Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed
into focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction.
The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR
Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one
of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers
Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private
respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12
July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA.1 Prior to their receipt of
the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls
should be removed to give way to the "People's Park".2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their
President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the
CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to
be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, andcarinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed
as CHR Case No. 90-1580.3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to
desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the
vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before
the CHR.4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well
as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the
demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,5 the CHR, in its resolution of
1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in
favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the
Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with
the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest."6
A motion to dismiss,7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also
averred, among other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-
Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a
moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent
business entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1
August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk
of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and
authority whether or not a certain business establishment (should) be allowed to
operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if already
issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance.8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the
motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise
manifested that they would bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that
the Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of
violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil
and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business."9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with
the contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously
objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved).10
In an Order,11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out
the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it
imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.
On 1 March 1991,12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and
supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had
jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who complained of the
gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss
should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a
paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a
quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human
rights of all persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and
to dignity. All these brazenly and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents
with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of women and children, and
their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and
traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to such a violent
demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.
In an Order,14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently
reinstated, however, in our resolution16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary
restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-
1580."17
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose
stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon
City;
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his
comment for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment,18 through Hon. Samuel
Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private
respondent Roque Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991,
requiring such comment.
The powers and functions22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to —
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to
provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine
the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the
intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial
body.23 This view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cariño v. Commission
on Human Rights,24 the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa,
has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to
the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law
to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less
take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power
is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is
not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals
or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this
controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to
define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a
symposium on human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in
1977, one of the questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human
rights?" The participants, representing different sectors of the society, have given the following
varied answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They
are the same in all parts of the world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or
the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property;
freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the
accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the right to elect public
officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political associations and engage
in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an education, employment, and
social services.25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer
fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by
the State but can only be recognized and protected by it.26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights
defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are
part of his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable.28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an
individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the
term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally
considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional
Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in creating an independent
commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back at the country's experience under
the martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our
fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of
the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an
advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the
Philippines,"29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights
most of the human rights expressed in the International Covenant, these rights
became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September 1972.
Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became subject
to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite periods,
sometimes for years, without charges, until ordered released by the Commander-in-
Chief or this representative. The right to petition for the redress of grievances
became useless, since group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and
other mass media were subjected to censorship and short term licensing. Martial law
brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost
independence and security of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They
were required to submit letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the
acceptance thereof. Torture to extort confessions were practiced as declared by
international bodies like Amnesty International and the International Commission of
Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following
discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the
importance of human rights and also because civil and political rights have been
determined by many international covenants and human rights legislations in the
Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent
legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its
impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can
be most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are
very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every
single right of an individual involves his civil right or his political right. So, where do
we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the
language of human rights advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the right to life, the right
against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific
rights that are considered enshrined in many international documents and legal
instruments as constituting civil and political rights, and these are precisely what we
want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights distinguished this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic
rights, and there are other violations of rights of citizens which can be addressed to
the proper courts and authorities.
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and,
therefore, in doing that the commission will be authorized to take under its wings
cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under the jurisdiction of the
ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define
the specific parameters which cover civil and political rights as covered by the
international standards governing the behavior of governments regarding the
particular political and civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or
prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced during martial law which we
would now like to safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are
really trying to say is, perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all those rights
stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined as human rights.
Those are the rights that we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our
Constitution. They are integral parts of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill
of Rights covered by human rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would
like to state that in the past regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human
rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a matter of fact, they
had defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life
consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is
that the sense of the committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by
the previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act
effectively: 1) protection of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and
the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5)
salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the religious.
xxx xxx xxx
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we
should, in order to make the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as much
as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the concept and
jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I was actually disturbed this morning
when the reference was made without qualification to the rights embodied in the
universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later on, this was qualified to refer
to civil and political rights contained therein.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on
Civil and Political Rights of which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other
covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights specified in that other
convention which may not be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be
wise to link our concept of human rights to general terms like "convention," rather
than specify the rights contained in the convention.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and
political rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by this provision — freedom
from political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to fair and public trials,
as well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective
violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and
political rights of a specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it
up to all of the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer
linking his concept or the concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-
called civil or political rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I
was referring to an international instrument.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific
article therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil and politically related, as we
understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the different rights-the rights of
labor to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee
to those that the Gentlemen has specified.
SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I
cannot stress more on how much we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few
lawyers will accept clients who do not pay. And so, they are the ones more abused
and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate — torture,
salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre — and the persons
who are allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians, men in the military and
big shots. Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must be independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially
for the little Filipino, the little individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get
it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil and political violations because if
we open this to land, housing and health, we will have no place to go again and we
will not receive any response. . . .30 (emphasis supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision
empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any
party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as referring —
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider
sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or
administration of the government. They include the rights of property, marriage,
equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil
rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or
community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being
enforced or redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution,
unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt.32
Political rights,33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in
the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public
office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the
management of government.34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that
the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more
severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the
"(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of
tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6)
other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to
have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless,
significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in
peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They
have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of
human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendation."35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the
stalls, sari-saristores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents
on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins
the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national
highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is
indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first
place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove
discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude
that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private
respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political
rights" intended by the Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines
and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of
Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to
cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in
accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite
for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational
guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the
power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said
body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in
pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in
the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative
power that it does not possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human
Rights,36 the Court, speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures
and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated
or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to
issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the
Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary
injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of the victims of
human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction
to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge
of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the
Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation
or protection of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose."
(footnotes omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and
recommendations to any appropriate agency of government.37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to
the vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is
there lack of locus standion the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more
importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially
consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become
moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard,
and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive
remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an
act already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its
resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to
also prevent CHR from precisely doing that.39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights
is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the
P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made
permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason and Puno, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R.
No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and
my dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR
can issue a cease and desist order to maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case
involving an alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in
situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.
In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as
posing prima facie a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of the civil
rights of said private respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp.
20-21) and which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987
Constitution).
Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at
street corners. Positive action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not
enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is
transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit
the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which may (or may
not ultimately) involve human rights violations.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further
proceedings.
# Separate Opinions
I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R.
No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and
my dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR
can issue a cease and desist order to maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case
involving an alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in
situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.
In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as
posing prima facie a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of the civil
rights of said private respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp.
20-21) and which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987
Constitution).
Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at
street corners. Positive action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not
enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is
transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit
the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which may (or may
not ultimately) involve human rights violations.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further
proceedings.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA,
minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD
and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and
NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and
DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and
represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN,
minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA
CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO,
JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T.
NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY
NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all
surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ,
KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE
VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and
TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented
by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all
surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA,
CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and
represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN
JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE
MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all
surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS
BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology
which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the
said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine
rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati,
Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal
plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources.
The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the
new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners.1 The complaint2was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs
"are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was
filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource
but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further
asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."4Consequently, it
is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to —
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands
has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant
rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the
habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time
immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology,
the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest
cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses;
the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a
host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water
table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of
the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which
may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and
the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded
estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the
entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and
varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the
disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine
resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire
country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i)
the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent
mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams
constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the
generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide
gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of
global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a
matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert
witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
CAUSE OF ACTION
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares
of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million
hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth
rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago
and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth
forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber
license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89
million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached
as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25
hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the
Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if
not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and
to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the
environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt,
experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs —
especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit
from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office.
On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all
logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the
continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a
country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna
and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and
"make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section
14, Article XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural
law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the
instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him
and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the
petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the
motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's
abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause
of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further
ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the
plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf
of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20
and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating
the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy),
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's
inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners
likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard
the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available
involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They
likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled
that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They
see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right"
which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then
reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a
political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of
Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but
to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done
by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of
time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor
cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms
of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil
Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take
issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit.
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all
citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that
the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule
3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the
latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm
and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their
right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits
of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of
the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the
petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order
reads as follows:
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help
but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the
noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a
specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong
they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the
Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague
conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action
in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with
political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of
by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers"
of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing
timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to
do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of
the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section
of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any
of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by
the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too
far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come —
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido
Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all
forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as
well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development
and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated
on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation
and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all
natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3
thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure
the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including
the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable
access of the different segments of the population to the development and the use of
the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future
generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true
value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987,15specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the
Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance
and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of
making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources
equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future
generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into
account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other
hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the
fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall
be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as
the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152
(Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a)
to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of
the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations." 17The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is
as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under
E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed
or granted.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails
to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency
of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the
truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically
admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true,
may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante
vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care
and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof
[cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and
deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that
happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory
affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF
ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the
basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing,
however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as
party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely
put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already
formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political
question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The
second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of
the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice
to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme
Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and
the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning
of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable
and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented
before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it
under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases,
even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
...
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of
contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing
timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to
do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even
invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted
with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to
strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in
policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by
the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D.
No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend,
modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other
form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not
a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public
interest or public welfare as in this case.
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the
latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are
not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause
[See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.
Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does
not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing
timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting
further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same
cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very
nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of
the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American
Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are
normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both
shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract
rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his
property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work
them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate
it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as
of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it
as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby
set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders
or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case
which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years.
The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and
course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the
utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to
clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing
and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim
that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal
interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness
of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to
embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The
Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of
environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and
the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such
beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure
to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for
future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is
no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that,
accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest,
with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive
violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and
generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular
claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and
control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil,
chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil
rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open
land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit
mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea
resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground
water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed
out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book
IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in
Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the
other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and
"environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide
range of topics:
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give
rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine
Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and
sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear
to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that
Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in
the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section
16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present
form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are
too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right
— a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the
Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public
respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the
relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more
specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy
principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that
the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of
aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be
a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently
and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and
"the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is
respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic
policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and
professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments —
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in
the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms
and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will
those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence
of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus
between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public
respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the
forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the
Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
# Separate Opinions
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case
which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years.
The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and
course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the
utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to
clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing
and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim
that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal
interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness
of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to
embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The
Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of
environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and
the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such
beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure
to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for
future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is
no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that,
accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest,
with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive
violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and
generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular
claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and
control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil,
chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil
rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open
land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit
mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea
resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground
water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed
out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book
IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in
Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the
other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and
"environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide
range of topics:
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give
rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine
Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and
sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear
to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that
Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in
the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section
16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present
form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are
too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right
— a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the
Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public
respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the
relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more
specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy
principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that
the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of
aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be
a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently
and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and
"the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is
respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic
policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and
professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments —
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in
the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms
and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will
those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence
of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus
between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public
respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the
forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the
Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
RESOLUTION
ANTONIO, J.:
In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas,
charges Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse of authority in
refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the
Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on the peace and order
conditions of the said municipality. Respondent, in answer to the complaint, stated that there has
never been an intention to refuse access to official court records; that although court records are
among public documents open to inspection not only by the parties directly involved but also by
other persons who have legitimate interest to such inspection, yet the same is always subject to
reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected. He further asserted
that a court has unquestionably the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its records
and the furnishing of copies therefrom may be refused where the person requesting is not motivated
by a serious and legitimate interest but acts out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify
private spite or to promote public scandal.
Restrictions are imposed by the Court for fear of an abuse in the exercise of the right.
For fear that the dirty hands of partisan politics might again be at play, Some of the
cases filed and decided by the Court after the declaration of Martial Law and years
after the election still bore the stigma of partisan politics as shown in the affidavits
and testimonies of witnesses.
Without casting aspersion on any particular individual, it is worth mentioning, that the
padlocks of the door of the Court has recently been tampered by inserting papers
and matchsticks.
The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for investigation and report. At
the preliminary hearing on October 16, 1975, Taal Mayor Corazon A. Caniza filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint to preserve harmony and (cooperation among officers in the same
municipality. This motion was denied by the Investigating Judge, but after formal investigation, he
recommended the exoneration of respondent. Pertinent portion of his report reads as follows:
* * * When this case was heard, complainant Dominador Baldoza informed the Court
that he is aware of the motion to dismiss filed by Mayor Corazon A. Caniza and that
he is in conformity with the dismissal of the administrative charge against Judge
Rodolfo Dimaano. The Court asked him if he could prove his case and he said he
can. So, the Court denied his oral motion to dismiss and required him to present his
evidence. Complainant only manifested to the Court that he has no oral evidence.
The only evidence he has are the exchanged communication which were all in
writing and attached to the record between him and the respondent. The Court asked
the respondent what he has to say on the documentary evidence of the complainant.
He manifested that all his answers to the complaint are all embodied in his answers
filed with the Court.
The complainant was warned to be more cautious in filing any administrative charge
against any public official especially, members of the judiciary, considering that an
administrative charge against a member of the judiciary may expose the latter to
public ridicule and scandal thereby minimizing if not eradicating public trust and
After a careful evaluation of the recommendation, We find that the respondent did not act arbitrarily
in the premises. As found by the Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed the complainant to
open and view the docket books of respondent certain conditions and under his control and
supervision. it has not been shown that the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent were
unreasonable. The access to public records predicated on the right of the people to acquire
information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the public has a legitimate
interest in matters of social and political significance. In an earlier case, 1 this Court held that
mandamus would lie to compel the Secretary of Justice and the Register of Deeds to examine the
records of the latter office. Predicating the right to examine the records on statutory provisions, and
to a certain degree by general principles of democratic institutions, this Court stated that while the
Register of Deeds has discretion to exercise as to the manner in which persons desiring to inspect,
examine or copy the records in his office may exercise their rights, such power does not carry with it
authority to prohibit. Citing with approval People ex rel. TitleGuarantee & T. Co. vs. Railly, 2 this
Court said:
The subject is necessarily committed, to a great degree, 'to his (register of deeds')
discretion as to how much of the conveniences of the office are required to be
preserved for the accomodation of these persons. It is not his duty to permit the
office to be thronged needlessly with persons examining its books of papers, but it is
his duty to regulate, govern, and control his office in such a manner as to permit the
statutory advantages to be enjoyed by other persons not employed by him as largely
and extensibly as that consistently can be done * * *. What the law expects and
requires from him is the exercise of an unbiased and impartial judgment, by which all
persons resorting to the office, under legal authority, and conducting themselves in
an orderly manner, shall be secured their lawful rights and privileges, and that a
corporation formed in the manner in which the relator has been, shall be permitted to
obtain all the information either by searches, abstracts, or copies, that the law has
entitled it to obtain.
Except, perhaps, when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or
sheer, Idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration
officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person
seeking access to the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information
which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not
made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature
and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy.
As to the moral or material injury which the publication might inflict on other parties,
that is the publisher's responsibility and lookout. The publication is made subject to
the consequences of the law.
The concurring opinion of Justice Briones predicated such right not on statutory grounds merely but
on the constitutional right of the press to have access to information as the essence of press
freedom. 3
The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on
matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as
documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by
law. 4 The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free
exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the
nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision making if they are denied access to
information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with
the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information
depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is
interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases. " 5 However, restrictions on access to certain records may be
imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted
upon a showing of immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of control
inadequate to maintain order. 6
Fernando, Actg. C.J., Barredo, Actg.(Chairman), Aquino and Martin JJ., concur.
- versus -
HONORABLE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA AND
HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL
ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, G.R. No. 171485
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------x
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO,
JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEODORO A.
CASINO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO,
MARIO J. AGUJA, SATUR C.
OCAMPO, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, JUAN
EDGARDO ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL.
GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL JOSEL J.
VILLANUEVA, LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE
R. MARCOS, RENATO B. MAGTUBO,
JUSTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO, ROILO
GOLEZ, DARLENE ANTONINO-
CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P.
ROSALES, JOSEL G. VIRADOR,
RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GILBERT C.
REMULLA, FLORENCIO G. NOEL,
ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-
BARAQUEL, IMELDA C. NICOLAS,
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI
JAVIER COLMENARES, MOVEMENT
OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR
CIVIL LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY
AMADO GAT INCIONG,
Petitioners,
- versus -
- versus -
- versus -
- versus -
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN
HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; ARTURO
LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
(PNP); GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (AFP); AND EDUARDO
ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid
formula are necessary.[1] Superior strength � the use of force � cannot make
wrongs into rights. In this regard, the courts should be vigilant in safeguarding the
constitutional rights of the citizens, specifically their liberty.
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban� s philosophy of liberty is thus most
relevant. He said: � In cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should
weigh heavily against government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the
marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak.� Laws and actions that restrict
fundamental rights come to the courts � with a heavy presumption against their
constitutional validity.� [2]
Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently modern
problem. How does the Constitution of a free people combine the degree
of liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny, with the degree of law, without
which, liberty becomes license?[3]
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the
PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless
violence.
The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give
full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling
out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that
PP 1017 was without factual bases. While he explained that it is not
respondents� task to state the facts behind the questioned Proclamation, however,
they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.
On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First
Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang,
members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their
detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement, they vowed to
remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon the people to
� show and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our
disgust, not only by going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red bands
on our left arms.� [5]
B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided
to Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), that a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical
mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on February 24,
2005. According to these two (2) officers, there was no way they could possibly
stop the soldiers because they too, were breaking the chain of command to join the
forces foist to unseat the President. However, Gen. Senga has remained faithful to
his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of command. He immediately took
custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return to the Philippine
Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.
On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic
Front (NDF) at North Central Mindanao, publicly announced: � Anti-Arroyo
groups within the military and police are growing rapidly, hastened by the
economic difficulties suffered by the families of AFP officers and enlisted
personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field.� He claimed
that with the forces of the national democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo
conservative political parties, coalitions, plus the groups that have been reinforcing
since June 2005, it is probable that the President� s ouster is nearing its
concluding stage in the first half of 2006.
For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the
issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all
programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People
Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local
governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to
the President� s mind were organized for purposes of destabilization, are
cancelled.Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that
� warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be
implemented.� [11]
According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the
ground for the dispersal of their assemblies.
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without
warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the
Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald
Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team
confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the
Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon City were stationed
inside the editorial and business offices of the newspaper; while policemen from
the Manila Police District were stationed outside the building.[13]
A few minutes after the search and seizure at theDaily Tribune offices, the
police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its
sister publication, the tabloid Abante.
Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the police
went after him during a public forum at the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. But his
two drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were taken into custody.
Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the rights of
Representatives Beltran, Satur Ocampo, et al., are not being raised in these
petitions.
On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state
of national emergency has ceased to exist.
In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged
that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section
4[15]of Article II, (b) Sections 1,[16] 2,[17] and 4[18] of Article III, (c) Section 23[19] of
Article VI, and (d) Section 17[20] of Article XII of the Constitution.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP
1017 is an � arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law
powers.� And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial Law,
petitioners argued that � it amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency
powers without congressional approval.� In addition, petitioners asserted that PP
1017 � goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under
the Revised Administrative Code.�
And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424, petitioner Loren B. Legarda maintained that
PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are � unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom
of expression, including its cognate rights such as freedom of the press and the
right to access to information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed under
Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.� In this regard, she stated that
these issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending
before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral arguments and heard the parties
on the above interlocking issues which may be summarized as follows:
A. PROCEDURAL:
1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions
moot and academic.
2) Whether petitioners in 171485(Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos.
171400 (ALGI),171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.),
and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing.
B. SUBSTANTIVE:
1) Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of
PP 1017.
2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.
a. Facial Challenge
b. Constitutional Basis
c. As Applied Challenge
A. PROCEDURAL
But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a � self-
starting capacity.� [23] Courts may exercise such power only when the following
requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or
controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of
constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.[24]
Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence,
we shall limit our discussion thereon.
The Court holds that President Arroyo� s issuance of PP 1021 did not
render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP
1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal
acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or
valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that
must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that � an
unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it
affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.� [30]
The � moot and academic� principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases,
otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution;[31] second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved;[32] third, when constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public;[33] and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[34]
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court� s
assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the
issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question
that the issues being raised affect the public� s interest, involving as they do the
people� s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the
press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of
educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the
police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees.[35] And
lastly, respondents� contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the
petitions are subject to judicial review.
In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban� s Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v.
Executive Secretary.[36] However, they failed to take into account the Chief
Justice� s very statement that an otherwise � moot� case may still be decided
� provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be
prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance.� The present case falls
right within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference
in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the
activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State
Supreme Court laid down the more stringent � direct injury� test in Ex Parte
Levitt,[42] later reaffirmed inTileston v. Ullman.[43] The same Court ruled that for a
private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an
executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct
injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general
interest common to all members of the public.
Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed
to show direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under the principle of
� transcendental importance.� Pertinent are the following cases:
(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,[52] where the Court ruled
that the enforcement of the constitutional right to information and
the equitable diffusion of natural resources are matters of
transcendental importance which clothe the petitioner with locus
standi;
(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,[54] while the Court noted that the
petitioners may not file suit in their capacity as taxpayers absent a
showing that � Balikatan 02-01� involves the exercise of
Congress� taxing or spending powers, it reiterated its ruling
in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,[55] that in cases of
transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly
and definitely and standing requirements may be relaxed.
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases
decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may
be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
In Lacson v. Perez,[58] the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not a real party-in-interest as it had not
demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders, members or supporters.
The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and
Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No.
171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged � direct
injury� resulting from � illegal arrest� and � unlawful search� committed by
police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not
question their legal standing.
In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule
in Philconsa v. Enriquez,[60] Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng
Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,[61] Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc.
v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[62]Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation,[63] and Ta� ada v. Tuvera,[64] that when the issue concerns a public
right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the
execution of the laws.
In G.R. No. 171483, KMU� s assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
violated its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal
standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of their
members.[65] We take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the
President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies
following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to
allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its members
may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No.
5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[66] the Court held that the mere
invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,
while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this
case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this
Court declares that petitioner have locus standi.
It must always be borne in mind that the question oflocus standi is but
corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the
underlying legal tenet of the � liberality doctrine� on legal standing. It cannot
be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question
which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice
Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of
this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of
the � transcendental importance� doctrine, a relaxation of the standing
requirements for the petitioners in the � PP 1017 cases.�
This Court holds that all the petitioners herein havelocus standi.
B. SUBSTANTIVE
Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis. Hence, it was not
� necessary� for President Arroyo to issue such Proclamation.
The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the
President� s exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power has reached its distilled
point - from the indulgent days of Barcelon v.
[70] [71]
Baker and Montenegro v. Castaneda to the volatile era
of Lansang v. Garcia,[72] Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,[73] and Garcia-Padilla v.
Enrile.[74] The tug-of-war always cuts across the line defining � political
questions,� particularly those questions � in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government.� [75] Barcelon and Montenegro were in unison in declaring that
the authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the
President and his decision is final and conclusive on the courts. Lansangtook
the opposite view. There, the members of the Court were unanimous in the
conviction that the Court has the authority to inquire into the existence of factual
bases in order to determine their constitutional sufficiency. From the principle of
separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the system of checks and balances,
� under which the President is supreme, x x x only if and whenhe acts within
the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to
determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial
Department, which in this respect, is, in turn,
constitutionallysupreme.� [76] In 1973, the unanimous Court ofLansang was
divided in Aquino v. Enrile.[77] There, the Court was almost evenly
divided on the issue of whether the validity of the imposition of
Martial Law is a political or justiciable question.[78] Then came Garcia-Padilla v.
Enrile which greatly dilutedLansang. It declared that there is a need to re-examine
the latter case, ratiocinating that � in times of war or national emergency, the
President must be given absolute control for the very life of the nation and the
government is in great peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable only to
his conscience, the People, and God.� [79]
Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not
expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she
believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of
such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
This case brings to fore a contentious subject -- the power of the President in
times of emergency. A glimpse at the various political theories relating to this
subject provides an adequate backdrop for our ensuing discussion.
John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government, called upon the
English doctrine of prerogative to cope with the problem of emergency. In times
of danger to the nation, positive law enacted by the legislature might be inadequate
or even a fatal obstacle to the promptness of action necessary to avert
catastrophe. In these situations, the Crown retained a prerogative � power to act
according to discretion for the public good, without the proscription of the law
and sometimes even against it.� [84] But Locke recognized that this moral
restraint might not suffice to avoid abuse of prerogative powers. Who shall judge
the need for resorting to the prerogative and how may its abuse be
avoided? Here, Locke readily admitted defeat, suggesting that � the people have
no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on
earth, but to appeal to Heaven.� [85]
Jean-Jacques Rousseau also assumed the need for temporary suspension of
democratic processes of government in time of emergency. According to him:
If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an
obstacle to their preservation, the method is to nominate a supreme lawyer, who
shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority. In
such a case, there is no doubt about the general will, and it clear that the
people� s first intention is that the State shall not perish.[86]
Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship or � supreme
magistracy� as he termed it. For him, it would more likely be cheapened by
� indiscreet use.� He was unwilling to rely upon an � appeal to
heaven.� Instead, he relied upon a tenure of office of prescribed duration to
avoid perpetuation of the dictatorship.[87]
Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from the fetters
of a repressive regime, the 1986 Constitutional Commission, in drafting the 1987
Constitution, endeavored to create a government in the concept of Justice
Jackson� s � balanced power structure.� [102] Executive, legislative, and judicial
powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and the Supreme Court,
respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly
of power in times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as
limitation or check upon the other. This system does not weaken the
President, it just limits his power, using the language of McIlwain. In other
words, in times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose
a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive
but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed
procedural limitations.
a. � Facial Challenge�
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its
� overbreadth.� They claim that its enforcement encroached on both unprotected
and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a
� chilling effect� to the citizens.
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of
a law that � reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control
over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.� Undoubtedly, lawless
violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered � harmful� and
� constitutionally unprotected conduct.� In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[105] it was
held:
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require
the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis
of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its
very existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression. In Younger v. Harris,[109] it was
held that:
First provision:
Second provision:
� and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction;�
Third provision:
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to
aid him in suppressinglawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves
ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the President� s calling-out
power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be
careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he
wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the
greater the power, the greater are the limitations.
Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures
without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news
media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees,
are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-
Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus.
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative
power. Its enabling clause states: � to enforce obedience to all the laws and
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.� Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by
President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.�
PP 1017 states in
part: � to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction.�
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the
military?
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers
not only to war but also to � other national emergency.� If the intention of the
Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to
declare a � state of national emergency� pursuant to Section 18, Article VII
(calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of
a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not
intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a
� state of national emergency.� The logical conclusion then is that President
Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in
the absence of a Congressional enactment.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a
different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be
construed together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of
a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together
and considered in the light of each other.[123] Considering that Section 17 of
Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national
emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise
of emergency powers.
When the common good so requires, the State may temporarily take
over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.
MR. BENGZON. Unless they are of such proportions such that they
would paralyze government service.[132]
x x x x x x
It may be argued that when there is national emergency, Congress may not be
able to convene and, therefore, unable to delegate to the President the power to
take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
�x x x
After all the criticisms that have been made against the
efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the fact
remains that the Constitution has set up this form of government,
with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the
commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The
Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given
notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples
in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under
this framework of government, legislation is preserved for
Congress all the time, not excepting periods of crisis no matter
how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic
features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have
specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been
surrendered to another department � unless we regard as
legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to
prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was
fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death
struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our
concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils
more than in normal circumstances � the various branches,
executive, legislative, and judicial,� given the ability to act, are
called upon � to perform the duties and discharge the
responsibilities committed to them respectively.�
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of
national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The
President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the
take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have
ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the
types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In
short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State
under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by
Congress.
c. � AS APPLIED CHALLENGE�
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that, on February
24, 2006, they were arrested without warrants on their way to EDSA to celebrate
the 20thAnniversary of People Power I. The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as
basis of the arrest.
And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged
that their members were � turned away and dispersed� when they went to EDSA
and later, to Ayala Avenue, to celebrate the 20thAnniversary of People Power I.
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes
invalid although they may be abused and misabused[135] and may afford an
opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.[136] The validity of a statute
or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to
accomplish the end desired,not from its effects in a particular case.[137] PP 1017
is merely an invocation of the President� s calling-out power. Its general purpose
is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo
to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or
impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens� constitutional
rights.
President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP
1017. General orders are � acts and commands of the President in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.� They are internal
rules issued by the executive officer to his subordinates precisely for
theproper and efficient administration of law. Such rules and regulations create
no relation except between the official who issues them and the official who
receives them.[139] They are based on and are the product of, a relationship in
which power is their source, and obedience, their object.[140] For these reasons, one
requirement for these rules to be valid is that they must be reasonable, not
arbitrary or capricious.
G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the
� necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent
acts of terrorism and lawless violence.�
Since the times of the Cold War the United Nations Organization
has been trying in vain to reach a consensus on the basic issue of
definition. The organization has intensified its efforts recently, but has
been unable to bridge the gap between those who associate
� terrorism� with any violent act by non-state groups against civilians,
state functionaries or infrastructure or military installations, and those
who believe in the concept of the legitimate use of force when resistance
against foreign occupation or against systematic oppression of ethnic
and/or religious groups within a state is concerned.
The absence of a law defining � acts of terrorism� may result in abuse and
oppression on the part of the police or military. An illustration is when a group of
persons are merely engaged in a drinking spree. Yet the military or the police may
consider the act as an act of terrorism and immediately arrest them pursuant to
G.O. No. 5. Obviously, this is abuse and oppression on their part. It must be
remembered that an act can only be considered a crime if there is a law defining
the same as such and imposing the corresponding penalty thereon.
So far, the word � terrorism� appears only once in our criminal laws, i.e.,
in P.D. No. 1835 dated January 16, 1981 enacted by President Marcos during the
Martial Law regime. This decree is entitled � Codifying The Various Laws on
Anti-Subversion and Increasing The Penalties for Membership in Subversive
Organizations.� The word � terrorism� is mentioned in the following
provision: � That one who conspires with any other person for the purpose of
overthrowing the Government of the Philippines x x x by force,
violence, terrorism, x x x shall be punished by reclusion temporal x x x.�
P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws the Communist
Party of the Philippines) enacted by President Corazon Aquino on May 5,
1985. These two (2) laws, however, do not define � acts of terrorism.� Since
there is no law defining � acts of terrorism,� it is President Arroyo alone, under
G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute
terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without
restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest without warrants,
breaking into offices and residences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition
and dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All
these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the
calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of
the Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that the � acts of terrorism� portion
of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.
x x x.
But what made it doubly worse for petitioners Davidet al. is that not only
was their right against warrantless arrest violated, but also their right to peaceably
assemble.
The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they
were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They were not committing any
crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted the
limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from circumstances, the charges
of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought. Even the
Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to justify the arresting
officers� conduct. In De Jonge v. Oregon,[148] it was held that peaceable
assembly cannot be made a crime, thus:
On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the
dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU et al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted.
Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malaca� ang� s
directive canceling all permits previously issued by local government units. This is
arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of
the principle that � freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the
State has a right to prevent.� [149] Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the
exception. Only upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and present
danger that the State may deny the citizens� right to exercise it. Indeed,
respondents failed to show or convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts
amounting to lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. With the blanket revocation
of permits, the distinction between protected and unprotected assemblies was
eliminated.
The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that
a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section
8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the
presence of the lawful occupantthereof or any member of his family or in the
absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant
must direct that it be served in thedaytime, unless the property is on the person or
in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that
it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the
CIDG operatives.
Not only that, the search violated petitioners� freedom of the press. The
best gauge of a free and democratic society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed
by its media. In the Burgos v. Chief of Staff[152] this Court held that --
While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the
� Metropolitan Mail� and � We Forum� newspapers in the above case, yet it
cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The
search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the
vicinity of theThe Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government
officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the
repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do
so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment
should he be so rash as to disobey.[153] Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was
subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government
sentiments. This Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional
right even if it involves the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on
public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. It is the
duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and
against any stealthy encroachments thereon. The motto should always be obsta
principiis.[154]
Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General admitted that
the search of the Tribune� s offices and the seizure of its materials for publication
and other papers are illegal; and that the same are inadmissible � for any
purpose,� thus:
JUSTICE CALLEJO:
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
Likewise, the warrantless arrests and seizures executed by the police were,
according to the Solicitor General, illegal and cannot be condoned, thus:
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
The Dissenting Opinion states that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
constitutional in every aspect and � should result in no constitutional or statutory
breaches if applied according to their letter.�
The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Its
ratiocination has been exhaustively presented. At this point, suffice it to reiterate
that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the military to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When in implementing its
provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts
which violate the citizens� rights under the Constitution, this Court has to declare
such acts unconstitutional and illegal.
SUMMATION
In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 � a
supervening event � would have normally rendered this case moot and
academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts were
committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no guarantee that PP
1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there have been
media reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed � if
the May 1 rallies� become � unruly and violent.� Consequently, the
transcendental issues raised by the parties should not be � evaded;� they must
now be resolved to prevent future constitutional aberration.
In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by
the President � acting as Commander-in-Chief � addressed to subalterns in the
AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid
standard � that the military and the police should take only the � necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence.� But the words � acts of terrorism� found in G.O. No. 5 have not
been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed
deleted from the said G.O. While � terrorism� has been denounced generally in
media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to
determine the limits of the AFP� s authority in carrying out this portion of G.O.
No. 5.
On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also
pristine clear that (1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and
Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU
and NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior
restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the
whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other materials, are not
authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid
provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil,
criminal or administrative sanctions on the individual police officers
concerned. They have not been individually identified and given their day in
court. The civil complaints or causes of action and/or relevant criminal
Informations have not been presented before this Court. Elementary due process
bars this Court from making any specific pronouncement of civil, criminal or
administrative liabilities.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP
1017 is CONSTITUTIONALinsofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce
laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the
President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in
PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution isCONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the
President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest without prior legislation.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal
and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their
rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts
constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the
imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as
well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its
articles for publication and other materials, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
(On leave)
REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Associate Justice
TUASON, J.:
This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff, the first having been denied in a
decision of this Court of July 30, 1949. The history of the petitioner's detention was thus briefly set
forth in that decision, written by Mr. Justice Bengzon:
The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country
from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in
these Islands. Upon liberation he was arrested as a Japanese spy, by U.S. Army Counter
Intelligence Corps. Later he was handed to theCommonwealth Government for disposition in
accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 682. Thereafter, the People's Court ordered his
release. But the deportation Board taking his case up, found that having no travel documents
Mejoff was illegally in this country, and consequently referred the matter to the immigration
authorities. After the corresponding investigation, the Board of commissioners of Immigration
on April 5, 1948, declared that Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally in 1944, without
inspection and admission by the immigration officials at a designation port of entry and,
therefore, it ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to Russia. The
petitioner was then under custody, he having been arrested on March 18, 1948. In May 1948
he was transferred to the Cebu Provincial Jail together with three other Russians to await the
arrival of some Russian vessels. In July and August of that year two boats of Russian
nationality called at the Cebu Port. But their masters refused to take petitioner and his
companions alleging lack of authority to do so. In October 1948 after repeated failures to
ship this deportee abroad, the authorities removed him to Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa
where he has been confined up to the present time, inasmuch as the Commissioner of
Immigration believes it is for the best interests of the country to keep him under detention
while arrangements for his departure are being made.
The Court held the petitioner's detention temporary and said that "temporary detention is a
necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending
arrangements for his deportation, the Government has the right to hold the undesirable alien under
confinement for a reasonable lenght of time." It took note of the fact, manifested by the Solicitor
General's representative in the course of the of the oral argumment, that "this Government desires to
expel the alien, and does not relish keeping him at the people's expense . . . making efforts to carry
out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land." No period was fixed within which the
immigration authorities should carry out the contemplated deportation beyond the statement that
"The meaning of 'reasonable time' depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of
obtaining a passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements with the
governments concerned and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away;" but the Court warned
that "under established precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus."
Mr. Justice Paras, now Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Perfecto, and the writer of this
decision dissented. Mr. Justice Feria and Mr. Justice Perfecto voted for outright discharge of the
prisoner from custody. Mr. Justice Paras qualified his dissent by stating that he might agree "to
further detention of the herein petitioner, provided that he be released if after six months, the
Government is still unable to deport him." This writer joined in the latter dissent but thought that two
months constituted reasonable time.
Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the Government has
not found way and means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are in sight,
although it should be said in justice to the deportation authorities, it was through no fault of theirs
that no ship or country would take the petitioner.
Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein (Sowapadji vs. Wixon, Sept.
18, 1946, 157 F. ed., 289, 290), even if they are "stateless," which the petitioner claims to be. It is no
less true however, as impliedly stated in this Court's decision, supra, that foreign nationals, not
enemy against whom no charge has been made other than that their permission to stay has expired,
may not indefinitely be kept in detention. The protection against deprivation of liberty without due
process of law and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land is not limited to
Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.
Whether an alien who entered the country in violation of its immigration laws may be detained for as
long as the Government is unable to deport him, is a point we need not decide. The petitioner's entry
into the Philippines was not unlawful; he was brought by the armed and belligerent forces of a de
facto government whose decrees were law furing the occupation.
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal
Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of which
the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty
and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was there
resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that
"Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social
origin, property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2): that "Every one has the right to an effective remedy by
the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile"
(Art. 9); etc.
In U. S. vs. Nichols, 47 Fed. Supp., 201, it was said that the court "has the power to release from
custody an alien who has been detained an unreasonably long period of time by the Department of
Justice after it has become apparent that although a warrant for his deportation has been issued, the
warrant can not be effectuated;" that "the theory on which the court is given the power to act is that
the warrant of deportation, not having been able to be executed, is functus officio and the alien is
being held without any authority of law." The decision cited several cases which, it said, settled the
matter definitely in that jurisdiction, adding that the same result had reached in innumerable cases
elsewhere. The cases referred to were United States ex rel. Ross vs. Wallis, 2 Cir. 279 F. 401, 404;
Caranica vs. Nagle, 9 Cir., 28 F. 2d 955; Saksagansky vs. Weedin, 9 Cir., 53 F. 2d 13, 16 last
paragraph; Ex parte Matthews, D.C.W.D. Wash., 277 F. 857; Moraitis vs. Delany, D.C. Md. Aug. 28,
1942, 46 F. Supp. 425.
The most recent case, as far as we have been able to find, was that of Staniszewski vs. Watkins
(1948), 90 Fed. Supp., 132, which is nearly foursquare with the case at hand. In that case a
stateless person, formerly a Polish national, resident in the United States since 1911 and many
times serving as a seaman on American vessels both in peace and in war, was ordered excluded
from the United States and detained at Ellis Island at the expense of the steamship company, when
he returned from a voyage on which he had shipped from New York for one or more European ports
and return to the United States. The grounds for his exclusion were that he had no passport or
immigration visa, and that in 1937 had been convicted of perjury because in certain documents he
presented himself to be an American citizen. Upon his application for release on habeas corpus, the
Court released him upon his own recognizance. Judge Leibell, of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, said in part:
When the return to the writ of habeas corpus came before this court, I suggested that all
interested parties . . . make an effort to arrange to have the petitioner ship out of some
country that he would receive him as a resident. He is, a native-born Pole but the Polish
Consul has advised him in writing that he is no longer a Polish subject. This Government
does not claim that he is a Polish citizen. His attorney says he is a stateless. The
Government is willing that he go back to the ship, but if he were sent back aboard a ship and
sailed to the Port (Cherbourg, France) from which he last sailed to the United States, he
would probably be denied permission to land. There is no other country that would take him,
without proper documents.
It seems to me that this is a genuine hardship case and that the petitioner should be
released from custody on proper terms. . . .
What is to be done with the petitioner? The government has had him in custody almost
seven months and practically admits it has no place to send him out of this country. The
steamship company, which employed him as one of a group sent to the ship by the Union,
with proper seaman's papers issued by the United States Coast Guard, is paying $3 a day
for petitioner's board at Ellis Island. It is no fault of the steamship company that petitioner is
an inadmissible alien as the immigration officials describe him. . . .
I intend to sustain the writ of habeas corpus and order the release of the petitioner on his
own recognizance. He will be required to inform the immigration officials at Ellis Island by
mail on the 15th of each month, stating where he is employed and where he can be reached
by mail. If the government does succeed in arranging for petitioner's deportation to a country
that will be ready to receive him as a resident, it may then advise the petitioner to that effect
and arrange for his deportation in the manner provided by law.
Although not binding upon this Court as a precedent, the case aforecited affords a happy solution to
the quandry in which the parties here finds themselves, solution which we think is sensible, sound
and compatible with law and the Constitution. For this reason, and since the Philippine law on
immigration was patterned after or copied from the American law and practice, we choose to follow
and adopt the reasoning and conclusions in the Staniszewski decision with some modifications
which, it is believed, are in consonance with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the
Philippines.
It was said or insinuated at the hearing ofthe petition at bar, but not alleged in the return, that the
petitioner was engaged in subversive activities, and fear was expressed that he might join or aid the
disloyal elements if allowed to be at large. Bearing in mind the Government's allegation in its answer
that "the herein petitioner was brought to the Philippines by the Japanese forces," and the fact that
Japan is no longer at war with the United States or the Philippines nor identified with the countries
allied against these nations, the possibility of the petitioner's entertaining or committing hostile acts
prejudicial to the interest and security of this country seems remote.
If we grant, for the sake of argument, that such a possibility exists, still the petitioner's unduly
prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if the only purpose of the
detention be to eliminate a danger that is by no means actual, present, or uncontrolable. After all, the
Government is not impotent to deal with or prevent any threat by such measure as that just outlined.
The thought eloquently expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court in
connection with the appliccation for bail of ten Communists convicted by a lower court of advocacy
of violent overthrow of the United States Government is, in principle, pertinent and may be availed of
at this juncture. Said the learned Jurist:
But the right of every American to equal treatment before the law is wrapped up in the same
constitutional bundle with those of these Communists. If an anger or disgust with these
defendants we throw out the bundle, we alsocast aside protection for the liberties of more
worthy critics who may be in opposition to the government of some future day.
If, however, I were to be wrong on all of these abstract or theoretical matters of principle,
there is a very practical aspect of this application which must not be overlooked or
underestimated — that is the disastrous effect on the reputation of American justice if I
should now send these men to jail and the full Court later decide that their conviction is
invalid. All experience with litigation teaches that existence of a substantial question about a
conviction implies a more than negligible risk of reversal. Indeed this experience lies back of
our rule permitting and practice of allowing bail where such questions exist, to avoid the
hazard of unjustifiably imprisoning persons with consequent reproach to our system of
justice. If that is prudent judicial practice in the ordinary case, how much more important to
avoid every chance of handing to the Communist world such an ideological weapon as it
would have if this country should imprison this handful of Communist leaders on a conviction
that our highest Court would confess to be illegal. Risks, of course, are involved in either
granting or refusing bail. I am naive enough to underestimate the troublemaking propensities
of the defendants. But, with the Department of Justice alert to the the dangers, the worst they
can accomplish in the short time it will take to end the litigation is preferable to the possibility
of national embarrassment from a celebrated case of unjustified imprisonment of Communist
leaders. Under no circumstances must we permit their symbolization of an evil force in the
world to be hallowed and glorified by any semblance of martyrdom. The way to avoid that
risk is not to jail these men until it is finally decided that they should stay jailed.
If that case is not comparable with ours on the issues presented, its underlying principle is of
universal application. In fact, its ratio decidendi applies with greater force to the present petition,
since the right of accused to bail pending apppeal of his case, as in the case of the ten Communists,
depends upon the discretion of the court, whereas the right to be enlarged before formal charges are
instituted is absolute. As already noted, not only are there no charges pending against the petitioner,
but the prospects of bringing any against him are slim and remote.
Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from
custody upon these terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration
authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he
keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall be
reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court of
First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. He shall also put up a bond for the above
purpose in the amount of P5,000 with sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the Commissioner of
Immigration is authorized to exact by section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes and Jugo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
Disiento
En decision disada por este Tribunal en la primera causa de habeas corpus incoada por el
solicitante Boris Mejoff (G.R. No. L-2855, Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons)*, se declaro que el habia
venido a Filipinas procedente de Shanghai como espia japones; en la liberacion, el ejercito
americano le arresto por se espia, habiendo sido mas tarde entregado al Gobierno del
Commonwealth para ser tratado de acuerdo con la ley No.682; pero como bajo el Codgo Penal
Revisado, antes de su enmienda por la Orden Ejecutiva No. 44, (mayo 31, 1945) no se castiga al
extranjero que comete traicion, Mejoff fue puesto en libertad. Despues de una debida investigacion,
la Junta de Departacion encontra que el solicitante no tenia permiso para entrar en Filipinas; fue
entregado a la Junta de Inmigacion, la cual ordeno su deportacion a Rusia por el primer transporte
disponible por haber vendo aqui ilegalmente; fue enviado a Cebu para que alli se embarcase, pero
los dos barcos de nacionalidad rusa que llegaron a dicho puerto en julio y agosto de 1948 rehusaron
admitirle. Por no encontrar transportacion para su departacion, Mejoff fue enviado a la Prison de
Muntinglupa, donde esta actualmente de tenido mientras el Gobierno no encuenra medio de
transportarle a Rusia.
La mayoria contiende que "The Petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not unlawful; he was
brought by the armed and belligerent forces of a de facto government whose decrees were law
during the occupation." Es tan ilegal la entrada del solicitante como la del ejercito al que sirvio como
espia. Ninguno tiene derecho a permanecer aqui. Puesto que fue vencido el ejercito invasor que le
trajo, el solicitante no tiene derecho a pemanecer aqui ni un minuto mas. Si desea proteccion, debe
acudir al Gobierno Japones a cuyo ejercito el sirvio; el hecho de que ya esta aqui no le da titulo para
permanecer libre aqui. El que ha venido como espia de enemigo del Pueblo de Filipinas no tiene
derecho a pedir igual trato que aquel ha entrado de buena fe. ¿Es que Filipinos tiene la obligacion
de acoger a un ciudadano indeseable de Rusia? ¿Desde cuando tiene que allanarse una nacion a
ser residencia de una extranjero que entro como enemigo o, peor aun, como espia? Un Estado
tiene indiscutible derecho a deportar y expulsar de su territorio a todo extranjero indeseable.
El solicitante sostiene que no tiene estado. Eso no es razon para que tenga derecho a permanecer
aqui. Puede ser departado a Rusio o a Shanghai de donde vino. Si todos los rusos que, por alguno
que otro motivo, o por odio al comunisomo, dejasen su pais y emigrasen aqui reclamando igual
derecho, no habria territorio suficiente para ellos. Se puede decir otro tanto de los chinos que, so
pretexto de no querer someterse al regimen comunista, optasen por resider para siempre aqui. Y si
los mismos communistas chinos viniesen clandestinamente y despues reclamasen igual proteccion
como la concedida a Mejoff, ¿tendreos que darles por el gusto?
Se invoca la resolucion aprobada por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, titulada
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights", en la que se establece, entre otras cosas, que "no one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." Yo soy de los que creen firmemente en lo
sagrado de esta resolucion; no puedo permitir que se detenga y se arreste a alguien sin motivo
justificado, de una manera arbitraria; pero el solicitante no esta detenido de esta manera, lo esta de
una manera provisional. Tan pronto como haya barco disponible para su deportacion o tan pronto
como pueda embarcarse en algun barco para el extenjero o para cualquier otro punto a donde
quiera ir, dejara de ser detenido. Conste que no esta preso como un criminal condenado por un
delito; esta tratado como cualquier otro extranjero sujeto a deportacion. Si el solicitante no hubiera
sido espia, si no hubiera venido aqui para ayudar a las hordas japonesas en la subyugacion del
pueblo filipino, si hubiera venido como visitante, por ejemplo, y, por azares de la fortuna, no pudo
salir, yo seria el primero en abogar por su liberacion inmediata.
Se cita el caso de Staniszewski vs. Watkins, (1948 A.M.C. 931, 42 American Journal of International
Law, 732) en el cual el recurrente estuvo detenido ya casi siete meses cuando se decreto su
libertad en un recurso de habeas corpus. En nuestra opinion, dicho caso no tiene simulitud con la
causa presente. Staniszewski era residente de los Estados desde 1911; estuvo sirviendo como
marino en barcos mercantes americanos en tiempo de guerra y se ordeno su detencion en Ellis
Island cuando volvio a America procedente de un viaje a Europa por no tener papeles de
inmigracion. Staniszewski no habia entrado en los Estados Unidos como espia, estuvo residiendo
en dicho pais por varios años, era ya habitante de los Estados unidos. La ocupacion de marino es
honrosa, la del espia mercenario, detestable. El espia es peor que el enemigo. Este lucha cara a
cara, y el espia, con disimulo y arte engañosa, escucha lo que a Staniszewski se le haya puesto en
libertad. Poner en libertad a un espia es poner en peligro la seguridad del Estado.
En cuanto a la duracion de la detencion provisional del recurrente, no hay regla fija, depende de la
cincunstancia de cada caso particular. Es evidente que los medios de comunicacion entre Filipinas y
Rusia o Shanghai, debico a fala de relciones diplomaticas, son completamente anormales. No es
culpa del gobierno el que no encuentre medios de transportacion para el.
La Comision de Inmigracion ha dado pasos para que la International Refugee Organziation of the
United Nations (IRO0 se hiciera cargo del recurrente para que pueda ser repartriado o enviado a
otro pais extranjero, pero el Jefe de dicha organizacion contesto que no estaba en condicines para
aceptar dicha recomendacion.
At the present time there is no regular passenger ocean service to German ports, so the
authorities are unable to forward him, and are holding him until some opportunity of returning
him to Germany may present itself. His continual detention is unfortunate, but certainly is not
illegal. His present condition can be alleviated only by the action of the executive branch of
the government. A federal court would not be justified in discharging him. . . .
If he is not really fit for sea service, it is not probable that he would be forced into it, although
he may be able to serve his government in some other capacity. But however that may be,
while this country has no power under existing legislation to impress him into sea service
against his will, he has no just cause to be relieved from the strict enforcement of our
deportation laws, and to remain at liberty in this country as a sanctuary contrary to our laws.
Footnotes
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2662 March 26, 1949
MORAN, C.J.:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding
General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period covering 19433 and
19444 who is now charged before a military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the
Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties
as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against
noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and
customs of war" — comes before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No.
68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and
Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission
and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioners.
First. — "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provision of
our constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a
signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare and therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international."
Hence petitioner argues — "That in view off the fact that this commission has been empanelled by
virtue of an unconstitutional law an illegal order this commission is without jurisdiction to try herein
petitioner."
Second. — That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the
Commission in behalf of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port
who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines is a
diminution of our personality as an independent state and their appointment as prosecutor are a
violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the
Philippines.
Third. — That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the United State not
being a party in interest in the case.
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and regulation
governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the Philippines on the
29th days of July, 1947 This Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our
Constitution provides in its section 3, that —
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including
the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been
guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and
offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of
humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and
enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with
the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as
Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of
Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) 1 when we said —
War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities
incident of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of war. An
importance incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the military command
not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary measure
those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the
law of war. (Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.) Indeed the power to create a military
commission for the trial and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And in
the language of a writer a military commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of
war continues. This includes the period of an armistice or military occupation up to the
effective of a treaty of peace and may extend beyond by treaty agreement. (Cowles Trial of
War Criminals by Military Tribunals, America Bar Association Journal June, 1944.)
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines
is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules
and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the
generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted
by the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two
Convention, Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and
principle of international law as continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or
shall be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines
was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound together with the United
States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent
countries. These rights and obligation were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all
our emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce the right on our own of trying and punishing
those who committed crimes against crimes against our people. In this connection it is well to
remember what we have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):
. . . The change of our form government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during then
Commonwealth because it is an offense against the same sovereign people. . . .
By the same token war crimes committed against our people and our government while we were a
Commonwealth are triable and punishable by our present Republic.
Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys namely Melville S. Hussey and
Robert Port in the prosecution of his case on the ground that said attorney's are not qualified to
practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the appointment of said
attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.
In the first place respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special
law and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. It has already been shown that
Executive Order No. 68 which provides for the organization of such military commission is a valid
and constitutional law. There is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel
appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In facts it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the
parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.
Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty. It
is only fair and proper that United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her
government and her people to a tribunal of our nation should be allowed representation in the trial of
those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our
government but by the United State Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of
her enemies. The least that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said
trials.
Alleging that the United State is not a party in interest in the case petitioner challenges the
personality of attorneys Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is of common knowledge that the United
State and its people have been equally if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes with which
petitioner stands charged before the Military Commission. It can be considered a privilege for our
Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of its citizens and its
government to a military tribunal of our country.
The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law with jurisdiction over the
crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having said petitioner
in its custody, this Court will not interfere with the due process of such Military commission.
For all the foregoing the petition is denied with costs de oficio.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
A military commission was empanelled on December 1, 1948 to try Lt. Gen. Shigenori Kuroda for
Violation of the laws and customs of land warfare.
Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port, American citizens and not authorized by the Supreme Court to
practice law were appointed prosecutor representing the American CIC in the trial of the case.
The commission was empanelled under the authority of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of
the Philippines the validity of which is challenged by petitioner on constitutional grounds. Petitioner
has also challenged the personality of Attorneys Hussey and Port to appear as prosecutors before
the commission.
The charges against petitioner has been filed since June 26, 1948 in the name of the people of the
Philippines as accusers.
We will consideration briefly the challenge against the appearance of Attorneys Hussey and Port. It
appearing that they are aliens and have not been authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law
there could not be any question that said person cannot appear as prosecutors in petitioner case as
with such appearance they would be practicing law against the law.
Said violation vanishes however into insignificance at the side of the momentous question involved
in the challenge against the validity of Executive Order No. 68. Said order is challenged on several
constitutional ground. To get a clear idea of the question raised it is necessary to read the whole
context of said order which is reproduced as follows:
I, Manuel Roxas president of the Philippines by virtue of the power vested in me by the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines do hereby establish a National War Crimes Office
charged with the responsibility of accomplishing the speedy trial of all Japanese accused of
war crimes committed in the Philippines and prescribe the rules and regulation such trial.
The National War crimes office is established within the office of the Judge Advocate
General of the Army of the Philippines and shall function under the direction supervision and
control of the Judge Advocate General. It shall proceed to collect from all available sources
evidence of war crimes committed in the Philippines from the commencement of hostilities by
Japan in December 1941, maintain a record thereof and bring about the prompt trial maintain
a record thereof and bring about the prompt trial of the accused.
The National War Crimes Office shall maintain direct liaison with the Legal Section General
Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied power and shall exchange with the said
Office information and evidence of war crimes.
The following rules and regulation shall govern the trial off person accused as war criminals:
(a) General. — person accused as war criminal shall be tried by military commission to be
convened by or under the authority of the Philippines.
II. JURISDICTION
(a) Over Person. — Thee military commission appointed hereunder shall have jurisdiction
over all persons charged with war crimes who are in the custody of the convening authority
at the time of the trial.
(b) Over Offenses. — The military commission established hereunder shall have jurisdiction
over all offenses including but not limited to the following:
(1) The planning preparation initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation
of international treaties agreement or assurance or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
(2) Violation of the laws or customs of war. Such violation shall include but not be limited to
murder ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for other purpose of civilian population of
or in occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or internees or person on
the seas or elsewhere; improper treatment of hostage; plunder of public or private property
wanton destruction of cities towns or village; or devastation not justified by military necessity.
(3) Murder extermination enslavement deportation and other inhuman acts committed
against civilian population before or during the war or persecution on political racial or
religion ground in executive of or in connection with any crime defined herein whether or not
in violation of the local laws.
(a) Appointment. — The members of each military commission shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines or under authority delegated by him. Alternates may be
appointed by the convening authority. Such shall attend all session of the commission, and in
case of illness or other incapacity of any principal member, an alternate shall take the place
of that member. Any vacancy among the members or alternates, occurring after a trial has
begun, may be filled by the convening authority but the substance of all proceeding had
evidence taken in that case shall be made known to the said new member or alternate. This
facts shall be announced by the president of the commission in open court.
(b) Number of Members. — Each commission shall consist of not less than three (3)
members.
(c) Qualifications. — The convening authority shall appoint to the commission persons whom
he determines to be competent to perform the duties involved and not disqualified by
personal interest or prejudice, provided that no person shall be appointed to hear a case in
which he personally investigated or wherein his presence as a witness is required. One
specially qualified member whose ruling is final in so far as concerns the commission on an
objection to the admissibility of evidence offered during the trial.
(d) Voting. — Except as to the admissibility of evidence all rulings and finding of the
Commission shall be by majority vote except that conviction and sentence shall be by the
affirmative vote of not less than conviction and sentence shall be by the affirmative vote of
not less than two-thirds (2\3) of the member present.
(e) Presiding Member. — In the event that the convening authority does not name one of the
member as the presiding member, the senior officer among the member of the Commission
present shall preside.
IV. PROSECUTORS
(a) Appointment. — The convening authority shall designate one or more person to conduct
the prosecution before each commission.
(1) To prepare and present charges and specifications for reference to a commission.
(2) To prepare cases for trial and to conduct the prosecution before the commission of all
cases referred for trial.
(1) Confine each trial strictly to fair and expeditious hearing on the issues raised by the
charges, excluding irrelevant issues or evidence and preventing any unnecessary delay or
interference.
(2) Deal summarily with any contumacy or contempt, imposing any appropriate punishment
therefor.
(4) Hold each session at such time and place as it shall determine, or as may be directed by
the convening authority.
(1) To have in advance of the trial a copy of the charges and specifications clearly worded so
as to apprise the accused of each offense charged.
(2) To be represented, prior to and during trial, by counsel appointed by the convening
authority or counsel of his own choice, or to conduct his own defense.
(3) To testify in his own behalf and have his counsel present relevant evidence at the trial in
support of his defense, and cross-examine each adverse witness who personally appears
before the commission.
(4) To have the substance of the charges and specifications, the proceedings and any
documentary evidence translated, when he is unable otherwise to understand them.
(1) To summon witnesses and require their attendance and testimony; to administer oaths or
affirmations to witnesses and other persons and to question witnesses.
(3) To delegate the Prosecutors appointed by the convening authority the powers and duties
set forth in (1) and (2) above.
(4) To have evidence taken by a special commissioner appointed by the commission.
(d) Evidence.
(1) The commission shall admit such evidence as in its opinion shall be of assistance in
proving or disproving the charge, or such as in the commission's opinion would have
probative value in the mind of a reasonable man. The commission shall apply the rules of
evidence and pleading set forth herein with the greatest liberality to achieve expeditious
procedure. In particular, and without limiting in any way the scope of the foregoing general
rules, the following evidence may be admitted:
(a) Any document, irrespective of its classification, which appears to the commission to have
been signed or issued by any officer, department, agency or member of the armed forces of
any Government without proof of the signature or of the issuance of the document.
(b) Any report which appears to the commission to have been signed or issued by the
International Red Cross or a member of any medical service personnel, or by any
investigator or intelligence officer, or by any other person whom commission considers as
possessing knowledge of the matters contained in the report.
(d) Any diary, letter to other document, including sworn statements, appearing to the
commission to contain information relating to the charge.
(e) A copy of any document or other secondary evidence of the contents, if the original is not
immediately available.
(2) The commission shall take judicial notice of facts of common knowledge, official
government documents of any nation, and the proceedings, records and findings of military
or other agencies of any of the United Nation.
(3) A commission may require the prosecution and the defense to make a preliminary offer of
proof whereupon the commission may rule in advance on the admissibility of such evidence.
(4) The official position of the accused shall not absolve him from responsibility nor be
considered in mitigation of punishment. Further action pursuant to an order of the accused's
superior, or of his Government, shall not constitute a defense, but may be considered in
mitigation of punishment if the commission determines that justice so requires.
(5) All purposed confessions or statements of the accused shall bee admissible in evidence
without any showing that they were voluntarily made. If it is shown that such confession or
statement was procured by mean which the commission believe to have been of such a
character that may have caused the accused to make a false statement the commission may
strike out or disregard any such portion thereof as was so procured.
(e) Trial Procedure. — The proceedings of each trial shall be conducted substantially as
follows unless modified by the commission to suit the particular circumstances:
(1) Each charge and specification shall be read or its substance stated in open court.
(2) The presiding member shall ask each accused whether he pleads "Guilty" or "Not guilty."
(3) The prosecution shall make its opening statement."(4) The presiding member may at this
or any other time require the prosecutor to state what evidence he proposes to submit to the
commission and the commission thereupon may rule upon the admissibility of such
evidence.
(4) The witnesses and other evidence for the prosecution shall be heard or presented. At the
close of the case for the prosecution, the commission may, on motion of the defense for a
finding of not guilty, consider and rule whether he evidence before the commission may defer
action on any such motion and permit or require the prosecution to reopen its case and
produce any further available evidence.
(5) The defense may make an opening statement prior to presenting its case. The presiding
member may, at this any other time require the defense to state what evidence it proposes to
submit to the commission where upon the commission may rule upon the admissibility of
such evidence.
(6) The witnesses and other evidence for the defense shall be heard or presented.
Thereafter, the prosecution and defense may introduce such evidence in rebuttal as the
commission may rule as being admissible.
(7) The defense and thereafter the prosecution shall address the commission.
(8) The commission thereafter shall consider the case in closed session and unless
otherwise directed by the convening authority, announce in open court its judgment and
sentence if any. The commission may state the reason on which judgment is based.
(g) Sentence. — The commission may sentence an accused, upon conviction to death by
hanging or shooting, imprisonment for life or for any less term, fine or such other punishment
as the commission shall determine to be proper.
(h) Approval of Sentence. — No. sentence of a military commission shall be carried into
effect until approved by the chief off Staff: Provided, That no sentence of death or life
imprisonment shall be carried into execution until confirmed by the President of the
Philippines. For the purpose of his review the Chief of Staff shall create a Board of Review to
be composed of not more than three officers none of whom shall be on duty with or assigned
to the Judge Advocate General's Office. The Chief of Staff shall have authority to approve,
mitigate remit in whole or in part, commute, suspend, reduce or otherwise alter the sentence
imposed, or (without prejudice to the accused) remand the case for rehearing before a new
military commission; but he shall not have authority to increase the severity of the sentence.
Except as herein otherwise provided the judgment and sentence of a commission shall final
and not subject to review by any other tribunal.
VII. The amount of amount of seven hundred thousand pesos is hereby set aside out of the
appropriations for the Army of the Philippines for use by the National War Crimes Office in
the accomplishment of its mission as hereinabove set forth, and shall be expended in
accordance with the recommendation of the Judge Advocate General as approved by the
President. The buildings, fixtures, installations, messing, and billeting equipment and other
property herefore used by then Legal Section, Manila Branch, of the General Headquarters,
Supreme Commander for the Allied Power, which will be turned over by the United States
Army to the Philippines Government through the Foreign Liquidation Commission and the
Surplus Property Commission are hereby specification reserved for use off the National War
Crimes Office.
Executive Order No. 64, dated August 16, 1945, is hereby repealed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 29th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and forty-seven, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the second.
MANUEL ROXAS
President of the Philippines
By the President:
EMILIO ABELLO
Chief of the Executive Office
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATION
Executive Order No. 68 is a veritable piece of Legislative measure, without the benefit of
congressional enactment.
The first question that is trust at our face spearheading a group of other no less important question,
is whether or not the President of the Philippines may exercise the legislative power expressly
vested in Congress by the Constitution. .
The Legislative powers shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and House of Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.)
While there is no express provision in the fundamental law prohibiting the exercise of legislative
power by agencies other than Congress, a reading of the whole context of the Constitution would
dispel any doubt as to the constitutional intent that the legislative power is to be exercised
exclusively by Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President of the President of the
Philippines, to the specific provision which allow the president of the Philippines to suspend the
privileges of the writ of habeas corpus and to place any part of the Philippines under martial law, and
to the rule-making power expressly vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court.
There cannot be any question that the member of the Constitutional Convention were believers in
the tripartite system of government as originally enunciated by Aristotle, further elaborated by
Montequieu and accepted and practiced by modern democracies, especially the United State of
America, whose Constitution, after which ours has been patterned, has allocated the three power of
government — legislative, executive, judicial — to distinct and separate department of government.
Because the power vested by our Constitution to the several department of the government are in
the nature of grants, not recognition of pre-existing power, no department of government may
exercise any power or authority not expressly granted by the Constitution or by law by virtue express
authority of the Constitution.
Executive Order No. 68 establishes a National War Crimes Office and the power to establish
government office is essentially legislative.
The order provides that person accused as war criminals shall be tried by military commissions.
Whether such a provision is substantive or adjective, it is clearly legislative in nature. It confers upon
military commissions jurisdiction to try all persons charge with war crimes. The power to define and
allocate jurisdiction for the prosecution of person accused of any crime is exclusively vested by the
Constitution in Congress. .
It provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trial of trial. This provision on procedural subject
constitutes a usurpation of the rule-making power vested by Constitution in the Supreme Court.
It authorized military commission to adopt additional rule of procedure. If the President of the
Philippines cannot exercise the rule -making power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court,
he cannot, with more reason, delegate that power to military commission.
It appropriates the sum of P7000,000 for the expenses of the National War Crimes office established
by the said Executive Order No. 68. This constitutes another usurpation of legislative power as the
power to vote appropriations belongs to Congress.
Executive Order No. 68., is, therefore, null and void, because, though it the President of the
Philippines usurped power expressly vested by the Constitution in Congress and in the Supreme
Court.
Challenged to show the constitutional or legal authority under which the President issued Executive
Order No. 68, respondent could not give any definite answer. They attempted, however, to suggest
that the President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 68 under the emergency power
granted to him by Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, and
Commonwealth Act No. 671, both of which are transcribed below:
SEC. 2. For the purpose of administering this Act and carrying out its objective, the President
may designate any officer, without additional compensation, or any department, bureau,
office, or instrumentality of the National Government.
SEC. 3. Any person, firm, or corporation found guilty of the violation of any provision of this
Act or of this Act or any of the rules or regulations promulgated by the President under the
authority of section one of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not more than ten
years or by a fine of not more than ten thousand pesos, or by both. If such violation is
committed by a firm or corporation, the manager, managing director, or person charge with
the management of the business of such firm, or corporation shall be criminally responsible
therefor.
SEC. 4. The President shall report to the national Assembly within the first ten days from the
date of the opening of its next regular session whatever action has been taken by him under
the authority herein granted.
SEC. 5. To carry out the purposed of this Act, the President is authorized to spend such
amounts as may be necessary from the sum appropriated under section five Commonwealth
Act Numbered four hundred and ninety-eight.
SEC. 6. If any province of this Act shall be declared by any court of competent jurisdiction to
be unconstitutional and void, such declaration shall not invalidate the remainder of this Act.
SECTION 1. The existed of war between the United State and other countries of Europe and
Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with
extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.
SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provision of Article VI, section 16, of the Constitution, the President
is hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and
regulation as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1
hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the
Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, department, offices, agencies or
instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the
determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive Department; (c) to
create new subdivision, branches, departments, offices, agency or instrumentalities of
government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and
appropriation which would lapse or otherwise became inoperative, and to modify or suspend
the operation or application of those of an administrative character; (e) to imposed new taxes
or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the
issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expensive of the proceeds thereof; (g)
to authorize the National, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for
purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or
the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other power as he may deem necessary to
enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulation
promulgated by him under the power herein granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations.
promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall
otherwise provide.
The above Acts cannot validly be invoked, Executive Order No. 68 was issued on July 29, 1947.
Said Acts had elapsed upon the liberation of the Philippines form the Japanese forces or, at the
latest, when the surrender of Japan was signed in Tokyo on September 2, 1945.
When both Acts were enacted by the Second National Assembly, we happened to have taken direct
part in their consideration and passage, not only as one of the members of said legislative body as
chairman of the Committee on Third Reading population Known as the "Little Senate." We are,
therefore in a position to state that said measures were enacted by the second national Assembly for
the purpose of facing the emergency of impending war and of the Pacific War that finally broke out
with the attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. We approved said extraordinary measures, by
which under the exceptional circumstances then prevailing legislative power were delegated to the
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the following provisions of the Constitution:
In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out declared national policy. (Article VI, section
26.)
It has never been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend the delegation beyond the
emergency created by the war as to extend it farther would be violative of the express provision of
the Constitution. We are of the opinion that there is no doubt on this question.; but if there could still
be any the same should be resolved in favor of the presumption that the National Assembly did not
intend to violate the fundamental law.
The absurdity of the contention that the emergency Acts continued in effect even after the surrender
of Japan can not be gainsaid. Only a few months after liberation and even before the surrender of
Japan, or since the middle of 1945, the Congress started to function normally. In the hypothesis that
the contention can prevail, then, since 1945, that is, four years ago, even after the Commonwealth
was already replaced by the Republic of the Philippines with the proclamation of our Independence,
two district, separate and independence legislative organs, — Congress and the President of the
Philippines — would have been and would continue enacting laws, the former to enact laws of every
nature including those of emergency character, and the latter to enact laws, in the form of executive
orders, under the so-called emergency powers. The situation would be pregnant with dangers to
peace and order to the rights and liberties of the people and to Philippines democracy.
Should there be any disagreement between Congress and the President of the Philippines, a
possibility that no one can dispute the President of the Philippines may take advantage of he long
recess of Congress (two-thirds of every year ) to repeal and overrule legislative enactments of
Congress, and may set up a veritable system of dictatorship, absolutely repugnant to the letter and
spirit of the Constitution.
Executive Order No. 68 is equally offensive to the Constitution because it violates the fundamental
guarantees of the due process and equal protection of the law. It is especially so, because it permit
the admission of many kinds evidence by which no innocent person can afford to get acquittal and
by which it is impossible to determine whether an accused is guilty or not beyond all reasonable
doubt.
The rules of evidence adopted in Executive Order No. 68 are a reproduction of the regulation
governing the trial of twelve criminal, issued by General Douglas Mac Arthur, Commander in Chief of
the United State Armed Forces in Western Pacific, for the purpose of trying among other, General
Yamashita and Homma. What we said in our concurring and dissenting opinion to the decision
promulgated on December 19, 1945, in the Yamashita case, L-129, and in our concurring and
dissenting opinion to the resolution of January 23, 1946 in disposing the Homma case, L-244, are
perfectly applicable to the offensive rules of evidence in Executive Order No. 68. Said rules of
evidence are repugnant to conscience as under them no justice can expected.
For all the foregoing, conformably with our position in the Yamashita and Homma cases, we vote to
declare Executive Order No. 68 null and void and to grant petition.
SECOND DIVISION
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
[1]
Appeals dated January 28, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47422, which dismissed
the petition to prohibit Judge Vivencio Baclig of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 77, from issuing a writ of demolition against petitioners,
and the sheriff and deputy sheriff of the same court from implementing an
alias writ of execution. Also assailed is the resolution of the Court of Appeals
[2]
(a) to solidarily pay the plaintiff Tandang Sora Dev. Corp. actual damages in the
amount of P20,000 with interest from date of filing of the complaint;
(b) to remove all construction, including barbed wires and fences, illegally
constructed by defendants on plaintiffs property at defendants expense;
(c) to replace the removed concrete monuments removed by defendants, at their own
expense;
(d) to pay attorneys fees in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00)
with interest computed from the date of filing of the complaint;
(e) to relocate the boundaries to conform with the Commissioners Report, particularly,
Annexes A and B thereof, at the expense of the defendants. [3]
Before the Court for resolution is the Ex-Parte Motion For The Issuance of A Writ of
Demolition, filed by plaintiff, through counsel, praying for the issuance of an Order
directing the Deputy Sheriff to cause the removal and/or demolition of the structures
on the plaintiffs property constructed by defendants and/or the present occupants. The
defendants-heirs of Herminigilda Pedro filed their comment on the said Motion.
Considering that the decision rendered in the instant case had become final and
executory, the Court, in its Order of November 14, 1997, directed the issuance of an
alias writ of execution for the enforcement of the said decision. However, despite the
service of the said writ to all the defendants and the present occupants of the subject
property, they failed to comply therewith, as per the Partial Sheriffs Return, dated
February 9, 1998, issued by the Deputy Sheriff of this branch of the Court. Thus, there
is now a need to demolish the structures in order to implement the said decision.
WHEREFORE, the defendants are hereby directed to remove, at their expense, all
constructions, including barbed wires and fences, which defendants constructed on
plaintiffs property, within fifteen (15) days from notice of this Order; otherwise, this
Court will issue a writ of demolition against them.
SO ORDERED. [4]
the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value, hence, they were parties
in interest. Since they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918, the writ
of demolition issued in connection therewith cannot be enforced against them
because to do so would amount to deprivation of property without due process
of law.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on January 28, 1999. It held
that as buyers and successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising, petitioners were
considered privies who derived their rights from Lising by virtue of the sale
and could be reached by the execution order in Civil Case No. Q-12918.
Thus, for lack of merit, the petition was ordered dismissed.
[6]
For our resolution are the following issues: (1) whether thealias writ of
execution may be enforced against petitioners; and (2) whether petitioners
were innocent purchasers for value and builders in good faith.
On the first issue, petitioners claim that the alias writ of execution cannot
be enforced against them. They argue that the appellate court erred when it
relied heavily on our ruling in Vda. de Medina vs. Cruz in holding that
[8]
petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the
legal protection of their lot by the Torrens system, unlike the petitioner in
the Medina case who merely relied on a mere Titulo de Composicion.
Coming now to the second issue, were petitioners purchasers in good faith
and for value? A buyer in good faith is one who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such
property. He is a buyer for value if he pays a full and fair price at the time of
the purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
person in the property. The determination of whether one is a buyer in good
[10]
faith is a factual issue which generally is outside the province of this Court to
determine in a petition for review. An exception is when the Court of Appeals
failed to take into account certain relevant facts which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion. The instant case is covered by this
[11]
exception to the general rule. As found by the Court of Appeals and not
refuted by private respondent, petitioners purchased the subject land in 1964
from Mariano Lising. Civil Case No. Q-12918 was commenced sometime in
[12]
1969. The Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the purchase of the land
took place prior to the institution of Civil Case No. Q-12918. In other words,
the sale to petitioners was made before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the
lot. Petitioners could reasonably rely on Mariano Lisings Certificate of Title
which at the time of purchase was still free from any third party claim. Hence,
considering the circumstances of this case, we conclude that petitioners
acquired the land subject of this dispute in good faith and for value.
The final question now is: could we consider petitioners builders in good
faith? We note that this is the first time that petitioners have raised this
issue. As a general rule, this could not be done. Fair play, justice, and due
process dictate that parties should not raise for the first time on appeal issues
that they could have raised but never did during trial and even during
proceedings before the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, we deem it proper
[13]
that this issue be resolved now, to avoid circuitous litigation and further delay
in the disposition of this case. On this score, we find that petitioners are
indeed builders in good faith.
A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is
building on is his, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. As earlier
[14]
impleaded them in Civil Case No. Q-12918. Since they failed to do so,
petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in said case. No man shall be
affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case
are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a
writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who
did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are
bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition
issued pursuant thereto. In our view, the spouses Victor and Honorata
[16]
Orquiola have valid and meritorious cause to resist the demolition of their
house on their own titled lot, which is tantamount to a deprivation of property
without due process of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated January 28, 1999, and its resolution dated December 29, 1999,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 47422, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents
are hereby enjoined from enforcing the decision in Civil Case No. Q-12918
through a writ of execution and order of demolition issued against petitioners.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Corona, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS
PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL
MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN
CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of
Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for
respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred to
as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges
— issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and
take possession of the following personal property to wit:
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution
and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners
in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners
filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction,
and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the
effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted
to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants
and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of
Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid
and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were
cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the
papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are
concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found
and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of
the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is
well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the
use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued
by this Court,12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in
evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled,
namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative,
whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein. 1äw phï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants
and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this
connection, the Constitution13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth
in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same
were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, nospecific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it
is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision
of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above
quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen,
in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it,
even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even
if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and
things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation,
however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should
not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other
than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages
against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and
against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance,
without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other
laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that
wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and
their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided
by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are
led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by
the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it
otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal
searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in
a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from
state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this
Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that
the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due
Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to
federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in
violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when
conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by
avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed
dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the
substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches — state
or federal — it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an
essential part of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the
right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional
Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely,
the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege
and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the
only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that
the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States,
and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured
by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any
police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which
the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for
a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given
crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant
should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause,
and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But,
then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee
under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents
of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power
they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually — but,
understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the
fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered
down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29,
1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey
Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be
included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners,
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that,
furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above
referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive
possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of
the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been
Advanced, notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution
sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged
affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either
inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners
herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the
cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should
we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being
best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with
the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is
hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers
and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and
that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents,
papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of
the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are
general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section
1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants
were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is
declared, abandoned;
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that
they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects
seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written
by the Chief Justice refrains from expresslydeclaring as null and void the such warrants
served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and
leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding
paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the
search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches
and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and
prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral developments of this case
should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but as well for
future cases and future generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are
admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably
outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the
petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of
the papers, things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in
any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the
intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners
possess legal standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures
were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that
"legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the
lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this
Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the
documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and
interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the
pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of
documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b)
ownership and/or control or possession — actual or constructive — of premises searched gives
"standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn
application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved
person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were
directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally,
followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation.
The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in
all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General
Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The
searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and
suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960)
(narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d.
650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant
was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not
belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized
from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d
680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the
defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that
under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself
or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or
his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of
Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man
relies upon when heplaces himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be
it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from
unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his
desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable
search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not tolerate
the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private
papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other
cases which have come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of differing
factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately
invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless others. By nothing we say here do we
either foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be
applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the
petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or
leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have
been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except
to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises
searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey
Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices (IBMC,
USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in
which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their
respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners'
proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched therefore independently gives them
standing to move for the return and suppression of the books, papers and affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the
interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what
it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the
Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are
persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private
property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by
distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due
consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common
law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform
Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between "lessee",
"licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in
fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman
vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the
property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United
States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the
corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli,
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully
moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents seized
from his home during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the
corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the
circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful.
The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained
should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the
articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But
in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix
Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under
against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and
was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones
vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere
guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary
rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure"
was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a
mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of corporate
property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude
that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First — he had a sufficient interest in
the property seized, and second — he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like
in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and had
seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by
an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded
from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and
records merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of the books
and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs.
United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962).
In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment;
the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including
himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected interest and that
there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and Villanoconsidered also the fact that the
search and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at
682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto
Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury
subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The Government contended that the
petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were physically in the possession of the
custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the
contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the
books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be
escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to
produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person
gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191
(1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers,
which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's
attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm
which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management." The papers
turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and records of
certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type
records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the
court which held that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored,
he had "standing" to move for the return of all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying
on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d
631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and
exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the
law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having been used "in
committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails
by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United States of
America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with
Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers
v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S.
Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not
appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present
petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not
petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY
AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed
in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the
premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless
whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the
documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers)
were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners
all personaland private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from
their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn
statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show
that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other places
were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects
of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their family
residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or
constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the
void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and
things arepersonal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the
lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or
return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear
legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General
Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal
prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do
not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.
FIRST DIVISION
The limits of government regulation under the State's Police Power are
once again at the vortex of the instant controversy.Assailed is the
government's power to control deployment of female entertainers to Japan by
requiring an Artist Record Book (ARB) as a precondition to the processing by
the POEA of any contract for overseas employment. By contending that the
right to overseas employment, is a property right within the meaning of the
Constitution, petitioners vigorously aver that deprivation thereof allegedly
through the onerous requirement of an ARB violates the due process clause
and constitutes an invalid exercise of the police power.
The factual antecedents are undisputed.
Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, former
President Corazon C. Aquino ordered a total ban against the deployment of
performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations. The ban was,
however, rescinded after leaders of the overseas employment industry
promised to extend full support for a program aimed at removing kinks in the
system of deployment. In its place, the government, through the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, subsequently issued Department Order No. 28,
creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), which was
tasked with issuing guidelines on the training, testing certification and
deployment of performing artists abroad.
Pursuant to the EIAC's recommendations, the Secretary of Labor, on
[1]
1. Department Order No. 3-A, providing for additional guidelines on the training,
testing, certification and deployment of performing artists.
2. Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to the Artist Record Book (ARB)
requirement, which could be processed only after the artist could show proof of
academic and skills training and has passed the required tests.
3. Department Order No. 3-E, providing the minimum salary a performing artist ought
to receive (not less than US$600.00 for those bound for Japan) and the authorized
deductions therefrom.
4. Department Order No. 3-F, providing for the guidelines on the issuance and use of
the ARB by returning performing artists who, unlike new artists, shall only undergo a
Special Orientation Program (shorter than the basic program) although they must pass
the academic test.
through which the state, as parens patriae gives effect to a host of its
regulatory powers.
Describing the nature and scope of the police power, Justice Malcolm, in
the early case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro wrote:[4]
"The police power of the State," one court has said...'is a power coextensive with self-
protection, and is not inaptly termed 'the law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to
be that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.' Carried onward by the current of
legislature, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative
discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that
mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the
individual." [5]
the said body, the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued the assailed
orders. These orders embodied EIAC's Resolution No. 1, which called for
guidelines on screening, testing and accrediting performing overseas Filipino
artists. Significantly, as the respondent court noted, petitioners were duly
represented in the EIAC, which gave the recommendations on which the
[10]
Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare.
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of
property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much
wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the
[14]
due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the
police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or
professions. Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written
and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their
trade. Seamen are required to take tests determining their
seamanship. Locally, the Professional Regulation Commission has began to
require previously licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish
documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had undertaken
continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses.It
is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a
property right under the due process clause. So long as Professionals and
other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation
exists.
Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution to support their argument that the
government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measures because they
abridge the freedom to contract. In Philippine Association of Service
Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, we held that "[t]he non-impairment clause of the
Constitution... must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the
government." Equally important, into every contract is read provisions of
[15]
existing law, and always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the
agreement deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare.
A last point. Petitioners suggest that the singling out of entertainers and
performing artists under the assailed department orders constitutes class
legislation which violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. We
do not agree.
The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and
individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is
limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to
operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be
treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
imposed. We have held, time and again, that the equal protection clause of
[16]
the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification
is based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to
the subject of the particular legislation. If classification is germane to the
[17]
purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to
present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal
protection guarantee.
In the case at bar, the challenged Department Order clearly applies to all
performing artists and entertainers destined for jobs abroad. These orders, we
stressed hereinbefore, further the Constitutional mandate requiring
Government to protect our workforce, particularly those who may be prone to
abuse and exploitation as they are beyond the physical reach of government
regulatory agencies. The tragic incidents must somehow stop, but short of
absolutely curtailing the right of these performers and entertainers to work
abroad, the assailed measures enable our government to assume a measure
of control.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision sought to be
reviewed, petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
It is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbage dump created by affluence and profligate
consumption and extravagance of the rich or fishing in the murky waters of the Pasig River and the
Laguna Lake or making a clearing in the forest so that he can produce food for his family, to
understand why protecting birds, fish, and trees is more important than protecting him and keeping
his family alive.
How do we strike a balance between environmental protection, on the one hand, and the individual
personal interests of people, on the other?
Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable development,
Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This Government Agency
is supposed to carry out and effectuate the aforesaid declared policy, so as to accelerate the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities
and towns, in the act clearly named, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies
for social and economic development.
Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos amended certain sections of
Republic Act No. 4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the
suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of
the lake for municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of
the Government and the general public over: — the environment impact of development on the
water quality and ecology of the lake and its related river systems; the inflow of polluted water from
the Pasig River, industrial, domestic and agricultural wastes from developed areas around the lake;
the increasing urbanization which induced the deterioration of the lake, since water quality studies
have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same; and the
floods in Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns which will influence the hydraulic system
of Laguna de Bay, since any scheme of controlling the floods will necessarily involve the lake and its
river systems, — likewise gave impetus to the creation of the Authority.
Special powers of the Authority, pertinent to the issues in this case, include:
Sec. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby further amended by adding thereto seven
new paragraphs to be known as paragraphs (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (o), and (p) which
shall read as follows:
(l) To require the cities and municipalities embraced within the region
to pass appropriate zoning ordinances and other regulatory measures
necessary to carry out the objectives of the Authority and enforce the
same with the assistance of the Authority;
To more effectively perform the role of the Authority under Republic Act No. 4850, as though
Presidential Decree No. 813 were not thought to be completely effective, the Chief Executive, feeling
that the land and waters of the Laguna Lake Region are limited natural resources requiring judicious
management to their optimal utilization to insure renewability and to preserve the ecological balance,
the competing options for the use of such resources and conflicting jurisdictions over such uses
having created undue constraints on the institutional capabilities of the Authority in the light of the
limited powers vested in it by its charter, Executive Order No. 927 further defined and enlarged the
functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces
encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region".
Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following provisions of Executive Order No. 927
which include in particular the sharing of fees:
Sec 2. Water Rights Over Laguna de Bay and Other Bodies of Water within the Lake
Region: To effectively regulate and monitor activities in the Laguna de Bay region,
the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all surface
water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
For the purpose of this Executive Order, the term "Laguna de Bay Region" shall refer
to the Provinces of Rizal and Laguna; the Cities of San Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan,
Quezon, Manila and Tagaytay; the towns of Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and Malvar in
Batangas Province; the towns of Silang and Carmona in Cavite Province; the town of
Lucban in Quezon Province; and the towns of Marikina, Pasig, Taguig, Muntinlupa,
and Pateros in Metro Manila.
Sec 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect fees for the
use of the lake water and its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but not
limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation,
and waste disposal purpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to be collected, and
the sharing with other government agencies and political subdivisions, if necessary,
shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Authority's Board, except fishpen fee, which will be shared in
the following manner; 20 percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local
governments, 5 percent shall go to the Project Development Fund which shall be
administered by a Council and the remaining 75 percent shall constitute the share of
LLDA. However, after the implementation within the three-year period of the Laguna
Lake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan, the sharing will be modified as
follows: 35 percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local governments, 5
percent goes to the Project Development Fund and the remaining 60 percent shall be
retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that the share of LLDA shall form part of its
corporate funds and shall not be remitted to the National Treasury as an exception to
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1234. (Emphasis supplied)
It is important to note that Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 813 defined the term "Laguna Lake"
in this manner:
(11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna Lake or lake is used in this Act, the
same shall refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area covered by the lake water when
it is at the average annual maximum lake level of elevation 12.50 meters, as referred
to a datum 10.00 meters below mean lower low water (M.L.L.W). Lands located at
and below such elevation are public lands which form part of the bed of said lake.
Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the
Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave
municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal
waters because R.A. 7160 provides:
(a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the
municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefor in accordance with the
provisions of this Section.
(2) Grant privilege to gather, take or catch bangus fry, prawn fry
or kawag-kawag or fry of other species and fish from the municipal
waters by nets, traps or other fishing gears to marginal fishermen free
from any rental fee, charges or any other imposition whatsoever.
Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen
permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to
the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July, 1995, occupied
almost one-third of the entire lake water surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from
7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens
and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on fishpen
zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public that:
In compliance with the instructions of His Excellency PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS
given on June 23, 1993 at Pila, Laguna pursuant to Republic Act 4850 as amended
by Presidential Decree 813 and Executive Order 927 series of 1983 and in line with
the policies and programs of the Presidential Task Force on Illegal Fishpens and
Illegal Fishing, the general public is hereby notified that:
1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay
Region, which were not registered or to which no application for registration and/or
permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March 31, 1993
are hereby declared outrightly as illegal.
One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the illegally
constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their
respective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected.
Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the Authority before
various regional trial courts, to wit: (a) Civil Case No. 759-B, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal, filed by Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito
Arroyo; (b) Civil Case No. 64049, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig, filed by
IRMA Fishing and Trading Corp., ARTM Fishing Corp., BDR Corp., MIRT Corp. and TRIM Corp.; (c)
Civil Case No. 566, for Declaratory Relief and Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig,
filed by Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc. and Tobias Reynaldo M. Tianco; (d) Civil Case
No. 556-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal,
filed by AGP Fishing Ventures, Inc.; (e) Civil Case No. 522-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and
Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by Blue Lagoon and Alcris Chicken
Growers, Inc.; (f) Civil Case No. 554-, for Certiorari and Prohibition, Regional Trial Court, Branch 79,
Morong, Rizal, filed by Greenfields Ventures Industrial Corp. and R.J. Orion Development Corp.; and
(g) Civil Case No. 64124, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Pasig, filed by SEA-MAR
Trading Co., Inc. and Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corp. and Minamar Fishing Corporation.
The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to
dismiss were invariably denied. Meanwhile, temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary
mandatory injunction were issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining the Authority
from demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in question.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, G.R. Nos. 120865-71, were filed
by the Authority with this court. Impleaded as parties-respondents are concerned regional trial courts
and respective private parties, and the municipalities and/or respective Mayors of Binangonan,
Taguig and Jala-jala, who issued permits for the construction and operation of fishpens in Laguna de
Bay. The Authority sought the following reliefs,viz.:
(B) Permanent prohibition against the regional trial courts from exercising jurisdiction
over cases involving the Authority which is a co-equal body;
(C) Judicial pronouncement that R.A. 7610 (Local Government Code of 1991) did not
repeal, alter or modify the provisions of R.A. 4850, as amended, empowering the
Authority to issue permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in
Laguna de Bay and that, the Authority the government agency vested with exclusive
authority to issue said permits.
By this Court's resolution of May 2, 1994, the Authority's consolidated petitions were referred to the
Court of Appeals.
In a Decision, dated June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Authority's consolidated
petitions, the Court of Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of
government whose decision or order are appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA
charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the
provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had
been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the
power to grant permits devolved to and is now vested with their respective local government units
concerned.
Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals decision, the Authority has returned to this Court charging the
following errors:
We take a simplistic view of the controversy. Actually, the main and only issue posed is: Which
agency of the Government — the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and
municipalities comprising the region — should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above,
specifically provide that the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said
region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and
the like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, has
granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters.
The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other
aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters.
We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned
laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority
over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically
expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the
part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws
should be made clear and expressed.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a
special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic
in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be
construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special
statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute,
general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest,
although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the
special law."3
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should
prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is
to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a
contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect
must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or
altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.4
Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are environmental
protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the
legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission.
We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner Laguna Lake Development Authority that
"Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900
km² lake surface water, the eight (8) major river tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain
into the lake, the 2,920 km² basin or watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal
provinces, greater portion of Metro Manila, parts of Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon provinces,
constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of
policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable development. This is an
exhaustible natural resource — a very limited one — which requires judicious management and
optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its ecological integrity and balance."
"Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy geared towards
the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of the region with due
regard to the inter-generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The
authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law — the
special law designed to govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources."
The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue
purposes. This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code
empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of
Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue
Raising Power Of Local Government Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the
Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and
management.6 It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the least
limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly,
the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the
Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper
sharing of fees collected.
In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our
holding that, considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake Development
Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 304, 306, which we quote:
there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial
body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease and desist order" and on
matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal to the
Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be instituted before the Court
of Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions
affecting the powers of the Authority as provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts
have jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the
Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has
the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to
the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by
its charter vested on it.
Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will render nugatory its avowed
purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of
this power would render useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if not abolish, the
Laguna Lake Development Authority. This, the Local Government Code of 1991 had never intended
to do.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction are hereby granted, insofar as
they relate to the authority of the Laguna Lake Development Authority to grant fishing privileges
within the Laguna Lake Region.
The restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued by Judge Arturo Marave, RTC, Branch 78,
Morong, Rizal; Judge Herculano Tech, RTC, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal; and Judge Aurelio
Trampe, RTC, Branch 163, Pasig, Metro Manila, are hereby declared null and void and ordered set
aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are hereby prohibited from issuing permits to
construct and operate fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures within the Laguna Lake
Region, their previous issuances being declared null and void. Thus, the fishing permits issued by
Mayors Isidro B. Pacis, Municipality of Binangonan; Ricardo D. Papa, Municipality of Taguig; and
Walfredo M. de la Vega, Municipality of Jala-jala, specifically, are likewise declared null and void and
ordered cancelled.
The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures put up by operators by virtue of permits
issued by Municipal Mayors within the Laguna Lake Region, specifically, permits issued to Fleet
Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; Manila Marine Life Business Resources, Inc., represented by,
Mr. Tobias Reynald M. Tiangco; Greenfield Ventures Industrial Development Corporation and R.J.
Orion Development Corporation; IRMA Fishing And Trading Corporation, ARTM Fishing
Corporation, BDR Corporation, Mirt Corporation and Trim Corporation; Blue Lagoon Fishing
Corporation and ALCRIS Chicken Growers, Inc.; AGP Fish Ventures, Inc., represented by its
President Alfonso Puyat; SEA MAR Trading Co., Inc., Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corporation, and
MINAMAR Fishing Corporation, are hereby declared illegal structures subject to demolition by the
Laguna Lake Development Authority.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
I fully concur with the decision written by Mr. Justice R. Hermosisima, Jr.. I would only like to stress
what the decision already states, i.e., that the local government units in the Laguna Lake area are
not precluded from imposing permits on fishery operations for revenue raising purposes of such local
government units. In other words, while the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether or not
projects or activities in the lake area should be allowed, as well as their regulation, is with the
Laguna Lake Development Authority, once the Authority grants a permit, the permittee may still be
subjected to an additional local permit or license for revenue purposes of the local government units
concerned. This approach would clearly harmonize the special law, Rep. Act No. 4850, as amended,
with Rep. Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code. It will also enable small towns and
municipalities in the lake area, like Jala-Jala, to rise to some level of economic viability.
Separate Opinions
I fully concur with the decision written by Mr. Justice R. Hermosisima, Jr.. I would only like to stress
what the decision already states, i.e., that the local government units in the Laguna Lake area are
not precluded from imposing permits on fishery operations for revenue raising purposes of such local
government units. In other words, while the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether or not
projects or activities in the lake area should be allowed, as well as their regulation, is with the
Laguna Lake Development Authority, once the Authority grants a permit, the permittee may still be
subjected to an additional local permit or license for revenue purposes of the local government units
concerned. This approach would clearly harmonize the special law, Rep. Act No. 4850, as amended,
with Rep. Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code. It will also enable small towns and
municipalities in the lake area, like Jala-Jala, to rise to some level of economic viability.