitioner's contention that the
salary increases granted by it pursuant to the existing CBA including anniversary wage increases should be
considered in determining compliance with the wage increase mandated by Republic Act No. 6640, is correct.
However, the amount that should only be credited to petitioner is the wage increase for 1987 under the CBA when
the law took effect. The wage increase for 1986 had already accrued in favor of the employees even before the
said law was enacted.

Ynot vs. IAC


148 SCRA 659
Doctrine of the Case: The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition. It grants
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. Hence, it is not a valid standard
making the law or order invalid and unconstitutional.
Facts: Executive Order 626-A was issued and one its provision includes that the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission, as he may see fit, distribute to charitable institutions the confiscated carabeef and the
Director of Animal Industry, as he may see fit, distribute the confiscated carabaos to deserving farmers.
Ynot was confiscated transporting carabao from Masbate to Iloilo. His carabaos were confiscated pursuant to the
Executive Order. He now assails the validity of EO 626-A on grounds that it comprise and undue delegation of
legislative power to the stated government officials.

Issue: Whether or not EO 626-A constitute a valid delegation of legislative power

Ruling: No. It does not. The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition
it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for
the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe
when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the
fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can
supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive
discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of
legislative powers.

Pharmaceutical vs Department of Health


GR No. 173034
Doctrine of the Case: The express grant of rule-making power to an administrive agency necessarily
includes the power to amend, revise, alter, or repeal the same; It is a standard provision in administrative
rules that prior issuances of administrative agencies that are inconsistent therewith are declared repealed
or modified.
Facts: This case concerns a petition challenging the validity of a Department of Health (DOH) Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR), claiming that it contained provisions, including a ban on the
advertising of breastmilk substitutes, that were not constitutional and went beyond the scope of the law it was
supposed to implement (Milk Code). The Milk Code gave effect to the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA). The WHA had since
adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected.

The Petitioner assails the international agreements that are allegedly being implemented by the DOH for lack of
specificity as to breastfeeding and lack of local legislation.

Issue: Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the
Department of Health (DOH) is valid

Ruling: Partially granted. The Court found that sections 4(f) and 11 (prohibition on the advertising and
promotion of breastmilk substitutes) and 46 (providing for administrative sanctions that are not found in the Milk
Code) went beyond the DOH’s authority and contravened the Milk Code, and were therefore null and avoid. The
Court found that the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are consistent with the Milk Code. Finally, the Court
dismissed the petitioner’s argument that the RIRR is unnecessary and oppressive, and offensive to the due process
clause of the Constitution insofar as it amounts to a restraint of trade, because trade must be subjected to some
form of regulation for the public good and public interests must trump business interests.

Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima


562 SCRA 251
Doctrine of the Case: "Public interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare" and
"simplicity, economy and welfare" may be considered as sufficient standards even if the law itself does not
provide for the standards.
Facts: Republic Act 9335 was enacted. The said law is intended to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation
of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.

The Petitioners, among others, assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President
as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC
officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%,
the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been
delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an
unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9335, insofar as granting the President the power to fix revenue targets, constitutional
and valid

Ruling: RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and
the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Thus, it is valid and constitutional.
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the
BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee and stated in
the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing submitted by the President to Congress. Thus, the
determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the
DBCC.

Also, the Court have recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest," "justice and equity,"
"public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare."

Philippine Coconut v. Republic


GR 178193, January 24, 2012
Doctrine of the Case: PD 755 did not specify the means of distributing the bank shares not claimed by
beneficiaries and did not specifically define “coconut farmers”. The laws failed the completeness test in the
sense that they failed to provide guidelines for rules and regulations
Facts: In 1971, RA 6260 was enacted, creating the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the
Coconut Investment Fund (CIF). The fund was to be sourced from a PhP 0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg of
copra.

The declaration of martial law in September 1972 saw the issuance of several presidential decrees (P.Ds.)
purportedly designed to improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund.

PD 755 was enacted to provide credit facilities to coconut farmers. It authorizes Philippine Coconut
Administration (PCA) to handle the funds that is for the benefit of coconut farmers. The funds were used to pay
for the financial commitments of farmers and provided them with free shares of the bank. The stock certificates
for the farmers were in the name of the PCA but were supposed to be distributed to the farmers who possessed
COCOFUND receipts (PCA Administrative Order No. 1).

The Aquino Administration initiated the recovery of ill-gotten gains through the implementation of the following
executive orders

a. EO 1 – establishment of the Presidential Committee on Good Governance (PCGG)


b. EO 2 – “Ill-gotten gains” included shares of stocks
c. EO 14 – The Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction

The Sandiganbayan declared PD NO 755 and PCA Admin. Order No. 1 and Resolution 074-075 as
unconstitutional and ordered the sequestration against stocks in banks owned by more than a million coconut
farmers and CIIF companies.

Petitioner avers before the SC that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in concluding that Section 1 of PD No. 755
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it authorizes the PCA to promulgate rules and
regulations governing the distribution of the UCPB shares to the coconut farmers. It contended that Section 1 of
PD 755 was complete in itself, prescribed sufficient standards that circumscribed the discretion of the PCA and
merely authorized the PCA to fill matters of detail an execution through promulgated rules and regulations.

Issue: Whether or not PD 755 and PCA Administrative Order No.1 and Resolutions 074-075 are invalid
delegations of legislative power

Ruling: Yes. PD 755 did not specify the means of distributing the bank shares not claimed by beneficiaries and
did not specifically define “coconut farmers”. The PCA assumed authority to define who “coconut farmers”
(intended beneficiaries) are and decided that those who did claim shall also be given “gift of bank shares” since
the law failed to provide guidelines regarding undistributed shares. The laws failed the completeness test in the
sense that they failed to provide guidelines for rules and regulations (the delegate may only implement rules and
regulations that enforce the law).

PAGE 10

Tatad v Secretary of Energy


MAIN POINT: Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March
1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the
Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of
the final date of full deregulation.
FACTS: The petitioner question the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil
Industry and For Other Purposes.” The deregulation process has two phases: (a) the transition phase and the (b)
full deregulation phase through EO No. 372.
The petitioner claims that Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the
Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and
the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are
considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power.

RULING: There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 can hurdle both the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No.
8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full
deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any
purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion
given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays
down the standard to guide the judgment of the President. He is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of
crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in
relation to the US dollar is stable.

Dagan v. PRC
578 SCRA 585 (2009)

MAIN POINT: Yes. The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed guidelines, hinges on
compliance with the following requisites:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature.
2. It must be promulgated in accordance within the scope of the authority given by the legislature.
3. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature.
4. It must be reasonable.

FACTS: Philracom issued a directive directing the Manila Jockey Club, Inc. (MCJI) and Philippine Racing Club,
Inc. (PRCI) to immediately come up with their respective Club’s House Rule to address Equine Infectious Anemia
(EIA) problem and to get rid of the horses’ facilities that were infected of the same. Said directive was issued
pursuant to AO No. 5 by the Department of Agriculture declaring it unlawful for any person, firm or corporation
to ship, drive or transport horses from any locality or place except when accompanied by a certificate issued by
the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI). In compliance with the directive, MCJI and
PRCI ordered the owners of racehorses stable in their establishments to submit the horses to blood sampling and
administration of the Coggins Test to determine whether they are afflicted with the EIA virus. Subsequently,
guidelines were issued by Philracom thru a second directive. Petitioners refused to comply with the directives.
Despite resistance from petitioners, the blood testing proceeded. The horses whose owners refused to comply
were banned from the races. Racehorse owners complained before the Office of the President (OP) which in turn
issued a directive instructing Philracom to investigate the matter. RTC, however, dismissed their petition for
injunction because: 1. The issue is already moot since almost all racehorse owners complied with the directives,
and 2. It is a valid exercise of police power.

ISSUE: Whether there is a valid delegation of legislative power to Philracom

RULING: Yes. The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed guidelines, hinges on compliance
with the following requisites:
5. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature.
6. It must be promulgated in accordance within the scope of the authority given by the legislature.
7. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature.
8. It must be reasonable.
All the prescribed requisites are met as regards to the questioned issuances

Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC
March 8, 2016

MAIN POINT: There are also no provisions in the Constitution with intent or language permitting discrimination
against foundlings as the three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. Foundlings
are citizens under international law as this is supported by some treaties, adhering to the customary rule to presume
foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is found.

FACTS: The petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe- Llamanzares also known as Grace Poe- Llamanzares
wishes to run as the President of the Republic of the Philippines. However, petitions were made by Estrella
Elamparo to deny due course or cancel the COC of Poe-Llamanzares for the reason that the latter is not a natural-
born citizen on the account of the fact that she is a foundling. In addition, Elamparo stated that Poe-Llamanzares
even assuming that the latter is a natural-born citizen she has deemed to lost the same when the she became a
naturalized American citizen, according to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

RULING: Yes. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may be considered a natural-born Filipino. It ruled
that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines as there is no restrictive language which would
definitely exclude foundlings as they are already impliedly so recognized. There are also no provisions in the
Constitution with intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings as the three Constitutions
guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. Foundlings are citizens under international law as this is
supported by some treaties, adhering to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country
in which the foundling is found

Par. 2; Party-List Representation

Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC


GR 147589

MAIN POINT: Private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground
that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representative may “be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations”.

FACTS: Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation
of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners
sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to
benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the
issue to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections and Whether or not the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

RULING: Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the
requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List
System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections,
merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
members of the House of Representative may “be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations”. It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine
proportional representation of the marginalized and underrepresented”, the criteria for participation in relation to
the cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court.
The Court not being a trier of facts. However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy
of the law and the Consitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Constitution,
to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine
compliance by the party lists.

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC


GR 136781

MAIN POINT: The twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution is not mandatory but merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics
of the party-list system of representatives.

FACTS: COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the
total number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition
for respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives although
they obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under the
Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House of Representatives come from the
party-list representatives.

ISSUE: Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for
party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?
RULING: It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives.
The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list
system of representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require
parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled
to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.

FORMULA FOR :
determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20
additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system
additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x additional seats
for concerned party

AKLAT v. COMELEC
427 SCRA 712

MAIN POINT: Only political parties and organizations that “actually and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies” can participate under the party-list system. At least a majority of its membership
should belong to the marginalized. The party must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded
or assisted by the government. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must
be Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties. In
addition, the nominee must be able to contribute to the formulation of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
whole nation. General averments that an organization represents the marginalized sectors must be substantiated
and shown through its constitution, history, platform and track record. It must demonstrate that in case of conflict
of interests, it is likely to choose the interest of the sectors.

FACTS: Aklat filed a Petition for declaration of re-qualification as a party-list organization for purposes of the
May 2004 elections. It alleged in its petition that it participated in the 2001 elections but was disqualified by the
Comelec as it was found not to have complied with the guidelines set by the Court in the case of Ang Bagong
Bayani v Comelec for party-list organizations to qualify and participate as such in the party-list
elections. Accordingly, Aklat re-organized itself in order that it will comply with the 8-point guidelines enunciated
by the Supreme Court in the said case.
In its assailed Resolution dated January 8, 2004, the Comelec dismissed the petition stating that Aklat cannot be
considered as an organization representing the marginalized and underrepresented groups as identified under
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. 7941). According to the Comelec, Aklats statement that it has re-
organized itself does not cure this defect as there is nothing in the petition which will help us identify what
particular marginalized and underrepresented group AKLAT is now representing. Further, the Comelec held that
AKLAT lumped all the sectoral groups imaginable under the classification of regular members just to convince
us that it is now cured of its defect

ISSUE: Whether the Resolution No. 6320 issued by the COMELEC as the deadline for filing petitions for
registration under the party-list system violates the sec.5 of RA 7941 which states that the 90-day period refers to
the prohibitive period beyond which petitions for registration by parties under the party-list system should no
longer be filed nor entertained, was tainted with grave discretion.

RULING: COMELEC did not commit any grave discretion because it has the power to promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations to enforce and administer election laws, including determination, within the parameters
fixed by law, of appropriate periods for the accomplishment of certain pre-election acts. The findings of fact by
the COMELEC with regard to the lack of representation and uplifting of marginalized groups are binding on the
Supreme Court thereby the petition was denied.

Partido ng Manggagawa v. COMELEC


484 SCRA 671

MAIN POINT: Votes cast for an ineligible or disqualified candidate cannot be considered “stray.” But said
doctrine cannot be applied to the party-list system in view of Section 10 of R.A. No. 7941 which expressly
provides that the votes cast for a party, sectoral organization or coalition “not entitled to be voted for shall not be
counted.”

Citizens v. COMELEC
521 SCRA 524

MAIN POINT: The twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable before the COMELEC may
properly order the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a party-list organization. Nevertheless, the
due process violation was committed when they were not apprised of the fact that the term-sharing agreement
entered into by the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a material consideration in the evaluation
of the organizations qualifications as a party-list group for the May 2013 elections.

FACTS: The present petitions were filed by the two rival factions within the same party-list organization, the
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phil., Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS). One group is headed by
Rep.Arquiza (Arquiza group) and the other by Francisco Datol (Datol group). SENIOR CITIZENS was allocated
one seat in Congress. Rep. Arquiza, then the organizations first nominee, served as a member of the House of
Representatives.

The nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled Irrevocable Covenant, which contains the
list of their candidates and terms on sharing of their powers. It contained an agreement on who among the
candidates will serve the terms according to the power sharing agreement.

After the conduct of the 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all the party-list candidates
and was allocated two seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first nominee,
Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).

Rep. Arquiza informed the office of COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. in a letter that the second
nominee of SENIOR CITIZENS, Rep. Kho, had tendered his resignation. By virtue of such resignation and as
provided under their agreement, Rep. Arquiza stated that its fourth nominee shall assume position since their third
nominee, Datol, has been previously expelled in their party. However, the board of the party list, headed by Rep.
Arquiza, recalled the previous acceptance of the resignation of Rep. Kho.

The COMELEC en Banc issued a resolution that the list submitted to them is deemed to be permanent as the law
deprives the party the right to change their nominees. Thus, even if the expulsion of Datol in the petitioner party-
list were true, the list and order of nominees of the Senior Citizens party-list remains the same in so far as the
COMELEC and the law are concerned as it does not fall under one of the three grounds mentioned in law for the
changing of nominees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process of Senior Citizens was violated

RULING: The twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable before the COMELEC may
properly order the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a party-list organization. The appropriate
due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those
outlined in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.

In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS was made pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 9513 through a summary evidentiary hearing. In this hearing, both the Arquiza Group and the
Datol Group were indeed given the opportunity to adduce evidence as to their continuing compliance with the
requirements for party-list accreditation.

Nevertheless, the due process violation was committed when they were not apprised of the fact that the term-
sharing agreement entered into by the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a material consideration
in the evaluation of the organizations qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. In other
words, they were deprived of the opportunity to adequately explain their side regarding the term-sharing
agreement and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly, in support of their position.

Bantay v. COMELEC
523 SCRA 1

MAIN POINT: COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands for a list of
the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. No national security or like concerns is
involved with the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups. In addition thereto, there is
absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the COMELEC from disclosing or even publishing through
mediums other than the "Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees. Mandamus, therefore, lies.

FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside
certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifested
their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.

Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an
Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Meanwhile
petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the Comelec’s Law Department
requesting a list of that groups’ nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of
Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names
confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request. Comelec’s reason for keeping
the names of the party list nominees away from the public is deducible from the excerpts of the news report
appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, is that there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the
Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and that party list elections must not be personality oriented
according to Chairman Abalos.

While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of
the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional prayers that the
33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and
that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the elections.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list
groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution

RULING: COMELEC’s basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups,
Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on
the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. There is
absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through
mediums other than the "Certified List" of the names.

Phil. Guardians v. COMELEC


GR 190529

MAIN POINT: PGBIs situation a party list group or organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and
immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding election is something that is not covered by Section
6(8) of RA 7941. From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter for
Congress to address. The Court cannot and do not address matters over which full discretionary authority is given
by the Constitution to the legislature

FACTS: For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC En Banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution
No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because
it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. PGBI filed its
Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading, the admission of its petition for
accreditation as a party-list organization under the Party-List System Act. The COMELEC denied PGBIs
motion/opposition for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is legal basis for delisting PGBI.

RULING: COMELEC's decision is annulled, delisting of any national, regional or sectoral party. The law is clear
the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a)fails
to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot
be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in
two preceding elections should now be understood to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood
and applied. PGBIs situation a party list group or organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and
immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding election is something that is not covered by Section
6(8) of RA 7941. From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter for
Congress to address. The Court cannot and do not address matters over which full discretionary authority is given
by the Constitution to the legislature; to do so will offend the principle of separation of powers. If a gap indeed
exists, then the present case should bring this concern to the legislatures notice.

BANAT v. COMELEC
586 SCRA 210

MAIN POINT: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating
in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties
to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings.

FACTS: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the National
Board of Canvassers (NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the
Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s national board of
canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc.
The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen (13) parties as winners in the
party-list elections in May 2007. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-
list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in
accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC formula.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony
Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to
use the Veterans formula. COMELEC denied the consideration.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition assailing the resolution
of the COMELEC in its decision to use the Veterans formula.
ISSUES:
• Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional
• Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat is
constitutional
• How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
• Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not,
can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?
RULING:
• The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more
than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
• Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-
list elections.
• The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 “those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes” is unconstitutional. The two percent
threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats presents an unwarranted obstacle to the
full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives."
• In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
• Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate
in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. Also, in defining a "party" that participates in party-list
elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political
parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. However,
by the vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties
from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

Abayon v. COMELEC
GR 189466

MAIN POINT: Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization
that sits and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution clearly
shows the Constitution’s point of view that it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not
their parties or organizations.

FACTS: Respondents Lucaban, Jr. et al. filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat
Tayo. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since
it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Further, they pointed out that petitioner
Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district
representative. She moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of the party-list organization called An Waray
in the immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.

Petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto since
the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization was a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was
just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of
Aangat Tayo.

On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but upholding
its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon.

ISSUES: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioner
Abayon as nominee of Aangat Tayo party-list organization, who took the seat at the House of Representatives.

RULING: RA 7941, the Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties
or organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of Representatives during the
elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the
disqualifications of Aangat Tayo. Since petitioner Abayon was not elected into office but was chosen by its
organization under its internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate her qualifications
as nominee.

But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits
and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution clearly shows
the Constitution’s point of view that it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not their
parties or organizations.

Layug v. COMELEC
666 SCRA 321

MAIN POINT: Indubitably, the HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's qualifications. Neither
does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay Party-List. It is vested by law, specifically, the
Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC.

FACTS: On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug filed pro se a Petition to Disqualify Buhay Party-List
from participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and Brother Mike from being its nominee. He argued that Buhay
Party-List is a mere “extension of the El Shaddai,” which is a religious sect. It is disqualified from being a party-
list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution4, as well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 79415, otherwise known as the “Party-List System Act.” Neither does Brother Mike,
who is allegedly a billionaire real estate businessman and the spiritual leader of El Shaddai, qualify as “one who
belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sector

COMELEC Second Division found Layug to be a “phantom petitioner” by “seeing to it that pleadings, orders and
judicial notices addressed to him are not received by him because the address he gave and maintains is fictitious”.
Accordingly, Layug was deemed to have received on June 23, 2010 a copy of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010
and, there being no motion for reconsideration filed within the reglementary period, said Resolution was declared
final and executory. It was entered, in the Book of Entries of Judgment on July 28, 2010.

Buhay Party-List was proclaimed as a winner entitled to two (2) seats in the House of Representatives. Being the
fifth nominee, however, Brother Mike was not proclaimed as the representative of Buhay Party-List.

ISSUE: Whether or not SC has jurisdiction to question the declaration of Velarde and Teing over questions of
qualifications in which the House of Representatives Tribunal has sole jurisdiction?

RULING: The Court not the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition.
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds:
(1) members who shall be elected from legislative districts; and
(2) those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. In this case, Buhay Party-List was entitled to two seats in the House that went to its first two
nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike,
being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat and thus had not become a member of the House of Representatives.

Indubitably, the HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's qualifications. Neither does the HRET
have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay Party-List. It is vested by law, specifically, the Party-List
System Act, upon the COMELEC.

Magdalo v. COMELEC
673 SCRA 651

MAIN POINT: The registration of political parties does not involve administrative liability as it is only limited
to the evaluation of qualifications for registration.

FACTS: Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the COMELEC,
seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the NCR for participation in the
10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. In the Petition, MAGDALO was represented by its Chairperson,
Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and its Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo).

COMELEC denied the Petition for Registration as it was not in accordance with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the
Constitution. It is common knowledge that the party’s organizer and Chairman, and some members participated
in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein
several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full battle gear at the
time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve their
goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies.

MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc for resolution.
MAGDALO also filed a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the
10 May 2010 Elections, in which it stated that its membership includes former members of the AFP, Anti-
Corruption Advocates, Reform-minded citizens.

The COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration saying that COMELEC had the power to
ascertain the eligibility of MAGDALO for registration and accreditation as a political party. It contends that this
determination, as well as that of assessing whether MAGDALO advocates the use of force, would entail the
evaluation of evidence, which cannot be reviewed by this Court in a petition for certiorari.

However, MAGDALO maintains that although it concedes that the COMELEC has the authority to assess
whether parties applying for registration possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the
applicable law.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration filed
by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means.

RULING: No. The Court ruled in the negative, but without prejudice to MAGDALOs filing anew of a Petition
for Registration. The COMELEC has a constitutional and statutory mandate to ascertain the eligibility of parties
and organizations to participate in electoral contests. The relevant portions of the 1987 Constitution, Section 5
(1).

“Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to
this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration”

Considering the constitutional and statutory authority of the COMELEC to ascertain the eligibility of parties or
organizations seeking registration and accreditation, the pertinent question now is whether its exercise of this
discretion was so capricious or whimsical as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. In view of the facts available to the
COMELEC at the time it issued its assailed Resolutions, this Court rules that respondent did not commit grave
abuse of discretion.

Atong Paglaum et. al.,


GR 203766
April 12, 2013

MAIN POINT: This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs
COMELEC. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
“marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for
national or regional parties
FACTS: Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May
2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
RULING: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme
Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases.
The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations,
(2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral
lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do
not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates
in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is
linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined
political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-
defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must
belong to the sector they represent.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating in
the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major
political parties can now participate in the party-list system “provided that they do so through their bona fide
sectoral wing” (see parameter 3 above).

PGBI v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190529
April 29, 2010

MAIN POINT: The law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2)
separate reasons for delisting

FACTS: Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered national, regional
or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system through its resolution, denying also the
latter’s motion for reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941),
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: “(8) It fails to participate in
the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the
party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered”

Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007
elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among others the misapplication in the ruling
of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC showing the
excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the law in question.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.

RULINGS: No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot
sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law
which provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the
legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly
show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC


G.R. No. 190582
April 8,2010

MAIN POINT: Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
FACTS: Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men and women
who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based
on moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made
misrepresentation in their application.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.

RULING: Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for registration should be granted. Comelec’s citation of the
Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application was a violation of the non-establishment clause laid down
in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a
secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"), rather than out of religious
conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be
detrimental to society.

The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the basis of their
sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws
to which we adhere

ANAD v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 206987
September 10, 2013

MAIN POINT: ANAD was already given an opportunity to prove its qualifications in a summary hearing and
was proven that they failed tocomply the other requirements.

FACTS: COMELEC En Banc issued a resolution on Nov 7, 2012, cancelling ANAD’s Certificate of Registration
and/or Accreditation on three grounds:
(a) ANAD did not belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors enumerated in RA 7941
(b) ANAD failed to comply with procedural requirements in Sec. 4, Rule 3 of Reso 9366. They only submitted
3 nominees; 5 nominees were required. No proof showing that nominees Arthur Tariman and Julius
Labandria are actually nominated by ANAD itself, because their names weren’t found in the Cert. of
Nomination submitted by ANAD.
(c) ANAD failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenses for the 2007 Elections as required
by RA 7166.

ANAD went to the SC and challenged said resolution. In the case of Atong Paglaum vs COMELEC, the SC
remanded the case to the COMELEC for re-evaluation in accordance with the parameters set in that case.
COMELEC affirmed the cancellation and disqualified ANAD from participating in the 2013 Elections. Yes,
ANAD may be considered as a sectoral party lacking in well-defined constituencies, but it is still disqualified for
grounds B and C above.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ANAD’s certificate

RULING: NO. ANAD was already given an opportunity to prove its qualifications in a summary hearing in Aug
23, 2012. In re-evaluating ANAD’s qualifications pursuant to the Atong Paglaum case, the COMELEC need not
have called another hearing. COMELEC could easily resort to the docs previously submitted by ANAD. ANAD
can’t question COMELEC’s finding that only 3 nominees were in the Certificate, and that ANAD failed to submit
the Statement of Contribution and Expenses for the 2007 Elections. In any case, the official tally of the
COMELEC shows that ANAD garnered 200,972 votes. Thus, even if it was declared qualified and the votes cast
for it are canvassed, statistics show that it will still fail to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives.

Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens v. COMELEC


G.R. 206844-45
July 23, 2013

MAIN POINT: The twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable before the COMELEC may
properly order the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a party-list organization. Nevertheless, the
due process violation was committed when they were not apprised of the fact that the term-sharing agreement
entered into by the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a material consideration in the evaluation
of the organizations qualifications as a party-list group for the May 2013 elections.

FACTS: The present petitions were filed by the two rival factions within the same party-list organization, the
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phil., Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS). One group is headed by
Rep.Arquiza (Arquiza group) and the other by Francisco Datol (Datol group). SENIOR CITIZENS was allocated
one seat in Congress. Rep. Arquiza, then the organizations first nominee, served as a member of the House of
Representatives.

The nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled Irrevocable Covenant, which contains the
list of their candidates and terms on sharing of their powers. It contained an agreement on who among the
candidates will serve the terms according to the power sharing agreement.

After the conduct of the 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all the party-list candidates
and was allocated two seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first nominee,
Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).

Rep. Arquiza informed the office of COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. in a letter that the second
nominee of SENIOR CITIZENS, Rep. Kho, had tendered his resignation. By virtue of such resignation and as
provided under their agreement, Rep. Arquiza stated that its fourth nominee shall assume position since their third
nominee, Datol, has been previously expelled in their party. However, the board of the party list, headed by Rep.
Arquiza, recalled the previous acceptance of the resignation of Rep. Kho.

The COMELEC en Banc issued a resolution that the list submitted to them is deemed to be permanent as the law
deprives the party the right to change their nominees. Thus, even if the expulsion of Datol in the petitioner party-
list were true, the list and order of nominees of the Senior Citizens party-list remains the same in so far as the
COMELEC and the law are concerned as it does not fall under one of the three grounds mentioned in law for the
changing of nominees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process of Senior Citizens was violated

RULING: The twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable before the COMELEC may
properly order the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a party-list organization. The appropriate
due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those
outlined in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.

In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS was made pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 9513 through a summary evidentiary hearing. In this hearing, both the Arquiza Group and the
Datol Group were indeed given the opportunity to adduce evidence as to their continuing compliance with the
requirements for party-list accreditation.

Nevertheless, the due process violation was committed when they were not apprised of the fact that the term-
sharing agreement entered into by the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a material consideration
in the evaluation of the organizations qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. In other
words, they were deprived of the opportunity to adequately explain their side regarding the term-sharing
agreement and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly, in support of their position.

Bello v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 191998
December 7,2010

MAIN POINT: Since Arroyo, AGPP’s first nominee, has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office
as a Member of the House of Representatives, Thus, following the lead of Abayon and Perez, we hold that the
Court has no jurisdiction over the present petitions and that the HRET now has the exclusive original jurisdiction
to hear and rule upon Arroyo’s qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives.

FACTS: AGPP filed its Certificate of Nomination together with the Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees
wherein the first nominee is Mike Arroyo. Several petitions for disqualification of Arroyo emerged but have been
dismissed both by Comelec Second division and comelec en banc. In the interim, AGPP obtained in the May 10,
2010 elections the required percentage of votes sufficient to secure a single seat. This entitled Arroyo, as AGPP’s
first nominee, to sit in the House of Representatives. He was proclaimed as AGPP’s duly-elected party-list
representative in the House of Representatives. On the same day, Arroyo took his oath of office, as AGPP’s
Representative. And, his name was, thereafter, entered in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.38

Thereafter two (2) separate petitions for quo warranto were filed with the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) questioning Arroyo’s eligibility as AGPP’s representative in the House of Representatives. The
HRET took cognizance of the petitions by issuing a Summons directing Arroyo to file his Answer to the two
petitions.

ISSUE: Whether the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of Arroyo’s qualifications as AGPP’s nominee
after his proclamation and assumption to office as a member of the House of Representatives.
RULING: The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of
party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office; they are, for all intents and purposes,
"elected members" of the House of Representatives although the entity directly voted upon was their party. Hence,
the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins.

ABC v. COMELEC
GR. No. 193256
March 22, 2011

MAIN POINT: HRET has jurisdiction over contests relating to the qualifications of the said party-list
representative who become a member of the House of Representatives. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the HRET
over contests relating to the qualifications of a party-list nominee or representative is derived from Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution, while the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over petitions for cancellation of
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition is derived from Section 2 (5),
Article IX-C of the Constitution

FACTS: Alliance For Barangay Concerns Party List, represented herein by its Chairman, JAMES MARTY LIM,
petitioner, and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., respondents.

Private respondent Melanio Mauricio, Jr. filed a petition with the COMELEC for the cancellation of registration
and accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-List on the ground that petitioner is a front for a religious organization
called the Children of God International, which is more popularly known as Ang Dating Daan; hence, it is
disqualified to become a party-list group under the Party-List System Act.

COMELEC, Second Division dismissed the petition based on procedural and substantial grounds. The
COMELEC has approved petitioner’s registration and accreditation as a party-list group, and petitioner had
participated and was voted upon in the 2007 elections.

On August 3, 2010, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution partially granting private respondent’s Motion
for Reconsideration with Motion to Annul Proclamation and Suspend Its Effects dated June 22, 2010.

ISSUE: Whether Comelec has jurisdiction

RULING: The jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) over petitions for cancellation of
registration of any political party, organization or coalition is derived from Section 2 (5), Article IX-C of the
Constitution.—

Based on the said provision, the Constitution grants the COMELEC the authority to register political parties,
organizations or coalitions, and the authority to cancel the registration of the same on legal grounds. The said
authority of the COMELEC is reflected in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. In sum, the COMELEC en banc had
jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation of the registration and accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-List for
alleged violation of Section 6 (1) of R.A. No. 7941.

Abang Lingkod Party-List v. COMELEC


G.R. No. 206952
October 22, 2013

MAIN POINT: R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list system to submit
proof of their track record as a group. The track record requirement was only imposed in Ang Bagong Bayani
where the Court held that national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations seeking registration under the
party-list system must prove through their, inter alia, track record that they truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented.

FACTS: ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant farmers and fisher
folks, and was registered under the party-list system on December 22, 2009. It failed to obtain the number of
votes needed in the May 2010 elections for a seat in the House of Representatives. On August 16, 2012, ABANG
LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC 2012 resolution, filed with the COMELEC pertinent documents
to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941. In a Resolution the COMELEC
En Banc cancelled ABANG LINGKOD registration as a party-list group. It pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD
failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely
offered photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections. ABANG LINGKOD
field a petitioner for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling its
registration under the party-list system.

ISSUE: Whether or not ABANG LINGKOD was denied due process as a partylist
RULING: Court finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the registration of ABANG
LINGKOD under the party-list system. The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's
registration on the ground that it declared untruthful statement in its bid for accreditation as a party-list group in
the May 2013 elections, pointing out that it deliberately submitted digitally altered photographs of activities to
make it appear that it had a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Essentially,
ABANG LINGKOD's registration was cancelled on the ground that it failed to adduce evidence showing its track
record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.

Cocofed-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v. COMELEC


G.R. No. 207026
August 6, 2013

MAIN POINT: Party-lists must submit a list of five nominees before the COMELEC. Otherwise, they would be
disqualified from participating in the elections. A sectoral party’s failure to submit a list of five nominees, despite
ample opportunity to do so before the elections, is a violation imputable to the party under Section 6(5) of RA
No. 7941.
FACTS: Petitioner is an organization and sectoral party whose membership comes from the peasant sector,
particularly the coconut farmers and producers. They manifested their intent to participate in the party-list
elections of May 13, 2013 and submitted the names of only two nominees.
COMELEC cancelled COCOFED’s registration and accreditation on several grounds. Notably, the fact
COCOFED submitted only two nominees, then it failed to comply with Section 8 of Republic Act (RA) No.
79417 that requires the party to submit to COMELEC a list of not less than five nominees.
Later, COMELEC issued its assailed resolution, maintaining its earlier ruling cancelling COCOFED’s registration
and accreditation for its failure to comply with the requirement of Section 8 of RA No. 7941, i.e., to submit a list
of not less than five nominees. COCOFED moved for reconsideration only to withdraw its motion later. Instead,
COCOFED filed a Manifestation with Urgent Request to Admit Additional Nominees with the COMELEC but
the COMELEC issued a resolution declaring the cancellation of COCOFED’s accreditation final and executory.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed resolution cancelling
COCOFED’s registration

RULING: NO. Failure to submit the list of five nominees before the election warrants the cancellation of its
registration. Under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941, violation of or failure to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections is a ground for the cancellation of registration. However, not every kind of violation
automatically warrants the cancellation of a party-list group’s registration. Since a reading of the entire Section 6
shows that all the grounds for cancellation actually pertain to the party itself, then the laws, rules and regulations
violated to warrant cancellation under Section 6(5) must be one that is primarily imputable to the party itself and
not one that is chiefly confined to an individual member or its nominee.
Milagros Amores v. HRET
G.R. No. 189600
June 29, 2010

FACTS: Petitioner, Milagros E. Amores, challenges the decision of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (public respondent), which both dismissed her petition for Quo Warranto. Her petition seeks to ouster
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, whom she alleged to have assumed office as a representative of the party list
organization Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) without formal proclamation by the Commission on
Elections; to be a disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector since at the time of his filing of his certificates
of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old, which was beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant
to Section 9 of Party-List System Act; to have changed his affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas
Filipino workers sector was not effected at least 6 months before the May 14, 2007 elections. The public
respondent held that age qualification pursuant to Section 9 of RA 7941 only applied to those nominated until
1998, unless the sectoral party exclusively represents the youth which is not CIBAC’s case. Moreover, it
held that Section 14 of RA 7941 did not apply as there was no resultant change in the party-list affiliation.

ISSUE: Do Sections 9 and 15 of Republic Act No. 7941 apply to Villanueva?

RULING: The court has held that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 or Partylist System Act, apply to the private
respondent. According to Section 9 of RA 7941, a nominee of the youth sector must be at least 25 but not more
than 30 years of age on the day of election. When a youth sectoral representative attains the age of 30 during his
term, he will be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term. Meanwhile, Section 15 reads “Change
of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during
his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six
(6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new
party or organization.” The court has found no textual support for the public respondent’s interpretation that
Section 9 is applicable only to those nominated until 1998 and found that Villanueva has changed his affiliation
only on March 17, 2007, which was within 6 months before the May 2007 elections.

Pars. 1,3, and 4; Rules on Apportionment


Reapportionment through Special Law

Tobias v. Abalos
239 SCRA 106

MAIN POINT: The conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than
250, 000 indubitably ordains compliance with the “one city – one representative” as provided in Article VI,
Section 5, par.3 of the Constitution. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The present composition of the
Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment

FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7675, “An Act Converting the municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”. Prior to the enactment of
the assailed statute, the Municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district.
Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill
which eventually became RA 7675, President Ramis signed it into law. Pursuant to Local Government Code of
1991, a plebiscite was held. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved the conversion. The
turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes” whereas 7,
911 voted “no”. By virtue of these results, RA 7675 was deemed ratified in effect.
Petitioners contention were that RA 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 46 thereof, is unconstitutional.
They alleged that it contravenes the “one subject – one bill” rule. They also alleged that the subject law embraced
two principal subjects, namely: 1. the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and 2. the division
of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

Petitioners argue that the division has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of
Representative beyond that provided in the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was
not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population
requirements.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not RA 7675 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not the number of the members of the House of Representative may increase.

RULING:
1. No. The conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than
250, 000 indubitably ordains compliance with the “one city – one representative” as provided in Article VI,
Section 5, par.3 of the Constitution. The creation of separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a
subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural ang
logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. It should be given a practical rather than a
technical construction.

2. Yes. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The present composition of the Congress may be
increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Petition dismissed.

PAGE 11

Mariano vs COMELEC
242 SCRA 211

MAINPOINT: A general reapportionment law is not required to increase the number of legislative
districts.

FACTS: The Petitioners assail RA 7854 as unconstitutional for being a “special law that increases the legislative
district of Makati”. The Petitioner points out in their petition that a general reapportionment law is required to be
passed by Congress to increase legislative districts and not a special law such as the assailed statute.

ISSUE: Whether or not a general reapportionment law is necessary to increase the number of legislative districts.

RULING: No. These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. In said case, we ruled
that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new
city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250)
members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from
increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was
done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative district.
Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of
all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation
where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate
period of time. That intolerable situation will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their
sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it
is not sovereignty.

Sema vs. COMELEC


GR No. 177597

MAINPOINT: The Court stressed out that only Congress can create provinces and cities because the
creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts.

FACTS: The ARMM's legislative arm, the ARMM Regional Assembly, enacted Muslim Mindanao Act 201
which created the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. The power to create the said provinces was pursuant to Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054. A plebiscite was conducted to which the electorate voted in favor of the creation of
the province. However, the Petitioner questioned the validity of the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to
create the province. He also questioned the resolution of the COMELEC which combines Shariff Kabunsuan and
Cotabato City into one legislative district during the 2007 election.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ARMM Regional Assembly has the power to create a new province and assuming
that the creation of the province is valid, is the COMELEC's act of combining two separate provinces into one
legislative district valid

RULING: No. The Court ruled on the unconstitutionality of both Muslim Mindanao Act 201 and Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054. The ARMM Regional Assembly is not allowed to create any legislative district or
provinces. The Court stressed out that only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts. Creation of province or a city
inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. The Constitution mandates that a province or a city
with at least 250,000 inhabitants is entitled to at least one representative.

The Court also ruled that COMELEC's act of combining the separate but geographically connected provinces is
valid s it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution.

Montejo v. COMELEC
242 SCRA 415

MAINPOINT: Correction of the imbalance must await the enactment of a reapportionment law. The
COMELEC has no authority to correct the imbalance by the transfer of municipalities from one district
to another.

FACTS: The province of Leyte is composed of 5 districts. Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made
its sub-province by virtue of Republic Act No. 214. When Biliran was converted into a regular province, 8
municipalities of the third district composed the new province. As a consequence, the composition of the third
district was reduced to 5 municipalities. To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants,
voters and municipalities in Leyte, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where it transferred
the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the
third district of Leyte. Petitioner Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of
Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipality in Leyte.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to
another legislative district

RULING: No. If as a result of the increase of the number of legislative districts, either because of the creation of
a new province or of a new city, an imbalance results in the remaining legislative districts of the mother province,
the Commission on Elections has no authority to correct the imbalance by the transfer of municipalities from one
district to another. Correction of imbalance must await the enactment of a reapportionment law.

Herrera v. COMELEC
GR 131499
November 17, 1999

MAINPOINT: The basis for division into districts shall be the number of inhabitants of the province
concerned and not the number of inhabitants of listed or registered voters.
FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras requested the COMELEC to have the province subdivided
into two provincial districts. Acting upon the request, the Provincial Election Supervisor conducted two
consultative meetings after which a consensus was reached in favor of the division. Guimaras was then
reclassified from 5th class to 4th class province. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2950 which allotted 8
Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to Guimaras. The petitioners then questioned Resolution No. 2950, pointing out
that the apportionment of two districts are not equitable due to disproportionate representation. It is claimed that
the districting embodied in Resolution No. 2950 results in a disparity of representation in that, in the first district,
there is a ratio of one board member per 18,729 voters while in the second district, the ratio is one board member
per 14,050 voters.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 2950

RULING: No. Under R.A. 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis for division into districts shall
be the number of inhabitants of the province concerned and not the number of inhabitants of listed or registered
voters as theorized upon by petitioners. Thus, COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the assailed Resolution because clearly, the basis for the districting is the number of inhabitants of the Province
of Guimaras by municipality based on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified by the NSO.

Samson v. Aguirre
315 SCRA 53
MAINPOINT: Every statute is presumed valid. Every law is presumed to have passed through regular
congressional processes. A person asserting the contrary has the burden of proving his allegations clearly and
unmistakably.

FACTS: R.A. 8535 was signed into law creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays in Quezon City.
Petitioner, councilor of the first district of Quezon City, questioned the constitutionality of said R.A. claiming
that certifications as to income, population, and land area of Novaliches were not presented during the
deliberations that led to the passage of R.A. 8535.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8535 is unconstitutional or invalid for failure to comply with the requirements of the
LGC

RULING: No. Samson did not present any proof that no certifications were presented during the deliberations.
Moreover, the representative from the Bureau of Local Government Finance estimated the combined average
annual income of the 13 barangays for the years 1995 and 1996 to be around P26,952,128.26. Under the Local
Government Code, a proposed city must have an average annual income of only at least P20,000,000.00 for the
immediately preceding two years. The representative from the NSO estimated the population in the barangays
that would comprise the proposed City of Novaliches to be around 347,310. This figure is more than the 150,000
required by the Implementing Rules. There is no need to consider the land area, given these figures, since under
the Local Government Code, the proposed city must comply with requirements as regards income and
population or land area. Their official statements attesting to the income, land area and population of Novaliches
could serve the certification contemplated by law.

Herrera v. COMELEC
GR 131499
November 17, 1999

MAINPOINT: Contiguous and adjacent means “adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border,
connected, and/or touching along boundaries often for considerable distances.” On its face, the map of Guimaras
shows that the municipalities grouped together are contiguous or adjacent.

FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras requested the COMELEC to have the province subdivided
into two provincial districts. Acting upon the request, the Provincial Election Supervisor conducted two
consultative meetings after which a consensus was reached in favor of the division. Guimaras was then
reclassified from 5th class to 4th class province. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2950 which allotted 8
Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to Guimaras. The petitioners then questioned Resolution No. 2950, pointing out
that the municipalities which comprise each district do not embrace a compact, contiguous and adjacent area.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 2950

RULING: No. Under Comelec Resolution No. 2950, the towns of Buenavista and San Lorenzo were grouped
together to form the first district and the second district is composed of the municipalities of Jordan, Nueva
Valencia and Sibunag. R.A. 7166 requires that each district must cover a compact, contiguous and adjacent
territory. Contiguous and/or adjacent means adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border, connected,
and/or touching along boundaries often for considerable distances. Not even a close perusal of the map of the
Province of Guimaras is necessary to defeat petitioners’ stance. On its face, the map of Guimaras indicates that
the municipalities of Buenavista and San Lorenzo are adjacent or contiguous. They touch along boundaries and
are connected throughout by a common border. Buenavista is at the northern part of Guimaras while San Lorenzo
is at the east portion of the province.

Aldaba vs. COMELEC


GR No. 188078

MAINPOINT: A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the
"immediately following election." In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter,
in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative.

FACTS: RA 9591 which creates a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan is questioned for
constitutionality on grounds that it violates the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative
district in a city. The contested law justifies that the population of the Municipality of Malolos will be more than
250,000 by the year 2010 which makes the creation of legislative district valid. This is supported by an undated
certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO).

ISSUE: Whether or not the population requirement was met

RULING: No. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have "a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand."

A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the "immediately
following election." In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately
following election, such city shall have a district representative. There is no showing in the present case that the
City of Malolos has attained or will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10
May 2010 elections.

Aquino III vs. COMELEC


GR No. 189793

MAINPOINT: There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population
that must compose a legislative district.

Facts: Senator Benigno Aquino and Mayor Jesse Robredo questioned the constitutionality of RA 9716 which
increases the number of legislative districts of the Province of Camarines Sur from four to five. They alleged that
the increase in legislative district is invalid due to the fact the residency requirement has not been met by the
proposed legislative districts. They alleged that a population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution
for such new district.

Issue: Whether or not the 250,000 population is required in the creation of a new legislative district

Ruling: There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must
compose a legislative district. Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires the 250,000 population
for the creation of a legislative district in a city and not a province. In fact, the said provision does not require a
population requirement for the creation of legislative districts for a province. On this basis the Court allowed
creation of representative districts of disproportionate sizes.

Navarro v. Ermita
GR 180050
April 12, 2011

MAINPOINT: The primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a
province, is economic viability.

FACTS: Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands). They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers
only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of
Section 461 of the LGC.

ISSUE: Whether RA 9355 is unconstitutional and invalid for failing to comply with the Constitution and LGC

RULING: No. It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local government
units are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their
constituents. The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to
accomplish these results. Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units,
particularly of a province, is economic viability.
The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing
that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the
time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the
minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its
constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the
May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence
as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.
This Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity.

Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC


GR No. 176970

MAINPOINT: The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a
political unit because it is the basis for the election of a member of the House of Representatives and
members of the local legislative body. It is not, however, a political subdivision through which functions of
government are carried out. It can more appropriately be described as a representative unit that may or
may not encompass the whole of a city or a province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate unit.

FACTS: RA 9731 was enacted. The said law increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative districts from one to two.
The COMELEC then issued a resolution to conduct a plebiscite in which the residents of Cagayan de Oro are to
decide in which district they belong. It must be noted that COMELEC did not have rules and regulations for the
conduct of plebiscite for RA 9731

The Petitioners questioned the validity of the plebiscite due to the absence of the rules, regulations and guidelines
for the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local government unit.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9731 is a legislative reapportionment law or a law of conversion and division of a
local government unit which would require the COMELEC to provide for rules and regulation for the conduct of
a plebiscite

RULING: No. RA 9731 is not a law of conversion and division of a local government unit. R.A. No. 9371 is, on
its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the authority granted to
Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution.

No division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity takes place or is mandated. Cagayan de
Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its territory
remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of another legislative district and the delineation
of the city into two districts for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X,
Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan
de Oro City into two districts.

The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a political unit because it is
the basis for the election of a member of the House of Representatives and members of the local legislative body.
It is not, however, a political subdivision through which functions of government are carried out. It can more
appropriately be described as a representative unit that may or may not encompass the whole of a city or a
province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a corporate unit, a district does not act for and
in behalf of the people comprising the district; it merely delineates the areas occupied by the people who will
choose a representative in their national affairs. Unlike a province, which has a governor; a city or a municipality,
which has a mayor; and a barangay, which has a punong barangay, a district does not have its own chief executive.
The role of the congressman that it elects is to ensure that the voice of the people of the district is heard in
Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the legislative district. Not being a corporate unit also signifies that it has
no legal personality that must be created or dissolved and has no capacity to act. Hence, there is no need for any
plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other similar action on a legislative district.

Bengzon v. Cruz
GR 142840
May 7, 2001

MAINPOINT: Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. As respondent Cruz was not
required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is
perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives.

FACTS: Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine
Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship. In 1994, he
reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was
then running for re-election. Petitioner Bengson then filed a case for Quo Warranto claiming that respondent Cruz
may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore
allegiance to the United States, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section
2 of the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not a natural-born Filipino who became and American citizen can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship

RULING: Yes. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act
of Congress. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if
he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all
the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.

Aquino vs. COMELEC


GR No. 120265

MAINPOINT: For the residency requirement to be met, one must prove that he has established not just
residence but domicile of choice. What this means is that it is the place "where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home," where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain.

Ownership of a property in a certain place does not automatically mean that one is a resident of such place
and it does not confer to such owner the right to vote in such place or the right to be voted upon.

FACTS: Agapito Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second
Legislative District of Makati City. His candidacy was questioned on the ground that the latter lacked the
residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the
Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections.

In the Certificate of Candidacy of Aquino he stated that he has been a resident of the Second District for 10
months. However, he avers that he has been renting a condominium unit in the area of where he seeks election.

ISSUE: Whether or not the candidate met the residency requirement as espoused by the Constitution

RULING: No, he has not. For the residency requirement to be met, one must prove that he has established not
just residence but domicile of choice. What this means is that it is the place "where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home," where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain.

Upon reviewing the decision of the COMELEC, it is found by the Court that the Petitioner is not only a resident
of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding
that election. From this data, it is clear and unassailable that San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac is his domicile of
origin.

As regards the property he rented, absent clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile,
he cannot be considered of a resident of such place. Also, property ownership is not and should never be an indicia
of the right to vote or to be voted upon.

Marcos vs. COMELEC


248 SCRA 300

MAINPOINT: The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other
things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.

To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or actual change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
acts which corresponds to this purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria,
the residence of origin should be deemed to continue.

FACTS: Imelda Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy seeking election for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte. In her COC, she indicated that she has been a resident of said district for seven months.

Upon knowing this, the incumbent representative of the said district filed a petition for disqualification as
candidate of Imelda Marcos for non-compliance with the one-year residency requirement as stated in the
Constitution. At the day when the petition was filed, Marcos amended her COC but failed due to the deadline of
filing and amending of COCs.

The disqualification case would continue in which the COMELEC decided to disqualify the Petitioner. On the
appeal and reconsideration, the Petitioner assert that when she wrote “seven months” in the COC she thought that
it was referring to her actual and physical presence in Tolosa. She asserts that she was a resident of Tolosa “since
childhood”. However, the COMELEC maintained their position bringing this case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the residency requirement has been met by the Petitioner thus allowing her to run for
election

RULING: Yes. The Court have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even
if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual
relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a
profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of
residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that “she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places”
flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence
and domicile for election law purposes.

Also, the argument of the Private Respondent that after the Petitioner left Tolosa in 1952, she “abandoned her
residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely
expressing her intention to live there again” is incorrect and misplaced.

The Supreme Court clarified that domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate an actual removal or actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one and acts which corresponds to this purpose. In the absence
of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. In this
case, there is no presence of such proof. Thus, the residency of the Petitioner was never lost and continues.

Domino vs. COMELEC


GR No. 134015

MAINPOINT: As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality
involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change
of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual
residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence
without intention.

FACTS: Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the Lone Legislative
District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in the
constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election.

Private respondents alleged that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the Certificate of Candidacy, is not a
resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election.

The Petitioner brought to the COMELEC multiple documentary evidence, one of which includes an MTC decision
excluding him as a voter and resident of Quezon City, to support his claim that he is a resident of Sarangani. In
addition to the documents, the Petitioner argued that he has been physically present in Sarangani for more than a
year already and that it would be sufficient enough to meet the residency requirement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner met the residency requirement to run as representative of Sarangani

RULING: No. Actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that from said date he had transferred his
residence in that place. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled
with conduct indicative of that intention. While "residence" simply requires bodily presence in a given place,
"domicile" requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it
one’s fixed and permanent place of abode, one’s home.

As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to
adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either
of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result
in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention.
Further, Domino’s lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of
registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does
give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his former
barangay. Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the fact of residence, and is
said to have decided preponderance in a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his
residence.

Perez v. COMELEC
GR 133944
October 28, 1999
MAINPOINT: It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement.

FACTS: Private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the Third District of Cagayan
in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner, as a voter and citizen, filed in the COMELEC a petition for the
disqualification of private respondent as a candidate on the ground that he had not been a resident of the district
for at least one (1) year immediately before the day of the elections as required by Art. VI, 6 of the Constitution.
In support of her claim, petitioner presented private respondents’ various documents, including respondent’s past
certificate of candidacy, all of which states that he is a resident of Barangay Calaoagan Dackel, Municipality of
Gattaran, which is outside the Third District of Cagayan.

ISSUE: Whether respondent satisfied the Constitution’s residency requirement

RULING: Yes. It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive
in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.

In this case, although private respondent declared in his certificates of candidacy prior to the May 11, 1998
elections that he was a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan, the fact is that he was actually a resident of the Third
District not just for one (1) year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for more than seven (7) years since July
1990. His claim that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible considering that he was
governor from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it would be convenient for him to maintain his residence in
Tuguegarao, which is the capital of the province of Cagayan.

Fernandez v. HRET
608 SCRA 733 (2009)

MAINPOINT: The Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the
district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to election
day.

FACTS: Petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative of the first legislative district of the province of Laguna.
In his Certificate of Candidacy, he indicated that he is a resident of Sta. Rosa City, Laguna. Private respondent
sought the cancellation of petitioner’s disqualification on the ground of an alleged material misrepresentation in
his COC regarding his place of residence, because during past elections, he had declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as
his address, and Pagsanjan was located in the Fourth District.

Moreover, respondent presented testimonies of witnesses who attested, among others, that they rarely, if ever,
saw respondent in the leased premises at the alleged Sta. Rosa residence; and other witnesses who testified that
contrary to the misrepresentations of petitioner, he is not a resident of the alleged Sta. Rosa residence. He further
claimed that petitioner was only leasing a resident in Sta. Rosa at the time of his candidacy. HRET decided in
favor of respondent adding a new qualification requirement for candidates seeking election to the position of
Member of the House of Representatives, and that is, they must be real property owners in the legislative district
where they seek election.

ISSUE: Whether or no petitioner sufficiently complied with the one-year residency requirement to be a Member
of the House of Representatives

RULING: Yes. The Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the district
where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to election day. To use
ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies
that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect,
imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office, which property requirement would be
unconstitutional.
Moreover, there are real and substantial reasons for petitioner to establish Sta. Rosa as his domicile of choice and
abandon his domicile of origin and/or any other previous domicile. To begin with, petitioner and his wife have
owned and operated businesses in Sta. Rosa since 2003. Their children have attended schools in Sta. Rosa at least
since 2005. Although ownership of property should never be considered a requirement for any candidacy,
petitioner had sufficiently confirmed his intention to permanently reside in Sta. Rosa by purchasing residential
properties in that city even prior to the May 2007 election, as evidenced by certificates of title issued in the name
of petitioner and his wife. One of these properties is a residence in Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa which petitioner acquired
even before 2006 but which petitioner had been leasing out. He claims that he rented out this property because
prior to 2006 he had not decided to permanently reside in Sta. Rosa.

Maquera vs. Borra


15 SCRA 7

MAINPOINT: The effect of said Republic Act No. 4421 is to impose property qualifications in order that
a person could run for a public office, which property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and
essence of the Republican system ordained in the Constitution.

FACTS: RA 4421 was enacted which requires all candidates for national, provincial, city and municipal offices
to post a surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary or emoluments of the position he is candidate of. The said
law is questioned for constitutionality as it adds an additional requirement to candidates for elective positions.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4421's addition of the bond requirement constitutional and valid

RULING: No. The effect of said Republic Act No. 4421 is to impose property qualifications in order that a
person could run for a public office, which property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of
the Republican system ordained in the Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same.
Consequently, Republic Act No. 4421 is unconstitutional and hence null and void.

The bond required in Republic Act No. 4421 and the confiscation of said bond are not predicated upon the
necessity of defraying certain expenses or of compensating services given in connection with elections, and is,
therefore, arbitrary and oppressive.

Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board


GR No. 157870

MAINPOINT: The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as
it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the
Constitution.

FACTS: This case questions the constitutionality of Section 36 of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drug Act of 2002. The said section requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office. Among the
many allegations of the petitioner, the one that relates to this topic is that they allege that it provides for an
additional qualification for a candidate for public office contrary to what is required and mandated by the
Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether the Congress can enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to
those laid down by the Constitution?

RULING: No. Section 36(g) is declared unconstitutional by the Court. The Congress cannot validly amend or
otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a
constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution. A candidate for senator needs only to meet the
qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3)
literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need
not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate.

Dimaporo vs. Mitra


202 SCRA 779

MAINPOINT: The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the
legislature, but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by
circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer.

FACTS: Petitioner Mohammad Ali Dimaporo was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Lanao
del Sur during the 1987 Congressional elections. On 1990, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Regional Governor for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. This act caused his non-inclusion in the
Roll of the Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election
Code.32

After losing the election, he attempted to return to his former office as Representative but was impliedly denied
due to this case with the Court. Because of this, he alleged that his removal from office due to Section 67, Article
IX of the Omnibus Election Code is illegal as it is contrary to the current Constitution. He asserts that the
questioned provision of law is repugnant to the Constitution as it provides for the shortening of a congressman's
term of office on a ground not provided for by the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code provides for the shortening of a
congressman's term on a ground not provided for by the Constitution thereby rendering it unconstitutional

RULING: No, it is a constitutional provision of law. This statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials
serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby
cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy; they cannot go back to their
former position.

As emphasized above, the one that is cut short is the tenure and not the term. The term of office prescribed by the
Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature, but the period during which an officer actually
holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure
may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term
of office.

Also, it must be noted that Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code actually is a mode of voluntary
renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.

Farinas vs Executive Secretary


GR No. 147387

MAINPOINT: There is no discrimination in having appointed public officials considered as to ipso facto
resigned from their position when they filed their Certificate of Candidacy and not applying the same rule
with elective officials. This is because the two are distinct from each other.

FACTS: Section 14 of RA 9006 was enacted which repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. They
contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section
67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso
facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even
as they campaign for re-election or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been
retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from
their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is unconstitutional for being discriminative of appointive public
officials

RULING: No. The questioned provision is constitutional. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective
officials and appointive officials. The former occupies their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They
are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the
other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while
others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper
to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing
of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the
power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.

Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive
officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same
classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.

Quinto vs. COMELEC


GR No. 189698

MAINPOINT: Reiteration of the Farinas vs. Executive Secretary Case: There is no discrimination in
having appointed public officials considered as to ipso facto resigned from their position when they filed
their Certificate of Candidacy and not applying the same rule with elective officials. This is because the
two are distinct from each other.
FACTS: This is a Motion for Reconsideration. In the original case, the Court ruled for the unconstitutionality of
Section 13 of RA 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code34 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8678 for violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from over breadth. The
common ground of all questioned provisions is the “ipso facto resignation” of appointed officials upon filing their
Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC.

In this Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC argues that the assailed decision is contrary to, and/or
violative of, the constitutional proscription against the participation of public appointive officials and members
of the military in partisan political activity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court correctly ruled on the unconstitutionality of the questioned provisions

RULING: No, the Court reversed its decision on reconsideration. The Court maintains that Farinas vs. Executive
Secretary is controlling.

An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the
people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected
officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded
from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other
words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the
end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials
are concerned.
Codilla vs. De Venecia
GR No. 150605

MAINPOINT: If the validity of the proclamation is the core issue of the disqualification case, the
proclamation of the candidate cannot divest COMELEC en banc of its jurisdiction to review its validity.

It is a ministerial duty of the House to administer oath of office to the winning candidate.

FACTS: Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte, were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte. A petition for disqualification was filed against Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus Election
Code, alleging that he used the equipment and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul
and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing,
influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.

At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still pending so Codilla’s name
remained in the list of candidates and was voted for. In fact, he garnered the highest number of votes. However,
his proclamation as winner was suspended by order of the COMELEC. After hearing of his disqualification case,
he was found guilty and ordered disqualified.

Codilla’s votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected Representative and
subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC
and also sought the annulment of Locsin’s proclamation. In this Motion for Reconsideration, the order of
proclamation of Locsin was set aside by the COMELEC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the case

RULING: Yes. This case is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. To stress again, at the time of the
proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was
seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

The House of Representatives cannot exercise discretion over the proclamation. In the case at bar, the
administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives
representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public
respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent
Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially
ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside
the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC
en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and
executory.

PAGE 12
Tolentino v. COMELEC
GR 148334
January 21, 2004

FACTS: In 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo succeeded as President and Senator Guingona as Vice-
President. Because of a vacancy in the Senate, COMELEC held a special election to be held simultaneously with
the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that
election. The Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired
term of former Senator Guingona, Jr.
COMELEC, through Resolution No. 01-005, proclaimed the winning candidates.
Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction because, among
others, it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election.

ISSUE: Whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held on 14 May 2001.

RULING: Yes. The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence,
whether made by the legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the
election’s validity. In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an
election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is
to be held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is
not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so. This
is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election
by some authority and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election.
MAINPOINT: In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an
election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is
to be held and operates as the call for that election.

Philconsa v. Mathay
18 SCRA 300 (1966)

FACTS: The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of
Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such
implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being that
the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired
only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said
Act expired on December 30, 1965.

ISSUE: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the
House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase
becomes effective.

RULING: The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not
operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it
will have expired.

MAINPOINT: The purpose of Section 14 (now 10), Article VI of the Constitution is to place a "legal bar to the
legislators "yielding to the natural temptation to increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for higher
compensation is lacking, but with the length of time that has to elapse before an increase becomes effective, there
is a deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need for it is clearly felt”.

People v. Jalosjos
324 SCRA 689

FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The
accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives and to leave his cell.

RULING: No. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation
of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations.
MAINPOINT: The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives
arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The
provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

Trillanes v. Pimentel
556 SCRA 471

FACTS: more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of
the President and key national officials. After a series of negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening.
In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was
charged with coup d’état before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in
detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for
Leave of Court to be allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests.

ISSUE: Whether Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and serve his
mandate as senator.

RULING: No. The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak
of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal
cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral
victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness
of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such
legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.

MAINPOINT: Allowing a detained member of Congress to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant
to his position—such an aberrant situation not only elevates his status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Jimenez v. Cabangbang
17 SCRA 876 (1966)

FACTS: Defendant Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee
on National Defense. He wrote an open letter to the President and caused its publication in several newspapers of
general circulation exposing the allegedly operational plans by some ambitious AFP officers regarding a massive
political build-up of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, to prepare him to become a candidate for
President in 1961.

ISSUE: Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication.

RULING: No. An open letter to the President of the Philippines when Congress was not in session which
defendant-Congressman caused to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines is
not a communication which the defendant published while he was performing his official duty, either as a Member
of Congress, or as officer of any Committee thereof. Said communication is not absolutely privileged.

MAINPOINT: Open letter to the President, when Congress was not in session, is not covered by constitutional
privilege.

Antonino v. Valencia
57 SCRA 70

FACTS: Lorenzo Sarmiento of the Liberal Party lost to Vicente Duterte of the Nacionalista Party in the election
for governor in Davao.
Subsequently, Senator Antonino issued a statement that the loss was caused by the support given by
Valencia, the Secretary of Public Works, to the independent LP candidate Maglana which caused a division in
LP votes. Antonino was quoted in various newspapers that had Valencia not “Sabotaged” and “double-crossed”
them, the LP would have won.
Antonino then proceeded to file requests to have Valencia investigated by the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee on alleged anomalous acquisitions of public works supplies and equipment.
Valencia retaliated by issuing a press release that he will also file charges with the Blue Ribbon Committee
regarding anomalous acts of the Senator. This release was published in newspapers

ISSUE: Whether the press release is libelous and that it is not protected as a qualified privilege communication.
RULING: Yes. As defendant's imputations against plaintiff were not made privately nor officially as to be
qualifiedly privileged under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court correctly held that by virtue of
their defamatory and libelous nature against the honor, integrity and reputation of plaintiff, malice in law was
presumed. It further correctly ruled that defendant had not overcome such presumption of malice, not having
shown the truth thereof, or that they were published with good intentions and with justifiable motive or even from
the most liberal standpoint that they were made in the exercise of the right of fair comment on the character, good
faith, ability and sincerity of public officials.

MAINPOINT: When defamatory statement does not constitute a qualified privileged communication, malice in
law is presumed.

Pobre v. Defensor Santiago


AC No. 7399
August 25, 2009

FACTS: Pobre filed a letter-complaint against Santiago for the latter’s statement made on the Senate Floor which
according to the petitioner reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court.
Senator Santiago explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on
parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress
or its committee.

ISSUE: Whether Senator Defensor-Santiago can be charged for her comments on the judiciary.

RULING: No. The court ruled in favor of Defensor-Santiago in this case. Indeed, her privilege speech is not
actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. Despite this, the court feels that
the lady senator has gone beyond the limits of decency and good conduct for the statements made which were
intemperate and highly improper in substance. The court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary
sanctions on her, but the factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so,
even without any sign of remorse from her.

MAINPOINT: The parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them
against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the peoples representatives, to perform the
functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the
congressional hall. It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation
aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.

Trillanes v. Castillo-Marigomen
GR. 223451
FACTS: Petitioner uttered statements describing former Makati Vice Mayor Ernesto Mercado as former VP
Binay's "front" or "dummy" in connection with the so-called Hacienda Binay, in response to media interviews
during gaps and breaks in Blue Ribbon plenary and committee hearings in the Senate.

ISSUE: Whether the statements made by Senator Trillanes are protected by his constitutionally guaranteed rights
to free speech and freedom of expression and of the press.

RULING: petitioner's remarks fall outside the privilege of speech or debate under Section 11, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. The statements were clearly not part of any speech delivered in the Senate or any of its
committees. They were also not spoken in the course of any debate in said fora. It cannot likewise be successfully
contended that they were made in the official discharge or performance of petitioner's duties as a Senator, as the
remarks were not part of or integral to the legislative process.

MAINPOINT: statements in media interviews are not covered by the parliamentary "speech or debate" privilege.

Liban v. Gordon
GR No. 175352
July 15, 2009
FACTS: Petitioners were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter. They filed
with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat
in the Senate” against respondent Richard J. Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors
during his incumbency as Senator of the Philippines.

Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent
Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes
of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.
RULING: No. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the
President or by any subordinate government official. The PNRC in itself is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-
owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable organization controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths
of which are private sector individuals. Thus, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was
elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.

MAINPOINT: The PNRC Chairman is not a government office for the purpose of the prohibition in Sec. 13,
Article VI of the Constitution.

Puyat v. De Guzman
113 SCRA 31

FACTS: Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries. The election
was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyat’s rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted
– hence he filed a quo warranto case before the SEC. Prior to Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez,
then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s
group. Fernandez filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said SEC case for him to intervene, not as a
counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation.

ISSUE: Whether Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC case without
violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies?

RULING: Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be
appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the
private respondents His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares
of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have
their respective capable and respected counsel.
MAINPOINT: An assemblyman cannot indirectly fail to follow the Constitutional prohibition not to appear as
counsel before an administrative tribunal like the SEC by buying a nominal amount of share of one of the
shareholders after his appearance as counsel therein was contested.

Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona
GR 134577 November 18, 1998

FACTS: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected
President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago,
allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained
that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the
losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-
NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader.
The Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.

ISSUE: Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader.

RULING: No. The interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws,
the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. While the Constitution is explicit on the
manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting
the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary." To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

MAINPOINT: While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not
vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law
or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

Avelino v. Cuenco
83 Phil. 17 [1949]

FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the
rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request
to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the
leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada
from delivering his speech. The Senate President with his supporters employed delaying tactics, they tried to
adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left
continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President of the Senate through Resolution
No. 68 and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.

RULING: It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four justice agree
that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate
in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator
Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as
the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the
majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any
time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all
controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the
said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place
them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

MAINPOINT: The Court held that there was a quorum in the session of the Philippine Senate (composed of
twenty-four Senators) in which twelve Senators were present, one Senator being in the United States.

People v. Jalosjos
324 SCRA 689

FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The
accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be
represented.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives

RULING: The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of
Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations.

MAINPOINT: The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the
absence is a legitimate one.

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines


GR 196271, 18 October 2011

FACTS: The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend
RA No. 9054 (An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended) and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.

ISSUE: Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate
Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING: Yes. Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum to do business. In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold
session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.

In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the
Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA
No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of
bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed.

MAINPOINT: Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum to do business. In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold
session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.

Arroyo v. De Venecia
277 SCRA 268 [1997]

FACTS: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents
charging violation of the rules of the House.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the
quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of
the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed
by the House of Representatives and by the Senate. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V.
Ramos.

ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House.

RULING: No. the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in
enacting R.A. No. 8240. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due
the other two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the
judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself.

MAINPOINT: The prevailing view is that Rules of Proceedings are subject to revocation, modification or waiver
at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural.

Osmeña v. Pendatun
109 Phil. 863 [1960]

FACTS: Congressman Osmeña asked for annulment of Resolution No. 59 (which contains his alleged
objectionable speech and words against the President) on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary
immunity. In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged, among others, after his allegedly
objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House
provides that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall
not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.

The House declared him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.

ISSUE: Whether the House may no longer take action against Osmena because after his speech, and before
approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other business.

RULING: No. Granted that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect past
acts or renew its rights to take action which had already lapsed.

MAINPOINT: Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action taken by a deliberate body when the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure.

Santiago v. Sandiganbayan
356 SCRA 636

FACTS: Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 disqualified aliens. Her act
was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act).

A motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by
then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the
Constitution.

RULING: Yes. In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress
to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional
provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case
may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019,
which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.

MAINPOINT: Where the question pertains to an affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court
subscribes to the view that unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the
Court should not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any other two branches of government—it is an
impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for
judicial intervention.

US v. Pons
34 Phil. 729 [1916]

FACTS: Pons was charged with the crime of illegal importation of opium. Pons alleged and offered to prove that
the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act
No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th of February
but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and void.

ISSUE: Whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals.

RULING: Yes. The Act of Congress provides, among other things, in section 7, that the Philippine Assembly
"shall keep in journal of its proceedings, which shall be published . . . ." In obedience to this mandate, the journal
of the Assembly's proceedings for the sessions of 1914 was duly published and it appears therein that the
Assembly adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.

MAINPOINT: When the legislative journals show with certainty the time of adjournment of the Legislature and
are clear and unambiguous respecting the same, they are conclusive; and extraneous evidence cannot be admitted
to show a different date of adjournment.

Casco Phil. Commercial Co. v. Gimenez


7 SCRA 347 [1963]

FACTS: Petitioner, and importer of urea and formaldehyde, sought the refund of the margin fee it paid as required
by RA 2609, relying upon a resolution of the Monetary Board of Central Bank declaring that the separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee.

Petitioner contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between
the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and
"formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea
formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor
of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin
fee.

RULING: No. The term “urea formaldehyde”, used in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609, under which the sale
of foreign exchange for the importation of certain articles is exempt from payment of margin fees, refers to the
finished product, and is distinct and separate from “urea” and “formaldehyde”, which are separate articles used
in the manu-facture of synthetic resin.

MAINPOINT: The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of a bill before it was
certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.

Morales v. Subido
27 SCRA 131 [1969]

FACTS: The petitioner, Enrique Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila Police Department
and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. Upon the resignation of the chief of police, the petitioner was designated
acting chief of police and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the Mayor
of Manila. The respondent Comissioner of Civil Cervice Abelardo Subido approved the designation of the
petitioner but rejected his appointment for “failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility
requirements for the said position”.
The petitioner asserted that there were various changes made in House Bill 6951 and according to the
Petitioner the House bill division deleted an entire provision and substituted what is now section 10 of the Police
Act of 1966 which substituted “served the police department of a city” to “who has served as officer in the Armed
Forces”.

That the omission was made not at any stage of the legislative proceedings but only in the course of
engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the proofreading stage and that the change was not made by Congress
but only by an employee.

It is for this reason that the Petitioner would have the court look searchingly into the matter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look
searchingly into the matter.

RULING: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows
that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The
SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of
the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest
to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and
unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with
consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.

MAINPOINT: The enrolled bill prevails in any discrepancy.

PAGE 13
Astorga v. Villegas
56 SCRA 714 [1974]

Main point: Journals of Congress may be resorted to determine whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed
by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress.
Facts: House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application filed in the House of Representatives, was passed on third
reading without amendments. But when the bill was discussed in the Senate, substantial amendments were
introduced by Senator Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. There was also an
amendment recommended by Senator Roxas but this does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as
having been acted upon. The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of H.B.9266 containing
the amendments recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually
approved by the Senate. The printed copies of the bill were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the
HOR, the Speaker of the HOR, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. Then the President affixed
his signature thereto by way of approval. The bill became RA 4065.

Senator Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of H.B. 9266 signed into law by the President
was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments
introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence, the Senate President invalidated his
signature on the bill. Thereafter, the President withdrew his signature on H.B. 9266.

Issue: What evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted?

Ruling: In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted. The journal of the proceedings of each House
of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. The Court is merely asked to inquire whether the
text of HB 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the
specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for that purpose.
The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the
Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him.

Phil. Judges Assn. v. Prado


227 SCRA 703
Main Point: Facts: Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraws the franking
privilege from the Supreme Court, the CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs, and the Land Registration Commission and its
Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. Petitioners maintain, among others, that the
second paragraph of Sec. 35 which repeals their franking privilege was not included in the original version of SB
720 or HB 4200. It only appeared in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Art. VI, Sec. 26(2).
Issue: Whether RA 7354 has been duly enacted in accordance with Art VI, Sec 26(2)?
Ruling: Yes. Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled
bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary. The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court. Both the
enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article
VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

Abakada v. Ermita 469 SCRA 1


Main POint: Where the failure of constitutional compliance in the enactment of statutes is not discoverable from
the face of the act itself but may be demonstrated by recourse to the legislative journals, debates, committee
reports or papers of the governor, courts have used several conflicting theories with which to dispose of the issue.

Facts: RA 9337 which amends certain provisions of the NIRC was enacted. These consolidated petitions question
the constitutionality of the law. Among others, petitioners argue that the Bicameral Conference Committee acted
without jurisdiction in deleting the provisions present in SB 1950 and HB 3705 and inserted provsions which
were present in SB 1950 violating the constitutional mandate that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills shall
originate exclusively in the HOR.

Issue: Whether the irregularities of the Bicameral Committee in its passage of the law nullify RA 9337

Ruling: No. A perusal of the journals show that there being differences and/or disagreements on the foregoing
provisions of the House and Senate bills, the Bicameral Conference Committee was mandated by the rules of
both houses of Congress to act on the same by settling said differences and/or disagreements. In the present case,
the changes introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee on disagreeing provisions were meant only to
reconcile and harmonize the disagreeing provisions for it did not inject any idea or intent that is wholly foreign
to the subject embraced by the original provisions.

Section 17. Electoral Tribunal

Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunal


Nature and Power
Angara v. Electoral Commission
63 Phil. 134 [1936]
Main Point: The Electoral Commission , is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to
determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and
that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions.

Facts: Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position
of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.

On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l Assembly
for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly
passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l
Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before
the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed
period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.

Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking
further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the
said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme
Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

Issue: Whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its
resolution of December 9 and in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein
petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly

Ruling: No. The Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform and the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

The present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission. The
confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed
prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to
prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be
filed.
Pre-proclamation controversies v. Election Contests;
Scope of inquiry ;
When Proper Election Contest
Vera v. Avelino
77 Phil. 192 [1946]
Main Point: Independently of constitutional or statutory grant, the Senate has, under parliamentary practice, the
power to inquire into the credentials of any member and the latter's right to participate in its deliberations.

Facts: COMELEC submitted to the President and the Congress a report regarding the national elections held in
1946. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija,
Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will.

During the session on May 25, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O.
Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero – who had been included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving
the highest number of votes and as proclaimed by the COMELEC– shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of
the chamber, pending the termination of the protest filed against their election.

Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against their colleagues who instituted the resolution, praying
for its annulment and allowing them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial prerogatives.

Issue: Whether the Senate may defer the oath-taking of any member against whom a protest had been lodged

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding that the
case was not a “contest”, and affirmed that it is the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be
admitted to its membership. "As used in constitutional provisions", election contest "relates only to statutory
contests in which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also to have himself inducted into the
office." Following the powers assigned by the Constitution, the question raised was political in nature and
therefore not under the juridical review of the courts

Roces v. HRET
469 SCRA 681 [2005]

Main Point: The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives and has the power to promulgate procedural rules to govern proceedings
brought before it. It has the power to hear and determine, or inquire into, the question of its own jurisdiction, both
as to parties and as to subject matter, and to decide all questions, whether of law or fact, the decision of which is
necessary to determine the question of jurisdiction.

Facts: Petitioner and former Congressman Ang Ping are candidates for Representative for the 3rd congressional
district of Manila in the May 2004 elections. A registered voter of Manila petitioned to cancel Ang Ping's COC
alleging that the latter misrepresented himself to be a natural-born citizen. Prior to the promulgation of resolution,
Mr. Ang Ping withdrew hic COC and had her wife substitute for him. The COMELEC First Division ordered the
BOI of Manila not to count any vote cast for Ang Ping and denied the subtitution. While the case was still with
the 1st Division, Ang Ping elevated the case to COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 6823 which ordered
the Regional Election Director to delete Ang Ping's name from the certified list of candidates.

On the election day, the BOCs resolved not to canvass votes for Mr. Ang Ping and proclaimed petitioner winner
citing RN 6823. Mrs. Ang Ping filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam with the HRET alleging that RN 6823
deprives their right to elevate the case to COMELEC En banc. HRET upheld that there was no final COMELEC
resolution disqualifying or denying due course to the COC of Mr. Ang Ping, thus her substitution for the latter
was legally permissible; and there was no prior notice and hearing in violation of the omnibus election code.

Issue: whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
it ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping is a proper party to file the election protest despite the denial in due course and
cancellation of her COC under COMELEC Resolution No. 6823

Ruling: No. The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives and has the power to promulgate procedural rules to govern proceedings
brought before it. It has the power to hear and determine, or inquire into, the question of its own jurisdiction, both
as to parties and as to subject matter, and to decide all questions, whether of law or fact, the decision of which is
necessary to determine the question of jurisdiction.

One of the three essential elements of jurisdiction is that proper parties must be present. Consequently, the HRET
merely exercised its exclusive jurisdiction when it ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping was a proper party to contest the
election of Roces.
Seneres v. COMELEC
585 SCRA 557 [2009]
Main Point:
Facts: In 1999, private respondent Ribles was elected president and chairperson of party-list group, BUHAY.
BUHAY participated in the 2001 and 2004 elections with its manifestation to participate bore the signatures of
Robles as president. In 2007, petitioner Seneres, holding himself as acting president and secgen of BUHAY also
filed a certificate of nomination with COMELEC nominating himself among others. The national council of
BUHAY adopted a resolution expelling Seneres as party member for submitting a certificate of nomination for
the party and filed a petition recognizing Villanueva as the new representative of BUHAY in the HOR for the
remaining term. COMELEC proclaimed BUHAY as a winning party-list for the MAy 2007 elections and declared
Robles as party president in a hold-over capacity.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its challenged Resolution dated June 19, 2007, which
declared respondent Robles as the duly authorized representative of BUHAY, and there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except the instant petition.

Ruling: The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals (HRETs) sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests
relative to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives begins only
after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.[25] Thus, once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs
jurisdiction over elections relating to the election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins.

Without a doubt, at the time Seneres filed this petition before the Court, the right of the nominees as party-list
representatives had been recognized and declared and the nominees had taken their oath and already assumed
their offices in the HOR. As such, the proper recourse would have been to file a petition for quo warranto before
the HRET within ten (10) days from receipt of the July 19, 2007 Resolution and not a petition for certiorari before
the Court.

Limkaichong v. COMELEC – 594 SCRA 434 [2009]


Main Point:
Facts: Two petitions were consolidated questioning the qualifications of Jocelyn Limkaichong to run for, be
elected to, and assume and discharge the position as Representative of the 1st District of Negros Oriental. The
contention of the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen because her
parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. In the election that ensued, she was voted for by the
constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes.

The COMELEC, after due hearing, declared Limkaichong as disqualified. On the following days however,
notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued
a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. She was eventually
proclaimed as the winner and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of
Representatives. This is in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending
the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to
the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Petitioners countered the proclamation before
the COMELEC. Limkaichong then argued that since she is now the proclaimed winner, the COMELEC can no
longer exercise jurisdiction over the matter. It should be the HRET which should exercise jurisdiction from then
on.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC should still exercise jurisdiction over the matter
Ruling: No. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has invariably held
that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the lower
house, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate
divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The
party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the
constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives
with respect to the latter’s election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article
VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’
jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

Aquino v. COMELEC -243 SCRA 400 [1995]

Main Point: The electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns
and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the latter become members of either
the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his
oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to Section. 17 of the
Constitution

Facts: Petitioner filed his COC for the position of Representative for the new 2nd Legislative District of Makati
City, in which he stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Private respondents
filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification. Petitioner
filed another COC amending in his COC that his residency in the constituency has been 1 year and 13 days.
COMELEC 2nd division dismissed the petition for disqualification. Private respondents filed an MR with the
COMELEC en banc. Meanwhile, petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election. COMELEC en banc issued
an order suspending petitioner's proclamation. Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his
proclamation, the COMELEC en banc declared petitioner ineligible and disqualified for office.

Issue:Whether THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE AND ADJUDGE THE


DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE INVOLVING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AFTER THE MAY 8, 1995
ELECTIONS, SUCH DETERMINATION BEING RESERVED TO AND LODGE EXCLUSIVELY WITH
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

Ruling: Yes. Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the
winning candidate. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be
said to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to Section. 17 of the Constitution. While the
proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec 6 of R.A. 6646
allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein.

Perez v. COMELEC – GR 133944, October 28, 1999


Main Point:
Facts: Private respondent filed his COC for representative of 3rd district of Cagayan in the 1998 elections.
Petitioner filed a petition for disqualification of private resident alleging that he does not meet the 1-year residency
requirement. COMELEC 1st division dismissed the petition finding private respondent qualified to run. PRivate
respondent was proclaimed elected and was sworn in office. COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

Issue: Whether private respondent's proclamation and assimption of office deprived COMELEC of jurisdiction
to pass upon his qualification for the office of representatitive

Ruling: Yes. No. Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the continuation of proceedings for disqualification even
after the elections if the respondent has not been proclaimed. The COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to
entertain the motion because the proclamation of private respondent barred further consideration of petitioners
action. In the same vein, considering that at the time of the filing of this petition, private respondent was already
a member of the HOR, this Court has no jurisdiction over the same. Pursuant to Art. VI, 17 of the Constitution,
the HRET has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of private respondents
ineligibility.

Aggabao v. COMELEC – 449 SCRA 400 [2005]


Main Point:
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition for TRO and preliminary injunction to nullify the resolution
affirming the COMELEC’s proclamation of Rodolfo Biazon as the duly elected 12th Senator in the May 2004
national and local elections. Barbers asserted that the proclamation was illegal and premature being based on an
incomplete canvass and that the remaining uncanvassed COCs and results of special elections will affect the
current result. The petition was filed before the COMELEC First division however was denied twice hence the
petitioner raised the issue to the High Court.

Issue: Whether the court can take cognizance of the petitions raised to grant the prohibition

Ruling: No. The word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 12 of the Revised Rules
of the SET underscores the exclusivity of the SETs jurisdiction over election contests relating to members of the
Senate. The authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete. It is therefore clear that the Court has
no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. Since Barbers contests Biazon’s proclamation as the 12th winning
senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers complaint

The alleged invalidity of Biazon’s proclamation involves a dispute or contest relating to the election returns of
members of the Senate. Indisputably, the resolution of such dispute falls within the sole jurisdiction of the SET.

Barbersv. COMELEC – 460 SCRA 569 [2005] 165691


Main Point:
Facts: COMELEC proclaimed Biazon as the 12th winning senator in the 2004 elections stating that after the
canvass of the supplemental provincial COCs from Maguidanao, Lanao del Sur and one barangay in Nueva
Vizcaya, Biazon garnered 10,685 more votes than Barbers and the difference will not materially be affected by
the votes in certain precincts where there was failure of elections.
Claiming that Biazon's proclamation was void, Barbers filed a petition to annul the Biazon's proclamation.
COMELEC denied the petition ruling that petitioner’s proper recourse was to file a regular election protest which
under the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code exclusively pertains to the SET.

Issue: Whether the annulment of proclamation is an election contest which exclusively pertains to the SET

Ruling: Yes. The alleged invalidity of Biazon’s proclamation involves a dispute or contest relating to the election
returns of members of the Senate. Indisputably, the resolution of such dispute falls within the sole jurisdiction of
the SET.

Rasul v. COMELEC – GR 134142, August 24, 1999


Main POint: Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as Section 250 of the Omnibus Election
Code provide that (t)he Senate and the Hous e of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. A verified petition contesting the election of any Member of the Senate shall be filed by any candidate
who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and been voted for the Office of Senator within fifteen (15) days
after the proclamation of the protestee.

Facts: COMELEC En banc issued RN 3047-A declaring that the remaining uncanvassed certificates no longer
affect the results and proceeded to proclaim the 12 winning senatorial candidates. {etitioner contends that due to
the indefinite suspesion of special elections in some areas, the total population of registered voters combined wth
the uncanvassed votes are sufficient to dislodge the 12th winning senator, respondent Teresa Aquino-Oreta.
Petitioner submits that the inclusion of respondent Teresa Aquino-Oreta who was premature and based on
incomplete canvass.

Issue: Whether SC has jurisdiction over the matter

Ruling: No. Inasmuch as petitioner contests the proclamation of herein respondent Teresa Aquino-Oreta as the
12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on
the complaint of petitioner. Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal provides that an election
protest must be filed by any candidate who has filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted upon for the
same office.

Guerero v. COMELEC – GR 137004, July 26, 2000

Main Point: Under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over
all contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus,
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of
Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins

Facts: Ruiz sought to perpetually disqualify respondent Farinas as Congressional candidate alleging that he had
been campaigning despite his failure to file a COC for said. COMELEC denied the petition stating that there is
none in the records to consider respondent an official candidate, hence, there is no COC to be cancelled or
candidate to be disqualified.

Farinas, however, obtained the highest number of votes and proclaimed winner. Ruiz filed an MR contending that
Farinas could not validly substitute for Chevylle Farinas since the latter was an independent candidate. Another
person cannot substitute for an independent candidate. Meanwhile, Farinas took his oath of office as member of
the HOR.

Petitioner intervened averring that he was the official candidate of the LP for congressman and stood to be
adversely affected in the MR filed by Ruiz. COMELEC en banc denied the petition ruling that the determination
of the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Fariñas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the HRET

However, petitioner contends that the jurisdiction of the HRET is limited only to the constitutional qualifications.
Consequently, he claims that any issue which does not involve these constitutional qualifications is beyond the
realm of the HRET. The filing of a COC being a statutory qualification under the Omnibus Election Code is
outside the pale of the HRET, according to him.

Issue: Whether the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Fariñas is already within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives?
Ruling: No. The word "qualifications" cannot be read as qualified by the term "constitutional." Basic is the rule
in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.

But as already held, in an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has
taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET.
The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between
constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people’s mandate.

Whether respondent Fariñas validly substituted Chevylle V. Fariñas and whether respondent became a legitimate
candidate, in our view, must likewise be addressed to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

Villarosa v. HRET – GR 143351, September 14, 2000


Main Point: The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives.

Facts: Petitioner Amelita Villarosa was a candidate for the office of Representative of the Lone District of
Occidental Mindoro in the 2998 elections. She sent an affidavit asking to insert in her COC the name GIRLIE as
in every barangays in Occidental Mindoro she is known as Girlie Villarosa. She was informed by the Provincial
Election supervisor Arsenio GUSTE that her nickname in her COC is JTV, thereby counting all ballots with JTV
in her favor. She was proclaimed the winning candidate against his opponent Ricardo Quintos, who filed an
election protest before the HRET asking for a recount of the ballots and that not to count JTV in Villarosa’s favor
but as stray votes. HRET ruled in favour of Quintos.

Issue: Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in not counting in favor of Villarosa the votes for
JTV

Ruling: No. JTV is not a nickname Villarosa was generally and populary known as manifested by her request to
insert Girlie in her COC. Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that any vote containing initials
only or does not sufficiently identify the candidate shall be considered a stray vote but not invalidate the whole
ballot; and he HRET correctly ruled that JTV votes or variations thereof, under the idem sonans rule, cannot be
counted for VILLAROSA because only one nickname or stage name is allowed.

Abayon v. HRET
GR 189466
February 11, 2010
Main Point: Party-list nominees are "elected members" of the HOR no less than the district representatives are,
the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has
taken his oath and assumed office as member of the HORs, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.

Facts:In GR 189466, petitioner Abayon is the first nominee of the Angat tayo party-list that won a seat in the
HOR in the 2007 elections. Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat
Tayo and petitioner Abayon claiming that Aangat tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat since it did not
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors and Abayon herself was not qualified to sit as a party-
list nominee since she did not belong to the marginalized sectors she being the wife of an incumbent congressional
district representative.

Petitioner countered that COMELEC had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral
party lsit organization and that she belonged to the women sector. Petitioner pointed out that HRET had no
jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto since respondents collaterally attacked the registrationof Aangat
tayo which is a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of COMELEC. Respondent HRET dismissed the petition
against Aangat Tayao but upheld the jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon.

In GR 189506, petitioner Palparan is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007
elections for the members of the HOR. Respondents filed with respondent HRET a petition for quo warranto
against Bantay adn petitioner Palparan alleging that he was ineligible because he did not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented the victims of the communist rebels,
CAFGUs, former rebels and security guards. Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction
over his persin since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in
the HOR; and that his eligibility was an internal concern of Bantay and must be brough before it and not before
the HRET.
Issue: Whether HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as
nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the HOR

Ruling: Yes. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization
that sits as and becomes a member of the HOR. Clearly, the members of the HOR are of two kinds: "members x
x x who shall be elected from legislative districts" and "those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." This means that, from the
Constitution's point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not their parties or
organizations. Hence, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications

Garcia v. HRET
GR 134792
August 12, 1999

Main Point: The petition for quo warranto attacks the ineligibility to hold office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, a serious charge, which, if true, renders member of the HOR disqualified from such office. In
view of the delicate nature and importance of this charge, the observance of the HRET Rules of Procedure must
be taken seriously if they are to attain their objective, i.e., the speedy and orderly determination of the true will of
the electorate.

Facts: Petitioners filed a case before the HRET questioning the eligibility of Congressman Angpin that he is not
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Upon filing, the petitioners fully paid HRET the required filing fee of
P5,000. However, the HRET dismissed the case due to failure of the payment requirement of P5,000 cash deposit.
Petitioners filed an MR with the attached corresponding receipt of payment. Again, HRET denied the motion for
reconsideration due to failure of the additional payment required by its rules.

Issue: Whether HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition and in refusing to reinstate
the same even after the payment of the required fee

Ruling: No. Unlike in the case of election protests, no period is provided for to make the cash deposit in the case
of petitions for quo warranto. However, the cash deposit required is fixed.It is required to be paid together with
the filing fee at the time the petition is filed. It is different from a protest and/or counter-protest where the amount
of the required cash deposit is yet to be determined since it has to be based on the number of ballot boxes and
other election documents and paraphernalia to be collected and brought to the tribunal.

Petitioners paid the required deposit after an unreasonable delay of 28 days. Indeed, in dismissing the petition the
HRET acted judiciously
within its jurisdiction. It was a judgment call of the HRET which is clearly authorized under its Rules.

Lazatin v. HET
GR No. 84297
December 8, 1988

Main Point: The Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the HOR in the respective Electoral Tribunal.

Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for representative of Pampanga during the
1987 elections. Private respondent objected to the inclusion of certain election returns. Petitioner was proclaimed
as congressman-elect. Private respondent filed a petition to declare petitioner's proclamation void ab initio and a
petition from assuming office. COMELEC failed to act on the latter petition so petitioner was able to assume
office. Later, COMELEC declared petitioner's proclamation void ab initio. Petitioner challenged the COMELEC
resolution before the Court, which set aside the COMELEC's revocation of petitioner's proclamation. Private
respondent filed in the HRET an election protest.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the protest on the ground that it had been filed late citing Sec. 250 of the omnibus
election code. However, HRET ruled that the protest had been filed on time in accordance with the Sec. 9 of the
HRET Rules.

Issue: Whether private respondent filed the petition on time

Ruling: Yes. Petitioner's reliance on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. It applies only to
petitions filed before the COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, or any
regional, provincial or city official, which is in such matter had ceased to be effective under the 1987 Constitution.
First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and the legislative power is now vested in a bicameral
Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the HOR in the respective Electoral Tribunal.
Pre-proclamation controversy
Chavez v. COMELEC
211 SCRA 315 [1991]

Main Point: Pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and
Member of the House of Representatives. What is allowed is the correction of “manifest errors in the certificate
of canvass or election returns.”

Facts: The Court issued a resolution in GR 104704 disqualifying Melchor Chavez from running as senator in the
1992 elections. COMELEC resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates,
however, failed to order the crediting of all Chavez votes in favor of petitioner Francisco Chavez and cancellation
of Melchor's name in the list of qualified candidates. Petitioner alleged that confusion arose as the Chavez votes
were either declared stray or invalidated by the BEIs and Commissioner Rama's issuance of a directive over radio
and TV ordering all Chavez votes to be credited in his favor did not reach the BEI at the 170,354 precincts
nationwide; and as a result, Chavez votes were not credited in his favor.

Petitioner sent a letter to COMELEC requesting to devise ways and means in crediting Chavez votes in his favor
but COMELEC failed to act on said letter. Petitioner filed this petition for mandamus to enjoin COMELEC from
proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate without first acting upon his complaint. Sen. Aquino intervened
praying for the dismissal of the instant petition on the ground that the law does not allow pre-proclamation
controversy involving the election of members of the Senate.

Issue: Whether petitioner's cause of action is a pre-proclamation controversy not allowed involving the election
of members of the Senate

Ruling: Yes. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving
local elective officials, nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-
President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives.

What is allowed is the correction of “manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns.” In the case
at bar, petitioner’s allegation that “Chavez” votes were either invalidated or declared stray has no relation to the
correctness or authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Otherwise stated, petitioner has not demonstrated
any manifest error in the certificates of canvass or election returns before the Comelec which would warrant their
correction.

Composition
Abbas v. SET
166 SCRA 651 [1988]

Main Point: The proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
is 2 to 1-an unmistakable indication that the "legislative component" cannot be totally excluded from participation
in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.
Facts: Petitioners filed before respondent SET an election contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition
who were proclaimed senators-elect in the 1987 elections. At the time, SET was composed of 3 SC justices and
6 senators. Petitioners filed with respondent for the disqualification or inhibition of the senator-members from the
hearing and resolution of the said election contest on the ground that all of them are interested parties as
respondents therein.

Issue: Whether the senator-members of the SET may be inhibited from participating in the Tribunal

Ruling: No. Article VI, Section 17, 1987 Constitution creates the SET, ordains its composition and defines its
jurisdiction and powers. The Constitution intended that both those "judicial' and 'legislative' components
commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of Senators.

Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed
membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1-an unmistakable indication that the "legislative component"
cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing
violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.

Pimentel v. HRET
GR 141489
November 29, 2002

Main Point: The Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the HOR who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein.

Facts: In accordance with the effectivity of the Party-list system act, the 1998 elections were held which included
the election of party-list groups whos nominees would become members of the House. Subsequently, the House
constituted its HRET and CA contingent. None of the elected party-list groups were nominated to the hret or the
CA. They were composed solely of district represenatitves belonging to different political parties.

Sen. Pimentel wrote 2 letters to Senate President Ople as chairman of the CA and Assoc. Justice Melo as chairman
of the HRET requesting for the restructure of the CA and HRET to include party-list representatives. The HRET
resolved to direct its secretary to refer the said letter to the Secgen of the HOR. Subsequently, HRET Secretary
reffered the letter to HOR Secretary.

Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition for prohibition, mandamus and PI with the court against the HRET and CA
contending that under the party-list system act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the
HRET and 2.4 seats in the CA.

Issue: Whether the non-inclusion of a party-list representative in the HRET violates the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation

Ruling: No. The Constitution expressly grants to the HOR the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits,
to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the
House in the HRET and the CA. These constitutional provisions were reiterated in the 1998 Rules of the HRET.
Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate
common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of
Representatives and not with this Court.

Independence
Bondoc v. Pineda
201 SCRA 792 [1991]

Main Point: The use of the word “sole” in the Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House
Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
HOR. The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although 2/3 of its members are politicians. To
be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to
hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.

Facts: Pineda, an LDP member, and Bondoc, an LP member, were rival candidates for the position of
representative of 4th district of Pampanga in the 1987 elections. Pineda garnered 3,300 more votes than Bondoc
and proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the HRET. A decision had been reached in which Bondoc won
over Pineda by a margin of 23 votes. LDP members in the HRET insisted on a recount of the ballots thereby
delaying by at least 4 months the finalization od the decision in the case. The recount resulted in increasing
Bondoc's lead to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Cong. Cerilles of
the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the decision, Cong. Camasura received a letter informing him that he was
already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and
for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation
of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from
the LDP, the HOR decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the
HRET.

Issue: Whether the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, may change
that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in
an election contest pending therein

Ruling: No.The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan
consideration.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong.
Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of
the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of
Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes
by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation
of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Action/Decision
Robles v. HRET
181 SCRA 780 [1990]

Main Point: The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts, without
any action on the part of tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction,
once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.

Facts: Petitioner Robles and private respondent Santos were candidates for the position of Congressman of the
1st district of Caloocan City in the 1987 elections. Petitioner Robles was proclaimed the winner. Santos filed an
election protest with respondent HRET alleging among others that the elections were characterized by the
commission of electoral frauds and irregularities; thus asking for a recount of the ballots in all 320 precincts.

HRET ordered the commencement of the revision of contested ballots and directed Santos to identify 25% of the
toal contested precints to be revised firt. Petitioner moved to suspend the revision while Santos filed a motion to
withdraw protest on the unrevised precints. No action on both motions were yet taken by HRET when Santos
filed to disregard withdrawal of protest. HRET granted Santos motion to disregard withdrawal of protest and
denied petitioner's motion to cancel continuation of the revision of the precincts.

Petitioner contends that when private respondent moved to withdraw protest on unrevised precincts, respondent
HRET lost its jurisdiction over the case, hence, when HRET ordered the revision of the unrevised protested ballots
it acted without jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether HRET had jurisdiction when it ordered the revision of the unrevised protested ballots

Ruling: Yes. It is noted that upon Santos' filing of his motion to withdraw protest on unrevised precincts, no
action thereon was taken by HRET. The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining
uncontested precincts, without any action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal
of its jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but
continues until the case is terminated

Arroyo v. HRET
246 SCRA 384 [1995]
Main Point: In order that the matters presented before it can be properly addressed and considered, the Tribunal
is mandated to act as a collegial body. And without collective effort as enjoined by Rule 68 but qualified by Rule
5 in this particular and most crucial stage of the proceedings, any resulting action purporting to be the official act
of the Tribunal should be, as it is hereby, struck down as highly irregular.

Facts: Congressional candidate private respondent Syjuco, Jr., filed an election protest before public respondent
HRET after petitioner Arroyo was proclaimed duly-elected congresman of Makati. Petitioner filed his counter-
protest that was dismissed by HRET. Revision of the ballots was undertaken. HRET, by vote of 6 congressmen-
members against 3 justices-members, annulled petitioner Arroyo's proclamation and declared private respondent
as duly-elected. Petitioner contends that the kind of evidence and how they were procured violate the internal
rules of the Tribunal; that cetain vital election document were procured at the sole instance of the ponente and
were never offered in evidence and that the 6 congressmen-members of the HRET declared certain contested
signature fake without the participation of the 3 justice-members.

Issue: Whether the non-participation of the other members of the Tribunal nullify the decision it rendered

Ruling: Yes. The aforementioned course of action grossly violates not only Rule 68 of the Tribunal's own rules
which requires that all questions shall be submitted to the Tribunal as a body, but also Rule 5 thereof which further
requires the presence of at least one (1) Justice-member to constitute a valid quorum. Without collective effort as
enjoined by Rule 68 but qualified by Rule 5 in this particular and most crucial stage of the proceedings, any
resulting action purporting to be the official act of the Tribunal should be, as it is hereby, struck down as highly
irregular.

Lerias v. HRET
202 SCRA 808 [1991]
Main Point: The power of the HRET, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election returns and
qualifications of its members is beyond dispute. Thus, judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of the
HRET is possible only in the exercise of this Court's so-called "extraordinary jurisdiction"—upon a determination
that the tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as
constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly
constituting such a grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.
Facts: Private respondent Mercado and petitioner Lerias garnered the 2 highest votes for the position of
representative of Leyte. In the provincial board's copy of the certificate of canvass for Libagon, Lerias received
146 more votes than Mercado. However, the PBCs ruled that their copy of the certificate of canvass contained
erasures and alterations, thus, cannot be used as basis. The PBCs rejected the explanation of the municipal board
of canvassers of Libagon that said corrections were made to correct honest clerical mistakes which did not affect
the integrity of the certificate and made in the presece of watchers of all 9 candidates who offered no objection.
The COMELEC copy of the COC showed that Lerias received 400 votes less what she received as shown in the
PBCs copy of the COC.

COMELEC proclaimed Mercado as the winning candidate having received the highest number of votes. Lerias
filed an election protest with respondent HRET presenting the original copies of the COCs and election returns
showing that she obtained 1,811 votes in Libagon while Mercado submitted the COMELEC copy of the contested
COCs where Lerias garnered only 1,411 votes. HRET rejected the election returns and sustained the COCs
because it is regular, genuine and authentic on its face and Lerias had agreed to use the COMELEC copy of the
COCs.

Issue: Whether HRET validly rejected to use the election returns over the ballot

Ruling: No. The findings and pronouncements of the HRET (majorirty opinion) are totally bereft of any support
in law and settled jurisprudence. In an election contest where what is involved is the correctness of the number
of votes of each candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves. But where the ballots
cannot be produced or are not available, the election returns would be the best evidence.

Canvassing boards, the Comelec and the HRET must exercise extreme caution in rejecting returns and may do so
only upon the most convincing proof that the returns are obviously manufactured or fake. And, conformably to
established rules, it is the party alleging that the election returns had been tampered with, who should submit
proof of this allegation.

Sandoval v. HRET
GR 149380
July 3, 2002

Main Point: The propriety of the substituted service of summons upon petitioner is no less pivotal, for upon it
depends not simply the jurisdiction of the HRET over the person of petitioner but also the breadth of fairness of
the proceedings therein, where the opportunity to be heard on the grave accusations against him and more
significantly on his own counter-protest is properly withheld or compulsorily observed. Compliance with the rules
on the service of summons is both a concern of jurisdiction as it is of due process.

Facts: Petitioner Sandoval and respondent OReta were congressional candidates of Malabon-Navotas during the
2001 elections. Petitioner was proclaimed winner . Petitioner took oath of office and assumed the post.
Respondent Oreta filed with HRET an election protest alleging electoral frauds. HRET issued the corresponding
summons for service upon petitioner. HRET process server served the summons by sustituted service upon a
certain Gene Maga indicating his position as "maintenance".

HRET issued resolution 1-081 taking note of petitioner's failure to file an answer to the election protest and ordred
to proceed to prelim conference. Instead of filing a prelim conference brief, petitioner moved for reconsideration
of resolution 1-081 and prayed for the admission of his answer. He argued that the substituted service of summons
upon him was improperly effected. HRET denied his petition.

Issue: Whether the substituted service was properly effected upon petitioner

Ruling: No. The purported substituted service of summons upon petitioner Sandoval was irregularly executed.
Except for the time and place of service and the signature of the "maintenance" man who received the summons,
there is absolutely nothing in the process server's affidavit of service indicating the impossibility of personal
service of summons upon petitioner within a reasonable time. It follows that Maga, not being an employee thereof,
would be an incompetent person to receive the summons in petitioner's behalf.

Lokin v. COMELEC
GR 179431-32
Main Point: An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between
the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine
who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It
can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed COC and has been voted for in the preceding elections.

Facts: CIBAC manifested their intent to participate in the 2007 elections and submitted a list of its nominees.
Prior to the elections, CIBAC withdrew the nominations including that of petitioner Lokin and to substituted by
Villanueva. Garnering enough votes to entitle them to a second seat, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel,
filed with COMELEC a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. The motion was
opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.

COMELEC approves the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin as nominee explaining that the actions of
Villanueva in his capacity as president of CIBAC were presumed to be within scope of his authority as such
including the withdrawal of Lokin as nominee. Petitioner Lokin filed a petition for mandamus to compel
respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC. COMELEC asserts that a
petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in law due tot he proclamation and assumption of office of
Cruz-Gonzales as 2nd nominee of CIBAC; that petitioner's proper recourse is an election protest filed in the
HRET depriving the SC jurisdiction over the matter.

Issue: Whether petitioner’s issue must be filed with the HRET as an election protest

Ruling: No. The controversy involving Lokin is not an election protest for it concerns a very peculiar situation
in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may
properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine
which between the defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal
votes, Lokin’s case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat
another nominee of the same party-list organization.

Sema v. HRET
GR 190734
March 26, 2010
Main Point:
Facts: Petitioner Sema and Respondent Dilangalen were congressional candidates of Shariff Kabunsuan in the
2007 elections. Dilangalen was proclaimed winner. Petitioner filed an election protest against Dilangalen before
the HRET. Dilangalen filed his counter-protest. The Tribunal conducted revision of ballots in all the contested
precinctws. It was discovered that only 1 out of 248 ballot boxes of the counter-protested precincts contained
ballots. The results of revision of ballots in the 195 protested precincts and 1 counter-protested precincts showed
that Dilangalen garnered the highest vote. Petitioner asserts that determination of votes should be base on sources
other than the missing ballots. HRET concluded that the ballots and/or ballot boxes must have been tampered
with after the elections and the counting and canvassing of votes. Thus, the HRET relied on the election returns
and other election documents to arrive at the number of votes validly cast for petitioner and Dilangalen.

Issue: Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by
relying on election returns and other election documents, instead of the ballots themselves, in determining who
actually won between petitioner and respondent

Ruling: No. The general rule is, if what is being questioned is the correctness of the number of votes for each
candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence is the ballots themselves. However, this rule applies only if the
ballots are available and their integrity has been preserved from the day of elections until revision. When the
ballots are unavailable or cannot be produced, then recourse can be made to untampered and unaltered election
returns or other election documents as evidence.

Since it is undisputed that there are hardly any valid or authentic ballots upon which the HRET could base its
determination of the number of votes cast for each of the parties, the HRET merely acted in accordance with
settled jurisprudence when it resorted to untampered and/or unaltered election returns and other election
documents as evidence of such votes.

Duenas v. HRET
593 SCRA 316 [2010]

Main Point: HRET possesses the authority to motu proprio continue a revision of ballots, it also had the
wherewithal to carry it out. It thus ordered the disbursement of its own funds for the revision of the ballots in the
remaining counter-protested precincts. We hark back to Rule 7 of the HRET Rules which provides that the HRET
has exclusive control, direction and supervision of its functions. The HRET’s order was but one aspect of its
power.

Facts: Petitioner was proclaimed as the Congressman for the 2nd District of Taguig. Private respondent filed an
election protest with the HRET. After revision of ballots in 100% of the protested precincts and 25% of the
counter-protested precincts, the case was submitted for resolution. However, HRET directed the continuation of
the revision for the remaining 75% of the counter-protested precincts in view of the discovery of fake/spurious
ballots in some of the protested and counter-protested precincts. HRET also ordered for petitioner to augment his
cash deposit to cover the expenses of the said revision. Instead of complying, petitioner filed an MR, which HRET
denied and ordered the use of its own funds to cover the expenses of the revision.
Issue: Whether HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion for ordering the continuation of the revision of the
remaining 75% of the counter-protested precincts

Ruling: No. In the matter of the revision of ballots, the HRET reserved for itself the discretion to continue or
discontinue the process. Rule 88 of the HRET Rules provides that it may direct motu propio the continuation of
the revision of ballots in the remaining contested precincts, or dismiss the protest, or the counter-protest, without
further proceedings.

HRET’s order that its own funds be used for the revision was an exercise of a power necessary or incidental to
the accomplishment of its primary function as sole judge of election protest cases involving its members.

PAGE 14
Section 18. Commission on Appointments
Daza v. Singson
180 SCRA 496 (1989)

MAINPOINT: SC ruled in favor of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission
on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership.

FACTS: the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned
its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal
Party.

On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political
realignment in the House of Representatives. On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives
revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner
and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the
original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member
from the LDP.

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on
Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the Commission on
Appointments?

RULING: YES. The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission
on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or
factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of
allegiance from one political party to another. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a
member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article
VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.

Coseteng v. Mitra
187 SCRA 377 (1990)

MP: There is no doubt that the apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments
was done on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein.

FACTS: Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives under KAIBA,
wrote to Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the Commission on Appointments (CA) and House
Tribunal – a request backed by nine congressmen.

Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen to the CA and later on,
added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a party, prompting the revision of the House majority membership in CA
due to political realignments and the replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP).

Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (considered
as petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying that the Court declare the election of respondent Ablan,
Singson and the rest of the CA members null and void on the theory that their election violated the constitutional
mandate of proportional representation because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members
must be nominated and elected by their parties. She further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because
of the support of 9 other congressmen from the Minority.
The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question, hence outside the
jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with the “proportional representation” clause in Art VI of the
Constitution and that petitioner was bound by the Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the Coalesced
Majority.

ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.

RULING: Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a political question but
because revision in House representation in CA wasbased on proportional representation.

The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in the House, comprising 79%
of the House membership. This granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two to LP
and KBL as the next largest parties. KAIBA, being a member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority
choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the House
membership and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in the 12 House seats in CA.

Guingona v. Gonzales
214 SCRA 789 (1992);
MR, 219 SCRA 326 (1993)

MP: Provision of Section 18 on proportional representation mandatory in character.

FACTS: The mathematical representation of each of the political parties represented in the Senate for the
Commission on Appointments (CA) is as follows: LDP—7.5; LP-PDP-LABAN--.5; NPC—2.5; LAKAS-
NUCD—1.5. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of
one Senator by adding one-half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect respondent Senator Romulo. In so doing, one other
party’sfractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the CA to less
than their proportional representation in the Senate.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of Art. VI, Sec. 18?

RULING: The respondent’s claim to membership in the CA by nomination and election of the LDP majority in
the Senate is not in accordance with Sec. 18 of Art. VI of the Constitution and therefore violative of the same
because it is not in compliance with the requirement that 12 senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractionalmembership of the
political parties in the CA by adding together 2 halvesto make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional
representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the CA by utilizing thefractional membership of
the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation. The provision of Sec. 18 on proportional
representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to
disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation.

MR: Conversion of fractional membership of a political party into a whole membership amounting to a reduction
of the other party's representation in the Commission on Appointments is a clear violation of the Constitutional
mandate requiring membership therein be based on proportional representation of the political parties.

he proportional representatives of each political party in the Commission on Appointments is based on the actual
number of members of each political party at the time of the election of members therein in recognition of
changing political alignments at the time of its orgarnization.

Drilon, et al v. Speaker
GR No. 180055
July 31, 2009

MP: Senator Madrigal’s suggestion—involves a determination of party affiliations, a question of fact which the
Court does not resolve.

FACTS: The first petition, G.R. No. 180055, has thus indeed been rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal
Party member of the House contingent to the CA, hence, as prayed for, the petition is withdrawn.

As for the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, it fails. The second petition filed by Senator Jamby Madrigal in a
summary tackle about the reorganization of the membership of the CA and that, in the meantime, "all actions
of CA be held in abeyance as the same may be construed as illegal and unconstitutional.

Senator Jamby Madrigal petitions to REORGANIZE the membership of the CA is based upon the
OBSERVATIONS that she herself observe in the list of COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS membership
that there are certain POLITICAL PARTIES acquire a seat of membership in CA held a position which
supposedly are not allowed in the provision of the constitution , moreover, she added to estopped the intention
of the committee request that "all actions of the Commission be held in ABEYANCE" .

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is the proper party concerned.

RULING: Senator Madrigal contention has been dismissed due to the guidelines she ignored. Petitioner has no
standing to file the petition .Petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort. Each
House of Congress has the sole function of reconstituting or changing the composition of its own contingent to
the CA. The extraordinary remedies of Prohibition and Mandamus and the relief of a TRO are not available to the
Petitioner.

Section 19. Constitutions of the Electoral Tribunal and the Commission on Appointments

Section 20. Records and Books of Accounts

Section 21. Inquiries in Aid of Legislation

Power of Inquiry

Senate v. Ermita
488 SCRA 1 [2006]

MP: The Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the
controversy and is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464; Indeed, legislators have standing
to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are
allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as
legislators.

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing
E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being
unconstitutional. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of
officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine
National Police (PNP). The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues
of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called
“Gloriagate Scandal”. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided
by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of
the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner representing the senate and the house has locus standi?

RULING: YES. That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public
decision-making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation is not disputed. E.O. 464,
however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to law-
making. Verily, the Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the
outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators
have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their
office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their
prerogatives as legislators.

Gudani v. Senga
498 SCRA 671 [2006]

MP: The President has constitutional authority to prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a
legislative inquiry, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer
who defies such injunction is liable under military justice; At the same time, any chamber of Congress which
seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies
under law to compel such attendance—the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the
attendance of the military officer.

FACTS: The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and
the surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department
including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of
Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the
Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact
that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly
violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered
them to be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior
officer.

ISSUE: may the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry?

RULING:SC hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-
in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice.
At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military
officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any
military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the
President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the
military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to
faithfully execute.

Remoro vs. Estrada


G.R. NO. 174105
April 2, 2009

MP: A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes; On-going
judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.

FACTS: Petitioner Reghis Romero II, as owner of R-II Builders, Inc., received from the Committee an invitation,
signed by the Legislative Committee Secretary,... the Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources
Development chaired by Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada will conduct a public hearing at 1:00 p.m. on the 23rd day
of August 2006 at. The inquiry is specifically intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible amendments
to the pertinent provisions of R.A. 8042, "the Migrant Workers Act" and to craft a much needed legislation relative
to the stated subject matter... petitioner Romero II requested to be excused from appearing and testifying before
the Committee at its scheduled hearings of the subject matter and purpose of Philippine Senate (PS) Resolution
Nos. 537 and 543 his request, being unmeritorious, was denied. Senator Jinggoy Estrada, as Chairperson of the
Committee, caused the service of a subpoena ad testificandum on petitioner Romero II, directing him to appear
and testify before the Committee at its hearing on September 4, 2006 relative to the aforesaid Senate resolutions.
On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed the instant petition, docketed as G.R. No. 174105, seeking to bar the
Committee from continuing with its inquiry and to enjoin it from compelling petitioners to appear before it
pursuant to the invitations thus issued.
observing that the Senate's motives in calling for an investigation in aid of... legislation were a political question.
Respondents averred that the subject matter of the investigation focused on the alleged dissipation of OWWA
funds and the purpose of the probe was to aid the Senate determine the propriety of amending Republic Act No.
8042 or The Migrant Workers Act of 1995 and enacting, laws to protect OWWA funds in the future.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject matter of the Committee's inquiry is sub judice?

RULING: NO. The same directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred from inquiring into the same
issues being litigated before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution or
administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose... inquiries in aid of
legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus,
legislate wisely and effectively; and to determine whether there is a need... to improve existing laws or enact new
or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial
proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation. The mere filing of a criminal or an
administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of
legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress
through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of
sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be
made subordinate to a criminal or administrative investigation. The... unremitting obligation of every citizen is to
respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with respect
to matters within the realm of proper investigation.[22] (Emphasis... supplied.) there is no more investigation to
be continued by virtue of said resolutions; there is no more investigation the constitutionality of which is subject
to a challenge. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations


G.R. No. 180643
March 25, 2008

MP: The presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for
the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion
Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions
relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high
executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA.

Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing
wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe
him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President
Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive
privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the communications
between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He
was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he
would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?

RULING: The communications are covered by executive privilege


The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution,
existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to
legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This
is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under
our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic
powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy
greater confidentiality than others.

Garcillano vs. House of Representatives


G.R. No. 170338
December 23, 2—8

MP: Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly
published rules of procedure; The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process.

FACTS: Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the
Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes,
notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These
recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both
Houses of Congress.

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate
hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the
investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds
involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation
only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of
half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules
when they first opened their session.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules
have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation through
the Senate’s website, satisfies the due process requirement of law.

RULING: The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available
at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take
effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form
of publication. Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement
because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedurecould
be arrested and detained by the Senate.Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could
not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure."

Nature and Essence

Neg. O. II Elec. Coop. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod


155 SCRA 421 [1991]

MP: Essence of the contempt power of the Philippine Congress; Power to punish recalcitrant witnesses founded
on reason and policy; Power implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power.

FACTS: Petitioner Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac were both invited to an investigation to be conducted by
the respondent’s Committee in connection with the operations of public utilities specifically the Negros Orriental
Electric Cooperative II. Due their failure to appear at the said investigation, petitioners were reproving for
legislative contempt.

ISSUE: Whether the Sanguniang Panlungsod has the power to mandate the testimony of witnesses and order
arrests who fail to observe the subpoena?

RULING: NO. The Constitution and the Local Government Code do not express its provision the granting of
power to subpoena and punish contempt for witnesses. Local legislative bodies do not have the contempt power
of the legislature since it is sui generis. The said power does not attach to its legislative function but to its character
as a distinct and individual power of one of the branches of the government. The same would not be applied to
the local legislative bodies which are creations of law. To allow such local legislative bodies to exercise such
power without statutory basis would deem be conflict in the doctrine of the separation of power.

WHEREFORE, the requiring of attendance and testimony of the petitioners at an investigation should not be
punished for legislative contempt for their disobedience of said subpoena, is declared null and void for being ultra
vires.

Requisites

Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee


203 SCRA 767

MP: Its exercise is circumscribed by the aforequoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein,
the investigation must be “in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure” and
that “the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected”.

FACTS: PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin Romualdez, et al for engaging in devices,
schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of plaintiff and the Filipino people. The
Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over personal
privilege before the Senate on the alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First Manila
Management of Companies or FMMC by Ricardo Lopa and called upon the Senate to look into the possible
violation of the law in the case with regard to RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public Officers [SBRC]) started its investigation on the
matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear before it and testify on what they
know regarding the sale of 36 corporations belonging to Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa and Bengzon refused to
testify, invoking their rights to due process, and that their testimony may unduly prejudice the defendants and
petitioners in case before the Sandiganbayan. SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying
and the SBRC continued its investigation of the matter. The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for
TRO and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the SBRC in requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in excess
of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed
by one of the defendants of the civil case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative purpose.

RULING: No. The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of
the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the
implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation
of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or
in the Senate alone.

1. In aid of legislation

Standard v. Senate
541 SCRA 456 [2007]

MP: Central to the Court’s ruling in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 (1991)—that
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was without any constitutional mooring to conduct the legislative
investigation—was the Court’s dete rmination that the intended inquiry was not in aid of legislation.

FACTS: SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in Metro Manila for
selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799). Enrile, in his
privileged speech, urged the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, to prevent the
occurrences of a similar fraudulent in the future. The respondent Committee then set an initial hearing to
investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. SCB stressed that there were cases allegedly involving the same issues
subject of legislative inquiry, thus posting a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent Committee to continue
with the inquiry.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon the judicial powers
vested solely in the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing cases.

RULING: Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as initiated in the
privileged speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practices committed by a foreign
bank in selling unregistered foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion of the said speech "to immediately
conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future."

The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not
automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power
of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative
investigation.

De la Paz v. Senate
579 SCRA 521 [2009]

MP: The exercise of the power of each house to determine the rules of its proceedings is generally exempt from
judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the
power as will constitute a denial of due process.

FACTS: In October 2008, Gen. De La Paz, a senior officer of the PNP, headed a delegation of 8 to attend an
Interpol GA. De La Paz brought with him his wife and 3 days after the scheduled GA, de la Paz is also scheduled
to retire. After the GA, De La Paz was apprehended in the departure area for he was carrying with him
€105,000.00 (P6,930,000.00). He was also carrying with him €45,000.00 (P2,970,000.00). He failed to declare in
writing that he is carrying such an amount and this is in violation of the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. De La Paz and his group
was later released but the €s were confiscated by the Russians. Upon arrival to the Philippines, De La Paz was
issued a subpoena by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for the investigation it was to conduct involving
the Moscow incident. De La Paz averred that the said committee does not have jurisdiction of the case. De La
Paz argued that the Committee is devoid of any jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident as the matter does
not involve state to state relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of
Procedure (Senate Rules). They further claim that respondent Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it
issued the warrant of arrest without the required signatures of the majority of the members of respondent
Committee. They likewise assail the very same Senate Rules because the same were not published as required by
the Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as the basis of any investigation involving them relative to the Moscow
incident.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Committee has jurisdiction over the matter?

RULING: The SC ruled against De La Paz. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:”Each
House shall determine the rules of its proceedings.” This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of
full discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own
rules. The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, raised by petitioner in the case
at bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue
partakes of the nature of a political question. Also, the signatures were properly obtained as evidenced by the
approval of the Senate president and it is shown that the gathering of the signatures is in accordance with the
Rules. It is also shown that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation were also published
in two newspapers of general circulation.

Romero v. Estrada
583 SCRA 396 [2009]

MP: A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes; On-going
judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation. Court has no authority to
prohibit a Senate Committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry
in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.

FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order(TRO) and
preliminary injunction under Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality of the invitations and compulsory processes
issued by the Senate Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development in connection with
its investigation on the investment of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration(OWWA) funds in the Smokey
Mountain project.

Pursuant to Resolution No. 537 and 543,Petitioner Reghis Romero II as owner of R-II Builders Inc. was invited
by the Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development to attend a public hearing at the
Senate on August 23,2006 regarding the investment of OWWA (Overseas Workers Welfare Administration)
funds in the Smokey Mountain project. The investigation is intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible
amendments to the pertinent provisions of RA 8042,The Migrant Workers Act.
Petitioner Romero in his letter-reply requested to be excused from appearing and testifying before the Committee
at its scheduled hearings of the subject matter and purpose of Philippine Senate Resolution Nos. 537 and 543.
The Committee denied his request. On the same date, invitations were sent to the other six petitioners, then
members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders Inc. requesting them to attend the September 4,2006
Committee hearing. The next day, Senator Jinggoy Estrada as Chairman of the Committee issued subpoena ad
testificandum to petitioner Romero II directing him to appear and testify before the Committee relative to the
aforesaid Senate resolutions. The Committee later issued subpoenas to the Board of Directors of R-II Builders
Inc.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject matter of the Senate inquiry is sub judice

RULING: NO. The Supreme court held that the sub judice issue has been rendered moot and academic by the
supervening issuance of the en banc resolution of July 1, 2008 in GR No. 164527. An issue or a case becomes
moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the issue would
be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would
be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Thus, there is no more obstacle-on the
ground of sub judice, assuming it is invocable to the continuation of the Committee’s investigation challenged in
this proceeding.

As stated in Arnault vs. Nazareno, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true- recourse must be
had to others who possess it.

2. In Accordance with Duly Published Rules of Procedure

Garcillano v. House
GR 170338
December 23, 2008
MP: Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly
published rules of procedure; The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process.

FACTS: Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the
Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes,
notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These
recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both
Houses of Congress.

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate
hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the
investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds
involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation
only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of
half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules
when they first opened their session.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules
have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation through
the Senate’s website, satisfies the due process requirement of law.

RULING: The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available
at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take
effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form
of publication. Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement
because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedurecould
be arrested and detained by the Senate.Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could
not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure."

3. Respect for the Rights of Persons Appearing In or Affected by Such Inquires

Neri v. Senate
564 SCRA 152 [2008]

MP: The presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.

FACTS: The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an
investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate
Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept
the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer,
invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not
she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive privilege.

RULING: The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications privilege. It
pertains to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and
deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential.” Presidential communications
privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of
power and the President’s unique constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. The
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

Power to Punish a Person Under Investigation

Arnault v. Nazareno
87 PHIL. 25 [1950]

MP: If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and
the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by
the committee by imprisonment.

FACTS: The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as Buenavista
and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of
the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million
for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited
anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the
transaction at the expense of the government. Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the
subject transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the
investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of
Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt. Arnault was
therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for
imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.

ISSUE: Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of
the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00?

RULING: Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of
the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power
to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be implied.
In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body
does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others
who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also
that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is
essential to obtain what is needed.

Sabio v. Gordon
504 SCRA 704 [2006]

MP: Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the
House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral
of investigatory power to the committees and it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order
to effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the committees.

FACTS: Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined
the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No member
or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG
members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.

RULING: No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate
and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct
conferral of investigatory power to the committees and it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take
in order to effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The
Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled
that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court
reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is
a proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.”

Sec. 22 Appearance of Heads of Departments in Congress

Senate v. Ermita
488 SCRA 1 [2006]

MP: When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which
it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive,
such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty, but when the inquiry in which
Congress requires their appearance is “in aid of legislation” under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, the
appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950); The oversight
function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit
of legislation. hen Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege—they are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads.

FACTS: This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China
National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer
scam.

The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for
them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to
Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford said officials
ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate
Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request.

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated that “all
heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior
to appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to
the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has
not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP
officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance.

ISSUE: Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.

RULING: To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two different
functions of the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry
during question hour.

The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:

“The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request
of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations
shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or
the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in
executive session.”

The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it
had issued, the department heads’ appearance is merely requested.

The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the appearance of department heads
during question hour as it explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

In aid of Legislation:

The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6, section21 of
the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or
affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”

The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information, recourse must
be had to others who do possess it.

But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry,
which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege”. This is the power of the government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized only to certain types of information
of a sensitive character. When Congress exercise its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one official may be exempted from this power -- the President.

Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. In view
thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such invocation must be
construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has
determined that the requested information is privileged.

The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that
the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds
of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the
President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes that the invited official possesses
information that is covered by the executive privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the
executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President,
or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes
E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent.

When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by
executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the
possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the President or the Executive Secretary
with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the
lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is
no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the
necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void. Section 1(a) are
however valid.

PAGE 15
Sec. 23. Declaration of a State of War; Emergency Powers
Delegation of Emergency Powers/Military Powers

SANLAKAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY


(2004)

MAINPOINT: Power exercised by the President in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed
forces is in consonance with her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief.

FACTS: 300 junior officers and enlisted men from the AFP staged a mutiny by storming the Oakwood Premiere
apartments in Makati City. The mutineers cried of corruption and demanded for the resignation of the President,
the Secretary of Defense, and the Chief of the PNP. The President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and called on the AFP to suppress the rebellion. After negotiations,
the President lifted the state of rebellion through Proclamation No. 435. Petitioner contends that the declaration
of a state of rebellion by the President is an indirect exercise of emergency powers. That under Section 23 (2),
Art. VII, such exercise of emergency powers is exclusive to Congress, and that the declaration made by the
President thus results to the latter’s usurpation of their said exclusive power

ISSUE: Whether or not said declaration constitutes exercise of emergency powers


RULING: Power exercised by the President in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces
is in consonance with her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. There was no instance wherein
the President has acted beyond her powers as both Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief

AMPATUAN v. PUNO

MAINPOINT: The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three
places mentioned. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a
power that the Constitution directly vests in the President.

FACTS: After the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces
of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She directed the AFP
and the PNP “to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and
suppress all incidents of lawless violence. 3 days later, she also issued AO 273 transferring supervision of the
ARMM to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO the term “transfer”
used to “delegate”. The petitioners claimed that the President’s issuances encroached the ARMM’s autonomy,
that it constitutes an invalid exercise of emergency powers, and that the President had no factual basis for declaring
a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical
violent incidents occurred. They want Proc. 1946 and AO 273 be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP
and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the said areas.

RULING: The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

“In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon
the next adjournment thereof.”

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned.
And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers.
The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

Sec. 24. Bills Originating in the House of Representatives

GUINGONA v. CARAGUE

MAINPOINT: Section 3, Article XVIII recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, LOI and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, repealed or revoked." The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees are inconsistent
with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI is untenable. The framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that
existing laws in the statute books including existing presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced
to mere "bills" that must again go through the legislative.

FACTS: Petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990
budget authorized by P.D. No. 81 as Amended by P.D. No. 1177, and by P.D. No. 1967. Petitioners argue that
the decrees of then President Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted and so the legislative power was
restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution was ratified by the people; that there is a need
for a new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress has not approved any such
law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests
on no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced.

That it is inoperative under Section 3, Article XVIII which provides ––


Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked."

And that the said decrees are inconsistent with Section 24, Article VI: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

ISSUE: Whether the PDs became inoperative when Pres. Marcos was ousted and/or the PD’s are inconsistent
with constitution Section 24 and 27 of Article VI.

RULING: No. Section 3, Article XVIII recognizes that:


"All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, LOI and other executive issuances not inconsistent
with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked."

Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or, are otherwise
amended, repealed or revoked. The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees are inconsistent with
Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI is untenable. The framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that existing
laws in the statute books including existing presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced to mere
"bills" that must again go through the legislative. The only reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the
Constitution which refer to "bills" is that they mean appropriation measures still to be passed by Congress. If the
intention of the framers thereof were otherwise they should have expressed their decision in a more direct or
express manner.

TOLENTINO V. SEC. OF FINANCE

MAINPOINT: It is not the law-but the (revenue) bill-which is required by the Constitution to 'originate
exclusively' in the House of Representatives. Such bill may undergo extensive changes in the Senate that the
result may be a rewriting of the whole, since Senate's power includes not only to 'concur with amendments' but
also to 'propose amendments.'

FACTS: The VAT is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or
exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the NIRC. One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. Also contended that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3
readings as required.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24


“All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application,
and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments”.

RULING: It is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in
the HR. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in
the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power
not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. The initiative for filing revenue, tariff or
tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come
from the HR and as a result of the Senate action to concur and amend, a distinct bill may be produced. The
Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill so long as action by the Senate as a body
is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. Also, upon the certification of a bill by the President to be urgent,
the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported
by the weight of legislative practice.

ALVAREZ V. GUINGONA

MAINPOINT: It is not the law-but the (revenue) bill-which is required by the Constitution to 'originate
exclusively' in the House of Representatives. Such bill may undergo extensive changes in the Senate that the
result may be a rewriting of the whole, since Senate's power includes not only to 'concur with amendments' but
also to 'propose amendments.

FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of RA 7720: “An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela
into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago”. April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817 after 3
public hearings conducted by the House Committee, submitted to the House a favorable report, with amendments.
HB No. 8817 was passed by the House on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading On January 18,
1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No.
1243 was filed just after the House of Representatives had conducted its first public hearing on HB No. 8817.

Senate Committee conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Then, said committee submitted Committee Report
No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the recommendation that it be approved without amendment, taking into
consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was on all fours with SB No. 1243. Committee Report No. 378 was
passed by the Senate on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading. The HR, upon being apprised of
the action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate. The enrolled bill was signed by the
Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720.

ISSUE: Whether considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No.

RULING: Yes. In the enactment of RA No. 7720, there was compliance with Section 24, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing
of HB No. 8817 was thus precursor not only of RA 7720 in question but also of SB No. 1243. Further, in Tolentino
vs. Secretary of Finance: It is not the law-but the (revenue) bill-which is required by the Constitution to 'originate
exclusively' in the House of Representatives. Such bill may undergo extensive changes in the Senate that the
result may be a rewriting of the whole, since Senate's power includes not only to 'concur with amendments' but
also to 'propose amendments.'

SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORP. V. THE PHILIPPINE CEMENT

MAINPOINT: For such to be a due delegation of tax, legislation must be complete and defined in terms of what
specific measures the public official can enforce. In this case, the Safeguard Measure Act (SMA) provides
measures as to what the Secretary of DTI may enforce as a safeguard measure which in effect imposes a form of
tax as regulation. The executive power to impose definitive safeguard measures is but a delegated power. The
power of taxation which is, by nature and by command of the fundamental law, a preserve of the legislature

FACTS: Respondent an association of domestic cement manufacturers, filed with the DTI an application for the
imposition of a definitive safeguard measure on the importation of gray Portland cement. It alleged that gray
Portland cement was being imported in increased Quantities causing declines in domestic production, capacity
utilization, market share, sales and employment, as well as depressed local prices. Petitioner, a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of cement opposed respondent’s application. - In accordance with the
procedure laid down in RA 8800, the Bureau of Import Services of the DTI conducted a preliminary investigation,
after which it justified the imposition of provisional measures. DTI issued an Order imposing a provisional
measure in the form of a safeguard duty equivalent to P20.60 per 40-kg bag on all importations of gray Portland
cement for a period not exceeding 200 days from the date of issuance by the BOC. Tariff Commission found no
cause for Safeguard Measures. Respondent appealed in the CA. The CA granted petition in part and DTI released
a MO imposing Safeguard Measures.

ISSUE:

RULING: Section 28(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution confirms the delegation of legislative power, yet
ensures that the prerogative of Congress to impose limitations and restrictions on the executive exercise of this
power:

“The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government”

This delegation of the taxation power by the legislative to the executive is authorized by the Constitution itself.
The Constitution also grants the delegating authority (Congress) the right to impose restrictions and limitations
on the taxation power delegated to the President but with observance of the restrictions and limitations imposed
by Congress. The SMA empowered the DTI Secretary, as alter ego of the President. And so the DTI Secretary
authority is derived from the SMA; it does not flow from any inherent executive power. The law did not grant the
executive official full and uninhibited discretion to impose such measures. The legislative intent should be given
full force and effect, as the executive power to impose definitive safeguard measures is but a delegated power.
The power of taxation which is, by nature and by command of the fundamental law, a preserve of the legislature.

Appropriation of Public Revenue for Public Purpose

PASCUAL V. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS

MAINPOINT: The rule is that if the public advantage or benefit is merely incidental in the promotion of a
particular enterprise, such defect shall render the law invalid. On the other hand, if what is incidental is the
promotion of a private enterprise, the tax law shall be deemed “for public purpose”.

FACTS: Governor Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground
that RA No. 920, which appropriates funds for public works particularly for the construction and improvement
of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of the feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained in the tracings
attached to the petition, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the
Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder
roads do not connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway. The respondents'
contention is that there is public purpose because people living in the subdivision will directly be benefitted from
the construction of the roads, and the government also gains from the donation of the land supposed to be occupied
by the streets, made by its owner to the government.

ISSUE: Whether or not the incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the purpose of
justifying an expenditure of the government
RULING: No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything
but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its
validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general
advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion.
Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of
private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public money. The test of the constitutionality
of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as
opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might
incidentally serve the public.

Sec. 25. Rules on Appropriation

DPWH vs. RONALDO QUIWA

MAINPOINT: (This I cannot really relate to the Rules of Appropriation since there was no mention of any
provision except that there was no prior appropriation for the DPWH project which is why they refuse to pay the
contractors)

FACTS: DPWH engaged contractors, including the respondents, for the urgent rehabilitation of the affected river
systems after the ragedy of Mt. Pinatubo. The contractors signed written agreements with Engineer and Project
Manager II of the DPWH. It is undisputed that the contractors have completed their assigned rehabilitation works.
But DPWH refused to pay the contractors for the reason that the contracts were invalid due to non-compliance
with legal requirements.

ISSUE: Whether, in the absence of the legal requirements, a valid contract between the DPWH and the plaintiffs
exists

RULING: Where there was no appropriation and where the contracts were considered void due to technical
reasons. It has been settled in several cases that payment for services done on account of the government, but
based on a void contract, cannot be avoided. This exercise of equity to compensate contracts with the government
was repeated in Eslao vs. COA, (COA), was ordered to pay the company of petitioner for the services rendered
by the latter in constructing a building for a state university, notwithstanding the contracts violations of the
mandatory requirements of law, including the prior appropriation of funds therefor.

GOH V. BAYRON and COMELEC

MAINPOINT: To be valid, an appropriation must indicate a specific amount and a specific purpose. However,
in this case, that purpose “to conduct elections” maybe broken down by related sub-categories so even if not
spelled out, regulation, special and recall elections are covered.

FACTS: Petitioner filed a recall petition to the COMELEC due to loss of trust and confidence against the
respondent Hon. Lucilo R. Bayron by violating the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
other related gross negligence, dishonesty and immaturity as mayor of the Puerto, Princessa City. COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. 9864 wherein the said resolution found the recall petition sufficient in form and
substance but the funds of any recall elections were suspended. Respondent filed an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and Clarification for the dismissal of the recall petition. That as stated in the said resolution, does
not have an appropriation in the 2014 GAA and it does not provide the COMELEC with legal authority to commit
public funds for the recall process.

ISSUE: Whether the 2014 General Appropriations Act (GAA) has no budget for the conduct of recall election
therefore said recall cannot be conducted.

RULING: The 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform its
constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections. There is no need for supplemental legislation to authorize
the COMELEC to conduct recall elections for 2014. When the Commission receives a budgetary appropriation
for its “Current Operating Expenditures,” such appropriation includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional
functions, including the conduct of recall elections.

Limits on Power to Appropriate

BRILLANTES VS. CONCEPCION

MAINPOINT: The sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President
and Vice-President. And, NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizen’s arm to conduct the “unofficial counting of
votes for the national or local elections.
FACTS: Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the assailed resolution,
Resolution 6712, which provides for the electronic transmission of advanced result of “unofficial” count.
Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power of
Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and would likewise encroach upon the authority
of NAMFREL, as the citizens’ accredited arm, to conduct the “unofficial” quick count as provided under pertinent
election laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was promulgated in the exercise of its executive and
administrative power “to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections” Comelec added that the
issue is beyond judicial determination.

ISSUE: Whether Resolution No. 6712 issued by the COMELEC in authorizing the use of election funds in
consolidating the election results should be declared VOID, as it is unconstitutional.

RULING: The assailed resolution usurps. Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA
8436. The sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-
President. And Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18
of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizen’s arm to conduct the “unofficial
counting of votes for the national or local elections. The quick count under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation
would not only be preemptive of the authority of congress and NAMFREL, but would also be lacking
constitutional and/or statutory basis. Moreover, the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise contravened the
constitutional provision that “no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.”

Prohibition on “riders” in appropriation bills

GARCIA V. MATA

MAINPOINT: Any provision contained in the body of the act that is fairly included in this restricted subject or
any matter properly connected therewith is valid and operative. But, if a provision in the body of the act is not
fairly included in this restricted subject, like the provision relating to the policy matters of calling to active duty
and reversion to inactive duty of reserve officers of the AFP, such provision is inoperative and of no effect.

FACTS: The subject of RA 1600, as expressed in its title, is restricted to “appropriating funds for the operation
of the government”. However, paragraph 11 of RA 1600 provides: “After the approval of this Act, and when there
is no emergency, no reserve officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty
for more than two years during any period of five consecutive years”. Respondents contend that the said provision
is unconstitutional as "it was indeed a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure in violation
of the constitutional inhibition against "riders" to the general appropriation act." It was indeed a new and
completely unrelated provision attached to the Appropriation Act.

ISSUE: Whether the said provision violates the rule on “riders”

RULING: Yes. The said provision has no relevance or pertinence whatsoever to the budget or to any
appropriation item contained therein since it refers to the fundamental government policy matters of the calling
to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP. If a provision in the body of the
act is not fairly included in this restricted subject, like the provision relating to the policy matters of calling to
active duty and reversion to inactive duty of reserve officers of the AFP, such provision is inoperative and of no
effect. It confers no right and affords no protection.

ATITIW V. ZAMORA

MAINPOINT: When a provision is not germane to the subject or purpose of the bill in which it is incorporated,
it shall be deemed unconstitutional pursuant to Art VI, Sec. 25(1) and Sec 26(1)

FACTS: President Aquino promulgated E.O. No. 220 creating the CAR to administer the affairs of government
in the Cordilleras. Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress enacted RA 6766 (An Act Providing for an Organic Act
for the Cordillera Autonomous Region). However, the creation of an autonomous region was overwhelmingly
rejected in all of the Cordilleras in a plebiscite except for the Ifugao province. Ifugao alone cannot validly
constitute the CAR and upheld the disapproval of the Organic Act. The Court also declared E.O. No. 220 to be
still in force and effect. President Estrada signed into law the 2000 GAA which includes the assailed Special
Provisions: “1. Use of Fund. The amounts appropriated shall be used to wind up the activities and operations of
the CAR, including the payment of separation and retirement benefits of all affected officials and employees…”
President Estrada issued E.O. No. 270 extending the implementation of the winding up of operations of the CAR.

ISSUE: Whether the assailed special provisions in RA 8760 is a rider and as such is unconstitutional.
RULING: No. The assailed Special Provision directing appropriations for the Cordillera Administrative Region
(CAR), which provides for the expenditures to for activities and pay separation and retirement benefits of all
affected officials and employees is not a rider. A rider is a provision which is alien to or not germane to the subject
or purpose of the bill in which it is incorporated. The rationale against riders is to preserve the unity of subject
matter of the bill. The Special Provision pertains to appropriations for CAR, it is particular, unambiguous and
appropriate, hence, it meets the germaneness standard.

FARINAS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

MAINPOINT: An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general subject.

FACTS: Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly,
Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Elections Practices”. The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec
67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily
deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election
practices. Sec 67 of the OEC imposes a limitation of officials who run for office other than the one they are
holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate
of candidacy. The repeal of Sec 67 of the OEC is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter
of RA 9006.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.

RULING: No. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14 of the RA 9006 does not
violate "one subject-one title rule." To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the
title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. An act having a single general subject, indicated
in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by
providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

Transfer of Funds

DEMETRIA V. ALBA

MAINPOINT: PD 1177 empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one to any program,
project or activity of any department included in the GAA or approved after its enactment, without regard as to
whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or
whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does
not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, but likewise goes beyond the tenor.

FACTS: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No.
1177, otherwise known as the “Budget Reform Decree of 1977.” The said PD authorizes the President to transfer
any fund appropriated for different departments to any program, project or activity of any department on the
grounds among others, allowing the President to override the safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations.

ISSUE: Is it unconstitutional?

RULING: Yes. PD 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said Section 16 (5) Article VIII. It does
not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, amounting to an undue delegation of
legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond its tenor. Such constitutional infirmities render the provision in
question null and void.

LIGA V. COMELEC

MAINPOINT: Funds needed by the Commission to defray expenses for holding regular and special elections,
referenda and plebiscites shall be provided in the regular appropriation of the Commission. In case of deficiency,
the amount provided shall be augmented from the special activities funds in the GAA and those specifically
appropriated for the purpose in special laws.

FACTS: Based on information learned from newspaper reports, petitioners questioned what they perceive as "the
threatened illegal transfer, disbursement and use of public funds in a manner contrary to the Constitution and the
law" for the conduct of the barangay elections. Petitioners claim that in the GAA of 1994, only P137,878,000
were appropriated by Congress for barangay elections. Respondent alleges that it intends to fund the barangay
elections from the P137,878,000 appropriated and from its own savings resulting from unused funds. The Solicitor
General defends the COMELEC as allowed by Sec. 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution and Sections 17 and 19
of the General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1994, viz:

"(5). No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of
the Senate, the Speaker of the HR, the Chief Justice of the SC, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may,
by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations."

RULING: Funds needed by the Commission to defray the expenses for the holding of regular and special
elections, referenda and plebiscites shall be provided in the regular appropriation of the Commission which, upon
request, shall immediately be released to the Commission. In case of deficiency, the amount so provided shall be
augmented from the special activities funds in the general appropriation act and from those specifically
appropriated for the purpose in special laws.

Note: Case is dismissed for lack of evidence of such illegal transfer. They only based it from news report without
confirmation or official statement from COMELEC.

NAZARETH V. VILLAR

MAINPOINT: Article VI, Section 29 (1) of the 1987 Constitution firmly declares that: “No money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” This constitutional edict requires that
the GAA be purposeful, deliberate, and precise in its provisions and stipulations.

FACTS: Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to provide a program for human resources development in science and
technology in order to achieve and maintain talent and manpower for science and technology mastery. Section 7
of R.A. No. 8439 grants additional allowances and benefits (Magna Carta benefits) to the covered officials and
employees of the DOST. Funds shall be appropriated from GAA of the year.

DOST RDIX Nazareth released the Magna Carta for covered officials and employees covering year 1998 despite
absence of specific appropriation in GAA. Subsequently COA issued several notices of disallowance
disapproving payment of Magna Carta benefits. Provision for use of savings of GAA was vetoed by the President.
DOST Sec Dr. Uriarte Jr requested from the Office of the President for authority to utilize DOST’s savings to
pay the Magna Carta benefits which exec sec Ronaldo Zamora approved. Nazareth lodged an appeal with COA
urging the lifting of disallowances. Her appeal was anchored by Memorandum from Exec Sec Zamora.

ISSUE: Whether the act of Exec Sec Zamora is Valid?

RULING: No. The plain language of the constitutional restriction leaves no room for the petitioner’s posture.
Art.VI Sec.25(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

There must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to
which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. So long as there is an item in the GAA for
which Congress had set aside a specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for
augmentation purposes. This interpretation is consistent not only with the Constitution and the GAAs, but also
with the degree of flexibility allowed to the Executive during budget execution in responding to unforeseeable
contingencies.

PICHAY V. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

MAINPOINT: The President has continuing authority to reorganize the Executive Department as provided by
E.O. 292 (Admin Code of 1987) under Sec 31 in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency

FACTS: Petition prayed to declare unconstitutional EO No. 13 (Abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission) and Transferring Its Investigative, Adjudicatory and Recommendatory Functions to the Office of
The Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, Office of the President. And prayed for to prohibit respondents
from administratively proceeding against petitioner based on the executive order.

EO No. 12 issued by PGMA created the PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate cases for possible
graft and corruption against presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President
(embodied in Sec 4 and 8 of EO No. 12). President Aquino III issued EO No. 13 abolished the PAGC and
transferred its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more
particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). Finance Secretary Purisima
filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint for grave misconduct against Pichay and other members of the Board
of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) due to the purchase by the LWUA of 445k
shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc. Pichay contends that the President is not authorized under any law
to create the IAD-ODESLA and that by creating such, the President has usurped the powers of congress (to create
a public office, appropriate funds and delegate quasi-judicial functions to administrative agencies) and that of the
Ombudsman.

ISSUE: Unconstitutional?

RULING: No! The President has continuing authority to reorganize the Executive Department as provided by
E.O. 292 (Admin Code of 1987) under Sec 31 in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is the
task of the Office of the President as the nerve center of the Executive Branch "to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency". The abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within
the ODESLA is within the prerogative of the President pursuant to E.O. 292.

PHILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ

MAINPOINT: Section 25(5), no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, and under
Section 29(1), no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
While Section 25(5) allows as an exception the realignment of savings to augment items in the general
appropriations law for the executive branch, such right must and can be exercised only by the President pursuant
to a specific law.

FACTS: Petitioners wants to declare unconstitional and void some of the provisions in the General Appropriation
Bill of 1994 which was passed and approved. Among other special provisions in question are:
• To allow the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the
AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System
• Authorize members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and
to realign their respective operating budgets (because petitioners, the Senate President and the Speaker of
the HR, but not the individual members of Congress are the ones authorized to realign the savings as
appropriated.

RULING: Valid contentions?

1. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment.
Allowed. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for
the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5)
and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. Under Section 25(5), no law shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations, and under Section 29(1)

“no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. While
Section 25(5) allows as an exception the realignment of savings to augment items in the general appropriations
law for the executive branch, such right must and can be exercised only by the President pursuant to a specific
law.”

The provision grants the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the HR the power to augment items in an
appropriation act for their respective offices from savings in other items of their appropriations, whenever there
is a law authorizing such augmentation.

2. Authorize members of Congress to propose and identify projects and to realign their operating budgets. The
members of Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment for their operating expenses. However, it
is the Senate President and the Speaker of the HR who shall approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp
of approval, these two officials will have to see to it that:
1. The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures from which the
same are to be taken; and
2. The transfer or realignment is for the purposes of augmenting the items of expenditure to which said
transfer or realignment is to be made.

SANCHEZ V. COA

MAINPOINT: The power to transfer savings under Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution pertains
exclusively to the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the HR, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions and no other. Transfer of funds under Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of
the Constitution may be made only by the persons mentioned in the section and may not be re-delegated being
already a delegated authority.

FACTS: Congress passed R.A. 7180 (GAA of 1992), w/c provided an appropriation for the DILG and the amount
for its Capability Building Program. The Project Director of the Ad Hoc Task Force informed then Deputy
Executive Secretary its the proposal “shamrock” type task force to implement local autonomy institutionalized
under the LGC to have design programs, strategize and prepare modules. The proposal was accepted by the
Deputy Executive Secretary and attested by then DILG Secretary Sarino, who issued a memorandum for the
transfer and remittance to the Office of the President of the sum of P300K for the operational expenses of the task
force. An additional cash advance of P300K was requested. These amounts were taken from the Fund. Upon post-
audit conducted by the Department auditor the amounts were disallowed for having no legal basis for the creation,
the cash advance not liquidated, expenditures funded from capability building are subject to
restrictions/conditions embodied in the Special Provisions of the DILG Appropriations, and expenses covered by
the cash advance not specified.

A Notice of Disallowance was then sent which the COA affirmed. The COA argued that, the Transfer under Sec.
25(5), Art. VI may be made only by the persons mentioned in the section and may not be re-delegated being
already a delegated authority. That the transfer must come only from savings of the office in other items of its
appropriation and be used for other items in the appropriation of the same office. Here, there were no savings
from which augmentation can be taken. the Fund is a regular appropriation, it partakes the nature of a trust fund
because it was allocated for a specific purpose. Thus, it may be used only for the specific purpose for which it
was created or the fund received.

ISSUE: Is COA correct?

RULING: Transfer of funds under Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution may be made only by the persons
mentioned in the section and may not be re-delegated being already a delegated authority. The power to transfer
savings under Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution pertains exclusively to the President, the President of
the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads
of Constitutional Commissions and no other. Here, the power and authority to transfer in this case was exercised
not by the President but only at the instance of the Deputy Executive Secretary, not the Executive Secretary
himself.

General Prohibition of “Riders”

CORDERO V. HON. CABATUANDO

MAINPOINT: The constitutional requirement is complied with as long as the law, as in the instant case, has a
single general subject which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse
they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject

FACTS: Manuel Cordero was the trial lawyer of the Tenancy Counsel Unit (TCU) of the Agricultural Tenancy
Commission of the Department of Justice. Filed against landlord Sta. Romana in order to reinstate and reliquidate
past harvests. Sta. Romana filed a motion to disqualify Cordero as counsel and invoked Sec. 54 of Republic Act
No. 1199 or The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. The said section indicates that representation by
counsel of tenants who cannot afford to pay should be done by the public defenders of the Department of Labor.

During pendency of the appeal Republic Act No. 2263, AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF
REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY-NINE, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES, was passed. Sections 19 and 20 amended
the previous law and now allows trial lawyers from the TCU to represent indigent tenants. Petitioner filed a
Manifestation averring that by virtue of the amendment the issue has now become moot and academic.
Cabatuando countered that the provisions were not embraced in the title of the amending law nor in the amended
law hence void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the TMD is embraced in the title of the bill

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that that the constitutional requirement in question is satisfied if all
parts of the law are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title of the bill. The
constitutional requirement is complied with as long as the law, as in the instant case, has a single general subject
which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject.

PHILCONSA V. GIMENEZ

MAINPOINT: Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution provides that, no bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.

FACTS: Petitioner, pursuant to the general prohibition of riders, challenged the constitutionality of RA No. 3836,
“An Act Amending Subsection (c) Section 12 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 186. As Amended by Republic
Act Numbered 3096”. It argues that, it allows a Senator or a member of the HR and an elective officer of either
House of Congress to retire regardless of age and whose service must be at least 12 years. the said title of Republic
Act 3836 gives no inkling or notice whatsoever to the public regarding the retirement gratuities and commutable
vacation and sick leave privileges to members of Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not the title of Republic Act No. 3836 is germane to the subject matter expressed in the act.

RULING: It is to be observed that under RA No. 3836, amending the first paragraph of section 12, subsection c
of CA No. 186, retirement benefits are granted to members of GSIS. This paragraph is related and germane to the
subject of CA No. 186. The succeeding paragraph of Republic Act 3836 refers to members of Congress and to
elective officers thereof who are not members of the GSIS. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these
officials, would relate to subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. This portion of the
amendment (re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and elected officers, such as the Secretary and
Sergeants-at-arms for each House) is not related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act 186
establishing the GSIS and which provides for both retirement and insurance benefits to its members.

The title of said Republic Act 3836 is void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation of the
aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Republic Act 3836 violates three
constitutional provisions, namely: first, the prohibition regarding increase in the salaries of Members of Congress;
second, the equal protection clause; and third, the prohibition that the title of a bill shall not embrace more than
one subject.

ALALAYAN V. NPC

MAINPOINT: No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill.

FACTS: Alalayan and PPDC are contractors with NAPOCOR. They are re-suppliers of power produced by
NAPOCOR. They aver that the provision of the said RA is a rider in only meant to increase the capital stock of
NAPOCOR. In 1961, Republic Act No. 3043. This law amended the charter of NAPOCOR. Section 3 of RA
3043 provides that:
• contractors being supplied by NAPOCOR shall not exceed an annual profit of 12%;
• if they do, they shall refund such excess to their customers;
• that NAPOCOR has the power to renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of
energy.

Petitioners assailed the said provision that Section 3 is a rider because first, it was not included in the title of the
amending law nor was it included in the amended law. Second, the main purpose of RA 3043 was to increase the
capital stock of NAPOCOR hence Section 3 was not germane to RA 3043.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of RA 3043 is constitutional.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court simply ruled that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the
title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it informs
the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill,
study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the
legislators.

INSULAR LUMBER COMPANY V. CTA

MAINPOINT: “No bill which may be enacted into a law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill.”

FACTS: Petitioner filed with the CIR a claim for refund of P19,921.37 representing 25% of the specific tax paid
on the manufactured oil and fuel used in its operations pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Republic Act No.
1435. The Commissioner denied the claim for refund. Contending that the first proviso in Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 1435 is unconstitutional. The title of R.A. No. 1435 is "An Act to Provide Means for Increasing The
Highway Special Fund." The Commissioner contends that the subject of R.A. No. 1435 was to increase Highway
Special Fund. However, Section 5 of, the Act deals with another subject which is the partial exemption of miners
and loggers. And tills partial exemption on which the Company based its claim for refund is clearly not expressed
in the title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for a decrease rather than an increase of the
Highway Special Fund. Commissioner anchored its argument on Article VI, Section 21(l) of the 1935 Constitution
which provides:

“No bill which may be enacted into a law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill.”
ISSUE: Whether Section 5 of RA 1435 is violative of Article VI, Section 21(l)

RULING: No. Republic Act No. 1435 deals with only one subject and proclaims just one policy - the necessity
for increasing the Highway Special Fund through the imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured
oils. The proviso in Section 5 of the law is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said
proviso, which has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is nor, a deviation from the general subject of the law.
The primary purpose of the aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of
which might completely fail to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the
law or its operation. A full debate on precisely the issue of whether its title reflects its complete subject was held
by Congress which passed it.

TIO V. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

MAINPOINT: "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" The
requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed
in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.

FACTS: The petition assails the constitutionality of PD No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. Following its
promulgation is the annual tax of 5% and 30% on gross receipts payable to the local government. The petitioner’s
grounds is that the imposition of tax is a rider and is harsh and confiscatory, oppressive and/or unlawful restraint
of trade. It is also alleged that the imposition of taxes is invalid since the title of the bill said only for the creation
of the Videogram Regulatory Board, not for the imposition of taxes. This violates the One-Subject-One-Title
Rule.

ISSUE: Whether the decree is violative of the one-subject one-tile rule.

RULING: The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the
general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that
the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are
germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject and title. An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general object."

PAGE 16
Sec. 26.Subject and Title of Bills; Three Readings

General Prohibition of “Riders”


XXX
Phil. Judges Assn. v. Prado
227 SCRA 703 [1993]
MAINPOINT:
Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be comprehensive as to cover every
single detail of the measure. XXX provided, fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people XXX.

FACTS:
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 (Postal Service Act of 1992) on the grounds that: (1)
its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings
in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members
before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

R.A. No. 7354 is entitled “An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and
Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith.” It is
alleged that the objectives of the proposed law stated in Section 3 are not expressed in the title itself, thus, violating
Article VI, Sec. 26(1), of the Constitution (“Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.”)

ISSUE:
WN the title of the challenged act violates the Constitution.

RULING:
No.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be comprehensive as to cover every
single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably
covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be
expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible.

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance


235 SCRA 630 [1994]

MAINPOINT:
The phrase “except when the president certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment” qualifies not only
the requirement that printed copies of a bill in its final form must be distributed to the members 3 days before its
passage, but also the requirement that before a bill can become a law, it must have passed 3 readings on separate
days.

FACTS:
This case involves Republic Act No. 7716 or the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law.

The petitioners argued that S. No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate days as required by the Constitution
because the second and third readings were done on the same day, March 24, 1994. But this was because on
February 24, 1994 and again on March 22, 1994, the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent.

ISSUE:
WN the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the requirement for the printing of the bill
and its distribution three days before its passage but not with the requirement of three readings on separate days,
is meritorious.

RULING:
No.

The presidential certification dispenses with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill
on separate days, because there is a necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in
order to meet a public calamity or emergency.

However, in this case, the certification of the bill in this case was invalid because there was no emergency, the
condition stated in the certification of a “growing budget deficit” not being an unusual condition in this country.
Under the Constitution such a law is required to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in
emergency session. Hence, the said RA 7716 is subject to judicial review.

Tobias v. Abalos
239 SCRA 106 [1994]
MAINPOINT:
The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the
subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of such conversion.

FACTS:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Manda-luyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Mandaluyong.”

Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only
one legislative district. After the enactment of the said law, the City of Mandaluyong had its own legislative
district and a portion of Mandaluyong/San Juan became a separate new legislative district of San Juan.

ISSUE:
WN the petitioners’ contention that the creation of 2 separate districts is violative of “one subject-one bill” rule
provided for by the Constitution.

RULING: No.
XXX the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from
the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion
into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong” necessarily includes and contemplates the subject
treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.

Tatad v. Sec. of DOE


281 SCRA 330 [1997]
MAINPOINT:
SC holds that Section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is
the deregulation of the downstream oil industry – not violative of the one subject rule.

FACTS:
In G.R. No. 124360 where petitioner is Senator Tatad, it is contended that section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff
differential violates the provision of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which should
be expressed in its title.

ISSUE: Is the contention tenable?

RULING: No.
As a policy, SC has adopted a liberal construction of the one title—one subject rule, consistently ruling that the
title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law.

A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general
subject.

Thus, section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the
deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective investors to put up
refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum.

Cawaling Jr. v. Comelec


GR 146319
October 26, 2001
368 SCRA 453
MAINPOINT:
The one subject rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general
object which the statute seeks to effect, and where the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation.

FACTS:
This case involved two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806 which
created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.

First petition – seeking to annul the plebiscite.

Second petition - seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being unconstitutional (one
of the contentions under this petition was, R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of
the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon). While the title of the
Act sufficiently informs the public about the creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that no such information
has been provided on the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.

ISSUE:
WN RA No. 8806 violated the “one subject-one bill” rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.

RULING: No.
Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it
is the necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon was created.

Hence, the title of the law, “An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor,” cannot be said to exclude the
incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered to have deprived the public of fair
information on this consequence.

Abakada v. Ermita
469 SCRA 14
Sept. 1, 2005
MAINPOINT:
The “no-amend-ment rule” refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to
bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence
or amendment— Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by
the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that
have been acted upon by both houses of Congress is prohibited.

FACTS:
Petitioners admit that it was indeed House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 that initiated the move for amending
provisions of the NIRC dealing mainly with the value-added tax. Upon transmittal of said House bills to the
Senate, the Senate came out with Senate Bill No. 1950 proposing amendments not only to NIRC provisions on
the value-added tax but also amendments to NIRC provisions on other kinds of taxes.

ISSUE:
Is the introduction by the Senate of provisions not dealing directly with the value-added tax, which is the only
kind of tax being amended in the House bills, still within the purview of the constitutional provision authorizing
the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to a revenue bill that originated from the House?

RULING:
Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate
was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions
in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article
VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments
that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.

The “no-amend-ment rule” refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to
bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence
or amendment. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the
Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have
been acted upon by both houses of Congress is prohibited.

The main purpose of the bills emanating from the House of Representatives is to bring in sizeable revenues for
the government to supplement our country’s serious financial problems, and improve tax administration and
control of the leakages in revenues from income taxes and value-added taxes, and the Senate, approaching the
measures from the point of national perspective, can introduce amendments within the purposes of those bills,
like providing ways that would soften the impact of the VAT measure on the consumer.

The amendments made on provisions in the tax on income of corporations are germane to the purpose of the
house bills which is to raise revenues for the government, and the sections referring to other percentage and excise
taxes are germane to the reforms to the VAT system, as these sections would cushion the effects of VAT on
consumers. This is the Germaneness Rule.

Abakada v. Ermita – MR
[October 18, 2005]
MAINPOINT:
It is incorrect to conclude that there is no clash between two opposing forces with regard to the no pass-on
provision for VAT on the sale of petroleum products merely because such provision exists in the House version
while it is absent in the Senate version. It is precisely the absence of such provision in the Senate bill and the
presence thereof in the House bills that causes the conflict. The absence of the provision in the Senate bill shows
the Senates disagreement to the intention of the House of Representatives make the sellers of petroleum bear the
burden of the VAT. XXX such conflicts and differences between the no pass-on provisions in the Senate and
House bills had to be acted upon by the bicameral conference committee as mandated by the rules of both houses
of Congress.

FACTS:
Petitioners Escudero, et al., insist that the bicameral conference committee should not even have acted on the no
pass-on provisions since there is no disagreement between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the one hand, and
Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, with regard to the no pass-on provision for the sale of service for power
generation because both the Senate and the House were in agreement that the VAT burden for the sale of such
service shall not be passed on to the end-consumer. As to the no pass-on provision for sale of petroleum products,
petitioners argue that the fact that the presence of such a no pass-on provision in the House version and the
absence thereof in the Senate Bill means there is no conflict because a House provision cannot be in conflict with
something that does not exist.

ISSUE:
WN there is no clash between two opposing forces with regard to the no pass-on provision for VAT on the sale
of petroleum products merely because such provision exists in the House version while it is absent in the Senate
version.
RULING:
No. There is clash.

Note that the rules of both houses of Congress provide that a conference committee shall settle the differences in
the respective bills of each house. Verily, the fact that a no pass-on provision is present in one version but absent
in the other, and one version intends two industries, i.e., power generation companies and petroleum sellers, to
bear the burden of the tax, while the other version intended only the industry of power generation, transmission
and distribution to be saddled with such burden, clearly shows that there are indeed differences between the bills
coming from each house, which differences should be acted upon by the bicameral conference committee.

The absence of such provision in the Senate bill and the presence thereof in the House bills that caused the conflict.
The absence of the provision in the Senate bill shows the Senates disagreement to the intention of the House of
Representatives make the sellers of petroleum bear the burden of the VAT. Thus, there are indeed two opposing
forces: on one side, the House of Representatives which wants petroleum dealers to be saddled with the burden
of paying VAT and on the other, the Senate which does not see it proper to make that particular industry bear said
burden. Clearly, such conflicts and differences between the no pass-on provisions in the Senate and House bills
had to be acted upon by the bicameral conference committee as mandated by the rules of both houses of Congress.

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT)


Party List v. COMELEC
595 SCRA 477
Aug. 7, 2009

MAINPOINT:
The constitutional requirement that “every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title thereof” is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the
general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.

FACTS:
RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352.

Petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, filed this petition for prohibition alleging that RA 9369
violated Section 26(1), Article VI of the Consti-tution - that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks
of poll automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns.

Both the COMELEC and the OSG maintain that the title of RA 9369 is broad enough to encompass topics which
deal not only with the automation process but with everything related to its purpose encouraging a trans-parent,
credible, fair, and accurate elections.

ISSUE:
Whether RA 9369 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution

RULING: No.
RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled “An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled ‘An Act Authorizing
the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local
Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility,
Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic
Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes.’ ”

The constitutional requirement that “every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title thereof” has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The
requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose
which the statute seeks to achieve. The title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents and will suffice
if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. Moreover, a title
which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the
amendatory act need not be further stated.

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines


GR 196271
18 October 2011
659 SCRA 270
MAINPOINT:
The President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three
separate readings requirement.

FACTS:
President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment
of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.

The House of Representatives and the Senate gave full recognition to the President’s certification and promptly
enacted RA No. 10153.

The petitioners challenged the validity of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2),
Article VI of the Constitution xxx that no necessity existed for the immediate enactment of these bills since there
was no public calamity or emergency that had to be met

ISSUE:
WN the enactment of RA No. 10153 based on the President’s certification is constitutional.

RULING:
Yes. The President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three
separate readings requirement.

The petitioners, failed to provide the Court with any cause or justification for this course of action xxx no reason
exists to nullify RA No. 10153.

SC respects other co-equal branches.

Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines


667 SCRA 200 (MR)
February 28, 2012

MAINPOINT:

FACTS:
The petitioners are adamant that the provisions of RA No. 10153, in postponing the ARMM elections, amend RA
No. 9054.

RULING:
RA No. 10153 does not amend xxx

Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but merely fills in the gap in RA No. 9054, there is no need for RA No.
10153 to comply with the amendment requirements set forth in Article XVII of RA No. 9054 (the Supermajority
Vote Requirement).

Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, the supermajority vote requirement set forth
in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 is unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot
pass irrepealable laws. The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal these
laws.

Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a mere majority vote,
provided there is quorum. In requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054 to comply with a higher voting
requirement than the Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated
the very principle xxx.

Sec. 27. Procedure in Passage of Bills; Item Veto

Passage of Bills

Arroyo v. De Venecia
277 SCRA 268 [1997]
MAINPOINT:
The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations: . . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill
not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations
of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United
States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government,
charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The
respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance,
and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution.

FACTS:
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading and
transmitted to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading. A bicameral conference
committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.

Said bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified
by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of
Representatives and by the Senate. The enrolled bill was signed into law (Republic Act No. 8240 “Sin Taxes”)
by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

ISSUE:
WN the enrolled bill which became a law is constitutional.

RULING:
Yes.
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate
and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment; There is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases that the enrolled bill embodies a
conclusive presumption.

Where there is no evidence to the contrary, the Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both
Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-
fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained, because “a duly
authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.

Abakada v. Ermita
469 SCRA 14
MAINPOINT:
All the changes or modifications made by the Bicameral Conference Committee were germane to subjects of the
provisions referred to it for reconciliation. Such being the case, the Court does not see any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Bicameral Conference Committee.

It is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found
either in the House bill or in the Senate bill—if the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or
two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an
“amendment in the nature of a substitute,” so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before
the committee.

Presidential Veto

CIR vs. CTA


185 SCRA 329 [1990]
MAINPOINT:
An “item” in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section imposing a particular kind of tax, but rather to the
subjects of the tax and the tax rate.

An unconstitutional veto is ineffectual.

FACTS:
The presidential veto referred merely to the inclusion of hotels, motels and resthouses in the 20% caterer’s tax
bracket but not to the whole section.

CTA opined that the President could not veto words or phrases in a bill but only an entire item. What the CTA
meant by “item” was an entire section.

ISSUE:
Is the CTA correct?

RULING: No.
An “item” in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section imposing a particular kind of tax, but rather to the
subjects of the tax and the tax rate. In the portion of a revenue bill which actually imposes a tax, a section identifies
the tax and enumerates the persons liable therefor with the corresponding tax rate. To construe the word “item”
as referring to the whole section would tie the President’s hand in choosing either to approve the whole section
at the expense of also approving a provision therein which he deems unacceptable or veto the entire section at the
expense of foregoing the collection of the kind of tax altogether.

However; the ineffectual veto by the President rendered the whole section 191-A as not having been vetoed at all
and it, therefore, became law as an unconstitutional veto has no effect, whatsoever.
Gonzales v. Macaraig
191 SCRA 452 [1990]
MAINPOINT:
Veto-power – The power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill does not
grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.
---------------------
The Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation
itself to stand.

FACTS:
Congress passed House Bill No. 19186, or the General Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed,
it eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the President.

Pursuant to the constitutional provision on the passage of bills, Congress presented the said Bill to the President
for consideration and approval.

President signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to have become Rep. Act No. 6688. In the process, seven
(7) Special Provisions and Section 55, a “General Provision,” were vetoed.

ISSUE:
WN the president is allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation
itself to stand.

RULING: No.
There can be no denying that inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how money shall be
spent; and that in addition to distinct “items” of appropriation, the Legislature may include in Appropriation Bills
qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure of funds. Settled also is the rule that the
Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself
to stand. That was also the ruling in Bolinao case, which held that the veto of a condition in an Appropriations
Bill which did not include a veto of the items to which the condition related was deemed invalid and without
effect whatsoever.

Bengzon v. Drilon
208 SCRA 133 [1992]
MAINPOINT:
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally vested power; The
veto power is not absolute.

FACTS:
President Aquino vetoed the underlined portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 of the Special Provisions
for the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts (General Appropriations Act, FY 1992, page
1071) and the underlined portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 2, of the Special Provisions for the Court of
Appeals (page 1079) and the underlined portions of Section 1.3 of Article XLV of the Special Provisions of the
General Fund Adjustments (page 1164, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992).

The reason given for the veto of said provisions is that “the resolution of this Honorable Court in Administrative
Matter No. 91-8-225-CA pursuant to which the foregoing appropriations for the payment of the retired justices
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have been enacted effectively nullified the veto of the President
of House Bill No. 16297, the bill which provided for the automatic increase in the retirement pensions of the
Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions by
reenacting Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595. The President’s veto of the aforesaid provisions
was further justified by reiterating the earlier reasons for vetoing House Bill No. 16297; “they would erode the
very foundation of our collective effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy on standardization
of compensation.

ISSUE:
WN the veto by the President of certain provisions in the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992
relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
is constitutional.

RULING: No.
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally vested power. But
even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its exercise. The veto power is not
absolute.
XXX the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she cannot act like an editor crossing out
specific lines, provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes. In the exercise of the veto power, it is
generally all or nothing. However, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration
needs the money to run the machinery of government and it cannot veto the entire bill even if it may contain
objectionable features. The President is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its
undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the “item veto power” to avoid
inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure.

Philconsa v. Enriquez
235 SCRA 506 [1994]
MAINPOINT:
A member of Congress has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or any other act of the
Executive which injures the institution of Congress.

FACTS:
This case involves conflicting claims of authority between the Legislative and the Executive over control of the
national budget.

Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the Special Provision on the appropriation for debt service without
vetoing the entire amount of P86,323,438.00 for said purpose.

ISSUE: WN members of the Senate has locus standi to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition
imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.

RULING: Yes.
XXX a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing to
question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill. Where the
veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the President by the Constitution,
the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the Legislature arises.

XXX An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress.

Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia


11 SCRA 486 (1964)
MAINPOINT:
The President may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill
without at the same time vetoing the particular item or Items to which it relates.

FACTS:
Disallowing some of the items in the said Appropriations Act, the President included the following in his veto
message “special purpose” XXX from the wordings of the Appropriations Act that the amount appropriated for
the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service was made subject to the condition that the same shall not be
used or expended for operation of television stations in Luzon, where there are already existing commercial
television stations.

ISSUE:
WN the President may legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill.

RULING:
The President may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill
without at the same time vetoing the particular item or Items to which it relates.

lf the veto of a condition attached to an item of an appropriation bill is unconstitutional, the same produces no
effect whatsoever and the condition imposed by the appropriation bill remains.

Tanada v. Tuvera
146 SCRA 446 (1986)
MAINPOINT:
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise
of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred
by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Sec. 28. Taxation

Scope and Purpose

Planters v. Fertiphil
548 SCRA 485
MAINPOINT:
XXX the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for public purpose. The main purpose of taxation
is revenue generation. The power of taxation is circumscribed by inherent and constitutional limitations.

FACTS:
President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465 which provided, among
others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers
in the Philippines.

Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market to the Fertilizer
and Pesticide Authority (FPA). After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the
P10 levy. With the return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI
No. 1465, but PPI refused to accede to the demand.

Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages questioning the said LOI for being unjust, unreasonable,
oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of law. Fertiphil alleged
that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly
of the fertilizer industry.

PPI’s claim was that the levy imposed under LOI No. 1465 was for the benefit of Planters Foundation, Inc., a
foundation created to hold in trust the stock ownership of PPI.

RTC invalidated the levy for violating the basic principle that taxes can only be levied for public purpose

ISSUE: WN RTC is correct.

RULING: Yes.

XXX the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for public purpose. The main purpose of taxation
is revenue generation. The power of taxation is circumscribed by inherent and constitutional limitations.

While it is true that the power of taxation can be used as an implement of police power, the primary purpose of
the levy is revenue generation. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and
substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax.

In this, the levy was not for public welfare/purpose.

Limitations on the Power: Uniform and Equitable

CIR v. CA
261 SCRA 236 [1996]
MAINPOINT: Uniformity requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated
alike or put on equal footing both in privileges and liabilities.

FACTS: Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37–93 reclassifying the brands of cigarettes, viz: ‘HOPE,' ‘MORE'
and ‘CHAMPION' being manufactured by Fortune Tobacco Corporation as locally manufactured cigarettes
bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax on cigarettes.

ISSUE:
WN RMC 37-93 is unconstitutional for being violative of the uniformity and equitable principle of taxation.

RULING: Yes. A reading of RMC 37–93, particularly considering the circumstances under which it has been
issued, convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure (revoking in the process
the previous holdings of past Commissioners) or merely as construing Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended,
but has, in fact and most importantly, been made in order to place “Hope Luxury,” “Premium More” and
“Champion” within the classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby
have them covered by RA 7654.

Said memorandum circular had become discriminatory.


Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1, of the 1987 Constitution mandates taxation to be uniform and equitable.
Uniformity requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike or put on
equal footing both in privileges and liabilities. Thus, all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class
must be taxed at the same rate and the tax must operate with the same force and effect in every place where the
subject may be found.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc


164 SCRA 27
G.R. No. L-23771
August 4, 1988

MAINPOINT: A tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject
of it is found. Uniformity means that all property belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike. The Legislature
has the inherent power not only to select the subjects of taxation but to grant exemptions. Tax exemptions have
never been deemed violative of the equal protection clause.

FACTS: Lingayen Gulf Electric Power operates an electric power plant serving the municipalities of Lingayen
and Binmaley, Pangasinan, pursuant to municipal franchise granted it by the respective municipal councils. The
franchises provided that the grantee shall pay quarterly to the provincial treasury of Pangasinan 1% of the gross
earnings obtained through the privilege for the first 20 years (from 1946) and 2% during the remaining 15 years
of the life of the franchise.

The petitioner submits that Section 4 of R.A. No. 3843 is unconstitutional insofar as it provides for the payment
by the private respondent of a franchise tax of 2% of its gross receipts, while other taxpayers similarly situated
were subject to the 5% franchise tax imposed in Section 259 of the Tax Code, thereby discriminatory and violative
of the rule on uniformity and equality of taxation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of R.A. No. 3843 is unconstitutional for being violative of the "uniformity and
equality of taxation" clause of the Constitution.

RULING: No. The benefits of the tax reduction provided by law (Act No. 3636 as amended by C.A. No. 132
and R.A. No. 3843) apply to the respondent's power plant and others circumscribed within this class. R.A. No.
3843 merely transferred the petitioner's power plant from that class provided for in Act No. 667, as amended, to
which it belonged until the approval of R.A. No. 3843, and placed it within the class falling under Act No.
3636, as amended. Thus, it only effected the transfer of a taxable property from one class to another.

A tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found.
Uniformity means that all property belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike. The Legislature has the
inherent power not only to select the subjects of taxation but to grant exemptions. Tax exemptions have never
been deemed violative of the equal protection clause.

Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance


235 SCRA 630

MAINPOINT: Tax laws must comply with the equal protection clause.

FACTS: It is the contention that by withdrawing the exemption previously granted to print media transactions
involving printing, publication, importation or sale of newspapers, Republic Act No. 7716 has singled out the
press for discriminatory treatment and that within the class of mass media the law discriminates against print
media by giving broadcast media favored treatment.

ISSUE: WN the said law shall be discriminatory.

RULING: No. We have carefully examined this argument, but we are unable to find a differential treatment of
the press by the law, much less any censorial motivation for its enactment. If the press is now required to pay a
value-added tax on its transactions, it is not because it is being singled out, much less targeted, for special
treatment but only because of the removal of the exemption previously granted to it by law. The withdrawal of
exemption is all that is involved in these cases. Other transactions, likewise previously granted exemption, have
been delisted as part of the scheme to expand the base and the scope of the VAT system. The law would perhaps
be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if the only privilege withdrawn had been that granted to the
press. But that is not the case.

Tan v. Del Rosario


237 SCRA 324 [1994]

MAINPOINT: Uniformity of taxation merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated,
are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities.
FACTS: Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement that taxation
“shall be uniform and equitable” in that the law would now attempt to tax single proprietorships and professionals
differently from the manner it imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships.

ISSUE: WN RA 7496 violates the constitutional requirement that taxation shall be uniform and equitable.

RULING: No. Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are
substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law
applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally
well to all those belonging to the same class. The requisites have been met.

Progressive System
Delegated Tax Legislation

Southern Cross Cement v. Phil. Cement


GR 158540
July 8, 2004
434 SCRA 65
MAINPOINT: The executive power to impose definitive safeguard measures is but a delegated power—the
power of taxation, by nature and by command of the fundamental law, being a preserve of the legislature. Section
28(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution confirms the delegation of legislative power, yet ensures that the
prerogative of Congress to impose limitations and restrictions on the executive exercise of this power. This
delegation of the taxation power by the legislative to the executive is authorized by the Constitution itself.

FACTS: Republic Act No. 8800, the Safeguard Measures Act (SMA), which was one of the laws enacted by
Congress soon after the Philippines ratified the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.

DT accepted an application from Philcemcor, alleging that the importation of gray Portland cement in increased
quantities has caused declines in domestic production, capacity utilization, market share, sales and employment;
as well as caused depressed local prices. Accordingly, Philcemcor sought the imposition at first of provisional,
then later, definitive safeguard measures on the import of cement pursuant to the SMA.

Tariff Commission, on 19 November 2001, received a request from the DTI for a formal investigation to
determine whether or not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland cement, pursuant
to Section 9 of the SMA and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

When the Tariff Commission forwarded its investigation report to DTI, the DTI Secretary Manual Roxas II
disagreed with the conclusion of the Tariff Commission that there was no serious injury to the local cement
industry caused by the surge of imports.

DTI Secretary denied the application for safeguard measures against the importation of gray Portland cement
filed by PHILCEMCOR.

ISSUE: WN the taxation power can be delegated by the legislative department to the executive department.

RULING: Yes. This delegation of the taxation power by the legislative to the executive is authorized by the
Constitution itself. At the same time, the Constitution also grants the delegating authority (Congress) the right to
impose restrictions and limitations on the taxation power delegated to the President. The restrictions and
limitations imposed by Congress take on the mantle of a constitutional command, which the executive branch is
obliged to observe.

Abakada v. Ermita
469 SCRA 1 [2005]
MAINPOINT: The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government
has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A
logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed
in the Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest which means “what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated.” This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such as delegated power constitutes not only a right
but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another.

With respect to the Legislature, Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that “the Legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”
The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and
exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated, has been described as the
authority to make a complete law—complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be
applicable—and to determine the expediency of its enactment. Thus, the rule is that in order that a court may be
justified in holding a statute unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power, it must appear that the power
involved is purely legislative in nature—that is, one appertaining exclusively to the legislative department. It is
the nature of the power, and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise, which determines the validity
of its delegation. Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation of legislative powers is subject to the following
recognized limitations or exceptions: (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of
Article VI of the Constitution; (2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article
VI of the Constitution; (3) Delegation to the people at large; (4) Delegation to local governments; and (5)
Delegation to administrative bodies.

While the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration
of an exercise of such power may be left to them, including the power to determine the existence of facts on which
its operation depends, the rationale being that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactment
of legislation is not of itself a legislative function but is simply ancillary to legislation; The Constitution as a
continuously operative charter of government does not require that Congress find for itself every fact upon which
it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself detailed determinations which it has declared to be
prerequisite to application of legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances impossible for Congress
itself properly to investigate.

Spouses Constantino v. Cuisia


GR 106064
Oct. 13. 2005
472 SCRA 505

MAINPOINT: There are powers vested in the President by the Constitution which may not be delegated to or
exercised by an agent or alter ego of the President.

FACTS: This Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assails said contracts which were entered into
pursuant to the Philippine Comprehensive Financing Program for 1992.

One of the contentions of the petitioners are, assuming that the contracts under the Financing Program are
constitutionally permissible, yet it is only the President who may exercise the power to enter into these contracts
and such power may not be delegated to respondents.

Petitioners stress that unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur
foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President. They argue that the gravity
by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must exercise
this power. They submit that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the
Constitution—the Monetary Board— reinforces the submission that not respondents but the President “alone and
personally” can validly bind the country.

ISSUE: Is the contention correct?

RULING: No. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President
to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a
strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of
Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any
other sovereign debt management goals.

If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing
power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming
detailed activities xxx This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet
positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the
President’s effectivity in running the government.

Exemptions
Abra Valley College v. Aquino
162 SCRA 106 [1988]

MAINPOINT: The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the
Constitution.

FACTS: Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning, filed a complaint to annul and
declare void the “Notice of Seizure” and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building xxx.
XXX the school is recognized by the government and is offering Primary, High School and College Courses, and
has a school population of more than one thousand students all in all; XXX that the high school and college
students are housed in the main building; XXX that the Director with his family is in the second floor of the main
building; and XXX that the annual gross income of the school reaches more than one hundred thousand pesos.

ISSUE: WN the lot and building in question are used exclusively for educational purposes for tax purposes.

RULING: The first floor is subject to tax, while the second floor is considered to be incidental to the main
purpose of the school.

XXX the Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase “exclusively used for
educational purposes” as provided for in Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution,
reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the school
building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use
of the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the Director and his family,
may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or primary
purpose—educational, the lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any
stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purposes of education.

Bayan v. Zamora
GR 138570
October 10,2000
342 SCRA 449

MAINPOINT: A taxpayer’s suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.

FACTS: Petitioners contended that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result
of the enforcement of the VFA.

ISSUE: WN the present case is a taxpayer’s suit.

RULING: No. A taxpayer’s suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.

As taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending powers.