In GSIS vs.

CA[1], the Supreme Court held that a court sitting as a land

registration court may determine the validity of an adverse claim, and if found to be
invalid, order its cancellation. The cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to
render it ineffective, otherwise the inscription will remain annotated and shall continue
as a lien upon the property. As long as there is yet no petition for its cancellation, the
notice of adverse claim remains subsisting[2].

Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), as

amended, provides that:

Sec. 70. Adverse claim. — Whoever claims any part or interest in

registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent
to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is
made in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement in
writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or
under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of
title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a
description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the
adverse claimant’s residence, and a place at which all notices may
be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration
as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim
shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of
registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse
claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by
the party in interest: Provided, however; That after cancellation, no
second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered
by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may
file a petition in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated
for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant
a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such
adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and
equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the
registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the
court, after notice and hearing, shall find that the adverse claim thus
registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not
less than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in
its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may
withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a
sworn petition to that effect.

The Supreme Court ruled in the case of Sajonas vs. CA[3] that the rationale of
the law is not for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse of
thirty days. For then, it would not have been necessary to include the caveat that “after
the lapse of the thirty-day period, the annotation of adverse claim may be
cancelled upon filing of a verified petition by the party in interest” to clarify and complete
the rule. The law employs the phrase “may be cancelled”, which indicates, as inherent
in its decision making power, that the court may or may not order the cancellation of an
adverse claim, notwithstanding such provision limiting the effectivity of an adverse claim
for thirty days from the date of registration. The court cannot be bound by such period
as it would be inconsistent with the very authority vested in it.

In a long line of decisions dealing with land registration proceedings, including

the case of Fojas vs. De Gray[4], it has been held that summary relief can only be
granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious
objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes contentious
and controversial which should be threshed out in an ordinary action or in the case
where the incident properly belongs. In In Re: Teotimo T. Tomada[5], the Supreme
Court ruled that if the real issue in the case is not only the validity of the adverse claim
for the purpose of determining whether it should be cancelled or allowed to remain as
an annotation, but one of ownership, the land registration court would have no
jurisdiction to cancel the adverse claim. These issues are beyond the jurisdiction of a
land registration court. These properly pertain to the court acting under their ordinary
civil jurisdiction because the proceedings provided in the Land Registration Act are
summary in nature and are inadequate for the litigation of issues properly pertaining to
civil actions, which are heard by the regular courts of general jurisdiction.

However, the ruling in Talusan vs. Tayag[6] changed the foregoing doctrine
adhered to by the courts in several cases in the past. The Land Registration Court now
has the authority to act not only on applications for original registration, but also on all
petitions filed after the original registration of title. Coupled with this authority is the
power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions. Especially where the issue of ownership is ineluctably tied up with the
question of registration, the land registration court commits no error in assuming
jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court, in the recent case, SM Prime Holdings, Inc. vs.Madayag[7],
ruled that to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote the expeditious resolution of
cases, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 eliminated the distinction between the
general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the latter’s limited jurisdiction when acting
merely as a land registration court. When the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the
latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make
it effective.

Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even controversial
and contentious issues, as well as those substantial ones, which may be involved in a
petition for cancellation of adverse claims.
[1] Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 737.

[2] G.R. No. 130352, 3 November 1998.

[3] G. R. No. 102377, 5 July 1996.

[4] G.R. No. L-29613 September 18, 1984

[5] G.R. Noz L-21887, 30 July 1969.

[6] G.R. No. 133698, 4 April 2001.

[7] G.R. No. 164687, 12 February 2009.