G.R. No.

185758 March 9, 2011

LINDA M. CHAN KENT, represented by ROSITA MANALANG, Petitioner,

vs. DIONESIO C. MICAREZ, SPOUSES ALVARO E. MICAREZ & PAZ
MICAREZ, and THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS, DAVAO DEL NORTE,
Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the July 17,
2008 Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of Panabo City, Branch 34 (RTC), dismissing
the complaint for recovery of property filed by petitioner Linda M. Chan Kent
(petitioner), docketed as Civil Case No. 13-2007, and its November 21, 2008, Order2
denying her motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

This petition draws its origin from a complaint for recovery of real property and
annulment of title filed by petitioner, through her younger sister and authorized
representative, Rosita Micarez-Manalang (Manalang), before the RTC. Petitioner is
of Filipino descent who became a naturalized American citizen after marrying an
American national in 1981. She is now a permanent resident of the United States of
America (USA).

In her complaint, petitioner claimed that the residential lot in Panabo City, which she
purchased in 1982, was clandestinely and fraudulently conveyed and transferred by
her parents, respondent spouses Alvaro and Paz Micarez (Spouses Micarez), in favor
of her youngest brother, respondent Dionesio Micarez (Dionesio), to her prejudice
and detriment. She alleged that sometime in 1982, she asked her parents to look for a
residential lot somewhere in Poblacion Panabo where the Spouses Micarez would
build their new home. Aware that there would be difficulty in registering a real
property in her name, she being married to an American citizen, she arranged to pay
for the purchase price of the residential lot and register it, in the meantime, in the
names of Spouses Micarez under an implied trust. The title thereto shall be transferred
in her name in due time.

Thus, on October 20, 1982, a deed of absolute sale was executed between Spouses
Micarez and the owner, Abundio Panganiban, for the 328 square meter residential lot
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-25833. Petitioner sent the money
which was used for the payment of the lot. TCT No. T-25833 was cancelled upon the
registration of the deed of sale before the Registry of Deeds of Davao del Norte. In
lieu thereof, TCT No. T-38635 was issued in the names of Spouses Micarez on
January 31, 1983.

Sometime in 2005, she learned from Manalang that Spouses Micarez sold the subject
lot to Dionesio on November 22, 2001 and that consequently, TCT T-172286 was
issued in her brother’s name on January 21, 2002.
At the end, petitioner prayed that she be declared as the true and real owner of the
subject lot; that TCT No. T-172286 be cancelled; and that a new one be issued in her
name.3

Considering that all the respondents are now also permanent residents of the USA,
summons was served upon them by publication per RTC Order4 dated May 17, 2007.
Meanwhile, the respondents executed two special powers of attorney5 both dated
August 3, 2007 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., authorizing their counsel, Atty. Richard C. Miguel (Atty. Miguel),
to file their answer in Civil Case No. 13-2007 and to represent them during the pre-
trial conference and all subsequent hearings with power to enter into a compromise
agreement. By virtue thereof, Atty. Miguel timely filed his principals’ answer denying
the material allegations in the complaint.

After the parties had filed their respective pre-trial briefs, and the issues in the case
had been joined, the RTC explored the possibility of an amicable settlement among
the parties by ordering the referral of the case to the Philippine Mediation Center
(PMC). On March 1, 2008, Mediator Esmeraldo O. Padao, Sr. (Padao) issued a
Mediator’s Report6 and returned Civil Case No. 13-2007 to the RTC allegedly due to
the non-appearance of the respondents on the scheduled conferences before him.
Acting on said Report, the RTC issued an order on May 29, 2009 allowing petitioner
to present her evidence ex parte.7

Later, Padao clarified, through a Manifestation,8 dated July 15, 2008, that it was
petitioner, represented by Atty. Benjamin Utulle (Atty. Utulle), who did not attend the
mediation proceedings set on March 1, 2008, and not Atty. Miguel, counsel for the
respondents and their authorized representative. Padao explained that Atty. Miguel
inadvertently affixed his signature for attendance purposes on the column provided
for the plaintiff’s counsel in the mediator’s report. In light of this development, the
RTC issued the assailed Order9 dated July 17, 2008 dismissing Civil Case No. 13-
2007. The pertinent portion of said order reads:

Being so, the Order dated May 29, 2008 is hereby corrected. For plaintiff’s and her
counsel’s failure to appear during the mediation proceeding, this instant case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, through her counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration10 to set aside the
order of dismissal, invoking the relaxation of the rule on non-appearance in the
mediation proceedings in the interest of justice and equity. Petitioner urged the trial
court not to dismiss the case based merely on technicalities contending that litigations
should as much as possible be decided on the merits. Resolving the motion in its
second assailed Order11 dated November 21, 2008, the RTC ruled that it was not
proper for the petitioner to invoke liberality inasmuch as the dismissal of the civil
action was due to her own fault. The dispositive portion of said order reads:

WHEREFORE, there being no cogent reason to depart from our earlier Order, this
instant motion for reconsideration is hereby ordered DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12

The denial prompted the petitioner to file this petition directly with this Court
claiming that the dismissal of the case was not in accordance with applicable law and
jurisprudence.

ISSUES

1. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO

GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE SIMPLY ON THE REASON
THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO APPEAR DURING THE MEDIATION
PROCEEDING, ALTHOUGH PRESENT FOR TWO (2) TIMES.

2. IS THE EXCUSABLE AND EXPLAINED FAILURE TO ATTEND THE

MEDIATION PROCEEDING FOR TWO (2) TIMES OR SETTINGS, OUT OF
THE FOUR (4) SCHEDULED SETTINGS, BY THE PLAINTIFF A GROUND
TO DISMISS THE CASE UNDER THE SUPREME COURT’S
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 20-2002?

The pivotal issue in this case is whether the RTC erred in dismissing Civil Case No.
13-2007 due to the failure of petitioner’s duly authorized representative, Manalang,
and her counsel to attend the mediation proceedings under the provisions of A.M. No.
01-10-5-SC-PHILJA and 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.

Petitioner claims that the dismissal of the case was unjust because her representative,
Manalang, and her counsel, Atty. Etulle, did not deliberately snub the mediation
proceedings. In fact, Manalang and Atty. Etulle twice attended the mediation
conferences on January 19, 2008 and on February 9, 2008. On both occasions,
Manalang was present but was not made to sign the attendance sheet and was merely
at the lobby waiting to be called by Atty. Etulle upon arrival of Atty. Miguel.
Manalang and Atty. Etulle only left PMC at 11:00 o’clock in the morning when Atty.
Miguel had not yet arrived.13

Petitioner, however, admits that her representative and counsel indeed failed to attend
the last scheduled conference on March 1, 2008, when they had to attend some urgent
matters caused by the sudden increase in prices of commodities.14

In the interest of justice, the Court grants the petition.

A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA dated October 16, 2001, otherwise known as the
Second Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Mediation Proceedings, was
issued pursuant to par. (5), Section 5, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution mandating
this Court to promulgate rules providing for a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases. Also, Section 2(a), Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, requires the courts to consider the possibility of an
amicable settlement or of submission to alternative modes of resolution for the early
settlement of disputes so as to put an end to litigations. The provisions of A.M. No.
01-10-5-SC-PHILJA pertinent to the case at bench are as follows:

9. Personal appearance/Proper authorizations

Individual parties are encouraged to personally appear for mediation. In the event they
cannot attend, their representatives must be fully authorized to appear, negotiate and
enter into a compromise by a Special Power of Attorney. A corporation shall, by
board resolution, fully authorize its representative to appear, negotiate and enter into a
compromise agreement.

12. Sanctions

Since mediation is part of Pre-Trial, the trial court shall impose the appropriate
sanction including but not limited to censure, reprimand, contempt and such other
sanctions as are provided under the Rules of Court for failure to appear for pre-trial,
in case any or both of the parties absent himself/themselves, or for abusive conduct
during mediation proceedings. [Underscoring supplied]

To reiterate, A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA regards mediation as part of pre-trial

where parties are encouraged to personally attend the proceedings. The personal non-
appearance, however, of a party may be excused only when the representative, who
appears in his behalf, has been duly authorized to enter into possible amicable
settlement or to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution. To ensure the
attendance of the parties, A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA specifically enumerates the
sanctions that the court can impose upon a party who fails to appear in the
proceedings which includes censure, reprimand, contempt, and even dismissal of the
action in relation to Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.15 The respective lawyers
of the parties may attend the proceedings and, if they do so, they are enjoined to
cooperate with the mediator for the successful amicable settlement of disputes16 so as
to effectively reduce docket congestion.

Although the RTC has legal basis to order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13-2007,
the Court finds this sanction too severe to be imposed on the petitioner where the
records of the case is devoid of evidence of willful or flagrant disregard of the rules
on mediation proceedings. There is no clear demonstration that the absence of
petitioner’s representative during mediation proceedings on March 1, 2008 was
intended to perpetuate delay in the litigation of the case. Neither is it indicative of
lack of interest on the part of petitioner to enter into a possible amicable settlement of
the case.

The Court notes that Manalang was not entirely at fault for the cancellation and
resettings of the conferences. Let it be underscored that respondents’
representative and counsel, Atty. Miguel, came late during the January 19 and
February 9, 2008 conferences which resulted in their cancellation and the final
resetting of the mediation proceedings to March 1, 2008. Considering the
circumstances, it would be most unfair to penalize petitioner for the neglect of
her lawyer.1avvphi1

Assuming arguendo that the trial court correctly construed the absence of
Manalang on March 1, 2008 as a deliberate refusal to comply with its Order or
to be dilatory, it cannot be said that the court was powerless and virtually
without recourse. Indeed, there are other available remedies to the court a quo
under A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA, apart from immediately ordering the
dismissal of the case. If Manalang’s absence upset the intention of the court a
quo to promptly dispose the case, a mere censure or reprimand would have been
sufficient for petitioner’s representative and her counsel so as to be informed of
the court’s intolerance of tardiness and laxity in the observation of its order. By
failing to do so and refusing to resuscitate the case, the RTC impetuously
deprived petitioner of the opportunity to recover the land which she allegedly
paid for.

Unless the conduct of the party is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or

dilatory as for non-appearance to provide substantial grounds for dismissal, the
courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still achieve the desired end.
The Court has written "inconsiderate dismissals, even if without prejudice, do
not constitute a panacea nor a solution to the congestion of court dockets, while
they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of the individual judges, they
merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the absence of
clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief
continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases before the
court.17

It bears emphasis that the subject matter of the complaint is a valuable parcel of
land measuring 328 square meters and that petitioner had allegedly spent a lot of
money not only for the payment of the docket and other filing fees but also for
the extra-territorial service of the summons to the respondents who are now
permanent residents of the U.S.A. Certainly, petitioner stands to lose heavily on
account of technicality. Even if the dismissal is without prejudice, the refiling of
the case would still be injurious to petitioner because she would have to pay
again all the litigation expenses which she previously paid for. The Court should
afford party-litigants the amplest opportunity to enable them to have their cases
justly determined, free from constraints of technicalities.18 Technicalities should
take a backseat against substantive rights and should give way to the realities of
the situation. Besides, the petitioner has manifested her interest to pursue the
case through the present petition. At any rate, it has not been shown that a
remand of the case for trial would cause undue prejudice to respondents.

In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds it just and proper that petitioner be
allowed to present her cause of action during trial on the merits to obviate
jeopardizing substantive justice. Verily, the better and more prudent course of action
in a judicial proceeding is to hear both sides and decide the case on the merits instead
of disposing the case by technicalities. What should guide judicial action is the
principle that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the
merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty or property
on technicalities.19 The ends of justice and fairness would best be served if the issues
involved in the case are threshed out in a full-blown trial. Trial courts are reminded to
exert efforts to resolve the matters before them on the merits and to adjudge them
accordingly to the satisfaction of the parties, lest in hastening the proceedings, they
further delay the resolution of the cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. 13-2007 is hereby

REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Panobo City,
Branch 34 for referral back to the Philippine Mediation Center for possible amicable
settlement or for other proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22320 July 29, 1968

MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners,

vs. HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA,
respondents.

Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioners. Isidro T. Almeda for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968,
specifically directed against the following observation therein made:

We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the
petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly,
abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple
money judgment which has long become final and executory. Some of the actions
were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far
from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them
to subvert the very ends of justice.

Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their
counsel.".

The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the
petitioners, while submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of
the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct" and
condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged against their clients.

At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After
mature deliberation and patient reprobing into the records of the case, however, we
are of the firmer conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded to in the above-
quoted portion of our decision, was designed to cause delay, and the active
participation of the petitioners' counsels in this adventure is patent.

After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining
Damaso Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent
proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were obviously
quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay
an execution long overdue.

Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of
stock were conjugal property, why did they not adopt this position from the very start,
or, at the latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality
of the levy's coverage, in order to end the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They
chose, however, to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing the
postponement of the projected execution sale six times. More than eight years after
the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be satisfied.

In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by

their counsels, sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution
of the final judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction
and which would, as expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. For instance,
after Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily from the scene following the rendition of
the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife, Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez,
intruded into the controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction
from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with civil case 7532 which she
filed with the said court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case 39407 was
decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the
respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was the proper forum for any action
relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held that
courts of first instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial
jurisdictions, lifted on October 4, 1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued
enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out the execution sale. It is clear,
however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants, knew or ought to have
known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to
issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of the writ
improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was
actually lifted, filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of
execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as justification the conjugal nature of
the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez' judgment debt,
the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still pending in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any
evidence in support of her aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her
counsels appeared during the scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent judge to
issue the following order:

When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning for
hearing, counsel for the movant did not appear despite the fact that he had been duly
notified of the motion for hearing. In view thereof the court assumes that he is
waiving his right to present evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift
writ of execution. Said urgent motion is therefore deemed submitted for resolution.

Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a

disclaimer of jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by
another tribunal), Mrs. Perez, now assisted by her husband who had staged a
comeback, prayed for the issuance of another injunction, this time from Branch XXII
of the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the same Branch which issued the
controverted writ of execution), in connection with civil case 7532, then still pending
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most probably anticipated anew by the
Perez spouses and their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII, on
November 8, 1963 denied the preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among
others, that he had no power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of
a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction was
denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was already
prepared with another "remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in
the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of
October 19, 1963, which denied his wife's above-mentioned motion to recall the
controverted writ of execution.

The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of
October 19, 1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he
was not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed
by his wife alone), was merely an offer to replace the levied stocks with supposed
cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as stockholders in the Republic Bank.1 As a
matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on December 21, 1963, the
counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the said cash dividends within five
days, but the promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent Judge on
January 4, 1964, denied the said motion for reconsideration.

The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly
negates the avowal of the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at
bar has any particular counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to
delay the enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." From the
chronology of antecedent events, the fact becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses,
coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies" projected to
foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. It is equally obvious that they
foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to adopt, such that
even before, one remedy had been exhausted, they interposed another until the case
reached this Court for the second time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more
than one member of this Court are persuaded that justice was practically waylaid.

The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532
and 55292 as the "proper remedy" when we said that.

In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity of
which are unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard,
the remedy is not the recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff
from proceeding with the projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the
levied stocks should be established as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a
permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of
the protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil
cases 7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and often
simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt. (Emphasis
supplied) .

And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be
branded as having been instituted for delay.

The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement
must not be considered out of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had
already availed of the suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases 7532
and 55292 were apparently instituted to prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares
of stocks in question. We used the word incidentally advisedly to show that in their
incessant search for devices to thwart the controverted execution, they accidentally
stumbled on the suggested remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the
"proper remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed respectively, for
the said courts did not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of
execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the
settled doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts outside of their
territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and the denial of the writs
of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did not amount to the
termination or dismissal of the principal action in each case. Had the Perez spouses
desired in earnest to continue with the said cases they could have done so. But the fact
is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she instituted the above
mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the basic civil case 39407,
anchored on the same grounds which she advanced in the former case, until the said
civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon her own motion. Anent
civil case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually deserted the same when they instituted
the herein petition for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on
the same grounds proffered in the said civil case — until the latter was also dismissed
on March 20, 1964, with the consent of the parties because of the pendency then of
the aforesaid petition for certiorari.

The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners'
counsel happened to be more assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be
condemned."

A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause
must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance
is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case
at bar.

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies
and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his
client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to
acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist
the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A
lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its
primacy is indisputable.

The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the
participation of each counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this
Court ordering that "treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be
paid by their counsel" is not clear. The word "counsel" may be either singular or
plural in construction, so that when we said "counsel" we meant the counsels on
record of the petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate delay in the
execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case 39407, after the Court of
Appeals had rendered its aforementioned decision of November 15, 1962. And it is on
record that the movants are such counsels. Atty. Bolinas, upon his own admission,
"entered his appearance in the case at bar about the time the Court of First Instance of
Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. 39407," or
about August 3, 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals decision above-
mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October,
1963 when he filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No. 55292 before the
Court of First Instance of Manila presided by the Hon. Judge Alikpala although it
appears on record that the urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs.
Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September 3, 1963, was over the signature of
one Ruby Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs.
Perez. It is to be recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed
above, which, curiously enough, antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ
of preliminary injunction issued in civil case 7532.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of

May 22, 1968 is hereby modified in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N.
Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and severally the treble costs assessed against the
petitioners.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion C.J., voted for denial of the motion for reconsideration. Fernando, J.,
took no part.