Minos Synopsis and Themes

Socrates and an unnamed companion discuss the question “what is law?”

Minos Outline
[All quotations are from the Malcolm Schofield translation of Minos in Plato: Complete
Works, John M. Cooper, ed. , Hackett Publishing Company, 1997, unless otherwise indicated.
I also consulted the W.R.M Lamb translation in the Loeb Classical Library edition.]

(313A)—SOCRATES RAISES THE QUESTION OF THEIR (HIS AND HIS INTERLOCUTOR’S)

VIEW OF LAW IS. HIS FRIEND ASKS WHAT SORTS OF LAW HE MEANS. SOCRATES ASKS
IF LAW CAN BE DIFFERENT FROM LAW JUST INSOFAR AS IT IS LAW. SOCRATES USES
THE EXAMPLE OF GOLD TO SUGGEST THAT THE QUESTION ‘WHAT IS X?” CANNOT BE
APPROPRIATE ANSWERED BY THE QUESTION “WHAT SORT OF X?”
(313A-B)—GOLD DOES NOT DIFFER FROM GOLD WITH RESPECT TO BEING GOLD; SO
TOO IN THE CASE OF STONE. SO TOO LAWS ARE ALL LAWS –ONE IS NOT MORE AND
ANOTHER LESS. SO WHAT IS A LAW?
(313B)—HIS FRIEND SAYS THAT LAW IS WHAT IS ACCEPTED (NOMIZOMENON—THE
PRESENT PASSIVE PARTICIPLE OF NOMIZO)
(313C)—SOCRATES SUGGESTS SOME ANALOGIES:
 SPEECH IS WHAT IS SPOKEN
 SIGHT IS WHAT IS SEEN
 HEARING IS WHAT IS HEARD
BUT THEN HE PRESENTS AS AN ALTERNATIVE THE OPPOSITE POINT OF VIEW: SPEECH
MIGHT BE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS SPOKEN, SIGHT MIGHT BE DIFFERENT FROM
WHAT IS SEEN, HEARING DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS HEARD, ETC. SO TOO LAW MIGHT
BE ONE THING, AND WHAT IS ACCEPTED MIGHTE ANOTHER. HE ASKS THE
INTERLOCUTOR TO GIVE HIS VIEW ON THIS MATTER.
(313C)—THE FRIEND NOW THINKS THEY ARE TWO DIFFERENT THINGS—SO LAW IS
NOT (AFTER ALL) WHAT IS ACCEPTED.
(313C-314B)—SOCRATES SUGGESTS ANOTHER WAY TO INVESTIGATE THE QUESTION:
 SEEING IS BASED ON EYE-PERCEPTION
 HEARING IS BASED ON EAR-PERCEPTION
 LEARNING IS BASED ON KNOWLEDGE
 DISCOVERY IS DISCOVERED –E.G., FACTS ABOUT HEALTH, BY MEANS OF
MEDICINE, INTENTIONS OF THE GODS BY DIVINATION.
--A SKILL IS A “DISCOVERY OF THINGS” [EURESIS TON PRAGMATON] –-SO LAW IS A
FORM OF PERCEPTION OR REVEALING
(314B-C) – SOCRATES ASKS HIS FRIEND TO CHOOSE AMONG THE AVAILABLE
ALTTENATIVES. THE FRIEND SAYS THE LAWS ARE THE RESOLUTIONS THEMSEVLES—
LAWS ARE THE DOGMATA (TEACHINGS) OF THE POLIS. SOCRATES SAYS THAT HE
MEANS THAT THE LAWS ARE POLITICAL; SOCRATES SAYS THIS MIGHT BE A GOOD
ANSWER BUT MAYBE THEY COULD GET A BETTER ANSWER IN ANOTHER WAY (THUS
INTRODUCING ANOTHER DIALECTICAL EXCHANGE).
(314C-D)—
 THE WISE ARE WISE BY WISDOM
 THE JUST ARE JUST BY JUSTICE
  THE LAW-ABIDING ARE SO BY VIRTUE OF LAWS; THE LAWLESS ARE SO BY
LAWLESSNESS.
 THE LAW-ABIDING ARE (ALSO) JUST; THE LAWLESS ARE UNJUST.
 LAW AND JUSTICE ARE VERY FINE (KALLISTON, MOST EXCELLCENT).
INJUSTICE AND LAWLESSNESS ARE VERY SHAMEFUL (AISCHISTON). “THE ONE
PRESERVES CITIES AND EVERYTHING ELSE, BUT THE OTHER DESTROYS AND
SUBVERTS THEM.”
SOCRATES CONCLUDES THAT THEY MUST THINK OF LAW AS FINE OR NOBLE AND
SEEK IT AS GOOD. BUT LAW IS THE RESOLUTION (DOGMA) OF A CITY.
(314E)—BUT SOME DOGMATA ARE ADMIRABLE AND OTHERS ARE WICKED; BUT LAW
WAS NOT WICKED; BUT IF THEY AGREE TO ALL OF THAT, THEN LAW CANNOT SIMPLY
BE THE RESOLUTION OF A CITY; A WICKED RESOLUTION CANNOT BE A (TRUE) LAW.
BUT SOCRATES SAYS THE LAW IS A KIND OF JUDGMENT OR OPINION –AN ADMIRABLE
OPINION (CHRESTE DOXA).
(315A)—BUT SUCH ADMIRABLE OPINIONS ARE TRUE OPINIONS, AND TRUE OPINIONS
ARE THE DISCOVERY OF BEING (HE ALETHES DOXA TOU ONTOS ESTIN EXEURESIS)
“THEN THE LAW WISHES OR INTENDS TO BE THE DISCOVERY OF BEING” (HO NOMOS
ARA BOULETAI TOU ONTOS EINAI EXEURESIS). HIS COMPANION ASKS WHY ARE NOT
ALWAYS THE SAME ON THE SAME MATTERS IF THEY ARE BASED ON REALITY.
(315A-B)—SOCRATES SAYS IT IS NONETHELESS TRUE THAT LAW WANTS TO BE THE
DISCOVERY OF BEING BUT HUMANS SOMETIMES DO NOT DISCOVER WHAT THE LAW
INTENDS (BOULETAI). SOCRATES THEN WANTS TO LOOK TO SEE WHETHER OR NOT
HUMANS DO IN FACE USE DIFFERENT LALWS OR THE SAME ONES, ETC.
(315B-D)-- HIS FRIEND THINKS THIS IS NOT DIFFICULT QUESTION. HE GIVES
EXAMPLES: WE THINK HUMAN SACRIFICE IS UNHOLY BUT THE CATHAGINIANS DO IT;
SOME EVEN SACRIFICE THEIR OWN SONS TO CHRONUS. THE PEOPLE OF LYCIA AND
DESCENDENTS OF ATHANES DO TOO, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE GREEKS; WE OURSELVES
(HE SAYS) HAD DIFFERENT LAWS IN THE PAST WITH RESPECT TO FUNERAL CUSTOMS.
IN EARLIER TIMES PEOPLE BURIED THEIR DEAD IN THE HOUSE; PEOPLE TODAY DO
NOT. HE SAYS THAT THOUSANDS OF EXAMPLES COULD BE GIVEN TO SHOW THAT 1)
WE DO NOT ALWAYS HAVE THE SAME LAWS, AND 2) DIFFERENT PEOPLE HAVE
DIFFERENT LAWS
(315D-E)—SOCRATES SAYS THIS ALL MIGHT BE CORRECT, BUT THAT IF THEY
CONTINUE TO SPEAK IN LONG SPEECHES, HE MAY NOT UNDERSTAND AND SO THEY
MIGHT NOT REACH AGREEMENT. BUT THEY MIGHT COME TO AGREE IF THEY MAKE
AN INQUIRY TOGETHER BY MEANS OF THE QUESTION AND ANSWER METHOD. HE
GIVES HIS FRIEND THE CHOICE OF ASKING OR ANSWERING; HIS FRIEND IS WILLING TO
ANSWER
(315E- 316B) ---ARE JUST THINGS UNJUST, OR VICE VERSA? OR IS THE JUST JUST, AND
THE UNJUST UNJUST? THE INTERLOCUTOR CHOOSES THE LATTER AND SOCRATES
POINTS OUT THAT ALL PEOPLE AGREE ABOUT THIS POINT; FOR EXAMPLE, INCLUDING
THE PERSIANS, AND ALWAYS, AT ALL TIMES THOSE WHICH PULL DOWN THE SAME
SCALE MORE ARE HEAVIER AND THOSE WHICH DO IT LESS ARE LIGHTER, HERE AND
EVEN OVER THERE IN CARTHAGE AND LYCIA. THINGS THAT ARE FINE ARE FINE
(NOBLE), AND THINGS SHAMEFUL ARE SHAMEFUL—NOT THE FINE SHAMEFUL OR THE
SHAMEFUL FINE. SOCRATES GENERALIZES: WHAT IS (ACCEPTED AS) SO IS SO, WHAT
IS NOT (ACCEPTED AS) SO IS NOT, EVERYWHERE.
(316B-C)—ONE WHO MISTAKES WHAT IS (ACCEPTED AS) 2SO MISTAKES WHAT IS
(ACCEPTED AS) SO. HIS FRIEND NOW AGREES BASED ON THE WAY SOCRATES HAS PUT
IT; BUT HE IS NOT CONVINCED WHEN HE THINGS OF THE WAY “WE ARE CONSTANTLY
TURNING THE LAWS UPSIDE DOWN.”
(316C)—SOCRATES POINTS OUT THAT WHEN WE MOVE THE PIECES IN A GAME ( LIKE
CHECKERS, ETC) THEY ARE STILL THE SAME PIECES. [NOTE: NOTICE WHAT THIS
ANALOGY IS SAYING ABOUT THE KIND OF ARGUMENT HE IS REALLY MAKING HERE. I
THINK THE ‘PIECES’ IN THE GAME CORRESPOND TO HAVING FIXED DEFINITIONS IN
THE CASE OF THE LAWS, I.E, TRUTHS BY DEFINITION OR FORMAL KNOWLEDGE;
MOVING THE PIECES IN THE GAME WOULD CORRESPOND TO EMPIRICAL JUDGMENTS].
(316C-D)--SOCRATES SUGGESTS A NEW WAY TO LOOK AT THE MATTER –WHAT
FOLLOWS IS A SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF DIALECTICAL QUESTIONING: TREATISES ON
HEALTH FOR THE SICK ARE BASED ON THE ART OF MEDICINE; THOSE WHO HAVE THIS
KNOWLEDGE ARE DOCTORS. PEOPLE WHO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SAME SUBJECT
ACCEPT THE SAME THINGS ON THE SAME MATTERS—THIS IS TRUE WHETHER THE
KNOWERS ARE GREEKS OR FOREIGNERS –AND IT IS TRUE THE KNOWERS AGREE
ALWAYS.
(316E-317A)—DOCTORS IN TREATISES ON HEALTH WRITE WHAT THEY ACCEPT AS
BEING SO; THE TREATISES ARE MEDICAL AND ARE LAWS OF MEDICINE. SO TOO,
FARMING TREATISES ARE LAWS OF FARMING—AND THE ANALOGY FOLLOWS WITH
THE ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES OF GARDENING AND COOKING. THE KNOWERS WRITE
THE TREATISES WHICH ARE THE ‘LAWS’ IN EACH CASE.
(317A-B)—IN THE CASE OF CITY ADMINISTRATION THE SAME IS TRUE—THE “KINGS
AND GOOD MEN” ARE THOSE WHO KNOW IN THIS CASE; AND THOSE WHO HAVE
KNOWLEDGE WILL NOT WRITE DIFFERENT THINGS ON DIFFERENT OCCASIONS ABOUT
THE SAME MATTERS. THEY WILL NOT EVEN CHANGE ACCEPTED IDEAS ON THE SAME
MATTERS. [NOTE THE TRIVIALITY OF THIS POINT—HE IS TALKING ABOUT IDEALIZED
KNOWERS—IT IS ‘TRIVIAL’ BECAUSE IF CHANGES ARE RELEVANT, THEN WE ARE NOT
REALLY TALKING ABOUT ‘THE SAME MATTERS’]. SO SOCRATES CONCLUDES THAT
THOSE WHO DO DISAGREE AND CHANGE IN THIS WAY ARE NOT KNOWERS, AND ONLY
WHATEVER IS REALLY CORRECT IS THE “ACCEPTED IDEA” IN EACH FIELD (MEDICINE,
COOKERY, GARDENING, ETC).
(317C)—WHATEVER IS NOT CORRECT, WE WILL NOT CALL THE ‘ACCEPTED’ IDEA OR
THE LAWFUL; SO IT IS ‘UNLAWFUL’. AND IN TREATISES ON LAW AND THE
ORGANIZATION OF CITY-STATES, THE CORRECT IS “A LAW OF ROYAL SKILL” BUT
WHAT IS NOT CORRECT IS UNLAWFUL—EVEN IF THOSE WHO DO NO KNOW THINK IT
IS A LAW.
(317D-318A)—SO SOCRATES CONCLUDES THAT THE PREVIOUS DEFINITION OF LAW AS
A DISCOVERY OF REALITY WAS CORRECT. NEXT, AS A FURTHER POINT SOCRATES
USES A CRAFT ANALOGY YET AGAIN. THE FARMER KNOWS HOW TO DISTRIBUTE
SEEDS –HE DISTRIBUTES APPROPRIATE SEEDS TO DIFFERENT TYPES OF LAND. THE
FARMER AND HIS LAWS DO THIS APPORTIONING WELL. THE NEXT CASE: NOTES IN
SONGS—THE FLUTE PLAYERS AND LUTE PLAYERS KNOWING HOW TO DISTRIBUTE
THEM. THE PERSON WITH THE BEST LAWS IN THIS FIELD IS THE ONE WHOSE SKILLS
AT FLUTE-PLAYING ARE BEST. LIKEWISE, THE PERSON WHO BEST DISTRIBUTES FOOD
IS THE ONE WHO DOES IT WORTHILY AND HIS LAWS AND SKILL ARE BEST IN THIS
AREA. THE TRAINER “PASTURES [NEMEIN] THE HUMAN HERD OF THE BODY” [LAMB
TRANSLATION]. ANALOGOUS EXAMPLES FOLLOW OF THE SHEPHERD AND THE
COWHERD
(318A-D)—BY ANALOGY, THE KING’S LAWS ARE BEST FOR HUMAN SOULS. SOCRATES
PRAISES THE INTERLOCUTOR’S ANSWERS; THEN SOCRATES ASKS WHO IN THE PAST
WAS A GOOD LAWGIVER OF FLUTEPLAYING—AND OFFERS TO REMIND HIM—WHICH
HE THEN DOES: MARSYAS AND OLYMPUS THE PHRYGIAN—THEIR TURNS WERE MOST
DIVERSE, AND STIR AND REVEAL THOSE “IN NEED OF THE GODS”. THEN SOCRATES
ASKS FOR THE PARALLEL CASE AMONG ANCIENT KINGS—WHO HAD THE MOST
DIVINE LAWS? THE INTERLOCUTOR CANNOT SAY; SOCRATES ASKS WHICH GREEKS
USE THE OLDEST LAWS; THE INTERLOCUTOR GUESSES THE SPARTANS, BUT
SOCRATES SAYS THEIR BEST LAWS COME FROM THE CRETANS—THE CRETANS HAVE
THE OLDEST LAWS AMONG THE GREEKS. SOCRATES SAYS THEIR GOOD KINGS WITH
GOOD LAWS WERE MINOS AND RHADAMANTHUS (SONS OF ZEUS AND EUROPA).
(318D-E)—HIS FRIEND NOTES THAT THESE TWO HAD DIFFERENT REPUTATIONS—
RHADAMANTHUS WAS GOOD, BUT MINOS WAS SAID TO BE UNJUST. SOCRATES
CLAIMS THAT THIS ACCOUNT OF MINOS IS SLANDER COMING FROM THE ATTIC
POETS. HIS FRIEND IS INCREDULOUS, SO SOCRATES APPEALS TO A DIFFERENT
TRADITION IN HOMER AND HESIOD, CLAIMING THAT THEIR TESTIMONY IS WORTH
MORE THAN THAT OF THE TRAGEDIANS.
(318E-319B)—SOCRATES BEGINS HIS ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT WITH A PREFACE
ABOUT THE IMPIETY OF MISJUDGING GOOD AND BAD MEN; THE GOOD ARE LIKE THE
GODS, AND SO THE GODS FAVOR THEM, AND IT IS IMPIOUS TO PRAISE THEIR
OPPOSITES. GOOD HUMANS ARE SACRED AND WE MUST BE CAREFUL IN OUR
JUDGMENTS. SOCRATES IS GOING TO RELATE THIS TRADITION TO SAVE HIS FRIEND
FROM SLANDERING “A HERO WHO IS SON OF ZEUS”.
(319B-C)—SOCRATES RELATES HIS ACCOUNT FROM HOMER: MINOS WAS KIND OF
CNOSSUS IN CRETE. ZEUS IS A SOPHIST, I.E. A MASTER OF SOME EXCELLENT ART;
MINOS WAS EDUCATED BY ZEUS. HOMER SAYS OF NO ONE ELSE THAT HE WAS
EDUCATED BY ZEUS, SO THIS IS EXCEPTIONAL PRAISE. IN THE ODYSSEY IT IS MINOS
WHO JUDGES THE DEAD—NOT RHADAMANTHUS.
(319D-E) –TO CALL MINOS THE SON OF ZEUS WHO WAS EDUCATED BY ZEUS IS PRAISE
THAT CANNOT BE SURPASSED. SOCRATES INTERPRETS HOMER TO MEAN THAT EVERY
NINE YEARS MINOS WOULD GO TO THE CAVE OF ZEUS TO LEARN FROM HIM
(319E-320B)—SOME THINK THIS PASSAGE MEANS MINOS WAS A DRINKING
COMPANION OF ZEUS, BUT SOCRATES POINTS OUT THAT THE CRETANS AND THE
SPARTANS ABSTAIN FROM DRINKING PARTIES; INDEED, TO NOT GET DRUNK WAS ONE
OF MINOS’ LAWS. MINOS WOULD NOT HAVE MADE A LAW HE DID NOT FOLLOW.
MINOS’ EDUCATION WAS FOR VIRTUE; SO HE MADE THE BEST LAWS, WHICH MADE
CRETE AND SPARTA HAPPY.
(320C)—RHADAMANTHUS WAS GOOD, BUT WAS EDUCATED BY MINOS IN ONLY A
PART OF THE KING’S ART—NAMELY, THE JUDICIAL PART. RHADAMANTUS PRESIDED
OVER THE TOWN COURT; BUT TALOS WAS JUDGE OVER THE REST OF CRETE, AND HE
WAS CALLED ‘BRONZE’ BECAUSE HE HAD THE LAWS WRITTEN ON BRONZE TABLETS.
(320D)—HESIOD ON MINOS—REFERS TO MINOS “HOLDING THE SCEPTER OF ZEUS”
WHICH SOCRATES INTERPRETS AS A SYMBOL FOR THE EDUCATION ZEUS GAVE HIM
(320E)—SOCRATES’ FRIEND ASKS ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF MINOS’ BAD REPUTATION.
ACCORDING TO SOCRATES IT ALL STEMS FROM THE FACT THAT MINOS MADE A
MISTAKE IN ATTACKING ATHENS AND THEREFORE ANGERING THE ATHENIAN POETS
(321A)—TRAGIC POETRY DID NOT BEGIN WITH THESPIS OR PHRYNICHUS (AS IS
BELIEVED) BUT IS MUCH OLDER (ACCORDING TO SOCRATES)—AND BEGAN IN
ATHENS. TRAGEDY “MOST DELIGHTS THE POPULACE AND MOST SEDUCES THE SOUL”.
IN TRAGEDY THE ATHENIANS GOT REVENGE ON MINOS FOR THE TRIBUTE HE FORCED
THEM TO PAY.
(321B)—THE PROOF THAT HIS LAWS WERE GOOD IS THAT THE REMAIN UNALTERED,
SOCRATES CLAIMS; THIS SHOWS THAT THESE LAWS DO SUCCEED IN DISCLOSING
REALITY
(321B-C) –SOCRATES’ FRIEND FINDS ALL THIS LIKELY, AND WHEN ASKED AGREES.
SOCRATES SAYS THAT SINCE THE CRETANS USE THE MOST ANCIENT LAWS, THEN
MINOS AND RHADAMANTHUS WERE ‘GOOD SHEPHERDS’ OF THE PEOPLE—AS HOMER
SAYS OF THE GOOD GENERAL.
(321C)—THE GOOD LAWGIVER OF THE BODY USES DIET AND EXERCISE TO BRING
HEALTH TO THE BODY
(321D)—WHAT CORRESPONDS TO THIS FOR THE MIND? WHAT REPLY SHOULD WE
MAKE IN ORDER TO AVOID SHAME? SOCRATES’ FRIEND DOES NOT KNOW. SOCRATES
POINTS OUT HOW DISGRACEFUL IT IS THAT WE KNOW MORE ABOUT GOODNESS AND
BADNESS OF THE BODY THAN WE DO ABOUT THE GOODNESS AND BADNESS OF THE
SOUL.
THE END
Minos Commentary
[Translations of the Minos consulted: -- W. R. M. Lamb trans. (Loeb Classical Library,
Harvard University Press, 1927); —Malcom Schofield trans. (Plato: Complete Works, John
M. Cooper, ed. , Hackett Publishing Company, 1997);—Thomas L. Pangle trans.( The Roots
of Political Philosophy: Ten Forgotten Socratic Dialogues, Thomas L. Pangle, ed. Cornell
University Press, 1987)]
The dialogue opens with the question "what is law?" (Actually what is law hemin,`for us', or
`among us'). The unnamed comrade asks: what sort of laws? Socrates says one law is not
different from another insofar as it is law -- what is similar about these things is not different,
so should be susceptible to being given the same account. This assumes that it is in virtue of
some similarity that things are given the same name, a dubious presumption [if it is assumed
that this is the way things are in fact done; that it is the way things should be done is perhaps
less dubious, or at least capable of being argued]. Socrates adds to this another dubious claim,
perhaps a corollary: each law is law to the same degree. (To put it in terms of Forms: each
participant in a given Form really does participate in the Form and so really is a thing of that
kind; but that leaves open the possibility avoided here, that the thing might participate to a
greater or lesser extent in the Form.) Socrates asks `what is law as a whole?' The comrade
says: "the things that are lawfully accepted". ["Lawfully accetped" is a translation for a
participle formed from nomizo]. Socrates asks if speech is identical with the things spoken,
sight with the things seen, hearing with the things heard? If not, is law identical with the
things enacted in law? This makes law seem like a faculty-- a way of knowing or expressing
something other than itself, a medium. This confuses the comrade and he drops his first
defintion. But Socrates' suggestion for a new approach to the definition makes explicit the
implication above. Perhaps law is some perception or showing, as is art (techne); art is a
discovery of things. Law is thus linked to knowledge. This suggestion does not appeal to the
comrade, who represents the democratic view. Law is the official opinions and decrees passed
by votes, i.e. the official opinion of the city, says the interlocutor. (Remember, "law",
"nomos", is also the word for "convention", which is distinguished from "phusis", "nature".
This dialogue suggests a deep link between the democratic spirit and conventionalism and at
the extreme, even relativism).
Socrates begins an exchange in which he awakens the interlocutor's sense of the law as an
ideal,i.e., a sense of its ideal link with justice. [Appeal to the "ought" is the only way to get
people to question the "anything goes" implication of conventionalism]. He awakens a sense
of the law's purpose (a purpose by fulfiling which it becomes truly a law --suggesting a
standard by which laws could be measured, with respect to which they might vary in value
and being)(314C-314E).
Some official opinions are worthy, but others are wicked. But law (considered as an ideal, in
terms of its true purpose) in not wicked. So law cannot be official opinion without
qualifications. But law is some kind of opinion, says Socrates. So it must be worthy opinion,
i.e. true opinion (314E). The true is the discovery of what is. Law "wishes to be" or "tends to
be" (bouletai einai) the discovery of what is. (What is the word for "discovery" here? It is
'exeuresis'; according to Liddel-Scott, p.236, the same word can also mean 'invention'. Note
that this `discovery' cannot be full knowledge, if the knowledge-opinion distinction is to
hold).
The companions asks: then why don't we always use the same laws about the same matters?
(i.e. how to account for the variability of law?). Socrates responds that this is due to human
failure -- humans are not always able to discover the realities which laws are meant to
disclose (what the law "wishes" or "intends"-- bouletai). But he suggests that they consider
whether or not people always use the same or different laws; both the question of whether the
same people use different laws at different times, and the question of whether different
peoples use different laws, are raised. The comrade thinks this is obvious. He gives an
example: the acceptability of human sacrifice among the Carthaginians. And not only
barbarians, but Greeks as well sometimes do such things and have other strange customs. And
customs (e.g. about ways of burying the dead) have changed over time. Socrates responds by
making his accustomed complaint about the uselessness of making long speeches in turn, and
suggests instead that they make a common investigation, through question and answer.
Socrates leads the interlocutor to the conclusion that everyone agrees that the just is just, and
the unjust is unjust. (The argument seems terrible -- it blantantly ignores the point that what in
particular is considered "just" is different. How many ways are there of understanding this?
Socrates' argument suggests that the basic concepts and distinctions remain the same,
although there may be variations as to how to apply them. Is this a trivial or important point?
The comrade objects: We never stop changing the laws. Socrates says: "these things, being
moved as draughts pieces, remain the same." (316C). Socrates, then, seems to be wanting to
point out that there are generally principles we consistently have recourse to even while we
come to different conclusions in different applications of them. That is why they are draughts
pieces; we can use them in different ways, but we always use them. [Definitional statements
are like the game pieces; the way we use them is like the various statements we make with
them? Perhaps this passage suggests something like an ancient initimation of the distinction
between analytic and synthetic statements? Socrates, if interested in Forms, would be
interested in what seem like analytic statements--necessary truths, truths by definition. The
Quinean point that such a distinction would be relative to a context of a network of
background beliefs would be already taken care of by the nature of Socratic-Platonic
dialectic, in which results are known to be measured against a set of background beliefs.
There is some evidence in the dialogues that both Socrates the character and Plato the author
are aware of this relativity (although sometimes it seems otherwise, because often the
emphasis is on what has been determined relative to the current agreements without making
that relativity explicit); see Drew Hyland's Finitude and Transcendence in the Platonic
Dialogues for more ideas about this issue in Plato in general]. About things of which they
have knowledge, people agree, whether Greeks or barbarians. (Having knowledge seems to
imply having a single, univocal truth to know; at least if people know the same thing in the
same way, they must agree). Thus, he seems to suggest that we 'know' the principles at a
certain level and 'agree' about them, and that the disagreements happen mainly when it comes
to applying the principles? This would go along with the 'extreme' 'Platonic' view that we
know the abstract (and relatively empty) Forms but do not really 'know' (but merely have
opinions about) the world around us.
When those who know write what they know, they compose "laws" pertaining to their subject
matter. Those who have knowledge of how to rule a city write the true laws of the city --
statesmen, kings, and good men (and clearly the 'statesmen' and 'kings' here are idealized,
synonymous with 'good men'). Those who have knowledge will not write different things at
different times about the same things [Notice that this does not deny that many different
things will have to be taken into account at different times]. (If this is not understood in a
precise sense, Plato himself would constitute an exception!) Concerning the same matters
they will never change legal customs. (Again "same matters" is meant very strictly; cf.
the Statesman--there one of the failings of law is its inflexibility). Those who change their
laws are those who lack knowledge. Only those laws which are correct are true laws. "Laws"
that are not based on knowledge are not even true laws. The true lawgiver in each area is he
who has the knowledge to make a suitable distribution. When it came to flute-playing the best
lawgiver was Marsyas (and also his lover Olympos). Their tunes, most divine, "alone move
and reveal those who are in need of the gods" and have lasted, because they are divine. The
only comparable lawgivers and laws are those of Sparta and Crete. These are the most ancient
laws. When Socrates refers to "the oldest laws" the comrade thinks Socrates is talking about
Sparta at first, but Socrates corrects him -- these are not much more or less than 300 years old,
but the best of them are culled from the older Cretan laws, the most ancient laws among the
Greeks. Minos and Rhadamanthus were the good kings of these people. The comrade objects
about saying this of Minos, who was supposed to be a harsh tyrant. Socrates says that the
Attic poets made up this bad reputation.
But Homer and Hesiod tell a different story, and they are more trustworthy than the
tragedians. According to the account of Homer (as interpreted by Socrates), Minos was the
son of Zeus who received the laws from his father. Zeus is a sophist, and it is a noble art;
Zeus educates his son. Homer thus gives Minos a eulogy such as he bestows on no other.
Socrates objects to the interpretation of the passage he cites in Homer, that would take the
word "confidant" to mean that Minos was the drinking companion and playfellow of Zeus;
this cannot be, because only the Cretans and the Lacadaemonians, of all humans, both Greeks
and barbarians, "refrain from drinking parties and from this play that takes place where there
is wine"! Socrates expresses no criticism of this law in particular nor of the Cretan code in
general; he praises it instead as divine. [This seems to be a direct contradiction of what is said
in the Laws. If this dialogue was by another author than Plato, as it is usually taken to be,
could it have been around early enough to be a dialogue Plato is responding to in in the Laws?
Or is the author of this dialogue responding to the Laws? And if Plato is the author of both,
what is their relation?].
Rhadamanthus was in turn educated by Minos, to be his judge. Talus, the man of bronze,
earned that epithet by having these laws inscribed on bronze tablets. Socrates cites verses of
Hesiod about Minos (from some lost work); the "scepter" of Zeus really means the education
that came from Zeus. The companion demands some explanation for Minos' evil reputation.
Socrates' response: Minos warred against Athens and so angered the Athenian poets. It is
dangerous to anger the poets, who have such power over opinion. The stability of his laws are
evidence of their having discovered the truth, and that is evidence of Minos having been good
and lawful. The good lawgiver of the body distributes to it the proper "foods and toils" to
make the body better. But what is it the good lawgiver of the soul distributes to souls? The
dialogue ends with this problem unresolved, Socrates stating that they should be ashamed of
their ignorance of this matter. (There is the implication that less time and effort have been
spent studying the good and evil of the soul than has been spent studying the things of the
body and all else).

Minos Bibliography
Grote, G. 1867. Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates. Vol. I. London. Chap.4
“Platonic Canon, as Recognized by Thrasyllus,” and chap. 5, “Platonic Canon, as Appreciated
and Modified by Modern Critics.”
Guthrie, W. K. C. 1978. A History of Greek Philosophy. Vol. 5 Cambridge. Chap. 6
“Spurious and Doubtful Dialogues.”
Oswiecimski, S. 1978. “The Enigmatic Character of Some of Plato’s Apocrypha.” Eos 66: 31-
40.
Oswiecimski, S. 1979. “The Ancient Testimonies in the Face of the Platonic
Apocrypha.” Eos 67: 233-55.
Pavlu, J. 1910. Die pseudoplatonischen Zwillingsdialoge ‘Minos’ und ‘Hipparch.’ Vienna.
Strauss, Leo. “On the Minos.” In Liberalism Ancient and Modern. New York: Basic Books,
1968.

Minos Relationships
The Minos is sometimes considered a prelude to the Laws. As noted above: "Socrates objects
to the interpretation of the passage he cites in Homer, that would take the word "confidant" to
mean that Minos was the drinking companion and playfellow of Zeus; this cannot be, because
only the Cretans and the Lacadaemonians, of all humans, both Greeks and barbarians, "refrain
from drinking parties and from this play that takes place where there is wine"! Socrates
expresses no criticism of this law in particular nor of the Cretan code in general; he praises it
instead as divine. [This seems to be a direct contradiction of what is said in the Laws. If this
dialogue was by another author than Plato, as it is usually taken to be, could it have been
around early enough to be a dialogue Plato is responding to in in the Laws? Or is the author of
this dialogue responding to the Laws? And if Plato is the author of both, what is their
relation?]." Also as noted above: "The good lawgiver of the body distributes to it the proper
'foods and toils' to make the body better. But what is it the good lawgiver of the soul
distributes to souls? The dialogue ends with this problem unresolved, Socrates stating that
they should be ashamed of their ignorance of this matter. (There is the implication that less
time and effort have been spent studying the good and evil of the soul than has been spent
studying the things of the body and all else). Thelack of resolution of this problem of what the
good lawgiver would distribute to souls --in the way of the corresponding 'foods' and 'toils' for
the soul-- points to a similar aporia in the Clitophon and the Euthyemus, an aporia that
becomes evident in connection with the Republic as well, as soon as one realize how little one
has actually be told in that dialogue about just how the 'rational part' is to rule and order the
psyche. On the other hand, perhaps the Republic acccount of the ordered psyche implies more
substance than it seems to imply; perhaps one can connect the art of erotics possessed by
Socrates (mentioned in the Symposium) with the true arts of the psyche (mentioned in
the Gorgias) with the 'science of measure' (mentioned in the Protagoras) with the 'wisdom' of
properly ordering the psyche (discussed in the Republic)? Perhaps the appropriate 'foods' and
'toils' are philosophy and dialectic, or the educational currciula discussed in the Republic (for
philosopher-rulers) and the Laws (for members of the Nocturnal Council). Or perhaps they
are the presumably related studies of the Platonic Academy? Also, there is an allusion to such
foods and toils in the Alcibiades Major, which, although it playfully and deliberately
frustrates eager curiosity by delaying its relevations (as part of the process of disciplining and
humbling Alcibiades there), perhaps contains more information than it would seem to have on
the surface about how to care for the psyche.