Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Now here, my dear Glaucon, is the whole risk for a human being,
as it seems. And on this account each of us must, to the neglect
of other studies, above all see to it that he is a seeker and student
of that study by which he might be able to learn and find out
who will give him the capacity and the knowledge to distinguish
the good and the bad life, and so everywhere and always to
choose the better from among those that are possible.
, the republic
I.
Not long ago, a student stopped me after class. He apologized
for asking an “impertinent” question. I am, after all, a Thomist—that
is, “Ask and ye shall receive at least an opinion, provided you know
the technical difference between opinion and truth!” The young
man wanted to know whether I thought there was such a thing as
truth. Note, he did not ask whether there was truth, but whether I
thought there was. Though I think such a problem as the existence of
truth might, deep down, bother not a few of our kind, still it is not
a question that one is asked every day. My opinion is that there is such
a thing as truth, which, technically, means that what I hold is not just
an opinion.
To my knowledge, I had never given any indication in writing or
speaking that I did not hold truth to be a decided possibility, to be a
fact, something I hope we can still affirm today without seeming
arrogant. Thus, I was puzzled. Why is such a question addressed to
someone who obviously holds to the possibility of truth? I have,
after all, pondered with delight Aquinas’s famous phrase, omne ens est
verum, “all being is true.” Josef Pieper’s The Truth of All Things I con-
sider to be a jewel of intelligence.3 With some confidentiality, how-
ever, as if he were letting me in on some deep secret about which I
was totally clueless, the student explained that “around here and in
our age groups, few people [he might have said no one] think that
truth exists.” At this presumably startling, if not shocking, informa-
tion, I did not bat an eyelash. I am a man of the world.
Surely, I thought to myself, this young man had not forgotten that
I had read in class the beginning lines of Allan Bloom’s The Closing of
01-logos-schall-pp14-29 3/1/04 1:57 PM Page 16
logos
the American Mind, in which Bloom bluntly states that the one thing
any professor can be sure of, on entering a class for the first time, is
that every student there thinks, or claims they think, that truth is rel-
ative.4 I will not here go into the self-contradictory irony of the
“truth” of the proposition that all “truth is relative.” The real icono-
clasts today, young or old, are not the unbelievers in truth’s existence
(who are a dime a dozen), but the knowers who affirm it. I am in fact
more surprised by students who do not think truth or culture is
purely relative than by those who think it is.
Most students today are brought up on a steady diet of a theory
of tolerance as the operative principle in all their dealings. No one
wants to judge anything or anybody when, in most circumstances,
that is the only intellectual operation worth performing. Such tol-
erance in turn is not merely a pragmatic agreement to get along
even when not in intellectual harmony—something that might be
defended on reasonable grounds. Rather, this tolerance is based on
the idea that the only legitimate way we can do whatever it is we
want to do is to affirm, as a general or theoretical proposition, that
nothing, in principle, is or can be certain or true. Such a position
frees us from all contact with reality or its having anything to say to
us about what is.
In Western thought this position was originally an epistemolog-
ical thesis about the adequacy of our senses to report external real-
ity, whereas, today, it is conceived to be mostly a political or moral
one. Any affirmation of a truth thus is considered to be discrimina-
tory, with tendencies to fanaticism—the most terrible modern
aberration of all. “Fanaticism,” to give it its due, however, at bottom
means that there are truths and they are worth affirming or pursu-
ing, though not necessarily in just any manner. The law of our
action or our polity, under a regime of speculative and dogmatic tol-
erance, thus becomes what is enforced or accepted, with no other
theoretical justification about the truth of what is affirmed. This is
the theoretic background against which John Paul II has called atten-
01-logos-schall-pp14-29 3/1/04 1:57 PM Page 17
logos
We know that, in knowledge, we can be what we are not, while
remaining what we are from nature. What is not ourselves—the
total complexus of other beings—can come to exist intentionally in
our minds. This intentional existence is what makes it right, makes
it delightful, that we are the kind of finite beings that we are to
whom everything is given, including the truth of things not our-
selves, including our very selves with our mysterious capacity to
know. The doctrine of the Beatific Vision even intimates that we are
finally to know God in this way, face to face.
II.
I tend to conceive the young men and women whom I meet after the
model of the two young potential philosophers, Adeimantus and
Glaucon, from the second book of The Republic of Plato (though I
admit that not everyone shows the zeal for truth these two young
men displayed before Socrates). These young Greeks wanted to hear
presented for their understanding the truth of things—in this case,
the truth of justice—even when they could brilliantly and eloquently
articulate the arguments against it. Yet they remained troubled and
unsettled. Save us from the young men and women who are never
unsettled, or from the old ones for that matter. Adeimantus and
Glaucon could not quite see why arguments they proposed against
truth or justice were wrong, even though they suspected their argu-
ments were erroneous. They were unsettled in their very being
because they did not know the truth.
Please God that we all find ourselves in this condition of those
who know they do not know. I love such students, such potential
philosophers, as I call them. They make teaching not just a profes-
sion or a duty but an adventure. Plato himself tells them, in the sev-
enth book of The Republic, that it is going to take considerable time
and experience—much more than they could possibly anticipate—
01-logos-schall-pp14-29 3/1/04 1:57 PM Page 19
logos
reality that constitutes the radical dynamism in what it is to be a
human being. With overtones of both Plato and Scripture, this is
what Augustine, in his Confessions, called “our restless hearts.” We
tirelessly seek to know the truth, even when we think it does not
exist or that it cannot, in principle, be known. We want to know, as
Eric Voegelin puts it, the very “ground” of our finite being because
we cannot help but know that we do not cause ourselves either to be
or to be what we are.5
We are the “rational” beings, as Aristotle called us. We do not
want to know this truth about ourselves for any particularly utili-
tarian purpose—for what we might “do” with it—though there is
nothing wrong with knowing how things work—with “doing” things.
In his essay “The Sacred and ‘Desacrilization,’” Josef Pieper remarked
about intellectual poverty or want—an insight concerning the ulti-
mate nonpragmatic purpose of truth—
III.
Years ago I read a passage in Hilaire Belloc’s The Path to Rome, a pas-
sage that has haunted me. It is a passage that immediately follows the
introductory observation of Belloc wherein he reflects that it is our
regular encounter with living—with evil itself—that eventually
recalls to us a scheme of things that we once knew. This scheme—
the structure of our faith itself—describes to us how things fit
together, how things that stand out of nothingness simply are.
The passage I recall is a passage of remarkable pertinence to the
01-logos-schall-pp14-29 3/1/04 1:57 PM Page 22
logos
condition of Catholicism in our time and place: Belloc rightly
reflected that those who have wandered away from the faith and
then return “suffer hard things.” He finds a “gulf ” between him, as
one of these who have once wandered, and his “many companions.”
He explains, “We are perpetually thrust into minorities, and the
world almost begins to talk a strange language; we are troubled by
the human machinery of a perfect and supernatural revelation; we
are over-anxious for its safety, alarmed, and in danger of violent
decisions.”7
“Violent decisions” seem to be at hand. We talk a “strange lan-
guage.” One Christmas I read an account of a school district that does
not allow the word “Christmas” to be pronounced in any classroom.
Justice Holmes, in a famous decision, said we may not shout “fire” in
a crowded theater. Evidently today, the word “Christian” substitutes
for the word “fire” among the words we cannot speak. Christianity
is indeed sometimes pictured as “a fire on the earth.” In the name of
toleration theory, it supposedly makes no difference what forms our
souls, yet we seek to remove from our souls those traditions that
called our attention to the fact that we have souls in the first place.
Tolerance does not tolerate truth, though that was once its purpose.
We are indeed troubled, to put it mildly, over the “human
machinery of a perfect and supernatural revelation.” We think of
bankrupt dioceses. A cousin of mine told me that two neighbors
across the street told her that they stopped going to church because
of the ecclesiastical scandals. My brother-in-law told me of a Pres-
byterian lady who assumed the scandals had “disproved” the Catholic
Church and proceeded to invite him to join a local church.
Others are not so much shocked by the facts of degradation but
rather by how little and how slowly anything was done about them,
even at the highest levels. We worry about why this great Pope him-
self has been so reticent, so apparently uncertain to act firmly and
decisively with men whom he himself appointed to high office when
they fail him.
01-logos-schall-pp14-29 3/1/04 1:57 PM Page 23
logos
not have allowed these things to happen, or so we surmise, without
reflecting on just what we would have had to do to stop them. We
either can reject God as unworthy of us, or suspect there is some-
thing of more profundity in God’s ways than we are willing to
acknowledge. Had God given us a sinless clergy, He would have no
doubt also given us religious figures who could not understand us in
our own sins. If history attested to no holocausts, it probably could
attest to no free will either.
I am reminded of these popular and contemporary questions not
merely because they concern us all and are part of the quest for the
meaning of things in which we are all involved, but also because they
are issues already anticipated in revelation and in our reflection on
it. The demand for a world in which there was no possibility of
atrocities or a Church in which the hierarchy was sinless might be
conceivable. Indeed, this world was conceived by God in the Garden
of Eden, as Genesis tells us. But if such a world existed, we can be
sure that we would not exist, for we are a product of a world in
which atrocities are possible and a sinful clergy is too often a fact.
The question is not whether God might not have created some other
sinless or atrocity-free world, but whether He could have created the
world in which we are and still be God.
V.
The second from the last sentence in the introduction to James
Thurber’s autobiography, My Life and Hard Times, reads, “It is unfor-
tunate, however, that even a well-ordered life can not lead anybody
safely around the inevitable doom that waits in the skies.”9 This pas-
sage, both amusing and profound in its context, is another way of
stating Socrates’ notion that philosophy is basically a preparation for
death. Socrates said in The Apology that nothing bad can happen to a
good man, even death is not known to be bad, while doing wrong is
wrong in all cases. We are aware not only that the good can suffer—
01-logos-schall-pp14-29 3/1/04 1:57 PM Page 25
logos
not ourselves, is responsible for the well-known evils that we all
seem to recognize, we have to be careful what we propose. If the
evil in the world is caused by God, then I suppose we have to reject
God and build another world. In fact, this is what we may very well
be doing. On the other hand, if evil has origins in our own will, then
the cure for the world’s ills would seem to be to acknowledge a
good we did not ourselves create. We probably cannot have it both
ways. And that, in essence, constitutes the risk of our own
existence.
When Josef Ratzinger remarked that the serene beauty of Apol-
lo is not sufficient for us, he did not mean to chastise the Greek
philosophers, poets, and dramatists. They did discover something
that moves our soul. Beauty does astonish us. But beauty in a world
with tragedy, with wanton evil, caused by those whom God created
to choose the good and the beautiful, does not allow us to escape the
Crucifixion. Our concept of beauty ought not to be such that we do
not, mentally, at least, allow the world that exists to be. If we want
our ways to be God’s ways, we will certainly end up with a differ-
ent kind of a world than the one we have. The question always must
be is our world an improvement? I like to ask this question because
it baldly states the real issue, namely, does the fact of human sin and
disorder logically imply that this particular world ought not to exist
in the first place? Would nothingness be better than a world in which
terrible things not only can happen but have happened, even in our
own lives?
The brief answer to this perplexing question is that the glory
and beauty of God remains the same whether we exist or not. God
needs us not. But assuming that God can choose to have something
exist outside of Himself, it follows that the greater glory would be
if creatures existed that could acknowledge and love what is, and to
say of what is that it is. This position would mean that creatures
could prefer themselves to God, otherwise they would not be real.
If this be true, we should not expect that our existence would not
01-logos-schall-pp14-29 3/1/04 1:57 PM Page 27
logos
countering our actions with our being created good. No evil simply
sits there. Evil’s consequences constitute the drama of reality, not
only in our own lives, but in those affected by our sins and, to be
sure, by our good deeds.
Let me end with ten propositions:
() “It is unfortunate that not even a well-ordered life can lead
anybody around the inevitable doom that awaits us in the skies.”
() “Is there such a thing as truth?”
() “Now here, my dear Glaucon, is the whole risk for a human
being, as it seems.”
() “We are troubled by the human machinery of a perfect and
supernatural revelation.”
() “Apollo is absolutely no longer sufficient.”
) “What is it, do you think, that causes this return to the faith?”
() “Why in the world should I change? What in the world is the
matter with you, Charlie Brown?”
() “Would nothingness be better?”
() “It would be no exaggeration to say that the chance reading in
a.d. of a lost dialogue by a disordered young man in an
obscure African city changed the world.”
() “God promised eternal salvation, everlasting happiness with
the angels, an immortal inheritance, endless glory, the joyful
vision of His face, His holy dwelling in heaven, and after the
resurrection, no further fear of dying.”
Notes
1. Josef Cardinal Ratzinger, “The Beauty and the Truth of Christ,” L’Osservatore Romano
( Nov. ): .
2. Hilaire Belloc, The Path to Rome (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Image, [] ), .
3. Josef Pieper, “The Truth of All Things,” in Living the Truth (San Francisco: Ignatius
Press, ).
4. Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster,
), .
5. Eric Voegelin, Conversations with Eric Voegelin, ed. R. Eric O’Connor (Montreal:
Thomas More Papers , ).
01-logos-schall-pp14-29 3/1/04 1:57 PM Page 29