Megaworld vs Tanseco

Facts: On July 7, 1995, petitioner Megaworld Globus Asia, Inc. (Megaworld) and respondent Mila S. Tanseco (Tanseco)
entered into a Contract to Buy and Sell1 a 224 square-meter (more or less) condominium unit at a pre-selling project,
"The Salcedo Park," located along Senator Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City.

The purchase price was ₱16,802,037.32, to be paid as follows: (1) 30% less the reservation fee of ₱100,000, or
₱4,940,611.19, by postdated check payable on July 14, 1995

stipulated delivery date of the unit; provided that if the construction is completed earlier, Tanseco would pay the
balance within seven days from receipt of a notice of turnover.

Section 4 of the Contract to Buy and Sell provided for the construction schedule as follows:

4. CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE – The construction of the Project and the unit/s herein purchased shall be completed
and delivered not later than October 31, 1998 with additional grace period of six (6) months within which to complete
the Project and the unit/s, barring delays due to fire, earthquakes, the elements, acts of God, war, civil disturbances,
strikes or other labor disturbances, government and economic controls making it, among others, impossible or difficult
to obtain the necessary materials, acts of third person, or any other cause or conditions beyond the control of the
SELLER. In this event, the completion and delivery of the unit are deemed extended accordingly without liability on the
part of the SELLER. The foregoing notwithstanding, the SELLER reserves the right to withdraw from this transaction
and refund to the BUYER without interest the amounts received from him under this contract if for any reason not
attributable to SELLER, such as but not limited to fire, storms, floods, earthquakes, rebellion, insurrection, wars, coup
de etat, civil disturbances or for other reasons beyond its control, the Project may not be completed or it can only be
completed at a financial loss to the SELLER. In any event, all construction on or of the Project shall remain the property
of the SELLER. (Underscoring supplied)

Tanseco paid all installments due up to January, 1998, leaving unpaid the balance of ₱2,520,305.63 pending delivery of
the unit.2 Megaworld, however, failed to deliver the unit within the stipulated period on October 31, 1998 or April 30,
1999, the last day of the six-month grace period.

A few days shy of three years later, Megaworld, by notice dated April 23, 2002 (notice of turnover), informed Tanseco
that the unit was ready for inspection preparatory to delivery.3 Tanseco replied through counsel, by letter of May 6,
2002, that in view of Megaworld’s failure to deliver the unit on time, she was demanding the return of ₱14,281,731.70
representing the total installment payment she had made, with interest at 12% per annum from April 30, 1999, the
expiration of the six-month grace period. Tanseco pointed out that none of the excepted causes of delay existed.4

Tanseco filed on June 5, 2002 with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board’s (HLURB) Expanded National Capital
Region Field Office a complaint against Megaworld for rescission of contract, refund of payment, and damages.5

In its Answer, Megaworld attributed the delay to the 1997 Asian financial crisis which was beyond its control; and
argued that default had not set in, Tanseco not having made any judicial or extrajudicial demand for delivery before
receipt of the notice of turnover.6

By Decision of May 28, 2003,7 the HLURB Arbiter dismissed Tanseco’s complaint for lack of cause of action, finding that
Megaworld had effected delivery by the notice of turnover before Tanseco made a demand. Tanseco was thereupon
ordered to pay Megaworld the balance of the purchase price, plus ₱25,000 as moral damages

On appeal by Tanseco, the HLURB Board of Commissioners, by Decision of November 28, 2003,8 sustained the HLURB
Arbiter’s Decision on the ground of laches for failure to demand rescission when the right thereto accrued. It deleted the
award of damages, however.

Tanseco filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals.12

By Decision of September 28, 2007,13 the appellate court granted Tanseco’s petition, disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed May 28, 2003 decision of the HLURB
Field Office, the November 28, 2003 decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners in HLURB Case No. REM-A-
030711-0162, the April 28, 2006 Decision and August 30, 2006 Resolution of the Office of the President in O.P. Case
No. 05-I-318, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered: (1) RESCINDING, as prayed for by
TANSECO, the aggrieved party, the contract to buy and sell

The appellate court held that under Article 1169 of the Civil Code, no judicial or extrajudicial demand is needed to put
the obligor in default if the contract, as in the herein parties’ contract, states the date when the obligation should be
performed; that time was of the essence because Tanseco relied on Megaworld’s promise of timely delivery when she
agreed to part with her money; that the delay should be reckoned from October 31, 1998, there being no force majeure
to warrant the application of the April 30, 1999 alternative date.

Tanseco, on the other hand, maintained her position too, and citing Megaworld’s bad faith which became evident when
it insisted on making the delivery despite the long delay,16 insisted that she deserved the award of damages and
attorney’s fees.

Article 1169 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or
extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.

However, the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that delay may exist:

(1) When the obligation or the law expressly so declares; or

(2) When from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it appears that the designation of the time
when the thing is to be delivered or the service is to be rendered was a controlling motive for the establishment
of the contract; or

(3) When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform.

In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper
manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other
begins. (Underscoring supplied)

The Contract to Buy and Sell of the parties contains reciprocal obligations, i.e., to complete and deliver the
condominium unit on October 31, 1998 or six months thereafter on the part of Megaworld, and to pay the balance of
the purchase price at or about the time of delivery on the part of Tanseco.

Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.18

The Court cannot generalize the 1997 Asian financial crisis to be unforeseeable and beyond the control of a business
corporation. A real estate enterprise engaged in the pre-selling of condominium units is concededly a master in
projections on commodities and currency movements, as well as business risks.

As for Megaworld’s argument that Tanseco’s claim is considered barred by laches on account of her belated demand, it
does not lie too. Laches is a creation of equity and its application is controlled by equitable considerations.20 It bears
noting that Tanseco religiously paid all the installments due up to January, 1998, whereas Megaworld reneged on its
obligation to deliver within the stipulated period. A circumspect weighing of equitable considerations thus tilts the scale
of justice in favor of Tanseco.

Pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 95721 which reads:

Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. - No installment payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium
project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after
due notice to the owner or developer, desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to
develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying
with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization interests but
excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the legal rate. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
Tanseco is, as thus prayed for, entitled to be reimbursed the total amount she paid Megaworld.

The Court finds the appellate court’s award of ₱200,000 as exemplary damages excessive, however. Exemplary damages
are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive
to curb socially deleterious actions.24 The Court finds that ₱100,000 is reasonable in this case.

Finally, since Article 119125 of the Civil Code does not apply to a contract to buy and sell, the suspensive condition of
full payment of the purchase price not having occurred to trigger the obligation to convey title, cancellation, not
rescission, of the contract is thus the correct remedy in the premises.26

WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals is, in light of the foregoing, AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.

As modified, the dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

The July 7, 1995 Contract to Buy and Sell between the parties is cancelled. Petitioner, Megaworld Globus Asia, Inc., is
directed to pay respondent, Mila S. Tanseco, the amount of ₱14,281,731.70

Martinez vs morfe

The facts in both petitions for certiorari are not in dispute. Petitioner Martinez y Festin8 alleged that on June 10, 1971,
an information against him for falsification a public document was filed. Its basis was his stating under oath in his
certificate of candidacy for delegate to that Constitutional Convention that he was born on June 20, 1945, when in truth
and in fact he knew that he was born on June 20, 1946. There was on July 9, 1971, a special appearance on his part
questioning the power of respondent Judge to issue a warrant of arrest and seeking that the information be quashed.
On the same day, there was an order from the lower court suspending the release of the warrant of arrest until it could
act on such motion to quash. Then came on July 22, 1971 an omnibus motion from him, with previous leave of court,
to quash the information, to quash the warrant of arrest, or to hold in abeyance further proceeding in the case. It was
not favorably acted on. On August 21, 1971, respondent Judge rendered an order denying the petitioner omnibus
motion to quash. In his belief that the information and the warrant of arrest in this case are null and void, the petitioner
did not post the required bond. He was arrested by the City Sheriff in the afternoon of September 6, 1971. At the time of
the filing of the petition he was confined at the City Jail in the custody of respondent City Warden of Manila. He was on
his way to attend the plenary session of the Constitutional Convention. Such arrest was against his will and over his
protest. He was arraigned on September 9, 1971. There was at such a time a motion by petitioner to reconsider the
court's order of August 21, 1971. It was denied in open court. On the very same day, he filed the petition for certiorari
and habeas corpus, but having been released thereafter on bail on September 11, 1971, the petition is now in the
nature solely of a certiorari proceeding.9

As for petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr., 10 it was alleged that he is a duly elected and proclaimed delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention. He took his oath of office and assumed the functions of such office on June 1, 1971. He has
continued since then to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities of a delegate. Two criminal complaints,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 146(57) and 148(58), were directly filed with the Court of First lnstance of Baguio and
Benguet by a certain Moises Maspil, a defeated delegate-aspirant who placed 15th in the order of votes garnered against
the petitioner, and his co-accused for alleged violation of Section 51 of the Revised Penal Code in that they gave and
distributed free of charge food, drinks and cigarettes at two public meetings, one held in Sablan and the other in Tuba,
both towns being in Province of Benguet. Respondent Presiding Judge conducted the preliminary investigation of said
criminal complaints. Thereafter on August 7, 1971, he issued an order for the filing of the corresponding informations.
Before a warrant of arrest in said criminal cases could be issued, petitioner in a motion of August 14, 1971 invoked the
privilege of immunity from arrest and search, pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6132, otherwise known as the
1971 Constitutional Convention Act, in relation to Sec. 15, Article VI of the Constitution and Article 145 of the Revised
Penal Code. Respondent Judge, on the very same day, issued an order, holding in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of
arrest and setting the hearing of said Motion on August 23, 1971. As scheduled on August 23, 1971, there was a
hearing on such motion. Petitioner however did not prevail notwithstanding his vigorous insistence on his claim for
immunity, a warrant of arrest being ordered on the same day. On September 11, 1971, there was a motion to quash
such order of arrest filed by petitioner. He was unsuccessful, respondent Judge, in an order of said date, ordering his
immediate arrest. His petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed with this Court on September 15, 1971. 11

What is thus sought by petitioners Martinez y Festin and Bautista, Sr. is that the respective warrants of arrest issued
against them be quashed on the claim that by virtue of the parliamentary immunity they enjoy as delegates, ultimately
traceable to Section 15 of Article VI of the Constitution as construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code,
they are immune from arrest. In the case of petitioner Martinez y Festin, he is proceeded against for falsification of a
public document punishable by prision mayor. 12 As for petitioner Bautista, Sr., the penalty that could be imposed for
each of the Revised Election Code offense, of which he is charged, is not higher than prision mayor. 13

The respondents in the above petitions were required to answer by resolutions of this Court issued on September 10
and September 20, 1971, respectively. An answer on behalf of respondent Judge Jesus P. Morfe in the case of petitioner
Martinez y Festin was filed on September 20, 1971 with an answer in intervention filed by respondent Executive Sheriff
of Manila and the Chief of Warrant Division likewise filed on the same date. His petition was duly heard on September
14, 1971, Delegate Estanislao A. Fernandez vehemently pressing his claim to immunity. Thereafter on October 29,
1971, a memorandum, comprehensive in scope and persuasive in its analysis of the constitutional question presented,
was filed on behalf of respondent Judge Morfe by Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, two Assistants Solicitors General
Bernardo P. Pardo and Rosalio A. de Leon as well as Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza. A memorandum on behalf of
President Diosdado Macapagal of the Constitutional Convention, who was given permission to submit such a pleading,
was submitted on March 8, 1972 by the Committee on Legal Affairs of the Constitutional Convention. 14

As for the petitions of Bautista, Sr., the answer on behalf of respondent Judge was filed on September 29, 1971. When
the matter was heard on October 14, 1971, he appeared through counsel, Delegate Juanito R. Remulla, while
respondent Judge was represented by Assistant Solicitor General Rosalio A. de Leon and Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza.
With the submission, on October 30, 1971, of an able memorandum on behalf of respondent judge, again, by the same
counsel from the Office of the Solicitor General as well as a carefully-prepared memorandum of petitioner Bautista, Sr.,
on December 1, 1971, the matter was deemed submitted for adjudication.

As noted at the outset, certiorari does not lie to quash the warrants of arrest issued against petitioner Martinez y Festin
as well as petitioner Bautista, Sr. Their reliance on the constitutional provision which for them should be supplemented
by what was provided for in the Revised Penal Code is futile. There is no justification then for granting their respective
pleas.

No other conclusion is allowable consistently with the plain and explicit command of the Constitution. As is made clear
in Section 15 of Article VI, the immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of
the peace. Treason exists when the accused levies war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid
and comfort. 15 A felony is act or omission punishable by law. 16 Breach of the peace covers any offense whether
defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. It is a well-settled principle in public law that the public peace
must be maintained and any breach thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution. Certainly then from the explicit
language of the Constitution, even without its controlling interpretation as shown by the debates of the Constitutional
Convention to be hereinafter discussed, petitioners cannot justify their claim to immunity. Nor does Article 145 of the
Revised Penal Code come to their rescue. Such a provision that took effect in 1932 could not survive after the
Constitution became operative on November 15, 1935. As will be shown, the repugnancy between such an expansion of
the congressional immunity and the plain command of the Constitution is too great to be overcome, even on the
assumption that the penalty to which a public officer will be subjected in the event that he did arrest one entitled
thereto for an offense punishable by less than reclusion temporal suffices to widen its scope. This is so considering not
only the history of such a Constitutional grant of immunity but also its basic purpose and objective.

1. Even if the provision granting the legislative immunity of freedom from arrest were clothed in language less clear, its
history precludes any other interpretation. As submitted to the Constitutional Convention of 1934, the draft proposal
was worded as follows: "The Members of the National Assembly shall in all cases except treason, open disturbance of
public order, or other offense punishable by death or imprisonment of not less than six years, be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of the National Assembly, and in going to and returning from the same." On
December 4, 1934, upon its being considered by the Convention, an amendment was proposed by Delegate Aldeguer so
that it would read: "The Members of the National Assembly shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the
peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the National Assembly, and in going and
returning from the same." What was sought by him was to retain the provision of the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916,
with phraseology identical to that found in the American Constitution.

He defended his proposal thus: "My amendment is not new. It is the same phrase granting parliamentary immunity to
the members of the Parliament of England. It is the same phrase granting parliamentary immunity to members of
Congress. It is the same phrase granting parliamentary immunity to members of the various state legislators of the
Union. Now, in reading the draft proposed by the Sub-Committee of Seven, I found out that it is a broad rule. Mr.
President, the question is not whether we should grant privilege of immunity to the members of the National Assembly
... " 17 He was interrupted by a point of order raised, but he was allowed to continue. He went on: "As I was saying, Mr.
President and Gentlemen of the Convention, the draft gives to the member of the National Assembly more privileges
than what the nature of the office demands. My question is that if the members of the Congress of the United States, if
the members of the Parliament, if the members of the various State Legislatures were able to perform their functions as
members of law-making bodies with the privileges and immunities granted by the phrase "breach of peace." I wonder
why the members of the future National Assembly cannot perform their duties with the same limitations and with the
same privileges. Mr. President and members the Convention, the history of parliamentary immunity shows that it was
never intended to exempt members of the National Assembly from criminal arrest. When American sovereignty was
implanted into these Islands, a new theory of government was implanted too. This theory of government places every
man equal before the eyes of the law. The grant of certain privileges to any set of persons means the abrogation of this
principle of equality before the eyes of the law. Another reason, Mr. President and Members of the Convention, is this:
The State Legislature is the agent of the State. The power or the right of the Legislature to claim privileges is based on
the right of self-preservation. The right of the State to claim privileges is due to the fact that it has the right to carry its
function without obstacle. But we must also remember that any Legislature is but the agent of the State. The State is
the principal. Any crime committed, whether such crime is committed by a colorum or by a gangster, endangers the
State. Giving more privileges to an agent, which is the Legislature, at the expense of the principal, which is the State, is
not a sound policy. So that, Mr. President, and Members of the Convention, believing that under the phrase "breach of
peace", our future members of the Assembly can very well perform the duties incumbent upon them. I submit my
amendment for the consideration of this Convention." 18

Delegate Manuel Roxas on behalf of the sub-committee of seven did not object. As a matter of fact, he was for such
amendment. He considered it "well-founded" and was for such immunity complying "with the wording of the [Philippine
Autonomy Act] in this particular." 19 The Convention readily approved the amendment by acclamation.

It does not admit of doubt therefore that the immunity from arrest is granted by the Constitution was understood in the
same sense it has in American law, there being a similar provision in the American Constitution. 20 Its authoritative
interpretation in the United States was supplied by the Williamson case, a 1908 decision. 21

According to the then Justice, later Chief Justice, White who penned the opinion, "the term "treason, felony and breach
of the peace," as used in the constitutional provision relied upon, excepts from the operation of the privilege all criminal
offenses, ... " 22 He traced its historical background thus: "A brief consideration of the subject of parliamentary privilege
in England will, we think, show the source whence the expression "treason felony, and breach of the peace" was drawn,
and leave no doubt that the words were used in England for the very purpose of excluding all crimes from the operation
of the parliamentary privilege, and therefore to leave that privilege to apply only to prosecutions of a civil nature." 23
Story's treatise on the Constitution was likewise cited, his view on the matter being quite emphatic: "Now, as all crimes
are offenses against the peace, the phrase "breach of the peace" would seem to extend to all indictable offenses, as well
those which are in fact attended with force and violence, as those which are only constructive breaches of the peace of
the government, inasmuch as they violate its good order." 24

As far as American constitutional law is concerned, both Burdick 25 and Willoughby 26 could use practically identical
appraising such immunity, the former stating that it "is not now of great importance" and the latter affirming that it "is
of little importance as arrest of the person is now almost never authorized except for crimes which fall within the classes
exempt from the priviledge." The state of the American law on this point is aptly summarizedby Cooley: "By common
parliamentary law, the members of the legislature are privileged from arrest on civil process during the session of that
body, and for a reasonable time before and after, to enable them to go to and return from the same."27 A prosecution for
a criminal offense, is thus excluded from this grant of immunity. So it should be Philippine law, if deference were to be
paid to what was explicitly agreed upon in the Constitutional Convention.

2. Would it make a difference however in the availability of the writs of certiorari sought by petitioners considering that
Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code would impose upon any public officer or employee who shall, while the Congress
is in regular or special session, arrest or charge any member thereof except in case such member has committed a
crime punishable by penalty higher than prision mayor? 28 The assumption here indulged is that the effect of the above
in the Revised Penal Code was to expand the grant of parliamentary immunity under the Philippine Autonomy Act,
although its literal language does not go that far. It is to be remembered, however, that it took effect on January 1, 1932
before the enforcement of the present Constitution in 1935. Considering that both under the then organic law, the
Philippine Autonomy Act and equally so under the present Constitution, such a more generous treatment accorded
legislators exempting them from arrest even if warranted under a penal law, the question as to whether it did survive
becomes unavoidable. It is our opinion that the answer must be in the negative.

The Constitution is equally explicit on the following point: "All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until
the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless
inconsistent with this Constitution until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and
all references in such laws to the government or officials of the Philippines shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to
refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution." 29 In People v. Linsangan 30 decided in
December, 1935, barely a month after the Constitution took effect, the continued applicability of Section 2718 of the
Revised Administrative Code that would allow the prosecution of a person who remains delinquent in the payment of
cedula tax, 31 this Court, in its opinion thru the pen of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Abad Santos, after setting
forth that the Constitution prohibits the imprisonment for debt on non-payment of poll tax, 32 held: "It seems too clear
to require demonstration that section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code is inconsistent with section 1, clause 12,
of Article III of the Constitution in that, while the former authorizes imprisonment for non-payment of the poll or cedula
tax, the latter forbids it. It follows that upon the inauguration of the Government of the Commonwealth, said section
2718 of the Revised Administrative Code became inoperative, and no judgment of conviction can be based thereon." 33

So it was in De los Santos v. Mallare. 34 Again under the provision of the Revised Administrative Code the President
could remove at pleasure any of the appointive officials under the Charter of the City of Baguio. 35 Relying on such a
provision, the then President Quirino removed petitioner De los Santos who was appointed City Engineer Baguio of on
July 16, 1946, and chose in his place respondent Gil R. Mallare. The Revised Administrative Code was a legislation that
dates back to 1917, 36 eighteen years before the Constitution prohibited any officer or employee in the civil service
being removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law. 37 Again this Court, in the light of aforecited provision
in an opinion of Justice Tuason, held: "So, unlike legislation that is passed in defiance of the Constitution, assertive and
menacing, the questioned part of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code does not need a positive declaration
of nullity by the court to put it out of the way. To all intents and purposes, it is non-existent, outlawed and eliminated
from the statute book by the Constitution itself by express mandate before the petitioner was appointed." 38 In the
language of the constitutional provision then that portion of Article 145 penalizing a public official or employee who
shall while the Congress is in regular or special session arrest or search any member thereof except in case he has
committed a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor is declared
inoperative.

The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full
recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except
the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it comes
to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if
notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in
Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a
legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the
criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that
there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed
that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to
answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an
individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the
judiciary would main independent. It is trite to say that in each and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a
virtue is of the essence.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and habeas corpus by Delegate Manuel Martinez by Festin in L-34022 and the
petitions for certiorari and prohibition by Delegate Fernando Bautista, Sr. in L-34046 and L-34047 are hereby
dismissed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

DELFINO BELTRAN, alias Minong, DOMINGO HERNANDEZ, alias Doming; CEFERINO BELTRAN, alias Ebing; MANUEL
PUZON alias Noling; CRESENCIO SIAZON, alias Ising; and ROGELIO BUGARIN, alias Boy, accused-appellants.

RELOVA, J.:

FACTS:

Accused-appellants Delfino Beltran and others were indicted for murder and double attempted murder with direct
assault evidence shows that in Ballesteros, Cagayan, Ernesto Alvarado was bringing Calixto Urbi home in a jeep.
Passing by the Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran shouted at them, "Oki ni inayo" (Vulva of your mother).

They proceeded on their way and ignored Delfino. After Alvarado had brought Urbi to his house he went to the house of
Mayor. The newly elected Mayor told the Chief of Police that something should be done about it.

When they came near the compound, they saw appellants and suddenly there was a simultaneous discharge of gunfire,
The mayor's son, Vicente, and Mayor also suffered injuries.

I: W/N appellants guilty of attempted murder with direct assault.

H: Yes. considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat. Rolando Tolentino is a policeman who at the
time was in his uniform, and both were performing their official duties to maintain peace and order in the community,
the finding of the trial court that appellants are guilty. For the double attempted murder with direct assault, applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposed on the aforesaid appellants is reduced to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum.

Accused-appellants Delfino Beltran, alias Minong; Rogelio Bugarin, alias Boy; Cresencio Siazon, alias Ising; Manuel
Puzon, alias Noling; Domingo Hernandez, alias Doming; and, Ceferino Beltran, alias Ebing, were indicted for murder
and double attempted murder with direct assault in the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 158- S. Likewise, Delfino Beltran was charged with attempted murder in Criminal Case No. 160-S.

After trial they were convicted and sentenced as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds all the accused DELFINO BELTRAN alias Minong, ROGELIO BUGARIN
alias Boy, CRESENCIO SIAZON alias Ising, MANUEL PUZON alias Noling, DOMINGO HERNANDEZ
alias Doming and CEFERINO BELTRAN alias Ebing, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder for the death of VICENTE QUIROLGICO. There being no mitigating circumstance, the Court has
no other alternative than to impose the maximum penalty provided for by law. Accused Delfino Beltran,
Rogelio Bugarin, Cresencio Siazon, Manuel Puzon, Domingo Hernandez and Ceferino Beltran are hereby
sentenced to the maximum penalty of DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of Vicente Quirolgico the sum of P
12,000.00 for the loss of his life; P 75,000.00 as reimbursement for expenses covering medical funeral
embalming mausoleum and burial lot, and the further sum of P 50,000.00 for moral damages, jointly
and severally and to pay the costs, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, taking into
consideration the nature of the principal penalty imposed.

The Court likewise finds all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of DOUBLE
ATTEMPTED MURDER WITH DIRECT ASSAULT and hereby imposes upon an of them the penalty of
RECLUSION TEMPORAL in its medium period and orders them to undergo a prison term ranging from
14 years, 8 months and 1 day as minimum to 17 years and 4 months as maximum and to pay the
costs.

Under Crim. Case No, 160-S, accused DELFINO BELTRAN is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and hereby sentence him to undergo a prison term
ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days of prision correccional and
to pay the costs. (pp. 402-403, Record)

The People's evidence shows that in the evening of January 11, 1972, between 9:00 and 10:00, in Ballesteros, Cagayan,
Ernesto Alvarado was bringing Calixto Urbi home in a jeep. Passing by the Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran alias
Minong, shouted at them, "Oki ni inayo" (Vulva of your mother). They proceeded on their way and ignored Delfino. After
Alvarado had brought Urbi to his house he went to the house of Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico and reported the matter.
The newly elected Mayor told the Chief of Police that something should be done about it.

They decided to go to the Puzon Compound with the intention to talk to Delfino Beltran and his companions to
surrender considering that he knew them personally as all of them were once working for Congressman David Puzon
When they came near the compound, they saw appellants Delfino Beltran, Rogelio Bugarin and Domingo Hernandez
and suddenly there was a simultaneous discharge of gunfire, The mayor's son, Vicente, who was with them, cried: " I
am already hit, Daddy." As he fell, Vicente pushed his father and both fell down. Mayor Quirolgico and Patrolman
Rolando Tolentino also suffered injuries. When the firing had stopped, they decided to bring Vicente to the hospital. As
the jeep left the compound three (3) men came out of the Puzon Compound and fired at the fleeing vehicle. They were
Cresencio Siazon, Ceferino Beltran and Noling Puzon. Likewise, Domingo Hernandez and Minong Beltran and Boy
Bugarin tried to give chase. After a while, all the six men returned inside the compound.

An hour after admission to the hospital Vicente Quirolgico died. Autopsy examination on the deceased Vicente
Quirolgico showed the following findings:

1. Gunshot wound. inlet wound at the posterior portion of right Mid-axillary line, at the level of the 5th
costal ribs at the back, traversing the right side of the chest, harrowing the right lung, and fracturing
the four (4) postal ribs on the right side front causing an outlet wound almost six (6) inches long over
the right side of the chest diagonally from above the right nipple downward near the right mid-axillary
line. The inlet has almost one (1) cm. diameter.
 2. Gunshot, wound left knee inlet wound at the exterior and posterior side of the left knee. almost (1)
cm. diameter, directed towards the medial side of the left knee, fracturing the left knee and inlet wound
two (2) inches long.

3. Gunshot wound of the right thigh, inlet wound, anterior on front side of the right thigh at the middle
thirds, measuring almost one (1) cm. diameter.

4. Gunshot wound at the internal angle of the left eye inlet wound almost one (1) cm. diameter, directed
downwards and medially traversing the right side of the face.

CAUSE OF DEATH: INTERNAL HEMORRHAGE secondary to Gunshot wound of the chest and left eye.
(Exh. "B", p. 10, Records).

and the examination on Mayor Quirolgico shows the following injuries:

(1) Wound, gunshot, face right;

(2) Wound, gunshot, upper lips right;
(3) Wound, gunshot, leg, right;
(4) Wound, gunshot, big toe, right;
(5) Wound, gunshot, 2nd toe, right (Exh. "A-1", P. 22, Record)

and on Patrolman Rolando Tolentino, the following injuries:

(1) Wound, gunshot, amper fated index, middle and ring fingers, right;
(2) Wound, lacerated, 1 cm. long, 1/3 cm. deep lumbar region, right;
(3) Wound, lacerated 1/4 cm. long, 1/3 cm. deep forearm, left.
(Exh. "A", p. 20, Record.)

On November 23, 1982, this Court, upon receipt of the information of the death of appellant Cresencio Siazon alias Ising
on February 17, 1982 due to "Cardio Respiratory Arrest Secondary to Carcinoma Liver, Pulmonary Tuberculosis," from
Mr. Ramon J. Liwag, Officer-in-Charge, New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, as well as the Comment filed by the Solicitor
General on the aforesaid information, Resolved to dismiss the case insofar as the criminal liability of the deceased
Cresencio Siazon alias Ising is concerned.

Appellant Rogelio Bugarin claims that between 5:00 and 5:30 in the afternoon of January 11, 1972,, the armed men
inside the passing jeep of Mayor Quirolgico fired at Rogelio Bugarin, who was then standing at the main gate of Puzon
Compound. After the armed men had passed by, Rogelio Bugarin proceeded to the office of Congressman Puzon where
he met Ebing Beltran and Delfino Beltran who both asked him about the gun reports. They just dismissed the incident
as no one was hurt. Rogelio Bugarin played guitar while waiting for supper.

Around 10:30 in the evening of the same date, or after appellants had taken their supper at Puzon Compound, they
heard an unusual sound which appeared to be a six by six truck that was bumped. Thereafter, at about 12:00 midnight
of the same day, Delfino Beltran, posted himself as guard and positioned himself in front of the gate of the Rural Bank.
While at the place he saw a group of persons, numbering more than ten, along the road in front of the Rural Bank.
Among the group of armed men, he was able to recognize the Chief of Police of Ballesteros, Gavino Collado, holding a
swinging flashlight, Gerry, Bundok Usita and Bunti Pinzon. When the group reached the gate of Puzon Compound, he
peeped and took hold of the gate with an iron chain. Accidentally, he dropped the chain and it created a sound which
caused the group of armed men to fire upon his direction for about half an hour. In retaliation, he loaded his gun
following which he saw a man falling down from the fence. As the firing continued, he stealthily mounted his gun on top
of the fence and fired the same.

When the firing ceased, he proceeded to the residence of Congressman Puzon. In the sala, he saw Boy Bugarin, Doming
Hernandez, Ising Siazon, Noling Puzon, Ebing Beltran and Floresida Amayon, conversing. Upon seeing him, his
companions asked him what was that firing all about. He told them that he traded shots with a group of armed men.
Thereafter, they hid in the basement of the residence of the Congressman, staying there for one whole day. The following
day, Delfino Beltran surrendered to Captain Retuta, while the rest escaped but thereafter surrendered.

The defense of appellant Delfino Beltran, alias Minong, is self- defense; whereas appellants Rogelio Bugarin, alias Boy,
Ceferino Beltran, alias Ebing, and Manuel Puzon, alias Noling denied having anything to do with the incident.

In this appeal, appellants contend that the trial court erred in: (1) giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution;
(2) holding that conspiracy existed among them in the commission of the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 158-S;
(3) finding that treachery and evident premeditation attended the commission of the crimes; (4) not finding that
appellant Delfino Beltran acted in self-defense; (5) finding appellants guilty of attempted murder with direct assault on
Mayor Quirolgico and Pat. Rolando Tolentino; and (6) not appreciating in favor of the appellants the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.

On the first assigned error, We reiterate the established doctrine that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses,
appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that it is in a better position to
decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the hearing, unless it had overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the
result of the case.

The judgment of conviction is not bereft of evidence to support the same. Hereunder are the testimonies of the
prosecution's eyewitnesses, namely:

Carmelita Collado who declared the following:

Q Will you inform the Honorable Court who was that one shouting?

A Minong Beltran, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Will you inform the Court what was that?

A I heard the voice of Mr. Minong Beltran saying, 'Cida, Cida, you bring out the guns
now I have already shot at the BRQ jeep and they are sure to come back.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Can you tell us what you saw at that time?

A I saw these three persons, Minong Beltran, Boy Bugarin and Domingo Hernandez,
sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q What else did you see if any?

A When these three persons came out, they were already

xxx xxx xxx

Q Will you inform this Court what was that?

A Upon coming out, Delfino Beltran ordered Doming Hernandez to go to the right side of the old office of
Congressman Puzon and he also instructed Boy Bugarin to seek cover to the Rural Bank.

xxx xxx xxx

Q During all these time that these were happening, the going out of Doming Hernandez, of Bugarin; the
ordering of Minong Beltran to the two, did you see any other persons inside the compound of
Congressman Puzon aside from the three?

A After the three had placed themselves in their respective positions, I saw persons coming out but I
was not able to recognize them. (tsn., pp. 5-7, 42-45, Nov. 18, 1972 hearing.)

Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico testified as follows:

Q And do you know what happened after you walked a few steps to the south?
 A When I was looking very well around the vicinity, at the southern part of the Rural Bank about the
corner of their fence, and as I tried to look intently, I recognized the face of Minong Beltran.

xxx xxx xxx

Q At the precise moment, when you saw Minong Beltran at the corner of the Rural Bank, what else
happened if any?

A As I tried to look near them, that was the time when there was a burst of gun fire, the direction of
which was coming from the place where they were staying.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Will you inform this Honorable Court who the other men were at that time?

A Boy Bugarin and Domingo Hernandez.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And after the shooting, there was the shout?

A At the lulling of the shooting, I heard the shout.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And what were the words?

A 'Nala na si Mayor' (The mayor is already hit). (tsn., pp. 20, 21, 31-32, 58-59, Nov. 17, 1972 hearing)

Patrolman Rolando Usita stated that:

Q You said that as the mayor was leaving the scene of the incident, you saw three of the accused
coming out of the guardhouse, do you confirm that?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And the persons who came out from this point according to you are the accused Ising Siazon, Ebing
Beltran and Noling Puzon, do you confirm that?

A Yes, sir.

Q And after that the three other accused named as Doming Hernandez, Boy Bugarin and Minong
Beltran came out of the same compound?

A No, sir. They came out from here. (tsn., pp. 84, 87, February 19, 1973 hearing)

Chief of Police Gavino Collado also pointed out the following:

Q May I see the sketch, your Honor?

A The mayor took this road in going to the hospital (witness pointing to the Bonifacio Cortez Street), and
as the jeep was going westward, and reached this point, three men came out from this part of the
compound and they fired at the vehicle in which the mayor and his son rode on.

xxx xxx xxx

 Q So that the Court would now understand from your statement that it was only after the jeep of the
mayor has left already the scene when three persons came out from the gate of the Puzon compound,
that you saw for the first time these persons?

A Yes, sir.

Q And these persons were Identified as Ebing Beltran, Cresencio Siazon and Noling Puzon?

A Yes, sir. (tsn., pp. 59, 80, January 9, 1973 hearing)

The denial of appellants Rogelio Bugarin, Ceferino Beltran and Manuel Puzon cannot, therefore, prevail over their
positive Identification, as the perpetrators of the crime by the aforenamed eyewitnesses who have not been shown to
have any evil motive to testify falsely against them.

Moreover, the physical evidence, as testified to by Dr. Gregorio R. Farin, Municipal Health Officer of Ballesteros,
Cagayan, who conducted the post mortem examination on the body of the deceased Vicente Quirolgico, shows that
several firearms could have caused his wounds:

Q Considering the nature of the injuries that were found on the body of the deceased, could it be
possible that several firearms could have caused these injuries?

A It is possible.

xxx xxx xxx

Q It is also possible that wounds Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were caused by three different bullets, 3 different
guns, different calibers?

A Yes, sir. It is possible. (tsn., pp. 65-66, Nov. 17, 1972 hearing)

The foregoing testimony of Dr. Farin finds support from the findings of witnesses Vicente de Vera, a Ballistician, and Lt.
Col. Crispin Garcia, Chief Chemistry Branch, both of the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame,
Quezon City, who conducted examinations on the empty shells and on the firearms, respectively, recovered from the
premises of the Rural Bank and the Puzon Compound. Vicente de Vera testified on direct examination, the following:

Q Under your findings No. 1, will you inform us your conclusion?

A My conclusion was that the 27 fired cartridges marked as CIS-1 to 27 were fired from the firearm
marked as Exhibit 'R' (SIG Natu Rifle).

Q Your other findings, please tell the Court.

A Under findings Nos. 2: Microscopic examination and comparison of the 223 Cal. fired cartridge cases
marked as CIS 28 to CIS 154 revealed the non-congruency of striations with the test cartridge cases
fired from the abovementioned 223 caliber M16 Armalite rifle with Serial No. 527226. They further
revealed the following:

1. CIS 28 to CIS 62 were fired from one (1) firearm;

2. CIS 63 to CIS 95 were fired from one (l) firearm;
3. CIS 96 to CIS 102 were fired from one (1) firearm;

4. CIS 103 to CIS 154 were fired from one (1) firearm

Q May we know your conclusion of this findings of yours?

A My conclusion is that, the 223 Caliber fired cartridges marked as CIS 28 to CIS 154 were fired from
four different firearms but not from the above-entioned 223 Cal. M16 Armalite with SN-527226. (tsn.,
pp. 29-30, January 8, 1973 hearing)
and on cross-examination declared that:

Q Supposing that there are three SIG rifles of the same Serial number and the fired cartridges from this
three guns have the same number of similar characteristics or congruency of striations?

A They can have no similar characteristics.

Q Do you mean to say that for every SIG rifle there is its own characteristics; that congruency of
striations?

A That is correct. (tsn., p. 36, January 8, 1973 hearing)

whereas, Lt. Col. Crispin B. Garcia on the witness stand declared:

Q With this request for examination of certain articles, what articles were actually submitted to you for
examinations?

A Well one (1) rifle SIG, Switzerland made with SN-5721, the barrel group bearing Serial Number
15721; the receiver group with SN-5720 and the barrel link bearing SN-9641, and another firearm
(Exh. 'R').

Q Colonel aside from this article, Exhibit 'R', what other articles or guns did you receive for
examination?

A One Armalite with Serial No. 527226. (Exhibit 'S')

xxx xxx xxx

Q With reference to the first rifle which you have mentioned, which is marked as Exhibit 'R', with
different serial numbers, in the barrel group, receiver group, and the barrel link, will you inform this
Honorable Court your findings?

A I found that the barrel of the Armalite is positive for the presence of gunpowder, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q With reference to this Armalite, M15, marked as Exhibit 'S', in this particular case, will you tell us
your findings about the presence of gunpowder?

A Exhibit 'S', the barrel is positive of gunpowder. (tsn., pp. 52, 55, 57, & 58, January 8, 1973 hearing)

The above findings further confirm the truth of the statements of eyewitnesses Gavino Collado, Patrolman Usita, Mayor
Quirolgico and Carmelita Collado that appellants traded shots with the Mayor's group, using long or high powered guns.

Anent the second assigned error, We agree with the trial court's finding on the existence of conspiracy. In the case at
bar, the sequence of events that transpired in the evening of January 11, 1972, from the time Delfino Beltran first fired
upon the passing jeep of Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico, driven by witness Ernesto Alvarado at around 9:00, the
subsequent preparations for the arrival of the Mayor as testified to by eyewitness Carmelita Collado, the shooting on the
other passing jeepney to further provoke the Mayor, and the simultaneous and sudden firing at the Mayor's group
which had just arrived at about 12:00 midnight in the scene of the crime; the final shooting of the fleeing Mayor; and,
the simultaneous common retreat and escape of all the accused, established the presence of conspiracy. For conspiracy
to exist, it is enough that at the time the offense was committed, the participants had the same purpose and were
united in its execution, as may be inferred from the attendant circumstances (People vs. Manalo, 133 SCRA 626).
Further, conspiracy does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence, as conspiracy
legally exists if, at the time of the offense, the accused had the same criminal purpose and were united in its execution.
Appellants' conduct and/or actuations before, during and after the commission of the crime charged in Criminal Case
No. 158-S are circumstances proving conspiracy.

Conspiracy having established, the act of one is the act of all. It is no longer necessary to specifically lay out the
particular participation of each participant.
Relative to the third assigned error, the trial court properly appreciated the existence of the aggravating circumstances
of evident premeditation and treachery. From 9:00 in the evening to 12:00 midnight of the same day, appellants had
three (3) long hours to meditate and reflect on their evil design and they clung in their determination to kill the Mayor,
which fortunately failed.

Premeditation is present where there was a lapse of two hours from the inception to execution.

The existence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery was shown in the simultaneous and sudden firing by the
accused on the newly arrived Mayor's group, without warning. We are convinced that they employed means, methods or
forms which could have tended directly or insured the accomplishment of their evil design against the Mayor, with
whom they have no personal grudge, without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the offended party had
made. No one from herein appellants sustained a scratch as they were really prepared for the coming Mayor.

With respect to the fourth assigned error, the claim of Delfino Beltran that he had just acted in self-defense, suffice it to
say, that the one invoking this justifying circumstance must prove beyond reasonable doubt that all the necessary
requisites of self-defense are present, namely: (1) Unlawful aggression on the part of the offended party; (2) Reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. Delfino Beltran had not proved any one of these. Thus, his claim of self-defense was properly
dismissed by the trial court.

Regarding the fifth assigned error, considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat. Rolando
Tolentino is a policeman who at the time was in his uniform, and both were performing their official duties to maintain
peace and order in the community, the finding of the trial court that appellants are guilty of attempted murder with
direct assault on the persons of Mayor Quirolgico and Pat. Tolentino is correct.

Relative to the last assigned error, following Our latest ruling in People vs. Nicolas Canamo, et al., G.R. No. 62043,
promulgated on August 13, 1985, We agree with appellants that they should be credited with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, as they in fact presented themselves voluntarily to the authorities. However, this
mitigating circumstance is offset by the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 158-S, with the modifications that for lack of necessary votes, the penalty imposed
upon appellants Delfino Beltran alias Minong, Rogelio Bugarin alias Boy, Manuel Puzon alias Nol

People vs dollantes

an appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, 7th Judicial Region, Branch XL, in Criminal
Case No. 5832, convicting the nine (9) accused, Pedro Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico Dollantes,
Sidrito Lokesio, Merlando Dollantes, Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester, all equally guilty of the
complex crime of "Assault upon a Person in Authority Resulting in Murder" and sentencing the abovementioned accused
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, jointly and severally, the sum of
P30,000.00 to pay attomey's fees in the amount of P3,000.00 and to pay the costs.

All of the accused were charged as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of April 1983 at nighttime, in the Municipality of Tayasan, Province of Negros
Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together and helping one another with evident premeditation and treachery, and with intent
to kill did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Marcos Gabutero,
Barangay Captain of Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros Oriental, an agent of a person in authority and which fact
accused had full knowledge, while the latter was in the lawful performance of his official duty or function as
Barangay Captain or on the occasion of such function, with a bolo and hunting knives with which the accused
were then armed and provided, thereby inflicting the following wounds in the victim, viz:

1. Stab wound measuring three and a half (3 1/2) cm. in length and half (1/2) cm. in width, ten (10)
cm. depthness located at the left anterior aspect of the trunk at the level of the 3rd intercostal space, 5
cm. away from the anterior mid-line. The wound was oriented horizontally and directed vertically and
slightly to the back. Ventricle and lung tissue penetrated.

2. Stab wound measuring four (4) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width, eleven and a half (11 1/2) cm.
depthness, located at the right anterior aspect of the trunk, at the level of the 2nd intercostal space
about five (5) cm. away from the anterior and midline, the wound was oriented horizontally and directed
downward and slightly to the back.
 3. Incised wound five (5) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width located at the left anterior aspect of the trunk
about 26 cm. below the left clavicle and four (4) cm. away from the anterior mid-line. The wound was
oriented obliquely.

4. Incised wound measuring two (2) cm. in length and one (1) cm. in width, located at the right anterior
aspect of the trunk about twenty-one (21) cm. below the right clavicle and eight (8) cm. away from the
anterior line. The wound was oriented obliquely.

5. Incised wound measuring one and a half (1 1/2) cm. in length, half (1/2) cm. in width located at the
anterior aspect of the upper extremity about nine (9) cm. above the wrist joint one and a half (1 1/2)
cm. away from the anterior mid-line and medially. The wound was oriented vertically.

6. Incised wound measuring four (4) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width located at the lateral aspect of the
right upper extreme about five (5) cm. above the elbow joint and five (5) cm. away from the posterior
midline laterally. The wound was oriented horizontally.

7. Through and through stab wound located at the left upper extremity the wound of entrance
measuring about three and a half (3 1/2) cm. in length and one (1) cm. in width located at the posterior
aspect of the forearm above five (5) em. below the elbow joint, three (3) cm. away from the anterior mid-
line medially. The wound was oriented vertically.

8. Incised wound measuring 3 cm. in length half (1/2) cm. in width located at the lateral aspect of the
left upper extremity about five (5) cm. below the elbow joint and (5) cm. away from the posterior mid-
line. The wound was oriented horizontally.

9. Stab wound measuring one and one-half (1 1/2) cm. in width and four (4) cm. depthness located at
the left anterior aspect of the trunk, about seven and a half (7 1/2) cm. above the ihac crest and twelve
(12) cm. away from the anterior mid-line. The wound was oriented obliquely and directed downward,
slightly to the right and posteriority, perforating part of the intestine.

10. Stab wound measuring three (3) cm. in length, one (1) cm. in width and seven and a half (7) cm. in
depthness, located at the left posterior of the trunk about three (3) cm. above the lower angle of the
scapula, and seven (7) cm. away from the posterior mid-line. The wound was oriented obliquely and
directed downward and slightly to the left.

11. Stab wound measuring three(3) cm. in length, one (l) cm. in width and twelve (12) cm. in depthness,
located at the left posterior aspect of the trunk about thirteen (13) cm. below the lower angle of the
scapula and six (6) cm. away from the posterior mid-line. The wound was oriented obliquely and
directed anteriority to the left.

12. Hemothorax on the left pleural cavity, which wounds caused the latter's untimely death.

Contrary to Art. 248, 148 and 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

(Information, Original Record, pp. 3-4)

The findings of facts of the trial court are as follows:

That deceased Marcos Gabutero at the time of his death was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Maglihe,
Tayasan, Negros Oriental; that due to the approaching fiesta of barangay Maglihe, a dance was held in said
barangay in the evening of April 21, 1983; that while the Barangay Captain was delivering a speech to start the
dance, the accused Pedro Dollantes went to the middle of the dancing floor, making a dance movement known
in the visayan as "nagkorantsa", brandishing his knife and challenging everyone as to who was brave among the
people present; the Barangay Captain approached Pedro Dollantes and admonished him to keep quiet and not
to disturb the dance. However, the accused, instead of heeding to the advice of the Barangay Captain, stabbed
the latter on the left arm; that accused Hugo Grengia held the left hand of accused Pedro Dollantes and Dionilo
Garol was able to get from the hand of Pedro Dollantes the hunting knife. Immediately thereafter, accused
Hamlet Dollantes, who rushed towards the Barangay Captain, stabbed the Barangay Captain at the back and
the other co-accused also took turns in stabbing the Barangay Captain; the Barangay Captain at that time was
not armed. Except for the accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester who were merely
holding stones, the other co-accused participated in the stabbing incident. When the Barangay Captain fell to
the ground and died, the accused in this case took turns in kicking the dead body of the Barangay Captain and
 were dancing around said dead body; that the Barangay Captain suffered eleven (11) wounds in the different
parts of his body, two of which happened to be at the back of his dead body. According to the attending
physician, Dr. Rogelio Kho who examined the body of the deceased, the victim died of "Severe hemorrhage and
cardiac tamponade due to stab wounds." (Decision, Crim. Case No. 5832, Rollo, p. 75).

The evidence for the prosecution consisted principally of the testimonies of Dionilo Garol, Bonifacio Cero, Marciana
Gabutero, the wife of the deceased, Pat. Ricardo Barrera, Dr. Rogelio Kho who conducted the post mortem examination
of the deceased, Ponsimillo Balasabas, the Municipal Treasurer of Tayasan, Negros Oriental and Pat. Jose Amis of the
Integrated National Police.

On the other hand, the defense presented the following witnesses: Accused: Hugo Grengia, Leonilo Villaester, Danny
Esteban, Alfredo Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes, and other witnesses: Machim Dollantes and Tacio Fausto.After a careful
evaluation of the evidence, the trial court was convinced that all the accused in this case conspired in the commission of
the crime.

Thus on February 20, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision finding all the accused guilty of the complex crime of
assault upon a person in authority resulting in murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of all the accused beyond reasonable doubt, this Court
hereby finds the accused Pedro Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes, Alfredo Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico
Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesia, Merlando Dollantes, Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester, guilty of
the complex crime of assault upon a person in authority resulting in murder, and hereby sentences the above-
mentioned accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Marcos Gabutero,
jointly and severally, the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) PESOS, to pay attorney's fees in the amount of
Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

SO ORDERED. (RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 79)

From the aforementioned decision, all the accused appealed. Accused Hugo Grengia submitted a separate brief.

The appellant raised the following assignment of errors:

FIRST ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDIT TO THE BIASED, INCREDIBLE AND
CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES DIONILO GAROL, BONIFACIO CERO
AND MARCIANA GABUTERO AND IN NOT CONSIDERING AT LEAST THE UNCONTRADICTED TESTIMONY OF
INDEPENDENT WITNESSES DOLLANTES AND TACIO FAUSTO.

SECOND AND THIRD ERRORS

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE EXPERT PROSECUTION WITNESS DR. ROGELIO
R. KHO WHICH IN EFFECT CONTRADICTS THE THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION AND THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTS.

FOURTH ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FROM NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED HUGO GRENGIA,
LEONILO VILLAESTER alias "Laon," DANILO ESTEBAN, HAMLET DOLLANTES, ALFREDO DOLLANTES AND
THE TESTIMONY OF INDEPENDENT WITNESSES TACIO FAUSTO AND MCLEAN DOLLANTES.

FIFTH ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE COMPLEX CRIME OF ASSAULT UPON
A PERSON IN AUTHORITY RESULTING TO MURDER AND SENTENCING THEM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF
RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF MARCOS GABUTERO, JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY, THE SUM OF THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS, and TO PAY THE COSTS OF THE
PROCEEDINGS. (Brief for Accused-Appellant, Rollo, p. 62)

In his separate brief, accused Hugo Grengia assigns the following errors:
 1. The lower court erred in not giving weight and credence to the admission of accused-appellant Hamlet
Dollantes that he was the lone perpetrator of the alleged stabbing of victim Marcos Gabutero.

2. The lower court erred in not considering the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, namely: Patrolman Ricardo
Barrera, Dr. Rogeho Kho which in effect buttressed the theory of the defense.

3. The lower court erred in not considering the entry in the police logbook of the Tayasan Integrated National
Police, dated April 21, 1983, as testified to by Patrolman Jose Amis.

4. The lower court erred in holding that conspiracy exist in perpetration of the felony.

5. The lower court erred in holding that the case of People vs. Agag (L-64951, June 29, 1984) is applicable to the
case at bar to justify the conviction of the accused-appellants.

6. The lower court erred in not giving weight and credence to the testimony of the defense witnesses.

7. Finally, the trial court erred in holding that the accused-appellant herein is guilty of the crime charged. (Brief
for accusedappellant Hugo Grengia, pp. 1-2)

The appeal is without merit.

The issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses.

The accused were positively identified by three (3) prosecution eye witnesses. They were: Dionilo Garol, Bonifacio Cero
and Marciana Gabutero, the wife of the victim. Except for the latter, the two other witnesses Garol and Cero are not
related to the victim or the accused. The testimonies of these three (3) witnesses were subjected to a lengthy cross-
examination and were found credible and free from material contradictions by the trial court (Rollo, p. 75).

Dionilo Garol who was six (6) meters away, saw clearly what happened. He testified that when the Barangay Captain
started to deliver his speech, the accused Pedro Dollantes brandishing a knife shouted "Who is brave here?" (TSN, page
6, Oct. 7, 1983). The victim then approached to admonish him t the latter stabbed the victim on the arm. Garol
immediately approached the accused Pedro Dollantes and tried to wrest the knife away from the hand of the accused.
The accused Hugo Grengia also tried to grab the knife but it was Garol who succeeded. The accused Grengia then told
him "Do not try to intervene because you might be included in the plan." (TSN, page 8, Oct. 17, 1983). Then Grengia
made some signs by nodding his head and the accused Hamlet Dollantes and Alfredo Dollantes rushed to and attacked
the victim followed by the other co-accused in this case who also rushed at and stabbed the victim. He specified that
accused Alfredo Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico Dollantes and Sidrito Lokesio were carrying knives while the
accused Merlando Dollantes was carrying a bolo; and that they stabbed the victim one after another. He said that the
accused Danny Esteban, Hugo Grengia andLeonilo Villaester were all carrying stones which they threw at the store of
the victim's wife (TSN, pp. 7-10; Oct. 17, 1983).

This testimony was fully corroborated by another prosecution eyewitness Bonifacio Cero who was about three (3) meters
away and whose narration tallied on all material ints with that of Dionilo Garol as to what transpired that night. He
stated further that when he saw the Barangay Captain being stabbed he tried to approach the group but he was held by
Danny Esteban who said "do not try to interfere, you are not a party to this. We have already gotten what we have been
aiming for." (TSN, page 12, Oct. 18, 1983). Thereafter, he ran away but Alfredo Dollantes, Pedro Dollantes and Danny
Esteban stoned him because they intended to kill him also. He also testified that when he returned to the crime scene,
he saw Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and companions simultaneously kicking the dead body and shouting "who is
brave among here. "

Marciana Gabutero, the wife of the victim funy corroborated the testimonies of Garol and Cero. She also added that
Hugo Grengia wanted to be a Barangay Captain and she happened to know that as a fact, because he told the crowd not
to long as Barangay Captain. She also testified that the accused Leonilo Villaester splashed one glass of tuba on the face
of the deceased and that the victim had had a misunderstanding with the Dollantes on a theft case involving Hamlet
Dollantes (Rollo, pp. 68-69).

It will be noted that the above witnesses were categorical and straightforward when they stated that they saw appellants
stab the victim. They even specified the type of weapon used by each of said appellants.

There is no possibility that they could have been mistaken in their Identification for apart from being near the crime
scene which was well illuminated with two Petromax lamps (TSN, page 6, Oct. 19, 1983), these witnesses are familiar
with the appellants since they are all residents of the same locality. Furthermore, there is no showing that the witnesses
had any motive to testify falsely against the appellants.

In fact, under similar circumstances, the Court has held that where the scene of the stabbing was clearly lighted and no
motive was shown why prosecution witnesses would incriminate the appellants, identification would be given full faith
and credit (People v. Escoltero, 139 SCRA 218).

The theory of the defense in this case is that it was only the accused Hamlet Dollantes who stabbed the victim while the
other accused did not participate in the stabbing incident (Rollo, pp. 75-76).

In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial court, appellants pointed out that there are certain inconsistencies
that render the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, incredible.

For one thing they claim that Dionilo Garol could not have een Hamlet Dollantes stab the victim because as Garol
himself stated, when said accused rushed towards the victim, he ran away. The evidence shows however, that Garol
clearly testified that he saw au of them stab the Barrio Captain, one after another and it was only after the Barrio
Captain fell to the ground that he ran towards the municipal hall to report the incident to the police (TSN, page 11, Oct.
17, 1983).

Another circumstance allegedly raising grave doubts on the credibility of Dionilo Garol was his failure to report to the
police authorities the fact of stoning (Rollo, pp. 71-72).

However, the fact of stoning was not the means used to kill the victim and the omission of the same in the narration in
the report does not detract from the established fact that the victim was stabbed several times which caused his death.

It was also pointed out that Dionilo Garol testified that the store of the victim's wife was stoned while Bonifacio Cero
also testified that he was the one being stoned.

There appears to be no inconsistency between the two testimonies. The fact that the store of the victim's wife was stoned
does not preclude the possibility that Bonifacio Cero was also stoned.

Finally, appellants maintain that Bonifacio Cero could not have seen with precision the stabbing of the victim while he
was being hugged by Danny Esteban and he had a feeling that he would be killed by the group. Much less could it be
possiblefor accused Danny Esteban, Leonflo Villaester, Sidrito Lokesio and Alfredo Dollantes who were at the store of
Severina Cadillero, to join in stabbing the victim, the appellants argued (Rollo, pp. 73-74).

The records show that Cero testified that he saw appellants stab the deceased before he was embraced by appellant
Danny Esteban who told him "do not interfere you are not a party to this. We have already gotten what we have been
aiming for." (TSN, page 12, Oct. 18, 1983). Clearly, the language is unmistakable that in that at said point, the stabbing
and the killing being described by all the witnesses had already been accomphshed.

Indeed, if there be any inconsistency or contradictions in their testimonies, the same are trivial and merely refer to
minor matters which do not affect credibility. They do not detract from the essential facts or vital details of the crime
pinpointing their criminal responsibility (Appellee's Brief, p. 16). As held by this Court, discrepancies in minor details
are to be expected from an uncoached witness (People v. Arbois, 138 SCRA 31). Such minor variations would rather
show the sincerity of the witnesses and the absence of connivance between them to make their testimonies tally in every
respect (People v. Pielago, 140 SCRA 419, 423). Truth to tell, such trivial differences constitute fail-safe reliability.

Accused Hugo Grengia claims that the trial court erred in not giving weight to the admission of accused Hamlet
Dollantes that he was the lone perpetrator of the killing incident (Brief for Accused-Appellant Hugo Grengia, p. 7). Thus
the defense argues that the accused Pedro Dollantes, Alfredo Dollantes, Merlando Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Sidrito
Lokesio, Monico Dollantes and Leonilo Villaester, did not stab the victim and were not at the scene of the crime and that
it was only accused Hamlet Dollantes who stabbed the victim.

As found by the trial court, such claim is not supported by sufficient evidence. On the contrary, an entry in the Police
Logbook (Exhibit "D") of the Integrated National Police of Tayasan, Negros Oriental, shows that one Gloria Callao, wife of
the accused Lauro Dollantes, turned over to the police two (2) hunting knives owned by the accused Hamlet Dollantes
and Alfredo Dollantes. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, such theory is behed by the
Identification made by the prosecution witnesses and by the number and location of the victim's wounds which are
mute evidence that several persons comn)itted the crime (People's Brief, p. 17).
As repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, the claim of alibi by the accused cannot prevail over positive Identification by
credible witnesses (People v. Tirol, 102 SCRA 58); more so where as in the case at bar, it was not demonstrated that it
was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of said crime at the time of its commission (People
v. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232).

On the other hand, the claim of Hamlet Dollantes of self-defense when he stabbed the victim is not sustained by the
records. As found by the trial court, the victim was not armed at the time of the incident, so that there was no danger to
the life and limb of the accused. The latter claims that he had to stab the victim who boxed him and would not release
his wounded hand (Rollo, p. 76). Apart from the obvious disproportion of the means used to repel the alleged attack,
three witnesses of the prosecution testified that the accused Hamlet Dollantes rushed towards the victim and stabbed
the latter at the back. Said testimonies were corroborated by the Post Mortem Examination (Exhibit "A") and the Sketch
(Exhibit "B") of the human body of the victim which showed a stab wound at the back. Furthermore, the nature,
character, location and extent of the wound suffered by the victim, negates the accused's claim of self-defense. (People v.
Tolentino, 54 Phil. 77). In fact, the eleven (11) wounds suffered by "he victim are indicative of aggression (People v.
Somera, 83 Phil. 548; People v. Mendoza, L-16392, Jan. 30, 1965).

Accused-appellant Hugo Grengia submits that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of conspiracy. Among
others, he pointed out that he was unarmed at the time of the incident, that his name was not mentioned in the report
made by Dionilo Garol to Patrolman Barrera as to the perpetrators of the crime; that his name was not included in the
entry in the police logbook of the Integrated National Police of Tayasan, Negros Oriental and that he had no participation
in the commission ofthe felony except the alleged nodding of his head at a time when he was trying to wrest the knife
from Pedro Dollantes which is not an indication of conspiracy (Brief for Grengia, pp. 13-16).

While it is true that the accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester did not participate in the
stabbing, the lower court finds them equally liable as principals with the other accused in this case. They were found to
be holding stones which they threw at the store owned by the victim and his wife; they participated in kicking and
dancing around the dead body of the Barangay Captain and although Grengia also tried to wrest the knife from Pedro
Dollantes, he clearly told Dionilo Garol when the latter succeeded in getting the knife and was holding the hands of
Pedro Dollantes, "do not try to intervene here because you might be included in the plan." (TSN, pp. 7-10, Octoer 17,
1983). Danny Esteban uttered the same statements to Bonifacio Cero, saying "do not try to interfere you are not a party
to this. We have already gotten what we have been aiming or." (TSN, pp. 9-14, October 18,1983).

Furthermore, as previously stated, while the victim was delivering a speech, Hugo Grengia was telumg people not to
listen to the victim as he will not stay long as a Barangay Captain. It is also to be noted that although he was a
compadre of the victim, he never tried to help the former while he was being stabbed and after the incident, he never
visited the victim's family.

Thus, the lower court found the existence of conspiracy as follows:

The accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester by their acts, aimed at the same object, and
their acts, though apparently independent, are in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of
personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. The conduct of the defendants, before,
during and after the commission of the crime clearly shows that they acted in concert. (People v. Emilio Agag, L-
64951, June 29, 1984, Justice Relova) There being conspiracy, the Court finds them guilty of Murder. (Decision,
Crim. Case No. 5832, Rollo p. 77)

In one case, this Court held "that while the acts done by the petitioners herein vary from those of their co-accused, there
is no question that they were all prompted and linked by a common desire to assault and retaliate against the group.....
Thus, they must share equal liability for all the acts done by the participants in the felonious undertaking." (Pring v.
Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 185-186 [1985]).

Appellant Hugo Grengia lays much stress on the testimony of Dr. Rogeho Kho that it is possible that all the stab
wounds were inflicted by the same weapon, in a desperate effort to show that only one person committed the crime and
that there is no conspiracy.

The records show however, that said Doctor merely replied to he questions propounded by the defense lawyer as to the
different possibilities on how the wounds of the victim may have been inflicted. But testifying specifically on the case at
bar, he categorically stated that actually the wounds could be produced by a single bladed weapon with different sizes
but not necessarily only a single bladed weapon.

Thus, the Doctor testified as follows:

 Atty. Jayme:

Q Basing upon your physical findings, Doc, upon the victim Marcos Gabutero, is it possible Doc, that in
accordance with your drawing that the wounds inflicted was caused by a single bladed weapon, is it
possible, Doctor, that this wound was caused by a single bladed weapon? Is it possible that this. I
repeat the question, your Honor.

Q According to your drawing which is labelled "BS" which according to you "blunt and sharp bladed
weapon which is practically single bladed weapon, according to your physical findings there is similarly
in the weapons used, could we say practically, Doctor, that these stab wounds as well as those incised
wounds may be caused by one single-bladed weapon?

A Actually it could be produced by a single bladed weapon with different sizes but not necessarily only a
single bladed weapon.

Q According to you it was a single bladed weapon with different or several sizes, now, what is your
honest observation upon your physical findings, what will be themaximum weapon used? I have here a
zerox copy for your own reference.

A With respect to the length of the wound there are two wounds that have three em. in length, it could
be possible that the same kind of weapon or instrument has been used. This refers to Wounds Nos.10
and 11. By the way, Sir, this refers to the stab wounds because the size of the incised wounds is
difficult to determine.

Atty. Jayme:

Yes, the stab wounds only.

A It's hard to determine Wound No. 9 because the length is not indicated here, so it is possible that
there are 3 or 4 kinds of instrument or weapons being used. (TSN, pp. 26- 27, December 15, 1983)

Appellant Hugo Garcia also emphasizes the testimony of Dr. Kho that the latter did not observe any contusions on the
body of the deceased, obviously to disprove that appellants danceda round and kicked the body after the victim was
slain.

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, "although the examining doctor failed to find any contusion or abrasion
on the cadaver of the victim, nevertheless, such absence is not conclusive proof that appellants did not kick the
deceased. It might be possible that kicks did not cause or produce contusions or abrasions or that they were not noticed
by the doctor." (Appellee's Brief, p. 22). Moreover, the fact of dancing and kicking complained of, is only one of the acts
showing conspiracy, without which, conspiracy cannot be said not to have been established.

The lower court also found that treachery was present in the commission of the crime, and that the accused Alfredo
Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesio and Merlando Dollantes are as equally guilty as principals
by direct participation. These accused took turns in stabbing the victim. In fact the victim was caught by surprise and
did not have time to defend himself.

Finally, the records show that the Barangay Captain was in the act of trying to pacify Pedro Dollantes who was making
trouble in the dance hall when he was stabbed to death. He was therefore killed while in the performance of his duties.
In the case of People v. Hecto (135 SCRA 113), this Court ruled that "As the barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce
the laws and ordinances within the barangay. If in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who
thereafter treacherously slew him the crime committed is murder with assault upon a person in authority."

There is no qeustion that the trial court's conclusions on credibilitY of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal.
(People v. Oliverio, 120 SCRA 22). After a careful review of the records, no plausible reason could be found to disturb the
findings of fact and of law of the lower court in this case.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

Justo vs CA
an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte
finding Petitioner Severino P. Justo guilty of the crime of assault upon a person in authority.
The Court of Appeals found the following facts to have been established.
“The offended party Nemesio B. de la Cuesta is a duly appointed district supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools,
with station at Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. Between 9:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary00 and 10:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary00 a.m.
on October 16, 1950, he went to the division office in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, in answer to a call from said office, in order to
revise the plantilla of his district comprising the towns of Sarrat and Piddig. At about 11:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary25
a.m., De la Cuesta was leaving the office in order to take his meal when he saw the Appellant conversing with Severino
Caridad, academic supervisor. Appellant requested De la Cuesta to go with him and Caridad to the office of the latter.
They did and in the office of Caridad, the Appellant asked about the possibility of accommodating Miss Racela as a
teacher in the district of De la Cuesta. Caridad said that there was no vacancy, except that of the position of shop
teacher. Upon hearing Caridad’s answer, the Appellant sharply addressed the complainant
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “Shet, you are a double crosser. One who cannot keep his promise.” The Appellant
then grabbed a lead paper weight from the table of Caridad and challenged the offended party to go out. The Appellant
left Caridad’s office, followed by De la Cuesta. When they were in front of the table of one Carlos Bueno, a clerk in the
division office, De la Cuesta asked the Appellant to put down the paper weight but instead the Appellant grabbed the
neck and collar of the polo shirt of the complainant which was torn. Carlos Bueno separated the protagonists, but not
before the complainant had boxed the Appellant several times.” (Petitioner’s Brief, pp. 17-18).
The present appeal is directed against that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which
says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“ cralaw It is argued by Counsel, however, that when the complainant accepted the challenge to a fight and followed the
Appellant out of the room of Mr. Caridad, the offended party was no longer performing his duty as a person in authority.
There is no merit in this contention. The challenge was the result of the heated discussion between the complainant and
the Appellant occasioned by the latter’s disappointment when he was told that Miss Racela could not be accommodated
in the district of the former as there was no more vacancy in said district except that of a shop teacher. Be this as it
may, when the Appellant grabbed the neck and collar of the shirt of the complainant, which is actually laying hands
upon a person in authority, he did so while the latter was engaged in the performance of his duties as the occasion of
such performance, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary his failure to accommodate Miss Racela as a teacher in his district
as he had supposedly promised the Appellant.” (Petitioner’s Brief, pp. 22-23.)
Petitioner argues:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) that when the complainant accepted his challenge to fight outside and followed him out of the room of Mr. Caridad
where they had a verbal clash, he (complainant) disrobed himself of the mantle of authority and waived the privilege of
protection as a person in authority; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand
(2) that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that there was no unlawful aggression on Petitioner’s part because
there was a mutual agreement to fight.
Neither argument is tenable. The character of person in authority is not assumed or laid off at will, but attaches to a
public official until he ceases to be in office. Assuming that the complainant was not actually performing the duties of
his office when assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of the crime of assault upon a person in authority; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryso long as the impelling motive of the attack is the performance of official duty. This is apparent
from the phraseology of Article 148 of our Revised Penal Code, in penalizing attacks upon person in authority “while
engaged in the performance of official duties or on occasion of such performance”, the words “on occasion” signifying
“because” or “by reason” of the past performance of official duty, even if at the very time of the assault no official duty
was being discharged (People vs. Garcia, 20 Phil., 358; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarySent. of the Tribunal Supremo of
Spain, 24 November 1874; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary26 December 1877; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary13 June 1882
and 31 December 1896).
Thus, the Supreme Court of Spain has ruled that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“No es razon apreciable para dejar de constituir el delito de atentado el que no estuviera el guarda en el termino en que
ejercia sus funciones, pues resultado que se ejecuto con ocasion de ellas, esta circunstancias siempre es suficiente, por
si sola, para constituir el atentado, sin tener en cuenta el sitio en que haya ocurrido.” (Sent. 13 de Junio de 1882) (1
Hidalgo, Codigo Penal, 642- 643).
No other construction is compatible with the evident purpose of the law that public officials and their agents should be
able to discharge their official duties without being haunted by the fear of being assaulted or injured by reason thereof.
The argument that the offended party, De la Cuesta, cannot claim to have been unlawfully attacked because he had
accepted the accused’s challenge to fight, overlooks the circumstance that as found by the Court of Appeals, the
challenge was to “go out”, i.e., to fight outside the building, it not being logical that the fight should be held inside the
office building in the plain view of subordinate employees. Even applying the rules in duelling cases, it is manifest that
an aggression ahead of the stipulated time and place for the encounter would be unlawful; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryto
hold otherwise would be to sanction unexpected assaults contrary to all sense of loyalty and fair play. In the present
case, assuming that De la Cuesta accepted the challenge of the accused, the facts clearly indicate that he was merely on
his way out to fight the accused when the latter violently lay hands upon him. The acceptance of the challenge did not
place on the offended party the burden of preparing to meet an assault at any time even before reaching the appointed
place for the agreed encounter, and any such aggression was patently illegal. Appellant’s position would be plausible if
the complaining official had been the one who issued the challenge to fight; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut here the
reverse precisely happened.
We find no reversible error in the decision appealed from, and the same is hereby affirmed. Costs against Appellant.