Global Issues Report

A policy support document for OSD-Policy prepared by the Center for International Issues Research.
16 November 2005

Indonesian Press Spins USG Conspiracies Related to Dead Terrorist

The death of Indonesia’s infamous terrorist and Figure 1: House Where Police
bomb-maker Dr. Azahari bin Husin during a Killed Dr. Azahari
confrontation with police in East Java on 9 November
2005 constitutes an important milestone in the War on
Terror in Southeast Asia. Ever since, the Indonesian
press has devoted nearly every headline and editorial
to his death and other topics related to terrorism.
Indonesian newspaper articles mostly applauded
police efforts while highlighting the continued danger
that terrorism poses to the country. Meanwhile, the
Source: SuaraMerdeka
media has used newspaper editorials to spin
conspiracy theories hostile toward the USG despite
recent efforts to assist Indonesia.

Police had been searching for Azahari since the 12 October 2002 attacks in Bali that
killed 202 people. He is believed to have engineered the bombs for that and nearly all
high-profile terrorist attacks in Indonesia, including the 2003 JW Marriot Hotel bombing,
the 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy, and the 1 October 2005 Bali attack. He is
also believed to have been an important member of the Al-Qaida-linked Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI), although there is evidence that his cadre was excluded from JI after
refusing to curb violent attacks on civilians. 1 Azahari and two accomplices were found
by an elite police unit called Detachment 88, which received Antiterrorism Assistance
(ATA) training from the USG in 2003. Following an exchange of fire, Azahari’s
accomplices threw bombs at police, one of which detonated inside the house. After the
unit raided his hideout, police discovered evidence that Azahari was planning future
attacks and reportedly found 47 bombs, as well as numerous videos glorifying the 1
October 2005 Bali attacks.2

1
See Global Issues Report, “Apparent Fracture of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Signals Transformation of Terrorist Threats
in Southeast Asia.” 28 October 2005.
2
“Tiga Peluru Tembus Azhari (Three Bullets Penetrate Azahari).” Jawa Pos 11 November 2005, 11 November 2005 <
http://www.jawapos.co.id/index.php?act=detail&id=5865>; “Bali Bombers Said They Would Go to Heaven in Video
Message.” The Jakarta Post 11 November 2005, 11 November 2005
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/detaillatestnews.asp?fileid=20051111181029&irec=1>; Dandy, Iptu. “Saya Tembak
sebelum Azhari Tarik Picu Bom (I Shot Before Azahari Triggered the Bomb).” Jawa Pos 15 November 2005, 15
November 2005 <http://www.jawapos.com/index.php?act=detail&id=5884>.
Mainstream newspapers praised Indonesian law enforcement and quoted officials
stressing the need to remain vigilant against terrorists. Kompas quoted the head of the
Indonesian National Intelligence Agency (BIN) Syamsir Siregar as saying “Azahari’s
death does not lessen the threat of terrorism in the country…[and his] accomplice,
Noordin M. Top, remains at large.” 3 Only the English-language Jakarta Post covered
the fact that the counterterrorism task force that found Azahari had received training
from the USG, depriving most Indonesians of news that would likely leave a positive
impression of the USG.4
Figure 2: Picture of Dr.
One of the most widely read Indonesian newspapers, Jawa Azahari’s Corpse.
Pos (Java Post), carried a story about Azahari’s death along
with a picture of his body with the face visible (Figure 2).
Showing such a picture is critical for Indonesians who often
give more weight to pictures than to print. Moreover, the
picture forces Indonesians to acknowledge the
accomplishment of the national police force whose statements
are generally met with suspicion, because it has undergone
only limited change since the days of Suharto’s authoritarian
rule.
Source:
www.jawapos.co.id
One positive editorial in Media Indonesia entitled “After
Azahari, How About Poso?” called on Indonesian law enforcement to continue the good
work and fight terrorism in Central Sulawesi, where Islamic militants have recently
launched a series of provocative attacks against local Christians in an attempt to spark
a conflict that would increase militant radical Islamic (MRI) activity in the region. 5
Referring to the recent violence by Islamic militants in Sulawesi as “terrorism” in the
article may indicate an important departure from previous attitudes that such violence in
that region is largely a legitimate response to onslaughts from Christian militias.

Despite the positive sentiment engendered by this disruption of terrorist operations,

many editorials used the occasion to portray a negative view of the U.S. Republika, a
widely-read pro-Islamic Indonesian newspaper, carried an editorial implying that the
USG has used both Azahari and Omar Al-Faruq on separate occasions to attack
Muslims. Al-Faruq is an Al-Qaida member who helped found a terrorist group called
Laskar Jundullah in Sulawesi and who recently escaped from a USG prison in
Afghanistan. The article argues that Al-Faruq’s escape from prison and Azahari’s
success in evading Indonesian authorities for so long could not have been
accomplished without USG compliance. It further contends that the USG prohibited
Indonesian authorities from interrogating terrorist suspects such as Al-Faruq and
Hambali, the operational head of Jemaah Islamiyah at the time of the 2002 Bali

3
“Tewasnya Azahari Tidak Kurangi Ancaman (Azahari’s Death Does Not Lessen Threat).” Kompass 11 November
2005, 11 November 2005 <http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0511/11/utama/2197718.htm>.
4
Komandjaja, Eva C. “Batu Raid a Boost for Antiterror Squad.” The Jakarta Post 11 November 2005, 13 November
2005 <http://www.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20051111.A04>.
5
“Setelah Azahari, Bagaimana Poso? (After Azahari, How About Poso?).” Media Indonesia 11 November 2005, 11
November 2005 <http://www.mediaindo.co.id/>.
bombing, in order to conceal its role in the terrorist attacks. 6 That such an article was
published in a major newspaper is symptomatic of the general mistrust of the U.S. in
Indonesia.

Another editorial in the Jawa Pos presented a biased discussion of Azahari’s terrorist
attacks, which implied that America, rather than JI, sponsored the 12 October 2002 Bali
bombing operation. It quoted an analysis supposedly offered by two state intelligence
officials who wrote: “The explosion produced by the bomb could probably only have
been made by a professional, not an amateur like Imam Samudera [a suspected JI
leader].” Furthermore, according to the quote, the JI is thus “only an invention, in fact
the result of planning and execution by America.” 7 Although the author made clear that
this was not necessarily his viewpoint, he did not discuss evidence that JI and other
militant radical Islamic organizations have been responsible for most terrorist activities
in Indonesia, nor did he provide an alternate characterization of the USG.

In an article that was published in Media Indonesia’s print edition, but not on its website,
the newspaper quoted a “military observer,” who claimed that the USG was actually
responsible for terrorist attacks in Indonesia, and that it funded Al-Qaida prior to 9/11. 8
Among Indonesian newspapers, it is common practice to publish potentially
inflammatory articles in print editions only, thereby avoiding international scrutiny and
possible diplomatic fall-out that often accompanies online publications.

The publication of these articles in major newspapers illustrates that many Indonesians
are hesitant to blame terrorist attacks on militant Islamic organizations operating within
Indonesia; instead reflexively blaming the USG. These press reactions were typical of
media reporting after a major event related to terrorism in Indonesia, with the
mainstream papers carrying optimistic and nationalistic reporting, accompanied by
editorials that blame the USG for tragedies that occur in the Muslim world – especially in
Indonesia. Despite the fact that the USG has helped Indonesia fight terrorism and
provided billions of dollars in tsunami relief efforts, the Indonesian press still criticizes
the USG and continues to spin conspiracy theories with little or no supporting evidence.

6
Junaidi, Irfan “Misteri Al-Faruq dan Azahari (the Mystery of Al-Faruq and Azahari).” Republika 11 November 2005,
11 November 2005 <ttp://www.republika.co.id/kolom.asp?kat_id=16>.
7
Arifin, Syamsul. “Terorisme Pasca-Azhari (Terrorism Post-Azahari).” Jawa Pos 11 November 2005, 11 November
2005 <http://www.jawapos.co.id/index.php?act=detail_c&id=197026>. Dr. Syamsul is an academic at the University
of Gaja Mada.
8
“Indonesian 'Observers' Suggest US, 'Enemies of Islam' Behind Terrorism.” FBIS 14 November, 15 November 2005
<https://www.fbis.gov/>. Although the article was not available on mediaindo.co.id, an editorial responding to it
appeared on the website: Media Indonesia, “Editorial: 'Tiga Alasan Teroris Memilih Indonesia' (Editorial [on the article]
‘Three Reasons Terrorists Choose Indonesia’).” Media Indonesia 14 November 2005, 15 November 2005
<http://www.mediaindo.co.id/>.