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A. W. MOORE 3 Sense-making From a Human Point of View I.THE ARTISTIC CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY A view famously held by Bernard Williams is that philosophy is a humanistic discipline (Williams 2006b).' I entirely endorse this view — and the reasons he gives for it. I have tried to defend something similar elsewhere (Moore 2012: esp. 602-4).* I shall not try to offer any further defence here. For the purposes of this essay Ishall take the view in question as a kind of datum. I am concerned with what follows from it, or rather with what follows from one particular embellishment of it, and with certain problems that this embellishment poses. But I must begin by saying something about what the view is; or rather, what it is not. It is not the view that philosophy is one of the human sciences. One might think that this barely needs saying. For one thing, is there not a familiar and well entrenched distinction, within academia, between the humanities and the human sciences? Maybe there is (although it is worth remembering that there are at least two disciplines, history and linguistics, which are standardly included in the humanities and which might also reasonably be classified as human sciences).’ However, that is beside the point. For the point is not simply to classify philosophy as one of the humanities either. (Williams makes this clear right at the beginning of his essay.) The point is rather, as Williams himself puts it, to signal ‘what models or ideals or analogies [we] should ... look to in thinking about the ways in which philosophy should be done’ (Williams 2006b: 180}. A slogan that helps to convey the point is this: philosophy, though it is not anthropological, is anthropocentric. That is to say, philosophy, though it is not the scientific study of human beings or of any of the peculiarities that mark their way of 44 Sense-making From a Human Point of View 4s life, has a fundamental concern with human beings and with what it takes to be one and is properly pursued, at the deepest level, from a human point of view. Philosophy is an attempt, by humans, from their unique position in the world, to make sense both of themselves and of that position. But ‘make sense of’ is a polymorphous term. One respect in which I would want to go beyond what Williams says is by urging that we take seriously the term's overtones of invention rather than discovery in this context. I believe that the sense-making involved in philosophy, at least in philosophy of the best sort, is, quite literally, sense-making: not an exploration of something antecedently given, but a creation of something, most notably a creation of concepts by which to live (such as Kant’s concept of a kingdom of ends, or Nietzsche's concept of eternal return, to pick two signal examples|.* Let us call the conception of philosophy on which it is both humanistic in Williams’ sense and creative in the sense just indicated the ‘artistic’ conception. (This is what Ihad in mind when Ireferred to an embellishment of Williams’ view.) Now if, as I hold, the artistic conception is correct, then we can straight away identify two things of which philosophers need to beware: one of these relates primarily to the element of humanism in the conception, the other to the element of creativity in it. The first thing of which they need to beware, the one that relates primarily to the element of humanism in the conception, is scientism. That is, they need to beware of the unwarranted appropriation of procedures that are suited to the natural sciences. Sometimes the appropriation of such procedures in the pursuit of philosophy is perfectly acceptable and not precluded by anything that Ihave said on behalf of the conception. For instance, among the many things in which philosophers can quite properly show an interest are the natural sciences themselves, these being (after all) a very significant part of human life; and such an interest may well include self-conscious engagement with them (cf. Williams 2006b: 182 and Williams 2006¢: 203). But there can be no presumption that procedures suited to the natural sciences will in general serve philosophy well. ‘The second thing of which philosophers need to beware, the one that relates primarily to the element of creativity in the artistic conception, is conservatism. If one of the purposes of philosophy is sense-making, understood quite literally as the production of 46 lw. MOORE something, then philosophers had better not be too beholden to extant forms of sense-making. They had better feel no compunction about modifying these, extending them in various ways, establishing new connections between them, supplementing them — or even challenging, disrupting, discarding, and replacing them.’ This I take to be an anti-Wittgensteinian idea. Wittgenstein is not in general a conservative with respect to sense-making (see e.g., Wittgenstein 1967: §132). But he is a conservative with respect to sense-making in philosophy, which he famously says ‘leaves everything as it is’ [ibid.: $124). For Wittgenstein, the purpose of philosophy is to cure us of the confusions that arise when we mishandle our own conceptual apparatus (ibid.: §§89-133). Innovation in our sense- making can only ever bring with it the risk of new confusions whereas, on Wittgenstein’s view, philosophers should be looking to minimize that risk. That is contrary to the spirit of the artistic conception. 2, THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY: A PROBLEM FOR THE ARTISTIC CONCEPTION It is instructive, in the light of these twin dangers of scientism and conservatism, to consider how the artistic conception relates to the distinction that is standardly drawn between ‘analytic’ philosophy and ‘continental’ philosophy. Now I am, in common with many others, impatient both with the connotations that the drawing of this distinction typically has and with the absurd terminology that is used to draw it (cf. Williams 2006¢: 201). But I do not deny that such a distinction exists; nor do I'see any great advantage in trying, at this stage, to promote a new label for it. More to the point, I think that the distinction has something to teach us about the artistic conception. It does this by creating a paradox vis-i-vis that conception. For, as far as actual practice is concerned, it is continental philosophers whom we might expect to be more sympathetic to the conception. They are the ones who seem more ready to engage with other humanistic disciplines, such as history and literary theory, and to do so, moreover, in such a way as to suggest some continuity with their own endeavours. They are the ones whose practice is on the whole more playful. Sense-making From a Human Point of View 47 Analytic philosophers are the ones who more often proceed as though they were mapping the features of something independent mapping, indeed independent of humanity altogether. They are the ones who are more likely to need reminding of the danger of scientism. On the other hand, as far as self-image is concerned, that is as far as the practitioners’ own conception of the scope and limits of philosophy is concerned, it is, if not exactly the other way round, then at least more nearly the other way round. Analytic philosophers are the ones who are liable to think that what they do is regulated by appeal to, or with reference to, some such fundamentally human phenomenon as language or discursive knowledge.” It is among continental philosophers that we are more likely to find the view that what philosophy is, first and foremost, is pursuit of the great questions of ontology.* Part of my response to this paradox is simply to acknowledge a failing in the practice of some analytic philosophers, a failing which does indeed suggest that they have paid insufficient heed to the danger of scientism. It is not just that their practice is not true to. philosophy as I conceive it, that is to the artistic conception. Their practice is not true to philosophy as they conceive it. Nor is it true to their own heritage. A significant part of that heritage is the aim, not only to make sense, but to make clear sense, where clarity is a matter of presentation, and where presentation presupposes an audience. Analytic philosophers should be more self-conscious than they very often are, first about who their audience might be, and second about the need to make sense of things from some suitable point of view that they share with that audience. This shared point of view will typically be much more restricted than a human point of view. But it will not typically be less restricted. For one prominent example of the failing that I have in mind, consider Derek Parfit’s book Reasons and Persons (1984). In his conclusion to that book, Parfit discusses the various kinds of argument that he has invoked. He says that these lie between two extremes (where ‘between’ is understood in such a way that this includes the two extremes themselves|: what he calls ‘the Low Road’, which ‘merely appeals to our intuitions’, and what he calls ‘the High Road’, which ‘asks what is the meaning of moral language, or the nature of moral reasoning’ (Parfit 1984: 447). Both extremes, and the territory between them, involve a human clement of the 48 A.W. MOORE kind to which I have alluded. Yet Parfit’s conclusions in the book are notoriously detached from any relevant point of view that he might share with his audience. For instance, he argues that there are good reasons to induce in ourselves dispositions that will subserve a certain ethical theory while keeping the content of that theory hidden (Parfit 1984: Pt. I, passim); but he does little or nothing to say what this means from the point of view of those for whom, if he were right, the practicalities of inducing such dispositions (not least by suppressing reflective self-consciousness of the very kind that his own argument has instilled) would constitute a real social and political problem.’ Is there a mirror-image failing in the practice of some continental philosophers? Is there a similar mismatch between their practice and their self-image? That would afford an interesting symmetry, if it were so. In fact, however, there is no obvious reason to think that it is 80 ~ not if we focus on the anthropocentrism that is evidenced in their practice. The great questions of ontology can certainly be addressed in an anthropocentric way. Phenomenology provides the model. Heidegger at one point equates phenomenology with ontology (and cach, in tum, with philosophy}; but he also insists that it should be executed with peculiar reference to the sort of being that each human being is, namely Dasein (Heidegger 1962: 61-2). I said that we see no mirror-image failing in the practice of continental philosophers if we focus on the anthropocentrism that is evidenced in their practice, But what if we focus on the creativity that is evidenced in their practice - creativity being the other element in the artistic conception ~ and then reflect on the associated danger of conservatism? Is there perhaps, if not a tension between addressing the great questions of ontology and proceeding anthropocentrically, then a tension between doing both of those things and being radically innovative? What tension do I have in mind? Well, consider this. Why should the radical innovation that I have suggested is a feature of the best philosophy not be so radical that it brings us to a new conception of who ‘we’ are and of what it takes to be one of ‘us’; so radical, in other words, that it provides us with ways of making sense of things that leave our humanity behind? There are various things that might be at stake here. We might come to reassess the relations between human beings and other animals in such a way that the former no Sense-making From a Human Point of View 49 longer have the special significance for us that is required for there to be a distinctively human point of view. Or advances in technology might challenge the very application of the concept of a human being in such a way that we are eventually led to abandon the concept altogether. And there is indeed, in certain continental philosophers, a preparedness, if not an aspiration, to think beyond the human in this way. Foucault, Deleuze, and Guattari are among the clearest and most interesting cases in point."" How can philosophy be pursued in a spirit such as this, while remaining resolutely anthropocentric? It is a good question. There is certainly a tension here. It is not, however, a tension that peculiarly afflicts any continental philosophers. I represented it above as a tension between three elements: the anthropocentrism evidenced in the practice of continental philosophers; the creativity evidenced there, where this is creativity of a kind that allows for radical innovation; and the pursuit of the great questions of ontology that many continental philosophers take to be their métier. But the third is not really relevant. The tension is already there between the first two. And this means that, if it afflicts anyone, it afflicts me. For those are precisely the two elements in the artistic conception. It is an urgent question for me, then, how this tension can be resolved. 3. THINKING BEYOND THE HUMAN IN PHILOSOPHY Is the following a reasonable way of resolving the tension? We should indeed be open to the possibility of thinking beyond the human in philosophy. But what this means is that we humans should be open to the possibility of thinking beyond the human in philosophy. We should be open to the possibility that our philosophy will one day no longer need to be, or may even one day no longer have the proper resources to be, anthropocentric. Nevertheless, we cannot oversee its becoming non-anthropocentric except by overseeing its evolution from something anthropocentric. And ‘evolution’ is the right word here. Nothing can happen in a metamorphic flash. Quite apart from whatever gradual transformation may have to be involved in our coming to embrace non-human possibilities outside philosophy, there is a gradual transformation that will certainly have to be involved in our coming to embrace non-human possibilities within philosophy. We cannot come to make radically new 50 AW. MOORE philosophical sense of things save through a progressive piecemeal process. |This is a conceptual point, not an anthropological point. There is a limit to how drastic and how rapid an upheaval in our philosophical sense-making can be while still counting as an upheaval in our philosophical sense-making - as opposed to our being as it were magically transported to some new position on the philosophical landscape.) So for now our philosophy needs to be anthropocentric. That is the only way, for now, in which we its practitioners can appropriate the sense that it helps us to make of things as distinctively ours, and the only way, therefore, in which we can recognize it as having the value and importance for us that it should. The tension between philosophy's anthropocentrism and its creativity is resolved by our recognizing the former as provisional. Yes, I think that is a reasonable way of resolving the tension, at least in outline. Even so, I am uncomfortable with letting the matter rest there. For I also think we should be extremely wary of thinking beyond the human in this way. [have already remarked on Wittgenstein’s conservatism and Deleuze’s anti-conservatism; and Thave made it clear that my sympathies are with the latter. However, there is a further, related disparity between the two thinkers with respect to which my sympathies are more with the former. And this inclines me towards a conservatism of practice, if not of principle. ‘The disparity that 1 have in mind turns on Wittgenstein’s and Deleuze’s different conceptions of the given. Wittgenstein says that what are given are forms of life (Wittgenstein 1967: 226). Deleuze says that what are given are differences (Deleuze 1994: 222), It is not obvious that there is any conflict between these —not least because it is not obvious that they mean the same by ‘the given’, Even so, there is. For Wittgenstein, a form of life, which he relates very closely to a language (Wittgenstein 1967: §§19, 23, and 241], provides a kind of framework within which sense is made of things. The limits of our form of life, we might say, are the limits of our world. That would be an anathema for Deleuze, for whom all unity ~ including the unity of any framework of this kind - has to be constituted within multiplicity, that is to say within what he counts as the given," and must itself, accordingly, be made sense of in the same way as everything else. T lean towards Wittgenstein in this conflict. There seems to me something fundamentally right in the idea that, for sense to be Sense-making From a Human Point of View st made of things, there must first of all be some such framework for it to be made within, a framework determining whose sense it is And if there is something fundamentally right in this idea, then any disruption of the sort that would be required for us to think beyond the human in philosophy would have to be a disruption to more than just our sense-making. There would have to be, beyond whatever new sense we made of things, a new ‘we’ making it. For Deleuze, too, there would have to be a new ‘we’, But, for Deleuze, this new ‘we’ would itself be a product of our sense-making, a sort of self-creation. The changes that would be involved in our thinking beyond the human, however extreme, would be of a piece with the changes that would be involved in our extending our sense-making in any other way. On a more Wittgensteinian conception, however, something more radical would be at stake. And the radicalness would be an ethical radicalness. For, in so far as the primary ethical question is the question of what it is for ‘us’ to live well, ethics itself would be called into question. None of this is a conclusive reason to eschew all such disruption. But it is a reason, an ethical reason, to tread extremely carefully. 4. SPINOZA: A CASE STUDY Let us take the case of Spinoza.’ Spinoza might be reckoned an opponent of anthropocentrism in philosophy. One of his best known doctrines is that our supreme virtue involves our making sense of things sub specie «ternitatis (Spinoza 2002: Pt. V, Props 2gif.). In fact, however ~ be the interpretation of that doctrine as it may ~ there is something profoundly anthropocentric in Spinoza's philosophy. Nowhere is this more blatant than in his account of the difference between good and bad. Spinoza denies that these are anything ‘positive considered in themselves’ (ibid.: Pt. IV, Pref.) Rather, they are ways we have of thinking of things, according to our desires. Thus, in Spinoza’s view, we judge a thing to be good because we desire it; we do not desire it because we judge it to be good ibid.: Pt. II, Prop. 9, Schol.). This, of course, entails a kind of relativism, as Spinoza freely acknowledges (e.g,, ibid.: Pt. III, Prop. 39, Schol., and Pt. IV, Pref.). Nevertheless, because he believes that there is a ‘model of human nature that we all set before ourselves’, and because he is writing from a shared human point of view, 52 AL W. MOORE Spinoza is able to bypass the relativism and define the good as ‘that which we certainly know to be the means for our approaching nearer to the model’ and the bad as ‘that which we certainly know prevents us from reproducing the said model’ (ibid.: Pt. IV, Pref). Such anthropocentrism is striking in its own right. But it is striking also for a more indirect reason, highly pertinent to the caution that I am now urging. It counteracts what would otherwise be a disturbing and sinister aspect of Spinoza’s philosophy, itself a natural attendant of the relativism to which he is committed, namely the doctrine that the right of each thing extends as far as its power does (Spinoza 2002b: Ch. 16, §4)."° Thus the right of a tiger on the loose extends as far as its power does; the right of a cancerous growth extends as far as its power does; the right of a repressive regime extends as far as its power does. Spinoza’s anthropocentrism provides a bulwark here. As soon as we can sce that an exercise of one of these powers is preventing us from reproducing the model of human nature in some way, we can sce that it is bad; and we can accordingly resist it. ‘To quote Max Stirner: ‘The tiger that assails me is in the right, and I who strike him down am also in the right. I defend against him not my right, but myself" (Stirner 1982: 128, emphasis in original). By the same token, were we to start trying to extend Spinozism beyond the human, we would undermine the assurances that such anthropocentrism provides and exacerbate that which is troubling in Spinoza’s power-centred vision. We might, for instance, begin to take seriously a point of view from which the flourishing of individuals was subordinate to the flourishing of the state. Admittedly, ‘assurances’ and ‘troubling’, like ‘good’ and ‘bad’, are to be understood from a human point of view. But that, ina way, is the point. The point is not that there is some neutral position from which to evaluate different forms of philosophizing; precisely not. ‘The point is that our philosophizing and our evaluating are, at least for now, from a common point of view, a human point of view, and, as long as that is the case, we are bound to acknowledge the dangers, that is to say the human dangers, in its being otherwise. To be sure, the sheer fact that there is no Archimedean point means that it is equally important for us to acknowledge the dangers, perhaps the non-human dangers, in our remaining beholden to one particular philosophical paradigm.” But that does not gainsay the conclusion that philosophy is, at least for now, an exercise in making Sense-making From a Human Point of View 53 sense of things from a human point of view. It merely reinforces the conclusion that we must proceed with care when doing philosophy. Only, let us not underestimate the force of this conclusion. For if philosophy is an exercise in making sense of things from a human point of view - if, as I put it earlier, philosophy is an attempt, by humans, from their unique position in the world, to make sense both of themselves and of that position ~ then the care with which ‘we must proceed when we are doing philosophy is the care with which we must proceed when our very humanity is in question." NOTES 1 See also (Williams 2014) for associated reflections on the nature of the humanities. 2 Something similar but not the same, because my concern in that book is specifically with metaphysics and not with philosophy more generally. Still, my concern is with metaphysics on a somewhat idiosyncratic and very generous characterization of metaphysics, as the most general attempt to make sense of things (a characterization that many people would in fact take to be more appropriate for philosophy as a whole|. And much of what this excludes within philosophy - such as aesthetics, ethics, political philosophy, and philosophy of religion ~ gives the discipline, if anything, an even greater claim to the title of being humanistic. 3 It is also worth remembering that Collingwood took metaphysics to be a branch of history: see (Collingwood 1998). (That said, he did not take philosophy to be a branch of history: see (Collingwood 2005: Ch. 10, §3).) 4 This too is a view that I have tried to defend elsewhere, in relation specifically to metaphysics but with implications for philosophy more generally (see Moore 2012: esp. Intro., §7, and Concl., §4). I say that I am going beyond what Williams says. But am I in fact doing something more radical than that? Am I contradicting what he says? In particular, does the view that philosophy is creative in the sense indicated conflict with Williams’ insistence that ‘there has to be such a thing in philosophy as getting it right’ (Williams 2006c: 202, emphasis in original)? I do not think so. This is because I do not think that answering to something antecedently given is EG only way of ‘getting it right’ {sce MIBBIE 2012: 381, 393-4). Certainly, my view does not conflict with the idea that there is such a thing in philosophy as doing it well. 5 Williams spends a great deal of time issuing warnings against scientism in philosophy, for example (Williams 2006b} and (2006e: passim). Warnings against conservatism in philosophy, unsurprisingly, are less visible in his work; unsurprisingly, because the corresponding idea that philosophy is creative is not there. But such warnings are not absent from his work altogether. They hardly could be, given that there is a closely associated 54 A.W. MOORE idea that is quite certainly in his work, namely that reflection must sometimes be allowed to disturb the concepts by which we live: see, for example [Williams 2006e, esp. Chs 8 and 9). 6 Cf. Dummett’s contention that ‘the philosophy of language is the foundation of all other philosophy’ (Dummett 1978: 442), or Quine’s suggestion that ‘philosophy of science is philosophy enough’ (Quine 1966: 151), where by ‘science’ he means not much more than organized knowledge (see e.g., Quine and Ullian 1978: 3} 7 Admittedly, these phenomena can be objects of {non-anthropocentric) scientific study. But their relevance to analytic philosophy is of a different ilk. If an analytic philosopher, reflecting on how (say] the word ‘causation’ is used, denies that there is any such thing as backward causation, then he or she is not announcing the result of an empirical investigation into the use of the word ‘causation’; he or she is enunciating a rule for its use, (Here I am betraying my Wittgensteinianism, my earlier complaint about Wittgenstein notwithstanding: cf. (Wittgenstein 1967: §383); cf. also (Hacker 1996, esp. Ch. 8}, and (Hacker 2007: 7-11),) For a sustained discussion of the relations between analytic philosophy and language from a deeply opposed perspective see [Williamson 2007: passim). What may be true is that the kind of attention that analytic philosophers pay language shows that they have not indulged in that suspension of our natural-scientific modes of thought which phenomenologists take as their starting point: what they call the epoche (cf. Moore 2012: 431; and for an explanation of the epoche see Husserl 1970: §35). But that is not, in itself, any offence to the artistic conception. There are all manner of ways in which philosophy might distance itself from the natural sciences without going as far as suspending their very modes of thought. (Some phenomenologists are perhaps insufficiently sensitive to this point: seee.g., Husserl 1962: §62.) Note that a yet different approach to philosophy has recently emerged, under the title ‘experimental philosophy’, which retains a broadly analytic interest in language but which also involves significant use of empirical investigation, notably the empirical investigation of people's linguistic intuitions (sce e.g., Knobe and Nichols 2008}. 8 Cf Heidegger's claim that ‘ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical disciplines among others’ but rather that they ‘characterize philosophy itself’ and that ‘philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology’ (Heidegger 1962: 62). 1 shall have a little more to say about this shortly. 9 Parfit’s book may also contain another prominent example of what Ihave in mind. He argues that personal identity is nothing over and above certain impersonally understood facts of bodily and psychological continuity (Parfitt 1984 Ill, passim}. And he tries to draw conclusions about persons, in particular ethical conclusions, that can themselves be understood impersonally. But there is good reason to think that only from a certain point of view involving a set of values that run contrary to these conclusions can there be any meaningful talk of persons in the first place {sce further Moore 1997: 229-32). 0 Reviews Write review The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology edited by Gluseppina D'Oro, Seren Overgaard aw moore The Cambri Go About this book > My library + My History Books on Google Play Terms of Service CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Pages displayed by permission of Cambridge University Press. Copyright. viii Contents 7 Armchair Metaphysics Revisited: The Three Grades of Involvement in Conceptual Analysis 122 FRANK JACKSON 8 A Naturalistic Methodology 141 9 What is Negative Experimental Philosophy Good For? 161 JONATHAN M. WEINBERG Part II: Between Analysis and the Continent 185 10 Life-changing Metaphysics: Rational Anthropology and its Kantian 18 ROBERT HANNA 11 Collingwood’s Idealist Metaontology: Between Therapy and Armchair Science 211 GIUSEPPINA D‘ORO 12 Pragmatism and the Limits of Metaphilosophy 229 ‘ROBERT B. TALISSE 13 On Metaphysical Quietism and Everyday Life 249 DAVID MACARTHUR 14 The Metaphilosophy of the Analytic-Continental Divide: From History to Hope 274 ROBERT PIERCEY Part IV: Continental perspectives 293 15 Phenomenological Method and the Achievement of Recognition: Who’s Been Waiting for Phenomenology? 295 pave SeRRONE 16 Existentialist Methodology and Perspective: Writing the First Person 317 J. REYNOLDS AND P. STOKES viii Contents 7 Armchair Metaphysics Revisited: The Three Grades of Involvement in Conceptual Analysis 122 FRANK JACKSON 8 A Naturalistic Methodology 141 9 What is Negative Experimental Philosophy Good For? 161 JONATHAN M. WEINBERG Part II: Between Analysis and the Continent 185 10 Life-changing Metaphysics: Rational Anthropology and its Kantian 18 ROBERT HANNA 11 Collingwood’s Idealist Metaontology: Between Therapy and Armchair Science 211 GIUSEPPINA D‘ORO 12 Pragmatism and the Limits of Metaphilosophy 229 ‘ROBERT B. TALISSE 13 On Metaphysical Quietism and Everyday Life 249 DAVID MACARTHUR 14 The Metaphilosophy of the Analytic-Continental Divide: From History to Hope 274 ROBERT PIERCEY Part IV: Continental perspectives 293 15 Phenomenological Method and the Achievement of Recognition: Who’s Been Waiting for Phenomenology? 295 pave SeRRONE 16 Existentialist Methodology and Perspective: Writing the First Person 317 J. REYNOLDS AND P. STOKES List of Contributors Acknowledgements Introduction Part I: Visions of Philosophy 1 Doing Philosophy 13 -ALESSANDRA TANESINI 2 Philosophy as Rational Systematization NICHOLAS RESCHER 3 Sense-making From a Human Point of View ‘AW, MOORE 4 Disagreement in Philosophy: An Optimistic Perspective HERMAN CAPPELEN Part I: Conceptual Analysis and the Naturalistic Challenge 5 Impure Conceptual Analysis HANS-JOHANN GLOCK 6 What Can We Do, When We Do Metaphysics? AMIE L. THOMASSON Re

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