Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference

Author(s): Chandran Kukathas

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 26, No. 5 (Oct., 1998), pp. 686-699
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191768
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 LIBERALISMANDMULTICULTURALISM
The Politicsof Indifference

CHANDRANKUKATHAS
AustralianNational University

My business in this state

Made me a looker-onhere in Vienna,
Where I have seen corruptionboil and bubble
Till it o'errunthe stew: laws for all faults,
But faults so countenanc'dthatthe strongstatutes
Standlike the forfeitsin a barber'sshop,
As much in mock as in mark.
-Shakespeare1

The greatestlibertyof subjects,dependethon the silence of the law.

-Hobbes2

In modern societies, particularlythe societies of the liberal democratic

West, culturaldiversityposes a challenge not only to the makersof govern-
ment policy, but also to the philosopherlooking to understandhow it might
be possible-in principle-for people of differentways to live together.The
challengeis posed becausesociety's institutionshave been challenged,as the
members of different groups have demanded "recognition."They have
demandednot simplyrecognitionof theirclaims to a (just)shareof the social
pie but, more important,recognitionof their distinct identitiesas members
of particularculturalcommunitieswithin society. The persistence and, in
some cases, the ferocityof demandsforrecognitionhaveled manyto concede
that recognize them we must. The problemthat arises for a liberal society,
however, is thattherequickly emerges a conflict between two demands:on
one hand, that the dignity of the individualbe recognized (by respecting
certainfundamentalrights);on the otherhand,thatthe claims of the groups
POLITICALTHEORY,Vol. 26 No. 5, October1998 686-699
? 1998 Sage Publications,Inc.
686
 Kukathas/ LIBERALISMAND MULTICULTURALISM 687

or culturalcommunitiesto which individualsbelong be recognized.Philoso-

phers such as CharlesTaylor,who have viewed the problemin this way, also
see thatno simple solutionto this conflict is available.A morecomplex, and
nuanced,answermustthereforebe given to the problemposed by the politics
of recognition;and that answermust acknowledgethe need for institutions
thatfacilitatepublic deliberationandfor attitudesof opennessandtolerance.
The argumentI wish to presenthere, however, is that the problemis not
a complex one. Or,at least,it is nota complexproblemin philosophicalterms.
Multiculturalismdoes not pose a difficult problem for liberalism-or for
liberal "political ethics." This is not to say that it poses no problems for
politics;butpoliticsis notphilosophy,andmy concernhereis withphilosophy.
The reason multiculturalismdoes not pose a philosophicalproblem for
liberalismis thatliberalism'scounsel is to resist the demandfor recognition.
Politicianshave always foundthis advicedifficultto follow, for the demands
of constituentsarenothingif not compelling(especiallyat electiontime). But
philosophers(includingmany avowedly liberal ones) have also found this
advice hardto take,perhapsbecauseit seems to suggestthatthereis not much
they can contributeto makingthe world a betterplace. Nevertheless,I wish
to arguehere,this is whatliberalismrecommends.In a sense, it recommends
doing nothing. But, of course, doing nothingis a very difficult thing to do.
The rest of this essay is devoted to explainingwhat it means to do nothing,
and why nothingshouldbe done; althoughit cannotreally say very much-
for reasonsthatwill, I hope, become clear-about how nothingis to be done.
To pursue this task, I will begin, in the next section, by examining the
analysisofferedby Taylorin his discussionof the dilemmasof contemporary
multiculturalismin an essay titled "ThePolitics of Recognition."I will then
offer an argumentagainstviewing the problemof multiculturalismin these
terms by arguingagainstrecognition.This will lead me to offer a positive
view of my own on whatliberalismamountsto: a view thatdefendsa version
of what has come to be known as liberal neutrality.In doing this, I shall
attemptto draw out the implicationsof such a view for the characterof the
liberalpolity. I shall conclude with some more generalobservationson the
relationsbetween liberalismand multiculturalism,makingclearerwhy that
relationshipis not as complex or as troublingas some might imagine.

HI

In his essay "ThePolitics of Recognition,"Taylorarguesthatthe reason

why the demandsof variousgroupsfor some kind of social recognitionhave
688 POLITICALTHEORY/ October1998

raised the stakes in contemporarydebatesaboutmulticulturalismis thatthe

issue being debatedis not simply materialwelfare but the identities of the
participantsin the life of society. In modernsociety, "theunderstandingthat
identitiesareformedin open dialogue,unshapedby a predefinedsocial script
has madethe politics of equalrecognitionmorecentralandstressful."3Equal
recognitionis notjust appropriatebutessential:"Theprojectionof an inferior
or demeaningimage on anothercan actuallydistortandoppress,to the extent
thatthe image is internalized."4
The first expressionof the politics of recognitioncame in the demandfor
equal rights and entitlements.The tendency that Taylor has labeled "the
politics of universalism"emphasizedthe equal dignity of citizens and criti-
cized any separationof the citizenry into first and second classes. And the
demand for equal rights was often extended to embrace a more general
critiqueof social inequality-since the possession of equal rights of status
still did not allow the poor to escape their second-class condition. Equal
dignity requiredmaterialequality.Out of this politics of universaldignity,
however,grew the politics of difference.This latterpolitics is also a demand
for universalrecognition.But recognitionhere, Taylorargues,means some-
thing else. "Withthe politics of equaldignity,whatis establishedis meantto
be universallythe same, an identicalbasket of rights and immunities;with
the politics of difference,whatwe areaskedto recognizeis the uniquedignity
of this individual or group, their distinctness from everyone else."5 The
charge it makes against contemporarypolitics is that distinctnesshas been
ignored,or assimilatedinto the dominantmajority.
The conflict betweenthese two formsof recognitionarises,at least in part,
because "[w]herepolitics of universaldignity fought for forms of nondis-
criminationthat were quite 'blind' to the ways in which citizens differ,the
politics of differenceoften redefinesnondiscriminationas requiringthatwe
make these distinctions the basis of differentialtreatment."6So while the
politics of difference defends special rights for aboriginalpeoples (say, to
self-government)or for certain minorities (say, to preserve their cultural
integrityby excluding others),to the originalpolitics of dignity "thisseems
like a reversal,a betrayal,a simple negationof their cherishedprinciple."7
Yet, the proponentsof the politics of differencereply that simply calling for
nondiscriminationis not enough because this outlook "negatesidentity by
forcing people into a homogeneousmold thatis untrueto them."8And while
the defendersof the originalpolitics of universaldignity claim to be neutral
on this issue, the charge they then meet is that their so-called neutral,
difference-blindprinciples,in fact, arehardlyneutralat all; they are,indeed,
reflective of the standardsof the dominantculture.In short, the politics of
 Kukathas/ LIBERALISMAND MULTICULTURALISM 689

differenceaccuses "liberalism"of being nothingmore thananotherinstance

of the particularmasqueradingas the universal.
In Taylor'sanalysis,the proponentsof the politics of differenceareright,
and liberalism-at least in this form-is guilty as charged.This is because
liberalismis, ultimately,unsympatheticand inhospitableto difference.This
is especially clear,Taylormaintains,in liberalism'sattitudetowardcollective
goals such as that of Quebecois, whose concernin the Canadianfederation
is, ultimately,the survivalof a distinctiveFrench-speakingsociety. For this
reason, Tayloris highly criticalof the solution offered by Will Kymlickain
his own effort to show how liberalismcan accommodatedifference. Kym-
licka's solutionis to maintaina positionof liberalneutrality,butto arguethat
since individualsneed certainbasic culturalgoods to pursuethe good life,
neutralityrequiresgrantingcertaingroupsdifferentialrights (to allow them
to maintain their cultural integrity) so that their members have an equal
opportunityto pursuethe good life.9The problemwith this solution, accord-
ing to Taylor,is thatit works only "forexistingpeople who find themselves
trappedwithin a cultureunderpressure,and can flourish within it or not at
all. But it doesn't justify measures designed to ensure survival through
indefinitefuturegenerations."'10
More broadly, Taylor's point is that the very idea of liberalism as a
proceduraldoctrineis untenable.Those who put forwardthis view of liber-
alism see it as defendinga neutralregime of toleranceof differentways. The
claim of difference-blindliberalism is that it can offer neutralground on
which people of all culturesare able to meet and coexist. On this view, "[I]t
is necessary to make a certain number of distinctions-between what is
publicandwhatis private,for instance,or betweenpoliticsandreligion-and
only then can one relegatethe contentiousdifferencesto a spherethat does
not impingeon the political.""But this view, he argues,is wrong:liberalism
cannot (and should not) claim culturalneutrality.And the controversyover
SalmanRushdie'sSatanic Versesshows how wrong it is, since mainstream
Islam refuses to separatereligion and politics. "Liberalismis not a possible
meeting groundfor all cultures,but is the political expressionof one range
of cultures,and quite incompatiblewith otherranges." 12
In slightlydifferentlanguage,this line of argumentis endorsedby Michael
Walzer,who suggests that a distinctioncan be drawnbetween two kinds of
liberalism.The first, which he labels Liberalism1, is committedto a "rigor-
ously neutralstate, that is, a state without culturalor religious projects or,
indeed, any sort of collective goals beyond the personal freedom and the
physicalsecurity,welfare,andsafetyof its citizens."The second,Liberalism2,
"allows for a state committedto the survivaland flourishingof a particular
690 POLITICALTHEORY/ October1998

nation, culture, or religion, or of a (limited) set of nations, cultures, and

religions-so long as the basic rightsof citizens who have differentcommit-
mentsor no suchcommitmentsat all areprotected."'3 ForWalzer,Liberalism2
is the defensiblevariantof liberalism,althoughfromwithinit a liberalsociety
may choose Liberalism1-on the groundsthat it is the kind of society that
has a culturalor historicalpredispositionto eschew collective goals beyond
freedomand security.Whatthis gives us, then,is a historicistcase for liberal
neutrality-for societies like the United States, althoughnot necessarilyfor
othersocieties.

III

If liberalismwere no more than a particularculturalform-a historical

episode in the development of civilization (and Europeancivilization at
that)-the case for liberalismwould be diminished,at least in its own terms,
since it presentsitself as a universalistdoctrine.But liberalism-or at least
that element within it that is philosophically significant-is more than a
particularculturalform. Taylor's way of viewing liberalism is, I wish to
suggest, inadequate;and his criticisms of liberalismare, consequently,un-
sound.If my assessmenthereis correct,liberalismdoes not have the problem
with multiculturalismits critics suggest.
The reasonwhy liberalismdoes not have a problemwith multiculturalism
is that liberalismis itself, fundamentally,a theory of multiculturalism.This
is because liberalismis essentiallya theoryaboutpluralism;and multicultu-
ralismis, in the end, a species of pluralism.Liberalismis one of the modern
world'sresponses-indeed, its most plausibleresponse-to thefact of moral,
religious, and culturaldiversity.Its response has been to say that diversity
should be accommodated,and differences tolerated;that a more complete
social unity, markedby a uniformand common culturethat integratesand
harmonizesthe interests of individualand community,is unattainableand
undesirable;thatdivision, conflict, andcompetitionwould always be present
in humansociety,andthe taskof politicalinstitutionsis to palliatea condition
they cannotcure.Politicalinstitutionswouldbe liberalinstitutionsif they left
people free to pursuetheir own ends, whetherseparatelyor in concert with
others,underthe rule of law. By implication,many liberalshave argued,this
requiresleaving people free to worship as they see fit; but it also requires
leavingthemfreeto live by differentculturalstandards-providedtheirdoing
so does not threatenthe legal and political order that allows for peaceful
coexistence.
 Kukathas/ LIBERALISMAND MULTICULTURALISM 691

But the point is not simply that liberalismdoes not have any difficulty
with acceptingsome formof multiculturalism.While liberalismis a termthat
is properlyused to identify a particularmovement of Europeanthought, it
also denotes a philosophicaloutlook whose primaryconcernis to articulate
the terms under which different ways may coexist. There is a historical
liberalism;but there is also a philosophicalliberalism.The fact that philo-
sophical liberalismis the inventionof particularhistoricalcircumstances(or
of particularculturallyidentifiablefigures) has no bearingon the coherence
or plausibilityof liberalismas a philosophicalidea.
What is it, then, thatliberalismhas to say aboutmulticulturalism?In the
end, what it offers is not a thesis aboutindividualdignity,or abouthow that
dignity should be recognized. To be sure, thinkers like Kant (drawing
inspirationfromRousseau)thoughtthis important;so did von Humboldtand
J. S. Mill, among others. But while human dignity may have been an
importantconsiderationfor such thinkers,it is not centralto liberalism.For
this reason, liberalismis not troubledby the questionof whetherrespecting
humandignity requiresrecognizingindividualidentitiesor recognizingthe
identities of groups.Liberalismis not concernedwith grantingrecognition
to either.It does not offer recognitionat all.
In this regard,liberalismis indifferentto the groupsof which individuals
may be members.Individualsin a liberalsociety are free to form groups or
associations,orto continuetheirassociationwith groupsthattheyhavejoined
or into which they may have been born.Liberalismtakes no interestin these
interests or attachments-cultural, religious, ethnic, linguistic, or other-
wise-that people mighthave. It takes no interestin the characteror identity
of individuals;nor is it concerneddirectlyto promotehumanflourishing:it
has no collective projects,it expressesno grouppreferences,andit promotes
no particularindividuals or individual interests. Its only concern is with
upholding the frameworkof law within which individualsand groups can
function peacefully. To be sure, upholding the rule of law may require
interventionin the affairsof individualsand groups(and this may, unavoid-
ably, have a bearingon individualand groupidentity);but liberalpolitics is
not concerned with these affairs in themselves. Indeed, it is indifferentto
particularhuman affairs or to the particularpursuits of individuals and
groups.Liberalismmight well be describedas the politics of indifference.
To assert this, however, is not only to offer a particularview of what
liberalismamountsto; it is also to presenta view with which thinkerslike
Taylortake issue. For them, a politics of indifferenceis neitherfeasible nor
desirablein the face of persistentdemandsfrom variousgroupsfor recogni-
tion. The question,then, is: Can these demandsindeed be resisted-if they
should be resistedat all?
692 POLITICALTHEORY/ October1998

In one way, thinkers like Taylor are clearly right to suggest that it is
difficult for the liberal state-or any state, for that matter-to resist the
demands of particularindividuals and groups for recognition. Tamil and
Basqueseparatistsin SriLankaandSpaincannoteasily be ignored.And when
afatwa is issued againsta writerlike SalmanRushdie,the conflict between
religious traditionsseems to requiremore thanindifference.Yet, to describe
liberalismas the politics of indifferenceis not to say that in a liberal state
there are no issues of public policy that cannot be ignored. It is, rather,to
make a point aboutthe goal of publicpolicy in a liberalstate.Thatgoal is not
to shape the cultureof the polity, or to upholdthe dignity of the individual,
or to rescue minority groups from their marginalizedstatus in society.
Liberalismis indifferentto these matters.Its only concernis to preservethe
orderwithin which such groupsandindividualsexist. Froma liberalpoint of
view, it does not matterwhathappensto the identitiesof particulargroupsor
to the identitiesof individuals.Whethersome culturalgroupsfragmentinto
a numberof smallerassociationsor areassimilatedinto the dominantculture
of the wider society, or disappearaltogether,does not matterfromthe liberal
standpoint.Of course,it may matterenormouslyto the groupsandindividuals
in question;butwhile liberalismdoes notcounselobstructingthose who wish
to preserveor enhancetheiridentities,it takes no interestin supportingsuch
endeavorseither.
Is this standpointuntenable, as Taylor and others suggest? I wish to
suggest that it is not; althoughit will often be difficult to hold to-for the
reason that, in politics, the demands of powerful interests will always be
difficult to resist. And the higher the stakes, the more vigorously will the
demandfor recognitionbe pressed.Yet, thereare two points that should be
made. The first is that, while resistanceto demandsfor recognitionmay be
difficult, it does not mean that it is impossible. The second is that the
feasibilityof adoptingthe standpointof indifferenceshouldbejudged against
the feasibility of the alternative,which is to accede to such demands.
Attemptingto grantrecognitionto those who demandit, however,is almost
always dangerous. This is because demands for recognition are often in
conflict with othersimilardemands,or otherinterests.Forexample,when in
1993 immigrantsfrompartsof the formerYugoslaviaclaimedrecognitionas
Macedonianswho formeda distinctethniccommunityin Australia,it imme-
diately broughtabout a challenge from others who regardedthemselves as
people of Macedoniandescent-a challengethatescalatedto acts of violence
betweenethniccommunitieswhen the Australiangovernmentsaw fit to rule
on which identificationwould be officially recognized.
The problem is that, when transformedinto the politics of recognition,
multiculturalpolitics quickly descends into the politics of interest group
 Kukathas/ LIBERALISMAND MULTICULTURALISM 693

conflict.14 Groupsarethemselvesnot in any way naturalor fixed entities but

mutablesocial formationsthat change shape, size, and characteras society
and circumstancesvary. To some extent, they vary accordingto economic
and political circumstances. Groups do not always demand recognition
because they exist; sometimesthey exist (at least in theirparticularsizes and
characters)becausethey have been grantedrecognition.In the UnitedStates,
policies of affirmativeaction for selected minoritiessupply incentives for
people to identify themselves as members of those particulargroups.15
Preferentialpolicies have acted similarlyas incentives (or disincentives)in
othercountries,wherethe benefitsof membershipwork to increasethe size,
and strength,of particulargroups.16
Yet, even when groups are relatively stable, recognition is troubling
because it signals an elevation of the conflict between groupsover material
gains into conflict over the characteror the identityof the society. At worst,
the dangerin this developmentlies in the fact thatit induces a conflict over
which compromise is difficult-if not impossible. If the identity of the
society becomes an issue-one that cannotbe regardedas trivial and, so, a
matterof indifference-conflict over it can only become morebitter,particu-
larly since some will be regardedas winnersand othersas losers.
In this light, I arguethatthe idea of a liberalpolity,understoodas one that
is, as much as possible, indifferentto such mattersas identity (including
nationalidentity)andgrouprecognition,has muchto commendit. It does not
offer a philosophicalattemptto reconcile the competingclaims of different
groups and different identities, all demandingrecognition.It assumes, in-
stead, that no resolutionis possible in philosophicalterms;and it would be
betternot to try. Its recommendation,therefore,is that political institutions
try to resist attemptsto put the issue of recognitionat the centerof political
debate.
Yet, there are further objections to the liberal move that need to be
considered.The most importantargumentthatTaylormightmakehereis that
this does not get aroundthe problemfor the simple reasonthat the attempt
to evade the politics of recognitionwill have its own, undesirable,implica-
tions. For it will, without doubt, favor some people over others. More
precisely, it will simply allow the standardsof the majority culture to
dominate.In such circumstances,the claims of liberalismto be offering no
more thana frameworkof law within which differentways may coexist will
ring hollow.
To some extent, this objectionis well founded;no political arrangements
areneutralin theiroutcome.The largemajorityculturewill tendto assimilate
the small minorityculture-although the contributionsof the minoritywill
also (to some degree)reshapethe dominantculture.While liberalismasserts
694 POLITICALTHEORY/ October1998

that the minorityis underno obligationnot to resist assimilation(by trying

to keep to its own ways), it does not impose uponthe majorityany obligation
to help the smaller culturalcommunitysucceed: if people are assimilated,
that is the way of the world.
Now, Taylor'sobjectionto this standpointwould be thatit does not meet
the demand-or satisfy the yearning-of those such as the Quebecois,whose
concern is not just to be free to pursue their own way of life, but, more
important,to ensurethe survivalof theirparticularculture:now and far into
the future.Here, however,liberalismcan only take a standthatis surely not
unreasonable:a stand that says that culturalsurvivalcannot be guaranteed
and cannotbe claimed as a right.And while this is not to say that members
of differentculturalcommunitiesmay not take some measuresthat increase
the chances of that group'senduring,the state should not be in the business
of tryingto determinewhich cultureswill prevail,which will die, and which
will be transformed.
The state, in the liberal view, should not be concernedabout anything
except orderor peace. It cannotaccomplishany more-it cannotdetermine
which cultureswill survive. The dangerin its attemptingto do more is, in
part,thatit may fall down in its primaryrole. This is, to some extent, whatis
happeningin societies such as the United States, as well as in otherdivided
societies. The state, in trying to shape society (underthe influence of its
modernmonks andclergymen-intellectuals-who in the pasttriedto influ-
ence the state's religious character)has tended to exacerbateconflicts. For
the sake of order, it may be preferablethat the state stick to its primary
functionof maintainingthe peace.
This does not mean that political institutionsshould not be sensitive to
conflicts over power betweendifferentgroups.If the goal is peace, political
institutionsmay, for example, have to develop explicit power-sharingar-
rangementsbetween ethnic or religious groups. In Malaysia, for example,
many political parties are racially based, but the governmentconsists of a
rulingcoalition of such parties(the BarisanNasional or NationalFront).In
many democratic countries, electoral systems are adopted to ensure that
minoritiesareassuredof a placein thepoliticalstructure. 17 Peacemayrequire,
among other things, different ways of devolving political power. But for
liberalism,the polity would still have to be there,in principle,not to promote
any particularcollective. Liberalismdoes not care who has power;nor does
it carehow power is acquired.All thatmattersis thatthe membersof society
are free to pursuetheirvariousends, and thatthe polity is able to accommo-
date all peacefully.
Now, Taylorhas objectedthatthis kind of view holds out a promisethat
turns out to be illusory: the promise that liberalismwill turnout to be the
 Kukathas/ LIBERALISMAND MULTICULTURALISM 695

meeting groundof all cultures.This is illusory because liberalismis itself

simply the political expression of one range of cultures; thus, it cannot
accommodateIslam, which refuses to separatereligion and the state. There
is something to be said for Taylor's view, since liberalismclearly cannot
accommodateall views. But we should be clear, nonetheless, about what
liberalismcannot accommodate:it cannotaccommodateviews that insist a
state be dedicated to the pursuit of some substantive goal that is to be
embodied in the structureof that political society. This does not, however,
mean that it is not capaciousenough to accommodatea very wide range of
cultures-including some, like certainIslamictraditions.This is very clearly
the case in countrieswith an Islamicminority,such as Britainandthe United
States. But even in countrieswith a clear(or even large)Muslim majority-
such as Malaysia and Indonesia-it is quite possible for liberalinstitutions
to prevail. In Malaysia, for example, Hindus, Buddhists,and Christians-
indeed, all religious minorities-are guaranteedfreedom of worship under
the constitutionof what is, essentially,a secularstate.This is in spite of the
fact thatthe king of this constitutionalmonarchyis always a Muslim, as are
a preponderanceof membersof Parliament.Indonesiais populatedby aneven
larger Muslim majority;yet, it also offers freedom of worship. Indeed, it
upholdsan effective separationof church(or mosque) andstate, as well as a
formal or principledone. (In the United Kingdom,on the otherhand,there
is an effective separationof religion and politics, but still an established
church.)
To the extent that it is able to accommodatea varietyof ways, and does
not pursuecollective ends of its own, thatpolity may be describedas a liberal
one. It is not so becauseit has membersa majorityof whom sharea particular
Europeanheritage.It is so if it may be describedas a society, not of majority
and minorityculturesbut of a pluralityof culturescoexisting in a condition
of mutual toleration.There is much to be said for Joseph Raz's view that
"[w]e should learnto thinkof oursociety as consistingnot of a majorityand
minorities, but of a pluralityof culturalgroups."18But doing this is best
accomplishedby refusing, in the first place, to recognize such distinctions
betweenculturalgroupsas havingany relevanceto the fundamentalpurpose
of the state.
One problemthat will, of course, be raisedis thatthis is easier said than
done. Groupswill not cease demandingrecognition,and rulerswill always
be tempted to satisfy their demands-whether for materialgain, or in an
attemptto hold on to politicalpower,or becausethey regardthe claims of the
group as just. Thus, there is always the prospect of the liberal state being
distractedfromits businessandinducedto pursueparticularcollective goals.
In particular,rulers are always likely to be tempted to reshape society to
696 POLITICALTHEORY/ October1998

promote(even if not exclusively) some particularreligion, or culture,or (not

unusually) some favored conception of the nation. Yet, while we should
recognizethatthis will always be so, thereis no need to makea virtueout of
whatis unnecessary.And in the liberalview, it is unnecessary;for liberalism's
counsel is thatthe statedo nothing.It does nothingnot by refusingto engage
in any activity at all-it still has a task to performin securingpeace within
political society. It does nothingby refusingto engage in activitiesthathave
no bearingon thattask.

IV

Throughoutthis essay, I have made numerousstatementsassertingwhat

liberalismdemandsor describingwhat liberalismimplies. Yet, while I think
these statementsidentify somethingthatis defensible as a liberal view, it is
also true to say that it identifies only one view of what liberalismamounts
to-and a controversialview at that. It may be important,then, to indicate
more clearly what kind of liberalism is being presentedhere, and why it
shouldbe commendedto those concernedaboutthe problemsanddilemmas
raisedby the multiculturalcharacterof many modernsocieties.
The liberalismpresentedhere is the liberalismof the limitedstate.And it
conceives of political society as an association of individuals and groups
living underthe rule of law but pursuingseparateends or purposes.Political
society, accordingto this version of liberalism,is not unitedby any kind of
common culture;nordoes it shareany collective goals. It is indifferentto the
goals pursuedby the individualsandgroupsin society-unless they impinge
upon the peace of society-and is not concernedto promoteany particular
form of the humangood. In some accountsof this liberalism,it is described
as a politicalorderthatis neutralwithregardto thehumangood.And although
the word neutral does not accuratelydescribe liberal society-since no
society is strictly neutralbetween all competingways-it does capturethe
spirit of the idea. A liberal polity of this kind is a political society that
accommodatesa wide variety of ways of life without attemptingto bring
aboutany deep social or political unity.
The foundationof such a liberalismdoes not lie in any view of human
dignity-as is suggested, for example,by Taylor'sanalysis of liberalthink-
ing. Nor does it lie in any kind of emphasison the importanceof individual
autonomy.Underthe institutionsof liberalsociety, in this view, ways of life
thatdisvalue autonomyor individualitymay still flourish.The foundationof
this liberalismlies, rather,in a particularview of freedom:the freedom of
 Kukathas/ LIBERALISMAND MULTICULTURALISM 697

individualsto associateor dissociatefromothersin pursuitof theirdiverse-

although often shared-ends. A polity is a liberal political society if its
institutionssustainthis liberty;it is a less liberalsociety the greaterthe extent
to which it draws its members-directly or indirectly-into collective en-
deavorswith which they neitherwish, nor need, to be concerned.It is, in the
end, somethinglike the liberalismidentifiedby Walzeras Liberalism1.
Therearemany objectionsraisedagainsthis versionof liberalism.One of
the most frequentlymentionedis thatno statecan be strictlyneutralbecause
the institutionsof every state must have some commitmentsthat violate the
requirementof neutrality by having some historical character.But this
objection is not a telling one. Certainly,all political institutionsmust have
some character.Just as the frameworkof a building must have some color
(since nothing is colorless), so must all political institutions have some
particularfeatures that have more to do with the accidents of history and
circumstancethan with the point thatthe institutionsserve. Political institu-
tions shapedby Europeantraditionswill producegovernmentsandlaws that
are conductedand writtenin some languagethatis more likely to be French
or Portuguese or Spanish than Arabic or Persian. They are likely, in the
modernday,to be republicsandto be democraticin the modernsense of the
term. Their parliamentswill follow particulartraditionsof procedure,and
theirlaws will recognizecertaindays as holidays.None of these thingsalters
the characterof the stateas neutral,since in none of these mattersis the state
pursuingor promotingany particularends.
A more importantobjection,however,is thatthis kind of liberalismis not
enough. The liberal state ought to pursuesome collective ends. At the very
least, it ought to pursue the task of creating a harmoniousand cohesive
society-one that makes for a stable social unity that will endure over a
substantialperiod of time. In this view, which is perhapscloser to the view
Walzerdescribesas Liberalism2, the liberalstateshouldbe committedto the
survivaland flourishingof thatnationand its common culture.
In defendingthe view I have put forwardhere, however,I would assert,
first, that this task lies beyond the capabilityof the institutionsof the state.
Laws may be passed in the effortto securesuch a social unity-to construct
a harmoniousorderthat recognizes and offers freedom to dissent (in word
and practice) to the various elements of society that do not share in the
collective project.But, especially in a society thatrefuses to repressminori-
ties, this offerwill not be enough.If the statebecomes involvedin the cultural
constructionof the nation,the minoritiesin the society will claim a stakeand
demanda say in thatconstruction.Laws designed, like "strongstatutes,"to
bringaboutsocial cohesion-far frombringingthe stateback into some kind
of order-will only cause dissension.
698 POLITICALTHEORY/ October1998

Social harmony,I would maintain,is morelikely the less vigorouslysocial

unity is pursued.In a multiculturalsociety,this, I suggest, is whatliberalism
offers. It offers the opportunity,undera state indifferentto the ways or the
goals of the differentpeoples living underthe law, for people to coexist and
for their differentarts and letters and sciences to flourish (or die out) with
them. It offers this opportunity,however, not because the laws grantthem
recognition,but because the laws are silent.

NOTES

1. Measurefor Measure,act 5, scene 1, lines 314-20.

2. ThomasHobbes,Leviathan,ed. RichardTuck(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,
1991), ch. 21: "Of the Libertyof Subjects,"152.
3. Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition,"in Multiculturalism.Examining the
Politics of Recognition,ed. Amy Gutmann(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1994),
36.
4. Ibid., 36.
5. Ibid., 38.
6. Ibid., 40.
7. Ibid.,40.
8. Ibid., 43.
9. See Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Communityand Culture(Oxford: ClarendonPress,
1989); andMulticulturalCitizenship(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1995).
10. Taylor,"Politicsof Recognition,"41 n.
11. Ibid., 62.
12. Ibid., 62.
13. MichaelWalzer,"Comment,"inMulticulturalism.ExaminingthePolitics ofRecognition,
99.
14. I have discussedthis in TheFraternalConceit.Individualistversus CollectivistIdeas of
Community(Sydney: Centrefor IndependentStudies, 1991).
15. Recently, in California,the category of PortugueseAmericanwas added to the list of
officially recognized minoritycategories,this presentinga substantialincentive for those with
any Portugueseancestryto identifywith this group(and securethe substantialfundingbenefits
offered to minoritystudentsat Californiauniversities).
16. This is discussed in Donald Horowitz,EthnicGroupsin Conflict(Berkeley:University
of CaliforniaPress, 1985), esp. ch. 2.
17. On this topic, see DonaldHorowitz,"Democracyin Divided Societies,"in Nationalism,
EthnicConflictand Democracy,ed. LarryDiamondandMarcF.Plattner(Baltimore,MD: Johns
HopkinsUniversityPress, 1994), 35-55.
18. JosephRaz, "Multiculturalism: A LiberalPerspective,"in Ethics in the Public Domain.
Essays in the Moralityof Law and Politics, ed. Joseph Raz (Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1994),
155-76.
 Kukathas/ LIBERALISMAND MULTICULTURALISM 699

ChandranKukathasis associatedprofessor of politics at the AustralianDefence Force

Academy.He is the author of Hayek and Modem Liberalism,and a numberof papers
on liberalismand multiculturalism.He is currentlycompletinga book on thepolitics of
culturaldiversityentitledThe LiberalArchipelago.