1

The Power of a Wavelet Coefficient in

Progressive Image Transmission

J. A. Garcia,∗ Rosa Rodriguez-Sánchez, J. Fdez-Valdivia,

and J. Martinez-Baena.

Abstract

The social power of a wavelet coefficient depends on the chance it has of being critical to the success –in

order to achieve higher coding priority– of any coalition of coefficients.

Here we show that the design of a prioritization protocol in progressive transmission often conceals a

bias in the power distribution of wavelet coefficients which is unsuspected and unintended by the authors of

this protocol.

In case there is no domination structure that may influence social power, the power of a coefficient

equals its (potential) individual abilities. But in prioritization protocols in which one imposes asymmetric

constraints on the behavior of the wavelet coefficients (e.g., the set partitioning sorting algorithm used in the

state of the art in progressive transmission), a substantial shift in power results from the various positions

of the coefficients in the hierarchy defined by the subband pyramid.

This paper presents a method to predict the power distribution of the wavelet coefficients in a priori-

tization protocol. The analysis is fairly general and not specific to wavelet transform configurations. It is

equally applicable to linearly spaced subband decompositions, and to other more general subband decom-

positions, such as wavelet packets and Laplacian pyramids. We also describe a prioritization protocol based

on the utility-per-coding-bit optimization that is consistent with the power distribution imposed by the set

partitioning sorting algorithm on the set of wavelet coefficients.

Index terms: Progressive image transmission, set partitioning sorting algorithm, domina-

tion structure, power of a wavelet coefficient, rational embedded wavelet image coding.
The authors are with the Departamento de Ciencias de la Computación e I.A., E.T.S. de Ingenierı́a Informática,

Universidad de Granada, 18071 Granada, Spain. E-mail: jags@decsai.ugr.es. Fax: +34.958.243317.

 2

I. Introduction

In this paper we offer a method for the a priori evaluation of the division of power among

the various wavelet coefficients when they are used to reconstruct the original scene through

a prioritization protocol. The method is based on a technique of the mathematical theory

of games to social power. We apply it here to the prioritization of information in rational

progressive transmission, [1].

The designing of some prioritization scheme is aimed to send first the most relevant in-

formation of the wavelet transform. The effect of a designing cannot be gauged in advance

except in the roughest terms; it can easily happen that the mathematical structure of a

prioritization scheme conceals a bias in power distribution unsuspected and unintended by

the authors of the scheme. How, for example, is one to predict the substantial shift in

power that may result from the various positions of the wavelet coefficients in the spatial

orientation trees used in progressive transmission? What is the relationship between the

potential individual abilities of coefficients and their positional power in the mathematical

structure? Can a prioritization protocol consistent with the distribution of power be found?

The method of measuring “social power” which we present in this paper is intended as a

first step in the attack on these problems.

Our definition of the social power of a wavelet coefficient depends on the chance it has of

being critical to the success of a coalition of coefficients–to achieve higher coding priority.

It is easy to see, for example, that in a situation in which the only significant wavelet

coefficients for reconstructing the original scene (at a bit rate) form the lowest level in the

hierarchical organization, the coefficients in the higher levels of the hierarchy are assumed

to be insignificant, but are necessary for the organization of these significant coefficients in

productive units through zerotree coding [2]. Then the insignificant coefficients in higher

levels of the tree can claim at least a portion of the value of the productive coefficients (in
 3

the lowest level of the hierarchy) whom they dominate.

In the following, Section II shows that if there is no asymmetric constraint on the wavelet

coefficients imposed by some organization structure that may influence social power, the

value of power of a coefficient equals its (potential) individual abilities. Next, Section III

analyzes the social power of coefficients in prioritization schemes in which one imposes asym-

metric constraints on the behavior of the wavelet coefficients. It proves the shift in positional

power of the coefficients that results from the domination structure in the set partitioning

sorting algorithm used in SPIHT, [3]. Section IV describes a prioritization protocol based

on the utility-per-coding-bit optimization, consistent with the distribution of power imposed

by the set partitioning sorting algorithm on the set of wavelet coefficients. The comparative

performance of the derived scheme with the state of the art in progressive transmission is

analyzed using a set of experiments in Section V. The main conclusions of this work are

summarized in Section VI.

II. Power of Wavelet Coefficients.

There may exist coefficients of large magnitude at very low scales in the wavelet transform

which retain the power to wield single-handed influence in the image reconstruction, and at

the same time often most of the wavelet coefficients are individually insignificant as measured

by their (potential) individual abilities, i.e., magnitudes, but they are still effective in image

reconstruction via coalitions.

Thus the estimation of the a priori power of a wavelet coefficient is a problem in which

the power must be generated among a large number of individually insignificant coefficients.

However, if wavelet coefficients form coalitions, their collective power may be high enough

to make a relevant contribution to the image reconstruction and must be taken into account

in defining the a priori power of individual coefficients.

 4

The question that arises now is how to charge each coefficient its “fair share” of the power

of the coalitions, and thus to perform a correct estimation of the individual coefficient’s

power. This problem falls naturally into the realm of cooperative game theory [4]. There,

too, we have players who can form coalitions and gain by doing so; some coalitions may gain

more than others. The question there, too, is how to divide the benefits of the cooperation

among the players. Depending on the criteria we want our solution to satisfy, we get different

solutions.

In our problem, a cooperative game consists of a set of wavelet coefficients N and a

characteristic function v : 2|N | → R, v(∅) = 0, which describes the worth which every

coalition (subset) of coefficients could normally obtain in their transmission when they decide

to cooperate, regardless of what the other coefficients can achieve when they decide to

cooperate. Because interactions among all the possible coalitions of coefficients may be

complex, it is assumed the simplifying assumption that the cooperative possibilities of the

game can be described by the function v that assigns a number v(S) to every coalition S.

What each coalition S of wavelet coefficients can achieve on its own regarding the image

transmission, its worth v(S), depends on the complementaries between the magnitudes of

the coefficients in S. Here we consider that the cooperative game is an additive game, and

the worth of coalition S is then as follows:

X
v(S) = wi,j (1)
(i,j)∈S

where wi,j denotes the magnitude of wavelet coefficient (i, j) in S. Thus, it is assumed that

the (original) individual abilities of coefficients (i, j) ∈ N are represented by their respective

magnitudes wi,j . By analyzing this cooperative game we analyze the basic structure of power

within the wavelet transform.

 5

We can now define the concept of “power” game:

Definition 1: Power game. A power game (v, N ) is a cooperative game that consists of

the set of wavelet coefficients N and an additive characteristic function v, v({(i, j)}) = w i,j

for all (i, j) in N , determined by the worth of coalitions of wavelet coefficients in image

transmission.

This definition assumes that there is no asymmetric constraint on the coefficients imposed

by some organization structure that may influence social power. But, of course, it is unre-

alistic when using a prioritization protocol as given in the Set Partitioning in Hierarchical

Trees (SPIHT) [3] or the Rational Embedded Wavelet Image Coding (REWIC) [1], [5]. This

will be discussed in Section III.

Following Ref. [6] the game v can be expressed as:

X
v(P) = ∆v (S) · uS (P); P ⊆ N (2)
S⊆N :S6=∅

where the quantity ∆v (S) is referred to as the dividend of coalition S in power game (v, N ),

and where uS is the unanimity game given by:

 
 
1 if S ⊆ P

 

 
uS (P) = (3)
 
0 otherwise.

 

 

From equation (2), to analyze the power game (v, N ) properly, we study its behaviour on

the collection of all unanimity games uS , where S ⊆ N : S 6= ∅. Since the unanimity games

form a basis, representation (2) is uniquely determined.

Firstly, we need the following result:

Proposition 1: Dividends of a power game. In a power game for defining the a priori
 6

power of wavelet coefficients, the dividend ∆v (S) of coalition S, S ⊆ N : S 6= ∅, is given by:

 
 
wi,j if S = {(i, j)} for some (i, j) ∈ N

 

 
∆v (S) = (4)
 
0 otherwise.

 

 

where wi,j is the magnitude of wavelet coefficient (i, j) ∈ N .

Proof. From Reference [6], the dividends ∆v (S) are given by:

(−1)|S|−|T |v(T )
X
∆v (S) = (5)
T ⊆S

for all S, where S ⊆ N : S 6= ∅. Given that v is an additive game we have that

 

(−1)|S|−|T | × 
X X
∆v (S) = wi,j  (6)
T ⊆S (i,j)∈T
  
 |S|  |S| − 1  
(−1)|S|−t 
X X
= wi,j × 
   .

(7)
  
(i,j)∈S t=1
t−1

The proof is completed by noting that the expression in brackets vanishes except for |S| = 1.

We have that individually insignificant coefficients are still effective via coalitions in the

reconstruction of the image, and a payoff x = {x(i,j) (v); (i, j) ∈ N } for the power game

(v, N ) is a correspondence that associates with each coefficient (i, j) a possible payment for

being involved in the game which charges each coefficient its fair share of coalitional power.

Hence, a payoff x for the cooperative game (v, N ) provides an estimation of the a priori

power of the wavelet coefficients in N .

Shapley [7] defined a value for games to be a function that assigns to each game v a payoff

x(i,j) (v) for each (i, j) ∈ N which can be described by:

X ∆v (S)
x(i,j) (v) = (8)
S⊆N :(i,j)∈S
|S|

with |S| being the cardinal of subset S, where ∆v (S) denotes the dividend of coalition S.

The Shapley value is a unique function that satisfies three axioms: (i) The symmetry axiom

requires that coefficients who are treated identically by the game v be treated identically by
 7

the value x(i,j) (v); (ii) the carrier axiom requires that the sum of x(i,j) (v) over all coefficients

(i, j) in any N equals v(N ); and (iii) the additivity axiom requires that, for any games v

and w, x(i,j) (v + w) = x(i,j) (v) + x(i,j) (w).

Based on the Shapley value of a power game we define the concept of “power” value of a

wavelet coefficient as follows:

Definition 2: Power Value of Wavelet Coefficients. Given a power game (v, N ) the

power value powv (i, j) of a wavelet coefficient (i, j) ∈ N is:

X ∆v (S)
powv (i, j) = . (9)
S⊆N :(i,j)∈S
|S|

The following result is a direct consequence of the definition of power game given in

Definition 1:

Proposition 2. In a power game (v, N ) as given in Definition 1, the power value of a

wavelet coefficient (i, j) equals its magnitude wi,j :

powv (i, j) = wi,j , (i, j) ∈ N . (10)

Proof. It simply follows from substituting equation (4) in the power value powv (i, j) of a

wavelet coefficient as given in Definition 2.

III. Social power in a prioritization protocol

This section is devoted to the game theoretic analysis of social power in prioritization

schemes in which one imposes asymmetric constraints on the behaviour of the wavelet coeffi-

cients. We firstly introduce the type of asymmetry between coefficients in the Set Partitioning

Sorting algorithm used in SPIHT [3]. We describe an organization in which each coefficient
 8

has veto power over the activities as performed by a specified collection of coefficients. So,

all coefficients are dominating a collection of other coefficients (that may be empty) in the

sense that they have veto power over the actions undertaken by this coefficients. This type

of asymmetry between coefficients is illustrated as follows.

A. The domination structure in the set partitioning sorting algorithm.

In a progressive transmission scheme, the ordering information is (often) not explicitly

transmitted to the decoder. Instead, it is based on the fact that the execution path of any

algorithm is defined by the results of the comparisons on its branching points. If the encoder

and decoder have the same sorting algorithm, then the decoder can duplicate the encoder’s

execution path if it receives the results of the magnitude comparisons, and the ordering

information can be recovered from the execution path [3]. The notion of “domination”

comes from the fact that, in the hierarchy defined by the subband pyramid from the wavelet

transform, any wavelet coefficient (i, j) in a collection S without permission from all their

superiors (i.e., at least one superior of (i, j) is not in S), is lost to transmission of S through

the sorting algorithm.

This section presents a formal description of the domination structure in the state of the

art SPIHT. In order to define this structure, firstly we need to recall the set partitioning

sorting algorithm as follows.

The sorting algorithm divides the set of coefficients into partitioning subsets Tm and per-

forms the magnitude test:

max {wi,j } ≥ 2 ? (11)

(i,j)∈Tm

If the decoder receives a “no” to that answer (the subset is insignificant), then it knows that

all coefficients in Tm are insignificant. If the answer is “yes” (the subset is significant), then

a certain rule shared by the encoder and the decoder is used to partition Tm into new subsets
 9

a b b1 b2 b11 b12 b21 b22

c d b3 b4 b13 b14 b23 b24
I II b31 b32 b41 b42
b33 b34 b43 b44
V
c1 c2 d1 d2
c3 c4 d3 d4
III IV

VI VII

(A)

a b
c d

b1 b2 c1 c2 d1 d2
b3 b4 c3 c4 d3 d4

b11 b12 b21 b22 b31 b32 b41 b42

b13 b14 b23 b24 b33 b34 b43 b44

(B)

Fig. 1. Data structure used in the SPIHT coder

Tm,l and the significance test is then applied to the new subsets. This set division process

continues until the magnitude test is done to all single coordinate significant subsets in order

to identify each significant coefficient (see [3] for further details).

To reduce the number of magnitude comparisons the set partitioning sorting algorithm

defines a rule that uses an expected ordering in the hierarchy defined by the subband pyra-

mid. A tree structure, called Spatial Orientation Tree (SOT), naturally defines the spatial

relationship on the hierarchical pyramid. Fig. 1 shows how a SOT is defined in a pyramid

constructed with recursive four-subband splitting.

As can be seen in Fig. 1, the coefficients are divided into trees (SOTs) where the roots of the

trees are the coefficients in the lowest resolution band (I). The coefficients are grouped into

2x2 matrices. With the exception of the band I, these coefficients are direct descendents of a
 10

coefficient of the same spatial orientation in the next lower level of resolution in the pyramid.

In Fig. 1 the arrows are oriented from the parent node to its four direct descendants.

The coefficients in band I are also divided into 2x2 matrices. These last four coefficients

are the parents of the coefficients of the same spatial location at a finer resolution, except

for the one on the top left hand corner of the 2x2 matrix (the coefficient a).

The trees are partitioned by SPIHT into four types of sets (each node of the tree corre-

sponds to a coefficient, and is identified by the coefficient coordinate):

• O(i, j): Set of coordinates of the direct descendants of the wavelet coefficient at location

(i, j). The size of O(i, j) is either 0 or 4 (because each node can either have 4 descendants

or none). For example, in Fig. 1, O(0, 1) consists of the coordinates of the coefficients b 1 , b2 ,

b3 y b4 . In general,

O(i, j) = {(2i, 2j), (2i, 2j + 1), (2i + 1, 2j), (2i + 1, 2j + 1)}

• D(i, j) : Set of all descendants of the coefficient at location (i, j). For example, D(0, 1)

consists of the coordinates of the coefficients b1 , ..., b4 , b11 , ..., b44 (see Fig. 1). Obviously, the

size of D(i, j) is either 0 or a power of four.

• H: Set of all root nodes (band I in Fig. 1)

• L(i, j): Set of coordinates of all descendants of the coefficient at location (i, j) except of

the children of the coefficient at (i, j).

L(i, j) = D(i, j) − O(i, j)

For example, L(0, 1) = b11 , ..., b14 , .., b44 (see Fig. 1).

The sorting algorithm uses parts of the spatial orientation trees as the partitioning subsets.

The set partitioning rules are simply:

1. the initial partition is formed with the sets {(i, j)} and D(i, j), for all (i, j) ∈ H;
 11

2. if D(i, j) is significant then it is partitioned into L(i, j) plus the four single-element sets

with (k, l) ∈ O(i, j);

3. if L(i, j) is significant then it is partitioned into the four sets D(k, l) with (k, l) ∈ O(i, j).

Based on the set partitioning sorting algorithm as given above, the definition of a “domi-

nation structure” is now introduced following [8]. The notion of “domination” on the wavelet

coefficients comes from the set partitioning rule that uses the expected ordering in the hierar-

chy defined by the subband pyramid in order to reduce the number of magnitude comparisons

(message bits): Given the specified sorting algorithm, a coefficient (i, j) in coalition S ⊆ N

for which at least one superior of (i, j) is not in S, is unproductive to the transmission of

coalition S through the set partitioning rule.

Definition 3: Domination structure. The domination structure on the set N of wavelet

coefficients is a mapping O on N such that O(i, j), (i, j) ∈ N , defines the set of direct

subordinates of the coefficient at location (i, j) that correspond to the coefficients of the same

spatial orientation in the next finer resolution of the pyramid, and where (i, j) is assumed to

dominate its subordinates (k, l) ∈ O(i, j).

Given a domination structure O, we have that the collection of all descendants of the

coefficient at location (i, j) in the hierarchy defined by the subband pyramid, name after

D(i, j), defines the transitive clausure of the domination O. We denote by

D −1 (i, j) = {(k, l) ∈ N | (i, j) ∈ D(k, l)} (12)

the set of superiors of coefficient (i, j) ∈ N in the domination structure O on N . Next

we define a class of coalitions of wavelet coefficients that are productive in the transmission

without coefficients outside that coalitions, because all superiors of the coefficients in that
 12

“autonomous” coalition are also member of the coalition:

Definition 4: Autonomous collections of coefficients. Let O a dominance structure

on N . The coalition S ⊆ N is autonomous in the dominance structure O if

D −1 (S) ⊂ S

where D −1 (S) = D −1 (i, j).

S
(i,j)∈S

We can now address the game theoretic analysis of a power game with a domination

structure, in which the set partitioning sorting algorithm imposes asymmetric constraints on

the behaviour of the coefficients, i.e., for every (i, j), (k, l) ∈ N

(k, l) ∈ O(i, j) implies that (i, j) 6∈ O(k, l).

We define the basic concept as follows:

Definition 5: Power game with a domination structure. A power game (v, N , O)

is a cooperative game on the set of wavelet coefficients N , where an additive characteristic

function v, v({(i, j)}) = wi,j for all (i, j) in N , determines the worth which coalitions could

normally obtain in their transmission were it not for the domination structure O as imposed

on N .

B. Restricted game

In the definition of power game with a domination structure (Def. 5) the worth of coef-

ficients (and their coalitions) is still independent of the domination structure O. Following

[8] we need to transform this power game (v, N , O) into a new game which describes all

possibilities open to the coefficients in the domination structure O, given their potentials

abilities as described by the additive game v using their respective magnitudes wi,j . The

resulting game is called the “restricted game” on domination structure O, as defined in the
 13

following:

Definition 6: Restricted game. Let (v, N , O) a power game with a domination structure.

The restricted game (vO , N ) is a cooperative game on the set of wavelet coefficients N , where

the worth of the coalitions S ⊆ N determines which they produce in their transmission with

the domination structure from the set partitioning rule:

vO (S) = v(σ(S)), for all S ⊆ N (13)

where σ(S) is the largest autonomous subset of S.

That is, the worth of coalition S with a domination structure O is simply the worth which

the largest autonomous subset of S could normally obtain in the transmission using the set

partitioning sorting algorithm.

Here we can also analyze the restricted game (vO , N ) on the collection of all unanimity

games uS as given in equation (3), where S ⊆ N : S 6= ∅. To this aim, firstly we need a new

proposition which gives the form of the dividends of a restricted game as follows:

Proposition 3: Dividends of a restricted game. In a restricted game (vO , N ) for

defining the a priori power of wavelet coefficients with a domination structure O, the dividend

∆vO (S) of coalition S, S ⊆ N : S 6= ∅, is given by:

 
 
wi,j if S = α({(i, j)}) for some (i, j) ∈ N

 

 
∆vO (S) =  
(14)
0 otherwise.

 

 

where wi,j is the magnitude of wavelet coefficient (i, j) ∈ N ; and with α(R) being the smallest

autonomous coalition which contains all members of R as well as their superiors in the

domination structure, e.g., α({(i, j)}) = {(i, j)} D −1 (i, j).

S

Proof.
 14

From the definition of restricted game (vO , N ) and Corollary 4.3 in [8], we have that:
 
X X
vO (P) =  ∆v (R) · uS (P); P ⊆ N (15)
S:D −1 (S)⊂S R⊆N : α(R)=S

where uS is the unanimity game as given in equation (3). The unrestricted, additive game

v represents the (original) individual abilities of the wavelet coefficients by means of their

magnitudes, and we have that v(R) = wi,j .

P
(i,j)∈R

The dividends ∆v (R) are defined as given in Proposition 1: ∆v (R) = wi,j if R = {(i, j)};

0, otherwise. Therefore, it follows that:

 
X X
vO (P) =  wi,j  · uS (P); P ⊆ N . (16)
S:D −1 (S)⊂S {(i,j)}∈N : α({(i,j)})=S

Recall that following Ref. [6] the game vO can also be expressed as:

X
vO (P) = ∆vO (R) · uR (P); P ⊆ N (17)
R⊆N :R6=∅

where the quantity ∆vO (R) is referred to as the dividend of coalition R in restricted game

(vO , N ), and where uR is the unanimity game as given in equation (3).

Equating representations (16) and (17), we have that:

X
∆vO (R) = wi,j (18)
(i,j)∈N : α({(i,j)})=R

with α(·) as given above.

On the domination structure O if (i, j) ∈ D −1 (k, l) then (k, l) 6∈ D −1 (i, j). Therefore, since

α({(i, j)}) = {(i, j)} D −1 (i, j) is the smallest autonomous superset of {(i, j)}, it follows
S

that α({(i, j)}) 6= α({(k, l)}), for all coefficients (i, j) 6= (k, l). Thus if α({(i, j)}) = R

then α({(k, l)}) 6= R for all (k, l) 6= (i, j). Hence, following equation (18), we have that:

∆vO (R) = wi,j if R = α({(i, j)}) for some (i, j) ∈ N ; 0, otherwise.

This concludes the proof.

 15

Based on the Shapley value of a restricted game we can now define the concept of “power”

value of a wavelet coefficient with a domination structure:

Definition 7: Power Value of Wavelet Coefficients with a domination structure.

Given a restricted game (vO , N ) the power value powvO (i, j) of a wavelet coefficient (i, j) ∈ N

with domination O is:

X ∆vO (S)
powvO (i, j) = . (19)
S⊆N :(i,j)∈S
|S|

with ∆vO (S) being the dividend of coalition S in restricted game (vO , N )

The following result predicts the substantial shift in power that results from the various

positions of the wavelet coefficients in the domination structure O, based on the power value

of a coefficient in a restricted game (vO , N ) (in comparison with that in a power game (v, N )

without a domination structure, as given in Proposition 2):

Proposition 4: Shift in social power in a domination structure. In a restricted game

(vO , N ), the power value of a wavelet coefficient is given by:

X wk,l
powvO (i, j) = −1
; (i, j) ∈ N (20)
(k,l)∈{(i,j)}∪D(i,j)
|D (k, l)| +1

where wk,l is the magnitude of the wavelet coefficient at location (k, l); D(i, j) is the set of

all descendants of the coefficient (i, j) in the hierarchy defined by the subband pyramid; and

with |D −1 (k, l)| being the cardinal of the set of superiors of (k, l).

Proof.

From Definition 7, the power of a wavelet coefficient (i, j) with domination structure O is:

X ∆vO (R)
powvO (i, j) = (21)
R⊆N :(i,j)∈R
|R|

with |R| being the cardinal of subset R.

 16

Substituting equation (14) in equation (21), it follows that:

X ∆vO (α({(k, l)}))

powvO (i, j) = . (22)
(k,l): (i,j)∈α({(k,l)})
|α({(k, l)})|

The proof is completed by noting that ∆vO (α({(k, l)})) = wk,l ; |α({(k, l)})| = |D −1 (k, l)| + 1;

and {(k, l) : (i, j) ∈ α({(k, l)})} = {(i, j)} D(i, j).

S

This shift in positional power of wavelet coefficients in the hierarchy defined by the subband

pyramid is best illustrated in one example as follows. Fig. 2(A) shows the (original) individual

abilities of the wavelet coefficients in a SOT of the pyramid for some original image, as given

by their magnitudes. Following Proposition 2, assuming there is no asymmetric constraint on

the coefficients imposed by some organization structure, the power of the coefficients in the

unrestricted game is simply given by the magnitudes of the coefficients. But it is unrealistic

given the set partitioning sorting algorithm used in the progressive image transmission.

Fig. 2(B) illustrates the social power of the wavelet coefficients in the domination structure

O, as given in Proposition 4. It shows the substantial shift in power that results from

the various positions of the wavelet coefficients in the set partitioning sorting algorithm.

Following equation (20) the magnitude of a coefficient is equally spread over itself and its

superiors.

The concept of domination structure as used in this paper is a fairly general concept and

not specific to the wavelet transform configuration shown in Section III-A. It is equally

applicable to quincunx wavelets in which case each parent would have two children instead

of four, except for the lowest frequency, where parents have a single child. Comparing the

power values in this case and the distribution of power of the wavelet transform, we conclude

that in the case of the quincunx a leader clearly gains a lower value of power because of its

leadership.

Also a similar approach to analyze the shift in social power can be applied to linearly
 17

24 15 10 11 24 26 0 0

9 9 12 13 25 27 0 0

14 15 18 19 30 7 0 0
15
16 17 20 21 28 7 0 0

0 0 4 4 2 2 2 0
11 15 19
1 4 4 4 2 2 2 0
0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 2 0 2 0
5 5 5 5 2 1 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(A)

83.3 44.1 39 5.5 8 8.6 0 0

61.3 38.1 30 6.5 8.3 9 0 0

8.6 12.8 11.6 10.8 10 2.3 0 0

44.1
11.3 11.8 11 10.8 9.3 2.3 0 0

0 0 1.3 1.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 0

5.5 12.8 10.8
0.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 0
0 0 0 0 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.6 0 0.6 0
1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 0.6 0.3 0 0.3

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(B)

Fig. 2. (A) original individual abilities; (B) positional power

spaced subband decompositions, such as the DCT, and to other more general subband

decompositions, such as wavelet packets and Laplacian pyramids. In the case of wavelet

packets, the domination structure is a bit more complicated, because it may not always be

possible to define similar parent-child relationships (e.g., a high-frequency coefficient may in

fact correspond to a larger spatial area than a co-located lower frequency coefficient).

IV. Prioritization protocol consistent with the distribution of power.

In an embedded wavelet scheme for progressive transmission a tree structure (e.g., the

spatial orientation trees (SOT) used in [3], [1]) naturally defines the spatial relationship on

the hierarchical pyramid. Transform coefficients over a spatial orientation tree correspond

to a particular local spatial region of the original image, and thus, each SOT is associated
 18

with one spatial region.

The embedded coding is distinctive from the conventional coding in the sense that any

spatial orientation tree is coded bit-plane by bit-plane through successive-approximation

quantization, [3]. Given an initial threshold Ti , with i = 0, the successive approximation

consists of an iteration over two scans, called the sorting pass and the refinement pass. The

bit stream of the sorting pass, BS2i , is generated using the set-partitioning approach, to

locate the significant wavelet coefficients with respect to the threshold. The bit stream of

the refinement pass, called BS2i+1 , results from the refinement of all the coefficients of the

SOT which have not been quantized to zero so far. After a refinement pass, a new threshold

may be computed as Ti = Ti−1 /2, with i ≥ 1, where i is the iteration number. The algorithm

may be iterated by applying successive sorting and refinement bit streams, BS2i and BS2i+1 .

The result of the coding of the particular SOT is a completely embedded bit stream as given

by a number of sorting and refinement bit streams BS0 BS1 , · · · , BSK .

Reference [1] addresses the problem of spatial orientation tree selection in the context

of embedded image coding for progressive transmission. It extends the set partitioning in

hierarchical trees (SPIHT) in [3] to consider the ordering of the trees, such that at every

time instance, it always chooses the tree which provides the maximum expected increase

in utility per coding bit. The approach is closely related to the rate-constrained wavelet-

based embedded image coding, since it is intended to show that an embedded coder can

be optimized by means of a rational strategy for rate control by organizing the progressive

transmission with expected increase in utility per coding bit.

Wavelet transform captures local characteristics in both space and frequency domains.

Depending on the image content and the particular truncation time, some trees have higher

coding priority than others in terms of expected increase in utility per coding bit. Therefore,

it may be worthwhile to explore the ordering of the trees. The resultant coding bitstream can
 19

be truncated at any point and still maintain an optimal utility-per-coding-bit performance

at every truncation point. Utility functions were addressed in [1].

It motivates an operational procedure for the selection of a bitstream S(R† , t) to be trans-

mitted at truncation time t on a utility basis: In accordance with Postulates 1.1 through 1.7

as given in [1], the rational choice for transmission at truncation time t is to select S(R† , t)

which provides the maximum achievable expected increase in utility I(S(Ri , t)/Q) per coding

bit, for any available spatial-orientation tree Ri :

( )
I(S(Ri , t)/Q)
S(R† , t) = arg max (23)
S(Ri ,t) #S(Ri , t)

where #S(Ri , t) denotes the number of bits in S(Ri , t).

If the rate control optimization is based on the actual expected increase in utility per

coding bit, the order of coding has to be transmitted to the decoder. To transmitting the

coding order, the SOT descriptor and the number n of bitstreams BSj BSj+1 · · · BSj+n to be

delivered to the decoder at any truncation time are encoded in the bit stream header. But

the ordering data within the particular spatial orientation tree is not explicitly transmitted

because of the utilization of the set partitioning sorting algorithm, [3].

The Rational Embedded Wavelet Image Coding (REWIC) calculates the expected increase

in utility based on the (potential) individual abilities of the wavelet coefficients (i.e., their

magnitudes) following Proposition 2. It permits us to efficiently implement the utility-per-

coding-bit optimization, but it ignores the substantial shift in power that results from the

positions of the coefficients in the sorting algorithm (Proposition 4). And the positional

power in the domination structure represents the chance each coefficient has of being critical

to the success–to achieve higher coding priority–of a coalition of coefficients.

The utility-per-coding-bit optimization consistent with the distribution of power is per-

formed by computing the expected increase in utility I(S(Ri , t)/Q) on the power values
 20

imposed by the sorting algorithm as follows.

Let
powvO (k, l)
qi (k, l) = P (24)
(n,m)∈Ri powvO (n, m)

be the normalized power value of a wavelet coefficient (k, l) in SOT Ri and which was

reconstructed using the bit streams S(Ri , 0), · · · , S(Ri , t − 1) transmitted for Ri before time

t. The power value powvO (k, l) is given in equation (20).

Also, let pi (k, l) be the normalized power value of a wavelet coefficient (k, l) in SOT Ri

which would be reconstructed using the candidate bitstream S(Ri , t) to be transmitted at

time t, in addition to bitstreams S(Ri , 0), · · · , S(Ri , t − 1) transmitted before the time t for

Ri .

Next we give a consistent definition of increase in utility following Proposition 3 in [1]:

Definition 8: Expected increase in utility consistent with the values of power.

Let Q ≡ {qi (k, l)} be strictly positive. The expected increase in utility provided by the trans-

mission at time t of bitstream S(Ri , t) and consistent with the distribution of power imposed

by the set partitioning sorting algorithm, is given by:


r r

(k,l) pi (k, l) [(qi (k, l)) − (pi (k, l)) ] if r < 0

 P






I(S(Ri , t)/Q) = pi (k,l) (25)
(k,l) pi (k, l) log qi (k,l) if r = 0
P





 r r
(k,l) pi (k, l) [(pi (k, l)) − (qi (k, l)) ] if r > 0
 P



where if r > 1 the system exhibits a risk seeking posture with respect to “gambles” on SOT-

dependent quality of encoding while r < 1 implies risk aversion. The risk neutrality is given

by r = 1.

In this case I(S(Ri , t)/Q) is clearly an index that measures the expected increase in utility–

derived from the transmission of a bitstream S(Ri , t)–to reconstruct the hierarchical power

of the wavelet coefficients. This approach recognizes that the set partitioning algorithm
 21

#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10

#11 #12 #13 #14 #15 #16 #17 #18 #19 #20

#21 #22 #23 #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #29 #30

#31 #32 #33 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 #40

#41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 #48 #49 #50

#51 #52 #53 #54 #55 #56 #57 #58 #59 #60

#61 #62 #63 #64 #65 #66 #67 #68 #69 #70

#71 #72 #73 #74 #75 #76 #77 #78 #79 #80

#81 #82 #83 #84 #85 #86 #87 #88 #89 #90

#91 #92 #93 #94 #95 #96 #97 #98 #99 #100

Fig. 3. Dataset of standard 512 × 512 grayscale test images.

conceals a bias in the priority of the data (i.e., the magnitude of a coefficient is equally

spread over itself and its superiors) which is unsuspected by the original analysis based on

the utility of a bitstream S(Ri , t) to reconstruct the (potential) individual abilities of the

coefficients.

V. Experimental Results

Here we perform a thorough comparison of the REWIC consistent with the distribution of

power (i.e., following equations (23) and (25)) and the state of the art in progressive trans-
 22

mission SPIHT. To perform the comparison we use an objective coder selection procedure

presented in [1]. Tests here reported were performed on a dataset composed of 100 standard

512 × 512 grayscale test images shown in Figure 3.

spiht spiht
Given a test image I, let {Iq(1) , · · · , Iq(K) } be the set of decoded images at bit rates
rewic rewic
q(1), · · · , q(K) using SPIHT; {Iq(1) , · · · , Iq(K) } be the set of decoded images at the same

bit rates q(1), · · · , q(K) using REWIC. The compound gain CG, [9], may then be applied to

quantify the visual distinctness by means of the difference between the original image I and

decoded images at very low bit rates q(i):

spiht
f (spiht, i) = CG(I, Iq(i) ). (26)

and similarly, f (rewic, i).

Once distortion functions f (†, i) have been calculated following equation (26), we make

use of an objective criterion for coder selection based on the overall difference between the

two functions f (spiht, i) and f (rewic, i), which can be measured by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov

(K-S) test to a certain required level of significance.

Definition: Coder Selection Procedure. In the language of statistical hypothesis testing,

the coding scheme REWIC consistent with the distribution of power is significantly better than

SPIHT for test image I if the following two conditions are true:

(1) f (rewic, i) ≤ f (spiht, i), with i = 1, 2, · · · , K; and

(2) we disprove, to a certain required level of significance, the null hypothesis of a Kolmogorov-

Smirnov test that two data sets {f (rewic, i) | i = 1, 2, · · · , K} and {f (spiht, i) | i =

1, 2, · · · , K} are drawn from the same population distribution function.

Condition 1 takes into account that optimal coder tends to produce the lowest value of

f (†, i) across bit rates, and disproving the null hypothesis in condition 2 in effect proves

data sets {f (rewic, i) | i = 1, 2, · · · , K} and {f (spiht, i) | i = 1, 2, · · · , K} are from different

 23

PERCENTAGE OF IMAGES AT WHICH REWIC/SPIHT IS SIGNIFICANTLY

BETTER THAN SPIHT/REWIC WITH AT LEAST 90 % CONFIDENCE

TOTAL

REWIC consistent with power better than SPIHT 31 %

SPIHT better than REWIC consistent with power 0%

TABLE I

distributions. If both conditions hold, it allows us to assess the fact that dataset {f (rewic, i) |

i = 1, 2, · · · , K} is significantly better than dataset {f (spiht, i) | i = 1, 2, · · · , K}.

Table I summarizes the results of this experiment on the test images of the dataset in

Figure 3: thirty-one out of one hundred test images (31 %) have passed conditions (1) and

(2) in the coder selection procedure, and hence, REWIC is significantly better than SPIHT

with high confidence level for thirty-one per cent of the dataset of test images. Whereas

SPIHT is better than REWIC for zero per cent of images.

VI. Conclusions

Assuming that there is no domination structure on the set of wavelet coefficients, the a

priori power of a wavelet coefficient equals its magnitude. But this basic assumption is un-

realistic if we use the prioritization protocol as given in the Set Partitioning in Hierarchical

Trees or the Rational Embedded Wavelet Image Coding. In fact, a domination structure

on the wavelet coefficients results from the set partitioning rule: A coefficient in a partic-

ular coalition for which at least one superior is not in the coalition, is unproductive to the

transmission of that coalition through this rule.

The a priori power of the wavelet coefficients with a domination structure predicts a shift

in power that results from the various positions of the wavelet coefficients in the hierarchy

defined by the subband pyramid, in which the magnitude of a coefficient is equally spread
 24

over itself and its superiors in the domination structure. The concept of domination structure

is a fairly general concept and not specific to the wavelet transform configuration.

If the rate control optimization is based on the expected increase in utility per coding

bit, the order of coding has to be transmitted to the decoder. The descriptor of the spatial

orientation tree and the number of bitstreams to be delivered to the decoder at any truncation

time are encoded in the bit stream header. But the ordering data within the particular spatial

orientation tree is not explicitly transmitted because of the utilization of the set partitioning

sorting algorithm.

The REWIC algorithm is based on the expected increase in utility of a bitstream to

reconstruct the individual abilities (i.e., magnitudes) of the wavelet coefficients. Hence it

ignores the substantial shift in power that results from the positions of the coefficients in a

domination structure. Anyway one utility-per-coding-bit optimization consistent with the

distribution of power is derived using the expected increase in utility –of the candidate

bitstream– to reconstruct the a priori power of the coefficients in the domination structure.

Acknowledgments. This research was sponsored by the Spanish Board for Science and

Technology (CICYT) under grant TIC2003-00473.

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