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HarmandCrime-Seriousness
I Introduction:
1. TheEmerging ofCrime-Seriousness
Importance
Thepresent topic,ofgauging harm,is partofa larger
criminal subjectthatwehave
beenmulling overforsometime:theseriousness ofcrime.The question ofhowto
has beengainingimportance
assesscrime-seriousness in recentyears,withthe
increasinginfluence or 'proportionalist'
of desert-oriented conceptionsof sen-
tencing--conceptionswhichmaketheseverity ofpunishment dependprincipally
on thegravityoftheoffence ofconviction.'
Thoseconceptions havefoundtheir
way into law in a numberof jurisdictions. SeveralUS stateshave adopted
sentencingguidelinesbasedin significant
parton offence Finlandand
gravity.2
Swedenhaveenactedsentencing laws(Finlandin 1976,Swedenin 1988)according
towhichpunishments aretodependprimarilyoncrimes'seriousness.3 Theselaws
(the'penalvalue'oftheoffence,
calluponjudgesto assesscrimes'gravity in the
Swedishlaw'sterminology)muchmoreexplicitly thanbefore, andtodeveloplegal
t grewoutofseveral
Thisarticle
FundFellowshipfrom
faculty attheLawFaculty,
seminars
theAmerican-Scandinavian
Foundation oneoftheauthors
enabled
A Thord-Gray
UppsalaUniversity. Memorial
toworkonthe
(vonHirsch)
inSpring
atUppsala
paper of1989.
Term
Ourthinking hasbeensubstantially
aidedbyextensive withUmaNarayan
discussions andAndrew Ashworth.We
forthecomments
arealsograteful andsuggestionsofseveral RonaldClarke,
colleagues: R. A. Duff,LenaHolmqvist,
DouglasHusak,James B. Jacobs,JohnKleinig, Sheldon AlvarNelson,DavidRichards,
Messinger, PaulRobinson,
Don E. Scheid,Richard Martha
Singer, JaneSmith, Henrik Tham,andMartin Wasik.
* Professor,SchoolofCriminal Justice,
Rutgers University,Newark, NJ,USA; Research Fellow,Law Faculty,
UppsalaUniversity,Sweden.
** ProfessorofCriminalLaw,Law Faculty, UppsalaUniversity,Sweden.
I See Andrew von Hirsch,Doing Justice(New York: Hill & Wang, 1976;reprinted, Boston:Northeastern
UniversityPress,1986);Richard
G. Singer,JustDeserts
(Cambridge,Mass:Ballinger,1979);Andrew vonHirsch,Past
orFutureCrimes(Manchester:ManchesterUniversityPress,1986);Andrew Ashworth,'Criminal andDeserved
Justice
Sentences'[1989]CrimL Rev 340; R. A. Duff,TrialsandPunishments (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,
1986);Andrew vonHirschandNilsJareborg, ochproportionalitet'
'Straff (1987)74 Nordisk forKrimnal-
Tidsskrift
videnskab 300;Andrew vonHirsch,'Proportionalityin thePhilosophy ofPunishment: From"WhyPunish?"to
"HowMuch?"'(1990)1 Criminal Law Forum 259.
2 Forexample, Minnesota,WashingtonStateandOregon haveadapted thatemphasize
guidelines of
proportionality
sentence.See Andrew vonHirsch,Kay Knapp,andMichaelTonry,TheSentencing Commission anditsGuidelines
(Boston:Northeastern Press,1987),chs2, 5 andAppendix;
University Oregon Admin. RulesSS253-02-20 (1989).
FinnishPenalCode,ch6; Swedish Criminal Code,chs29,30.
c OxfordUniversityPress1991 Oxford Journal ofLegalStudies Vol.11,No. I
2. Harmand Culpability
ofcrimehas twodimensions:
Seriousness harmand culpability.9
Harmrefersto
theinjury
doneorriskedbytheact;culpability, ofintent,
tothefactors motive
and
circumstancethatdetermine
the extentto whichtheoffendershouldbe held
II ScopeoftheAnalysis
We havelimited ofharminvariousrespects,
thescopeofouranalysis andshould
at
explain the what
outset those are.
limitations
1. Victimizing
CriminalConduct
The presentarticleaddressesonlythe harmfulness of criminal
conductwhich
injuresor threatens victims.
identifiable We are restrictingourselves
to conduct
alreadydeclaredcriminal,becauseourinterest inharmarisesinthecontext ofsen-
tencing We
policy. wish to assessharm, to see how serious theoffenceis; and we
wishtodetermine itsseriousnessforthepurposeofdetermining theseverity ofthe
punishment. Thereis, ofcourse,another context forconsideringharm-namely,
whendecidingwhether conductshouldbe declaredcriminalat all. Whether
conductis harmful,and howharmful it is, shouldbe an important factor in the
10
See MartinWasik,'Excusesat theSentencing Stage'[1983]CrimL Rev 450; Andrew vonHirschand Nils
Jareborg,'Provocationand Culpability',
in Ferdinand Schoeman Character
(ed), Responsibility, andtheEmotions
(Cambridge:Cambridge Press,1987)246.
University
" TheModelPenalCode,forexample, hasnogeneral requirementofharm, comparabletoitsgeneral
culpability
requirementsin5 2.02.Rather, kindsofconduct,
particular apparentlydeemedbythelegislaturetobeharmful,are
described:forexample,S 223.2defines
theftas thetaking
orexerciseofunlawful overthemoveable
control property
ofanother.Thereis noexpressrequirementthatthetakingbeinjurious toanyone.
12 Joel
Feinberg,HarmtoOthers (Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,1984);seealsoJohnKleinig,
'Crimeandthe
Concept ofHarm' (1978)15 AmericanPhilosophical 27.
Quarterly
2. Standardization
This articlewillbe concerned chieflywiththestandard harminvolved in a given
or
category subcategory of crime. We willthusbe the
assessing injuriousnessofa
standard instanceof(say)burglary, orofburglaryofa certainkind-nottheinjury
doneto MarySmithwhenherapartment wasbrokenintoandherfavourite vase
wasstolenon 24 Juneofthisyear.
Howhurtful a givenintrusion is dependsonthesituation ofthevictim, andthe
particularvictim'ssituationvariesgreatly.The theft ofa carfroma richperson
maybenomorethana temporary thattheft
inconvenience; from a poorpersonina
ruralareamayleavehimbereft ofanymeansoftransportation. We thusneedto
assume,inrating thestandard caseofa givenspeciesofcrime,thatinjury occursto
someone whois neitherespeciallyvulnerablenorresilient.
Whythisemphasis onstandard harm?Particular actsaretoodiverse
criminal to
be ratedon an individualized basis.The analysisis aidedwhenone(1) ratesthe
standardcase of an offence,and then(2) addressesunusualcases through
principlesofaggravationandmitigation. Thefirstofthesetaskswillkeepus amply
occupied here.The second, on and
aggravation mitigation, is complexenoughto
callfora separatearticle.
In thecriminallaw,one judgesharmin orderto determine
howblameworthy the
theconduct,notin orderto compensatethevictimforhis or
actoris in committing
3. Normative
FocusandtheQuestion
ofCultural
Variability
Ouranalysisofharmis normative:
We areoffering
a theoryonhowharmsshould
be rated.The reasonforthisnormative is thatouraccountis partofa
emphasis
13SeevonHirsch, op cit,aboven 8, 64-5.In crimes ofintent,
thedefining
elements ofthecrimemustactually be
knownto theactor.What,however, of thefurther harmfiul
consequences?How much,forexample, needthe
defendant haveknownofthehumiliating characterofan assault,forhumiliation
to be consideredin gauging
that
crime'sseriousness?A fullanswer wouldrequire an excursusintoculpability
theory, whichwewillnotutidertake
here.However, it shouldbe clearthatthoseulterior consequencesshouldat leastbe foreseeable:unforeseeable
consequenceshavenoplaceintheassessment ofthegravityoftheconduct.
14 These rulesmightdistinguish (i) casesof specialharmresulting fromvulnerabilities
sharedby significant
numbers of persons(eg, thespecialvulnerability of theaged),from(ii) casesof specialharmthatare more
to
idiosyncraticparticular individuals. a
For discussion ofthisdistinction
anditsimplications, seeUmaNarayan,
Conduct
Offensive (NewBrunswick, NJ:Rutgers University,
1990)(unpublishedPhD dissertation),
ch5.
15 Fordiscussion ofaggravation/mitigation ruleswithinthecontextofnumerical see von
sentencingguidelines,
Hirsch, and
Knapp Tonry, above
op cit, n 2, 102-5.
Ifthemitigation/aggravationapproach is used todealwithnon-standard
cases,thestatuteneedstoprovideadequate
leewayto reducethepenalty in mitigated cases.Forthatreason,thenewSwedishlawprovides thatthecourt,in
mitigatedcases,may sentence below the applicablestatutory
minimum 'whenthepenalvalue(of theoffence)
callsforit.'Swedish
obviously Criminal Code29:3.
III HarmandtheLivingStandard
In gaugingharms,thehardtaskis thatofcomparing theharmfulness ofcrimes
whichinvolvedifferent interests. Howis cartheft to be compared withburglary,
whenthe former involvesa significant property loss, and thelattera smaller
financial
setback butaninvasion ofprivacyas well?Makingsuchcomparisons calls
fora commoncriterion, or at leasta commonguidingidea, forassessingthe
interests
involved.
Theguiding ideawhichwehavecometofindmostnatural is oneconcerned with
thequalityofa person'slife.The mostimportant interests are thosecentralto
personalwell-being; and,accordingly, themostgrievous harmsarethosewhich
diminish
drastically one'sstandard ofwell-being.
Mayhem is so seriousbecauseit
makesitsvictims livein misery; burglaryseemsless serious becauseit doesnot
createsuchmiserybutstillhas a significant impact on the qualityoflifein its
intrusionon theperson'sprivacy andcomfort.
We required a termforthisidea,andcameuponAmartya Sen'susefulessay,
TheStandard ofLiving.19 Economists have
traditionally used 'livingstandard'to
referonlyto thedegreeofeconomic affluence
orwant.Sen,however, suggestsa
richeruse forthisterm,one thatincludesnotonlyeconomic meansbutother,
non-economic capabilitiesthataffect personalwell-being.We decidedtoadoptthe
term'livingstandard', understood inthisbroadersense.
Beforeembarking on thespecifics ofourproposed analysis ofharms, weneedto
setforththerationale. Whyrelyontheideaofthelivingstandard?
1. InadequaciesoftheWelfare
Interest
Criterion
Our interest in thelivingstandardgrewoutofdissatisfactionwiththe'welfare
interest'criterionwhichJoelFeinbergproposedin his 1984 book,Harmto
Others.20
Previously, oneofus (vonHirsch)hadrelieduponFeinberg's criterion,
forthepurposeofgrading crimeseriousness
forsentencing.21
Feinberg suggests
thattheimportance of interests
infringedby criminalconductcan be gauged
according tothedegreetowhichthoseinterests affect
characteristically choice.
The mostimportant accordingto Feinberg,are so-calledwelfare
interests,
interests-andhencethe mostgrievousharmsthosethatintrudeupon such
interests.
Welfare interests
aredefinedas theinterests
a personneedssatisfied
in
19AmartyaSen,TheStandard ofLiving(Cambridge: Press,1987)20-38.
Cambridge
University
op cit,aboven 12,at37-45,55-61,206-14.
2oFeinberg,
2' vonHirsch,op cit,aboven 8, at66-74.
2. TheIdea oftheLivingStandard
The term'livingstandard' hasa narrow economic meaning, referring toaffluence.
It has,however, a broader meaning-the onewhichSenemphasizes,26 andwhich
is usedalso in quality-of-life studiessuchas a recentStockholm survey.27 This
referstothequalityofpersons'existence ina sensethatincludesnotonlymaterial
support andamenity butothernon-economic capabilitiesthataffect thequality ofa
person'slife.
The livingstandard is oneofa family ofrelatednotions, including well-being,
thatrefer to theextent ofhumanflourishing. Well-being,however, canbe highly
personalized. Thequality ofmylifedependsuponmyparticular focalaims.To the
personwhowantstodevotehislifetocontemplation andprayer, material comfort
and socialamenities maymatter little.Thus to determine a particular person's
well-being, oneordinarily needstoknowmuchabouthislifegoalsandhisreasons
foradopting them.
The livingstandard, however,does not focuson actuallifequalityor goal
achievement, but on the meansor capabilities forachieving a certainqualityof
It is also standardized,
life.28 referringto the means and capabilities thatwould
ordinarilyhelp one achieve a good life.Consider the person who is in goodhealth,
affluent,andwitha widesocialnetwork from whichtodrawfriends andacquaint-
ances.If hischiefgoalin lifeis to writegreatpoetryand he lackstherequisite
talent,he may still be frustrated and unhappy.Nevertheless, it would be
to
appropriate say thathe hasa good standard of not
living: merely because ofhis
wealthbutbecausehe has theothermeansthatpeopleordinarily canuse to live
well-whether ornothe choosestousethosemeansoractually enjoystheirfruits.
Thesefeatures areimportant forourpresent purposebecause,as notedabove,we
areprimarily concerned withstandard harms.
A givencapability orresource cansupport achievement ofa variety ofendsofa
person'schoosing. One thuscanmakeliving standard judgments without having
eitherto knowa particular person'sfocalaimsor to specify in detailwhatthe
26 See n 19.
in Transition:
27 See RobertEriksonand Rune Aberg,Welfare inSweden1968-1981
A SurveyofLivingConditions
(Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1987)ch 1.
2s See Sen, op cir,above n 19, at 30-1, 36-7.
3. WhyUse theLivingStandard?
Whyrelyonthelivingstandard inordertogaugeharms? A simpleanswer
is thatit
appearstofitthewayoneordinarily judgesharms.Whyis mayhem moreharmful
thanburglary? Not becausethemaimedperson'schoiceshavebeennarrowed
more.It is becausetheoverallqualityofhislifeis moreadversely
affected.
In adoptinga living-standard we are notclaiming
criterion, thatgoodnessor
badnessofconductdepends,as a generalmatter, on theconduct'seffect
on the
qualityof people'slives.31Our claimis moremodest:thatthelivingstandard
29This distinction between(1) well-being understood as includingelements of freedom-of-choice,
and (2)
freedom-of-choiceperse, is usefullyelucidated in Amartya Sen, 'Well-Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey
Lectures1984'(1985)82Journal ofPhilosophy 169,esp 206-8.He suppliestheexample ofthepersoneatinghis
sandwich ontheriverbank,whoseesa mandrowning intheriver. Theeventaddstotheperson's choices-becausehe
nowhastheextraoptionofsavingthevictim ornot-butthosechoicesmerely detractfrom hiswell-being.
As Sen
notes:'Theadditionalopportunity ofsavingthedrowning person didnotgiveyoua better (orevenas gooda) wayof
pursuing yourownwell-being. In fact,inan important way,the. .. changereduced yourwell-being freedom.You
werenolonger freetoeatyoursandwich without anxiety,and,... there
was a genuinelossofopportunitytopursue
own
your well-being.' (at207).
30 Sen,op cit,aboven 19,at27. Foranexplanation oftheexclusion ofaltruistic seeid27-8.
satisfactions,
31 Harm consistsofbeingmadeworseoff.Onecangaugehowmuchoneis harmed, ie,howmuchworseoffoneis,
bytheimpact oftheconduct onthequality ofone'slife.Otherevils,however, do notnecessarily
involveharmas part
oftheirdefiningcharacteristics.
Anexample is offence.Beingtreated offensivelydoesnotnecessarilyinvolvebeing
madeworseoffinthesenseofhaving one'spersonal resourcesdiminished;itsevilresidessimplyinbeingdealtwith
without consideration
orrespect. To gaugethegravity ofoffensive conduct,onethusmayrequire a standardother
thanonethatrefers toreduction intheoffended person's
livingstandard.Fora useful analysisofoffence,
andhowit
differs
from harm, seeNarayan, op cit,aboven 14,chs1-3.Seealson 53below.
4. TheLogicofLiving-StandardJudgments
How,andfrom whoseperspective,
areliving-standard
judgmentstobemade?The
kindofanalysisweareproposing
presupposescertain ofoursociety
socialpractices
and certainassumedvaluesbut, giventhosepracticesand values,calls fora
35A philosopher
mightaskwhether suchnorms arerootedintheethicaltraditions
ofourownculture,
orhavemore
universal Wedo nothavetoaddress
applicability. thequestion,however, as wearenotat themoment to
attempting
our
apply living-standardcriteria
in othercultural
settings.
Ourownviewwouldbe thata respect forotherpersons'
interests
is essential
toanyvalidsystemofethics,
butthat
theparticular
moralprinciplesthrough whichthatrespectis expressed---eg, principles
regarding
privacy-may
a
reflect
legitimately culture's
ethical
traditions.
For a somewhat comparable view,seeStuart Innocence
Hampshire,
andExperience
(Cambridge,Mass:Harvard UniversityPress,1989)ch2.
ofa Living-Standard
IV Elements Analysis
Havingsketched our rationale,
we needto explainhowcriminal harmscan be
gradedthrougha living-standard Let us, then,sketchthemainelements
analysis.
ofthatanalysis.
Standard:
theLiving
1. Rating TheFourLevels
If harmsareto be gaugedaccordingtotheextent towhichtheyaffect someone's
livingstandard,thenthe standard
living needs to be graded.
Any gradingschemeis
bound to be somewhatarbitrary, but one shouldbe able to make rough
forexample,between
distinctions: an intrusion
suffering thataffects
an adequate
standard ofcomfortandonethatreducesthepersontothemeresubsistence level.
To accomplish scale.The fourliving-standard
this,weproposea four-level levels
maybe formulated as follows:
2. TheGeneric-Interest
Dimensions
A criminalactcan intrudeupona varietyofdifferentkindsofinterests.To cite
previouslymentioned examples,assaultaffects
both the and
person'ssafety his
a a
self-respect;burglary,person's materialcomfortand herprivacy.The crime
can affectthesevariousdimensions in different
degrees, and with differential
impactson thelivingstandard:theprivacy-intrusion
in a burglary,
forexample,
mayaffect thestandard oflivingmorethanthecomfort-intrusion. Our analysis
thusneedsto distinguishvariousgeneric-interest
dimensions. We suggestfour,
namely:
-Physicalintegrity
-Materialsupport
andamenity
-Freedomfromhumiliation
-Privacy/autonomy
We do notclaimthislistis complete,
andhaveusedno deeptheoryofinterests
to
deriveit.Instead,
werelyonourimpressions
ofthemainkindsoflegally-protected
we thought
37 Initially, we couldderivedefinitions fromtheGerman
ofinterest-types doctrineofRechtsgilter.
However, thedoctrine didnotoffer
usmuchuseful whenweexamined
guidance ofandreferences
it.Fordiscussion to
thisdoctrine,see,WinfriedHassemer, Theorie desVerbrechens
undSoziologie (Frankfurt: Verlagsanstalt,
Europaiische
1973).
38Thisdimension a degreeofoverlapbetween
creates harmandculpability.
Humiliation
normallypresupposes
intent(orat least,apparent I amhumiliated
intent). bybeingbeaten;butnot,normally,bybeinginjuredthrough
someone's negligent ofa vehicle.
handling
theLiving-Standard
3. Standardizing Impact
Estimatingtheimpactofa givenintrusion on someone'slivingstandard requires
assumptions to be made on what other resourceshe or shepossesses.The more
slenderthoseresources,themoredevastating theintrusion. How,then,shouldone
determinethestandard impact?
Our living-standardanalysisis designedto gaugeharmsaffecting a variety of
from
interests, the most to the least important. It is thus to
helpful imagine
someonewhohasvariousinterests at thevariousliving-standard levels,andthen
ask howdeprivation or intrusion intothisparticular interestwouldaffectthat
person'squalityoflife.The hypothetical victimwouldthusbe assumedto have
interests
ateachofthevariousliving-standard levels:certain orresources
interests
neededto subsist;othersneededto raisehiswell-being totheminimal andtothe
adequate level; and certain other, 'enhancing' interests. These assumptions
providea perspective forjudgingthe importance of a particular
intrusion: it
enablesone to judgehowimportant theparticular interestor resource intruded
uponis to a goodlife,compared to thevariousotherinterests and resources a
personmayhave.Notall actualvictims willhavea lowerlivingstandard to begin
with,andthussuffer disproportionately fromanygivendeprivation. Suchcasesof
to harm--coupled
greatervulnerability withquestionsof foreseeability of that
bytheoffender-should
vulnerability be addressed bytherulesonaggravation and
mitigation.
4. Temporal
Perspective
Whattemporal perspectiveshouldoneadoptwhenjudging theimpactofa crime
on someone'swell-being?The perspective makesa difference.
Considerhaving
one'spocketpicked.Ifthequestionis 'Howwasyourday?',itmakesperfect sense
toanswerthatitwasawful,becauseonelostone'swalletwitha smallsumofcash
andallone'sIDs. However, ifthequestionis howone'syearhasbeen,itis sillyto
say thatit has been awful,merelybecause one's pocketwas pickedfourmonths
ago.
5. Replacement
Whatofreplaceable items?Something maybe important tothequalityofone'slife
and yetreadilyreplaced.Considerthe theftof an umbrellain rainyBergen,
Norway. Isn'tthatserious?-after all,thevictim willconstantly
bedrenched, cold,
andillwithout it. Obviously not:thepersonnormally canobtaina newumbrella
cheaply enoughso thatitmakeslittledifference, tothequalityofhisor
ordinarily,
herexistence.
Theprinciple canbestatedgenerally, as follows. Supposeanoffence damagesor
destroys an interest,X. SupposethatX canbe replacedfora certain replacement
cost,Y. If,inthestandard case,making theoutlayY wouldhavesignificantly less
impacton thelivingstandard thanthelossoftheitemX itself,thentheharm
shouldbemeasured bytheimpactonthelivingstandard ofincurringthecost,y.40
In dealingwithreplacement in thisfashion,however,we shouldkeep the
generic-interestdimensions inmind:an itemmaybe readily replaceablefromthe
perspective ofonedimension butnotanother. Considerourburglary andtheftofa
television. a the loss
From comfort-perspective, is'readily replaced.However,the
intrusion intoprivacy is notsomething whichis replacedor madewholeby the
acquisitionofan ersatzTV.
Is thisanalysisclass-biased? Afterall,someimpoverished willhavegreat
persons
difficulty a
affordingreplacement that most peopleeasily couldafford. We are,
however, speaking of the standardcase-so that should
replaceability be judgedby
howaffordable thereplacement itemordinarily is. Onecanexpectdeviationsfrom
thatnormin bothdirections: personswhocaneasilypayevenforthemostcostly
replacements, and othersforwhomeventhemostinexpensive couldrepresenta
6. 'Psychological Harm'
We havenotincluded'psychological harm'as a distinct dimension inouranalysis.
The omission is intentional,
becausethetermis toomuchofa catchallto be of
help.
Emotions, likebeliefsand attitudes, are capableof beingsupported byvalid
reasons (as the literatureofmoral is
psychologycurrently exploring).41 I lose
When
a tennismatchI maybe furious atmyopponent, buthaveno reasonforbeingso.
However,if I lost becausethe opponentcheated,thenmy angerbecomes
warranted: I amentitled toresent theinjury.42
A variety ofemotional statesjustifiablyflowfrombeingcriminally victimized.
Attacks onone'ssafety elicit
(quiteproperly) fear;debasements elicitshameanda
senseofhumiliation, andso forth. Suchdistress,however, canbe considered part
oftheintrusion intotheinterest dimension involved. Indeed,thatis ourapproach:
whenexamining a crimethataffects personal safety,thefearjustifiably as
elicited
well as theactualinjurywouldbe considered in assessingthe living-standard
impact.Whenexamining conductthataffectsself-respect-as severalof the
offences discussed belowdo--thesenseofhumiliation is theinjurythatreducesthe
livingstandard.In thisfashion, we can analysethevariousformsofwarranted
distressthatvariousintrusions produce.43
Otheremotional statesmayflowfrom criminalvictimization, butwithlessgood
reason.A burglary mayput someone in greatfear of personalattack,without
regard to the actual risksor those that mightreasonably be anticipated.Some
crimesmayspecially causedispleasure becauseofaversions towhatis believedto
be the typicaloffender-for exampleto his assumedrace or lifestyle.Such
responses would be disregarded in ouranalysis, as theycannotbe ifall forms of
psychological are as
impact lumpedtogether 'psychological harm'.
V. Applying
theAnalysis:
SomeIllustrations
Havingoutlined theelementsofa living-standard itmight
analysis, be illuminating
to tryit on somehypothetical
cases.Here,then,aresomebriefoffence descrip-
tions.The actsdescribedaremeantto be typicalinstances
ofvariousgeneraof
thefts,
robberies, etc.(Thedescriptions
burglaries, arenotnecessarily
co-extensive
withthestatutoryoffence To control
definitions.44) forculpability,
weshallassume
41Fordiscussion
ofsuchissuesinthecontext
ofthecriminal
law,seeSchoeman,
op cit,aboven 10.
42 See discussion
ofthemoralpsychology
ofprovocation,
invonHirschandJareborg,
op cit,aboven 10.
43A comparableissueisthatofoffence.
Shouldtheoffensiveness
ofconduct beassessedbythedistressitcauses,or
byhowmuchtheconduct violates
norms ofrespectful
orconsideratetreatment?
Wewouldfavour thelatter
view.See
vonHirsch, above
op cit, n 23,709-12;Narayan,opcit,aboven 14,chs1,3.
4 Manyjurisdictionshave broad offence
statutory definitions.
The ModelPenalCode (art221),forexample,
defines as anyentryintoa building
burglary withintentto commit a crime;and has specialprovisions
onlyfor
residential
night-time burglary. Suchbroaddefinitions
are insufficient
forratingtheharmfulness oftheconduct, as
continued
onpage24
1. Homicide
Our standardcase is: A killsB. The analysisis simpleenough.The conduct
destroys whichis ratedas 10. Hencetheconduct
subsistence, harm
hasthehighest
rating.
2. AssaultandBattery
The assumedstandard caseis: A beatsup B. Supposethebeating is quitepainful,
andresults in substantialbruisesandsomelacerations-but notenoughtorequire
hospitalization.
Consider, theinterest
first, dimension ofphysical integrity.Fromthisperspec-
tive,beingbeatenup is noworsethanaccidentally walking intoa solidglassdoor.
It hurtsbadlywhenithappens, onehasa blackeyeanda headachefora fewdays,
andthenitis over.Howseriousis that?
-Is theliving-standard levelinvolvedlevel1? (subsistence)? Obviouslynot.
Thereis no lossoffunctioning. It is merely uncomfortable, andcomfort, physical
ormaterial, is notpresupposed at thislevel.
-Is itlevel2' (minimal well-being),or30 (adequatewell-being)? Again,no.We
hardly think thattheperson who walks into a door
glass and getsa blackeyehashis
overalllivingstandard reducedbelowsuchlevelsofadequacy.
-Is itlevel40 (enhanced well-being)?Fora briefperiod,yes.One'squalityof
existencehasdefinitelygone down-while oneis stillsoreandblack-eyed. Butthe
period involved may be too briefto qualify from the middle-term perspectiveof
whichwearespeaking.
Let us, however,consideranotherinterest dimension: thatoffreedom from
humiliation.Here,theintrusion intothelivingstandard is potentiallymoregrave:
beingbeatenup is demeaning. Howmuchitis so is a matter ofsocialconvention.
In themoregladiatorial societies,losinga (fair)fightmaynotbe regarded as
particularlydegrading-and thisholdseveninsomeofourownsubcultures, eg,in
thevenerable American institutionofthebar-room brawl.(Buteventhere,being
victimized in an unfairfight-eg,beingambushed byseveralassailants-may be
continued
from page23
theydisregard factors
critical theliving-standard
affecting
typically impact--eg, theamount ofdestruction,ifany,
wroughttotheburglarized premises. Hence,intheabovehypotheticalcases,weconsider subspecies
separate ofthe
offence
ofburglary, viz:residential
burglarywithransacking,andordinary residential
burglary.
Sentencingguidelines or case-lawjurisprudence broadstatutory
couldsubcategorize offence
categoriesin this
fashion.
However, theadditional elements thesubcategory
identifying falloutsidethelegaldefinition
oftheoffence,
andwouldhavetobe established at thesentencing Thathearing
hearing. (intheUnitedStates,at least)hasa lower
requirementofproofthanthecriminal proceeding guilt.Thealternative
establishing (andinourviewultimately the
course)
preferable wouldbea statutory thatdrewnarrower
recodification andmorefully offence
descriptive categories.
Recodification,
however, is an ambitioustaskwhichmanyjurisdictions would be to
reluctant undertake.For fuller
see vonHirsch,KnappandTonry,op cit,aboven 2, 97-8,andMichaelTonry,'Criminal
discussion, Law: The
Missing in
Element Sentencing Reform' L Rev607.
(1982)35 Vanderbilt
3. PettyAssault
Consider thecase:A slapsB's face.Here,thematerial discomfort is trivial.
So the
is
question again one of humiliation.Having one's face is
slapped humiliating. But
oneis notbeingmadehelpless, as inthecaseofbeating. One canextricate oneself
withdignity-remonstrate, moveaway,calltheauthorities, etc.We thusdoubtit
as level
qualifies involving 30. A reasonableperson, we would think,wouldnot
regard himselfas having suffered a majordeprivation, sufficientto reducehis
wholequalityof lifeforan appreciable period to below the 'adequate'level.
the
Conceivably, humiliation involves level
40, on grounds thatthere hasbeensome
diminution of overallwell-being. However, even this conclusion is debatable,
givena middle-termtime perspective.
4. ArmedRobbery
The assumedstandard caseis: A robsB at gunpoint,
takeshiswalletanda small
amount ofcash.
The property losshereis quiteminor--ordinarily,
toosmalltohavemorethan
marginal impactonthelivingstandard.
The majorelement is thethreatenedbodilyintrusion:
towit,thethreatto kill.
Thisis a threatened
intrusionintoa level10interest:
subsistence.
However,we needa discount to reflect
thattheintrusion
is merelythreatened
and contingent.
We thereforesaythere
is a discounted
10. How suchdiscountsmight
be madewillbe discussedlater.
6. 'Date Rape'
A typicalcasemightrunsomething likethis.A female student drinkstoexcessata
malestudentcluband then,withhercapacityofphysical reduced,is
resistance
madetohavesexualintercourse overherprotests.
The differencebetween thisandthepreceding caseis thatthethreatto bodily
thevictim
is eliminated:
safety is notthreatenedwithseriousinjury ifshedoesnot
consent.
However,theinterest in sexualintegrity is intrudedupon muchas in the
preceding case-with its attendant grave humiliation. For reasonsexplained
already, this
therefore, would seem toinvolvea 2'.
withRansacking
7. Burglary
The scenario is alltoofamiliar:a burglarentersa homeand,after stealing someof
thecontents, defacesthewallsandpictures, smashes furnitureandchina,etc.
Let us,first, consider theinterestdimension ofmaterial supportandamenity. In
itsextreme forms, destructionofa person'slivingspacecanbe veryserious.Ifthe
personis leftliterally
homeless, andcannotafford alternative quarters,hejoinsthe
ranksofthehomeless who-at least in oursocialenvironments and climates-live
at thesubsistence level.
Thekindofintrusion involved here,however, is lessdrastic.A ransacking is,in
its materialconsequences, aboutcomparable to havinga kitchen-fire in one's
flat-inwhichsmokedamageandfiremen's effortsresultin substantialdamageto
furnishings,clothing, etc.How much are one'sinterestsset back by such anevent?
--Certainly, oneis notreducedtothesubsistence level(1). Oneis notrendered
homeless,and stillhas warmthand shelter.
8. Common
Residential
Burglary
Here,thedwelling is entered,and a commonitemofproperty is removed. No
ransackingoccurs.
Materialamenity. The intrusion on materialcomfort is minimal.A readily-
itemofproperty
replaceable is lost.Otherwise,theliveability
ofthedwellingis not
affected.
In materialtermsthelivingstandard wouldscarcelybe affected.
Privacy/autonomy.Here, the entryconstitutes a significantintrusioninto
However,
privacy. theoccupant's preferred arrangementsofhis/her homearenot
disturbed.
significantly Ourjudgment is thatthiswouldinvolvelevel4P.
VI Harm-Scales, andDiscounts
Combinations,
Constructing andapplying theliving-standard helps,butdoesnotsuffice,
ratings
togradeharms.The reasonsshouldbe apparent fromthepreceding illustrations.
First,an offence maygiveriseto multipleliving-standard ratingsin different
dimensions. A beating,as justnoted,had a low ratingin thephysical-integrity
dimension,buta higher oneinthefreedom-from-humiliation dimension. We thus
needa wayofcombining intoa netharmfulness
thesediverseassessments grade.
Second,discounts need to be madeforriskedor threatened harm.An armed
robbery,forexample, so wedescribed
riskssubsistence, itas 'discounted' 10.Butit
makeslittlesensetodiscount ontotheliving-standard
directly scale:ifonereduced
therobbery ratingto 2', forexample,thatwouldnotbe sayingtheoffence risks
subsistence,butrather thatitactuallyaffects
theliving-standardlevelofminimal
well-being-which maywellnotbe an accurate characterization.
1. Creatinga Harm-Scale
anddiscounts,
To dealwithcombinations werequirean explicit This
harm-scale.
wouldgradeharmsfrom With
theverygravetotheminor. thescalein there
place,
gradations,10 to 40, should'map onto'
would be ruleson how theliving-standard
the scale. Then, adjustments could be made fordiscounts-for-risk and for
combinations.
A simpleharm-scale mighthave fivegradations of gravity:
grave,serious,
upper-intermediate, and
lower-intermediate, Each
lesser. mightbe set
gradation
as a
forth band, so as tomakeroom the
within band.Setforth
thescale look for'differentiations
like
schematically, might Figure1 (opposite).
Onecouldbemoreambitious-for example,construct numerical
a 100-point scale,
with20 pointsforeachgrade.This,however, is notnecessary,and maygivea
misleading senseofprecision.
I-grave
II-serious
III-upper-intermediate
IV-lower-intermediate
V-lesser
Fig 1. A simple
harm-scale
HarmGradation LevelIntruded
Living-Standard Upon
I-grave Subsistence level
(living-standard 10)
II-serious Minimalwell-being
(level20)
III-upper-intermediateAdequatewell-being
(level30)
IV-Iower-intermediateEnhanced (level40)
well-being
V-lesser Livingstandard
notaffected
or
onlymarginally
so
Fig 2. Theharm-scale
andliving-standard
levels
Noticethismapping-rule,elementaryas itis,involves
valuejudgments,forweare
characterizingthegravity
ofvariouslevelsofintrusions intothelivingstandard.
We are, forexample,asserting thatintrusions intosubsistenceinvolvegrave
harms,etc. However,thesejudgments seemstraightforward enough(givenour
preceding torequirenoelaboration.
discussion)
In thisscale,within-category
variationscan be denotedsimplybythelocation
withina givenband: no numbersare necessary. For example,the difference
between homicide andmayhem canbe shownas in Figure3:
r * -- - homicide
4
grave* --- mayhem
Fig 3. Within-category
variations
2. Discounts
forThreatened
orRiskedHarms
Manycrimesonlycreatea threator riskto a giveninterest. Theirharm-rating
shoulddependnotonlyontheimportance oftheinterest butthedegreetowhichit
is risked.Themoreremote therisk,thelowerthatrating, ie,thegreater shouldbe
thediscount.
Consider thesefouroffences: homicide, attempted homicide,46armedrobbery,
anddrunken driving.Allaffectthe interest insubsistence, but in different degrees.
Homicideactuallytakesa life;an attempt mayinvolvea highriskof life-loss;
robbery threatens thevictim'slifebutthethreat is contingent (therobbermight
usethegunonlyifthevictim resists).In drunken driving, the riskismoreremote,
depending on how much alcoholthe offender hasconsumed and how crowded the
highways are.
To dealwiththesesituations, a two-step processseemsappropriate. The first
is
tomakea living-standard valuation ofthecompleted harm.In homicide, we have
donethatalready: theharmis atthehighendofthe'grave'range.Thesecondstep
is to makean appropriate discount forthreat or risk.47We might,forexample,
treatcertainattempts as constituting a sufficiently highriskto keepattempted
homicide inthe'grave'range--albeit at a pointin thatrangebelowthecompleted
harm.Next,we givethethreatened homicide thatis present in armedrobbery a
somewhat largerdiscount:perhaps,one wouldplace thatoffence in the next
('serious')harmcategory-because theriskofa killingoccurring is stillsubstan-
tial,and because of the apprehension of death the conduct can be expectedto
createin thevictim. As wedescendtomorecontingent risksto survival (eg,those
typicallyinvolved in drunken driving) the discount would be placed a lower
in
harmcategory.
46 We are
view,see
assumingthatattemptsshouldbe treatedas less seriousthancompletedcrimes.For a contrary
AndrewAshworth,'CriminalAttemptsand the Role of ResultingHarm undertheCode, and in theCommonLaw'
(1988) 19 RutgersLJ 725.
47 See also Paul Robinson,'A SentencingSystemforthe21stCentury?'(1987) 66 TexasL Rev 1, 44-5.
3. Combinations
The combination problemariseswhenan offence (eg, assault,as we justsaw)
affectstwoormoreinterest dimensions.Here,a first stepcouldbe toidentify the
dimension thatyieldsthehighest harm-rating, and identify thatas the'primary
harm'.Supposethatoffence X affects
bothphysical integrity andself-respect,but
indifferentdegrees.Supposethephysical-integrity intrusion is a substantial
threat
tosubsistence-ie, a discounted
10.We might, according tothediscount principles
just outlined,rate this harmin the second('serious')category. Supposethe
self-respectintrusion involvesan actual(notjustrisked)humiliation-but only
such as to compromise living-standardlevel 30--'adequate' well-being. This,
according toour.just-describedmapping principles,wouldqualify theintrusionat
thethirdharmcategory, of'upper-intermediate'.On thisanalysis, thephysical-
integrityintrusionwouldhavethehigher rating,andthusconstitute theprimary
harm.We wouldconcludethatthe primary harm-ie, the riskto physical
integrity-would be at thesecond('serious')levelofharm.Schematically, thisis
showninFigure4:
serious * - offence
X-
harm
primary
Fig4. Primary
harm
Thenextstepwouldbe toconsider
thesecondary harms-thoseinotherinterest
features.It makesoffenceX somewhat
dimensions-aspossibleexacerbating
worsethat-besidestheprimary harmto physicalintegrity-it
also humiliates.
How muchtheexacerbation is dependson twofactors.One is how'close' the
harmis in gravity
secondary to theprimary harm.Here thesecondary harmis
upper- i
intermediate harm
secondary
I (freedom
from
humiliation)
VII 'Collective'
HarmsandOtherComplications
Our analysishas been directedat the simplevictimizing
offence:defendant
or
(intentionally negligently)
injures(or an
creates riskof injuring)
unjustified
48A comparable
analysis a criminal
holdalsoforcaseswhere
might involves
transaction legalinfractions.
multiple
49 Wedo nothereaddress
situations
where is a corporation
thevictim orotherlegalentity.
5oSeediscussion
atn 13,above.
51 Here, we are referring to the most plausiblesubspeciesof drug prohibition:when the substanceis plainly
injurioustohealth,and thesalesinvolvesubstantialquantities.Othersubspeciesofdrugprohibition wouldnotfitthis
analysis.When the health impactof the substanceis debatable (as with marijuana)it is not clear whetherany
.diminution oflivingstandardis involved.Wheretheperpetrator is thevictimhimself-ie,drug-possession crimes-it
is far fromclear what the aim is: to protectthe usei fromself-injury, or to achieve some ulterioraim such as
discouragingundesiredlifestyles.Since we do notfeelsuch conductshouldbe criminalized, it is no wonderthatwe
findit difficult
to rateits seriousness.
52 That issueis linkedto themorefundamental ofdrugs:whetherand to whatextentthe
one ofthecriminalization
criminallaw is an appropriateinstrument forpreventing thevoluntary consumptionofdeleterioussubstances.For a
reviewofthoseissues,see Douglas Husak, 'RecreationalDrugs and Paternalism'(1989) 8 Law and Philosophy 353.
53 Offensiveconduct,to theextentcriminalized, persons,butmaynotinvolveharmin thesenseof setbacks
affects
to someone'sinterests.See n 31 above.
54 One of us has suggestedthat'unjustadvantage'is a poor wayof analysing thegravityofcrimesgenerally-but
mightbe usefulforcrimessuch as tax fraud:von Hirsch,'Proportionality in thePhilosophyof Punishment',op cit,
above n 1.
VIII Applicability
toSentencing
Law
Couldourproposedanalysisbe helpfulin actualsentencing law?Our answeris
'yes,if':it could be but
helpful, only ifa number of otherconditions aremet.One
condition is completion of thetasksdiscussedhere.We haveonlybegun,by
describing theliving-standard analysis.The additional tasks,of constructing a
harm-scale and devising rulesfordiscounts-for-risk and forcombinations, have
only been outlined.A secondconditionis that culpability be dealt with.
Ultimately, we are a
seeking jurisprudence ofcrime which
seriousness, callsnotonly
foran assessment of the harmfulness of the conductbut also of the actor's
culpability. Failinga fulltheory ofculpability, weatleastneeda wayofcontrolling
forthemoreobviousdifferences inculpability amongcrimes, so thatwecanassess
howmuchsuchcrimes'gravity is affected by variationsin theirharmfulness. The
thirdcondition is a sentencing lawwhichmakestheseriousness ofcrimecount.In
a lawwithwide-open sentencing discretion and doctrines emphasizing specialor
generalprevention, crime-seriousness may have only marginal(or at least,
uncertain) importance inscalingpunishments.
Suppose,however, thatthesethreeconditions havebeensatisfied. In whatway
couldourapproach be usefulin making sentencing decisions? The answertothis
questionwilldependon thesentencing structure ofthejurisdiction. Let us takea
lookat twostructures: sentencing guidelines, suchas Minnesota's;ss andstatutory
sentencing principles, such as thoseembodiedin Sweden'snew law.s6Both
schemes emphasize thegravity oftheoffence, butusedifferent decision-makers.
Numericalsentencing guidelinessuch as Minnesota'srelyupon a special
rule-making agency(thesentencing commission) to makestandardseriousness-
assessments. The courts'jobis only(orchiefly) todecideupontheapplicability of
aggravating ormitigating factorsinnon-standard cases.
The commission's guidelines are embodiedin a sentencing grid.The vertical
axisofthegridconstitutes a crime-seriousness score;thehorizontal, a criminal-
history score.The cellswithinthegridsetforththepresumptive sentencesor
sentence-ranges.
Sucha scheme requires thesentencing commission totakeeachstatutory offence
category andassignita numerical seriousness-grade, sayfrom'1' (leastseriousJto
'10' (mostserious).Wheretheoffence category is broadand embraceshetero-
s5 ForthetextofMinnesota'sguidelines, seeMinnesota
SentencingGuidelinesCommission, MinnesotaSentencing
Guidelines
andCommentary,
Annotated (StPaul,Minn:Minnesota CLE Press,1985and1990Supp).Foranalysis ofthe
aimsandstructure,
guidelines' seevonHirsch, and
Knapp Tonry, op cit,aboven 2, ch5.
56Swedish Criminal
Code,chs29,30. Fora description ofthelaw'sstructure,seevonHirsch, op cit,aboven 4;
vonHirschandJareborg,op cit,n 4. TheEnglish WhitePaper(aboven 5) alsoproposes useofstatutorysentencing
andseetheCriminal
principles, Justice Bill1991.
5 Swedish Criminal
Code29:1.
60 Seethereport
bythepreparatory commission, (SOU 1986:13-15).
fdrbrort
Pdfdljd
F'ingelsestraffkommittin,
61 Swedish Code29:2,29:3.
Criminal
62
Pd/bljdfbr op cit,aboven 60.
brott,