Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Shane D. Drefcinski
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ephebophile priests. Andrew Sullivan, the former editor of The New
Republic, speaks for a number of commentators when he claims that
the scandal “exposes the hypocrisy and dysfunction at the heart of the
hierarchy.”1
Qua philosopher, I am uninterested in which political party is
more hypocritical. Nor do I wish to pass judgment on whether a
number of Catholic bishops in America are hypocrites. My question,
rather, is whether hypocrisy is always a vice. To answer this question,
I will employ some of the philosophical distinctions drawn by Aris-
totle and St. Thomas Aquinas, and the examples of hypocrisy offered
by Dante in his Inferno. I will argue that hypocrisy, properly under-
stood, is a vice, but that its scope is narrower than is commonly
thought. Many of the deeds we today mistakenly call ‘hypocritical’
are, strictly speaking, not instances of hypocrisy but examples of
either inconsistency or what Aristotle and Aquinas called ‘inconti-
nence.’2 I also will argue that there are two other serious problems
with our wider use of the term ‘hypocrisy.’ First, it makes acts of
hypocrisy virtually unavoidable. Second, it risks emptying the term
of its significance. Thus, while hypocrisy is a vice, what is called
‘hypocrisy’ is not always a vice.
I. What Is a Vice?
In order to determine whether hypocrisy is always a vice, we must
first determine what a vice is. Clearly vice is the contrary of moral
virtue.3 A moral virtue is a firm character state4 that makes people
and their actions to be good,5 where to be good qua human being is
to be perfect or complete according to our nature as rational beings.6
Correspondingly, a vice is a firm character state that makes people
and their actions to be bad, that is, to be disposed in a way that is not
fitting to our nature as rational beings. So, for example, the virtue of
temperance disposes people to desire in a moderate way, as deter-
mined by right reason, the pleasures of the table, and then to act
08-logos-drefcinski-pp151-160 2/19/03 8:22 PM Page 153
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different. Incontinent or weak-willed people recognize what the
appropriate course of action is and even choose to do it. Neverthe-
less, usually because of strong appetites, they act against their better
judgment and do what they think is wrong, only to feel regret after-
wards. So, for example, incontinent people may, like gluttons, overeat
at a banquet. Yet unlike gluttons, the incontinent banqueters act con-
trary to their choice and so later regret what they have done. Their
regret indicates that, unlike vice, incontinence is conscious of itself.17
Moreover, because the incontinent know what they ought to do, and
regret their failure to do it, incontinence is a curable condition.18
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others. Dante singles out the high priests Caiaphas and Annas as
paradigms of hypocrisy presumably because, even as they are plot-
ting to have Christ killed, they are careful not to defile themselves
by entering the palace of the Gentile Pilate on the morning of
Passover.27 All of these individuals, we may surmise, are blind to
their own wickedness, which is just as Aristotle would have pre-
dicted. Hence, Caiaphas, Annas, and the Pharisees all closely follow
Aristotle’s account of vice and Aquinas’s definition of “hypocrisy.”
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failure to live up to their bad moral principles is a positive indication
that they have not completely embraced a distorted view of the good.
Now it may be tempting to argue that, pace Aristotle, Aquinas,
and Dante, the Web-based pundit’s definition of “hypocrite” is cor-
rect and all of my above examples are illustrations of hypocrisy. If the
meaning of a term lies in its use, as Wittgenstein maintained,31 and
“hypocrisy” presently is used to describe any contradiction between
stated beliefs and actual behavior, then that is what the term means,
St. Thomas be damned.
However, I think that we should resist this move for at least two
reasons. First of all, the overly broad understanding of “hypocrisy”
makes the condition virtually unavoidable. Both Aquinas and Aris-
totle recognize that virtuous people are not perfect—they can act
wrongfully without losing their virtue. So on the proposed under-
standing of “hypocrisy,” even the virtuous are hypocrites. Further-
more, it may be only a slight exaggeration to say that any moral code
worthy of respect should be so difficult to follow that its adherents
occasionally will fail to live up to its lofty standards. So, to make mat-
ters worse, it would seem that the only way to realistically avoid
hypocrisy is to adopt moral standards that are so low that one is
never in any danger of violating them.
Second, I think that by making hypocrisy so ubiquitous, we risk
emptying it of its significance. Part of the reason why the charge of
hypocrisy has such bite is because it has historically been viewed as
a particularly odious kind of turpitude. After all, there is something
especially noxious when the vicious feign virtue for the sake of
appearances. If hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue, as La
Rouchefoucauld famously declared, it is a payment that defrauds
the recipient, for it eventually raises doubts about the authenticity of
the virtuous themselves. And when any contradiction between high
principle and low deed is deemed “hypocritical,” we seem headed
toward a flaccid moral skepticism that denies that there is any virtue
left for vice to pay tribute to.
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Notes
I wish to thank John Van Ingen and an audience at Luther College in Decorah, Iowa, for
their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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139–54.
13. In Greek, proaivresiı; in Latin, electio.
14. EN 3.2.1112 a 14–17; 6.2.1139 b 5–6.
15. EN 3.3.1113 a 3–14.
16. EN 3.5.1114 a 11–13, 15–22; 7.8.1150 b 30–35.
17. EN 7.3.1147 a 25–b 3; 7.8.1150 b 31.
18. EN 7.8.1150 b 33.
19. Inferno, canto xxiii, trans. John Aitken Carlyle (New York: Random House, 1932),
125.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., 126.
22. S.T. II-II, q. 111, aa. 2–3.
23. S.T. II-II, q. 111, a. 4.
24. S.T. II-II, q. 11, a. 1.
25. S.T. II-II, q. 111, a. 3; cf. EN 4.7.1127 a 24–b 9; S.T. II-II, q. 109.
26. The Anti-Christ, aphorism 55, trans. Walter Kaufmann, The Portable Nietzsche (New
York: Penguin Books, 1982), 640.
27. John 18:28.
28. See, for example, Linda Clements, “Clinton Established the One Grope Rule,”
http://www.linda. net/1-grope.html, 21 October 1998; Franklin Foer, “Feminism,
Clinton, and Harassment,” Slate, http://slate.msn.com/default.aspx?id=1090, 18
April 1998; Andrew Ross, “What if it were President Packwood?,” Salon,
http://www.salon.com/news/1998/12/22newsb.html, 22 December 1998; Cathy
Young, “Harassment Hypocrites,” National Review, 9 November 1998.
29. Lonnie Lee Best, “Is Bill Clinton a Hypocrite Or Not?” http://www.
hardcoretruth.com/bill_clinton/.
30. President George W. Bush has been accused of hypocrisy for being a staunch sup-
porter of the war on drugs even though he likely used cocaine during the 1970s. For-
mer President Clinton belongs on the list because, inter alia, he signed the Defense
of Marriage Act while breaking his own marriage vows. Representatives Barr, Bur-
ton, Chenoweth, Hyde, and Livingston are all conservative Republicans who have
committed adultery. Swaggart and Baker are preachers who had to publicly repent
of their adultery. Jackson made a public display of his counseling the Clintons when
the Lewinsky affair became public, even as he simultaneously was engaged in an
extramarital affair. Finally, Chmura refused to attend a post-Super Bowl ceremony
at the White House because he believed that Bill Clinton was not morally fit to be
president, yet later was tried (and acquitted) for raping his 17-year-old baby-sitter.
31. Philosophical Investigations, I, § 43.
32. EN 1.3.1095 a 5.