Professional Documents
Culture Documents
James S. Spiegel
Introduction
The Christian faith is profoundly ironic. From its historical devel-
opment and the principal figures involved to the essence of its mes-
sage, it is a worldview full of surprises, giving us exactly the opposite
of what we expect. This irony is especially evident in the virtue of
humility, both as displayed in the life of Christ and as divinely com-
manded for the daily practice of his followers. The aim of this paper
is to explore humility as a Christian virtue and apply the insights
drawn from this discussion to the problem of evil. The discussion
will reveal a certain moral-theological coherence within Christian-
ity that is normally hidden from view.
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1. Humility as a Moral Virtue
Let us begin with the concept of “virtue.” The ancient Greeks gen-
erally understood virtue to denote any characteristic that enables a
thing to fulfill its function. Thus, a virtuous sail is one that realizes
its end by catching wind; a virtuous cup holds liquid, and so on. But
the concept may be understood more broadly to refer to any specific
excellence. Thus conceived, when applied to human beings virtue
may be defined, in the words of Robert C. Roberts, as “a trait that
makes a person a good specimen.”1 So to be more specific, a moral
virtue would be any characteristic that enables a person to be a good
moral specimen.
Is humility properly considered the sort of trait that makes a
person a good moral specimen? Well, just what is humility anyway?
Conceptions of this characteristic fall into two basic categories.
What I shall call the traditional view conceives of humility as essen-
tially consisting in a low view of oneself. For example, Gabrielle Tay-
lor writes that “the man who accepts his lowly position as what is due
him is the man who has humility, or the humble man.”2 Historical-
ly, this perspective has been taken by most Christian thinkers on the
subject, as we shall see below. Others, such as Norvin Richards,
reject this approach because it apparently cannot account for those
accomplished or especially praiseworthy people for whom, it would
seem, a low self-estimation does not accurately reflect their true
moral worth. On this definition, he says, such persons “could be
humble only through self-deception or ignorance.”3 So Richards
prefers to define humility as a proper estimation of oneself. It con-
sists, therefore, in “taking oneself neither more nor less seriously
than one should,”4 thus placing a lower as well as an upper limit on
how one ought to regard oneself. Richards supports this claim by
noting that “anyone who undervalues his good qualities is thereby
wrong about them.”5 Consequently, on this conception “a humble
attitude would embody an error about oneself ”6 and amount to a
lack of self-respect.
There are two basic problems with Richards’s account or, more
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Scheler’s account captures the performative quality of humility
that Richards ignores. But he goes to the opposite extreme of fail-
ing to sufficiently account for the cognitive element of the virtue.
Criticizing Scheler on this score, however, is probably unfair, since
he intends to focus his analysis on humility as a “spiritual disposition”
in response to our place before God. That is, he assumes that the
humble person already recognizes God’s greatness and her own
smallness. So the cognitive aspect of humility is more likely taken for
granted by Scheler than ignored by him.
A balanced account of humility, it would seem, must recognize
both cognitive and performative aspects of the virtue. Nancy Snow
has offered a definition that achieves such a balance. She proposes
that humility consists in both a recognition of one’s flaws or defects
and a proper behavioral response to them. She writes, “To be hum-
ble is to recognize your limitations, to take them seriously, and
thereby to foster a realism in attitudes and behavior regarding self
and others. Humility can be defined as the disposition to allow the
awareness of and concern about your limitations to have a realistic
influence on your attitudes and behavior.”8
Snow correctly recognizes that humility is performative, neces-
sarily issuing forth in certain types of behavior. And she is also cor-
rect in noting that, typically, humility is inspired by recognition of
one’s natural limits. I say this is “typically” the case because, from a
Christian perspective, humility must be conceived in such a way as
to allow for the humility of Christ, a perfect moral specimen. Jesus
was divine, so his humility could not have flowed from a recognition
of any actual flaws on his part. It is primarily for this reason that I
would broaden this cognitive requirement to affirm at least a low
self-regard, if not a recognition of one’s actual unworthiness. Thus,
in the discussion that follows, I will assume that humility involves
low self-regard, whether deserved or not, and a concomitant will-
ingness to serve or, otherwise put, performative self-lowering.
So why should it be supposed that humility is a moral virtue?
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and lovers rather than endearing them. Humility begets proper ser-
vice of others, whatever form that might take, and this nourishes
vital relationships. Second, humility is a trait essential to communi-
ty. For any community to survive, its members must function as a
team, each carrying on a task that contributes to the whole. This
demands mutual service that humility promotes. Moreover, just as
in a friendship, a community thrives precisely when those who com-
pose it are willing to accede to the legitimate desires of others.
Finally, humility breeds contentment, a sense of “well-being,” as it
contributes to the peace of mind robbed of those who incessantly
crave but often fail to acquire their “fair share” of goods and recog-
nition. A person who does not see herself as “above” anyone else will
naturally be more content with her share.
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In affirming the centrality of virtue to the Christian life, few are
as unabashed as John Calvin, who regarded humility as the “sovereign
virtue . . . the mother and root of all virtue.”21 He writes that “By
God’s mercy alone we stand, since by ourselves we are nothing but
evil . . . As our humility is his loftiness, so the confession of our
humility has a ready remedy in his mercy.”22 Such confession, Calvin
maintains, will only come to a person as she “lay[s] aside the disease
of self-love and ambition” and obtains a clear vision of herself
through Scripture.23
Calvinist theologian Jonathan Edwards identifies “evangelical
humiliation” as one of the telltale religious affections by which one
may discern true Christian spirituality. He defines this as “a sense that
a Christian has of his own utter insufficiency, despicableness, and odi-
ousness, with an answerable frame of heart.”24 Such humility he dis-
tinguishes from “legal humiliation,” which consists solely in the
recognition that one is morally helpless and insufficient before God.
But such humiliation does not involve an “answerable frame of
heart,” by which Edwards intends a disposition to abase oneself and
“exalt God alone.”25 While legal humiliation is useful as a means to
so incline one’s heart, it is only evangelical humiliation that is truly
virtuous and a Christian grace. True humility is known by certain
signs, among which Edwards includes: (1) an inclination to submit
to others and a disinclination to assume authority, (2) a disinclination
to speak highly of one’s own experiences, and (3) an inclination to
regard oneself as an unworthy teacher and an inclination to seek
instruction oneself.
In his classic devotional work on the topic, Andrew Murray
affirms the centrality of humility to the Christian moral life. Like
Calvin he maintains that “humility is not so much a grace or virtue
along with others; it is the root of all, because it alone assumes the
right attitude before God and allows Him as God to do all.”26 Mur-
ray’s argument is a straightforward Christological one, noting that
the defining characteristics of Christ were his meekness and lowli-
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Nowhere in the Scriptures is the emphasis on humility more
pronounced than in the teachings of Jesus. That the last shall be first
and vice versa is a consistent theme in his discourses.37 “Anyone who
will not receive the kingdom of God like a little child,” he says, “will
never enter it.”38 The beatitudes underscore the blessings to be had
by those who are meek, mournful, needy, and poor in spirit.39 Even
the command to love one’s neighbor as oneself is essentially a call to
humility.
Then there is the life of Christ, a vivid illustration of moral para-
dox. His self-description as “gentle and humble in heart”40 is con-
firmed in the gospel narratives in dramatic, sometimes disturbing
ways. Most significantly, the key New Testament text dealing with
the divine incarnation, the Philippians “kenosis” passage, treats the
humility of Jesus as his crowning virtue. There Paul writes,
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ishness and pride, our natural vicious tendencies as human beings.
The humble person places others before herself and maintains a
proper estimate of her own moral worth. Indeed, these two aspects
of the virtue of humility are not unconnected. It is because the hum-
ble person so clearly sees her own (low) moral worth that she places
others before herself and their needs above her own. Humility is a
virtue, then, which turns the natural fallen moral condition of
human beings on its head, introducing a different and more profound
sort of moral irony. For in exhibiting this virtue, the humble person
consequently increases in actual moral worth and is therefore
deserving of greater moral credit than she otherwise would be and
more than other persons who are not humble, other things being
equal. But—and this is the new, positive irony that supplants the
irony of abject pride—the humble person refuses to act so as to
affirm her greater moral worth (where “acting” may be taken in the
broad sense, inclusive of speaking about or dwelling upon some-
thing). In fact, to consistently display humility and grow in it is to
successfully resist the temptation to affirm one’s increasing moral
worth resulting from its demonstration.
It should be clear why humility is an ironic characteristic. It is a
trait constituted by attitudes and behaviors that one would not
expect from a person. Typically, people desire at least their “fair
share.” We strive for what we deserve and jockey for a little more
besides. The humble person, on the other hand, does not seek goods
or recognition beyond what her talents or efforts warrant. Surpris-
ingly, she seeks no more than and perhaps less than her just deserts.
This is why the humble person is a perplexing entity whose words
and actions, or lack thereof, will sometimes provoke reproofs from
those who do not share her perspective—the viciously proud. Fur-
thermore, the humble person is ironic because, as just noted, even
as her humility increases she manages to avoid the natural tendency
to dwell on her own accomplishments, be they moral or otherwise.
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above analysis suggests that we need not view pain as necessarily evil
and, therefore, as evidence against theism. Rather, we may see suf-
fering as a divine blessing, disguised though it may be.45 Suffering is
a form of involuntary humility that presents the sufferer with an
opportunity to see and affirm her place before God.
Some recent theodicies focus on this deeply ironic feature of suf-
fering. The most famous of these is John Hick’s “soul-making” theod-
icy. He proposes that there are two basic stages to the divine creative
process. The first of these was God’s initial creation of the physical
universe, along with all the sundry life forms populating our planet.
The second stage of creation is that which involves God’s directing
of human moral development, achieved in part through our strug-
gles and painful trials. Many virtues (e.g., courage, mercy, compas-
sion, patience, etc.) require a context of suffering for their
cultivation. Thus, says Hick, “it is an ethically reasonable judgment
. . . that human goodness slowly built up through personal histories
of moral effort has a value in the eyes of the Creator which justifies
even the long travail of the soul-making process.”46 If this is correct,
then suffering has value for what it can produce in a person, viz., a
better soul.
More recently, John Edelman has proposed that suffering is a
divine grace because of the wisdom it imparts. He writes, “there is
an understanding that consists in the recognition of the limits of
human power, and there is a suffering that necessarily accompanies
and often occasions this understanding, namely, the suffering—the
pain—one feels in running up against those limits. So the under-
standing and the suffering cannot come one apart from the other.”47
Suffering is a grace, on Edelman’s view, not because of its usefulness
in building character or otherwise improving a person morally but
in the more direct sense that it brings one into contact with a vital
truth concerning one’s own contingency. This insight, existentially
emblazoned upon the soul by pain, might graciously occasion other
goods as well, Edelman notes, such as “open[ing] the door to an
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results in a greater attention to the moral life and, thus, more con-
sistent displays of diverse virtues that, again, is praiseworthy.
Adams’s theodicy, too, provides both direct and indirect expla-
nations of the law of exaltation. First, to gain a vision of God and be
more intimately associated with God is its own reward and exalta-
tion. As Adams notes, intimacy with God is an incommensurate
good. This is surely the most direct way in which the involuntarily
humble are exalted. Moreover, again, there is the indirect moral
result of this intimacy that warrants moral praise, viz., the virtuous
life naturally inspired by the vision of God gained through suffering.
This approach not only provides explanatory power in account-
ing for the law of exaltation (via the theodicies of Hick, Edelman,
and Adams), it helps us to see just how suffering can improve a soul,
provide wisdom, and procure intimacy with God. First, through
the experience of involuntary humility, we are invited to humble
ourselves voluntarily. Our pretenses of absolute autonomy are dis-
abled during suffering, so we are more likely to assume a lower
regard for ourselves than during times of relative ease and prosper-
ity. Furthermore, our suffering lowers us in fact (i.e., we become
more inferior to others in terms of our physical or psychological
health), which we are likely to affirm both attitudinally and behav-
iorally. The sense of our contingency presses upon us, and it
becomes a more difficult matter of will (or delusion) to feign inde-
pendence and self-sufficiency. In short, suffering inclines us to rec-
ognize our vulnerability and limitation, thus overcoming the moral
inertia of abject pride. Finally, in suffering we grow closer to God
because we see our likeness (in involuntary humility) with Christ in
our respective sufferings.
My basic claims about the centrality of humility as a Christian
moral virtue and involuntary humility as an ironic divine grace do
not constitute a distinct or unique theodicy. Rather, they serve to
enhance the “greater good” approach to the problem of human suf-
fering. The model I have developed here not only makes this theod-
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Notes
1. Robert C. Roberts, “Sense of Humor as a Christian Virtue,” Faith and Philosophy 7,
no. 2 (1990): 190.
2. Gabrielle Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 17.
3. Norvin Richards, Humility (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 2.
4. Ibid., 17.
5. Ibid., 187.
6. Ibid.
7. Max Scheler, “Humility,” Aletheia 2 (1981): 210.
8. Nancy Snow, “Humility,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 29 (1995): 210.
9. Richards, Humility, 189.
10. Snow, “Humility,” 211.
11. John Calvin quotes Chrysostom as saying that the “the foundation of our philosophy
is humility” (John T. McNeill and Ford Lewis Battles, eds., Institutes of the Christian
Religion, vol. 1 [Philadelphia, Pa.: The Westminster Press, 1960], 268).
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12. Augustine observes that “the first sin of man was pride” and that the essence of
God’s first commandment to human beings was that “humility was always to be held
onto; that is, that the lowliness of man placed under God should be preserved”
(John E. Rotelle, ed., Sermon 159b in The Works of Saint Augustine, vol. III/11 [New
York: New City Press, 1997], 150).
13. St. Bernard defines humility as “that thorough self-examination which makes a man
contemptible in his own sight” (George B. Burch, trans., Steps of Humility, [Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1940], 125). St. Bernard expounds on the Bene-
dictine rule for development of humility: fear of God, suppression of desire, submis-
sion to a superior, perfect obedience, complete confession, admission of inferiority,
belief in one’s inferiority, conventionality, silence, gravity, restrained speech, and
downcast eyes. These steps are precisely the opposite of the steps of vicious pride,
which begin with curiosity, then proceed to frivolity, mirth, boastfulness, etc. So to
find humility, St. Bernard explains, one need only traverse the path of pride in the
reverse direction.
14. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., 1947),
1848.
15. Ibid., 1849.
16. Thomas à Kempis, Of the Imitation of Christ (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Whitaker House, 1981),
82.
17. Ibid., 121.
18. Ibid., 122.
19. Clifton Wolters, trans., Cloud of Unknowing, (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1961), 70.
20. Ibid.
21. John Calvin, Sermons on Job, lxxx, quoted in Calvin’s Institutes, 269.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Jonathan Edwards, The Works of Jonathan Edwards (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust,
1974), 294.
25. Ibid.
26. Andrew Murray, Humility (New Kensington, Pa.: Whitaker House, 1982), 12.
27. Ibid., 18–19.
28. James 4:10. (This and all other biblical references are from the New International
Version of the Bible.). See also I Pet. 5:6.
29. Prov. 3:34.
30. Isa. 66:2.
31. I Cor. 1:27-29.
32. Job 5:11.
33. Ps. 25:9.
34. II Chron. 7:14.
35. Matt. 11:25.
36. Ps. 149:4.
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50. Here Adams echoes à Kempis when he says “no man so feels in his heart the passion
of Christ as he who suffers” (Imitation, 87).
51. à Kempis expounds upon this sentiment when he writes,
As long as it is grievous to you to suffer, and you desire to flee it, so long shall
you be ill at ease, and the desire of escaping tribulation will follow you every-
where. If you set yourself to what you ought, namely to suffering and to death,
it will be better with you and you shall find peace. (Imitation, 90)