MARBURY vs MADISON
This case resulted from a petition to the Supreme
Court by William Marbury, who had been
appointed by President John Adams as Justice of
the Peace in the District of Columbia but whose
commission was not immediately delivered. He
petitioned for an of writ of mandamus to force the
incumbent Secretary of the State, James Madison,
to deliver the documents. But the court’s Chief
Justice, John Marshall, denied Marbury’s petition
holding that the part of the statute where Marbury
had based his claim, which was the Judiciary Act
of 1789 passed by the Congress, is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, since these provides a
midnight appointment of the “Midnight Judges”.
Upon deciding, the Supreme Court has to consider
three questions:
1. Is the position legally his?
2. Does he have a right to demand?
3. Does the Judiciary have the right to
instruct the executive to continue the
process?
The Supreme Court arrived in a decision that
first, Marbury had the right to his commission but
the court did not have the power to force Madison
to deliver the commission because that power
should be exercised by the Congress. Second,
Marbury has the right to demand because he was
duly appointed accordingly. Third, the Judicial
courts authorizes ONLY the issuance of writ of
mandamus if authorized by the principles and
usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons
holding office. The Secretary of State, being a
person holding office did not authorized the
issuance of the writ, therefore the Supreme court
does not have the power to confer such action.
-THIS CASE WAS THE FIRST TIME IN
WESTERN HISTORY A COURT INVALIDATED
A LAW BY DECLARING IT
"UNCONSTITUTIONAL", A PROCESS CALLED
JUDICIAL REVIEW, THE IDEA THAT COURTS
MAY OVERSEE AND NULLIFY THE ACTIONS
OF ANOTHER BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT
AND FORMED THE BASIS FOR THE
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW.
SCOTT vs SANDFORD
Dredd Scott, born a slave in Virginia, tried to
bought his freedom but was denied. He based his
claim on some legal precedents that his presence
and residence in free territories which prohibits
slavery should also make him free. This first case
was dismissed on the basis of failure to provide a
witness to testify that he’s a slave owned by Eliza
Emerson. 1847, Scott was granted another trial in
the Missouri Supreme court which declared Scott
and his family legally free. But this decision was
appealed by Ms. Emerson on the same court and
the decision was reversed by 1852. 1853, when
Scott was sued again in a federal court with Mr.
Sandford as the defendant, it held again that Scott
is still a slave, thus making Scott appeal to the US
Supreme court. The Supreme court decision
agreed with the federal court’s decision which
held that Scott is still a slave which brought three
questions before the court:
1. Scott was not a citizen of the state, and is
therefore unable to bring a suit in a
federal court, because if he has been a
citizen according to Missouri law, there is
a provision that no State can act by any
law on its own passed since the adoption
of the constitution, introduce a new
political member into the political
community.
2. The provisions of Missouri Compromise
which prohibits the slavery forever and
declaring that it is a free territory, was
beyond the congress (who created it) to
enact, causing it to be proclaimed
unconstitutional.
3. Scott could not be defined as free based
on his stay in a state where slavery is
prohibited because the Supreme Court did
not have jurisdiction on this matter,
thereby the decision of Missouri
government took precedence which held
him a slave.
 PLESSY vs FERGUSON
Homer Plessy, an American citizen with a mix of
black filed a case against Honorable Judge
Ferguson, judge of Criminal District Court
Orleans. On June 1892, Plessy engaged and paid
for a first-class passage on the East Louisiana
Railway and entered as a passenger train, and took
possession of a vacant seat in a coach where
passengers of the white race were accommodated.
Plessy was required by the conductor, to vacate
said coach, and occupy another seat intended for
his color. Plessy refused to, and was forcibly
ejected from said coach by a police officer and
imprisoned, charged with a criminal offense,
violating an act of the State’s general assembly
which was ordering segregation on trains (Acts
1890 No. 111. Plessy argued that:
1. His civil rights have been violated in such
a manner that the general assembly
ordering racial segregation on trains was
unconstitutional as is inviolable granted
under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments ("no state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, and property,
without due process of law.")
2. Such railroad company was incorporated
by the laws of Louisiana as a common
carrier, and was not authorized to
distinguish between citizens according to
their race.
The ruling against Plessy was affirmed in the
Louisiana State Supreme Court, but the Court
refused to grant a re-hearing, and allowed only a
petition to be entered for the writ of error.
The court of Louisiana asserted that:
1. The Act under scrutiny is not
discriminatory against any race as it is
equally applicable to both “whites” and
“non-whites”.
The Court decided in favor of the respondent.
Mr. Justice Brow, affirmed the decision arguing
that, Thus the Court held that separate facilities
must be equal to comply with constitutional
rights. In this case the carriages were equal. Thus
the separate but equal’ doctrine was explicitly
accepted by the court. Justice Brown saw no issue
with the competence of the Louisiana General
Assembly to segregate carriages on race grounds
on the line the applicant traveled on, as the line
was purely interstate. and which was dissented by
Mr. Justice Harlan, argued that, by Louisiana
statute, the validity of which is here involved, all
railway companies (other than street-railroad
companies) carry passengers in that state are
required to have separate but equal
accommodations for white and colored persons.
MCCULLOCH vs MARYLAND
A privately owned national bank facilitating the
financial transactions of the US government was
established by 1917. This bank lasted only for a
short time, until the US Congress created a second
bank but financial problems continued to flood the
country. Americans believed that this bank causes
the economic depression of the country, so some
states attempted to retaliate against the “monster
monopoly.” They either banned the bank outright
or taxed it. Maryland, passed a law requiring a
stamp tax on all notes issued by banks not
chartered by the state. Maryland sued James
McCulloch, for $110, a penalty for circulating
unstamped banknotes in violation of Maryland’s
tax law. Maryland won its case in the state courts,
but the bank appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The case centered around two constitutional
questions.
1. Did Congress have the constitutional
power to create a nationally chartered
bank?
2. Did Maryland (and other states) have the
constitutional power to tax a national
bank chartered by Congress?
On the first question, the attorneys representing
Maryland pointed out that:
1. chartering banks was not one of the
“delegated powers” of Congress. Those
powers are listed in Article I, Section 8, of
the Constitution. Setting up a bank is not
listed. They concluded that therefore only
the states, or the people they represent,
had the power to incorporate banks.
Daniel Webster, the bank lawyer, referred the
justices to another part of the Constitution.
Argued that:
1. The last paragraph of Article I, Section 8,
Congress is given the power “to make all
Laws which shall be necessary and
proper” to carry out its delegated powers.
“A bank is a proper and suitable
instrument to assist the operations of the
government.”
Concerning the second question of the case, the
attorneys representing Maryland noted that:
2. the Constitution placed no limit on the
power of a state to tax any person or
property within its borders.
Bank lawyers responded that:
2. If the states may tax the bank, to what
extent shall they tax it, and where shall
they stop?” Webster wondered if states
would go on to tax the mail or perhaps
even the U.S. courts. He warned, “An
unlimited power to tax involves,
necessarily, a power to destroy.”
The court ruled in favor of the bank and against
the right of the states to tax it.
a. In any conflict between national and
state power, wrote Marshall, a law
passed by Congress “is supreme within
its sphere of action.”
b. Did Congress have the constitutional
power to establish a national bank in
the first place? --Yes, said Marshall,
Congress has the power to pass all laws
“necessary and proper” to carry out its
delegated powers. The bank provided
the means to carry out these powers.
c. On the second question about whether
Maryland had the power to tax the
bank, Marshall ruled it did not. He
declared that states can only tax their
own people and property. The bank
was an “instrument” of the U.S.
government, which represents all the
people. If Maryland were allowed to
tax the bank, he argued, this might lead
to taxes on other U.S. government
operations.
In effect, Marshall and the other justices of the
Supreme Court reduced the power of the states in
two ways.
First, by activating the “necessary and proper”
clause, the court expanded the potential for
congressional lawmaking. Second, by
invalidating Maryland’s stamp tax on the bank,
the justices eliminated state taxation as a means
of undermining acts of Congress.
THIS CASE ESTABLISHED THE BASIS FOR
THE EXPANSIVE AUTHORITY OF THE US
CONGRESS, ALLOWING IT TO DO MORE
THAN THE CONSTITUTION SPECIFICALLY
AUTHORIZES IT TO DO.
LEMON VS KURTZMAN
Both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island adopted
statutes that provided for the state to pay for
aspects of non-secular, non-public education. The
Pennsylvania statute was passed in 1968 and
provided funding for non-public elementary and
secondary school teachers’ salaries, textbooks,
and instructional materials for secular subjects.
Rhode Island’s statute was passed in 1969 and
provided state financial support for non-public
elementary schools in the form of supplementing
15% of teachers’ annual salaries.
The appellants in the Pennsylvania case
represented citizens and taxpayers in
Pennsylvania who believed that the statute
violated the separation of church and state
described in the First Amendment. Appellant
Lemon also had a child in Pennsylvania public
school. The district court granted the state
officials’ motion to dismiss the case. In the Rhode
Island case, the appellees were citizens and tax
payers of Rhode Island who sued to have the
statute in question declared unconstitutional by
arguing that it violated the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment. The district court found
in favor of the appellees and held that the statute
violated the First Amendment.
Question
Do statutes that provide state funding for non-
public, non-secular schools violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?
Conclusion
Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the
opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that a
statute must pass a three-pronged test in order to
avoid violating the Establishment Clause. The
statute must have a secular legislative purpose, its
principal or primary effect must be one that
neither promotes nor inhibits religion, and it must
not foster “excessive government entanglement
with religion.” The Court held that both the state
statutes in question had secular legislative
purposes because they reflected the desire of the
states to ensure minimum secular education
requirements were being met in the non-public
schools. The Court did not reach a holding
regarding the second prong of the test, but it did
find that the statutes constituted an excessive
government entanglement with religion. In the
Rhode Island program, the amount of oversight of
teachers and curricula required to ensure that there
is no unnecessary injection of religion into secular
topics would require the government to become
excessively involved in the nuances of religious
education. The same danger holds true for the
Pennsylvania statute, which additionally provides
state funding directly to a church-related
organization. Government financial involvement
in such institutions inevitably leads to “an
intimate and continuing relationship” between
church and state. The Court also noted the
potential political implications of public funding,
as there is a risk of religious issues becoming
politically divisive.
In his concurring opinion, Justice William O.
Douglas wrote that the intrusion of the
government into the running of non-public
schools through grants and other funding creates
the entanglement that the Establishment Clause
prohibits. He also argued that non-secular schools
are so thoroughly governed by religious
ideologies that any amount of public funding
supports those doctrines, which the Framers of the
Constitution dictated the government must not do.
Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the concurrence,
and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the parts
relating to case numbers 569 and 570. Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a separate
concurrence in which he argued that the danger
was not only that religion would infiltrate the
government, but also that the government would
push secularization onto religious creeds. An
analysis of the statutes in question shows that they
impermissible involve the government in
“essentially religious activities,” which the
Establishment Clause is meant to prevent. In his
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part,
Justice Byron R. White wrote that the majority
opinion goes too far and, in restricting the use of
state funds in non-secular schools, creates an
obstacle to the use of public funds for secular
education. He argued that there was no proof that
religion would invade secular education or that
the government oversight of the use of public
funds would be so extensive as to constitute
entanglement.
Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate in
the discussion or decision of case number 89.
ROE vs WADE
Roe, a Texas resident, sought to terminate her
pregnancy by abortion. Texas law prohibited
abortions except to save the pregnant woman's
life. After granting certiorari, the Court heard
arguments twice. The first time, Roe's attorney --
Sarah Weddington -- could not locate the
constitutional hook of her argument for Justice
Potter Stewart. Her opponent -- Jay Floyd --
misfired from the start. Weddington sharpened her
constitutional argument in the second round. Her
new opponent -- Robert Flowers -- came under
strong questioning from Justices Potter Stewart
and Thurgood Marshall.
Question
Does the Constitution embrace a woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy by abortion?
The Court held that a woman's right to an abortion
fell within the right to privacy (recognized in
Griswold v. Connecticut) protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The decision gave a
woman total autonomy over the pregnancy during
the first trimester and defined different levels of
state interest for the second and third trimesters.
As a result, the laws of 46 states were affected by
the Court's ruling.