RULE 86
Thus, if husband and
ALIPIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5
hectare fishpond in Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa,
Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years
ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he
subleased the fishpond, for the remaining period of
his lease, to the spouses Placido and PuritaAlipio and
the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel. The
stipulated amount of rent was P485,600.00, payable
in two installments of P300,000.00 and P185,600.00,
with the second installment falling due on June 30,
1989. Each of the four sublessees signed the
contract.
The first installment was duly paid, but of the second
installment, the sublessees only satisfied a portion
thereof, leaving an unpaid balance
of P50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees
failed to comply with their obligation, so on October
13, 1989, private respondent sued the Alipio and
Manuel spouses for the collection of the said amount.
In the alternative, he prayed for the rescission of the
sublease contract should the defendants fail to pay
the balance
Petitioner PuritaAlipio moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that her husband, PlacidoAlipio, had
passed away on December 1, 1988. She based her
action on Rule 3, 21 of the Rules of Court. (but this is
now amended! See ratio later).
The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the
ground that since petitioner was herself a party to the
sublease contract, she could be independently
impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel
spouses and that the death of her husband merely
resulted in his exclusion from the case. The Manuel
spouses failed to file their answer. For this reason,
they were declared in default.
RTC and CA ruled against petitioners. SABI NG CA:
The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or
interest thereon must be dismissed when the
defendant dies before final judgment in the regional
trial court, does not apply where there are other
defendants against whom the action should be
maintained.
Moreover, it is noted that all the defendants, including
the deceased, were signatories to the contract of sub-
lease. Under the law and well settled jurisprudence,
when the obligation is a solidary one, the creditor
may bring his action in toto against any of the
debtors obligated in solidum.
wife bound themselves jointly and severally, in case
of his death, her liability is independent of and
separate from her husband's; she may be sued for
the whole debt and it would be error to hold that the
claim against her as well as the claim against her
husband should be made in the decedent's estate.
ISSUE:
1. WON a creditor can sue the surviving spouse of a
decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection
of a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal
partnership.
2. Joint or solidary obligation baitey?
SC: REVERSED LOWER COURTS. Petition granted!
Creditor CANNOT sue. Proper remedy is for him to file
a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.
First. Petitioner's husband died on December 1,
1988, more than ten months before private
respondent filed the collection suit in the trial court on
October 13, 1989. This case thus falls outside of the
ambit of Rule 3, §21 which deals with dismissals of
collection suits because of the death of the defendant
during the pendency of the case. As amended, Rule
3, §20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now
provides that the case will be allowed to continue
until entry of final judgment.
Petitioner and her late husband, together with the
Manuel spouses, signed the sublease contract binding
themselves to pay the amount of stipulated
rent. Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also
that of the Manuels) is one which is chargeable
against their conjugal partnership. When petitioner's
husband died, their conjugal partnership was
automatically dissolved and debts chargeable against
it are to be paid in the settlement of estate
proceedings.
The reason for this is that upon the death of one
spouse, the powers of administration of the surviving
spouse ceases and is passed to the administrator
appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the
settlement of estate proceedings.Indeed, the
surviving spouse is not even a de facto administrator
such that conveyances made by him of any property
belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of
the mass of conjugal partnership property is void.
Where a complaint is brought against the surviving
spouse for the recovery of an indebtedness
chargeable against said conjugal [partnership], any
judgment obtained thereby is void. The proper action
should be in the form of a claim to be filed in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse.
It must be noted that for marriages governed by CPG,
an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is
chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is
the partnership which is primarily bound for its
repayment.Thus, when the spouses are sued for the
enforcement of an obligation entered into by them,
they are being impleaded in their capacity as
representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as
independent debtors such that the concept of joint or
solidary liability, as between them, does not
apply. But even assuming the contrary to be true, the
nature of the obligation involved in this case, as will
be discussed later, is not solidary but rather merely
joint.
From the foregoing, it is clear that private respondent
cannot maintain the present suit against petitioner.
Second. The trial court ordered petitioner and the
Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the unpaid
balance of the agreed rent in the amount
of P50,600.00 without specifying whether the amount
is to be paid by them jointly or solidarily. Art. 1207—
presumption of joint obligation!
To be sure, should the lessees or sublessees refuse to
vacate the leased property after the expiration of the
lease period and despite due demands by the lessor,
they can be held jointly and severally liable to pay for
the use of the property. The basis of their solidary
liability is not the contract of lease or sublease but the
fact that they have become joint tortfeasors.In the
case at bar, there is no allegation that the sublessees
refused to vacate the fishpond after the expiration of
the term of the sublease. Indeed, the unpaid balance
sought to be collected by private respondent in his
collection suit became due on June 30, 1989, long
before the sublease expired on September 12, 1990.
Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of
lease that when there are more than two lessees or
sublessees their liability is solidary. On the other
hand, the pertinent portion of the contract involved in
this case reads:
2. That the total lease rental for the sub-leased
fishpond for the entire period of three (3) years and
two (2) months is FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT-FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (P485,600.00) PESOS,
including all the improvements, prawns, milkfishes,
crabs and related species thereon as well all fishing
equipment, paraphernalia and accessories. The said
amount shall be paid to the Sub-Lessor by the Sub-
Lessees in the following manner, to wit:
A. Three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos
upon signing this contract; and
B. One Hundred Eight-Five Thousand Six-Hundred
(P185,6000.00) Pesos to be paid on June 30, 1989.
Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely
joint. Since the obligation of the Manuel and Alipio
spouses is chargeable against their respective
conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance
of P50,600.00 should be divided into two so that each
couple is liable to pay the amount of P25,300.00.
VENTURA vs. MILITANTE
FACTS:
Private respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of
Money and Damages against petitioner. During the
lifetime of Carlos Ngo he was indebted with the
plaintiff (herein priv. resp.). Said obligation is already
due and demandable and the defendant thru Ms.
Ventura who is ostensibly taking care of the
properties/estate of deceased Carlos Ngo, refused,
failed and neglected and still continues to refuse, fail
and neglect to pay despite repeated demands.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the foregoing complaint
on the ground that “the estate of Carlos Ngo has no
legal personality,” the same being “neither a natural
nor legal person in contemplation of law.”
In his Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, petitioner
insisted that since “the money claim subject of this
case actually represents the costs of automotive spare
parts/replacements contracted by deceased Carlos
Ngo during his lifetime for the benefit/business of the
family x x x the conjugal partnership x x x shall be
accountable for the payment thereof.” Subsequently,
private respondent's counsel manifested that he is
poised to “amend the complaint in order to state the
correct party defendant that he intends to sue in this
case”. The public respondent gave private
respondent fifteen (15) days to make the
amendment.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
order of public respondent permitting private
respondent to amend his complaint. Public
respondent issued the herein assailed order that the
indebtedness was incurred by Carlos Ngo and
defendant Sulpicia Ventura and since Carlos Ngo is
now dead that will not preclude the plaintiff from
filing a case against the living defendant, Sulpicia
Ventura.
Petitioner scurried to this Court praying that the
foregoing order of the public respondent be set aside
and the amended complaint of private respondent.
RULING:
We grant the petition. The original complaint of
petitioner named the “estate of Carlos Ngo as
represented by surviving spouse Ms. Sulpicia Ventura”
as the defendant. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
same on the ground that the defendant as named in
the complaint had no legal personality. We agree.
Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party
plaintiff in a court action. A deceased person does
not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring
action so much so that a motion to substitute cannot
lie and should be denied by the court. An action
begun by a decedent's estate cannot be said to have
been begun by a legal person, since an estate is not a
legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion
to amend the party plaintiff will not likewise lie, there
being nothing before the court to amend. Considering
that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the
capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does
not have the capacity to be sued and may not be
named a party defendant in a court action.
It is clear that the original complaint of private
respondent against the estate of Carlos Ngo was a
suit against Carlos Ngo himself who was already dead
at the time of the filing of said complaint. At that
time, and this, private respondent admitted, no
special proceeding to settle his estate had been filed
in court. As such, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over either the deceased Carlos Ngo or his
estate.
To cure this fatal defect, private respondent amended
his original complaint. In his amended complaint,
private respondent deleted the estate of Carlos Ngo
and named petitioner as the defendant. When
petitioner, in her comment to the amended complaint,
reasoned that the conjugal partnership of gains
between her and Carlos Ngo was terminated upon the
latter's death and that the debt which he contracted,
assuming it was a charge against the conjugal
property, could only be paid after an inventory is
made in the appropriate testate or intestate
proceeding, private respondent simply reiterated his
demand that petitioner pay her husband's debt which,
he insisted, redounded to the benefit of everyone in
her family.
It is true that amendments to pleadings are liberally
allowed in furtherance of justice, in order that every
case may so far as possible be determined on its real
facts, and in order to speed the trial of causes or
prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary
expense. But amendments cannot be allowed so as to
confer jurisdiction upon a court that never acquired it
in the first place. When it is evident that the court has
no jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter
and that the pleading is so fatally defective as not to
be susceptible of amendment, or that to permit such
amendment would radically alter the theory and the
nature of the action, then the court should refuse the
amendment of the defective pleading and order the
dismissal of the case.
Moreover, as correctly argued by petitioner, the
conjugal partnership terminates upon the death of
either spouse. After the death of one of the spouses,
in case it is necessary to sell any portion of the
conjugal property in order to pay outstanding
obligations of the partnership, such sale must be
made in the manner and with the formalities
established by the Rules of Court for the sale of the
property of deceased persons. Where a complaint is
brought against the surviving spouse for the recovery
of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal
property, any judgment obtained thereby is void. The
proper action should be in the form of a claim to be
filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse.
In many cases as in the instant one, even after the
death of one of the spouses, there is no liquidation of
the conjugal partnership. This does not mean,
however, that the conjugal partnership continues.
And private respondent cannot be said to have no
remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules
of Court, he may apply in court for letters of
administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of
the deceased Carlos Ngo if after thirty (30) days from
his death, petitioner failed to apply for administration
or request that administration be granted to some
other person.
RULE 87, Section 6
CHUA vs. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT
Refer to PDF
RULE 89, Section 7
OPULENCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Aladin Simundac and Miguel Olivan filed a complaint
for specific performance against Natalia Carpena
Opulencia on the ground that the latter executed in
their favor a 'contract to sell' of lot in Sta. Rosa,
Laguna.
Opulencia, despite demands, failed to comply with her
obligations under the contract.
Opulencia contends that where the estate of the
deceased person is already the subject of a testate or
intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter
into any transaction involving it without prior approval
of the Probate Court. She maintains that the Contract
to Sell is void because it was not approved by the
probate court, as required by Section 7, Rule 89 of
the Rules of Court.
SEC. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell,
mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate. The court
having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may
authorize the executor or administrator to sell,
mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in
cases provided by these rules and when it appears
necessary or beneficial, under the following
regulations
Opulencia, instead of submitting evidence, filed a
demurrer.
Meanwhile, the court a quo granted the demurrer and
dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, the appellate court set aside the trial
court's dismissal of the complaint holding that Sec. 7
Rule 89 does not apply in this case because she
entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an
heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the
estate.
ISSUE:
WON Contract to sell without the requisite court
approval is valid
RULING + RATIO: YES.
Contract to Sell is valid
Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not
applicable, because petitioner entered into the
Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as
an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the
contract, she represented herself as the lawful owner
and seller of the subject parcel of land.
Hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from
the moment of the decedent‟s death.
Opulencia, therefore, became the owner of her
hereditary share the moment her father died.
Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate
the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the
substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her
share in the estate of her late father.
Administration of Estate not prejudiced by Contract to
sell
The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioners offer to
sell is contingent on the complete clearance of the
court on the Last Will Testament of her father.
Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner‟s
apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a
premature partition and distribution of the properties
of the estate. Indeed, it is settled that the sale made
by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to
the pending administration, in no wise stands in the
way of such administration.
Estoppel
She had already received P300,000 as initial payment
of the purchase price. She may not renege on her
own acts and representations, to the prejudice of the
private respondents who have relied on them.
Jurisprudence teaches us that neither the law nor the
courts will extricate a party from an unwise or
undesirable contract he or she entered into with all
the required formalities and with full awareness of its
consequences.
Disposition: Petition denied.
RULE 93
GOYENA vs. GUSTILO
FACTS:
Amparo Ledesma-Gustilo filed a Petition for Letters
of Guardianship over the person and property of her
sister Julieta since she is not in a position to take care
of herself anymore due to her old age, general
weakness, and suffering from a mini-stroke thereby
requiring the assistance of a guardian to manage her
interests in various enterprises.
Pilar Y. Goyena, Julieta„s close friend for more than
six decades, opposed the petition. She claims that
Julieta is competent and sane enough to manage her
person and property. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
declared Julieta to be “incompetent and incapable of
taking care of herself and her property” and Gustilo
was appointed to be her guardian. The RTC decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in finding Julieta to be
incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself
HELD:
It is well-entrenched doctrine that questions of fact
are not proper subjects of appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as this mode of appeal
is confined to questions of law. The test of whether
the question is one of law or of fact is whether
the appellate court can determine the issue raised
without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in
which case it is a question of law; otherwise, it is
question of fact.
In support of an affirmative answer, Goyena posits as
follows:
1. The Court of Appeals„ basis for its decision that
there are no antagonistic interests between Julieta
and Amparo is contrary to the evidence on record,
2. The Court of Appeals„ erred in holding that there is
no showing that Amparo is hostile to the best
interest of Julieta, and
3. Julieta Ledesma„s appointed representatives are
most suitable to be appointed as her guardian.
Clearly, the issues raised and arguments in support of
Goyena„s position require a review of the evidence,
hence, not proper for consideration in the petition at
bar. The Court cannot thus be tasked to go over the
proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess,
and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court
and appellate court were correct in according them
superior credit.
That the issues raised are factual is in fact admitted
by Goyena in her Reply. Goyena claims that the
petition falls within the exceptions to the rule because
the findings of the Court of Appeals are clearly belied
by the evidence on record.
In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must
be allowed the judge who deals directly with the
parties. As the Court said in Feliciano v. Comahort:
“As a rule, when it appears that the judge has
exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian,
and has given due consideration to the reasons for
and against his action which are urged by the
interested parties, his action should not be disturbed
unless it is made very clear that he has fallen into
grievous error.”
In the case at bar, Goyena has not shown that the
lower courts committed any error. Goyena„s assertion
that Amparo„s intent in instituting
the guardianship proceedings is to take control of
Julieta„s properties and use them for her own benefit
is purely speculative and finds no support from the
records.
ADOPTION
LAHOM vs. SIBULO
FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife‟s nephew and
brought him up as their own.
Inn1972 the trial court granted the petition for
adoption and ordered the Civil Registrar to change
the name of Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.
Jose Melvin refused to use the surname Lahom and
continued to use Sibulo in all his transactions despite
pleas from the Lahom spouses leading to Mrs Lahom
commencing a petition to rescind the decree of
adoption.
Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA 8552
(Domestic Adoption Act) went into effect, this law
deleted the right of adopters rescind a decree of
adoption; where it was provided that: “Adoption
being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject
to rescission by the adopter(s). However the
adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes
provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.

Due to Jose Melvin‟s averred callous indifference,

ingratitude and lack of care and concern prompted
the couple to file a petition in Court in 1999 to rescind
the decree of adoption issued in 1972.

ISSUE:
WON the adoption maybe revoked after the effectivity
of RA 8552

RULING: NO

Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute

in force at the time of the commencement of the
action.The controversy should be resolved in light of
the law governing at the time the petition was filed.
In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA
8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree
of adoption in 1972.

The new law has already abrogated and repealed the

right of the adopter under the Civil Code and Family
Code to rescind the decree of adoption, thus the
rescission of the adoption decree, having been
inititated by Lahom in 1999, after the effectivity of RA
8552 (1998) had come into force, could no longer be
pursued.

Prescription

Even before passage of RA 8552, an action to set

aside the adoption is subject to the five year bar rule
under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and the adopter
would lose right to revoke the adoption decree after
the lapse of that period.