Professional Documents
Culture Documents
136051 June 8, 2006 USSR engaged the services of Financial Building for the construction of
ALFREDO P. ROSETE, OSCAR P. MAPALO and CHITO P. a multi-level office and staff apartment building at the said lot, , which
ROSETE, Petitioners, would be used by the Trade Representative of the USSR
vs. Forbes Park authorized its construction on USSR’s representation that it
JULIANO LIM and LILIA LIM, Respondents. would be building a residence for its Trade Representative
F: The case is a Complaint for Annulment, Specific Performance When Forbes Park discovered that USSR violated the deed of
with Damages. restrictions, it suspended all permits of entry for the personnel and
R’s filed the said Complaint against P’s seeking to: annul a materials of Financial Building in the said construction site
Deed of Sale executed between the P’s and restore ownership of said Financial Building filed in the RTC Complaint for Injunction and
lands to R’s. P’s filed a MtD which was however denied. P’s filed a Damages with a prayer for Preliminary Injunction against Forbes Park
Forbes Park filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Financial
Petition for Certiorari with the CA to challenge the denial of the MtD.
Building had no cause of action because it was not the real party-in-
Meanwhile, P filed an Answer. Then, R’s filed a Notice to Take interest
Deposition Upon Oral Examination. P’s filed an objection to the Notice the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction against Forbes Park
to Take Deposition. RTC denied the objection to the Notice to Take but on appeal, the Court of Appeals nullified it and dismissed the
Deposition. P again filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, this time to complaint. Said decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court
contest the denial of the objection to the Notice to Take Deposition. CA After Financial Building’s case was terminated with finality, Forbes Park
filed with the RTC a Complaint for Damages, against Financial Building
dismissed. Hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
arising from the violation of its rules and regulations
P’s contend that the taking of their oral depositions should not Financial Building argued that the instant case is barred for failure of
be allowed without leave of court as no answer has yet been served and respondent to set it up as a compulsory counterclaim in the earlier civil
the issues have not yet been joined because their answers were filed ex case
abudanti cautela. ISSUE: whether or not the action filed by Forbes Park is barred
I: WN the taking of oral depositions is proper even without an HELD: YES
Answer and non-joinder of the issues. The instant case is barred due to Forbes Park’s failure to set it up as a
compulsory counterclaim in the injunction suit filed by Financial Building
H/R: YES, the taking of oral depostions is proper. There has
against Forbes Park
actually been an Answer and joinder of issues. A compulsory counterclaim is one which arises out of or is necessarily
An answer is a pleading in which a defending party sets forth connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
his defenses and the failure to file one may render the defending party of the opposing party’s claim. If it is within the jurisdiction of the court
in default. P’s contention that an answer filed ex abundanti cautela (“out and it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties
of abundant caution”) is not an answer is untenable. An answer ex over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, such compulsory
abundati cautela does not make their answer any less of an answer. A counterclaim is barred if it is not set up in the action filed by the
opposing party; Thus, a compulsory counterclaim cannot be the subject
look at the answer filed by P reveals that in contained their defenses.
of a separate action but it should instead be asserted in the same suit
P’s argument that the issues of the case have not yet been involving the same transaction or occurrence, which gave rise to it
joined must necessarily fail in light of our ruling that petitioners have tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not
filed their answers although the same were made ex abudanti cautela. (1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim
Issues are joined when all the parties have pleaded their respective largely the same?
theories and the terms of the dispute are plain before the court. In the (2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim
present case, the issues have been joined when petitioners, as well as absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
(3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim
the other defendants, filed their answers.
as well as the defendant’s counterclaim? and
Thus, P’s contention that the lower court erred when it said (4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
that the joinder of issues is required in order that taking of depositions
may be availed of is untenable. Under Rule 23, Section 1, a deposition In the case at bar, undoubtedly, the prior Civil Case and the instant case
pending action may be availed of: (1) with leave of court when an arose from the same occurrence – the construction work done by
answer has not yet been filed but after jurisdiction has been obtained Financial Building on the USSR’s lot in Forbes Park Village. The issues
over any defendant or property subject of the action, or (2) without leave of fact and law in both cases are identical
The parties, issues of fact and law in both cases are identical.The
of court after an answer to the complaint has been served. In the instant factual issue is whether the structures erected by Financial Building
case, the taking of the deposition may be availed of even without leave violate Forbes Park’s rules and regulations, whereas the legal issue is
of court because petitioners have already served their answers to the whether Financial Building, as an independent contractor working for the
complaint. USSR, could be enjoined from continuing with the construction and be
G.R. No. 133119. August 17, 2000] held liable for damages if it is found to have violated Forbes Park’s rules
FINANCIAL BUILDING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs . FORBES As a result of the controversy, Financial Building seized the initiative by
PARK ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent filing the prior injunction case, which was anchored on the contention
that Forbes Park’s prohibition on the construction work in the subject
FACTS: premises was improper. The instant case on the other hand was
USSR owned a residential lot in Forbes Park Village in Makati City. initiated by Forbes Park to compel Financial Building to remove the
same structures it has erected in the same premises involved in the
prior case and to claim damages for undertaking the said
construction. Thus, the logical relation between the two cases is patent Compulsory Counterclaim
and it is obvious that substantially the same evidence is involved in the Reillo vs. San Jose (2009)
said cases Facts:
Since Forbes Park filed a motion to dismiss in the earlier civil case, its Sps. Quiterio and Antonina San Jose were the original
existing compulsory counterclaim at that time is now barred
registered owners of a parcel of land located in E. Rod, QC. The Sps.
A compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original
suit and derives its jurisdictional support therefrom. Hence, where there San Jose had 5 children, Virginia, Virgilio, Galicano, Victoria and
is no claim against the counterclaimant, the counterclaim is improper Catalina. The Sps. San Jose had already passed away, as well as their
and it must dismissed, more so where the complaint is dismissed at the children Virginia, Virgilio. This case is between heirs. The petitioners are
instance of the counterclaimant. In other words, if the dismissal of the grandchildren of the Sps. San Jose and the respondents are the other
main action results in the dismissal of the counterclaim already filed, it heirs, the children of Galicano.
stands to reason that the filing of a motion to dismiss the complaint is an In 1999, the respondents filed with the RTC a complaint for
implied waiver of the compulsory counterclaim because the grant of the
annulment of title, annulment of deed of extra-judicial settlement,
motion ultimately results in the dismissal of the counterclaim
Thus, the filing of a motion to dismiss and the setting up of a partition and damages against the petitioners. The petitioners executed
compulsory counterclaim are incompatible remedies. In the event that a the deed of extra-judicial settlement which caused the issuance of a
defending party has a ground for dismissal and a compulsory new TCT in favor of Ma. Teresa Piñon, one of the petitioners.
counterclaim at the same time, he must choose only one remedy. If he Petitioners filed their ANSWER WITH COUNTER-PETITION
decides to file a motion to dismiss, he will lose his compulsory and with COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM denying that the deed of
counterclaim. But if he opts to set up his compulsory counterclaim, he
extrajudicial settlement of estate among heirs was falsified, they also
may still plead his ground for dismissal as an affirmative defense in his
answer admitted that the Sps. San Jose had 5 children, that the subject property
was not the only property of the Sps and submitted in their counter-
petition for partition the list of the other 12 parcels of land which
belonged to the Sps.
Respondents filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings
alleging that the denials made by petitioners were in the form of
negative pregnant, petitioners failed to state the basis that the
questioned deed was NOT falsified, failed to specifically deny the
allegations in the complain and stating in their counter-petition for
partition, impliedly admitted that petitioners were not the SOLE heirs of
the Sps. San Jose. Respondents ALSO filed a reply to answer with
compulsory counterclaim with a motion to dismiss due to failure of the
petitioners to pay the required docket fees for their counter-petition for
partition.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of herein respondents, declaring that
the deed of extrajudicial settlement null and void. RTC found that the
petitioners misrepresented themselves to be the sole heirs and it did not
consider the counter-petition for partition because the corresponding
docket fees were not paid. The CA affirmed the RTC decision
Issues:
1. Did the RTC err in not admitting the counter-petition for partition and
compulsory counterclaim when it decided the case based on the
pleadings?
2. Whether or not the dismissal of the counter-petition for partition was
proper due to the non-payment of docket fee?
3. Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioners counter-petition for
partition will result to multiplicity of suits? (Remember in their counter-
petition they stated that there were 12 other properties of the Sps. San
Jose)
Held:
1. NO.
Where a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed, the
essential question is whether there are issues generated by the
pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no
ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending party’s
answer to raise an issue
In this case, respondents’ principal action was for the
annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among It bears stressing that the action filed by respondents in the
Heirs with Waiver of Rights executed by petitioners and annulment of RTC was an ordinary civil action for annulment of title, annulment of the
title on the ground that petitioners stated in the said Deed that they are deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition of a parcel of land now
the legitimate descendants and sole heirs of the spouses Quiterio and covered by TCT No. M-94400; hence, the authority of the court is limited
Antonina. Although petitioners denied in their Answer that the Deed to the property described in the pleading. The RTC cannot order the
was falsified, they, however, admitted respondents’ allegation that collation and partition of the other properties which were not included in
spouses Quiterio and Antonina had 5 children, thus, supporting the partition that was the subject matter of the respondents’ action for
respondents’ claim that petitioners are not the sole heirs of the annulment. Thus, a separate proceeding is indeed proper for the
deceased spouses. Petitioners’ denial/admission in his Answer to the partition of the estate of the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina.
complaint should be considered in its entirety and not truncated parts.
Considering that petitioners already admitted that respondents BDO vs Sps Locsin
Galicano, Victoria, Catalina and Maribeth are the children and Sps Locsin had 2 loan agreements with BDO secured by 2 separate
grandchild, respectively, of the spouses Quiterio and Antonina, who properties respectively. Also, they also had a credit line agreement with
were the original registered owners of the subject property, and thus the same bank which was secured by a property of their business
excluding respondents from the deed of settlement of the subject partners, Sps Evidante. Sps Locsins defaulted on their credit line
property, there is no more genuine issue between the parties generated agreement which prompted the bank to file for extra judicial foreclosure
by the pleadings, thus, the RTC committed no reversible error in on all 3 properties. The Sps filed for TRO and injunction saying that the
rendering the judgment on the pleadings. first property should not be included as the Sps have already paid the
In this case, the counterclaim was not compulsory but just amortizations due on that particular loan agreement. The Public auction
permissive, as such docket fees must be paid. pushed through anyway, but was later nullified. BDO then amended
2. YES. their petition to include all 3 properties. Before the second public auction
could begin, the Sps filed a case of damages against BDO for basically
We also find no merit in petitioners’ contention that the the same reasons and the QC RTC for allowing the sale. (Mentioned
Counter-Petition for Partition in their Answer was in the nature of a only VERY later on the facts that there was a “cross-default”
compulsory counterclaim which does not require the payment of docket provision on all agreements, that states that default on one loan
fees. will result in the default of all.) So the Sps, basically lost and their
properties auctioned off. BUT because of the interests and legal
Respondents’ action was for the annulment of the Deed of expenses, the proceeds from the sale were not enough, BDO now files
Extrajudicial Settlement, title and partition of the property subject of the a case for collection of sum of money against the Sps in the
Deed. On the other hand, in the Counter-Petition filed by petitioners in Mandaluyong RTC. The Sps filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
their Answer to respondents’ complaint, they were asking for the that it should have been raised as compulsory counterclaim in their
partition and accounting of the other 12 parcels of land of the deceased complaint (for specific performance, damages and nullification of the
spouses Quiterio and Antonina, which are entirely different from the public auction), and by failing to raise it as such, it is now "barred by the
subject matter of the respondents’ action. Petitioners’ claim does not rules." RTC denied the sps, but CA ruled in their favor.
arise out of or is necessarily connected with the action for the Issue: Was the collection of sum of money filed in Mandaluyong RTC a
Annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the property compulsory counterclaim, and therefore should be dismissed? SC- NO,
covered by TCT No. 458396. Thus, payment of docket fees is it should not be dismissed, strictly speaking, it’s not a compulsory
necessary before the RTC could acquire jurisdiction over petitioners’ counterclaim.
petition for partition. Held: (Simply put, the SC held that the cause of action against the sps-
The rule regarding the payment of docket fees upon the filing which is the deficiency of the total debt from the proceeds of the sale,
of the initiatory pleading is not without exception. It has been held that if arose only after the decision of the QC RTC, so the latter suit in the
the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of Mandaluyong RTC would definitely constitute another suit.)
docket fees, the court may allow payment of the fee within reasonable The counterclaim must be existing at the time of filing the
time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary answer, though not at the commencement of the action for under
period. Section 3 of the former Rule 10, the counterclaim or cross-claim which a
3. NO. party may aver in his answer must be one which he may have "at the
Significantly, in petitioners’ Answer with Counter-Petition for time" against the opposing party. That phrase can only have reference
Partition, they enumerated 12 other parcels of land owned by the to the time of the answer. Certainly a premature counterclaim cannot be
deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina. They alleged that some of set up in the answer. This construction is not only explicit from the
these properties had already been disposed of by respondents and language of the aforecited provisions but also serves to harmonize the
some are still generating income under the control and administration of aforecited sections of Rule 10, with section 4 of the same rule which
respondents, and these properties should be collated back by provides that "a counterclaim . . . which either matured or was acquired
respondents to be partitioned by all the heirs of the deceased spouses. by a party after serving his pleading may, with the permission of the
court, be presented as a counterclaim . . . by supplemental pleading12. When to implead another as 3rd party defendant: 1) whether it arises out
before judgment." of the same transaction
Thus a party who fails to interpose a counterclaim although In the present case, the claims of respondent against the
arising out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or petitioner arose out of the contracts of lease and sale; such
occurrence of the plaintiff's suit but which did not exist or mature at the transactions are different and separate from those between
time said party files his answer is not thereby barred from interposing Bethel and the petitioner as 3 rd party plaintiff for the construction
such claim in a future litigation. of the latter’s project. The controversy between the respondent
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides: and petitioner, on one hand, and that between the petitioner and
"Sec. 2. Compulsory counterclaim, or cross-claim, not set up barred. Bethel, on the other, are entirely distinct from each other.
— A compulsory counterclaim, or a cross claim, not set up shall be
barred." SY TIONG SHIOU vs SY CHIM
The reason for the rule relating to counterclaims is to avoid multiplicity of
suits and to enable the Courts to dispose of the whole matter in Topic: Third Party Complaint
controversy in one action, and adjustment of defendant's demand by
counterclaim rather than by independent suit. GR 174168
The Sps Valmonte were the unregistered owners of the apartment that Mactan – Cebu International Airport Authority v. Heirs of
Alcala was staying in. The wife Valmonte acquired the apartment Estanislao Minoza
through inheritance from her parents. As the Sps were US residents, Facts:
they opted to rent it out to Alcala. However, after failing to pay the rent The late Estanislao Minoza entered into a contract of sale of land with
for many months, the Sps filed, through their lawyer (remember, the Sps the National Airports Corporation (NAC). The deed of sale had an
Valmonte were in the US during these proceedings, which brought assurance that Estanislao can buy the properties back if the lots are no
about the complications) a case for unlawful detainer against Alcala. longer needed. The expansion project did not push through. 40 years
after, the heirs of Estanislao informed petitioner that they were
exercising the buy back option but was refused to do so. Topic: who can sign without secretary’s certificate
A motion for intervention with an attached complaint-in-intervention was
filed by the heirs of Filomeno Minoza (intervenors) claiming that they FACTS:
were the true, legal and legitimate heirs of the late Estanislao Minoza
RTC denied motion for intervention (No verification and certification of Mid-land is a registered owner of land in pasig. Petitioner was
non-forum shopping was included); CA reversed the RTC represented by its president Salonga and he entered into an agreement
1. *As to the lack of verification and certification of non- with respondent who is the proprietor of ECRM Enterprises. The
forum shopping, the CA opined that the filing of the motion for agreement was for the lease of the land to Tablante for 3 months for a
reconsideration with an appended complaint-in intervention containing Home and Garden Exhibition. At the date of the expiration of the Lease
the required verification and certificate of non-forum shopping amounted Agreement, Tablante assigned his rights and interests to Rockland
to substantial compliance of the rules corporation. Petitioner eventually learned that Tablante executed a
Lease Contract with MC Home Depot whi constructed improvements on
Issue: Whether lack of verification and certification of non-forum the land. Upon the expiration of the lease, petitioner demanded
shopping is fatal to the petition? – NO. respondents to vacate and in order to forestall the ejectment,
respondents filed a specific performance case with the RTC against
Ruling: petitioner compelling them to renew the lease contract for another 3
The initial lack of complaint-in-intervention of the requisite years. Petitioner filed an unlawful detainer in the MTC but it was
verification and certification of non-forum shopping was cured dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, since the issue was the right of ECRM
when the intervenors, in their motion for reconsideration of the to exercise an option to renew the lease of contract incapable of
order denying the motion to intervene, appended a complaint-in- pecuniary estimation and therefore cognizable by the RTC.
intervention containing the required verification and certificate of
non-forum shopping A petition for certiorari was filed with the CA which dismissed the case
on the ground that the verification and certification against non forum
As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does shopping was signed by Merelos, the General Manager of the
not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may corporation without attaching a Corporate Secretary’s certificate or
order its submission or correction, or act on the pleading if the attending board resolution authorizing him to sign for and in behalf of petitioner.
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. ISSUE:
Further, a verification is deemed substantially complied with when one
who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the Whether the general manager can sign the verification and certification
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in even without the corporate secretary certificate? YES
the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct;
RATIO:
As to the certification against forum shopping, non-compliance
therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not While an individual corporate officer cannot solely exercise any
curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there corporate power without authority from the board, we have
is a need to relax the Rules on the ground of “substantial compliance” or recognized the authority of some corporate officers and we
presence of “special circumstances or compelling reasons.” Also, the recognize the authority of the GM to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs certification without need for board resolution. In sum, we have
or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be held that the following officials or employees of the company can
dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable sign the verification and certification without need of a board
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the
common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting
signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment
substantially complies with the Rule Specialist in a labor case. From the foregoing, it is thus clear
that the failure to attach the Secretary’s Certificate, attesting to
considering that the intervenors in their motion for General Manager Antonio Merelos’s authority to sign the
reconsideration, appended a complaint-in-intervention with the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, should not
required verification and certification of non-forum shopping, the be considered fatal to the filing of the petition. Nonetheless, the
requirement of the rules was substantially complied with. BUT requisite board resolution was subsequently submitted to the
attempt to intervene is doomed to fail CA, together with the pertinent documents. Considering that
petitioner substantially complied with the rules, the dismissal of
MID-PASIG LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs TABLANTE the petition was, therefore, unwarranted.
"Ultimate facts" are the essential and substantial facts which either form
G.R. No. 94093 August 10, 1993 the basis of the primary right and duty or which directly make up the
FAR EAST MARBLE (PHILS.), INC., LUIS R. TABUENA, JR. and wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant, while "evidentiary facts"
RAMON A. TABUENA, petitioners, are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts.
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and BANK OF PHILIPPINE What then are the ultimate facts which BPI had to allege in its
ISLANDS, respondents. complaint so as to sufficiently establish its cause of action?
Basically, a cause of action consists of three elements,
On February 5, 1987, herein respondent Bank of the namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of
Philippines Islands (BPI) filed a complaint for foreclosure of chattel the defendant; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation
mortgage with replevin against petitioner Far East Marble (Far East), of said legal right.
Ramon A. Tabuena and Luis R. Tabuena, Jr. These elements are manifest in BPI's complaint, particularly when it was
therein alleged that: (1) for valuable consideration, BPI granted several
In its answer, Far East admitted the genuineness and due loans, evidenced by promissory notes, and extended credit facilities in
execution of the promissory notes involved in the case, but denied BPI's the form of trust receipts to Far East (photocopies of said notes and
allegation that repeated demands for payment were made by BPI on it . receipts were duly attached to the Complaint); (2) said promissory notes
Far East then raised the affirmative defenses of prescription and lack of and trust receipts had matured; and (3) despite repeated requests and
cause of action, arguing that since the promissory notes matured in demands for payment thereof, Far East had failed and refused to pay.
1976 while BPI filed its action to foreclose the chattel mortgage only in
1987 (or more than 10 years from the time its cause of action accrued), Clearly then, the general allegation of BPI that "despite
and there being no demand for payment which would interrupt the repeated requests and demands for payment, Far East has failed to
period of prescription for instituting said action, BPI's claims have pay" is sufficient to establish BPI's cause of action.
prescribed. Besides, prescription is not a cause of action; it is a defense which,
having been raised, should, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals,
BPI countered that its allegation of repeated demands on Far be supported by competent evidence. But even as Far East raised the
East for payment sufficiently stated a cause of action; that within ten defense of prescription, BPI countered to the effect that the prescriptive
years from the time its cause of action accrued in 1976, it sent written period was interrupted and renewed by written extrajudicial demands for
extrajudicial demands on Far East requesting payment of its due and payment and acknowledgment by Far East of the debt.
outstanding obligations; that within that 10-years period, it received
written acknowledgments of debt from Far East; and, that these A complaint is sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of the
demands for payment and acknowledgments of debt effectively cause of action even though the allegation may be vague or indefinite,
interrupted and renewed the prescriptive period. Worth noting is the fact for in such case, the recourse of the defendant would be to file a motion
that the acknowledgment of debt and the demands for payment, for a bill of particulars.
including the affidavits of BPI's counsel who prepared the demand letter In the case at bar, the circumstances of BPI extending loans and credits
and that of BPI's messenger who allegedly personally delivered said to Far East and the failure of the latter to pay and discharge the same
letters to Far East were duly annexed to BPI's pleadings. upon maturity are the only ultimate facts which have to be pleaded,
although the facts necessary to make the mortgage valid enforceable
We now come to petitioner's assigned errors. must be proven during the trial.
The trial court's finding that BPI's claims due to prescription,
can no longer prosper, is inextricably connected with, and underpinned In fine, the finding of the trial court that prescription has set in
by, its other conclusion that BPI's allegation that it made "repeated is primarily premised on a misappreciation of the sufficiency of BPI's
requests and demands for payment" is not sufficient to state a cause of allegation as above discussed. The records will show that the hearing
action. The trial court held that: conducted by the trial court was merely pro forma and the trial judge did
Apart from the fact that the complaint failed to allege that the period of not sufficiently address the issue of whether or not a demand for
prescription was interrupted, the phrase "repeated requests and payment in fact made by BPI and duly received by herein petitioner Far
demands for payment" is vague and incomplete as to establish in the East.
minds of the defendant, or to enable the Court to draw a conclusion, that WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
demands or acknowledgment [of debt] were made that could have
interrupted the period of prescription. FILIPINAS TEXTILE VS CA
FACTS: On December 6, 1985, SIHI instituted a Complaint5[4] for the
W/N the interruption of the prescriptive period to institute an action is an collection of the sum of P3,118,949.75, with interest, penalties,
ULTIMATE FACT which had to be expressly and indispensably pleaded exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit against herein
by BPI in its complaint, and that failure to so alleged such circumstance
petitioners Filtex and Villanueva.
is fatal to BPI's cause of action.
In its Complaint, SIHI alleged that sometime in 1983, Filtex
SC = We believe and hold otherwise. applied for domestic letters of credit to finance the purchase of various
Section 3 of Rule 6 state that a "complaint is a concise raw materials for its textile business. Finding the application to be in
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes order, SIHI issued on various dates domestic letters of credit 6[5]
of action." Further elaborating thereon, Section 1 of Rule 8 declares that
every pleading, including, of course, a complaint, "shall contain in a 5
methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the
ultimate facts . . . omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts." 6
authorizing Indo-Philippine Textile Mills, Inc. (“Indo-Phil”), Texfiber of credit, sight drafts, trust receipts and comprehensive surety
Corporation (“Texfiber”), and Philippine Polyamide Industrial Corporation agreement upon which SIHI’s Complaint15[23] was based, thus giving rise
(“Polyamide”) “to value” on SIHI such drafts as may be drawn by said to the implied admission of the genuineness and due execution of these
corporations against Filtex for an aggregate amount not exceeding documents. Under Sec. 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, when an action
P3,737,988.05. or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached
Filtex used these domestic letters of credit to cover its purchase of to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the
various textile materials from Indo-Phil, Texfiber and Polyamide. genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed
Allegedly by way of inducement upon SIHI to issue the aforesaid admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them,
domestic letters of credit and “to value” the sight drafts issued by Indo- and sets forth what he claims to be the facts.
Phil, Texfiber and Polyamide, Villanueva executed a comprehensive Moreover, under Section 173 of the Internal Revenue Code the
surety agreement7[7] on November 9, 1982, whereby he guaranteed, liability for payment of the stamp taxes is imposed on “the person
jointly and severally with Filtex, the full and punctual payment at maturity making, signing, issuing, accepting, or transferring” the document. As
to SIHI of all the indebtedness of Filtex. correctly pointed out by SIHI, Filtex was the issuer and acceptor of the
In order to ensure the payment of the sight drafts aforementioned, trust receipts and sight drafts, respectively, while the letters of credit
Filtex executed and issued to SIHI several trust receipts 8[8] of various were issued upon its application. On the other hand, Villanueva signed
dates, which were later extended with the issuance of replacement trust the comprehensive surety agreement. Thus, being among the parties
receipts covering the merchandise sold. obliged to pay the documentary stamp taxes, the petitioners are
Because of Filtex’s failure to pay its outstanding obligation despite estopped from claiming that the documents are inadmissible in evidence
demand, SIHI filed a Complaint on December 6, 1985 praying that the for non-payment thereof.
petitioners be ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the principal amount Interestingly, the petitioners questioned the admissibility of these
of P3,118,949.75, plus interest and penalties, attorney’s fees, exemplary documents rather belatedly, at the appeal stage even. Their respective
damages, costs of suit and other litigation expenses. answers16[25] to SIHI’s Complaint were silent on this point. The rule is
In its Answer with Counterclaim,9[9] Filtex interposed special and well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not
affirmative defenses, i.e., the provisions of the trust receipts, as well as adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not, and
the comprehensive surety agreement, do not reflect the true will and ordinarily will not, be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be
intention of the parties, full payment of the obligation, and lack of cause raised for the first time on appeal because this would be offensive to the
of action. For his part, Villanueva interposed the same special and basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.17[26]
affirmative defenses and added that the comprehensive surety Hence, the petitioners can no longer dispute the admissibility of
agreement is null and void and damages and attorney’s fees are not the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust receipts and comprehensive surety
legally demandable.10[10] The petitioners, however, failed to agreement. However, this does not preclude the petitioners from
specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution impugning these documents by evidence of fraud, mistake,
of the actionable documents upon which the Complaint was compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel and want of
based. consideration.18[27]
RTC rendered judgment11[11] holding Filtex and Villanueva jointly G.R. No. 152154 July 15, 2003
and severally liable to SIHI. CA affirmed.] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
ISSUE: whether or not the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust receipts vs.
and comprehensive surety agreement are admissible in evidence HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION),
FERDINAND E. MARCOS (REPRESENTED BY HIS
despite the absence of documentary stamps thereon as required by the
ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA [IMEE]
Internal Revenue Code.12[20] MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND
HELD: yes IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA ROMUALDEZ
We rule in the affirmative. As correctly noted by the respondent, the MARCOS, respondents.
Answer with Counterclaim13[21] and Answer,14[22] of Filtex and Villanueva, F: The case is a Petition for Forfeiture before the
respectively, did not contain any specific denial under oath of the letters Sandiganbayan.
7 13
8 14
9 15
10 16
11 17
12 18
The P seeks that the amount of $356M (now $658M) form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at
deposited in escrow in the PNB be declared as ill-gotten wealth by the least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party.
Marcoses. The said amount was initially deposited with Swiss Banks. P Under the foregoing, SJ is proper.
filed with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland, a request for the (Not pertinent to issue on specific denial, but in case asked...)
transfer of the amount to an escrow account in the PNB. After As to the propriety of forfeiture, The law raises the
determination that the funds were indeed ill-gotten wealth, the Swiss prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hence
Federal SC granted the request. Hence, the funds are now in escrow subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate
with the PNB. P now seeks the Forfeiture of the said amount in its to the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who
favor. owns it.
In the case at hand, the two elements were estanblished. First, it was proved that the
The R Marcoses filed their Answer and pre-trial ensued. Afgter
Marcoses owned the funds during their incumbency. Second, it was grossly disproportionate to their income. Clearly, the
several resettings, P filed a Motion for Summary Judgment alleging that
amount was ill-gotten and should therefore be forfeited in favor of the P Republic.
the R Marcoses failed to tender a genuine issue. The Sandiganbayan
initially granted, but then reversed itself (M for SJ was denied). Hence G.R. No. L-9531 May 14, 1958
this Petition. WARNER BARNES and CO., LTD., plaintiff-appellee,
I: WN R’s Answer failed to tender a genuine issue. vs.GUILLERMO C. REYES, ET AL., defendants-appellants
H/R: YES, R’s failed to tender a genuine issue by failing to
FACTS:
substantiate their specific denials. Hence, Summary Judgment should
Petitioners filed against the defendants-appellants an action for
ensue. foreclosure of mortgage
Summary J is based on Rule 35, Sec 1. It is described as a The deed of mortgage sued upon was attached to the complaint as
judgment which a court may render before trial but after both parties Annex "A"
have pleaded. It is ordered by the court upon application by one party, After having been granted an extension, the appellants filed an answer
supported by affidavits, depositions or other documents, with notice alleging:
upon the adverse party who may in turn file an opposition supported
also by affidavits, depositions or other documents. This is after the court 1. That they admit paragraph 1 of the complaint;
2. That the defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
summarily hears both parties with their respective proofs and finds that form a belief as to the truth of the material averments of the remainder
there is no genuine issue between them (Auman v. Estenzo). of the complaint; and
In the present case, R failed to tender genuine issues. All they 3. That they hereby reserve the right to present an amended answer with
gave were stock answers like "they have no sufficient knowledge" or special defenses and counterclaim
"they could not recall because it happened a long time ago," and, as to
Mrs. Marcos, "the funds were lawfully acquired," without stating the appellants did not file any amended answer so petitioners moved for
basis of such assertions. judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the answer failed to
Section 10, Rule 8 provides that a defendant must specify tender an issue
each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit. The
purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific denial is to make RTC granted petitioners motion and thereafter rendered a judgment in
them disclose facts which will disprove the allegations of petitioner at their favor
the trial, together with the matters they rely upon in support of such
denial. It is to avoid and prevent unnecessary expenses and waste of the lower court held "that the denial by the defendants of the material
time by compelling both parties to lay their cards on the table, thus allegations of the complaint under the guise of lack of knowledge is a
reducing the controversy to its true terms. general denial so as to entitle the plaintiff to judgment on the pleadings
In the present case, Mrs. Marcos she claimed that the funds
were lawfully acquired. However, she failed to particularly stateISSUE: the whether the allegations made by defendants-appellants sufficient to
ultimate facts surrounding the lawful manner or mode of acquisition of tender a triable issue
the subject funds. Simply put, she merely stated in her answer with the HELD: NO
other respondents that the funds were "lawfully acquired" without Section 7 of Rule 9 of the Rules of court, in allowing the defendant to
controvert material averments not within his knowledge or information,
detailing how exactly these funds were supposedly acquired legally by
provides that "where the defendant is without knowledge or information
them. It is true that one of the modes of specific denial under the rules is sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of material averment, he shall so
a denial through a statement that the defendant is without knowledge or state and this shall have the effect of a denial
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the material Just as the explicit denials of an answer should be either general or
averment in the complaint. However, such a general, self-serving claim specific, so all denials of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
of ignorance of the facts was insufficient to raise an issue. R Marcoses belief should refer either generally to all the averments of the complain"
should have positively stated how it was that they were supposedly thus intended to be denied, or specifically to such as are to be denied by
that particular form of plea. The would be so definite and certain in its
ignorant of the facts alleged. allegation that the pleaders' adversary should not be left in doubt as to
Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is what is admitted, what is denied, and what is covered by denials of
called in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief. Under this form of
pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading denial employed by the defendant, it would be difficult, if not impossible
responded to which are not squarely denied. A negative pregnant is a to convict him of perjury if it should transpire that some of his denials of
knowledge, etc., were false, for he could meet the charge by saying that
his denials referred only to matters of which he had in fact no knowledge
or information
In the case at bar, A copy of the mortgaged deed was attached and
made a part of the complaint. There are also allegations of partial
payments, defaults in the payment of outstanding balance, and a
covenant to pay interest and attorney's fees. It is hard to believe that the
appellants could not have had knowledge or information as to the truth
or falsity of any of said allegations
As a copy of the deed of mortgage formed part of the complaint, it was
easy for and within the power of the appellants, for instance, to
determine and so specifically allege in their answer whether or not they
had executed the alleged mortgage
An unexplained denial of information and belief of a matter of records,
the means of information concerning which are within the control of the
pleader, on are readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to
constitute an effective denial
The form of denial adopted by the appellants, although allowed by the
Rules of Court, must be availed of with sincerity and in good faith,—
certainly neither for the purpose of confusing the adverse party as to
what allegations of the complaint are really put in issue nor for, the
purpose of delay
the appellants obviously did not have any defense or wanted to delay
the proceedings
This rule, specifically authorizing an answer that defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief his to the truth of an averment and giving such answer is not the effect of a denial, does not apply where the
fact as to which want of knowledge is asserted is to the knowledge of the court as plainly and necessarily within the
defendants knowledge that his averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue
Modes of Specific Denial respondents that they are the registered owners of the subject property
Gaza vs. Lim (2003) is unavailing.”
Facts: We observe that the Court of Appeals failed to consider paragraph
Gaza purchased a parcel of land in Quezon from Vda de 2 of petitioners’ answer quoted as follows:
Urrutia. RD Lucena cancelled the latters title and issued a TCT in favor "2. That defendants specifically deny the allegations in paragraph 2 and
of Gaza. The Gazas engaged in lumber and copra business, they 3 of the complaint for want of knowledge or information sufficient to form
constructed implements on the property. They eventually ceased in the a belief as to the truth thereof, the truth of the matter being those
business, the property was left to the care of Ernesto and eventually alleged in the special and affirmative defenses of the defendants;"
Petil and was padlocked. The Lims are the half-siblings of Gaza, they Clearly, petitioners specifically denied the allegations contained in
claimed they used the same property for their lumber and copra paragraphs 2 and 3 of the complaint that respondents have prior and
business, they presented a Lumber Cert of Reg and Mayor’s permit. In continuous possession of the disputed property which they used for their
1993 the padlock was destroyed, according to Gaza, his half-siblings lumber and copra business. Petitioners did not merely allege they have
broke the lock of the main gate without the consent of Petil, the care no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to truth of
taker, entered the property and occupied the second floor of the those allegations in the complaint, but added Special and Affirmative
warehouse and. The Gazas then forcibly opened the 2 nd floor and defenses.
occupied it. The Lims filed with the MTC an action for forcible entry "From the allegations of plaintiffs, it appears that their possession of the
against the Gazas. The Gazas then answered with compulsory subject property was not supported by any concrete title or right,
counterclaim, the CCC was dismissed but the decision was for the nowhere in the complaint that they alleged either as an owner or lessee,
Gazas. On appeal, the RTC modified the MTC decision by removing hence, the alleged possession of plaintiffs is questionable from all
moral and exemplary damages. The CA reversed the MTC and RTC aspects. Defendants Sps. Napoleon Gaza and Evelyn Gaza being the
decision. The Gazas filed MR but was denied. registered owner of the subject property has all the right to enjoy the
Issues: same, to use it, as an owner and in support thereof, a copy of the
13. Whether or not the CA erred that there was no implied admission on the transfer certificate of title No. T-47263 is hereto attached and marked as
part of the petitioners, of prior and actual possession? Annex "A- Gaza" and a copy of the Declaration of Real Property is
14. Whether or not the CA erred in resolving the issue of implied admission, likewise attached and marked as Annex "B- Gaza" to form an integral
not being one of the issues settled in the pre-trial? part hereof;
Held: YES. "6. That considering that the above-entitled case is an ejectment case,
Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as and considering further that the complaint did not state or there is no
amended, provides that material averments in the complaint, other than showing that the matter was referred to a Lupon for conciliation under
those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed the provisions of P.D. No. 1508, the Revised Rule on Summary
admitted when not specifically denied. Section 1019 of the same Rule Procedure of 1991, particularly Section 18 thereof provides that such a
provides the manner in which specific denial must be made: failure is jurisdictional, hence, subject to dismissal;
Three (3) modes of specific denial are contemplated by the above "7. That the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the
provisions, namely: action or suit;
(1) by specifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the "The complaint is for forcible entry and the plaintiffs were praying for
truth of which the defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable, indemnification in the sum of P350,000.00 for those copra, lumber,
setting forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to tools, and machinery listed in par. 4 of the complaint and P100,000.00
support his denial; for unrealized income in the use of the establishment, considering the
(2) by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true and foregoing amounts not to be rentals, Section 1 A (1) and (2) of the
material and denying only the remainder; Revised Rule on Summary Procedure prohibits recovery of the same,
(3) by stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information hence, the Honorable Court can not acquire jurisdiction over the
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the same. Besides, the defendants Napoleon Gaza and Evelyn Gaza being
complaint, which has the effect of a denial the owners of those properties cited in par. 4 of the complaint except for
The Court of Appeals held that spouses Gaza, petitioners, failed to those copra and two (2) live carabaos outside of the subject premises,
deny specifically, in their answer, paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the complaint plaintiffs have no rights whatsoever in claiming damages that it may
for forcible entry. suffer, as and by way of proof of ownership of said properties cited in
The Court of Appeals then concluded that since petitioners did not paragraph 4 of the complaint attached herewith are bunched of
deny specifically in their answer the allegations in the complaint, they documents to form an integral part hereof;
judicially admitted that Ramon and Agnes Lim, respondents, “were in The above-quoted paragraph 2 and Special and Affirmative
prior physical possession of the subject property, and the action for Defenses contained in petitioners’ answer glaringly show that petitioners
forcible entry which they filed against private respondents (spouses did not admit impliedly that respondents have been in prior and actual
Gaza) must be decided in their favor. The defense of private physical possession of the property. Actually, petitioners are repudiating
vehemently respondents’ possession, stressing that they (petitioners)
are the registered owners and lawful occupants thereof.
19 Respondents' reliance on Warner Barnes and Co., Ltd. vs.
Reyes in maintaining that petitioners made an implied admission in their
answer is misplaced. In the cited case, the defendants' answer merely
"Section 10. Specific Denial. – A defendant must specify each
material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever
alleged that they were "without knowledge or information sufficient to
practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to form a belief as to the truth of the material averments of the remainder
support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, of the complaint" and "that they hereby reserve the right to present an
he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the amended answer with special defenses and counterclaim." In the instant
remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he
case, petitioners enumerated their special and affirmative defenses in
shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial." their answer. They also specified therein each allegation in the
complaint being denied by them. They particularly alleged they are the
registered owners and lawful possessors of the land and denied having
wrested possession of the premises from the respondents throughc. When the shipment arrived at ABB Koppel, it was discovered that only
force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth. They asserted that 65 out of 120 pcs of motors were actually delivered and the remaining
respondents' purported possession is "questionable from all could not be accounted for
aspects." They also averred that they own all the personal properties16. The shipment was purportedly insured with Malayan. Petitioner Malayan
enumerated in respondents' complaint, except the two paid ABB Koppel the amount insured and was then subrogated to the
carabaos. Indeed, nowhere in the answer can we discern an implied rights of ABB Koppel against Regis and Paircargo;
admission of the allegations of the complaint, specifically the allegation17. Petitioner Malayan filed a complaint for damages against respondents in
that petitioners have priority of possession. MeTC presenting the Marine Risk Note as proof of insurance on the
Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that herein petitioners impliedly admitted respondents' allegation that
cargo
they have prior and continuous possession of the property.
18. MeTC ruled that only Regis (respondent) is liable; RTC affirmed MeTC
Casent Realty vs Philbanking but the CA vacated RTC’s judgment
Casent Realty executed 2 promisory notes in favor of Rare Realty (Ona. CA ruled that the Marine Risk Note presented as proof of the insurance
the 2 loans, initially hundreds of thousands pero by the time this case policy was invalid. It also pointed the fact that the Marine Risk Note was
happened, millions na coz of interest). However, Rare assigned the procured after the occurrence of the loss (which is not allowed in
rights to the PNs in favor of Philbanking. Philbanking and Casent on the Insurance Law)
other hand went into a Dacion agreement to erase all indebtedness of Issue: Whether the Marine Risk Note is sufficient? – NO
Casent to Philbanking by conveying all their rights to Iloilo City Ruling:
properties. Philbanking is now collecting on the 2 PNs from Rare.19. Since no insurance policy was presented by petitioner, there is no basis
Casent is contesting that there is no more indebtedness by virtue of the for this court to admit or consider the same.
Dacion agreement and the fact that Philbanking even confirmed such20. Since the Marine Insurance Policy was never presented, there is no
agreement. They felt so strongly about their case that they file for legal basis to consider it in the resolution of the case
Demurer of evidence, which Philbanking didn’t answer to. RTC ruled in21. It is important to note that the Marine Risk note is merely supplementary
favor of Casent. CA overturned stating that the PNs were not part of
to the contract of insurance. The insurance policy should have been
Casent’s debts to the bank but to Rare.
attached to the complaint
Issue: Does respondent's failure to file a Reply and deny the Dacion
22. Section 7, Rule 9 is mandatory! Since petitioner alluded to an
and Confirmation Statement under oath constitute a judicial admission
actionable document, the contract of insurance should have
of the genuineness and due execution of these documents?
been attached to the complaint;
Held: SC ruled partly in favor of Casent, but Philbanking was awarded
23. If a legal claim is irrefragably sourced from an actionable document, the defendants cannot be
the judgment for their claim of money against Casent. (The 2 PNs deprived of the right to examine or utilize said document in order to intelligently raise a defense. The inability or
already matured while still with Rare, long before they assigned them to refusal of the plaintiff to submit such document into evidence constitutes an effective denial of that right of the
Philbanking as security for Rare’s own loans, clearly the PNs are defendant which is ultimately rooted in due process of law.
Casent’s debt to Rare, not the Bank).
“Genuineness merely refers to the fact that the signatures were not
SANTOS, JR. vs PNOC EXPLORATION CORPORATION
falsified and/or whether there was no substantial alteration to the
document. While due execution refers to whether the document was
Topic: no default motu proprio
signed by one with authority.”
Rule 8, Section 8 of the Rules of Court:
FACTS:
Section 8. How to contest such documents. — When an action
or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached
PNOC filed a complainr for sum of money against petitioner Pedro
to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the
Santos for the unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by
genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed
respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors.
admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them,
Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could not
and sets forth, what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an
be located in his last known address and the trial court allowed service
oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a
of summons by publication. Santos failed to file an answer so
party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an
respondent moved of reception of evidence ex parte and the case was
inspection of the original instrument is refused.
deemed submitted for decision. Santos filed an omnibus MR on the
Since respondent failed to file a Reply, in effect, respondent admitted
ground that the affidavit of service by respondent failed to comply with
the genuineness and due execution of said documents.
the rules as it was not executed by the clerk of court and that he was
On that point Casent is correct, Philbanking DID NOT disprove the
denied due process when he was not notified. Trial court denied MR.
Genuineness and Due execution of the Dacion. that but that is not the
RTC and CA rendered judgment ordering Santos to pay the amount to
real issue, the issue is money and the real fact is that whether the PNs
PNOC
were part of the Dacion in the first place.
Admission of the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation Statement does not prevent the
introduction of evidence showing that the Dacion excludes the promissory notes. ISSUE: was the declaration of Santos in default valid? NO
It is even worse when the court issues an order not denominated as an "Mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to the case.
order of default, but provides for the application of effects of default. The word "mistake," which grants relief from judgment, does not apply
Such amounts to the circumvention of the rigid requirements of a default and was never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might
order, to wit: (1) the court must have validly acquired jurisdiction over
have committed in the trial. Such errors may be corrected by means of
the person of the defendant; (2) the defendant failed to timely file his
answer; and (3) there must be a motion to declare the defendant in an appeal. This does not exist in the case at bar, because respondent
default with notice to the latter. has in no wise been prevented from interposing an appeal.
H/R: NO, default judgment still requires presentation of evidence
"Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, the amounting to a preponderance of evidence.
kind which prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or Petitioners argue that the quantum of evidence for judgments
presenting his case to the court,or was used to procure the judgment flowing from a default order under Section 3 of Rule 9 is not the same
without fair submission of the controversy. This is not present in the as that provided for in Section 1 of Rule 133 (preponderance of
case at hand as respondent was not prevented from securing a fair trial evidence).
and was given the opportunity to present her case. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court has
ascertained that the relief is warranted by the evidence offered and the
Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and facts proven by the presenting party. It would be meaningless to require
prudence could not have guarded against. Under Section 1 Rule 38, the presentation of evidence if every time the other party is declared in
"negligence" must be excusable and generally imputable to the party default, a decision would automatically be rendered in favor of the non-
because if it is imputable to the counsel, it is binding on the client. To defaulting party and exactly according to the tenor of his prayer. This is
follow a contrary rule and allow a party to disown his counsel's conduct not contemplated by the Rules nor is it sanctioned by the due process
would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening clause. (Pascua v. Florendo)
by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. What the aggrieved litigant The court is not supposed to admit that which is basically
should do is seek administrative sanctions against the erring counsel incompetent. Although the defendant would not be in a position to
and not ask for the reversal of the court's ruling. object, justice requires that only legal evidence should be considered
against him. If the evidence presented should not be sufficient to justify
In Tuason v CA, the court explained the nature of a Petition for Relief a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be dismissed. And if an
from Judgment: unfavorable judgment should be justifiable, it cannot exceed in amount
“A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed or be different in kind from what is prayed for in the complaint. (Lim
only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate Tanhu v. Ramolete)
Any advantage they may have gained from the ex parte presentation of evidence does not lower
remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may
the degree of proof required.
be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of
the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or
[G.R. No. 158401, January 28, 2008]
excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, Petitioner, vs. WILLIAM
cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a GOTHONG & ABOITIZ (WG&A), INC., Respondent
party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the
loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the FACTS:
petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had WG&A for brevity is a duly organized domestic corporation engaged in
been lost thru inexcusable negligence.” the shipping industry
PPA, on the other hand, is a government-owned and controlled
company created to operate and administer the country's sea port and
In the case, Montalban contended that judgment was entered against
port facilities.
her through mistake or fraud because she was not duly served WG&A and PPA entered into a lease contract wherein WG&A leased the
summons. However, under the discussion of the following grounds, the Marine Slip Way of PPA until such time that PPA turns over its
SC sees no merit in her petition. operations to the winning bidder for the North Harbor Modernization
Project
*Petition for Relief from Judgment is set aside. PPA allegedly terminated the contract prior to the expiration period
which prompted WG&A to file on November 28, 2001, an Injunction suit
before the RTC. It likewise prayed for the issuance of a temporary
G.R. No. 151098 March 21, 2006
restraining order to arrest the evacuation. In its complaint, it also sought
ERLINDA GAJUDO, FERNANDO GAJUDO, JR., ESTELITA recovery of damages for breach of contract and attorney's fees.
GAJUDO, BALTAZAR GAJUDO and DANILO ARAHAN CHUA, On December 11, 2001, WG&A amended its complaint for the first time
Petitioners, The complaint was still denominated as one for Injunction with prayer for
vs. TRO. In the said amended pleading, the petitioner incorporated
1
TRADERS ROYAL BANK, Respondent. statements to the effect that PPA is already estopped from denying that
F: The case is a Complaint for Annulment of Real Estate the correct period of lease is “until such time that the North Harbor
Mortgage filed by the P’s against the R Bank. Modernization Project has been bidded out to and operations turned
P Chua obtained a loan from the R secured by a real estate over to the winning bidder. It likewise included, as its third cause of
mortgage. P Chua failed to pay, hence extra-judicial foreclosure and action, the additional relief in its prayer, that should the petitioner be
auction sale ensued. After the auction sale, P Chua offered to buy back forced to vacate the said facility, it should be deemed as entitled to be
the property and R agreed to sell it back. However, the R suddenly refunded of the value of the improvements it introduced in the leased
property
changed its position, increasing the payment of P to the current market
Following the first amendment in the WG&A's complaint, PPA submitted
value of the foreclosed property. Hence the aforementioned complaint its answer on January 23, 2002
was filed. Meanwhile, the TRO was denied by the trial court by way of an order
During trial, a conflagration hit the Quezon City Hall and dated January 16, 2002
destroyed the records of the case. The P’s refiled the complaint. R failed Shortly thereafter, WG&A filed a Motion to Admit Attached Second
to answer. P’s filed a Motion to Declare R in Default for failing to file an Amended Complaint
This time, however, the complaint was already captioned as one for
answer despite being served with Summons. Upon proof that summons
Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
was indeed served, the RTC issued an Order of Default against R and Preliminary Injunction and damages and/or for Reformation of Contract.
allowed presentation of evidence ex parte. R filed a Motion to Set Aside Also, it included as its fourth cause of action and additional relief in its
the Order of Default and averred that the failure to file its Answer was prayer, the reformation of the contract as it failed to express or embody
due to a mistake of the typist and inadvertence of counsel. RTC denied the true intent of the contracting parties
the motion. CA ruled that the Order of Default was proper. Hence this PPA opposed the amendment on the ground that the reformation sought
appeal. for by the petitioner constituted substantial amendment, which if
I: WN the quantum of proof in default judgment is different that granted, will substantially alter the latter's cause of action and theory of
the case
that required in civil cases (i.e. preponderance of evidence).
RTC denied the Admission of the Second Amended Complaint In the case at bar, petitioners filed their motion for leave of court to
RTC applied the old Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court instead of admit amended answer only after respondents have rested their case.
the the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amending Section 3, Rule 10 Petitioners argue that the error was due to the oversight of the three
OLD SECTION 3, RULE 10: previous counsels. Petitioners’ fourth counsel also claims that he
Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. – After the case is set for
learned of the alternative defense late as his clients (petitioners herein)
hearing, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of
court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that did not inform him of the Deed of Sale. Allegedly, they relied on the
the motion was made with intent to delay the action or that the cause of advice of their previous counsels that the said deed of sale “was a mere
action or defense is substantially altered. Orders of the court upon the scrap of paper because it was not signed by Carlito de
matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, Juan.” Respondents contend that petitioners’ motion is too late in the
and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard day.
NEW SECTION 3, RULE 10:
SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the
Petitioners’ motion for admission of amended answer may be a
next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only
upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the little tardy but this by itself is not a cause for its denial. Their amended
court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court answer alleges that respondents no longer own the subject property
upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion having sold the same to de Juan who, in turn, sold the property to
filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to petitioners. These allegations, if correct, are vital to the disposition of the
be heard case at bar. The interest of justice and equity demand that they be
On appeal, CA directed the RTC to admit respondent's second considered to avoid a result that is iniquitous. Truth cannot be barred by
amended complaint pursuant to Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of
technical rules. For this reason, our ruling case law holds that
Civil Procedure
ISSUE: whether or not the second amended complaint should be admitted amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally
HELD: YES allowed in furtherance of justice so that every case may so far as
RTC erred in applying the old Sec. 3 , Rule 10 instead of the provisions possible be determined on its real facts and in order to prevent
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure the circuity of action.
The application of the old Rules by the RTC almost five years after its
amendment by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure patently constitutes Bautista vs. Maya-Maya Cottages
grave abuse of discretion
Allowed Amendments
The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that
under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially Sps Bautista claimed to be the owner of a property in Nasugbu,
alter the cause of action or defense." Batangas by virtue of an OCT. Maya-maya cottages filed for the
This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or cancellation of the cancellation of the title, alleging “without any color of
alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to right and through dubious means.” Sps filed a motion to dismiss stating
be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and that maya-maya has no cause of action, and that as a private
prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules corporation, cannot own real property. The RTC granted the MTD.
which is to secure a “just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
Maya-maya then filed an MR and motion for leave to file amended
action and proceeding
complaint for quieting of title. The RTC approved, thus reversing the first
When Amendments Allowed MTD. The CA affirmed.
Quirao vs. Quirao (2003) Issue: Is Maya-maya already prohibited from filing an amendment?
Held: (Indeed, they can.)
Facts: Section 2, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
provides:
Respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession, “SEC. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. – A party may amend his
ownership and damages against the petitioners. The respondents claim pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive
that the owner of the subject property, sugarland was owned by the late pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10)
Leopoldo Quirao, the respondents are his widow and son. days after it is served.”
The above provision clearly shows that before the filing of any
In their answer, the petitioners claim that the sugarland was responsive pleading, a party has the absolute right to amend his
owned by their grandfather, Segundo Clarito. AFTER filing their answer, pleading, regardless of whether a new cause of action or change in
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, citing an Extra-judicial partition with theory is introduced. It is settled that a motion to dismiss is not the
sale of the subject property executed by respondents in favor of a responsive pleading contemplated by the Rule. Records show that
certain De Juan. So they argue that since the respondents are no longer petitioners had not yet filed a responsive pleading to the original
owners, they have no standing to file the complaint. complaint. What they filed was a motion to dismiss. It follows that
respondent, as a plaintiff, may file an amended complaint even after the
The case underwent pre-trial, trial ensued and respondents original complaint was ordered dismissed, provided that the order of
rested their case. Petitioners then filed a “Motion for leave of court to dismissal is not yet final, as in this case.
admit attached amended answer”, they sought to add an alternative
defense that even if respondents were owners of the property by CAGUNGUN vs PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK
inheritance, the respondents executed a deed of extra-judicial partition
of property in favor of De Juan. WHEREIN DE JUAN sold part of the Topic: Conform to evidence
property to them (petitioners), evidenced by a deed of sale and a receipt
of partial payment. FACTS:
Issue: Whether or not an amended answer is still allowed even after The Cagungun spouses filed suit with RTC against Country
pre-trial conference, after the respondents rested their case? Development Bank. Vicente Cagungun died and was substituted by his
children as plaintiff while Country entered into merger whose name has
Held: YES. been changed to Planters Development Bank. Country had opened an
extension office in Olongapo and among their first customers were the
Cagungun spouses who had diverse business interests in the locality the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the
and they opened some accounts. The Cagungun spouses claimed and pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall
testified that the exigencies of their business required them to deposit do so freely when presentation of the merits of the action will be
daily so they entrusted and left with the bank the savings pass books. subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that
The Cagungun spouses received a letter from Country telling them that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his
their loan was past due and that payment was being demanded. This action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance
prompted them to investigate and despite difficulties, because they had to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
connections, they were able to access and pry information and found
that there were invalid withdrawals which were unauthorized, made or It is thus clear that when there is an objection on the evidence
received by depositors with forged signatures of Vicente Cagungun. The presented because it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, an
lower court ruled that the withdrawals were not made by petitioners and amendment must be made before accepting such evidence. If no
the signatures of Cagungun appearing therein were falsified as amendment is made, the evidence objected to can’t be considered. In
confirmed by an NBI handwriting expert. The court also considered the case before us, the trial court, there being an objection on the
petitioners to have paid their mortgage loan in view of the instructions to evidence being presented by respondent, failed to order the amendment
apply funds adequate for the purpose. For not applying the savings of of the complaint. Thus, we are constrained not to consider evidence
petitioners in the savings account as payment to their loan thereby regarding the amounts allegedly withdrawn from their accounts. With
causing the threatened foreclosure of the real estate mortgage over this ruling, it follows that the outstanding loan of petitioners in the
their house and lot, and for allowing the unauthorized withdrawals remains unpaid.
through the falsified deposit slips, the lower court held respondent liable
to pay for moral damages. Exemplary damages were also awarded for As regards respondent’s right to exercise its right to foreclosure of
the refusal to give access to bank records. Attorney’s fees were also the real estate mortgage on petitioners’ property, we rule that
awarded. respondent cannot exercise such right under the circumstances
obtaining. It will be the height of inequity if we allow such a thing.
The CA agreed that the money withdrawn were without the knowledge
and authority of petitioners but however held that petitioners are not free DO-ALL METAL INDUSTRIES, ET AL v. SECURITY BANK (2011)
from the obligation to pay the loan for though the same was not paid for
failure to comply with the instructions of petitioners, it remained an The Lim family, thru Do-All Metal Industries, owed money from
Security Bank. Since they were unable to pay their indebtedness, they
unpaid obligation. It removed the award of exemplary and moral
assigned their property in Pasig City to the Bank as payment
damages. thereof. Thereafter, the Bank agreed to lease the property to
the Lims, indicating that should the bank opt to sell the property, the
RULING: Lims, thru DMI, shall be given the right of first refusal.
Eventually, the Bank decided to sell the property, offering it
The award for moral and exemplary damages is proper. As to first to the Lims. However, no agreement regarding the purchase price
the more pertinent parts of the ruling related to the topic, Petitioners was reached by the parties. Because of this, the Bank posted
security guards around the area and prevented the Lims
claim that the CA erred in deleting the portions of the RTC decision
from entering the property.
declaring their mortgage loan paid and enjoining foreclosure. They insist Alleging that they suffered damages due to the Bank’s
that they were able to prove that certain amounts were withdrawn from malicious conduct, the Lims sued the Bank for damages. They also
their account and they were not applied to pay the loan and that the asked for an injunction against the Bank to allow them to enter the
amounts were sufficient to pay their loan and the real estate mortgage premises. Upon checking the premises however, they
would have been discharged. discovered that some of their personal properties are missing.
They thus filed a supplemental complaint against the Bank alleging an
additional P27M.
Looking at the complaint filed by petitioners, there is no allegation that
said amounts were withdrawn from their accounts and that same were Issue:
not applied as payments for their loan. Petitioners likewise did not ask W/N damages may be awarded based on the a
in their prayer that said amounts be returned to them or that they be l l e g a t i o n s i n a s u p p l e m e n t a l complaint without prior payment
used to off-set their indebtedness to respondent. Moreover, when of docket fees?
petitioners tried to prove this allegation, counsel for respondent objected
and attempted to have the testimony thereon stricken off the record. SC = NO.
22 23
While it is true that there was no positive act on the part of the court to Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious
lift the default order because there was no motion nor order to that reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution on a
effect, the anti-graft court's act of granting respondent the opportunity to pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not
file a responsive pleading meant the lifting of the default order on terms
eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail,
the court deemed proper in the interest of justice
2) YES considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal
the allegations against former President Marcos appear obviously service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to
couched in general terms. They do not cite the ultimate facts to show appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices:
how the Marcoses acted "in unlawful concert" with Cruz in illegally
amassing assets, property and funds in amounts disproportionate to serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard,
Cruz's lawful income, except that the former President Marcos was the thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance,
president at the time
responsive pleadings or an opposition; or
The 1991 Virata-Mapa Doctrine42 prescribes a motion for a bill of
particulars, not a motion to dismiss, as the remedy for perceived
ambiguity or vagueness of a complaint for the recovery of ill-gotten (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered
wealth,43 which was similarly worded as the complaint in this case. That containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be
doctrine provided protective precedent in favor of respondent when he claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse,
filed his motion for a bill of particulars not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of
While the allegations as to the alleged specific acts of Cruz were clear, such pleading or other papers.
they were vague and unclear as to the acts of the Marcos couple who
were allegedly "in unlawful concert with" the former. There was no
factual allegation in the original and expanded complaints on the If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation
collaboration of or on the kind of support extended by former President to our set of adjective rules requiring personal service whenever
Marcos to Cruz in the commission of the alleged unlawful acts practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court
constituting the alleged plunder. All the allegations against the the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the
Marcoses, aside from being maladroitly laid, were couched in general other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and no
terms. The alleged acts, conditions and circumstances that could show written explanation was made as to why personal service was
the conspiracy among the defendants were not particularized and
not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must,
sufficiently set forth by petitioner
Phrases like "in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for
with grave and scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws," Section 11 itself begins with the clause “whenever practicable ”.
"unjust enrichment," "embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth," "arrogated unto himself
all powers of government," are easy and easy to read; they have potential media quotability and they evoke
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11,
passion with literary flair, not to mention that it was populist to flaunt those statements in the late 1980s. But
they are just that, accusations by generalization. Motherhood statements they are, although now they might be
Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
a politically incorrect expression and an affront to mothers everywhere, although they best describe the personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes
accusations against the Marcoses in the case at bar of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal
Personal Filing and Service service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time,
Maceda vs. Vda. De Macatangay (2006) place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when
personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be
Facts: had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to
why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In
Petitioner Sonia Maceda and Bonifacio Macatangay were adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise
married, and had one child. They separated and executed a consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues
“Kasunduan” where they agreed to live separately. Macatangay soon involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be
lived with Carmen, they had 3 children. Macatangay passed away, he expunged for violation of Section 11.
was a member of the SSS. His common law wife, Carmen filed a death
benefit application with the SSS Lucena branch, the latter denied her In the case at bar, the address of respondent’s counsel is
application stating that Sonia was the primary beneficiary. Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner Sonia’s counsel’s
is LucenaCity. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away
Sonia filed a death benefit application. The 3 illegitimate from Lucena City Such distance makes personal service
children likewise filed their separate applications for the death benefit. impracticable. As inMusa v. Amor, a written explanation why service
Sonias application was granted. Bonifacio’s mother, respondent Vda de was not done personally “might have been superfluous.”
Macatangay filed a petition before the Social Security Commission
(SSC) that she was the designated beneficiary together with the 3 illegit As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal
children. SSS QC intervened, stating that Sonia was not dependent construction of a rule of procedure has been allowed where, among
upon Bonifacio for support and cannot be considered the primary other cases, “the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate
beneficiary. The SSC taking into consideration the Kasunduan as proof with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
that Sonia was no longer dependent for support on Bonifacio. procedure prescribed.”
Sonia filed a petition for review before the CA which was Without preempting the findings of the Court of Appeals on the
dismissed outright for failing to include a written explanation as to why merits of petitioners’ petition in CA G.R. No. 73038, if petitioners’
respondents were not personally served copies of the petition. allegations of fact and of law therein are true and the outright dismissal
of their petition is upheld without giving them the opportunity to prove
Issue: Whether or not the petition should be dismissed due to Sonia’s their allegations, petitioner Sonia would be deprived of her rightful death
failure to include a written explanation as to why respondents were not benefits just because of the Kasunduan she forged with her
personally served copies of the petition? husband Macatangay which contract is, in the first place, unlawful. The
resulting injustice would not be commensurate to petitioners’ counsel’s
Held: No. “thoughtlessness” in not explaining why respondents were not
personally served copies of the petition.
addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days
Andy Quelnan vs VHF Philippines from the date of the first notice, service becomes effective upon t
Service by registered mail he expiration of five (5) days therefrom.[14] In such a case, there arises
VHF filed an ejectment case against Quelnan in the MeTC. Substituted a presumption that the service was complete at the end of the said five-
service of summons was sent to his wife. Quelnan failed to answer day period. This means that the period to appeal or to file the necessary
which prompted the court to release its ruling in favor of VHF. The pleading begins to run after five days from the first notice given by the
decision was sent through registered mail, but Quelnan failed to claim it postmaster. This is because a party is deemed to have received and to
even after 3 notices. When the notice to vacate came, Quelnan file a have been notified of the judgment at that point.
Petition for relief of Judgment from the RTC. RTC agreed, stating there With the reality that petitioner was first notified by the postmaster on
was excusable negligence when the wife apparently tore the summons November 25, 1992, it follows that service of a copy of the MeTC
in anger. decision was deemed complete and effective five (5) days therefrom or
Issues: on November 30, 1992. Necessarily, the 60-day period for filing a
(1) If a party fails to claim his copy of the adverse decision which was petition for relief must be reckoned from such date (November 30, 1992)
sent through registered mail, when is he deemed to have knowledge of as this was the day when actual receipt by petitioner is presumed. In
said decision? short, petitioner was deemed to have knowledge of the MeTC decision
(2) Will the presumption of completeness of service of a registered mail on November 30, 1992. The 60-day period for filing a petition for relief
matter under Rule 13, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure thus expired on January 29, 1993. Unfortunately, it was only on May 24,
apply in relation to the 60-day period for filing a petition for relief from 1993, or 175 days after petitioner was deemed to have learned of the
judgment under Rule 38, Section 3 of the Rules? judgment that he filed his petition for relief with the RTC. Indubitably, the
Held: (Quelnan’s position that he had no knowledge of the decision and petition was filed way beyond the 60-day period provided by law.
that he was not sent the summons is untenable, 1) there was valid
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE 2)he received 3 NOTICES for the decision.)
Relief from judgment under Rule 38 is a legal remedy SPS. BELEN vs HONORABLE CHAVEZ
whereby a party seeks to set aside a judgment rendered against him by
a court whenever he was unjustly deprived of a hearing or was Topic: Service by registered mail
prevented from taking an appeal, in either case, because of fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable neglect. FACTS:
Section 3 of Rule 38 reads: The private respondents spouses Pacleb, represented by their Atty.
SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. — A petition Rioveros, filed before the RTC of Batangas an action for enforcement of
provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be a foreign judgment against petitioner spouses Belen. The complaint
alleged that the private respondents secured a judgment by default from
verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the
the Superior Court of Californiaand the judgment ordered petitioners to
judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more pay respondents an amount representing the loan payment and share in
than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or the profits plus interesr and costs of suit. The summons was served on
such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits, petitioners’ address in Laguna, as was alleged in the complaint, and
showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied received by Marcelino Belen. Atty. Alcantara filed an answer alleging
upon and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial that contrary to respondents’ averment, petitioners were actually
cause of action or defense, as the case may be. (Emphasis supplied) residents of California, USA and that the liability was extinguished by a
release of abstract judgment in the same collection case. In view of
Clear it is from the above that a petition for relief from judgment must be
petitioners’ failure to attend trial,the RTC ordered the ex parte
filed within: (a) 60 days from knowledge of judgment, order or other presentation of evidence but before such took place, Atty. Alcantara filed
proceedings to be set aside; and (b) six (6) months from entry of such a MTD citing the judgment of dismissal issued by the SC of California.
judgment, order or other proceeding. These two periods must concur. For failure to present a copy of the alleged judgment, the MTD was
Both periods are also not extendible and never interrupted. Indeed, denied. Petitioners and Atty. Alcantara failed to appear at the pre-trial
relief is allowed only in exceptional cases as when there is no other conference thus the RTC declared petitioners in default and allowed the
available or adequate remedy. ex parte presentation of evidence. Atty. Alcantara passed away without
the RTC being informed and the RTC rendered a decision ordering
when he became aware of the judgment subject of his petition for relief.
petitioners to pay. A copy of the RTC decision intended for Atty.
The records clearly reveal that a copy of the MeTC decision was sent to Alcantara was returned with the notation "Addressee Deceased." A copy
petitioner through registered mail at his given address on November 25, of the RTC decision was then sent to the purported address of
1992. It should be noted that petitioner was not represented by counsel petitioners in San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna and was received by a
during the proceedings before the MeTC. The first notice to him by the certain Leopoldo Avecilla. Meanwhile, immediately after the
postmaster to check his mail was on November 25, 1992. Thereafter, promulgation of the RTC decision, private respondents filed an ex-parte
subsequent notices were sent by the postmaster on December 7, 1992 motion for preliminary attachment which the RTC granted. Private
respondents sought the execution of the RTC decision. The RTC
and December 11, 1992. For sure, a certification that the registered mail
directed the issuance of a writ of execution. Upon the issuance of a writ
was unclaimed by the petitioner and thus returned to the sender after of execution, the real properties belonging to petitioners were levied
three successive notices was issued by the postmaster. Hence, service upon and the public auction. Atty. Carmelo B. Culvera entered his
of said MeTC decision became effective five (5) days after November appearance as counsel for petitioners. Atty. Culvera filed a Motion to
25, 1992, or on November 30, 1992, conformably with Rule 13, Section Quash Writ of Execution (With Prayer to Defer Further Actions). He later
10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads: filed a Notice of Appeal from the RTC Decision averring that he received
a copy thereof only on 29 December 2003. The CA dismissed the
SEC. 10. Completeness of Service. − Personal service is complete upon
petition for certiorari of petitioners.
actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration ISSUES:
of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners
Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the through either the proper service of summons or the appearance of the
addressee, or after five (5) days from the date he received the first late Atty. Alcantara on behalf of petitioners
notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier. (Emphasis supplied) whether there was a valid service of the copy of the RTC decision on
There is no doubt that under the Rules, service by registered mail is petitioners.
RULING:
complete upon actual receipt by the addressee. However, if the
On one hand, courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing On November 2, 1995, respondent court [3] rendered a decision in
of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a favor of the private respondent ordering the petitioner to pay the former.
civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them Copy of the decision sent to petitioner was returned for the reason that it
or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to
had “moved” (residence), while copy sent to Atty. Arnold M. Aquino, then
its authority. As a rule, if defendants have not been summoned, the
court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment petitioner’s counsel, was returned “unserved” being unclaimed.
rendered against them is null and void. To be bound by a decision, a Petitioner states that a copy of the decision was personally delivered by
party should first be subject to the court’s jurisdiction. In an action in the Civil Docket Clerk of the trial court on Atty. Aquino who had refused
personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not to receive the same saying he was no longer counsel for the petitioner,
voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service although no notice of withdrawal as counsel was filed by him in court.
of summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction
over her person. This method of service is possible if such defendant is
On April 11, 1996, private respondent filed a motion for
physically present in the country. If he is not found therein, the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly execution of the judgment, copy furnished to Atty. Arnold M. Aquino and
try and decide the case against him. The action filed against petitioners, petitioner which the court granted on October 9, 1996. The assailed writ
prior to the amendment of the complaint, is for the enforcement of a of execution was correspondingly issued, which petitioner received on
foreign judgment in a complaint for breach of contract whereby October 30, 1996.
petitioners were ordered to pay private respondents the monetary
award. It is in the nature of an action in personam because private On November 5, 1996, Atty. Jose de Luna entered his
respondents are suing to enforce their personal rights under said
appearance as new counsel for the petitioner with motion for
judgment.
Applying the foregoing rules on the service of summons to the instant reconsideration of the order dated October 9, 1996 granting the motion
case, in an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the for execution or the quashal of the writ of execution on the ground that
defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the petitioner had not been duly notified of the decision.
court is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case
through personal service or, if this is not possible and he cannot be On November 9, 1996, petitioner received a Notice of Demand
personally served, substituted service as provided in Rule 14, Sections for Payment from the deputies of the Ex-officio Sheriff of the RTC of
6-7. If defendant cannot be served with summons because he is
Cagayan attaching thereto copies of the writ of execution and the
temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of
summons may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines decision. On November 14, 1996, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.
under Rule 14, Section 15. In all of these cases, it should be noted, Two(2) months later, on January 23, 1997, the respondent court issued
defendant must be a resident of the Philippines, otherwise an action in the assailed resolution denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration or
personam cannot be brought because jurisdiction over his person is to quash writ of execution.
essential to make a binding decision.
However, the records of the case reveal that herein petitioners have Petitioner went to the CA on a petition for certiorari claiming that
been permanent residents of California, U.S.A. since the filing of the
action up to the present. From the time Atty. Alcantara filed an answer the denial of the respondent Judge of its motion for reconsideration was
purportedly at the instance of petitioners’ relatives, it has been tainted with grave abuse of discretion since he was not duly notified of
consistently maintained that petitioners were not physically present in the decision and there is no legal and factual basis for the issuance of
the Philippines. In the answer, Atty. Alcantara had already averred that the writ of execution.[5] The appellate court found no such abuse of
petitioners were residents of California, U.S.A. and that he was discretion and dismissed the petition. [6] It likewise denied petitioner’s
appearing only upon the instance of petitioners’ relatives. motion for reconsideration.[7]
We now come to the question of whether the service of a copy of the
RTC decision on a certain Teodoro Abecilla is the proper reckoning point
in determining when the RTC decision became final and executory. The Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari alleging
Court of Appeals arrived at its conclusion on the premise that Teodoro that:
Abecilla acted as petitioners’ agent when he received a copy of the RTC
decision. As a general rule, when a party is represented by counsel of ISSUES
record, service of orders and notices must be made upon said attorney WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITED A GRAVE ABUSE
and notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel of OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN
record, is not notice in law. The exception to this rule is when service
EXCESS OF IT IN FINDING THAT THE UNJUSTIFIABLE REFUSAL OF
upon the party himself has been ordered by the court. In the instant
case, a copy of the RTC decision was sent first to Atty. Alcantara, PETITIONER’S COUNSEL ON RECORD TO RECEIVE IN OPEN
petitioners’ counsel of record. However, the same was returned COURT A COPY OF THE SUBJECT DECISION IS ONLY A MERE
unserved in view of the demise of Atty. Alcantara. Thus, a copy was NEGLIGENCE OF COUNSEL AND THEREFORE, BINDS
subsequently sent to petitioners’ "last known address in San Gregorio, PETITIONER, HENCE, THE DECISION HAD BECOME FINAL AND
Alaminos, Laguna," which was received by a certain Leopoldo Avecilla. EXECUTORY.
Undoubtedly, upon the death of Atty. Alcantara, the lawyer-client relationship between him and petitioners has
ceased, thus, the service of the RTC decision on him is ineffective and did not bind petitioners. The subsequent
service on petitioners’ purported "last known address" by registered mail is also defective because it does not
comply with the requisites under the aforequoted Section 7 of Rule 13 on service by registered mail. Section 7 WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
of Rule 13 contemplates service at the present address of the party and not at any other address of the party. OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF RESPONDENT
Service at the party’s former address or his last known address or any address other than his present address
JUDGE, BY CITING JURISPRUDENCE ON “NEGLIGENCE OF
does not qualify as substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 7, Rule 13. Therefore, service by
COUNSEL BINDS HIS CLIENT” WHICH IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE
registered mail presupposes that the present address of the party is known and if the person who receives the
same is not the addressee, he must be duly authorized by the former to receive the paper on behalf of the party
INSTANT CASE BECAUSE THEY HAVE DIFFERENT FACTS.[8]
GCP vs Precipe
HELD:
FACTS
On April 18, 1990, private respondent filed the herein complaint I. The Court does not agree.
for damages for physical injuries sustained by him as a passenger of
petitioner’s bus. Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that clients are
bound by the actions of their counsel in the conduct of their case. [14] If it
were otherwise, and a lawyer’s mistake or negligence was admitted as a
reason for the opening of a case, there would be no end to litigation so DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA and RONBERTO VALINO, Sheriff IV,
long as counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Pasig City, Respondents.
learned.[15] F: Jovencio Rebuquiao was the registered owner of the property
in dispute. He executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of P Sps
The only exception to the general rule is when the counsel’s Vicente. Subsequently, he executed another Deed of Absolute Sale in
actuations are gross or palpable, resulting in serious injustice to client, favor of R Avera and her then husband.
that courts should accord relief to the party.[16] Indeed, if the error or R Avera would eventually file a Petition for Declaration of
negligence of the counsel did not result in the deprivation of due Nullity of Marriage docketed as a JDRC Case. She asserted exclusive
process to the client, nullification of the decision grounded on grave ownership over the property in dispute and a Notice of Lis Pendens was
abuse of discretion is not warranted.[17] issued. Eventually a TCT in the names of the P’s was issued despite the
Notice of lis pendens.
In this case, while Atty. Aquino, counsel of petitioner, was far from In the JDRC case, a judgment was rendered in favor of R
being vigilant in protecting the interest of his client, his infractions cannot Avera ordering that the property in dispute be put in the custody of R
be said to have deprived petitioner of due process that would justify Avera and not her husband. A Writ of Execution was issued and
deviation from the general rule that clients are bound by the actions of enforced by the R Sheriff Valino.
their counsel. Thus, P filed for Injunction against R Sheriff. RTC ordered a
TRO. CA reversed. Hence this appeal.
HELD 2 P’s contend that they are not bound by the judgment in the
The fact that Atty. Aquino refused to receive a copy of the decision JDRC Case because they are not parties to the case notwithstanding
and no substituted service was effected does not erase the fact that a the Notice of Lis pendens.
copy of the trial court decision had earlier been sent by registered mail I: WN the P’s are bound by the judgment in the JDRC case
to Atty. Aquino which was returned for the reason that he has moved. [27] because of the Notice of lis pendens.
This is sufficient service of the decision on petitioner since service upon H/R: NO, the Notice of lis pendens in the JDRC case does not bind
counsel of record at his given address is service to petitioner. [28] As the P’s.
explained in Macondray & Co., Inc. vs. Provident Insurance Corp. :[29] Section 24, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Civil Procedure
If counsel moves to another address without informing the court provides that a purchaser of the property affected by the Notice of lis
of that change, such omission or neglect is inexcusable and will not stay pendens is deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the
the finality of the decision. “The court cannot be expected to take judicial action only from the time of filing such notice. Section 14, Rule 13 of the
notice of the new address of a lawyer who has moved or to ascertain on 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reiterates this rule. Thus, a notice of lis
its own whether or not the counsel of record has been changed and who pendens affects a transferee pendente lite, who by virtue of the notice,
the new counsel could possibly be or where he probably resides or is bound by any judgment, which may be rendered for or against the
holds office.”[30] transferor, and his title is subject to the results of the pending litigation.
Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any subsequent
The rule is that when a party is represented by counsel in an transaction affecting the land involved would have to be subject to the
action in court, notices of all kinds including motions, pleadings and outcome of the litigation. A purchaser who buys registered land with full
orders must be served on the counsel. And notice to such counsel is notice of the fact that it is in litigation between the vendor and a third
notice to the client.[31] Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon party stands in the shoes of his vendor and his title is subject to the
the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an incidents of the pending litigation.
adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a In the case at bar, the notice of lis pendens does not affect petitioners’
ground for setting aside a judgment, valid and regular on its face. [32] title to the property in dispute. A notice of lis pendens concerns litigation
between a transferor and a third party. The notice of lis pendens does
While the rule admits of exceptions, in order to prevent a not concern litigation involving Rebuquiao, who transferred his title to
miscarriage of justice,[33] no such circumstance is here present as the property in dispute to petitioners, and his title. The notice of lis
petitioner was duly accorded due process. pendens pertains to the JDRC case, an action for nullity of the marriage
between Avera and Domingo. Since Rebuquiao’s title to the property in
dispute is not subject to the results of the JDRC case, petitioners’ title to
This Court has also held that in cases where service was the same property is also not subject to the results of the JDRC case.
made on the counsel of record at his given address, notice sent to
petitioner itself is not even necessary.[34] Even then, in the present case,
the trial court had sent a copy of the decision to petitioner’s known
address which was returned however for the reason that it has moved.
[35]