FEDERICO M. LEDESMA, JR. vs.


NLRC

FACTS:
 Petitioner was employed as a service driver by the private respondent on probationary basis, he was required
to report at private respondent’s training site in Dasmariñas, Cavite, under the direct supervision of its site
administrator, Pablo Manolo de Leon.
 Petitioner filed a complaint against de Leon for allegedly abusing his authority as site, immoral conduct
allegedly carried out within the private respondent’s premises.
 A copy of the complaint was duly received by private respondent’s Chief Accountant, Nita Azarcon.
 De Leon filed a written report against the petitioner addressed to private respondent’s Vice-President for
Administration, Ty citing his suspected drug use.
 Private respondent’s Human Resource Manager, Cueva served a copy of a Notice to petitioner requiring him
to explain within why no disciplinary action should be imposed on him instead he filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against private respondent before the Labor Arbiter.
 In his Position Paper, petitioner averred that in view of the complaint he filed against de Leon, the latter
retaliated by falsely accusing petitioner as a drug user. Ty, however, instead of verifying the veracity of report,
readily believed his allegations and together with Cueva, verbally dismissed him from service.
 Petitioner immediately went to St. Dominic Medical Center for a drug test and he was found negative for any
drug substance.
 With his drug result on hand, he went back to private respondent’s main office to talk to Ty and Cueva and to
show to them his drug test result, since his drug test proved that he was not guilty of the drug use charge
against him, he decided to continue to work.
 He reported for work but he was no longer allowed to enter the training site for he was allegedly banned there
from according to the guard on duty.
 Private respondent countered that petitioner was never dismissed from employment but merely served a
Notice to Explain why no disciplinary action should be filed against him in view of the report that he was
suspected of using illegal drugs. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner prematurely lodged a complaint for
illegal dismissal against private respondent before the Labor Arbiter.
 Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner declaring illegal his separation from employment.
 The Labor Arbiter, however, did not order petitioner’s reinstatement for the same was no longer practical, and
only directed private respondent to pay petitioner backwages. Both parties questioned the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision before the NLRC.
 Petitioner assailed the portion of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision denying his prayer for reinstatement, private
respondent controverted the Labor Arbiter’s finding that petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment,
and insisted that petitioner was never dismissed from his job but failed to report to work.
 NLRC granted the appeal raised by both parties and reversed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision.
 The NLRC declared that petitioner failed to establish the fact of dismissal for his claim that he was banned
from entering the training site was rendered impossible by the fact that he was able to subsequently claim his
salary and 13th month pay.
 Petitioner’s claim for reinstatement was, however, granted by the NLRC.
 The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was likewise denied by the NLRC in its Resolution.
 The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari and affirmed the NLRC decision giving more
credence to private respondent’s stance that petitioner was not dismissed from employment, as it is more in
accord with the evidence on record and the attendant circumstances of the instant case.
 Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by CA.

ISSUE/S:
 Whether or not CA subverted due process of law when it did not consider the evidence on record showing that
there was no just cause for dismissal as petitioner is not a drug user and there is no evidence to support this
ground for dismissal.

HELD:
 It is best to stress that the issues raised by petitioner in this instant petition are factual in nature which is not
within the office of a Petition for Review.
 The reason for this rule is that, this Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties for the factual findings of the labor officials
who have acquired expertise in their own fields are accorded not only respect but even finality, and are binding
upon this Court.
 However, when the findings of the Labor Arbiter contradict those of the NLRC, departure from the general rule
is warranted, and this Court must of necessity make an scrutiny and examine the records all over again
including the evidence presented by the opposing parties to determine which findings should be preferred as
more conformable with evidentiary facts.
 The Labor Arbiter found that the petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment warranting the payment of
his backwages.
 The NLRC and the Court of Appeals found otherwise.
 In reversing the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, the NLRC underscored the settled evidentiary rule that before the
burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove the validity of the employee’s dismissal, the employee must first
sufficiently establish that he was indeed dismissed from employment. The petitioner, in the present case, failed
to establish the fact of his dismissal.
 The NLRC did not give credence to petitioner’s allegation that he was banned by the private respondent from
entering the workplace, opining that had it been true that petitioner was no longer allowed to enter the training
site when he reported for work.
 Well-entrenched is the principle that in order to establish a case before judicial and quasi-administrative
bodies, it is necessary that allegations must be supported by substantial evidence.
 In the present case, there is hardly any evidence on record so as to meet the quantum of evidence required,
i.e., substantial evidence. Petitioner’s claim of illegal dismissal is supported by no other than his own bare,
uncorroborated and, thus, self-serving allegations, which are also incoherent, inconsistent and contradictory.
 It is true that the Constitution affords full protection to labor, and that in light of this Constitutional mandate, we
must be vigilant in striking down any attempt of the management to exploit or oppress the working class.
However, it does not mean that we are bound to uphold the working class in every labor dispute brought
before this Court for our resolution.
 The law in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the
employer. It should be made clear that when the law tilts the scales of justice in favor of labor, it is in
recognition of the inherent economic inequality between labor and management. The intent is to balance the
scales of justice; to put the two parties on relatively equal positions.
 JOSE T. CAPILI v. NLRC and UNIVERSITY OF MINDANAO

G.R. No. 120802, 17 June 1997

FACTS:

Capili was an instructor at UM, a private educational institution. In 1993, the school informed Capili that he would be
eligible for retirement when he would reach the age of 60 years. Capili answered that he was not opting to retire but
would continue to serve until he reaches the age of 65.

When the school reiterated its position that it could retire him, Capili filed a complaint questioning his forced retirement.
UM invoked Article 287 of the Labor Code which provides that any employee may be retired upon reaching the
retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract. It
contended that it has a retirement plan, known as the University of Mindanao & Associated Enterprises Retirement
Plan. Capili contended that he was not a member of said retirement plan, therefore it is not applicable to him.

Later, after receiving the Labor Arbiter’s decision but before filing his appeal, Capili received partial payment of his
retirement pay. During the pendency of his apppeal with the NLRC, he received full payment of his retirement benefits.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not an employee can be compelled to retire at the age of sixty years.
2. Whether or not the subsequent acceptance of retirement benefits estops an employee from pursuing his complaint
questioning the validity of his forced retirement.

RULING:

1. No, an employee cannot be compelled to retire at the age of sixty years in the absence of a provision on retirement
in the CBA or if the employer has no retirement plan.

Under the Labor Code, as amended by R. A. No. 7641, the option of the employer to retire an employee at age 60
no longer exists. Under the present rule, the option to retire upon reaching the age of 60 years or more but not
beyond 65 is the exclusive prerogative of the employee if there is no provision on retirement in the CBA or any
agreement or if the employer has no retirement plan.

In this case, UM failed to show that Capili was a member of the school’s retirement plan. The Court finds that it is
not applicable to all employees of UM and its associated enterprises. It applies only to those who opted to become
members thereof.

2. Yes, the acceptance of retirement benefits will estop the employee from pursuing his case. By accepting the
retirement benefits, the employee is deemed to have opted to retire under the present rule stated above. This
could only mean that he has already acceded to his retirement, effective on such date—when he reached the age
of 60 years.
 CORAZON JAMER petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

HERMOSISIMA, JR.,J.:

Facts:
This complaint arose from the dismissal of the complainants Corazon Jamer and Cristina Amortizido both were
cashier of Isetann. They were both dismissed on the alleged ground of dishonesty for incurring a shortage
ofP15,353.78.
Complainants were asked to explain and they submitted their respective written explanations for the shortage.
Respondents placed both complainants under preventivesuspension for the alleged shortages. Thereafter,
respondents conducted an administrative investigation. Finding the explanation of the complainants to be
unsatisfactory, respondent dismissed the complainants from the service. Aggrieved, complainant instituted this present
action .
The Labor Arbiter directed the respondents to reinstate complainants to service with full backwages and
without loss of seniority rights.
Isetann and John Go appealed the aforesaid decision to the NLRC. The NLRC found that the complainants were
validy dismissed for lack of confidence.

Issue:

Whether NLRC is correct?

Held:
Yes. The failure of petitioners to report to management the aforementioned irregularities constitute fraud or
willful breach of the trust reposed in them by their employer or duly authorized representative one of the just causes in
terminating employment as provided for by paragraph (c), Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in is hereby AFFIRMED.
 Philippine Association of Service Expporters, Inc. vs. Drilon
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988

EN BANC, SARMIENTO, J:

Facts:

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a firm "engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order
No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING
THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,"
and specifically assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers
but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held
likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in
character.

On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the
respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United
States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor
General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.

Issue:

Whether the challenged Department Order is a valid regulation in the nature of a police power measure under the
Constitution.

Held:

The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." 5 As defined, it
consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not
capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
embrace.

Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits.

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the
taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental
attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. The police power of the
State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection. It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.

As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. 13 In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary, the presumption logically stands.

The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question
that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution 15 does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women.

"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more
paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. Under these circumstances, the
Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and
economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot
seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an
indefinite ban on deployment.

This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern
of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of
events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent
living to its citizens.

Decision:

The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be
tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes and Griño-
Aquino, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr. and Medialdea, JJ., are on leave

 SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC. & MARLOWE NAVIGATION CO., INC.
G.R. No. 167614. March 24, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a POEA-
approved Contract of Employment. On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation
of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April. However, respondents did not deliver on their promise to
make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May.

Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the
time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired
portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his
money claims. LA rendered the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits. Respondents appealed to the
NLRC to question the finding of the LA. Likewise, petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not
applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal
dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.

Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple
Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries
for the unexpired portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration; he questioned the constitutionality of
the subject clause. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject
clause. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue
raised by petitioner.

The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, to wit:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of
US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment
contract or a total of US$4,200.00.

Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the
NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine
months and 23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00

Issue:
1.) Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is the lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his 12-month
employment contract, and not just for a period of three months?
2.) Should petitioner’s overtime and leave pay form part of the salary basis in the computation of his monetary award,
because these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his contract?

Held:
1.) Yes. Petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine
months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month. The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional.

In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were
treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired
portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed
OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their
money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.
 The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the
monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs
with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers
with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar
disadvantage.

The Court further holds that the subject clause violates petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of
property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid governmental purpose. The subject clause being unconstitutional,
petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to
law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.

2.) No. The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE
Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the
basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work “performed” in
excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work “performed” on designated rest days and holidays.

By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in the
computation of petitioner's monetary award; unless there is evidence that he performed work during those periods.