Adam Throne

As military technology has developed overtime, a fundamental concept of war has been

deterrence. Each side attempts to develop weapons so menacing that the other or others actively

choose to withhold from conflict. This has led to some incredible technologies including machine

guns, aircraft, chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, and more recently biological weapons.

Deterrence culminated in the Cold War when the United States and Soviet Union engaged in an

unrestricted arms race. Since then treaties have begun to limit nuclear and chemical weapons, but

both the United States and Russia agreed even before the collapse of the USSR to abandon their

biological weapons programs. So, why then is there an increasing interest among developing powers

to develop biological weapons as a mean of deterrence?

Biological weapons are defined as infectious agents intended to incapacitate and kill living

targets. They can be categorized as bacteria, viruses, or toxins. Possible uses are targeting humans,

agriculture, water supplies, and specific human attributes including the ability to reproduce. In the

past, a biological attack on a large scale did not seemed feasible. Perpetrators struggled to develop,

disseminate, and keep alive harmful pathogens. However, the emergence of gene editing technology

has made these processes more efficient and plausible. The poor response by world healthcare to

recent naturally occurring epidemics illustrates how effective a carefully planned and well executed

attack may be. As a result, biological agents are being reconsidered by both state and individual

actors as a means of violence. Leading powers, including the United States, recognize that the risk of

blowback and international scrutiny that would be caused by reopening nuclear weapons programs

outweigh the deterrence benefits they provide. However, rogue nations with nothing to lose,

particularly North Korea, view them as a means to survival. By having widespread ranges, societal

impacts, and no clear termination, biological weapons are capable of preventing attacks by

adversaries.
 Biological Weapons have a broader impact than most traditional weapons and other forms of

WMD. Unlike a bomb or other traditional attack, a biological attack is not isolated to its point of

release. Aerosolized bacteria can travel through the air fairly efficiently. This is one reason why crop-

dusting has been listed as a potential means of dissemination. Following an accidental release of

Anthrax from the Sverdlovsk Biological Plant in the USSR in 1979, cases of poisoning were reported

over 50 miles downwind. Additionally, individuals are capable of passing an infection once they are

infected. Naturally occurring epidemics such as the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa demonstrate

the mechanics of this concept. It is possible to isolate cases and prevent the spread of infection.

However, this strategy has never been tested on a massive scale involving multiple cities or types of

pathogens. Additionally, many infections have a long onset period before symptoms begin to show.

For Ebola, this period is 2 to 22 days. Through genetic engineering, this length may be increased.

During this delayed onset period, victims are able to pass the disease without detection. Through

public and private transportation, a disease could be spread across a nation before symptoms begin to

show and a response can be coordinated. Certainly, a nation feels less inclined to initiate conflict if it

feels certain that its entire population is at risk from a Biological deterrent.

Due to their wide range, biological weapons are capable of disrupting society substantially

through their ability to evoke fear. In a full-scale biological outbreak, the norms of society would

shift altogether. In order to avoid spreading the disease, education would stop, employees would quit

going to work, travel would be banned, and relationships would be terminated. Traditional terror

attacks have caused heavy emotional trauma in the United States. Following 9/11, the entire nation

was distraught. However, the psychological effect of a biological attack would be far greater, because

a successful attack would be persistent and continuous. After 9/11, people were able to recognize the

damage that had been done, respond, and unify. This would not be possible during a biological

attack, because there is no clear end. Even after most cases have been resolved or a vaccine has been

distributed, the risk of reinfection is substantial. The national economy would recess and long term
impacts would be likely. In order to evade the significant emotional and societal impact of Biological

Weapons, nations abstain from attacking those who possess them.

With no easy solution to biological weapons or determined termination, biological weapons

would have a persistent impact on a targeted nation. Despite occurring naturally, the 2014 Ebola

outbreak lasted for nearly 2 years. Over this entire time, there were only approximately 28,000 cases

reported throughout West Africa. In the case of an attack, there could be over 28,000 initial cases.

According to Dr. Osterholm, 2 coke bottles of an aerosolized bacteria would be capable of infecting

the entire Mall of America. On Black Friday, over 100,000 people visit the mall. Millions of

individuals visit malls across the country. With the added effect of genetic engineering designed to

evade treatment by antibiotics or existing vaccines, the recovery from such an attack could take years

or even decades. It is commonly believed that the only way to beat the United States, or any other

hegemonic power, is either through a war of attrition or a lopsided war. The economic and social toll

of a biological attack would ensure a drawn-out conflict. This possibility for long-term consequences

prevents the use of violence against nations capable of using biological weapons.

In conclusion, biological weapons are useful deterrents because of their broad impacts,

psychological and societal impacts, and long-lasting consequences. For leading powers, it is not

ethical or strategic to open biological weapons programs. It makes sense though that regimes looking

to survive have generally been the outliers who pursue modern biological programs. By publicly

demonstrating biological weapons capabilities, these nations are able to prevent attack from nations

with much stronger conventional arsenals. The clearest example of this is North Korea. Once

biological weapons capabilities are developed, it is difficult to predict and prevent attacks. Therefore,

ways to prevent the proliferation of these weapons and the risk of global catastrophe are the pursuit

of preventative deals and the development of organized infrastructure for responding to epidemics

quickly.