Safety Critical Elements and Performance Standards Report Summary

FRONT-END ENGINEERING DESIGN (FEED) DOC NO.
5691-GEN-SA-RPT-0015
SERVICES FOR THIEN UNG FIXED
PLATFORM REV. NO. 1
SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS AND Page 2 of 66

PERFORMANCE STANDARDS REPORT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................... 4
2.0 ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................... 5
3.0 GENERAL ................................................................................................................................ 6
3.1 Introduction............................................................................................................................... 6
3.2 Objective .................................................................................................................................. 7
3.3 Scope ....................................................................................................................................... 7
4.0 Definitions ............................................................................................................................... 8
4.1 Major Accident Event (MAE) .................................................................................................... 8
4.2 Safety Critical Element (SCE) .................................................................................................. 8
4.3 Performance Standards (PS) ................................................................................................... 8
5.0 MAJOR ACCIDENT EVENTS (MAE) ...................................................................................... 9
6.0 SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS (SCE) ................................................................................ 10
7.0 PERFORMANCE STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT ............................................................... 11
8.0 PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ........................................................................................... 11
PS-01 Hydrocarbon Containment - Topsides ........................................................................ 12
PS-02 Hydrocarbon Containment - Riser .............................................................................. 14
PS-03 Pressure Relief Systems ............................................................................................. 16
PS-04 HVAC Enclosed Areas ................................................................................................ 18
PS-05 Hazardous Open Drains.............................................................................................. 20
PS-06 Cranes and Lifting Equipment ..................................................................................... 22
PS-07 Hazardous Area Hardware.......................................................................................... 25
PS-08 Fire & Gas Detection System ...................................................................................... 27
PS-09 Emergency Shutdown and Blowdown System ........................................................... 31
PS-10 Structural Integrity ....................................................................................................... 34
PS-11 Passive Fire and Explosion Protection ....................................................................... 37
PS-12 Active Fire Fighting ..................................................................................................... 39
PS-13 Escape Routes ............................................................................................................ 42
PS-14 Temporary Refuge ...................................................................................................... 45

FRONT-END ENGINEERING DESIGN (FEED) DOC NO. 5691-GEN-SA-RPT-0015
PLATFORM REV. NO. 1

PS-15 Lifeboats (TEMPSC) ................................................................................................... 47
PS-16 Escape Systems ......................................................................................................... 50
PS-17 Personal Survival Equipment ...................................................................................... 53
PS-18 Helicopter Facilities ..................................................................................................... 56
PS-19 Alarm and Telecommunications .................................................................................. 58
PS-20 Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) ............................................................................ 61
PS-21 Navigational Aids (NAVAIDS) ..................................................................................... 63
PS-22 Emergency Lighting .................................................................................................... 65

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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report covers the identified Safety Critical Elements (SCE) (refer Table 1.1) from the MAE
Assessment upon the HAZID workshop and the SCE Identification processes on Thien Ung Platform.
Each SCEs have been reviewed by other disciplines from Technip on their respective fields as
summarized in the table below.
Table 1-1 – Safety Critical Elements of Thien Ung Platform
PS No. Safety Critical Element (SCE) Reviewed By (Disciplines)

PS-01 Hydrocarbon Containment - Topsides Process / Piping
PS-02 Hydrocarbon Containment - Risers and Pipelines Process
PS-03 Pressure Relief System Process
PS-04 HVAC Enclosed Area HVAC
PS-05 Hazardous Open Drains Process
PS-06 Crane and Lifting Equipments Mechanical
PS-07 Hazardous Area Hardware Electrical

PS-08 Fire & Gas Detection System Safety / Instrument
PS-09 Emergency Shutdown and Blowdown System Process / Instrument / Safety
PS-10 Structural Integrity Structural

PS-11 Passive Fire and Explosion Protection Structural / Safety
PS-12 Active Fire Fighting Safety
PS-13 Escape Routes Safety

PS-14 Temporary Refuge Safety
PS-15 Lifeboats (TEMPSC) Safety
PS-16 Escape System Safety
PS-17 Personnel Survival Equipment Safety
PS-18 Helicopter Facilities Safety
PS-19 Alarm and Telecommunications Telecom
PS-20 Uninterrupted Power Supply Electrical
PS-21 Navigational Aids Electrical
PS-22 Emergency Lighting Electrical

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2.0 ABBREVIATIONS
API - American Petroleum Institute
ANSI - American National Standards Institute
ASME - American Society of Mechanical Engineers
BDV - Blow Down Valve
CAP - Civil Aviation Publication
CCR - Central Control Room
CPP - Central Processing Platform
CCTV - Closed Circuit Television
EER - Escape, Evacuation and Rescue
EPIRB - Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacons
ESD - Emergency Shut Down
ESDV - Emergency Shut Down Valve
F&G - Fire and Gas
FDP - Fixed Drilling Platform
FEED - Front End Engineering Design
FERA - Fire Explosive Risk Analysis
FGS - Fire and Gas System
GBS - Gravity Base Structure
HAZID - Hazard Identification
HP - High Pressure
HSE - Health, Safety and Environment
HVAC - Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning
I/O - Input / Output
IEC - International Electrotechnical Commission
IR - Infra Red
KO - Knock Out
LEL - Lower Explosive Limit
LQ - Living Quarters
LSA - Life Saving Appliance
MAE - Major Accident Event
MCC - Motor Control Centre
MCP - Manual Call Point
NDB - Non Directional Beacon
PABX - Private Automatic Branch Exchange
PA/GA - Public Address and General Alarm
PFP - Passive Fire Protection
PID - Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
POB - People on Board
PS - Performance Standards
PSV - Pressure Safety Valve
QRA - Quantitative Risk Analysis
SART - Search and Rescue Transponder
SCE - Safety Critical Elements
SDV - Shutdown Valve
SIL - Safety Integrity Limit
SITHP - Shut In Tubing Head Pressure
SOLAS - The International Convention for the Safety of Life At Sea
TEMPSC - Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft
TR - Temporary Refugee
TUP - Thien Ung Platform
UPS - Uninterrupted Power Supply
VHF - Very High Frequency
VSAT - Very Small Aperture Terminal
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3.0 GENERAL
3.1 Introduction
The Thien Ung field is located in the middle part of Block 04.3 in the Nam Con Son Basin, offshore
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, approximately 15 km of Dai Hung field and approximately 270 km
southeast of Vung Tau. The block 04.3 covers an area of approximately 2600 km2. The Thien Ung
field is including its two (2) structural parts. Thien Ung structure discovery was made in 2004 with the
04.3-TU-1X well. Two subsequent appraisal wells (04.3-TU-2X and 04.3-TU-3X), drilled and tested
respectively, delineated the field. Location of the Thien Ung field is shown in Figure 3-1.
Figure 3-1 – Thien Ung Reservoir Location
(WA-356-P)
A Pre-FEED study was carried out to select the most viable platform configuration. The configuration
of two separate platforms, namely Fixed Drilling Platform (FDP) and Central Processing Platform
(CPP) bridge linked were selected for FEED. Drilling will be carried out by self contained Modular
Drilling Rig located at FDP.
PLATFORM REV. NO. 1

3.2 Objective
The objectives of the Safety Critical Elements and Performance Standards report are:
To identify the Safety Critical Elements;

To discuss the process of developing the performance standards including definition of the
terms used within the performance standards; and
To present the Performance Standards for each SCE.
The overall objective of the Performance Standards is to allow independent and competent scrutiny
of all systems/equipment of the Thien Ung Installation that are critical to safety.
3.3 Scope
The scope of this document covers the identification of the SCE performance standards for the SCEs
identified for the Thien Ung associated with normal operation of the facilities, and therefore excludes
fabrication, construction, hook-up, commissioning, etc. Environmental performance standards are
also excluded from the scope of this document.
Performance standards define the key requirements for SCEs (with respect to Functionality,
Reliability/Availability and Survivability) in order to meet their safety goal. During the FEED stage, the
performance standards will only focus on the design assurance measures, the operational
performance standards can only be developed in the Detailed Design stage.
The level of detail in this document does not include sub-components of each component a
performance standard (e.g. specific SDVs in the ESD performance standard) of; this level of detail
will be included in the Detailed Design performance standards. Apart from this, vendor data will also
be further incorporated during detailed design.
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4.0 DEFINITIONS
The following terms are defined in the MAE and SCE Identification Report.
4.1 Major Accident Event (MAE)

A Major Accident Event is defined as an event connected to the facility, including natural events,
having the potential to cause multiple fatalities of persons at or near the installation.
4.2 Safety Critical Element (SCE)

Safety Critical Element is defined as an element or part of the installation:
1. The failure of which could cause or contribute substantially to a major incident, or
2. The purpose of which is to prevent or limit the effects of a major incident.
SCEs form the hardware controls that provide the means to prevent, detect, control, mitigate and
recover from hazards that may arise on, or be released from, the facility.
4.3 Performance Standards (PS)

Performance standards detail the specific attributes of the safety systems and define the minimum
functional performance required to enable them to meet the required safety critical goals.
Performance standards are developed for each SCE and associated sub-elements in order to identify
the performance criteria and means of assurance required to achieve with respect to Functionality,
Availability, Reliability, Survivability and Interdependency.
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5.0 MAJOR ACCIDENT EVENTS (MAE)

The starting point for identifying the MAEs is to identify all possible hazards on Thien Ung Platform
during HAZID workshop. A HAZID workshop was held at Technip’s office on the 4th and 5th of May
2011.
The two day sessions were attended by a multi-disciplinary team from both Technip and Vietsovpetro
JV with experience and understanding in their respective fields. The major hazards which can cause
severity to the personnel on the list of MAEs are given in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Major Accident Events on Thien Ung Platform
MAE No. Hazards

MAE-01 Release of Flammable Gas
MAE-02 Release of Condensate
MAE-03 Helicopter Crash
MAE-04 Dropped Objects Leading to Major Release
MAE-05 Ship Collision

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6.0 SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS (SCE)

Each major accident hazard was addressed in turn and each of the SCE associated with that hazard
listed. The SCEs are those measures that considered to be safety critical in preventing, controlling
and mitigating the MAE identified.
The list of SCEs is given in previous Executive Summary Table 1.1. The list has been further
developed to identify what each SCE is primarily designed to achieve: Prevention, Mitigation and
Control or Post-Event Emergency Response as shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6-1 – Matrix of Major Accident Events and their Safety Critical Elements
Safety Critical Elements
Passive Fire and Explosion Protection

Hydrocarbon Containment - Topsides
Hydrocarbon Containment – Risers
Alarm and Telecommunications

Personnel Survival Equipment
Crane and Lifting Equipments
Uninterrupted Power Supply

ESD and Blowdown System
Hazardous Area Hardware
Hazardous Open Drains
Pressure Relief System
F&G Detection System

HVAC Enclosed Area
Temporary Refugee
Emergency Lighting
Helicopter Facilities
Active Fire Fighting
Major Accident Events
Structural Integrity
Escape System
Navigation Aids
Escape Routes
and Pipelines
TEMPSC
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Release of Flammable
MAE-01 P P P P P D C M M E E E E E E E E
Gas
Release of
MAE-02 P P P P P P D C M M E E E E E E E E
Condensate
MAE-03 Helicopter Crash D C M M E P E E E
MAE-04 Dropped Objects P P M E E
MAE-05 Ship Collision D M E E E E E E E P E
*P= Prevention, D= Detection, C= Control, M= Mitigation and E= Emergency Response

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7.0 PERFORMANCE STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT

Performance Standards are developed to define and detail the specific attributes of the safety critical
systems to enable them to meet their intended function(s), i.e. prevention, detection, control,
mitigation or emergency response. This is achieved by setting the goals for the SCE and by providing
a mechanism to measure and validate their performance.
Performance standards are developed for each SCE and associated sub-elements in order to identify
the performance criteria and means of assurance required to achieve with respect to Functionality,
Availability, Reliability, Survivability and Interdependency.
These specific activities are detailed in Figure 7-1.
Figure 7-1 Safety Critical Elements Performance Standards Development
Describe SCE and sub-elements, define scope

Set Scene and limits of SCE and define the safety goal of the
SCE to reflect the SCE function in preventing and
Define SCE Goals and Scope mitigating major accidents.
Define the safety critical functionality required of

Functionality the SCE. Set criteria for assessing the
performance. Identify the means for assuring that
What does the SCE need to do?
the design adequately fulfil these criteria and in
turn provide the required functionality.
Set the required level of reliability (function when

Reliability / Availability required without failure) and availability (capable
How reliable must the SCE be? of performing its function under the conditions
Will the SCE be available when required? required) for each sub-element of the SCE. Set
criteria for assessing the performance and define
the means of assurance in design.
Survivability
Describe the major accident event(s) the SCE is
Will the SCE work as long as it is required expected to endure in order to provide its safety
to?
critical function(s). Describe the functionality the
SCE should deliver subsequent to the MAE and
for how long. Identify the assurance method that
demonstrates the adequacy of SCE in design.
Dependencies
Does the SCE interact or require
interactions from other system? Identify the interactions and dependencies on
other systems, on which the attainment of the
Performance Standard parameters may depend.
8.0 PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

The performance standards for each identified SCE of Thien Ung Platform are presented as follows:
FRONT-END ENGINEERING DESIGN (FEED) SERVICES FOR THIEN UNG FIXED PLATFORM DOC NO. 5691-GEN-SA-RPT-0015
SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS AND PERFORMANCE STANDARDS REPORT REV. NO. 1
Page 12 of 66
THIEN UNG PLATFORM Safety Critical Element Performance Standard
PS-01 Hydrocarbon Containment - Topsides
GOAL: To prevent loss of containment. MAEs:

MAE 01, MAE 02
SCOPE: All topsides equipment containing hydrocarbons downstream of the incoming well fluids from the wells and up to the Subject Matter Expert:
export riser ESDV, consist of the following: Cheah Sern Hoe (Process)
– Pressure vessels; Orlando Rivera (Piping)
– Coalescers;
– Scrubber;
– Pumps, and
– Piping system
FUNCTIONALITY
Functional Requirement Performance Criteria Assurance Ref.
01-F-01 Pressure vessels safely contain Pressure vessels shall be designed in accordance with Specification for Pressure Vessel 1
pressurised liquids and gases at ASME VIII and TCVN 6153/54/55/56. Process and Utility Design Basis 2
specified design pressures, Process vessels shall be designed to be corrosion Material Selection and Corrosion Philosophy Report 3
temperatures and environmental resistant.
loadings for the design life of the
installation.
01-F-02 Piping system safely contain Piping systems shall be designed in accordance with Specification for Pressure Vessel 1
hydrocarbon liquids and gases at ANSI/ASME B31.3. Process and Utility Design Basis 2
specified design composition, Process lines should be sized in accordance with API Material Selection and Corrosion Philosophy Report 3
pressures, temperatures and RP 14E to ensure high flowrates do not lead to Specification for Piping and Layout Design Basis 4
environmental loadings for the erosion.
design life of the installation. Piping systems shall be designed to be corrosion
resistant.
Page 13 of 66
RELIABILITY / AVAILABILITY
Sub-Element Performance Criteria Assurance Ref.
01-A-01 Pressure vessels and piping No availability or reliability requirement for safety Nil. Nil
system. reasons.
SURVIVABILITY
Hazardous Event Performance Criteria Assurance Ref.
01-A-01 Fire and explosion. Piping and equipment with the potential to give rise to Quantitative Risk Analysis (HOLD). 5
significant escalation hazards withstands the effect of a
design case jet fire and explosion.
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Safety Critical Element / Sub-element Criticality
Standard Ref.
01-D-01 Passive Fire and Explosion To increase the failure times of vessel saddles and supports in the event of external fire or direct jet fire PS-11
Protection impingement.
01-D-02 Pressure Relief System To relief excess pressure in the event of external fire or direct jet fire impingement and other causes. PS-03
01-D-03 Emergency Shutdown System To allow effective shutdown and isolation of inventory. PS-09
01-D-04 Blowdown System To relief excess pressure in the event of external fire or direct jet fire impingement and other causes. PS-09
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
Ref. Document No. Document Title
1 5691-GEN-ME-SP-0002 Specification for Pressure Vessel
2 5691-GEN-PR-RPT-9901 Process and Utility Design Basis
3 5691-GEN-PI-RPT-0005 Material Selection and Corrosion Philosophy Report
4 5691-GEN-PI-SP-0001 Specification for Piping and Layout Design Basis
5 5691-GEN-SA-RPT-0013 Quantitative Risk Analysis Report (HOLD)
PS-RE Hydrocarbon
Page 14 of 66
PS-02 Hydrocarbon Containment - Riser
GOAL: Hydrocarbon containment provides secure containment of export hydrocarbons and other imported flammable MAEs:
fluids at or below design conditions, outboard of the respective ESDV. MAE 01, MAE 02
Subject Matter Expert:
SCOPE: The export riser from the riser ESDV to the pipeline.
Cheah Sern Hoe (Process)
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01 Riser and their associated supports Riser shall be designed and constructed in Process Design Philosophy 1
are capable of containing accordance with the environmental conditions and Material Selection and Corrosion Philosophy Report 2
hydrocarbons at specified design fluids data specified in the Process Design Basis.
pressures, temperatures and Internal and external corrosion protection is provided
environmental loadings for the to prevent corrosion causing loss of containment.
design life of the installation.
01-A-01 Riser No availability or reliability requirement for safety Nil Nil
reasons.
SURVIVABILITY
01-S-01. Topside fire event Riser shall be protected from impairment by topsides Provision of PFP for risers as per recommendation 3
fire events. from the Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis in QRA
Report.
01-S-02. Sea surface fire Riser to be protected from sea surface fire. Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis in QRA Report 3
01-S-03. Ship collision Riser to be protected from ship collision. Assessed in Non-Flammable Hazards Assessment. 3
Page 15 of 66
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
01-D-01 Nil Nil. Nil.
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
2 5691-GEN-PI-RPT-0005 Material Selection and Corrosion Philosophy Report
3 5691-GEN-SA-RPT-0012 Quantitative Risk Assessment Report (HOLD)
Page 16 of 66
PS-03 Pressure Relief Systems
GOAL: To protect process hydrocarbon equipment from overpressure and provide a safe and reliable means to vent MAEs:
equipment. MAE 01, MAE 02
SCOPE: All pressure relieving equipment on the platform, excluding blowdown valves (addressed in PS-09).
Cheah Sern Hoe (Process)
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01 Prevent over-pressure in the PSV set pressure shall be at or below the design Nil Nil
hydrocarbon containment systems pressure of the vessel or system it is protecting in
due to process upset or fire case. accordance with API 520.
PSV shall be sized in accordance with API 520.
01-A-01 PSVs PSVs for over-pressure protection for process Provision of spares with interlocks for critical PSVs. Nil
inventories to be available at all times (including
during on-line testing).
SURVIVABILITY
01-S-01 Fire and explosion. PSVs are not designed to survive fire and explosion. Nil. Nil
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
01-D-01 Nil Nil. Nil.
Page 17 of 66
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
Nil Nil Nil
Page 18 of 66
PS-04 HVAC Enclosed Areas
GOAL: Provision of adequate ventilation for the dilution and removal of potential flammable gas mixtures from enclosed MAEs:
areas and to prevent the ingress of potentially flammable gas/air, toxic gas mixtures and smoke into non- MAE 01, MAE 02
hazardous enclosed areas.
SCOPE: HVAC and/or ventilation equipment, including: Subject Matter Expert:
– HVAC System filter banks fire dampers (including actuation and indicators) Zaidi Abdullah (HVAC)
or the following hazardous and non-hazardous area:
- HV Switchgear/ MCC Room;
- Central Control Room;
- Transformer Room;
- Battery Room;
- Mechanical Workshop; and
- Instrument/Electrical Workshop.
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01 Prevent ingress/egress of smoke or Fire dampers and ventilation fans shall shutdown in HVAC Specification 1
potentially flammable gas/air accordance with the F&G Cause and Effects. HVAC Design Philosophy and Design Basis 2
mixtures through ventilation system Fire dampers shall be designed to fail safe to close
inlets/discharges and upon power failure.
ductwork/penetration.
01-F-02 Provide status indication and alarms Status of dampers and exhaust fans enunciated at HVAC Specification 1
for ventilation system components. HVAC Control Panel and at CCR. HVAC Design Philosophy and Design Basis 2
o
01-A-01 Dampers Each HVAC dampers shall close on demand. Frangible bulb valves shall be set for 68 C and be of 1
an approved pattern. Frangible bulb valves on galley
o
extract system shall be set for 90 C.
Fire and gas dampers are designed to be fail-safe.
Page 19 of 66
SURVIVABILITY
01-S-01 Fire. Fire dampers to survive credible fire events and to Fire & Gas Dampers shall be type certified for fire 1
ensure the integrity of penetrations within fire walls. rating to meet the requirements of SOLAS.
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
01-D-01 Fire & Gas Detection System Send signals to initiate fire damper closure/fan shutdown. PS-08
01-D-02 UPS Back up power source to enable ventilation to continue running. PS-20
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
1 5691-GEN-ME-SP-0032 HVAC Specifications
2 5691-GEN-ME-RPT-0004 HVAC Design Philosophy and Design Basis
Page 20 of 66
PS-05 Hazardous Open Drains
GOAL: To contain spills of hazardous liquids and dispose of them without risk to personnel. MAEs:
MAE 01
SCOPE: All collection devices and pipe work with connections to the open drain system as per P&ID: Subject Matter Expert:
– Equipment / package drip pan; Cheah Sern Hoe (Process)
– Open Drains and collection headers.
Only hazardous open drain is expected on FDP, as there is no non-hazardous area on FDP itself
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01 To contain liquid leaks from Grated deck, liquid containment areas and/or drip Process Design Basis 1
equipment and spills from sampling trays provided under hydrocarbon equipment that P&ID 2, 3
points, tundishes, instruments during contains liquids such as vessels, pumps, and Equipment Layout 4
replacement, pump seals. coalescers.
All liquid containment areas to be provided with
drainage points to prevent liquids lying on the decks
to limit the spread of pool fires from liquid releases.
01-F-02 Prevention of flow from hazardous to Drains systems serving hazardous and non- Process Design Basis 1
non-hazardous areas. hazardous areas shall be separated and no
communication shall be possible between them.
01-A-01 Hazardous Open Drains Drains system integrity to be maintained at all times Nil Nil
when in service.
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SURVIVABILITY
01-S-01 Nil Nil Nil Nil
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
01-D-01 Emergency Shutdown and Limits the volume of inventory released. PS-09
Blowdown System Reduces pressure and hence leak rate.
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
2 5691-FDP-PR-PID-6532 FDP Hazardous Open Drain Caisson and Pump
3 5691-FDP-PR-PID-6531 FDP Hazardous Open Drain Headers
4 5691-FDP-PI-DW-0005 FDP - Equipment Layout Sump Deck
Page 22 of 66
PS-06 Cranes and Lifting Equipment
GOAL: To provide a safe method to transfer loads to and from supply boat and around the platforms. MAEs:
MAE 01, MAE 02, MAE 05
SCOPE: All lifting equipments including pedestal crane structure. Subject Matter Expert:
Subramanian Sreenivasan (Mechanical)
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01 To provide mechanical handling Lifting equipment including pedestal crane, monorails Material Handling Study 1,2
equipment to lift and transfer loads with manual / electric operated trolley hoists and pad
safely. eyes and / or beam clamps are provided.
Lifting equipment to be designed, constructed,
maintained and to be suitable for lifting its intended
safe working load.
01-F-02 Crane shall be operated within The cranes are sized to handle maximum load to be Material Handling Study 1,2
defined limits. lifted. Datasheet for Pedestal Crane 3,4,5
The cranes are designed in accordance with API 2C. Specification for Pedestal Cranes 6
The Load-Radius chart should be provided for static
and dynamic rated load.
Protection system shall be provided to give visual
and audible warning to the crane driver of potential
overload including low hydraulic pressure.
01-F-03 The crane does not drop a Emergency load lowering capabilities shall be Specification for Pedestal Cranes 6
suspended load due to failure of the provided for the load hoist mechanism (for both main
crane power supply. and auxiliary hoists) in the event of power failure or
control failure in accordance with API 2C. Means
shall be provided for controlled lowering and stopping
of drums under all load conditions.
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FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-04 The crane is prevented from lifting Equipment and laydown areas shall be arranged so Material Handling Study 1,2
over live hydrocarbon equipment that lifts over live hydrocarbon equipment are limited Specification for Pedestal Crane 6
during normal operations. during normal operations.
Limit system shall be installed on crane to protect
vulnerable live hydrocarbon equipment.
01-F-05 Crane to operate safely with no The cranes electrical components are certified for Material Handling Study 1,2
ignition risk. use in a Zone 2 area.
01-F-06 Provide safe means of transferring Crane load chart will provide maximum personnel Specification for Pedestal Crane 6
personnel. rating lift capacity.
01-A-01 Crane The crane overload and limit systems are fault Nil Nil
tolerant.
SURVIVABILITY
01-S-01 Not applicable. Nil. Nil. Nil
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
01-D-01 Alarm and Telecommunications To allow communication between the crane driver and other personnel on TUP. PS-19
Manual operated horn to warn other personnel overheads.
To allow communication between the crane driver and marine crews (supply boats).
Page 24 of 66
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
1 5691-CPP-ME-RPT-0002 Material Handling Study Report for CPP
2 5691-CPP-ME-RPT-0002 Material Handling Study Report for FDP
3 5691-FDP-ME-DS-0055 Datasheets for Pedestal Crane (FDP)
4 5691-CPP-ME-DS-0101 Datasheets for Pedestal Crane (CPP – South Side)
5 5691-CPP-ME-DS-0100 Datasheets for Pedestal Crane (CPP – North Side)
6 5691-GEN-ME-SP-0009 Specification for Pedestal Cranes
Page 25 of 66
PS-07 Hazardous Area Hardware
GOAL: To minimise the potential for ignition of an accidental release of flammable materials. MAEs:
MAE 01, MAE 02
SCOPE: The following equipment located in Hazardous Areas: Subject Matter Expert:
– Battery room; Bernard Lip (Electrical)
– Spark/Flame Arrestors;
– Anti-static devices and Lightning Arrestors;
– Earthing & Bonding (Electrical and Non-Electrical Equipment) in hazardous areas;
– Hot Surface Insulations; and
– All field electrical and instrument devices.
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01 To prevent ignition from electrical, All electrical, mechanical and instrument equipment Hazardous Area Classification Drawings 1-7
mechanical and instrument used shall comply with the hazardous area Electrical Design Basis 8
equipment. classification of the facility. Hazardous Area Schedule 9
All equipment in outdoor area, shall as a minimum
comply with Zone 2 requirements unless otherwise
specified.
Unclassified equipment is located within LQ,
Technical Rooms and protected by fire dampers.
01-F-02 Prevent ignition from electrical faults, Earthing of equipment shall be in accordance with Electrical Design Basis 8
lightning or static electricity IEC.
discharge. An assessment of lighting protection system
requirement shall be carried out in accordance with
IEC.
01-F-03 Protection against fire and explosion Electrical equipment installed in hazardous area shall Electrical Design Basis 8
hazard. have a type of protection suitable for the relevant
zones and specified in accordance with IEC 60079.
Page 26 of 66
01-A-01 Hazardous area certified equipment Not applicable. Nil. Nil.
SURVIVABILITY
01-S-01 Accidental hydrocarbon release All field equipment utilized during fire and gas Instrument Design Basis 10
scenarios are rated to Class 1, Zone 1. Hazardous Area Classification Philosophy 11
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
01-D-01 Emergency Shutdown To initiate isolation of electrical equipment upon fire and gas detection. PS-09
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
1 5691-CPP-SA-DW-0001 Hazardous Area Classification Drawings Top Deck
2 5691-CPP-SA-DW-0002 Hazardous Area Classification Drawings Main Deck
3 5691-CPP-SA-DW-0003 Hazardous Area Classification Drawings Access Deck
4 5691-CPP-SA-DW-0004 Hazardous Area Classification Drawings Cellar Deck
5 5691-CPP-SA-DW-0005 Hazardous Area Classification Drawings Sump Deck
6 5691-CPP-SA-DW-0006 Hazardous Area Classification Drawings Elevation Looking North
7 5691-CPP-SA-DW-0007 Hazardous Area Classification Drawings Elevation Looking West
8 5691-GEN-EL-RPT-0001 Electrical Design Basis
9 5691-GEN-SA-RPT-0011 Hazardous Area Schedule and Report
10 5691-GEN-IN-RPT-0002 Instrument Design Basis
11- 5691-GEN-SA-RPT-0005 - Hazardous Area Classification Philosophy
Page 27 of 66
PS-08 Fire & Gas Detection System
GOAL: To provide early warning of the outbreak of fire and indication of the presence of hazardous gas, smoke or MAEs:
excessive heat, allowing appropriate actions to be taken to minimise consequences. MAE 01, MAE 02
SCOPE: All fire and gas detection and alarm equipment including: Subject Matter Expert:
– Field fire, smoke and combustible gas detection devices; Cheaw Yee Soon (Instrument)
– Push buttons, i.e. Manual Call Point (MCP), ESD Station and APS Pushbutton; Mohan Damuderan (Safety)
– Interconnecting cables and junction boxes;
– Logic solver;
– Input/output(I/O) modules; and
– Fire alarm control panels.
Note: Public Address and General Alarm (PA/GA) system will be addressed in PS-19.
8.1
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01 Detection of fire Flame detections shall be provided at equipment Fire and Gas Detection Philosophy 1
containing hydrocarbon inventories. Instrument Design Basis 3
Triple IR shall be provided to detect hydrocarbon gas
and liquid fires, hydrogen fires and alcohol fires at
open area.
Flame detection devices shall meet the requirements
of API 14G.
A single flame detector shall generate an alarm (at
DCS and mimic panel) and detection of from 2 out of
'N’ (2ooN) vote shall initiate executive actions.
Optical type smoke detectors with sampling probe
units shall be used for building and LQ ventilation air
intakes
Heat detectors shall be installed in Transformer
Room, Mechanical Workshop and Kitchen in LQ.
Page 28 of 66
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-02 Detection of gas. IR point gas detectors and open path gas detectors Fire and Gas Detection Philosophy 1
shall be provided in all wellhead and manifold areas,
open hydrocarbon processing areas, open utility area
and local equipment shelter.
IR point gas detectors also to be provided for use in
HVAC air inlets (including safe area ventilation air
intakes) and mechanical ventilation inlets / outlets to
prevent gas from entering normally manned internal
area such as LQ and CCR.
The Battery Room shall be equipped with at least two
combustible gas detectors calibrated for hydrogen.
01-F-03 To initiate audible and visual alarms Point gas detectors shall initiate high alarm at Fire and Gas Detection Philosophy 1
to alert platform personnel and of the 20%LEL gas detection and high high alarm at
hazardous incident detected. 50%LEL.
Open path gas detectors shall initiate high level
alarm at 1LELm gas detection and high high alarm at
3LELm.
Confirmed detection of fire and gas (2ooN voting of
flame, heat or smoke detectors) shall initiate visual
and audible alarms.
01-F-04 To provide means for manually Manual stations shall be push button type with flip up Fire and Gas Detection Philosophy 1
raising an alarm and alerting cover to protect against accidental activation.
personnel to an incident and its APS stations for each of the platforms shall be
location. located at CCR, muster area & survival craft stations,
helideck and bridge connection between FDP and
CPP.
MCP shall be provided at LQ and along the outdoor
escape path.
Page 29 of 66
01-A-01 Fire and gas detectors and Fire and gas detection devices to be available on Fire and Gas Detection Philosophy 1
pushbutton stations, and FGS. demand.
FGS communication with DCS shall be via dual
redundant communication links using industry
standard protocol.
An alarm shall be sent to DCS for total FGS failure.
Fire and gas system to be in service at all times.
SURVIVABILITY
01-S-01 Fire Event Fire and gas system cables shall meet IEC 60331 Fire and Gas Specification 2
fire resistant properties.
The FGS shall be equipped with redundant modules
and designed such that on failure of a single module,
the other working module shall be able to continue
function as SIL3 to protect the plant.
Fire and gas system panel and ICSS shall be
protected by location, i.e. located in CCR which is
protected by fire/ blast wall.
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
01-D-01 Uninterrupted Power Supply Provide power in the event of power loss to the fire and gas system. PS-20
01-D-02 Alarm and Telecommunications To alert personnel to an incident based on signal from Fire and Gas System. PS-19
01-D-03 Helicopter Facilities To alert helicopter crew to a hazardous incident on the Thien Ung Platform. PS-18
Page 30 of 66
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
1 5691-GEN-SA-RPT-0006 Fire and Gas Detection Philosophy
2 5691-GEN-IN-SP-0003 Specification for Fire & Gas System (FGS)
3- 5691-GEN-IN-RPT-0002 - Instrument Design Basis
Page 31 of 66
PS-09 Emergency Shutdown and Blowdown System
GOAL: To initiate a safe isolation and depressurisation of plant and equipment to prevent or mitigate the effects of a MAEs:
major accident event. MAE 01, MAE 02
SCOPE: Input devices through to the output devices including actuators and status displays, and interfaces with other systems as Subject Matter Expert:
detailed below: Cheah Sern Hoe (Process)
– Input field devices; Cheaw Yee Soon (Instrument)
– SDVs, ESDVs, BDVs;
Mohan Damuderan (Safety)
– Logic solver and logic functions;
– HP flare KO drum;
– HP flare header; and
– Flare tip.
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01 To detect abnormal operating Process input devices shall be provided in ESD Specification 1
conditions that have a potential to accordance with API 14C.
generate a major accident event.
01-F-02 On detection of abnormal operating ESD Cause and Effect matrix shall be developed to Safety and Loss Prevention Philosophy 2
conditions, initiation by the F&G identify the executive actions involving the ESD Fire & Gas Cause and Effect Chart 4,5
system or manual intervention, components that are critical in mitigating hazardous
appropriate executive shutdown events.
action is taken to isolate inventory ESD system shall include strategically located
and electrical power to prevent, isolation valves that shall be used for isolating the
control or mitigate a major accident process lines to limit the quantity of hydrocarbon
event. inventory released.
All shutdowns shall be preceded by a warning pre-
alarm to give adequate opportunity for the operator to
effect corrective action prior to shutdown
Page 32 of 66
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-03 Controlled depressurisation of The design of relief and blowdown system for Thien Safety and Loss Prevention Philosophy 2
isolated inventories below a Ung Platforms shall comply with API RP 520 and API
specified pressure within a specified RP 521.
time. The automatic blowdown calculation will be to
blowdown the inventory to a pressure of 100 psig
within 15 minutes.
01-A-01 SDVs. SDVs shall close on demand. HOLD Nil
01-A-02 BDVs. BDVs shall open on demand. HOLD Nil
SURVIVABILITY
SD.1 Fire and explosion ESD system cables shall meet IEC 60331 fire ESD Specification 1
resistant properties. Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis from QRA Report 3
The Riser SDVs shall be protected against jet fire
impingement for the time specified if recommended
in the QRA Report.
HP flare drum and headers shall be designed to
withstand credible fire and explosion scenarios.
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
01-D-01 Fire & Gas Detection System Detects gas releases and fires and automatically initiates shutdown. PS-08
01-D-02 PFP RESDVs are protected by PFP. PS-11
01-D-03 UPS Provide power in the event of power loss to the emergency shutdown system. PS-20
01-D-04 ESD Push Button To provide manual activation of ESD. PS-19
Page 33 of 66
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
1 5691-GEN-IN-SP-0002 Specification for Emergency Shutdown System (ESD)
2 5691-GEN-SA-RPT-0003 Safety and Loss Prevention Philosophy
3 5691-GEN-SA-RPT-0013 Quantitative Risk Analysis (HOLD)
4 5691-FDP-IN-DW-0002 Fixed Drilling Platform - Fire & Gas Cause and Effect Charts
5 5691-CPP-IN-DW-0002 Central Processing Platform - Fire & Gas Cause and Effect Charts
Page 34 of 66
PS-10 Structural Integrity
GOAL: Supports the topsides inclusive of the TR and riser under all anticipated operating, accidental and environmental MAEs:
loads through service life. Supports the topsides and helideck for sufficient time under emergency conditions to MAE 03, MAE 04, MAE 05
allow personnel to evacuate.
SCOPE: Substructure and topside structure consist of the following: Subject Matter Expert:
– Primary Structure; and Bambang Harto (Structural)
– Secondary / Tertiary Structure.
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01 Substructures to withstand Substructure shall be designed in accordance to API Structural Design Basis 1
operational, environmental and RP 2A. Substructure Structural Materials 2
accidental loads, including dropped Substructure material shall comply with API 2W and
object and boat impacts. ASTM.
01-F-02 Substructure to withstand corrosion. The criteria used for cathodic protection of the jacket Structural Design Basis 1
of Thien Ung fixed platforms should comply with the
standard DNV RP B401 – 2005 or equivalent.
01-F-03 Topside structures to withstand Topside structures shall be designed based on API Topside Structural Design Basis 3
operational and environmental RP 2A.
loads.
01-F-04 Topside structures to withstand Topside structural members shall be coated in Topside Structural Design Basis 3
corrosion. accordance with NACE RP0176-94.
01-A-01 Topside structural members Nil Nil. Nil.
Page 35 of 66
SURVIVABILITY
01-S-01. Fire and explosion. Critical structures shall survive credible fire and Topsides Structural Design Basis 3
explosion for sufficient time to avoid escalation Fire and risk analysis from QRA Report 4
and/or enable emergency response actions to be
completed.
01-S-02. Dropped object / Swinging load. Topsides structural steel shall retain sufficient Topsides Structural Design Basis 3
integrity to prevent loss of hydrocarbon containment Quantitative Risk Analysis 4
in all credible dropped object scenarios.
Main deck and laydown and other susceptible areas
shall be designed to resist penetration by dropped
object.
01-S-03. Helicopter Crash Landing. Substructure should have sufficient strength and Topsides Structural Design Basis 3
ductility without the risk of global progressive
collapse during impact and post impact conditions.
Helicopter local design shall consider helicopter
crash landing scenarios.
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
01-D-01. Cranes and Lifting Equipments Prevent dropped loads that could damage substructures. PS-06
01-D-01. Navaids Prevent damage to the structure from collisions PS-21
01-D-02. Emergency Shutdown The emergency shutdown system isolates inventories and reduces the duration of fire to which the PS-09
topsides structure may be exposed.
01-D-03. Passive Fire Protection PFP protects structural members during fire. PS-11
Page 36 of 66
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
1 5691-CPP-ST-RPT-0001 CPP Substructure Design Basis
2 5691-CPP-ST-RPT-0002 Substructure, foundation Modelling and Loadings
3 5691-CPP-ST-RPT-0051 CPP Topside Design Basis
Page 37 of 66
PS-11 Passive Fire and Explosion Protection
GOAL: To limit the effects of a fire or blast by providing a reliable, secure and effective system of thermal insulation / MAEs:
barriers for equipment, area and structures. MAE 01, MAE 02, MAE 03, MAE 04
SCOPE: Fire and blast rated barriers and Passive Fire Protection (PFP) coatings including following: Subject Matter Expert:
– Fire rated walls; Mohan Damuderan (Safety)
– Blast rated walls; Bambang Harto (Structural)
– PFP applied to structures, walls, piping, pressure vessels and pressure vessels supports.
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01. Fire wall, including the supporting The rating of the fire division shall be confirmed by Quantitative Risk Analysis 1
structure, to provide protection for the Fire and Explosion Analysis as part of QRA
personnel and essential systems for study.
sufficient time to allow evacuation of All penetrations of the firewall to be appropriately
the platform. rated.
01-F-02. Blast walls to be able to contain the Blast walls shall be designed to withstand blast load Quantitative Risk Analysis 1
effects of the initial explosion event at the exceedance criteria of 0.5 bar.
and avoid uncontrolled escalation.
01-F-03. Appropriate PFP to be applied to PFP applied in accordance with QRA Quantitative Risk Analysis 1
protect process equipment, piping, recommendations and topsides fire impact analysis.
critical supports and structural PFP shall comply with PFP Specification.
members to reduce the risk
associated with escalation of
hydrocarbon fires.
01-F-04. The platform is designed to The maximum speed for accidental boat impact is CPP Substructure Design Basis 2
absorbed boat impact energy before 1.5 m/s with maximum mass 2300 MT.
structural damage become severe.
Page 38 of 66
01-A-01. Firewall, Blast walls and PFP. As a passive protection system, fire and blast walls HOLD Nil.
and PFP should have 100% availability. A measure
of the reliability of fire & blast walls and PFP is
unnecessary.
SURVIVABILITY
01-S-01. Fire Barriers to be designed such that they remain The rating of fire barriers are in line with 1
functional in the identified credible fires that they are recommendation from the QRA.
intended to mitigate.
PFP to be designed so that it remains functional in
the identified credible fires that it is intended to
mitigate.
01-S-02. Explosion Blast walls to survive design blast overpressure. The rating of the blast walls is in line with 1
recommendation from the QRA
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
01-D-01 Topsides Structure The topsides structure provides support for the fire and blast rated walls. PS-10
01-D-02 Pressure Vessels Pressure vessels shall be designed for blast loads. PS-01
01-D-03 ESDV ESDV shall be designed for fire rating. PS-09
01-D-04 Riser Riser shall be designed for protected from direct jet fire impingement. PS-02
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
2- 5691-CPP-ST-RPT-0001 - CPP Substructure Design Basis
Page 39 of 66
PS-12 Active Fire Fighting
GOAL: To provide equipment to extinguish fires on the helideck, to control fires in enclosed areas (control rooms, MAEs:
machinery spaces, equipment enclosures, turbine enclosures, etc) and to distribute firewater at the required
pressures and flows for all firewater dependent systems on the facility. MAE 01, MAE 02, MAE 03, MAE 04
SCOPE: Fire fighting system consists of the following: Subject Matter Expert:
- Firewater pumps; Mohan Damuderan (Safety)
- Firewater ringmain;
- Deluge valves and nozzles;
- Gaseous fire protection system;
- Portable extinguishing system;
- Dry powder fat fryer extinguishing system;
- Fire monitors; and
- Helideck foam deluge.
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01. Firewater pump shall deliver water at The firewater pumps shall follow requirement of Firewater Demand Report 1
3
identified pressure and flow rates NFPA 20 and the capacities are 1350m /hr at pump HSE Design 2
based on the largest fire water discharge which are sized based on the largest
demand scenario. firewater demand scenario, which is Fire Zone H.
01-F-02. Protect firewater ringmain from Surge Calculations will be completed as part of the HOLD Nil
surge. Detailed Design Engineering scope.
3
01-F-03. To mitigate against the effect of Fire monitors flow capacity should be 120m /hr at HOLD Nil
process fires to aid search and minimum pressure of 7barg.
rescue. Fire hose reel should be provided
01-F-04. To extinguish fire on helideck. The helideck fire fighting system shall be provided as Firewater Demand Report 1
per CAP 437 requirements.
Foam deluge will be provided at helideck.
Page 40 of 66
01-A-01. Firewater Pumps Fire water pump system shall meet fire water 2×100% firewater pumps are provided with 1
demand at all times. redundancy of location and independent diesel engine.
01-A-02. Ringmain Firewater shall be available at all times to end users Isolation valves provide isolation of one section of the Nil
ringmain in the event of damage or maintenance, while
still providing firewater to all other sections of the
ringmain.
01-A-03. Fire monitors Fire monitors shall operate on demand. Fire monitors are provided at strategic location of the Nil
process area on each deck to ensure no two adjacent
monitors shall be out of service/impaired at once
during a credible fire
01-A-04. Foam deluge Foam deluge to be available at all time for the HOLD HOLD
helideck area.
SURVIVABILITY
01-S-01. Fire and explosion event Fire water pumps and diesel storage/supply to Fire water pumps are contained within fire/blast rated Nil
survive credible fires and explosions. wall partitions for any credible fire and/or blast
exposure.
Redundancy in fire water pump configuration
(2×100%).
Duty and standby firewater pumps are located on
opposite sides of the facility and on the utility side of
the fire/blast wall.
Survivability is assured through redundancy and
diversity of location.
Page 41 of 66
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
01-D-01. Fire & Gas Detection System To trigger firewater pumps start PS-08
01-D-02. Passive Fire Protection Fire/blast wall and fire rated enclosure protects pumps from fire / explosion. PS-11
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
1 5691-GEN-SA-RPT-0013 Firewater Demand Calculation report
2 5691-GEN-SA-RPT-0002 HSE Design Basis
Page 42 of 66
PS-13 Escape Routes
GOAL: To provide sufficient safe, diverse, correctly sized and readily identifiable escape routes to enable all personnel MAEs:
to leave an area affected by an incident or from any part of the installation they are likely to occupy, to reach the MAE 01, MAE 02, MAE 03
Temporary Refuge, and to transfer from the Temporary Refuge (TR) to the TEMPSC or liferafts embarkation area.
SCOPE: Escape routes including: Subject Matter Expert:
Escape routes from all internal and external areas that lead to the TR; Mohan Damuderan (Safety)
Escape routes from the TR that lead to the TEMPSC or liferafts;
Stairs and ladders;
Doors;
Markings and signage.
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01. Provide escape routes to TR and At least two diverse routes are provided from all Escape Route Layouts 1-10
evacuation routes between TR and working areas to the muster areas. EER Philosophy 11
evacuation embarkation areas Primary escape route area width should be 1.2m and
during a MAE. height of 2.1m.
Secondary escape route area width should be 0.7m
and height of 2.1m.
01-F-02. Stairs and ladders are adequately Stair landings on escape routes shall permit the EER Philosophy 11
sized and sufficiently safe for passage of two personnel carrying a stretcher.
personnel using them. All ladders shall be provided with latched bars for
fallback protection.
01-F-03. Escape route doors are adequately All escape doors shall open in the direction of escape EER Philosophy 11
sized for personnel using them. and sliding door shall be constructed so that they can
be easily opened from both sides.
01-F-04. Escape routes are readily Direction indication shall be provided to the muster Escape Route Layouts 1-10
identifiable and clearly signposted. area and shall be illuminated as API 14F EER Philosophy 11
requirement. Safety Design Basis 12
Page 43 of 66
01-A-01. Escape Route Escape routes to remain unobstructed and available At least two diverse routes are provided from all 1-11
at all times. working areas to the muster areas.
At least one escape/evacuation route from any plant
area to the TR should be available at all times.
SURVIVABILITY
01-S-01. Fire and Explosion At least one escape route (from any area where Escape Route Layouts 1-10
personnel are normally present) to the muster point EER Philosophy 11
shall remain unimpaired during all design major
accident events for the maximum period for which it
may be required for safe muster and emergency
response functions to be performed.
Escape doors from areas and rooms will be self
closing, rated to an equal standard of fire and blast
rating as the wall they pass through. Doors, other
than those to the accommodation space, shall be
fitted with a fire rated observation panel
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
Emergency and escape lightings provide illumination to allow mustering, communication, escape and PS-22
01-D-01. Emergency and Escape Lightings evacuation actions to be performed in an emergency.
01-D-02. Personal Survival Equipment Equipment to facilitate escape to TR provided along escape routes. PS-17
01-D-03. Structure Integrity Escape and Evacuation Routes require support from the Topsides Structure. PS-10
Page 44 of 66
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
1 5691-CPP-SA-DW-0020 Escape Routes and Safety Sign Layout Top Deck
2 5691-CPP-SA-DW-0021 Escape Routes and Safety Sign Layout Main Deck
3 5691-CPP-SA-DW-0022 Escape Routes and Safety Sign Layout Access Deck
4 5691-CPP-SA-DW-0023 Escape Routes and Safety Sign Layout Cellar Deck
5 5691-CPP-SA-DW-0024 Escape Routes and Safety Sign Layout Sump Deck
6 5691-FDP-SA-DW-0020 Escape Routes and Safety Sign Layout Main Deck
7 5691-FDP-SA-DW-0021 Escape Routes and Safety Sign Layout Mezzanine Deck
8 5691-FDP-SA-DW-0022 Escape Routes and Safety Sign Layout Cellar Deck
9 5691-FDP-SA-DW-0023 Escape Routes and Safety Sign Layout Sump Deck
10 5691-FDP-SA-DW-0024 Escape Routes and Safety Sign Layout Sea Deck
11 5691-GEN-SA-RPT-0004 Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Philosophy
Page 45 of 66
PS-14 Temporary Refuge
GOAL: To provide a safe location for personnel to muster in an emergency while attempting to bring any credible MAEs:
incident under control, or effect a controlled evacuation of the facility. MAE 01, MAE 02, MAE 03
SCOPE: All muster areas including Primary and Secondary Muster at LQ. Mohan Damuderan (Safety)
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01. TR shall provide a place where all Sufficient space provided at the muster area to allow HSE Design Basis 1
POB can muster, capable of the muster of maximum POB of 130 personnel or
2
supporting life in a major accident 0.35m /person as SOLAS requirement.
scenario. TR should be located close to the Central Control
Room to maintain communication link during
emergency.
01-F-02. Provide Alternative Muster Point for Alternative muster area shall be provided at lifeboat HSE Design Basis 1
personnel who are unable to reach embarkation area and sized to allow the assembly of EER Philosophy 2
the TR due to impairment of escape the maximum capacity of each lifeboat. Escape Routes Layout 3
routes.
01-A-01. TR and Secondary Muster Area TR and Secondary Muster Area should be available At no time shall the muster areas be blocked or Nil
at all times. reduced below the minimum area restriction.
Page 46 of 66
SURVIVABILITY
01-S-01. All Credible Major Accident Hazards TR shall provide protection to personnel from the HSE Design Basis 1
hazards of explosion, fire, heat and smoke for the
time necessary to enable an orderly evacuation to
proceed.
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
01-D-01. HVAC System Dampers closed on smoke or gas detection to minimise ingress and allow ventilation of the TR. PS-04
The substructure and topside structure provides structural support to the TR and Secondary Muster PS-10
01-D-02. Structural Integrity Area.
01-D-03. Passive Fire Protection and The fire/blast wall provides protection against topsides fire and explosion events, and limits gas PS-11
Explosion migration.
01-D-04. Escape Routes Escape routes provide access and egress to the muster points under normal and emergency conditions. PS-13
To permit relaying of emergency instructions and coordination of emergency response actions. PS-19
01-D-05. Alarm and Telecommunications To provide communications between the TR, the rescue vessel and emergency services.
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
2 5691-GEN-SA-RPT-0004 Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Philosophy
3- 5691-CPP-SA-DW-0022 - Escape Routes and Safety Sign Layout – Access Deck
Page 47 of 66
PS-15 Lifeboats (TEMPSC)
GOAL: Primary means of evacuating the platform under emergency conditions, from the installation to the nearest place MAEs:
of safety, independent of external resources. MAE 01, MAE 02, MAE 03
SCOPE: 4 × 50 men free-fall lifeboats and associated equipments: Subject Matter Expert:
Launch and release mechanisms; Mohan Damuderan (Safety)
Fuel, start and propulsion systems; and
Lifesaving equipment and survival provisions.
Note: Davits are provided to retrieve the lifeboats, hence, they are not part of the facility evacuation process and have not
been considered in the scope of this PS.
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01. TEMPSC shall provide means of 4 × 50 men TEMPSC are provided to accommodate HSE Design Basis 1
evacuation for all personnel on 100% POB as per SOLAS requirement with spare Specification for TEMPSC 2
board with sufficient capacity. unit in place. EER Philosophy 4
01-F-02. TEMPSC shall provide a method of TEMPSC shall be equipped with 2 nos. of GMDSS Specification for TEMPSC 2
communication to and provide a VHF radio telephone, for 2-way radio
means of locating the TEMPSC by communications with other vessels, 1 no of
external parties Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon
(EPIRB) for automatic transmission on aircraft and
SARSAT/COSPAS international distress frequencies
and 2 nos. of SART.
01-F-03. TEMPSC to be able to move away TEMPSC are provided with fuel capacity sufficient for Specification for TEMPSC 2
from the facility, towards a place of a minimum of 24 hours continuous operation at 6
safety, after launched. knots speed.
01-F-04. TEMPSC to contain survival A minimum amount of survival equipment and Specification for TEMPSC 2
equipment. supplies shall be as specified in LSA Code.
Page 48 of 66
01-A-01. TEMPSC TEMPSC sufficient for maximum POB shall be Provision of 4 × 50 men TEMPSC provide sufficient 1
available at all times. redundancy for evacuation.
All equipment shall be inspected for physically
damaged components and general workmanship
standards.
SURVIVABILITY
01-S-01. Fire and explosion Survivability shall be assured through TEMPSC The TEMPSC are located behind the fire/blast wall 3
location and redundancy. (and LQ), protected from process area fire/explosion
Hull and canopy is constructed with fire resistant events.
materials.
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
01-D-01. Emergency and Escape Lighting To provide illumination at the embarkation area to allow evacuation process during an emergency. PS-22
01-D-02. Escape Routes Escape Routes are required for personnel to access the TEMPSC. PS-13
01-D-03. Alarm and Telecommunications To permit relaying of emergency instructions and coordination of evacuation actions. PS-19
01-D-04. Personal Survival Equipment Lifejackets and survival suits (where used) to be worn onboard the TEMPSC. PS-17
01-D-05. Passive Fire and Protection To provide protection for TEMPSC from fire and explosion events. PS-11
01-D-06. Structural Integrity The structure supporting the evacuation facilities must remain intact for the endurance period of the TR. PS-10
Page 49 of 66
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
2 5691-GEN-SA-SP-0003 TEMPSC Specification
3 5691-CPP-SA-DW-0022 Escape Routes and Safety Sign Layout Access Deck
4- 5691-GEN-SA-RPT-0004 - Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Philosophy
Page 50 of 66
PS-16 Escape Systems
GOAL: To provide independent alternative methods of evacuation from the installation for all personnel in the event that MAEs:
primary means of evacuation are unavailable. MAE 01, MAE 02, MAE 03
SCOPE: The escape systems comprise the following equipment items, including their attachments and supports:: Subject Matter Expert:
Life rafts; and Mohan Damuderan (Safety)
Rope ladder.
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01. To provide secondary means of Life rafts are provided at four locations on the cellar Safety Equipment Layout 1,2
evacuation from the installation deck of CPP platform. Each life rafts have a capacity Safety Equipment Specification 3
when primary means of evacuation of 15 men.
(TEMPSC) are not available. Life rafts are provided at two locations on the cellar
deck of FDP platform. Each life rafts have a capacity
of 25 men.
The life rafts shall comply with the requirements of
section 4.1, 4.2 and 6.2.3 of the International Life-
Saving Appliance (LSA) Code and the latest IMO
requirements of SOLAS Convention Regulation 38.
Each Life raft shall be equipped with a manually
activated Emergency Position Indicating Radio
Beacon (EPIRB).
01-F-02. To provide an evacuation system Rope ladder shall be located adjacent to life rafts Safety Equipment Layout 1,2
allowing for dry transfer from the positions on the facilities. Safety Equipment Specification 3
platform to the launched life raft for The rope ladder shall have a minimum Safe Working
personnel. Load of 1,000 kg at one loading on the ladder.
Page 51 of 66
01-A-01. Life raft Life rafts shall be available for personnel unable to Availability is ensured through redundancy. Four 1,2
evacuate through TEMPSC. 15men life rafts are located at multiple locations on
CPP platform and two 25men life rafts located at
different locations on FDP platform
01-A-02. Rope ladder The rope ladder shall be available for personnel to Safety Equipment Specification 3
evacuate with who are unable to muster at the
Temporary Refuge and have mustered at the
Secondary Muster Area.
SURVIVABILITY
01-S-01. Fire and Explosion The life rafts and personal descent devices are Life rafts and personal descent devices shall be [5]
protected from the effects of the design case fire and provided in sufficient numbers and diverse locations
explosion event. such that no single incident (where personnel can
reasonable be expected to use the devices), can
cause impairment of all systems.
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
01-D-01. Emergency Lighting To provide illumination at the embarkation area to allow evacuation process during an emergency. PS-22
01-D-02. Escape Routes Escape Routes are required for personnel to access the life rafts and rope ladder. PS-13
01-D-03. Personal Survival Equipment Required to minimise potential for injury or increase chances of survival during evacuation. PS-17
01-D-04. Structural Integrity The structure supporting the evacuation facilities must remain intact for the endurance period. PS-10
Page 52 of 66
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
1 5691-CPP-SA-DW-0013 Safety equipment and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Cellar Deck
2 5691-FDP-SA-DW-0012 Safety equipment and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout – Cellar Deck
3 5691-GEN-SA-SP-0002 Specification for Safety Equipment
Page 53 of 66
PS-17 Personal Survival Equipment
GOAL: To provide all personnel escaping/evacuating from a hazard and personnel with specific emergency duties with MAEs:
suitable protective clothing and equipment and other lifesaving appliances. MAE 01, MAE 02, MAE 03
SCOPE: Personal survival equipment including: Subject Matter Expert:
Lifejackets; Mohan Damuderan (Safety)
Helicopter Rescue Equipment;
Self-contained Breathing Apparatus;
Emergency Equipment;
Smoke Hoods;
Lifebuoy; and
Stretcher.
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01. To provide sufficient quantities of The number of lifejackets required shall be equal to Safety Equipment Layout 1,2
lifejackets to enable personnel to the lifeboat capacity. Safety Equipment Specification 3
evacuate the installation. A lifejacket container shall be provided at muster
area near the TEMPSC.
Lifejackets shall be in accordance with International
Life Saving Appliance Code.
01-F-02. To provide Helicopter Rescue Helicopter rescue equipment shall be provided at Safety Equipment Specification 3
Equipment to support emergency close proximity to the helideck on the platform to
duties in response to helicopter ensure that the equipment is readily available
crash. irrespective of incident conditions.
Page 54 of 66
01-A-01. Personal Safety Equipment Personal Safety Equipment to be available at all Availability is ensured through redundancy. 1,2
times.
SURVIVABILITY
01-S-01. Fire and Explosion Personal safety equipment to survive credible fire Personal safety equipment will primarily be stored 3
and explosion to allow use by personnel. within safe area or protective cabinets.
01-S-02. Helicopter Crash Helicopter rescue equipment shall remain available Two sets of rescue equipment are provided at the 3
following a design helicopter impact. helideck.
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
01-D-01. Temporary Refuge Temporary refuges house some of the Personal Safety Equipment. PS-14
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
1 5691-CPP-SA-DW-0010 Safety Equipment and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout Top Deck
2 5691-CPP-SA-DW-0011 Safety Equipment and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout Main Deck
3 5691-CPP-SA-DW-0012 Safety Equipment and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout Access Deck
4 5691-CPP-SA-DW-0013 Safety Equipment and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout Cellar Deck
5 5691-CPP-SA-DW-0014 Safety Equipment and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout Sump Deck
6 5691-FDP-SA-DW-0010 Safety Equipment and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout Main Deck
7 5691-FDP-SA-DW-0011 Safety Equipment and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout Mezzanine Deck
8 5691-FDP-SA-DW-0012 Safety Equipment and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout Cellar Deck
Page 55 of 66
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
9 5691-FDP-SA-DW-0013 Safety Equipment and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout Sump Deck
10 5691-FDP-SA-DW-0014 Safety Equipment and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout SeaDeck
11 5691-GEN-SA-SP-0002 Specification for Safety Equipment
8.2 WP-PS-HD Helicopter Facilities
Page 56 of 66
PS-18 Helicopter Facilities
MAEs:
GOAL: To provide essential and emergency facilities for the safe use of the helideck.
MAE 01, MAE 02, MAE 04, MAE 05
SCOPE: Helideck facilities including: Subject Matter Expert:
– Helideck landing area; Mohan Damuderan (Safety)
– Obstacle free / limited obstacle sectors;
– Visual aids including wave-off lights;
– Markings;
– Drains;
– Perimeter safety net; and
– Fire Fighting System.
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01. Helicopter able to land and take-off The helideck will comply with the requirements of Safety Loss Prevention Philosophy 1
safely. the CAP 437 Design of Helidecks for Offshore
Installations. The landing area of the helideck will be
sized for a MI-172.
01-F-02. To provide means of fire fighting and Two local dedicated foam systems, i.e. integrated Safety Loss Prevention Philosophy 1
rescue during helideck incidents. foam spray system and another foam monitor shall Fire Fighting Equipment Layout - Helideck 2
be provided for the helideck.
Potable fire extinguishers are provided at the
helideck to ensure that the equipment is readily
available irrespective of incident conditions.
01-A-01. Helideck Nil. Nil. Nil.
Page 57 of 66
SURVIVABILITY
01-S-01. Helicopter Fire Helideck fire-fighting equipment to survive credible Survivability is ensured through redundancy and 2
emergency scenarios to allow use by personnel. diversity of location.
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
01-D-01. Active Fire Fighting Foam deluge at helideck PS-12
01-D-02. Structural Integrity Structural integrity ensures availability of helideck. PS-10
01-D-03. UPS Helideck lighting backed up by UPS. PS-20
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
1 5691-GEN-SA-RPT-0003 Safety and Loss Prevention Philosophy
2 5691-CPP-SA-DW-8318 Safety Equipment and Fire Fighting Equipment Layout For Helideck
Page 58 of 66
THIEN UNG PLATFORM FEED Safety Critical Element Performance Standard
PS-19 Alarm and Telecommunications
GOAL: To ensure that all personnel on Thien Ung Platform at any location are made aware of any need for mustering or MAEs:
abandonment once the decision has been made. MAE 01, MAE02, MAE 04, MAE 05
SCOPE: Facility for both Internal and External Communications include the following: Subject Matter Expert:
– Public Address and General Alarm (PA/GA) system; Zailan Yassin (Telecom)
– VSAT Satellite Communication;
– VHF-FM Marine Base Radio and Portables;
– Non-Directional Beacon (NDB); and
– VHF Aeronautical radio system.
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01. Public Address and General Alarm Sufficient quantities of PA/GA loudspeakers shall be Telecommunications System Design Basis 1
system capable of reaching all areas installed to allow the broadcast of voice
of the installation where personnel announcements and alarm tones to all areas of the
are frequently present. TUP, with the exception of designated high ambient
noise areas.
Emergency alarms level shall be 65 dBA in minimum
and 6 dBA above the maximum background noise
level. In the areas where the noise level exceeds 85
dBA, visual alarms in the form of strobe lights shall
be used to supplement the audible alarms.
01-F-02. Communication systems to enable Intercom and paging system shall be designed to Telecommunications System Design Basis 1
two way communications within the provide five-party lines for individual two-way
facility. communications.
For life-saving use, two-way VHF-FM Radiophone
shall be provided to be stowed away on Thien Ung
platform for life rafts use.
01-F-03. To provide means of VSAT satellite link is provided for communication Telecommunications System Design Basis 1
communications between the Thien with the offshore Thien Ung Platform.
Ung Platform and VSP office in
Vung Tau.
Page 59 of 66
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-04. To provide means of Marine VHF radio system is provided to transmit and Telecommunications System Design Basis 1
communications between the Thien receive a distress signal and to communicate with
Ung Platform and the supply boat shipping, other offshore facilities and emergency
and ships. facilities.
01-F-05. To provide means of Non Directional Beacon (NDB) shall be installed on Telecommunications System Design Basis 1
communications between the Thien Thien Ung platform to provide guidance for helicopter
Ung Platform and helicopters. landing on the platform.
01-A-01. PA/GA system Alarms should be provided by a range of methods The PAGA system shall be dual/duplicated and 1
and/or equipment at diverse locations such that an centrally-controlled. Should any part of the system
alternative is available on single failure. fails, the backup system shall take control and provide
the necessary service to maintain integrity of
operation.
01-A-02. UHF-FM Communication system No single fault shall result in the loss of channels to Repeater should be considered to ensure sufficient 1
single remote users, or total loss of the system. coverage of radio signal on the various parts of the
platform.
SURVIVABILITY
01-S-01. Fire and Explosion. PA/GA and UHF radio system remains operable All PA/GA and UHF radio system cable shall be fire 1
during the design fire case. resistant to IEC 60331.
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
01-D-01. Uninterruptible Power Supply The UPS provides a secure source of power for the telecommunications system during emergency. PS-20
01-D-02. Fire and Gas System PA/GA is initiated by signal from fire and gas system. PS-08
Page 60 of 66
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
1 5691-GEN-IN-RPT-0003 Telecommunications System Design Basis
Page 61 of 66
PS-20 Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS)
MAEs:
GOAL: To provide a reliable source of electrical power to the critical safety systems requiring it in the event of main
power failure or shutdown. MAE 01 , MAE 02, MAE 03, MAE 04,
MAE 05
SCOPE: UPS Power and Distribution System
Bernard Lip (Electrical)
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01. Provision of power supply to critical A 400/230V, 3 phase, 50 Hz (or 230V, 1 phase, 50 Electrical Design Philosophy 1
loads upon loss of main and Hz) UPS system shall be provided to power vital
emergency powers. electrical loads such as telecommunication systems,
aircraft control, instrumentation systems such as
ESD and F&G, obstruction lights, illuminated
windsock, package UCP and helideck lighting.
LV Switchboard/MCC control and HV Switchgear
tripping circuits shall be supplied by dedicated 110V
DC UPS system.
Marine navigational aids system shall be supplied by
dedicated 24V DC UPS system.
LQ shall be supplied by dedicated 230V, I-phase and
50Hz UPS system.
Batteries shall be sized with a 25% ageing factor and
a further 10% contingency shall be added.
Page 62 of 66
01-A-01. UPS UPS power system to be available at all times The UPS system shall be configured as 100% dual 1
redundant system for both DC and AC UPS system,
except for 24V DC UPS system for marine navaids
system and 230V, I-phase, 50Hz UPS system for the
LQ which are both configured for 1X100% UPS only.
SURVIVABILITY
01-S-01. Fire and explosion UPS to survive credible Fire and Explosion. UPS located in Battery Room which is located behind 2
the firewall.
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
01-D-01. Passive Fire Protection UPS / Emergency Power systems are protected by firewall. PS-11
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
2 5691-CPP-PI-DW-0004 Central Processing Platform – Equipment Layout Access Deck
Page 63 of 66
PS-21 Navigational Aids (NAVAIDS)
MAEs:
GOAL: To alert marine vessels and aircraft of the position of the facility.
MAE 07
SCOPE: The installation location systems comprise: Subject Matter Expert:
– Marine navigational lights; Bernard Lip (Electrical)
– Foghorns; -
– Aviation obstruction lights; and
– Helideck lightings.
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01. To provide audible and visual Main white navigational lights shall be provided in Electrical Design Basis 1
prompts to air and marine traffic to compliance with IALA recommendations.
alert them to the position of the
facility.
01-F-02. Aircraft warning lights shall be Helideck lighting shall be provided in accordance Electrical Design Basis 1
designed such that glaring to the with ICAO or CAP 437.
pilot and hazard to helicopter
approach.
01-F-03. Navigation aids/aviation obstruction The marine navigational lights shall have battery Electrical Design Basis 1
lighting able to operate following configuration for 96 hours or 4 days of independent
main and emergency power failure. operation.
01-F-04. Foghorns shall be provided for Installed locations of the foghorns shall enable the Electrical Design Basis 1
deployment during periods of poor blasts to be in unison, heard from all approach
visibility. directions to the CPP/FDP complex.
01-A-01. Navigation lights, foghorns and Navaids/aviation obstruction light to be continuously Reliability/availability is achieved through redundancy Nil
aviation obstruction lights. available at dark or night time. in provision of navaids/aviation obstruction lamps.
Page 64 of 66
SURVIVABILITY
01-S-01. Not applicable. Nil. Nil. Nil.
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
01-D-01. UPS Provide emergency power supply to navigational aids in the event of main power failure. PS-20
DOCUMENT REFERENCES
1 5691-GEN-SA-RPT-0001 Electrical Design Basis
Page 65 of 66
PS-22 Emergency Lighting
MAEs:
GOAL: To provide adequate illumination at emergency response locations and along escape routes during emergency. MAE 01, MAE 02, MAE 03, MAE 04, MAE
05
SCOPE: Emergency and escape lightings including the following: Subject Matter Expert:
– Escape lighting including integral batteries; Bernard Lip (Electrical)
– Illuminated emergency exit signage including integral batteries; and
– Emergency lighting powered by external emergency power system.
FUNCTIONALITY
01-F-01. To provide sufficient illumination to Emergency lighting luminaries shall be installed at Electrical Design Basis 1
enable escape, evacuation and strategic locations including control rooms,
emergency response actions. switchgear room, instrument room, living quarters,
escape routes and areas where required for safety
reasons
Part of emergency lighting to be escape lighting and
be located such as to illuminate the escape routes,
ladders and walkways to allow safe movement of
personnel to the muster points, lifeboats, etc
Escape lighting shall be fed and equipped in the
same fashion as the rest of the emergency lighting
except with internal self contained battery back-up for
a 90 minutes autonomy time.
The battery shall be recharged within six (6) hours.
01-F-02. To provide illumination to enable Escape luminaries shall be installed at the exit doors, Electrical Design Basis 1
escape from rooms. sleeping cabin, external and internal escape ways
and muster area.
Minimum required level of illumination is 1 lux along
the centre line of an escape route.
Page 66 of 66
01-A-01. Emergency and escape lightings Sufficient emergency and escape lighting for Reliability/availability are assured through redundancy Nil
escape/evacuation shall be available at all times. of lighting fixtures (with self-contained batteries).
SURVIVABILITY
01-S-01. Fire and explosion Emergency lighting (in areas not directly effected by Survivability is ensured through redundancy in lighting Nil
fire and explosion) to remain in operation for units/power supplies and location.
sufficient duration to ensure safe escape and
evacuation.
DEPENDENCY
Performance
Standard Ref.
01-D-01. UPS Provide power supply to emergency lighting in the event of main power is not available. PS-20
DOCUMENT REFERENCES

Safety Critical Elements and Performance Standards Report Summary

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FRONT-END ENGINEERING DESIGN (FEED) DOC NO.

SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS AND Page 2 of 66

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................... 4

2.0 ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................... 5

3.0 GENERAL ................................................................................................................................ 6

3.2 Objective .................................................................................................................................. 7

3.3 Scope ....................................................................................................................................... 7

4.0 Definitions ............................................................................................................................... 8

4.1 Major Accident Event (MAE) .................................................................................................... 8

4.2 Safety Critical Element (SCE) .................................................................................................. 8

4.3 Performance Standards (PS) ................................................................................................... 8

5.0 MAJOR ACCIDENT EVENTS (MAE) ...................................................................................... 9

6.0 SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS (SCE) ................................................................................ 10

7.0 PERFORMANCE STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT ............................................................... 11

8.0 PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ........................................................................................... 11

PS-01 Hydrocarbon Containment - Topsides ........................................................................ 12

PS-02 Hydrocarbon Containment - Riser .............................................................................. 14

PS-03 Pressure Relief Systems ............................................................................................. 16

PS-04 HVAC Enclosed Areas ................................................................................................ 18

PS-05 Hazardous Open Drains.............................................................................................. 20

PS-06 Cranes and Lifting Equipment ..................................................................................... 22

PS-07 Hazardous Area Hardware.......................................................................................... 25

PS-08 Fire & Gas Detection System ...................................................................................... 27

PS-09 Emergency Shutdown and Blowdown System ........................................................... 31

PS-10 Structural Integrity ....................................................................................................... 34

PS-11 Passive Fire and Explosion Protection ....................................................................... 37

PS-12 Active Fire Fighting ..................................................................................................... 39

PS-13 Escape Routes ............................................................................................................ 42

PS-14 Temporary Refuge ...................................................................................................... 45

SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS AND Page 3 of 66

PS-15 Lifeboats (TEMPSC) ................................................................................................... 47

PS-16 Escape Systems ......................................................................................................... 50

PS-17 Personal Survival Equipment ...................................................................................... 53

PS-18 Helicopter Facilities ..................................................................................................... 56

PS-19 Alarm and Telecommunications .................................................................................. 58

PS-20 Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) ............................................................................ 61

PS-21 Navigational Aids (NAVAIDS) ..................................................................................... 63

PS-22 Emergency Lighting .................................................................................................... 65

SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS AND Page 4 of 66

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Table 1-1 – Safety Critical Elements of Thien Ung Platform

PS No. Safety Critical Element (SCE) Reviewed By (Disciplines)

PS-06 Crane and Lifting Equipments Mechanical

PS-07 Hazardous Area Hardware Electrical

PS-09 Emergency Shutdown and Blowdown System Process / Instrument / Safety

PS-10 Structural Integrity Structural

PS-12 Active Fire Fighting Safety

PS-13 Escape Routes Safety

PS-22 Emergency Lighting Electrical

SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS AND Page 5 of 66

SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS AND Page 6 of 66

Figure 3-1 – Thien Ung Reservoir Location

SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS AND Page 7 of 66

To identify the Safety Critical Elements;

SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS AND Page 8 of 66

4.1 Major Accident Event (MAE)

4.2 Safety Critical Element (SCE)

1. The failure of which could cause or contribute substantially to a major incident, or

2. The purpose of which is to prevent or limit the effects of a major incident.

4.3 Performance Standards (PS)

SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS AND Page 9 of 66

5.0 MAJOR ACCIDENT EVENTS (MAE)

Table 5.1 Major Accident Events on Thien Ung Platform