Project-Based Management

Individual Assignment – Question 2

Examine a specific example of contemporary project failure. Choose one that has generated significant
media attention. Critically examine the stated causes of the projects failure and then reflect on the potential
underlying issues that might lay behind those statements. Where was blame apportioned? Who gained
and who lost from that particular apportionment? What other factors might have been significant in the
failure?

The Sydney Opera House

“It could be a colossal failure or an outstanding masterpiece.”

(Ove Arup, 1965)

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Intro & Background

The Sydney Opera House is often described as a masterpiece of twentieth century architecture
and a world-famous iconic building (DEE, 2016; Unesco, 2006). It is both nationally and internationally
admired, and one of the most important tourist attractions both for Sydney and for Australia. Its
architectural form constitutes of three separate “groups of interlocking vaulted ‘shells’” (Unesco, 2006, p.
13), located on a terraced platform in the Sydney Harbour. In 1957, the Danish architect Jørn Utzon won
the architectural competition with his unconventional, schematic design, which he estimated to cost $7
million. The original competition proposal asked to build an “opera house” accommodating a major
concert hall with more than 3,500 seats for concerts with opera as its secondary role. Further, a minor hall
with 1,200 seats for drama and small opera should be included in the design. The opera house should cost
at least £750,000 ($1.5 million) and the completion was dated on Australia Day, January 26, 1963 (Drew,
2000). After various changes of the project scope, the final stage of the Sydney Opera House was
completed in June 1973 at final costs of $102 million. The final building layout comprised a large Concert
Hall with 2,679 seats, an Opera Theatre with 1,547 seats, a Drama Theatre with 544 seats, and some
smaller rooms with around 1,000 further seats. The large schedule delays and vast cost increases not only
drew significant media attention in form of carping newspaper articles and burlesquing cartoons, but also
led to civil commotion and protests at that time (Sykes, 1993).

The purpose of this essay is to examine the stated causes of the mentioned schedule and cost bad
planning, and to reflect on the potential underlying issues behind those statements. Further, other factors
that might have been of significance to the events will be analysed. The question of responsibility and
accountability as well as blame will be discussed and critically evaluated. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn
on whether or not the Sydney Opera House project was a success or a failure. First of all, however, the
essay will provide a short definition of “project success” based on reviewed literature.

Framework & Definitions

Baccarini (1999) differentiates between two distinct components when evaluating project success:
(1) project management success and (2) project product success. Project management success focusses
on the project management process, i.e. the successful accomplishment of the project with regards to
cost, time, and quality. Project product success, by contrast, focusses on the effects of the project’s end-
deliverable, i.e. the accomplished work. Nixon, Harrington, and Parker (2012) argue that the Sydney Opera
House succeeded on the project product level, while failing completely on the project management level.
While the Sydney Opera House is nowadays regarded as a “success for the nation” (p. 205), Nixon et al.
point at the fact that the project exceeded the original budget by 16 times and the initial deadline by 4
times.

Baccarini (1999) further suggests that time, budget, and quality are not sufficient to measure
project management success adequately. In his opinion, the quality of the project management and
leadership performance must also be evaluated in order to obtain a more complete picture of project
management success. Therefore, he suggests to extend the traditional triangle to include the performance
of the management process. In the case of the Sydney Opera House, time delays and increasing costs were
not only the result of project trade-offs, but also largely the result of various wrong decisions and other
effecting factors.

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Project Definiton Phase

Larson and Gray (2011) determine several steps within the project definition stage. The first step
comprises the definition of the project scope. In the Sydney Opera House project, the project scope was
not clearly defined. The original project objective was not to build an opera house in the first place, but a
major concert hall with a dual function as an opera (Sykes, 1993). In his book “Reviewing the Performance”,
Woolley (2010) describes the fact that the competition title was set as “Sydney Opera House” as an
“ambiguity of purpose” (p. 14), since the competition title was not properly reflecting the purpose of the
project. Rather, the title “Opera House” was chosen with the sole purpose to avoid the reproach that
Sydney already had a concert hall. This ambiguity, or rather misdirection, in the original project description
was never changed, leading to a scope creep affecting not only the scope and quality of the project, but
inherently also time and costs variables. In Woolley’s view, there was no solution for accommodating both
functions in the same space because of the varying requirements of those functions.

The second step in the project definition phase according to Larson and Gray (2011) is the
definition of project priorities. Project priorities were not defined at any stage of the project. The criteria
of time and costs were both implicitly regarded as “accepted”, since time delays and increasing costs were
tolerated in order to meet the “constrained” criteria of the project, which was the quality of the design.
Specifications of the design, however, “were made on the way” (p. 59) as Sykes describes the design and
construction process in his book “Sydney Opera House - From the Outside In”.

Architectural Competition

Based on the above-mentioned definition of the project, the competition panel was supposed to
select a suitable project. The jury eventually chose a design allowing following explanation on their choice
in the Assessor’s Report (1957):

“The drawings submitted are simple to the point of being diagrammatic. Nevertheless we have
returned again and again to the study of these drawings, we are convinced that they present a
concept of an opera house which is capable of being one of the great buildings of the world.”
(Assessor’s Report, 1957, p. 7)

Drew (2000) criticises the composition of the competition panel since all four judges were
architects, none of which had experience in the construction of theatre, opera, or musical acoustics.
Further, he states that there was no representative of the client in the panel. Drew criticises the lack of
both expert knowledge and judgement in the various aspects of the respective project, such as acoustics
and structural engineering, and also the absence of a deputy representing the client’s expectations and
needs.

The competition panel chose the very conceptual design of the relatively unexperienced architect
Jørn Utzon, disregarding all specifications made in the competition description and thereby creating
various risks to the project: (1) The design of Utzon was at a very schematic and rudimentary level, which
meant uncertainty of scope and quality of the whole project; (2) Utzon had only limited experience with
the execution of such a project, since he had never supervised the construction of a large building before;
and (3) Utzon’s design did not meet the specifications made in the competition description (Sykes, 1993).
Further, (4) Utzon had not consulted any structural engineer on the practicability of his unique design or
the plausibility of the construction costs (Unesco, 2006). All these factors were predestined to lead to
major changes in the quality and scope of the project, thus effecting time and costs.

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As a result, an architectural gesture had been chosen that did neither provide a practicable
solution for the structure nor an appropriate solution for the interior layout. Since the large number of
seats could not be accommodated within Utzon’s design, the jury changed the amount of seats to 2,800
for the larger and 1,800 in the smaller hall, which would still prove difficult to achieve (Drew, 2000). Later,
the idea arose to create a multi-purpose venue in both halls accommodating 2,100 to 2,000 seats each.
This idea was finally abandoned in favour of a concert hall in the large hall and an opera as well as a ballet
in the smaller hall.

In the end, the development of the architectural gesture towards a realisable solution proved to
be a very complicated and long-lasting process with numerous design problems to be solved by Utzon in
cooperation with the involved engineering firm Ove Arup & Partners as well as further consultants.
Therefore, the project was divided into three stages: Stage 1 including the foundations and the podium,
Stage 2 comprising the construction of the shell structure as well as the tiling, and Stage 3 involving all
remaining works in order to complete the building, such as closing the gapping openings between the
arched rooftops, the glass walls, and the interiors of the two large halls. (Sykes, 1993)

Design and Construction Phase: Responsibilities & Accountabilities

The design process was further exacerbated by the fact that responsibilities and accountabilities
were not clearly defined. Woolley (2010) states that the legal responsibility for the satisfactory outcome
of the project lies within the scope of the construction authority, i.e. the Minister of Public Work and the
Government Architect. However, no delegate of the constructing authority was represented in the
competition panel. Larson and Gray (2011) say that the clarification of responsibilities and accountabilities
is essential to a project’s success. There were no clear responsibilities since the design process of the early
project stage was an unclear back and forth among Utzon, the structural engineering firm, and the other
technical consultants. Again, Woolley depicts a lack of required skill set and sense of responsibility when
describing “it [the construction authority] clearly expected the Technical Committee to advise it of any
changes in the brief” while, in turn, “the Technical Committee relied on the advice of its architect and
other consultants” (p. 45).

Design and Construction Phase: Communication

The lack of responsibilities, in turn, inherently had an impact on the project communication. Sykes
(1993) criticizes the difficulties in communication in the early stages of the project. According to Sykes,
there was a dissatisfaction with the internal project communication. Larsen and Grey (2011) suggest that
a communication plan must be set up in order to achieve a quick and appropriate distribution of
information among stakeholders. No such communication plan or equivalent policy was set into place for
the Sydney Opera House project. Sykes illustrates the situation as follows: In order to achieve a solution
for the several design problems provoked by awarded concept, Utzon was supposed to work closely with
the engineering firm Ove Arup & Partners. However, Utzon did often not share his thoughts on the design
until he had reached an in his view satisfactory solution, thereby retarding the design process and resulting
in frustration of the involved engineers. Since Utzon refused to install a telephone in his Sydney office,
problems needed to be conveyed by a courier or needed to be solved on site. The result was that the
involved engineers accused Utzon of lack of cooperation, while Utzon accused his engineers of lack of
consultation. Moreover, Woolley (2010) also criticises the lack of critical discourse, which in his opinion
was due to the lack of expertise and experience within the project team.

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Who was blamed? Who gained and who lost from that particular apportionment?

In 1965, the State Elections took place. As a new local government was elected, the constructing
authority of the project changed as well. According to Sykes (Sykes, 1993), the new government was not
in Utzon’s favour. By the end of its mandate, the old government had already intensified their demands
on Utzon. The new minister even increased the pressure on Utzon accusing him of “providing confident
assurances and then failing to meet the expectations” (Woolley, 2010, p. 15). There was a controversial
debate on Utzon’s contribution to the project. While the local government and opponents of Utzon
blamed him for his persistence on design, lack of collaboration, and insufficient understanding of structural
problems caused by his design, other stakeholders and supporters admired his “visionary and aesthetic
instinct” (Sykes, 1993, p. 49) as well as his consistency and persistence on his initial concept.

In 1967, the journalist Donald Horne summarises the accusations against Utzon as follows: “Utzon
is a brilliant architect, BUT Utzon was insisting on the wrong organisational approach. Utzon ignores
questions of time. Utzon ignores questions of cost. Utzon is not a practical man.” (Drew, 2000, p. 6). Finally,
Utzon resigned in 1966 marking a crucial turning point in the project. Woolley (2010) describes the
situation as a catastrophy. In his opinion, Utzon’s leave was truly regrettable since a mutual accord would
have been possible with more cooperation on both sides. The new construction authority engaged three
local architects, which were to complete the project under the direction of the government architect.
Among the trio was Peter Hall, who was described as an experienced and trustworthy person and who
made it his business to complete the project by adhering as closely as possible to Utzon’s design. (Woolley,
2010)

Other Factors

Sykes (1993) sees the main cause of the project failure in the uncertainties, the unknown
unknowns, involved in such a unique and novel project. These uncertainties primarily arose from the lack
of clarity and definition of the project. He describes it as genuinely impossible to make predictions on cost
and time if scope and specifications of the project are not yet defined. In consideration of the immense
uncertainties involved, it is disputable why the construction of the Sydney Opera House was even started.

In fact, the construction of the Sydney Opera House was approved in 1959 based on unfinished
drawings, a newly set schedule, and understated project costs (Bourne, 2007). Joe Cahill, Premier of NSW
and project sponsor, insisted on the start of construction. There might have been personal issues of
achievement and accomplishment involved in this rushed decision, or Cahill might just have wanted to
ensure that the project would actually be realised. Cahill died in October 1959 only few months after the
construction commenced.

Opportunities

However, there were not only negative sides to the project. Other stakeholder, such as the
engineer Ove Arup, also saw opportunities in the project. In 1969, the structural engineer Ove Arup and
his colleague Jack Zunz state in an article of the journal The Structural Engineer:

“Because the circumstances under which it [Sydney Opera House] is being built are so unusual,
and because its problems are so difficult, it [the project] has created unique opportunities, both
in the design office and on the site, for the development of new techniques.” (Arup & Zunz, 1969,
p. 132)

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Further, Sykes (1993) appreciates the spirit of camaraderie on site. In total, around 10,000 people
from all over the world worked on the project. At the peak of construction activity, around 1,600 people
were employed in the project at the same time. Often, the labour worked six days a week and some
workers even slept on site disregarding the regulations. Nevertheless, most of them were proud to be
employed on such a high-profile project site. Despite of the variety of cultures and backgrounds, the
workers enjoyed group activities, such as forming sport teams.

Conclusion: A Project Management Failure, but a Project Product Success

In order to evaluate whether the project was a failure or a success, Baccarini’s definition of project
success, i.e. the differentiation between project management success and project product success, will be
took up again. In terms of project management, the whole project definition, design, and construction
stages were a failure without any doubt. Various wrong decisions were made at the different stages of the
project. First of all, the project was defined in an inappropriate and misleading manner, thus setting an
unfirm base for the whole project. The competition panel was uni-disciplinary, thus lacking the required
expertise in the various disciplines involved in building an opera house of such magnitude and novelty. The
first government lacked of management and leadership capabilities. The project or risk management can
only be described as ad hoc without any clear system or structure. Further, some authors criticised the
lack of expertise and experience, and the absence of critical discourse within the project. In some
references, Utzon was criticised for lacking will of cooperation and critical distance to the project, while in
others it is argued that he was just doing his job as architect by trying to realise the project as close as
possible to the initial concept. In summary, it can be stated that a set of unelaborate, uninformed, or even
personal decisions led to the project failure in terms of project management.

In her discourse “Avoiding the Successful Failure”, Bourne (2007) suggests that there are other
factors, which are more influential for a project’s success than the traditional view of project success,
which circulates around the criteria time, budget, and scope in the “iron triangle”. Bourne draws a
comparison to the Millenium Dome (nowadays The O2), an entertainment park, which was erected in
London in order to celebrate the beginning of the third millennium. The Millenium Dome, built within
schedule, budget, and scope, turned out to be what Baccarini classifies as project product failure. In
contrast, the Sydney Opera House, exceeding both time and costs more than tenfold and changing the
project scope manyfold, is nowadays regarded as one of the most precious buildings of the twentieth
century (Unesco, 2006). Woolley (2010) accounts the prominent and central location, the architectural
response to the site with a dynamic set of related forms and the all-round view as well as the choice of
materials for the Sydney Opera House’s project success. At the same time, he suggests a more
differentiated view of the opera’s success and splits the project product into an architectural and a musical
component. He claims that a great monument has been erected – however, not in the intended high art
of music, which in his view had been the purpose of the project, but rather in the high art of architecture.
Nonetheless, the Sydney Opera House continues attracting millions of visitors a year from all over the
world (SOH Annual Report 2014/2015).

Woolley (2010) appropriately answers the question of success or failure by stating that “It is hard
to offer criticism of such a beautiful and inspiring building and indeed, on those particular qualities there
is none” (p.24).

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List of References

Arup, O., & Zunz, G. (1969). Sydney Opera House. The Structural Engineer, 47(3), pp. 99-132.

Baccarini, D. (1999). The logical framework method for determining critical success/failure factors in
projects. International Journal of Project Management, 14(3), pp. 141-151.

Bourne, L. (2007). PMI Global Congress Asia Pacific 2007. Avoiding the successful failure. Hong Kong.

DEE. (2016). World Heritage Center - The Sydney Opera House. (A. G. Energy, Ed.) Retrieved October 19,
2016, from http://www.environment.gov.au/heritage/places/world/sydney-opera-house/values

Department of Public Works, NSW. (1957). Assessor's Report - Sydney Opera House.

Drew, P. (2000). Utzon and the Sydney Opera House (1st ed.). Annandale, Australia: Inspire Press.

Larson, E., & Gray, C. (2011). Project management - The managerial process (5th ed.). New York, USA:
McGraw-Hill/Irwin.

Nixon, P., Harrington, A., & Parker, D. (2012). Leadership performance is significant to project success or
failure: a critical analysis. International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management,
61(2), pp. 204-216.

SOH Annual Report 2014/2015. (n.d.). Retrieved October 21, 2016, from
https://www.opengov.nsw.gov.au/download/14719

Sydney Opera House. (n.d.). Sydney, Australia: Land Printers.

Sykes, J. (1993). Sydney Opera House - From the Outside In. Pymble, Australia: Playbill.

Unesco. (2006). Sydney Opera House - Nomination for Inscription on Wolrd Heritage List 2006. Retrieved
October 18, 2016, from Unesco: http://whc.unesco.org/uploads/nominations/166rev.pdf

Watson, A. (2006). Buildung a masterpiece: Sydney Opera House. Sydney, Australia: Powerhouse
Publishing.

Woolley, K. (2010). Reviewing the Performance - The Design of the Sydney Opera House. Boorowa, NSW,
Australia: The Watermark Press.

Cover Picture

ThousandWonders.net (2016). Opera House Sunrise. Photo by Clint Sharp. Retrieved October 20, 2016,
from http://static.thousandwonders.net/Sydney.Opera.House.original.4307.jpg

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