9. Cruz v. Sec.

of DENR, GR 135385, December 6, 2000

Facts: Cruz assailed the validity of the RA 8371 (the indigenous people‘s rights act) on the ground that the
law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the state‘s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein. The ipra law enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al contended that, by providing for an
all-encompassing definition of ―ancestral domains‖ and ―ancestral lands‖ which might even include private
lands found within said areas, sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

Issue: whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional

Ruling: : No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral
domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights
granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them,
as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization
of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

10. Chavez v. PEA, GR 133250, July 9, 2002

Facts: petitioner moved to legitimize a government contract that conveyed to a private entity
157.84 hectares of reclaimed public lands along roxas boulevard in metro manila. However,
published reports place the market price of land near that area at a price higher than the
negotiated. The private entity somehow managed to deceive the government to sell the reclaimed
lands without public bidding in patent violation of the government auditing code. The senate
committees established the clear, indisputable and unalterable fact that the sale of the public
lands is grossly and unconscionably undervalued based on official documents submitted by the
proper government agencies during the senate investigation.
Issue: Whether or not stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to amari of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed on portions of manila bay, violate the constitution?
HELD:
The bulk of the lands subject of the amended JVA are still submerged lands even to this very
day, and therefore inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Of the 750 hectares subject of
the amended JVA, 78% of the total area is still submerged, permanently under the waters of
manila bay. Under the amended JVA, the PEA conveyed to amari the submerged lands even
before their actual reclamation, although the documentation of the deed of transfer and issuance
of the certificates of title would be made only after actual reclamation. To allow vast areas of
reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands is in violation of
sec. 2 article xii of the constitution.

11. La Bugal-B’laan v. Ramos, GR 127872, Dec. 1, 2004

FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995), its implementing rules and regulations and the
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995 by the
government with Western Mining Corporation(Philippines) Inc. (WMCP).
Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service contract and is
antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed
foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino
nation.

ISSUE: whether RA 7942 violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service contract and is
antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed
foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino
nation

HELD:
NO. The Court believes that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of discretion to the
Chief Executive in order to preserve and enhance our country’s competitiveness in world
markets. On the basis of this control standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality of the
Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations – insofar as they relate to
financial and technical agreements – as well as the subject FTAA.

12. Dipido v. Gozun – 485 SCRA 586

In 1987, Pres. Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign
companies when it comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In
1995, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already
signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement FTAA authorized Arimco Mining Corporation AMC (later CAMC) to
explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya including Brgy. Didipio. After the
passage of the law, DENR rolled out its implementing Rules and Regulations.

Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single company that now
goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99%
of stockholders of which are Australian nationals. Petitioners filed a demand letter addressed to
then DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez, for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA for the primary
reason that Rep. Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO 96-40 are
unconstitutional. Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order.

Issue: Whether or not the State, through Republic Act No. 7942 and the CAMC FTAA, abdicated
its primary responsibility to the full control and supervision over natural resources?

Ruling: It has been ruled that the State may likewise compel the contractor’s compliance with
mandatory requirements on mine safety, health and environmental protection, and the use of anti-
pollution technology and facilities. Moreover, the contractor is also obligated to assist in the
development of the mining community and to pay royalties to the indigenous peoples concerned.
The State has the capability to enforce compliance and to impose sanctions, should the occasion
therefore arise.

In other words, the FTAA contractor is not free to do whatever it pleases and get away with it; on
the contrary, it will have to follow the government line if it wants to stay in the enterprise.
Ineluctably then, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 vest in the government more than a sufficient degree
of control and supervision over the conduct of mining operations.

13. Chavez v. NHA – 530 SCRA 235 [2007]

Doctrine: Secs. 2 and 3, Art. XII of the Constitution declare that all natural resources are owned
by the State and they cannot be alienated except for alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain.
Facts:
On March 19, 1993, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) entered
into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) for the development of the Smokey Mountain dumpsite and
reclamation area to be converted into a low cost medium rise housing complex and
industrial/commercial site. The Project will involve 79 hectares of reclaimed land (it was initially
40 hectares but the JVA was amended). The JVA also provides that as part of the consideration
for the Project, NHA will convey a portion of the reclaimed lands to RBI.
The reclamation of the area was made; and subsequently, Special Patents were issued conveying
the reclaimed land to NHA.
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed this Petition for Prohibition
and Mandamus seeking to declare NULL and VOID the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) and the
Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project, and all other agreements in relation
thereto, for being Unconstitutional and Invalid.
Issue: Whether the reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain (Chavez claims that there was no proclamation officially classifying the reclaimed lands
as alienable and disposable).

Ruling: YES. When Proclamations Nos. 39 (placed the lands under the administration and
disposition of the NHA) and 465 (increased the reclamation area from 40 hectares to 79 hectares)
were issued, the inalienable lands covered by said proclamations were converted to alienable and
disposable lands of public domain. Furthermore, when the titles to such reclaimed lands were
transferred to the NHA, said alienable and disposable lands of public domain were automatically
classified as lands of the private domain or patrimonial properties of the State. The reason is
obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then
it would be useless to transfer it to the NHA since it will not be able to transfer such lands to
qualified entities and thus, it will not achieve its purpose.

14. Republic v. Enciso, GR No. 160145, November 11, 2005

Facts: Enciso, herein respondent filed for the registration of his land property in Zambales in the
RTC, contending that the only tenants to the land were his family and his predecessors-in-
interest. The RTC granted his application for the registration of his land. The solicitor general
challenged the decision of the RTC contending that the respondent failed to adduce any
muniment of title and/or the tax declaration with the application to prove bona fide acquisition of
the land applied for or its open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
thereof in the concept of owner since june 12, 1945 or prior thereto. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC in toto, hence this petition.
Issue : whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC‘s decision and if the contention of the
OSG is valid.
Held : the Court ruled that the CA erred in its decision for the mere possession of the land and
that of Enciso‘s predecessors-in-interest will not suffice in for judicial confirmation of title. The
court sustained the contention of the OSG, that respondent failed to prove that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of owners since time immemorial, or from june 12, 1945.

15. Philippine Geothermal v. Napocor, GR No. 144302, May 27, 2004

FACTS : on september 10, 1971, the national power corporation (npc) entered into a service
contract with philippine geothermal, inc. (pgi), a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of california, united states of america, for the exploration and exploitation of geothermal
resources covering the tiwi and mak-ban geothermal fields. Section 3 of said contract provides
for a term of 25 years renewable for another 25 years upon the option of PGI.

When the contract was about to expire, npc was doubtful whether a renewal would be
constitutional in light of section 2, article xii of the 1987 constitution which provides that ―the
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the state‖.

As the service contract contained an arbitral clause, pgi filed on july 8, 1996 a request for
arbitration with the international court of arbitration (ica) of the international chamber of
commerce (icc).

On august 21, 1996, the npc filed before the regional trial court (rtc) of quezon city a petition for
declaratory relief against pgi praying for the determination of the constitutionality of section 3 of
the service contract on the renewal of the contract at the option of pgi.

On october 2, 1996, pgi filed a motion to dismiss the petition for declaratory relief alleging,
among other things, that the trial court has no jurisdiction over it in light of the pending
arbitration proceedings it instituted.

The quezon city rtc denied the motion to dismiss, which was affirmed by the court of appeals.
Hence, the present appeal to the supreme court. During the pendency of the petition, however,
pgi and npc filed several joint motions to suspend proceedings upon the ground that they were
negotiating for the settlement of the case. They subsequently entered into a compromise
agreement, wherein they agreed to terminate the service contract subject matter of the dispute, in
favor of a new geothermal sales contract and pgi has committed to form a philippine company
for the development and operation of the tiwi and mak-ban steamfields on a going-forward basis,
thereby effectively erasing any doubt as to the legality of the compromise. Pgi and npc then filed
a joint motion to approve compromise agreement and to dismiss.

Issue: Whether the motion to dismiss by the parties should be granted on the ground that they
have terminated the service contract which is the subject matter of the dispute

Ruling : the supreme court granted the parties‘ motion to dismiss, on the ground that they have
terminated the service contract subject matter of the dispute. However, the court stated that since
only the issue of jurisdiction over the constitutionality of a contract was elevated to it, it is
beyond its jurisdiction to pass upon and approve the compromise agreement of the parties.

16. JG Summit v. CA, GR No. 124293, January 31, 2005

Facts: by virtue of proclamation no. 50, establishing the committee on privatization (cop) and the
asset privatization trust (apt), issued by president corazon aquino on 8 december 1986, the non-
performing assets of the government were up for privatization. Philippine shipyard and
engineering corporation (philseco) was up for bidding for no less than one billion three hundred
million pesos (p 1,300,000.00) for 87.67% equity. Kawasaki heavy industries, ltd. Of kobe, japan
(kawasaki), the other party to the joint venture was given the right to top by five percent (5%) the
highest bid for the said shares in exchange of the right of first refusal under the joint venture
agreement (jva). J.g. summit holdings, inc.topped by submitting a bid of two billion and thirty
million pesos (p2,030,000,000.00) with an acknowledgment of kawasaki/[philyards'] right to top
wherein the latter subsequently exercised its right. The petitioner later challenged that since
philseco is a landholding company, kawasaki could exercise its right of first refusal only up to
40% of the shares of philseco due to the constitutional prohibition on landholding by
corporations with more than 40% foreign-owned equity.

Issue: Whether or not the prohibition under section 7, article xii of the 1987 constitution against
ownership by aliens of real properties applies only to lands

Held: The prohibition under section 7, article xii of the 1987 constitution applies only to
ownership of land. The said prohibition does not extend to immovable or real property as defined
under article 415 of the civil code. Otherwise, there would have a strange situation where the
ownership of immovable property such as trees, plants and growing fruit attached to the land
would be limited to filipinos and filipino corporations only.