Supreme Court: E. V. Filamor For Appellant. Juan de Borja For Himself and Co-Appellees

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6622 July 31, 1957
Intestate Estate of the deceased MARCELO DE BORJA. CRISANTO DE BORJA, administrator-

appellant,
vs.
JUAN DE BORJA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.
E. V. Filamor for appellant.

Juan de Borja for himself and co-appellees.
FELIX, J.:
The case. — Quintin, Francisco, Crisanta and Juliana, all surnamed de Borja, are legitimate children
of Marcelo de Borja who, upon his demise sometime in 1924 or 1925, left a considerable amount of
property. Intestate proceedings must have followed, and the pre-war records of the case either
burned, lost or destroyed during the last war, because the record shows that in 1930 Quintin de
Borja was already the administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja.
In the early part of 1938, Quintin de Borja died and Crisanto de Borja, son of Francisco de Borja,
was appointed and took over as administrator of the Estate. Francisco de Borja, on the other hand,
assumed his duties as executor of the will of Quintin de Borja, but upon petition of the heirs of said
deceased on the ground that his interests were conflicting with that of his brother's estate he was
later required by the Court to resign as such executor and was succeeded by Rogelio Limaco, a son-
in-law of Quintin de Borja.
It also appears that on February 16, 1940, at the hearing set for the approval of the statement of
accounts of the late administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja, then being opposed by
Francisco de Borja, the parties submitted an agreement, which was approved by the Court (Exh. A).
Said agreement, translated into English, reads as follows:
1. All the accounts submitted and those that are to be submitted corresponding to
this year will be considered approved;
2. No heir shall claim anything of the harvests from the lands in Cainta that came
from Exequiel Ampil, deceased, nor from the land in Tabuatin, Nueva Ecija;
3. That the amounts of money taken by each heir shall be considered as deposited in
conjunction with the other properties of the intestate and shall form part of the mass
without drawing any interest;
4. That it shall be understood as included in this mass the sum of twelve thousand
pesos (P12,000) that the sisters Crisanta and Juliana de Borja paid of their own
money as part of the price the lands and three thousand pesos (P3,000) the price of
the machinery for irrigation;
5. The right, interests or participation that the deceased Quintin de Borja has or may
have in Civil Case No. 6190 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, shall be
likewise included in the total mass of the inheritance of the Intestate;
6. Not only the lands in Tabuatin but also those in Cainta coming from the now
deceased Exequiel Ampil shall also from part of the total mass of the inheritance of
the Intestate of the late Marcelo de Borja;
7. Once the total of the inheritance of the intestate is made up as specified before in
this Agreement, partition thereof will be made as follows:
From the total mass shall be deducted in case or in kind, Twelve Thousand Pesos
(P12,000) that shall be delivered to Da. Juliana de Borja and Da. Crisanta de Borja in
equal shares, and the rest shall be divided among the four heirs, i. e., Don Francisco
de Borja, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, Da. Juliana de Borja, and Da. Crisanta de
Borja, in equal parts. (TRANSLATION)
The Intestate remained under the administration of Crisanto de Borja until the then outbreak of the
war. From then on and until the termination of the war, there was a lull and state of inaction in
Special proceeding No. 2414 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig branch (In the Matter of
the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja), until upon petition filed by Miguel B. Dayco, as
administrator of the estate of his deceased mother, Crisanta de Borja, who is one of heirs, for
reconstitution of the records of this case, the Court on December 11, 1945, ordered the
reconstitution of the same, requiring the administrator to submit his report and a copy of the project
of partition.
On January 3, 1946, the administrator, Dr. Crisanto de Borja, filed his accounts for the period
ranging from March 1 to December 22, 1945, which according to the heirs of Quintin de Borja were
so inadequate and general that on February 28, 1946, they filed a motion for specification. On April
30, 1946, they also filed their opposition to said statement of accounts alleging that the income
reported in said statement was very much less than the true and actual income of the estate and that
the expenses appearing therein were exaggerated and/or not actually incurred, and prayed that the
statement of accounts submitted by the administrator be disapproved.
The administrator later filed another report of his administration, dated August 9, 1949,
corresponding to the period lapsed from December 23, 1945, to July 31, 1949, showing a cash
balance of P71.96, but with pending obligation amounting to P35,415.
On August 22, 1949, Juan de Borja and sisters, heirs of the deceased Quintin de Borja, filed their
opposition to the statement of accounts filed by the administrator on the ground that same was not
detailed enough to enable the interested parties to verify the same; that they cannot understand why
the Intestate could suffer any loss considering that during the administration of the same by Quintin
de Borja, the Estate accumulated gains of more than P100,000 in the form of advances to the heirs
as well as cash balance; that they desired to examine the accounts of Dr. Crisanto de Borja to verify
the loss and therefore prayed that the administrator be ordered to deposit with the Clerk of Court all
books, receipts, accounts and other papers pertaining to the Estate of Marcelo de Borja. This motion
was answered by the administrator contending that the Report referred to was already clear and
enough, the income as well as the expenditures being specified therein; that he had to spend for the
repairs of the properties of the Estate damaged during the Japanese occupation; that the allegation
that during the administration of Quintin de Boria the Estate realized a profit of P100,000 was not
true, because instead of gain there was even a shortage in the funds although said administrator
had collected all his fees (honorarios) and commissions corresponding to the entire period of his
incumbency; that the obligations mentioned in said report will be liquidated before the termination of
the proceedings in the same manner as it is done in any other intestate case; that he was willing to
submit all the receipts of the accounts for the examination of the interested parties before the Clerk
or before the Court itself; that this Intestate could be terminated, the project of partition having been
allowed and confirmed by the Supreme Court and that the Administrator was also desirous of
terminating it definitely for the benefit of all the parties.
On September 14, 1949, the administrator filed another statement of accounts covering the period of
from March 1, 1945, to July 31, 1949, which showed a cash balance of P71.95, with pending
obligations in the sum of P35,810.
The heirs of Quintin de Borja, Juan de Borja and his sisters, registered their opposition said
statement of accounts and prayed the Court to disapprove the same and to appoint an account to go
over the books of the administrator and to submit a report thereon as soon as possible. The heir
Juliana de Borja also formally offered her objection to the approval of the accounts submitted by the
administrator and prayed further that said administrator be required to submit a complete accounting
of his administration of the Estate from 1937 to 1949. On the other hand, Francisco de Borja and
Miguel B. Dayco, as the only heir of the deceased Crisanta de Borja, submitted to the Court an
agreement to relieve the administrator from accounting for the period of the Japanese occupation;
that as to the accounting from 1937 to 1941, they affirmed their conformity with the agreement
entered into by all the heirs appearing in the Bill of Exceptions of Juliana de Borja; and they have no
objection to the approval of the statement of accounts submitted by the administrator covering of the
years 1945 to 1949.
On December 6, 1949, the administrator, answered the opposition of the heir Juliana de Borja,
alleging that the corresponding statement of accounts for the years 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940 and
1941 were presented and approved by the Court before and during the Japanese occupation, but
the records of the same were destroyed in the Office of the Clerk of that Court during the liberation
of the province of Rizal, and his personal records were also lost during the Japanese occupation,
when his house was burned; that Judge Peña who was presiding over the Court in 1945 impliedly
denied the petition of heirs to require him to render an accounting for the period from 1942 to the
early part of 1945, for the reason that whatever money obtained from the Estate during said period
could not be made the subject of any adjudication it having been declared fiat money and without
value, and ordered that the statement of accounts be presented only for the period starting from
March 1, 1945. The administrator further stated that he was anxious to terminate this administration
but some of the heirs had not yet complied with the conditions imposed in the project of partition
which was approved by the Supreme Court; that in accordance with said partition agreement,
Juliana de Borja must deliver to the administrator all the jewelry, objects of value, utensils and other
personal belongings of the deceased spouses Marcelo de Borja and Tircila Quiogue, which said heir
had kept and continued to retain in her possession; that the heirs of Quintin de Borja should deliver
to the administrator all the lands and a document transferring in favor of the Intestate the two parcels
of land with a total area of 71 hectares of cultivated land in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija which were in
the possession of said heirs, together with the house of Feliciana Mariano Vda. de Sarangaya, which
were the objects of Civil Case No. 6190 mentioned in Paragraph 11 of the project of partition; that as
consequence of the said dispossession the heirs of Quintin de Borja must deliver to the
administrator the products of the 71 hectares of land in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and the rentals of
the house of Feliciana Mariano or else render to the Court an accounting of the products of these
properties from the time they took possession of the same in 1937 to the present; that there was a
pending obligation amounting to P36,000 as of September 14, 1949, which the heirs should pay
before the properties adjudicated to them would be delivered. The Court, however, ordered the
administrator on December 10, 1949, to show and prove by evidence why he should not be
accounts the proceeds of his administration from 1937.
Meantime, Juliana de Borja filed a Constancia denying possession of any jewelry belonging to the
deceased spouses Marcelo de Borja and Tarcilla Quiogue or any other personal belonging of said
spouses, and signified her willingness to turn over to the administrator the silver wares mentioned in
Paragraph III of the project of partition, which were the only property in her care, on the date that she
would expect the delivery to her of her share in the inheritance from her deceased parents.
On July 6, 1950, Juan de Borja and his sisters Marcela, Saturnina, Eufracia, Jacoba and Olimpia, all
surnamed de Borja, as heirs of Quintin de Borja, filed a motion for the delivery to them of their
inheritance in the estate, tendering to the administrator a document ceding and transferring to the
latter all the rights, interests and participation of Quintin de Borja in Civil Case No. 7190 of the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, pursuant to the provisions of the project of Partition, and expressing
their willingness to put up a bond if required to do so by the Court, and on July 18, 1950, the Court
ordered the administrator to deliver to Marcela, Juan, Saturniana, Eufracia, Jacoba and Olimpia, all
surnamed de Borja, all the properties adjudicated to them in the Project of Partition dated February
8, 1944, upon the latter's filing a bond in the sum of P10,000 conditioned upon the payment of such
obligation as may be ordered by the Court after a hearing on the controverted accounts of the
administrator. The Court considered the fact that the heirs had complied with the requirement
imposed by the Project of Partition when they tendered the document ceding and transferring the
rights and interests of Quintin de Borja in the aforementioned lands and expressed the necessity of
terminating the proceedings as soon as practicable, observing that the Estate had been under
administration for over twenty-five years already. The Court, however, deferred action on the petition
filed by the special administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Juliana de Borja until after compliance
with the conditions imposed by the project of partition. But on July 20, 1950, apparently before the
properties were delivered to the heirs, Francisco de Borja and Miguel B. Dayco filed a motion
informing the Court that the two parcels of land located in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, produced some
21,300 cavans of palay, amounting to P213,000 at P10 per cavan, which were enjoyed by some
heirs; that the administrator Crisanto de Borja had not taken possession of the same for
circumstances beyond his control; and that there also existed the sum of P70,204 which the former
administrator, Quintin de Borja, received from properties that were redeemed, but which amount did
not come into the hands of the present, administrator because according to reliable information,
same was delivered to the heir Juliana de Borja who deposited it in her name at the Philippine
National Bank. It was, therefore prayed that the administrator be required to exert the necessary
effort to ascertain the identity of the person or persons who were in possession of the same amount
and of the value of the products of the lands in Mayapyap, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and to recover
the same for the Intestate Estate.
On July 28, 1950, the special administratrix of the estate of Juliana de Borja, then deceased, filed an
answer to the motion of these two heirs, denying the allegation that said heir any product of the
lands mentioned from Quintin de Borja, and informed the Court that the Mayapyap property had
always been in the possession of Francisco de Borja himself and prayed the court that the
administrator be instructed to demand all the fruits and products of said property from Francisco de
Borja.
On July 28, 1950, the heirs of Quintin de Borja also filed their opposition to the said motion of
Francisco de Borja and Miguel B. Dayco on the ground that the petition was superfluous because
the present proceeding was only for the approval of the statement of accounts filed by the
administrator; that said motion was improper because it was asking the Court to order the
administrator to perform what he was duty bound to do; and that said heirs were already barred or
stopped from raising that question in view of their absolute ratification of and assent to the statement
of accounts submitted by the administrator.
On August 16, 1950, by order of the Court, the properties adjudicated to Juliana de Borja in the
project of Partition were finally delivered to the estate of said heir upon the filing of a bond for
P20,000. In that same order, the Court denied the administrator's motion to reconsider the order of
July 18, 1950, requiring him to deliver to the heirs of Quintin de Borja the properties corresponding to
them, on the ground that there existed no sufficient reason to disturb said order. It also ruled that as
the petition of Francisco de Borja and Miguel B. Dayco made mention of certain properties allegedly
belonging to the Intestate, said petition should properly be considered to gather with the final
accounts of the administrator.
The administrator raised the matter by certiorari to this Tribunal, which was, docketed as G.R. No. L-
4179, and on May 30, 1951, We rendered decision affirming the order complained of, finding that the
Juan de Borja and sisters have complied with the requirement imposed in the Project of Partition
upon the tender of the document of cession of rights and quit-claim executed by Marcela de Borja,
the administratrix of the Estate of Quintin de Borja, and holding that the reasons advanced by the
administrator in opposing the execution of the order of delivery were trivial.
On August 27, 1951, the administrator filed his amended statement of accounts covering the period
from March 1, 1945, to July 31, 1949, which showed a cash balance of P36,660. An additional
statement of accounts filed on August 31, 1961 for the period of from August 1, 1949, to August 31,
1951, showed a cash balance of P5,851.17 and pending obligations in the amount of P6,165.03.
The heirs of Quintin de Borja again opposed the approval of the statements of accounts charging the
administrator with having failed to include the fruits which the estate should have accrued from 1941
to 1951 amounting to P479,429.70, but as the other heirs seemed satisfied with the accounts
presented by said administrator and as their group was only one of the 4 heirs of Intestate Estate,
they prayed that the administrator be held liable for only P119,932.42 which was 1/4 of the amount
alleged to have been omitted. On October 4, 1951, the administrator filed a reply to said opposition
containing a counterclaim for moral damages against all the heirs of Quintin de Borja in the sum of
P30,000 which was admitted by the Court over the objection of the heirs of Quintin de Borja that the
said pleading was filed out of time.
The oppositors, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, then filed their answer to the counterclaim denying the
charges therein, but later served interrogatories on the administrator relative to the averments of
said counterclaim. Upon receipt of the answer to said interrogatories specifying the acts upon which
the claim for moral damages was based, the oppositors filed an amended answer contending that
inasmuch as the acts, manifestations and pleadings referred to therein were admittedly committed
and prepared by their lawyer, Atty. Amador E. Gomez, same cannot be made the basis of a
counterclaim, said lawyer not being a party to the action, and furthermore, as the acts upon which
the claim for moral damages were based had been committed prior to the effectivity of the new Civil
Code, the provisions of said Code on moral damages could not be invoked. On January 15, 1952,
the administrator filed an amended counterclaim including the counsel for the oppositors as
defendant.
There followed a momentary respite in the proceedings until another judge was assigned to preside
over said court to dispose of the old case pending therein. On August 15, 1952, Judge Encarnacion
issued an order denying admission to administrator's amended counterclaim directed against the
lawyer, Atty. Amador E. Gomez, holding that a lawyer, not being a party to the action, cannot be
made answerable for counterclaims. Another order was also issued on the same date dismissing the
administrator's counterclaim for moral damages against the heirs of Quintin de Borja and their
counsel for the alleged defamatory acts, manifestation and utterances, and stating that granting the
same to be meritorious, yet it was a strictly private controversy between said heirs and the
administrator which would not in any way affect the interest of the Intestate, and, therefore, not
proper in an intestate proceedings. The Court stressed that to allow the ventilation of such personal
controversies would further delay the proceedings in the case which had already lagged for almost
30 years, a situation which the Court would not countenance.
Having disposed of these pending incidents which arose out of the principal issue, that is, the
disputed statement of accounts submitted by the administrator, the Court rendered judgment on
September 5, 1952, ordering the administrator to distribute the funds in his possession to the heirs
as follows: P1,395.90 to the heirs of Quintin de Borja; P314.99 to Francisco de Borja; P314.99 to the
Estate of Juliana de Borja and P314.99 to Miguel B. Dayco, but as the latter still owed the intestate
the sum of P900, said heirs was ordered to pay instead the 3 others the sum of P146.05 each. After
considering the testimonies of the witnesses presented by both parties and the available records on
hand, the Court found the administrator guilty of maladministration and sentenced Crisanto de Borja
to pay to the oppositors, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, the sum of P83,337.31, which was 1/4 of the
amount which the state lost, with legal interest from the date of the judgment. On the same day, the
Court also issued an order requiring the administrator to deliver to the Clerk of that Court PNB
Certificate of Deposit No. 211649 for P978.50 which was issued in the name of Quintin de Borja.
The administrator, Dr. Crisanto de Borja, gave notice to appeal from the lower Court's orders of
August 15, 1952, the decision of September 5, 1952, and the order of even date, but when the
Record on Appeal was finally approved, the Court ordered the exclusion of the appeal from the order
of September 5, 1952, requiring the administrator to deposit the PNB Certificate of Deposit No.
2114649 with the Clerk of Court, after the oppositors had shown that during the hearing of that
incident, the parties agreed to abide by whatever resolution the Court would make on the ownership
of the funds covered by that deposit.
The issues. — Reducing the issues to bare essentials, the questions left for our determination are:
(1) whether the counsel for a party in a case may be included as a defendant in a counterclaim; (2)
whether a claim for moral damages may be entertained in a proceeding for the settlement of an
estate; (3) what may be considered as acts of maladministration and whether an administrator, as
the one in the case at bar, may be held accountable for any loss or damage that the estate under his
administration may incur by reason of his negligence, bad faith or acts of maladministration; and (4)
in the case at bar has the Intestate or any of the heirs suffered any loss or damage by reason of the
administrator's negligence, bad faith or maladministration? If so, what is the amount of such loss or
damage?
I. — Section 1, Rule 10, of the Rules of Court defines a counterclaim as:
SECTION 1. Counterclaim Defined. — A counterclaim is any claim, whether for

money or otherwise, which a party may have against the opposing party. A
counterclaim need not dismiss or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party,
but may claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought by the
opposing party's claim.
It is an elementary rule of procedure that a counterclaim is a relief available to a party-defendant

against the adverse party which may or may not be independent from the main issue. There is no
controversy in the case at bar, that the acts, manifestations and actuations alleged to be defamatory
and upon which the counterclaim was based were done or prepared by counsel for oppositors; and
the administrator contends that as the very oppositors manifested that whatever civil liability arising
from acts, actuations, pleadings and manifestations attributable to their lawyer is enforceable against
said lawyer, the amended counterclaim was filed against the latter not in his individual or personal
capacity but as counsel for the oppositors. It is his stand, therefore, that the lower erred in denying
admission to said pleading. We differ from the view taken by the administrator. The appearance of a
lawyer as counsel for a party and his participation in a case as such counsel does not make him a
party to the action. The fact that he represents the interests of his client or that he acts in their behalf
will not hold him liable for or make him entitled to any award that the Court may adjudicate to the
parties, other than his professional fees. The principle that a counterclaim cannot be filed against
persons who are acting in representation of another — such as trustees — in their individual
capacities (Chambers vs. Cameron, 2 Fed. Rules Service, p. 155; 29 F. Supp. 742) could be applied
with more force and effect in the case of a counsel whose participation in the action is merely
confined to the preparation of the defense of his client. Appellant, however, asserted that he filed the
counterclaim against said lawyer not in his individual capacity but as counsel for the heirs of Quintin
de Borja. But as we have already stated that the existence of a lawyer-client relationship does not
make the former a party to the action, even this allegation of appellant will not alter the result We
have arrived at.
Granting that the lawyer really employed intemperate language in the course of the hearings or in
the preparation of the pleadings filed in connection with this case, the remedy against said counsel
would be to have him cited for contempt of court or take other administrative measures that may be
proper in the case, but certainly not a counterclaim for moral damages.
II. — Special Proceedings No. 6414 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig branch) was
instituted for the purpose of settling the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja. In taking cognizance of
the case, the Court was clothed with a limited jurisdiction which cannot expand to collateral matters
not arising out of or in any way related to the settlement and adjudication of the properties of the
deceased, for it is a settled rule that the jurisdiction of a probate court is limited and special (Guzman
vs. Anog, 37 Phil. 361). Although there is a tendency now to relax this rule and extend the
jurisdiction of the probate court in respect to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its
recognized powers (14 Am. Jur. 251-252), this should be understood to comprehend only cases
related to those powers specifically allowed by the statutes. For it was even said that:
Probate proceedings are purely statutory and their functions limited to the control of
the property upon the death of its owner, and cannot extend to the adjudication of
collateral questions (Woesmes, The American Law of Administration, Vol. I, p. 514,
662-663).
It was in the acknowledgment of its limited jurisdiction that the lower court dismissed the
administrator's counterclaim for moral damages against the oppositors, particularly against Marcela
de Borja who allegedly uttered derogatory remarks intended to cast dishonor to said administrator
sometime in 1950 or 1951, his Honor's ground being that the court exercising limited jurisdiction
cannot entertain claims of this kind which should properly belong to a court general jurisdiction. From
what ever angle it may be looked at, a counterclaim for moral damages demanded by an
administrator against the heirs for alleged utterances, pleadings and actuations made in the course
of the proceeding, is an extraneous matter in a testate or intestate proceedings. The injection into
the action of incidental questions entirely foreign in probate proceedings should not be encouraged
for to do otherwise would run counter to the clear intention of the law, for it was held that:
The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of the
creditors and those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the
debts and expenses of administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our
probate law (Magabanua vs. Akel, 72 Phil., 567, 40 Off Gaz., 1871).
III. and IV. — This appeal arose from the opposition of the heirs of Quintin de Borja to the approval
of the statements of accounts rendered by the administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de
Borja, on the ground that certain fruits which should have been accrued to the estate were
unaccounted for, which charge the administrator denied. After a protracted and extensive hearing on
the matter, the Court, finding the administrator, Dr. Crisanto de Borja, guilty of certain acts of
maladministration, held him liable for the payment to the oppositors, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, of
1/4 of the unreported income which the estate should have received. The evidence presented in the
court below bear out the following facts:
(a) The estate owns a 6-door building, Nos. 1541, 1543, 1545, 1547, 1549 and 1551 in Azcarraga
Street, Manila, situated in front of the Arranque market. Of this property, the administrator reported
to have received for the estate the following rentals:
Annual
Total
Period of time monthly
rentals
rental
March to December, 1945 P3,085.00 P51.42
January to December, 1946 4,980.00 69.17
Total P40,295.00
The oppositors, in disputing this record income, presented at the witness stand Lauro Aguila, a
lawyer who occupied the basement of Door No. 1541 and the whole of Door No. 1543 from 1945 to
November 15, 1949, and who testified that he paid rentals on said apartments as follows:
1945
Door No. 1541 (basement)
February P20.00 Door No. 1543
March 20.00 For 7 months at
P300
April 60.00 a month P2,100.00
May-December 800.00
Total P900.00
1946
January-December P1,200.00 January-December P4,080.00
1947
January P100.00 January P380.00
February 100.00 February 380.00
March 180.00 March 1-15 190.00
April-December 1,140.00 March 16- 4,085.00
December
P1,820.00 P5,035.00
1948
January-December P1,920.00 January-December P5,150.00
1949
January-November P1,680.00 January-December P4,315.00
15
From the testimony of said witness, it appears that from 1945 to November 15,1949, he paid a total
of P28,200 for the lease of Door No. 1543 and the basement of Door No. 1541. These figures were
not controverted or disputed by the administrator but claim that said tenant subleased the
apartments occupied by Pedro Enriquez and Soledad Sodora and paid the said rentals, not to the
administrator, but to said Enriquez. The transcript of the testimony of this witness really bolster this
contention — that Lauro Aguila talked with said Pedro Enriquez when he leased the aforementioned
apartments and admitted paying the rentals to the latter and not to the administrator. It is interesting
to note that Pedro Enriquez is the same person who appeared to be the administrator's collector,
duly authorized to receive the rentals from this Azcarraga property and for which services, said
Enriquez received 5 per cent of the amount he might be able to collect as commission. If we are to
believe appellant's contention, aside from the commission that Pedro Enriquez received he also
sublet the apartments he was occupying at a very much higher rate than that he actually paid the
estate without the knowledge of the administrator or with his approval. As the administrator also
seemed to possess that peculiar habit of giving little importance to bookkeeping methods, for he
never kept a ledger or book of entry for amounts received for the estate, We find no record of the
rentals the lessees of the other doors were paying. It was, however, brought about at the hearing
that the 6 doors of this building are of the same sizes and construction and the lower Court based its
computation of the amount this property should have earned for the estate on the rental paid by Atty.
Aguila for the 1 1/2 doors that he occupied. We see no excuse why the administrator could not have
taken cognizance of these rates and received the same for the benefit of the estate he was
administering, considering the fact that he used to make trips to Manila usually once a month and for
which he charged to the estate P8 as transportation expenses for every trip.
Basing on the rentals paid by Atty. Aguila for 1 1/2 doors, the estate received P112,800 from
February 1, 1945, to November 15, 1949, for the 6 doors, but the lower Court held him accountable
not only for the sum of P34,235 reported for the period ranging from March 1, 1945, to December
31, 1949, but also for a deficit of P90,525 or a total of P124,760. The record shows, however that the
upper floor of Door No. 1549 was vacant in September, 1949, and as Atty. Aguila used to pay P390
a month for the use of an entire apartment from September to November, 1949, and he also paid
P160 for the use of the basement of an apartment (Door No. 1541), the use, therefore, of said upper
floor would cost P230 which should be deducted, even if the computation of the lower Court would
have to be followed.
There being no proper evidence to show that the administrator collected more rentals than those
reported by him, except in the instance already mentioned, We are reluctant to bold him accountable
in the amount for which he was held liable by the lower Court, and We think that under the
circumstances it would be more just to add to the sum reported by the administrator as received by
him as rents for 1945-1949 only, the difference between the sum reported as paid by Atty. Aguila
and the sum actually paid by the latter as rents of 1 1/2 of the apartments during the said period, or
P25,457.09 1/4 of which is P6,364.27 which shall be paid to the oppositors.
The record also shows that in July, 1950, the administrator delivered to the other heirs Doors Nos.
1545, 1547, 1549 and 1551 although Doors Nos. 1541 and 1543 adjudicated to the oppositors
remained under his administration. For the period from January to June, 1950, that the entire
property was still administered by him, the administrator reported to have received for the 2
oppositors' apartments for said period of six months at P168.33 a month, the sum of P1,010 which
belongs to the oppositors and should be taken from the amount reported by the administrator.
The lower Court computed at P40 a month the pre-war rental admittedly received for every
apartment, the income that said property would have earned from 1941 to 1944, or a total of
P11,520, but as We have to exclude the period covered by the Japanese occupation, the estate
should receive only P2,880 1/4 of which P720 the administrator should pay to the oppositors for the
year 1941.
(b) The Intestate estate also owned a parcel of land in Mayapyap, Nueva Ecija, with an area of 71
hectares, 95 ares and 4 centares, acquired by Quintin de Borja the spouses Cornelio Sarangaya and
Feliciana Mariano in Civil Case NO. 6190 of the Court of First Instance of said province, In virtue of
the agreement entered into by the heirs, this property was turned over by the estate of Quintin de
Borja to the intestate and formed part of the general mass of said estate. The report of the
administrator failed to disclose any return from this property alleging that he had not taken
possession of the same. He does not deny however that he knew of the existence of this land but
claimed that when he demanded the delivery of the Certificate of Title covering this property, Rogelio
Limaco, then administrator of the estate of Quintin de Borja, refused to surrender the same and he
did not take any further action to recover the same.
To counteract the insinuation that the Estate of Quintin de Borja was in possession of this property
from 1940 to 1950, the oppositors presented several witnesses, among them was an old man,
Narciso Punzal, who testified that he knew both Quintin and Francisco de Borja; that before the war
or sometime in 1937, the former administrator of the Intestate, Quintin de Borja, offered him the
position of overseer (encargado) of this land but he was notable to assume the same due to the
death of said administrator; that on July 7, 1951, herein appellant invited him to go to his house in
Pateros, Rizal, and while in said house, he was instructed by appellant to testify in court next day
that he was the overseer of the Mayapyap property for Quintin de Borja from 1937-1944, delivering
the yearly proceeds of 1,000 cavanes of Palay to Rogelio Limaco; that he did not need to be afraid
because both Quintin de Borja and Rogelio Limaco were already dead. But as he knew that the facts
on which he was to testify were false, he went instead to the house of one of the daughters of
Quintin de Borja, who, together with her brother, Atty. Juan de Borja, accompanied him to the house
of the counsel for said oppositors before whom his sworn declaration was taken (Exh. 3).
Other witnesses, i.e., Isidro Benuya, Federico Cojo, Emilio de la Cruz and Ernesto Mangulabnan,
testified that they were some of the tenants of the Mayapyap property; that they were paying their
shares to the overseers of Francisco de Borja and sometimes to his wife, which the administrator
was not able to contradict, and the lower Court found no reason why the administrator would fail to
take possession of this property considering that this was even the subject of the agreement of
February 16, 1940, executed by the heirs of the Intestate.
The lower Court, giving due credence to the testimonies of the witnesses for the oppositors,
computed the loss the estate suffered in the form of unreported income from the rice lands for 10
years at P67,000 (6,700 a year)and the amount of P4,000 from the remaining portion of the land not
devoted to rice cultivation which was being leased at P20 per hectare. Consequently, the Court held
the administrator liable to appellees in the sum of P17,750 which is 1/4 of the total amount which
should have accrued to the estate for this item.
But if We exclude the 3 years of occupation, the income for 7 years would be P46,900 for the
ricelands and P2,800 (at P400 a year) for the remaining portion not developed to rice cultivation or a
total of P48,700, 1/4 of which is P12,175 which We hold the administrator liable to the oppositors.
(c) The Hacienda Jalajala located in said town of Rizal, was divided into 3 parts: the Punta section
belonged to Marcelo de Borja, the Bagombong pertained to Bernardo de Borja and Francisco de
Borja got the Jalajala proper. For the purpose of this case, we will just deal with that part called
Junta. This property has an area of 1,345, hectares, 29 ares and 2 centares (Exh. 36) of which,
according to the surveyor who measured the same, 200 hectares were of cultivated rice fields and
100 hectares dedicated to the planting of upland rice. It has also timberland and forest which
produce considerable amount of trees and firewoods. From the said property which has an assessed
value of P115,000 and for which the estates pay real estate tax of P1,500 annually, the administrator
reported the following:
Expenditure
(not including
administration's
Year Income fees
1945........... P625.00 P1,310.42
1946............. 1,800.00 3,471.00
1947............. 2,550.00 2,912.91
1948............. 1,828.00 3,311.88
1949............. 3,204.50 4,792.09
1950............. 2,082.00 2,940.91
P12,089.50 P18,739.21
This statement was assailed by the oppositors and to substantiate their charge that the administrator
did not file the true income of the property, they presented several witnesses who testified that there
were about 200 tenants working therein; that these tenants paid to Crisanto de Borja rentals at the
rate of 6 cavanes of palay per hectare; that in the years of 1943 and 1944, the Japanese were the
ones who collected their rentals, and that the estate could have received no less than 1,000 cavanes
of palay yearly. After the administrator had presented witnesses to refute the facts previously
testified to by the witnesses for the oppositors, the Court held that the report of the administrator did
not contain the real income of the property devoted to rice cultivation, which was fixed at 1,000
cavanes every year — for 1941, 1942, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950, or a total of 8,000
cavanes valued at P73,000. But as the administrator accounted for the sum of P11,155 collected
from rice harvests and if to this amount we add the sum of P8,739.20 for expenses, this will make a
total of P19,894.20, thus leaving a deficit of P53,105.80, ¼ of which will be P13,276.45 which the
administrator is held liable to pay the heirs of Quintin de Borja.
It was also proved during the hearing that the forest land of this property yields considerable amount
of marketable firewoods. Taking into consideration the testimonies of witnesses for both parties, the
Court arrived at the conclusion that the administrator sold to Gregorio Santos firewoods worth P600
in 1941, P3,500 in 1945 and P4,200 in 1946 or a total of P8,300. As the report included only the
amount of P625, there was a balance of P7,675 in favor of the estate. The oppositors were not able
to present any proof of sales made after these years, if there were any and the administrator was
held accountable to the oppositors for only P1,918.75.
(d) The estate also, owned ricefields in Cainta, Rizal, with a total area of 22 hectares, 76 ares and 66
centares. Of this particular item, the administrator reported an income of P12,104 from 1945 to 1951.
The oppositors protested against this report and presented witnesses to disprove the same.
Basilio Javier worked as a tenant in the land of Juliana de Borja which is near the land belonging to
the Intestate, the 2 properties being separated only by a river. As tenant of Juliana de Borja, he
knew the tenants working on the property and also knows that both lands are of the same class, and
that an area accommodating one cavan of seedlings yields at most 100 cavanes and 60 cavanes at
the least. The administrator failed to overcome this testimony. The lower Court considering the facts
testified to by this witness made a finding that the property belonging to this Intestate was actually
occupied by several persons accommodating 13 ½ cavanes of seedlings; that as for every cavan of
seedlings, the land produces 60 cavanes of palay, the whole area under cultivation would have
yielded 810 cavanes a year and under the 50-50 sharing system (which was testified by witness
Javier), the estate would have received no less than 405 cavanes every year. Now, for the period of
7 years — from 1941 to 1950, excluding the 3 years of war — the corresponding earning of the
estate should be 2,835 cavanes, out of which the 405 cavanes from the harvest of 1941 is valued at
P1,215 and the rest 2,430 cavanes at P10 is valued at P24,300, or all in all P25,515. If from this
amount the reported income of P12,104 is deducted, there will be a balance of P13,411.10 1/4 of
which or P3,352.75 the administrator is held liable to pay to the oppositors.
(e) The records show that the administrator paid surcharges and penalties with a total of P988.75 for
his failure to pay on time the taxes imposed on the properties under his administration. He advanced
the reason that he lagged in the payment of those tax obligations because of lack of cash balance
for the estate. The oppositors, however, presented evidence that on October 29, 1939, the
administrator received from Juliana de Borja the sum of P20,475.17 together with certain papers
pertaining to the intestate (Exh. 4),aside from the checks in the name of Quintin de Borja. Likewise,
for his failure to pay the taxes on the building at Azcarraga for 1947, 1948 and 1949, said property
was sold at public auction and the administrator had to redeem the same at P3,295.48, although the
amount that should have been paid was only P2,917.26. The estate therefore suffered a loss of
P378.22. Attributing these surcharges and penalties to the negligence of the administrator, the lower
Court adjudged him liable to pay the oppositors ¼ of P1,366.97, the total loss suffered by the
Intestate, or P341.74.
(f) Sometime in 1942, a big fire razed numerous houses in Pateros, Rizal, including that of Dr.
Crisanto de Borja. Thereafter, he claimed that among the properties burned therein was his safe
containing P15,000 belonging to the estate under his administration. The administrator contended
that this loss was already proved to the satisfaction of the Court who, approved the same by order of
January 8, 1943, purportedly issued by Judge Servillano Platon(Exh. B). The oppositors contested
the genuineness of this order and presented on April 21, 1950, an expert witness who conducted
several tests to determine the probable age of the questioned document, and arrived at the
conclusion that the questioned ink writing "(Fdo)" appearing at the bottom of Exhibit B cannot be
more than 4 years old (Exh. 39). However, another expert witness presented by the administrator
contradicted this finding and testified that this conclusion arrived at by expert witness Mr. Pedro
Manzañares was not supported by authorities and was merely the result of his own theory, as there
was no method yet discovered that would determine the age of a document, for every document has
its own reaction to different chemicals used in the tests. There is, however, another fact that called
the attention of the lower Court: the administrator testified that the money and other papers delivered
by Juliana de Borja to him on October 29, 1939, were saved from said fire. The administrator
justified the existence of these valuables by asserting that these properties were locked by Juliana
de Borja in her drawer in the "casa solariega" in Pateros and hence was not in his safe when his
house, together with the safe, was burned. This line of reasoning is really subject to doubt and the
lower Court opined, that it runs counter to the ordinary course of human behaviour for an
administrator to leave in the drawer of the "aparador" of Juliana de Borja the money and other
documents belonging to the estate under his administration, which delivery has receipted for, rather
than to keep it in his safe together with the alleged P15,000 also belonging to the Intestate. The
subsequent orders of Judge Platon also put the defense of appellant to bad light, for on February 6,
1943, the Court required Crisanto de Borja to appear before the Court of examination of the other
heirs in connection with the reported loss, and on March 1, 1943, authorized the lawyers for the
other parties to inspect the safe allegedly burned (Exh. 35). It is inconceivable that Judge Platon
would still order the inspection of the safe if there was really an order approving the loss of those
P15,000. We must not forget, in this connection, that the records of this case were burned and that
at the time of the hearing of this incident in 1951, Judge Platon was already dead. The lower Court
also found no reason why the administrator should keep in his such amount of money, for ordinary
prudence would dictate that as an administration funds that come into his possession in a fiduciary
capacity should not be mingled with his personal funds and should have been deposited in the Bank
in the name of the intestate. The administrator was held responsible for this loss and ordered to pay
¼ thereof, or the sum of P3,750.
(g) Unauthorized expenditures —

1. The report of the administrator contained certain sums amounting to P2,130 paid to and receipted
by Juanita V. Jarencio the administrator's wife, as his private secretary. In explaining this item, the
administrator alleged that he needed her services to keep receipts and records for him, and that he
did not secure first the authorization from the court before making these disbursements because it
was merely a pure administrative function.
The keeping of receipts and retaining in his custody records connected with the management of the
properties under administration is a duty that properly belongs to the administrator, necessary to
support the statement of accounts that he is obliged to submit to the court for approval. If ever his
wife took charge of the safekeeping of these receipts and for which she should be compensated, the
same should be taken from his fee. This disbursement was disallowed by the Court for being
unauthorized and the administrator required to pay the oppositors ¼, thereof or P532.50.
2. The salaries of Pedro Enriquez, as collector of the Azcarraga property; of Briccio Matienzo and
Leoncio Perez, as encargados, and of Vicente Panganiban and Herminigildo Macetas as forest-
guards were found justified, although un authorized, as they appear to be reasonable and necessary
for the care and preservation of the Intestate.
3. The lower Court disallowed as unjustified and unnecessary the expenses for salaries paid to
special policemen amounting to P1,509. Appellant contended that he sought for the services of
Macario Kamungol and others to act as special policemen during harvest time because most of the
workers tilting the Punta property were not natives of Jalajala but of the neighboring towns and they
were likely to run away with the harvest without giving the share of the estate if they were not
policed. This kind of reasoning did not appear to be convincing to the trial judge as the cause for
such fear seemed to exist only in the imagination. Granting that such kind of situation existed, the
proper thing for the administrator to do would have been to secure the previous authorization from
the Court if he failed to secure the help of the local police. He should be held liable for this
unauthorized expenditure and pay the heirs of Quintin de Borja ¼ thereof or P377.25.
4. From the year 1942 when his house was burned, the administrator and his family took shelter at
the house belonging to the Intestate known as "casa solariega" which, in the Project of Partition was
adjudicated to his father, Francisco de Borja. This property, however, remained under his
administration and for its repairs he spent from 1945-1950, P1465,14, duly receipted.
None of these repairs appear to be extraordinary for the receipts were for nipa, for carpenters and
thatchers. Although it is true that Rule 85, section 2 provides that:
SEC. 2. EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR TO KEEP BUILDINGS IN REPAIR. —

An executor or administrator shall maintain in tenant able repair the houses and
other structures and fences belonging to the estate, and deliver the same in such
repair to the heirs or devisees when directed so to do by the court.
yet considering that during his occupancy of the said "casa solariega" he was not paying any rental
at all, it is but reasonable that he should take care of the expenses for the ordinary repair of said
house. Appellant asserted that had he and his family not occupied the same, they would have to pay
someone to watch and take care of said house. But this will not excuse him from this responsibility
for the disbursements he made in connection with the aforementioned repairs because even if he
stayed in another house, he would have had to pay rentals or else take charge also of expenses for
the repairs of his residence. The administrator should be held liable to the oppositors in the amount
of P366.28.
5. Appellant reported to have incurred expenses amounting to P6,304.75 for alleged repairs on the
rice mill in Pateros, also belonging to the Intestate. Of the disbursements made therein, the items
corresponding, to Exhibits I, I-1, I-21, L-26, L-15, L-64 and L-65, in the total sum of P570.70 were
rejected by the lower court on the ground that they were all unsigned although some were dated.
The lower Court, however, made an oversight in including the sum of P150 covered by Exhibit L-26
which was duly signed by Claudio Reyes because this does not refer to the repair of the rice-mill but
for the roofing of the house and another building and shall be allowed. Consequently, the sum of
P570.70 shall be reduced to P420.70 which added to the sum of P3,059 representing expenditures
rejected as unauthorized to wit:
Exhibit L-59 ............. P500.00 Yek Wing

Exhibit L-60 ............. 616.00 Yek Wing
scale
Exhibit Q-2 ............. 323.00 "Howe"
Total
...................... P3,059.00
will give a total of P3,479 1/4 of which is P869.92 that belongs to the oppositors.
6. On the expenses for planting in the Cainta ricefields: — In his statement of accounts, appellant
reported to have incurred a total expense of P5,977 for the planting of the ricefields in Cainta, Rizal,
from the agricultural year 1945-46 to 1950-51. It was proved that the prevailing sharing system in
this part of the country was on 50-50 basis. Appellant admitted that expenses for planting were
advanced by the estate and liquidated after each harvest. But the report, except for the agricultural
year 1950 contained nothing of the payments that the tenants should have made. If the total
expenses for said planting amounted to P5,977, ½ thereof or P2,988.50 should have been paid by
the tenants as their share of such expenditures, and as P965 was reported by the administrator as
paid back in 1950, there still remains a balance of P2,023.50 unaccounted for. For this shortage, the
administrator is responsible and should pay the oppositors ¼ thereof or P505.87.
7. On the transportation expenses of the administrator: — It appears that from the year 1945 to
1951, the administrator charged the estate with a total of P5,170 for transportation expenses. The un
receipted disbursements were correspondingly itemized, a typical example of which is as follows:
1950
Gastos de viaje del administrador From
Pateros
To Pasig ................ 50 x P4.00 = P200.00
50 x
To Manila ............... P10.00 = P500.00
To Cainta ................ 8 x P8.00 = P64.00
To Jalajala ............... 5 x P35.00 = P175.00
= P399.00
(Exhibit W-54).
From the report of the administrator, We are being made to believe that the Intestate estate is a
losing proposition and assuming arguendo that this is true, that precarious financial condition which
he, as administrator, should know, did not deter Crisanto de Borja from charging to the depleted
funds of the estate comparatively big amounts for his transportation expenses. Appellant tried to
justify these charges by contending that he used his own car in making those trips to Manila, Pasig
and Cainta and a launch in visiting the properties in Jalajala, and they were for the gasoline
consumed. This rather unreasonable spending of the estate's fund prompted the Court to observe
that one will have to spend only P0.40 for transportation in making a trip from Pateros to Manila and
practically the same amount in going to Pasig. From his report for 1949 alone, appellant made a total
of 97 trips to these places or an average of one trip for every 3 1/2 days. Yet We must not forget that
it was during this period that the administrator failed or refused to take cognizance of the prevailing
rentals of commercial places in Manila that caused certain loss to the estate and for which he was
accordingly held responsible. For the reason that the alleged disbursements made for transportation
expenses cannot be said to be economical, the lower Court held that the administrator should be
held liable to the oppositors for ¼ thereof or the sum of P1,292.50, though We think that this sum
should still be reduced to P500.
8. Other expenses:
The administrator also ordered 40 booklets of printed contracts of lease in the name of the Hacienda
Jalajala which cost P150. As the said hacienda was divided into 3 parts one belonging to this
Intestate and the other two parts to Francisco de Boria and Bernardo de Borja, ordinarily the
Intestate should only shoulder ¹/3 of the said expense, but as the tenants who testified
during the hearing of the matter testified that those printed forms were not
being used, the Court adjudged the administrator personally responsible for
this amount. The records reveal, that this printed form was not utilized
because the tenants refused to sign any, and We can presume that when the
administrator ordered for the printing of the same, he did not foresee this
situation. As there is no showing that said printed contracts were used by
another and that they are still in the possession of the administrator which
could be utilized anytime, this disbursement may be allowed.
The report also contains a receipt of payment made to Mr. Severo Abellera in the sum of P375 for
his transportation expenses as one of the two commissioners who prepared the Project of Partition.
The oppositors were able to prove that on May 24, 1941, the Court authorized the administrator to
withdraw from the funds of the intestate the sum of P300 to defray the transportation expenses of
the commissioners. The administrator, however, alleged that he used this amount for the payment of
certain fees necessary in connection with the approval of the proposed plan of the Azcarraga
property which was then being processed in the City Engineer's Office. From that testimony, it would
seem that appellant could even go to the extent of disobeying the order of the Court specifying for
what purpose that amount should be appropriated and took upon himself the task of judging for what
it will serve best. Since he was not able to show or prove that the money intended and ordered by
the Court to be paid for the transportation expenses of the commissioners was spent for the benefit
of the estate as claimed, the administrator should be held responsible therefor and pay to the
oppositors ¼ of P375 or the sum of P93.75.
The records reveal that for the service of summons to the defendants in Civil Case No. 84 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, P104 was paid to the Provincial Sheriff of the same province (Exhibit
H-7). However, an item for P40 appeared to have been paid to the Chief of Police on Jalajala
allegedly for the service of the same summons. Appellant claimed that as the defendants in said civil
case lived in remote barrios, the services of the Chief of Police as delegate or agent of the Provincial
Sheriff were necessary. He forgot probably the fact that the local chiefs of police are deputy sheriffs
ex-officio. The administrator was therefore ordered by the lower Court to pay ¼ of said amount or
P10 to the oppositors.
The administrator included in his Report the sum of P550 paid to Atty. Filamor for his professional
services rendered for the defense of the administrator in G.R. No. L-4179, which was decided
against him, with costs. The lower Court disallowed this disbursement on the ground that this Court
provided that the costs of that litigation should not be borne by the estate but by the administrator
himself, personally.
Costs of a litigation in the Supreme Court taxed by the Clerk of Court, after a verified petition has
been filed by the prevailing party, shall be awarded to said party and will only include his fee and that
of his attorney for their appearance which shall not be more than P40; expenses for the printing and
the copies of the record on appeal; all lawful charges imposed by the Clerk of Court; fees for the
taking of depositions and other expenses connected with the appearance of witnesses or for lawful
fees of a commissioner (De la Cruz, Philippine Supreme Court Practice, p. 70-71). If the costs
provided for in that case, which this Court ordered to be chargeable personally against the
administrator are not recoverable by the latter, with more reason this item could not be charged
against the Intestate. Consequently, the administrator should pay the oppositors ¼ of the sum of
P550 or P137.50.
(e) The lower Court in its decision required appellant to pay the oppositors the sum of P1,395 out of
the funds still in the possession of the administrator.
In the statement of accounts submitted by the administrator, there appeared a cash balance of
P5,851.17 as of August 31, 1961. From this amount, the sum of P1,002.96 representing the
Certificate of Deposit No. 21619 and Check No. 57338, both of the Philippine National Bank and in
the name of Quintin de Borja, was deducted leaving a balance of P4,848. As Judge Zulueta ordered
the delivery to the oppositors of the amount of P1,890 in his order of October 8, 1951; the delivery of
the amount of P810 to the estate of Juliana de Borja in his order of October 23, 1951, and the sum
of P932.32 to the same estate of Juliana de Borja by order of the Court of February 29, 1952, or a
total of P3,632.32 after deducting the same from the cash in the possession of the administrator,
there will only be a remainder of P134.98.
The Intestate is also the creditor of Miguel B. Dayco, heir and administrator of the estate of Crisanta
de Borja, in the sum of P900 (Exhibits S and S-1). Adding this credit to the actual cash on hand,
there will be a total of P1,034.98, ¼, of which or P258.74 properly belongs to the oppositors.
However, as there is only a residue of P134.98 in the hands of the administrator and dividing it
among the 3 groups of heirs who are not indebted to the Intestate, each group will receive P44.99,
and Miguel B. Dayco is under obligation to reimburse P213.76 to each of them.
The lower Court ordered the administrator to deliver to the oppositors the amount of P1,395.90 and
P314.99 each to Francisco de Borja and the estate of Juliana de Borja, but as We have arrived at
the computation that the three heirs not idebted to the Intestate ought to receive P44.99 each out of
the amount of P134.98, the oppositors are entitled to the sum of P1,080.91 — the amount deducted
from them as taxes but which the Court ordered to be returned to them — plus P44.99 or a total of
P1,125.90. It appearing however, that ina Joint Motion dated November 27, 1952, duly approved by
the Court, the parties agreed to fix the amount at P1,125.58, as the amount due and said heirs have
already received this amount in satisfaction of this item, no other sum can be chargeable against the
administrator.
(f) The probate Court also ordered the administrator to render an accounting of his administration
during the Japanese occupation on the ground that although appellant maintained that whatever
money he received during that period is worthless, same having been declared without any value,
yet during the early years of the war, or during 1942-43, the Philippine peso was still in circulation,
and articles of prime necessity as rice and firewood commanded high prices and were paid with
jewels or other valuables.
But We must not forget that in his order of December 11, 1945, Judge Peña required the
administrator to render an accounting of his administration only from March 1, 1945, to December of
the same year without ordering said administrator to include therein the occupation period. Although
the Court below mentioned the condition then prevailing during the war-years, We cannot simply
presume, in the absence of proof to that effect, that the administrator received such valuables or
properties for the use or in exchange of any asset or produce of the Intestate, and in view of the
aforementioned order of Judge Peña, which We find no reason to disturb, We see no practical
reason for requiring appellant to account for those occupation years when everything was affected
by the abnormal conditions created by the war. The records of the Philippine National Bank show
that there was a current account jointly in the names of Crisanto de Borja and Juanita V. Jarencio,
his wife, with a balance of P36,750.35 in Japanese military notes and admittedly belonging to the
Intestate and We do not believe that the oppositors or any of the heirs would be interested in an
accounting for the purpose of dividing or distributing this deposit.
(g) On the sum of P13,294 for administrator's fees:
It is not disputed that the administrator set aside for himself and collected from the estate the sum of
P13,294 as his fees from 1945 to 1951 at the rate of P2,400 a year. There is no controversy as to
the fact that this appropriated amount was taken without the order or previous approval by the
probate Court. Neither is there any doubt that the administration of the Intestate estate by Crisanto
de Borja is far from satisfactory.
Yet it is a fact that Crisanto de Borja exercised the functions of an administrator and is entitled also
to a certain amount as compensation for the work and services he has rendered as such. Now,
considering the extent and size of the estate, the amount involved and the nature of the properties
under administration, the amount collected by the administrator for his compensation at P200 a
month is not unreasonable and should therefore be allowed.
It might be argued against this disbursement that the records are replete with instances of highly
irregular practices of the administrator, such as the pretended ignorance of the necessity of a book
or ledger or at least a list of chronological and dated entries of money or produce the Intestate
acquired and the amount of disbursements made for the same properties; that admittedly he did not
have even a list of the names of the lessees to the properties under his administration, nor even a
list of those who owed back rentals, and although We certainly agree with the probate Court in
finding appellant guilty of acts of maladministration, specifically in mixing the funds of the estate
under his administration with his personal funds instead of keeping a current account for the
Intestate in his capacity as administrator, We are of the opinion that despite these irregular practices
for which he was held already liable and made in some instances to reimburse the Intestate for
amounts that were not properly accounted for, his claim for compensation as administrator's fees
shall be as they are hereby allowed.
Recapitulation. — Taking all the matters threshed herein together, the administrator is held liable to
pay to the heirs of Quintin de Borja the following:
Under Paragraphs III and IV:

(a) P7,084.27
...............................................................................
(b) 12,175.00
...............................................................................
(c) 16,113.95
...............................................................................
(d) 3,352.75
...............................................................................
(e) 341.74
...............................................................................
(f) 3,750.00
................................................................................
(g) 1 ..................................................................... 532.50
2 ..................................................................... 377.25
3 ..................................................................... 366.28
4 ..................................................................... 869.92
5 ..................................................................... 505.87
6 ..................................................................... 500.00
7-a
b .................................................................. 93.75
c .................................................................. 10.00
d ................................................................... 137.50
P46,210.00
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified by reducing the amount that the
administrator was sentenced to pay the oppositors to the sum of P46,210.78 (instead of
P83,337.31), plus legal interests on this amount from the date of the decision appealed from, which
is hereby affirmed in all other respects. Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Endencia, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE

BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE
BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco, appellees,
vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de
Borja, appellant. .
G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA,

special Administratrix appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972
TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late Francisco de
Borja, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Josefa Tangco, defendant-
appellant.
L-28040
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for administrator-appellee.
Quiogue & Quiogue for appellee Matilde de Borja.
Andres Matias for appellee Cayetano de Borja.
Sevilla & Aquino for appellant.
L-28568
Sevilla & Aquino for special administratrix-appellee.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for oppositor-appellant.
L-28611
Sevilla & Aquino for plaintiff-appellee.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir and David Gueverra for defendant-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:p
Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, special administratrix of the testate estate
of Francisco de Borja,1 from the approval of a compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in its Special
Proceeding No. R-7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja, Administrator".
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the disapproval of the same
compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special
Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja,
Special Administratrix".
And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala
Poblacion, which is the main object of the aforesaid compromise agreement, as the separate and
exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal asset of the community with his
first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate estate, which is
under administrator in Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
Branch II.
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October
1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-
7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946,
Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was
appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole
administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja
allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana
instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was
appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was questioned in
said proceeding.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been
plagued with several court suits and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some eighteen
(18) cases remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone
has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end to all these litigations,
a compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963,2 by and between "[T]he heir and
son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of
Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her
lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr." The terms and conditions of the compromise agreement are as
follows:
AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,
AND
The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr.
WITNESSETH
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein terminate and settle, with finality,
the various court litigations, controversies, claims, counterclaims, etc., between them
in connection with the administration, settlement, partition, adjudication and
distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja.
THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed voluntarily and without
any reservations to enter into and execute this agreement under the following terms
and conditions:
1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties
situated in Jalajala, Rizal, presently under administration in the Testate Estate of
Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal), more specifically described as follows:
Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la jurisdiccion del

Municipio de Pililla de la Provincia de Rizal, y con el pico del Monte
Zambrano; al Oeste con Laguna de Bay; por el Sur con los herederos
de Marcelo de Borja; y por el Este con los terrenos de la Familia
Maronilla
with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount of P0.30 per
square meter.
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda.
de de Borja the total amount of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000)
Philippine Currency, in cash, which represent P200,000 as his share in the payment
and P600,000 as pro-rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all
surnamed de Borja and this shall be considered as full and complete payment and
settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well
as the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No.
7866-Rizal, respectively, and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by
the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or
Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise. The
funds for this payment shall be taken from and shall depend upon the receipt of full
payment of the proceeds of the sale of Jalajala, "Poblacion."
3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that

particular obligation incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in favor of the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now Development Bank of the Philippines,
amounting to approximately P30,000.00 and also assumes payment of her 1/5 share
of the Estate and Inheritance taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco de Borja or
the sum of P3,500.00, more or less, which shall be deducted by the buyer of Jalajala,
"Poblacion" from the payment to be made to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under
paragraph 2 of this Agreement and paid directly to the Development Bank of the
Philippines and the heirs-children of Francisco de Borja.
4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay directly to

Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the balance of the payment due her under
paragraph 2 of this Agreement (approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name
of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, corresponding certified checks/treasury
warrants, who, in turn, will issue the corresponding receipt to Jose de Borja.
5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose

de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, and
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, for themselves and for their heirs, successors,
executors, administrators, and assigns, hereby forever mutually renounce, withdraw,
waive, remise, release and discharge any and all manner of action or actions, cause
or causes of action, suits, debts, sum or sums of money, accounts, damages, claims
and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, which they ever had, or now have or
may have against each other, more specifically Sp. Proceedings Nos. 7866 and
1955, CFI-Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija, Civil Case No. 3033, CFI
Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as well as the case filed against
Manuel Quijal for perjury with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, the intention being to
completely, absolutely and finally release each other, their heirs, successors, and
assigns, from any and all liability, arising wholly or partially, directly or indirectly, from
the administration, settlement, and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of
the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de
Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja expressly and specifically
renounce absolutely her rights as heir over any hereditary share in the estate of
Francisco de Borja.
6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the payment under
paragraph 4 hereof, shall deliver to the heir Jose de Borja all the papers, titles and
documents belonging to Francisco de Borja which are in her possession and said
heir Jose de Borja shall issue in turn the corresponding receive thereof.
7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of the sale of the
properties mentioned under paragraph 1 of this agreement and upon receipt of the
total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala property "Poblacion",
otherwise, the non-fulfillment of the said sale will render this instrument NULL AND
VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have her unto set their hands in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the 12th of October, 1963.
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12 October 1963 to
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August 1966,
to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement,
but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R.
case No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval (G.R. case
No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963 is not
disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the
heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja;
(2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco de Borja
and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect.
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate
Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the
Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the
settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is
against the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial
settlement of a decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the decedent
left no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial
and legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco de Borja having been submitted to the Nueva
Ecija Court and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made, those circumstances, it is
argued, bar the validity of the agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja stresses
that at the time it was entered into, on 12 October 1963, the governing provision was Section 1, Rule
74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a
deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He also relies on the dissenting opinion
of Justice Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was expressed the view that if the
parties have already divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is
a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different manner, the probate of the will
is worse than useless.
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent
from an examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco.
Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana
Ongsingco —
shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of her hereditary

share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa
Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late
Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis
Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the
cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja
among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely
the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or
eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any
other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or
vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil
Code of the Philippines, Art. 777)3 there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting
capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual
extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.4 Of course, the
effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir.
However, the aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither
does the coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations between the parties (the approving
order of the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered
settled and should be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the
contract the character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it
serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja,
Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code.
Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed
independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were
not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the
Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja personally
and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the
heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda.
de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in their individual capacities, upon
the perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same.
The only difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by
the Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is
explicit on the point:
8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial
compromise.
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A expressed no

definite period for its performance, the same was intended to have a resolutory
period of 60 days for its effectiveness. In support of such contention, it is averred that
such a limit was expressly stipulated in an agreement in similar terms entered into by
said Ongsingco with the brothers and sister of Jose de Borja, to wit, Crisanto, Matilde
and Cayetano, all surnamed de Borja, except that the consideration was fixed at
P600,000 (Opposition, Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39- 46) and which
contained the following clause:
III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation of the sale of
the property mentioned herein and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the
proceeds of the sale by the herein owner heirs-children of Francisco de Borja,
namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja; Provided that if no
sale of the said property mentioned herein is consummated, or the non-receipt of the
purchase price thereof by the said owners within the period of sixty (60) days from
the date hereof, this agreement will become null and void and of no further effect.
Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja was not a party to this
particular contract (Annex 1), and that the same appears not to have been finalized, since it bears no
date, the day being left blank "this — day of October 1963"; and while signed by the parties, it was
not notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, since it carries a proposed notarial ratification
clause. Furthermore, the compromise contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A), provides in its par. 2
heretofore transcribed that of the total consideration of P800, 000 to be paid to Ongsingco, P600,000
represent the "prorata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde all surnamed de Borja"
which corresponds to the consideration of P600,000 recited in Annex 1, and that circumstance is
proof that the duly notarized contract entered into wit Jose de Borja under date 12 October 1963
(Annex A), was designed to absorb and supersede the separate unformalize agreement with the
other three Borja heirs. Hence, the 60 days resolutory term in the contract with the latter (Annex 1)
not being repeated in Annex A, can not apply to the formal compromise with Jose de Borja. It is
moreover manifest that the stipulation that the sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made
within sixty days from the date of the agreement with Jose de Borja's co-heirs (Annex 1) was plainly
omitted in Annex A as improper and ineffective, since the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that was
to be sold to raise the P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco for her share formed part of the estate of
Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until authorized by the Probate Court. The Court of First
Instance of Rizal so understood it, and in approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 days
counted from the finality of the order now under appeal, for the carrying out by the parties for the
terms of the contract.
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the
compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate
of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was an heir of Francisco de Borja,
whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her
eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that
eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could not
bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of
whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by article 1088 of
the present Civil Code:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser
by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of
one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale of the vendor.
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could
not be forbidden.
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") is void because it
amounts to a compromise as to her status and marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The point
is without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the agreement with Jose de Borja (Annex "A")
describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself definite admission of her civil status. There is
nothing in the text of the agreement that would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status as
the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of the cession of her
hereditary rights.
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
in its order of 21 September 1964, in Special Proceedings No. 832 (Amended Record on Appeal in
L-28568, page 157), that the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963 (Annex "A") had been
abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its execution, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
in its order of 21 September 1964, had declared that "no amicable settlement had been arrived at by
the parties", and that Jose de Borja himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated that the
proposed amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred to in the order and motion
above-mentioned was the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963, which already had been
formally signed and executed by the parties and duly notarized. What the record discloses is that
some time after its formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to back out from the
compromise agreement, pleading various reasons restated in the opposition to the Court's approval
of Annex "A" (Record on Appeal, L-20840, page 23): that the same was invalid because of the lapse
of the allegedly intended resolutory period of 60 days and because the contract was not preceded by
the probate of Francisco de Borja's will, as required by this Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara ruling; that
Annex "A" involved a compromise affecting Ongsingco's status as wife and widow of Francisco de
Borja, etc., all of which objections have been already discussed. It was natural that in view of the
widow's attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to reach a new settlement or novatory agreement
before seeking judicial sanction and enforcement of Annex "A", since the latter step might ultimately
entail a longer delay in attaining final remedy. That the attempt to reach another settlement failed is
apparent from the letter of Ongsingco's counsel to Jose de Borja quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief
for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No. 28040; and it is more than probable that the order of 21
September 1964 and the motion of 17 June 1964 referred to the failure of the parties' quest for a
more satisfactory compromise. But the inability to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the
original compromise (Annex "A") and justifies the act of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court order
for its approval and enforcement from the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore
described, decreed that the agreement be ultimately performed within 120 days from the finality of
the order, now under appeal.
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law, and, therefore, its order
should be upheld, while the contrary resolution of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija should
be, and is, reversed.
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the appeal has affected her
unfavorably, in that while the purchasing power of the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished, the
value of the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is that her delay in receiving the payment of
the agreed price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to her attempts to nullify the agreement
(Annex "A") she had formally entered into with the advice of her counsel, Attorney Panaguiton. And
as to the devaluation de facto of our currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, 30
June 1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with
every subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency and properties of the estate", is particularly
opposite in the present case.
Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion),
concededly acquired by Francisco de Borja during his marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is
the husband's private property (as contended by his second spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or
whether it forms part of the conjugal (ganancial) partnership with Josefa Tangco. The Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano, presiding) declared that there was adequate evidence to
overcome the presumption in favor of its conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil
Code.
We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja has
become moot and academic, in view of the conclusion reached by this Court in the two preceding
cases (G.R. No. L-28568), upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana Ongsingco's eventual share in
the estate of her late husband, Francisco de Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with the accompanying
reciprocal quit-claims between the parties. But as the question may affect the rights of possible
creditors and legatees, its resolution is still imperative.
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares, had been originally acquired
jointly by Francisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja and their title thereto was duly
registered in their names as co-owners in Land Registration Case No. 528 of the province of Rizal,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465). Subsequently, in 1931, the Hacienda
was partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta section went to Marcelo de Borja; the Bagombong
section to Bernardo de Borja, and the part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco
de Borja (V. De Borja vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).
The lot allotted to Francisco was described as —
Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E. Hermogena

Romero; S. Heirs of Marcelo de Borja O. Laguna de Bay; containing an area of
13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, assessed at P297,410. (Record on Appeal, pages 7
and 105)
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of

Francisco de Borja, instituted a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 7452)
against Jose de Borja, in his capacity as Administrator of Josefa Tangco (Francisco de Borja's first
wife), seeking to have the Hacienda above described declared exclusive private property of
Francisco, while in his answer defendant (now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that it was conjugal
property of his parents (Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco), conformably to the presumption
established by Article 160 of the Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of the Civil Code of
1889), to the effect that:
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.
Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages, compensatory, moral and exemplary,
as well as for attorney's fees.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano, held that the plaintiff had
adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property of the late Francisco de Borja, and his Administratrix,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be entitled to its possession. Defendant Jose de Borja then
appealed to this Court.
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the character of the Hacienda in question
as owned by the conjugal partnership De Borja-Tangco was solemnly admitted by the late Francisco
de Borja no less than two times: first, in the Reamended Inventory that, as executor of the estate of
his deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in the Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit "2"); and again, in the Reamended Accounting of the
same date, also filed in the proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O.
Vda. de Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted therein an inventory
dated 7 September 1954 (Exhibit "3") listing the Jalajala property among the "Conjugal Properties of
the Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once more, Tasiana Ongsingco, as
administratrix of the Estate of Francisco de Borja, in Special Proceedings No. 832 of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955, an inventory wherein she listed
the Jalajala Hacienda under the heading "Conjugal Property of the Deceased Spouses Francisco de
Borja and Josefa Tangco, which are in the possession of the Administrator of the Testate Estate of
the Deceased Josefa Tangco in Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal" (Exhibit "4").
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they are plain admissions against
interest made by both Francisco de Borja and the Administratrix of his estate, in the course of
judicial proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija Courts, supporting the legal presumption in favor of
the conjugal community, the Court below declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) was not
conjugal property, but the private exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja. It did so on the
strength of the following evidences: (a) the sworn statement by Francis de Borja on 6 August 1951
(Exhibit "F") that —
He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 parte,

337 hectareas) adjunto a mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala,
Rizal).
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja, that the entire Hacienda had
been bought at a foreclosure sale for P40,100.00, of which amount P25,100 was contributed by
Bernardo de Borja and P15,000. by Marcelo de Borja; that upon receipt of a subsequent demand
from the provincial treasurer for realty taxes the sum of P17,000, Marcelo told his brother Bernardo
that Francisco (son of Marcelo) wanted also to be a co-owner, and upon Bernardo's assent to the
proposal, Marcelo issue a check for P17,000.00 to pay the back taxes and said that the amount
would represent Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. The witness further
testified that —
Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by Francisco de Borja
when he was still a bachelor and which he derived from his business transactions.
(Hearing, 2 February 1965, t.s.n., pages 13-15) (Emphasis supplied)
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement overweighed the admissions
in the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant Jose de Borja since probate courts can not
finally determine questions of ownership of inventoried property, but that the testimony of Gregorio
de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja acquired his share of the original Hacienda with his private
funds, for which reason that share can not be regarded as conjugal partnership property, but as
exclusive property of the buyer, pursuant to Article 1396(4) of Civil Code of 1889 and Article 148(4)
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place, witness Gregorio de
Borja's testimony as to the source of the money paid by Francisco for his share was plain hearsay,
hence inadmissible and of no probative value, since he was merely repeating what Marcelo de Borja
had told him (Gregorio). There is no way of ascertaining the truth of the statement, since both
Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were already dead when Gregorio testified. In addition, the
statement itself is improbable, since there was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain
to Gregorio how and when Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo. A
ring of artificiality is clearly discernible in this portion of Gregorio's testimony.
As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion thereof (ante, page 14) does not
clearly demonstrate that the "mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal) " refers
precisely to the Hacienda in question. The inventories (Exhibits 3 and 4) disclose that there were two
real properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de Borja, one of 72.038 sq. m., assessed at P44,600,
and a much bigger one of 1,357.260.70 sq. m., which is evidently the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion). To which of these lands did the affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to? In
addition, Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y exclusivo" is plainly self-
serving, and not admissible in the absence of cross examination.
It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant (Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and "7")
are not conclusive on the conjugal character of the property in question; but as already noted, they
are clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the declarants, Francisco de Borja and his
executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater probative weight than the self-
serving statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F"). Plainly, the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal
character of the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted but actually
confirmed by proof. Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) declared property of the conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court that claims for damages should
be ventilated in the corresponding special proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the
deceased, the same requires no pro announcement from this Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Case
No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are
reversed and set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three (3)
cases.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
Borja v. Borja
46 SCRA 577
FACTS:
Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife who died, Josefa
Tangco, with the CFI of Rizal. He was appointed executor and administrator, until he
died; his son Jose became the sole administrator. Francisco had taken a 2nd wife
Tasiana before he died; she instituted testate proceedings with the CFI of Nueva Ecija
upon his death and was appointed special administatrix. Jose and Tasiana entered upon
a compromise agreement, but Tasiana opposed the approval of the compromise
agreement. She argues that it was no valid, because the heirs cannot enter into such
kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco, and at the time the
agreement was made, the will was still being probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija.
ISSUE:
W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet been
probated.
HELD:
YES, the compromise agreement is valid.
The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800,000 as full payment for her
hereditary share in the estate of Francisco and Josefa.
There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among
the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was
merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and
interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There
is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested immediately

from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of
the Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting
capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if
the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the
estate.
G. R. No. 39547
[ G. R. No. 39547, May 03, 1934 ]
IN RE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED FRANCISCO

TORDILLA. GAUDENCIA TORDILLA, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS.
MOISES TORDILLA, OPPONENT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
HULL, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur providing for the distribution of the estate of one Francisco
Tordilla, who died intestate in Naga, Camarines Sur, on December 18, 1925,
leaving as his only heirs his widow, a legitimate son, the defendant and
appellant, and a recognized natural daughter, petitioner and appellee.
It might be said by way of introduction that the record is voluminous and
that many questions of fact could have been clearly established by direct
means rather than to leave the question in doubt by presenting only
circumstantial evidence. This is especially true as to the first and second
assignments of error which read:
"I. In including in the partition that residential lot containing 3352 square
meters and more fully described as parcel (2) in the decision (69-70 R. A.).
"II. In including ten (10) carabaos and six (6) cattle (Items 8 and 9 in Dec.
at pp. 70-71 R. A.) among the properties partitioned and in not holding that
said animals do. not exist and never came to the possession of the estate."
In a prior proceeding between the deceased and a third party, the third
party was given a right to repurchase the land there in question. But that
fact, standing alone, does not" remove the lot from the properties left by the
deceased. The fact is whether or not the third party had exercised his option
to repurchase. That fact was well known to appellant and was easily
susceptible of definite and accurate proof. He has seen fit to leave the
record in doubt and, therefore, the finding of the trial court will not be
disturbed.
The same remarks are true as to the number of carabaos and cattle that the
deceased had at the time of his death.
The contention of appellant in the third assignment of error is that, where a
certain value is stated in a deed of donation, that value cannot be
questioned when the properties are brought into collation. This is incorrect,
as article 1045 of the Civil Code provides for the assessment of the property
at its actual valuation at the time of donation. The recital in the deed cannot
therefore be controlling. The actual value at the time of the donation is a
question of fact which must be established by proof the same as any other
fact.
The fourth assignment of error is not well taken. The original testimony
was taken by a commissioner, and the report of the commissioner with the
evidence was stricken from the files on motion of appellant. Thereafter the
parties agreed to submit the case for the decision of the trial court on the
evidence taken by the commissioner. Such a procedure waived the
erroneous ruling on evidence by the commissioner. The appellant should
have reserved the right to introduce additional evidence and should have
tendered the proper evidence in the trial court. The trial court, with much
experience, and after study of the evidence produced, held that the actual
value of one of the properties was greater than that recited in the deed of
donation, and also fixed the fruits and income from the donated properties
at a higher figure than appellant thought just. The fruits and interest
produced by property subject to collation must be ascertained under article
1049 of the Civil .Code. (See Guinguing vs. Abuton and Abuton, 48 Phil.,
144.) There is some doubt in our mind as to the real value of the parcel in
question and the amount of the income from the donated properties. But
we cannot state from the fragmentary evidence which has been brought to
our attention that the opinion of the trial court is contrary to the weight of
the evidence, and, in case those figures are incorrect, what are the correct
figures.
On the questions of fact dealt with in the fifth and sixth assignments of
error, after due consideration, we have determined to be guided by the
judgment of the trial court.
The seventh, eighth, and ninth assignments of error refer to the validity of
Exhibit H, a contract entered into between the appellee and the appellant in
another case and signed shortly before the death of their father. The
contract is in the nature of a compromise and covered two items, namely,
first, the support of the natural daughter which the brother agreed to
assume for one year and, second, a proposed division of their future
inheritance upon the death of their father. It is assumed that appellant has
complied with his terms of the contract, and the father died before the
obligation of the brother terminated. The second portion of the contract
Exhibit H clearly relates to the anticipated future inheritance and,
therefore, is null and void under the provisions of article 1271 of the Civil
Code which reads:
"ART. 1271. All things, even future ones, which are not out of the commerce
of man, may be the subject-matter of contracts.
"Nevertheless, no contract may be entered into with respect to future
inheritances, except those the object of which is to make a division
intervivos of the estate, in accordance with article 1056.
"Any services not contrary to law or to good morals may also be the subject-
matter of a contract."
The action of the trial court in holding Exhibit H to be uncontroverted and
predicating its final action on the terms of that document was erroneous
and contrary to law.
The tenth assignment of error reads: "In adjudicating to the natural
daughter the same share or amount of properties as that adjudicated to the
legitimate son." This assignment of error is based on article 840 of the Civil
Code which provides:
"Art. 840. When the testator leaves legitimate children or descendants, and
also natural children, legally acknowledged, each of the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the portion pertaining to each of the legitimate
children who have not received any betterment, provided that a sufficient
amount remains of the disposable portion, from which it must be taken,
after the burial and funeral expenses have been paid.
"The legitimate children may pay the portion pertaining to the natural ones
in cash, or in other property of the estate, at a fair valuation."
Appellee contends that article 840 of the Civil Code has been repealed by
the Code of Civil Procedure, based on the statement of this court in
Concepcion vs. Jose (46 Phil., 809). It is true that in the majority decision
in that case it speaks of article 840 being repealed. While, with the question
there considered, namely, from where the funeral expenses should be
taken, the Code of Civil Procedure changed the rule as to those items from
what had formerly been in the Civil Code, by reading the whole decision we
have no hesitancy in saying that what the court then had in mind was not a
repeal of the article but in fact merely a modification thereof. In the case of
In re Intestate Estate of Tad-Y, found in the same volume (46 Phil., 557),
this court, speaking through the Chief Justice, applied article 840 of the
Civil Code in the following language:
"To determine the share that pertains to the natural child which is but one-
half of the portion that in quality and quantity belongs to the legitimate
child not bettered, the latter's portion must first be ascertained. If a widow
shares in the inheritance, together with only one legitimate child, as in the
instant case, the child gets, according to the law, the third constituting the
legitime in full ownership, and the third available for betterment in naked
ownership, the usufruct of which goes to the widow. Then the natural child
must get one-half of the free third in full ownership and the other half of
this third in naked ownership, from which third his portion must be taken,
so far as possible, after deducting the funeral and burial expenses. * * *."
Our attention has not been called to any case in which this court has treated
article 840 as entirely and completely repealed.
We are therefore of the opinion that this case must be disposed of according
to the above quotation from the case of Tad-Y.
The eleventh assignment of error relates to a matter of accountancy which
the court ordered to take place after its original decision had become in
force and needs no further discussion at this time.
The decision and orders of the trial court must therefore be reversed and
the case remanded for further proceedings consonant with this opinion.
Costs against appellee. So ordered.
Malcolm, Villa-Real, Imperial, and Goddard, JJ., concur.

Supreme Court: E. V. Filamor For Appellant. Juan de Borja For Himself and Co-Appellees

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Supreme Court: E. V. Filamor For Appellant. Juan de Borja For Himself and Co-Appellees

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-6622 July 31, 1957

Intestate Estate of the deceased MARCELO DE BORJA. CRISANTO DE BORJA, administrator-

E. V. Filamor for appellant.

I. — Section 1, Rule 10, of the Rules of Court defines a counterclaim as:

SECTION 1. Counterclaim Defined. — A counterclaim is any claim, whether for

It is an elementary rule of procedure that a counterclaim is a relief available to a party-defendant

(g) Unauthorized expenditures —

SEC. 2. EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR TO KEEP BUILDINGS IN REPAIR. —

Exhibit L-59 ............. P500.00 Yek Wing

(g) On the sum of P13,294 for administrator's fees:

Under Paragraphs III and IV:

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA,

G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972

Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for administrator-appellee.

Quiogue & Quiogue for appellee Matilde de Borja.

Andres Matias for appellee Cayetano de Borja.

Sevilla & Aquino for appellant.

Sevilla & Aquino for special administratrix-appellee.

Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for oppositor-appellant.

Sevilla & Aquino for plaintiff-appellee.

Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir and David Gueverra for defendant-appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:p

THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between

Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la jurisdiccion del

3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that

4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay directly to

5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose

shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of her hereditary

It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A expressed no

The lot allotted to Francisco was described as —

Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E. Hermogena

On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of

He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 parte,

The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:

xxx xxx xxx

Fernando, J., took no part.

YES, the compromise agreement is valid.

And as a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested immediately

[ G. R. No. 39547, May 03, 1934 ]

IN RE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED FRANCISCO

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