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MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940

Doctrine: Social Justice

LAUREL, J.:

Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public
Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing
along the following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to

Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in
pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of
and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and
pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as
well.

Issues:

1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act
NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and
freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Held:

1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the
interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the
public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the
fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of
the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through
the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi
estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of
a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort
and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”

Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform


175 SCRA 343 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection – Valid Classification

Eminent Domain – Just Compensation

These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No.
6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).

Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by
the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the
right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the
case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was
promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers
and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands
covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian
reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was
also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while
considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are
not inconsistent with its provisions.

[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]

G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)

The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme
provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do
not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to
distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In
short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.

G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)

Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these
laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must be determined by
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which
provides that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the
constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not
necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of money and not in bonds.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.

3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.

HELD:

1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian reform
program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights
conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled
to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to
share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two
classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In
any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of
Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform
program.

2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is no law
which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can
be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so long as both
parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial
intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation determined by an
administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an
administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is
even so provided by RA 6657:

Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The
agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in
funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient
money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.

LUZ FARMS v. SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, GR No. 86889, 1990-12-04

Facts:

President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine... retary of
Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied
in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657

Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657
(Commercial Farms)

Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others
in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b),... Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law... and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No.
6657 promulgated

Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional

Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:

(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural
Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."

The Constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:

AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM

Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other... farmworkers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may... prescribe, taking into
account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small landowners. The State shall... further provide
incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety. In fact, it acknowledges the
correctness of the decision of this Court in the case of the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform

It, however, argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution,... in
including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 131). Livestock or poultry
raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary... resource in this undertaking and represents no
more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers.

On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture"
and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's International

Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the following words:

"Agriculture - the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding,
breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming.

It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking x x x.

Livestock - domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit.

Issues:

The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine
in its coverage as... well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith.

Ruling:

The petition is impressed with merit.

The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural,"
clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in
the coverage of... the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.

The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 186 of R.A. 3844, as land devoted
to any growth. Including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and... abandoned land (Record,
CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).

The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture."

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted
to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that
the aforecited... agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is
simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform (Rollo, p. 21).

Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing
"corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans"
(pending final redistribution of their... landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%)
of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is
unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore... violative of due process (Rollo, p. 21).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.


Natalia Realty Inc and Estate Developers & Investors Corp vs DAR
FACTS:
Petitioner Natalia is the owner of three contiguous parcels of land located in Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal.
On 18 April 1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located in the Municipalities of
Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were
designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The Natalia properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as
townsite reservation.
EDIC, developer of Natalia, applied for and was granted preliminary approval and locational clearances by the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission. Petitioners were likewise issued development permits after complying with the
requirements. Thus the Natalia properties later became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.
On 15 June 1988, CARL was enacted.
DAR, through MARO, issued a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which
consisted of roughly 90.3307 hectares.
Natalia and EDIC protested to this.
Members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo, Inc. (SAMBA), filed a complaint against Natalia and EDIC
before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain petitioners from developing areas under cultivation by SAMBA members.
DAR Regional ruled by temporarily restraining petitioners from further developing the subdivision.
Petitioners elevated their cause to DARAB but the latter merely remanded the case to the Regional Adjudicator for
further proceedings
Natalia wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform reiterating its request to set aside the Notice of Coverage.
Neither respondent Secretary nor respondent Director took action on the protest-letters.
Hence, this petition.
Natalia’s contention: Subject properties already ceased to be agricultural lands when they were included in the areas
reserved by presidential fiat for townsite reservation.
OSG’s contention: The permits granted petitioners were not valid and binding because they did not comply with the
implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers' Protective Decree," in that no application for conversion of the NATALIA lands from agricultural to residential was
ever filed with the DAR. In other words, there was no valid conversion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties shall be included in the coverage of CARP

HELD:
NO.
Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced,
all public and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands
which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands."
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language
be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands
upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation.

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED ITS PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, THE COURT OF APPEALS and ALVIN OBRIQUE,
REPRESENTING BUKIDNON FREE FARMERS

FACTS:
The petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural education institution owned and run by the estate located in the town of
Musuan, Bukidnon province. It started as a farm school at Marilag, Bukidnon, in early 1910, in response to the public
demand for an agricultural school in Mindanao. In the early 1960's, it was converted into a college until it became what
is now known as the CMU, but still primarily an agricultural university. On January 16, 1958 the late Carlos P. Garcia,
issued Proclamation No. 467, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a
site which would be the future campus of what is now the CMU. A total land area comprising 3,080 hectares was
surveyed and registered and titled in the name of the petitioner.Several tribes belonging to cultural communities,
opposed the petition claiming ownership of certain ancestral lands forming part of the tribal reservations. Some of the
claims were granted so that what was titled to the present petitioner school was reduced from 3,401 hectares to 3,080
hectares. In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap
Program" under which the land resources of the University were leased to its faculty and employees. This arrangement
was covered by a written contract. The faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five members each, and the
CMU provided technical know-how, practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4 to 5
hectares of land for the lowland rice projects. Each group pays the CMU a service fee and also a land use participant's
fee. It was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or
employees. This particular program was conceived as a multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity
program to utilize available land, train people in modern agricultural technology and at the same time give the faculty
and staff opportunity within the confines of the CMU reservation to earn additional income to augment their salaries.
Among the participants in this program were
Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao, Joven Caballero, Nestor Pulao, Danilo Vasquez, Aronio Pelayo and other complainants
(respondents).
Obrique was a Physics Instructor at the CMU while the others were employees in the lowland rice project. In 1986, the
agri-business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar cane known as Agri-Business Management and Training
Project was discontinued due to losses incurred while carrying on the said project. Some CMU personnel, among whom
were the complainants, were laid-off when this project was discontinued. The CMU later launched a self-help project
called CMU-Income Enhancement Program (CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote the
spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and technical training in actual field project implementation and augment
the income of the faculty and the staff. The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some contracts were renewed.
Those whose contracts were not renewed were served with notices to vacate. The non-renewal of the contracts, the
discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar can project, the loss of jobs due to termination or separation from the service
and the alleged harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of, the complaint.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No. 005 for Declaration of Status of Tenants and
coverage of land under the CARP.
2.) Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the Petition for Review on Certiorari and affirming the decision of DARAB.

RULING:

DARAB JURISDICTION LIMITED ONLY TO MATTERS INVOLVING IMPLEMENTATION OF CARP.


Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to
matters involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it is restricted to agrarian cases and controversies
involving lands falling within the coverage of the aforementioned program. It does not include those which are actually,
directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for, among such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting
up experimental farm stations, research and pilot production centers, etc.Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try,
hear and adjudicate the case pending before it involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the
CMU land reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by the school to be
necessary for its purposes. SEGREGATING SOME HECTARES OF LAND WITHOUT FINDING THAT COMPLAINANTS ARE
TENANTS: GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Where the quasi-judicial body finds that the complainants/petitioners are not entitled to the rights they are demanding,
it is an erroneous interpretation of authority for that quasi-judicial body to order private property to be awarded to
future beneficiaries. The order segregating 400 hectares of the CMU land was issued on a finding that the complainants
are not entitled as beneficiaries, and on an erroneous assumption that the CMU land which is excluded or exempted
under the law is subject to the coverage of the CARP. Going beyond what was asked by the complainants who were not
entitled to the relief prayed for, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion because it implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. NEITHER DARAB OR COURT OF APPEALS HAS RIGHT TO PASS
UPON NEEDS OF SCHOOL.
As to the determination of when and what lands are found to be necessary for use by the CMU, the school is in the best
position to resolve and answer the question and pass upon the problem of its needs in relation to its avowed objectives
for which the land was given to it by the State. Neither the DARAB nor the Court of Appeals has the right to substitute its
judgment or discretion on this matter, unless the evidentiary facts are so manifest as to show that the CMU has no real
need for the land. The evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of grave abuse of discretion by respondents Court of
Appeals and DAR Adjudication Board. The Court declared the decision of the DARAB and the Court of Appeals as null and
void and hereby order that they be set aside, with costs against the private respondents. ARMERS AGRICULTURAL
LABORERS ORGANIZATION (BUFFALO), respondents.

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