Columbia Roosevelt Review

Spring 2010

The Roosevelt Institute

at
Columbia University
 Columbia Policy Review
A project of the Roosevelt Institute at Columbia University
Copyright 2010
All rights reserved

Sonali Pillay - Editor-In-Chief

William Organek - Assistant Editor
Sophia Rogers - Assistant Editor

The Editorial Board

Raul Mendoza - Administrative Director

Katharine O’Gorman - Research Director
Sarah Scheinman - Secretary
William Organek - Treasurer
Phillip Verma - Equal Justice Director
Maddy Joseph, Asher Hecht - Education Co-Directors
Isaac Lara, Eric Rosenberg - Defense and Diplomacy C0-Director
Adrian Soghoian, Julian Haimovich - Energy and Environment Director
Jake Grumbach - Health Care
Pari Sastry, Pooja Reddy - Economic Development Co-Directors
Adrian Haimovich - President Emeritus
Eric Rosenberg - Executive Board Member
Maddy Joseph - Education Center Member
Columbia Roosevelt Review
A project of

The Roosevelt Institute

at
Columbia University

Spring 2010
 Acknowledgements
A sincere thanks must be offered to the members of the Columbia community
whose content-editing and assistance ensured that the quality and soundness of
the pieces in this journal. Both our writers and executive board members thank
you for your time and effort and your support of the Roosevelt Institute.

Jessamyn Blau
Teaching Assistant in the Barnard Economics Department
Mary-Elena Carr
Director of the Columbia Climate Center of the Earth Institute
Professor Robert Jervis
Adlai E. Stevenson Professor and Professor of International and Public Affairs in the Columbia
Political Science Department
Colleen Kennedy
Professor E’mett McCaskill
Professor in the Barnard Psychology Department
Alexis Morin
Professor Brigitte Nacos
Adjunct Associate Professor in the Columbia Political Science Department
Dr, Kenneth Ong
The Brooklyn Hospital Center, New York Presbyterian Healthcare Medical Centers
Constantino Pischedda
Graduate Student in the Columbia Political Science Department
Professor Ira Katznelson
Ruggles Professor of Political Science and History in the Columbia Political Science
Department
Professor David Weiman
Professor in the Barnard Economics Department
Professor Raymond Smith
Adjunct Assistant Professor in the Columbia Political Science Department
 Preface

We welcome you to the second annual Columbia Roosevelt Review of the Columbia Chapter
of the Roosevelt Institute. Students from Barnard College, Columbia College, and the Mailman
School of Public Health contributed the pieces that comprise this year’s journal. These students
have identified pressing issues on the local, state, national, and international levels, and pre-
scribed progressive solutions to these problems.

The Roosevelt Institute is the first student-run think-tank in the United States. It is a non-partisan,
non-profit organization that aims to involve and engage the nation’s undergraduate and graduate
students in progressive public policy.

Our chapter interacts with the student body in many different ways. The first mode of participa-
tion is our weekly body meetings in which a student or a faculty member introduces a public pol-
icy issue facing the United States, which is followed by a lively discussion of how policy-makers
could remedy the current situation. These meetings are aimed at giving members exposure to
public policy issues that they may become passionate enough about to research further and put
together pieces like the ones in this journal. The second mode of participation is through the
various Centers we have, in which our members who have a particular policy interest can go to
explore those topics further. These Centers include: Defense and Diplomacy, Economic Devel-
opment, Education, Energy and Environment, Equal Justice, and Healthcare.

The Journal’s pieces will be arranged by Center. As our journal aims to touch upon every region
of public policy, the pieces will cover a diverse spectrum of topics, from proper mechanisms of
dealing with Credit Default Swaps to security at our nation’s chemical facilities.

Our members, executive board, and editorial staff put a tremendous effort into creating a high-
caliber journal, which, for the first time, has been content-edited by Columbia University profes-
sors, graduate students and PhD candidates. This sign of support by the Columbia community
shows the dedication of our chapter to excellence and the creation of innovative policy solutions.
We hope that this journal will both explore public policy issues that are somewhat unknown to
the general public, as well as inspire and support the agendas of policy-makers to continue to
push the envelope of innovate policy solutions.
 Table of Contents

Defense and Diplomacy

1 Privatized Port Security: Leaving America Vulnerable
Jake Grumbach
4 De-emphasizing the nuclear missions of B-52s in the U.S. Global Strike Command
Shree Awsare and Eric Rosenberg
5 Securing Our Chemical Facilities
Isaac Lara
13 International Determination and Strength Can End Genocide in Darfur
Shelby B. Layne

Economic Development
17 A Clearing System for Credit Default Swaps
Parinitha Sastry
17 Green Detriot: The Way Forward for America’s Auto Industry
Sophia Rogers

Education
21 Guaranteeing a Better Tomorrow Through Early Childhood Education
Travis Alvarez
23 Towards a Better System of Teacher Evaluation in New York State
Madeleine Joseph
26 Supporting Student Loan Schemes in Developing Countries Through USAID
Pooja Reddy

Energy and the Environment

30 An Analysis of City Adaptation Plans for Climate-Induced Sea Level Rise and Increased
Precipitation
Angela Wong
33 Big Data and Computer Server Energy Efficiency: the Need for a Rigorous, Scalable, and
Universal Standard
Adrian Sogohoian

Equal Justice
36 Executive Authority and Congressional Intelligence Oversight
Philip Verma and Jill Marcellus
38 Mixed-Member Proportional Representation: Fixing the “People’s House“
William Organek
44 Congress and War Powers
Sarah Scheinman
46 Automatic Absentee Voting
Aditya Mukerjee
47 Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones for New York State
Phiip Verma

Health Care
50 The Limits of “Fair Discrimination”: Rape and Domestic Violence Classifications in
Health Insurance
Ihotu J. Ali
53 Financial Compensation and the Commodification of Women’s Reproductive Labor
Carla Palacios
55 Are Electronic Health Records a Deterrent to Patients Seeking Medical Care
Lauren M. Anderson

62 End Notes
 Defense and Diplomacy

This will be the eighth year that the United States has fought a war on two fronts,
in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the midst of these wars, genocide in Sudan continued,
lawlessness ensued in Somalia, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was met with
inconsistent remarks by US officials. While the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
have been costly both in the toll they have taken on American lives and on our
economy, our nation faces equally great concerns in the realm of defense on the
homefront, nuclear policy, and diplomacy. These concerns will be addressed in this
portion of the journal.

Privatized Port Security: Leaving America Vulnerable
Jake Grumbach
After the attacks of 911, the President stated that it would
be his “first priority” to “take every precaution to protect our citi- Port Security Background
zens at home and around the world from further attacks.” Thus,
to make good on his promise, the Bush Administration* and Con-
gress would have to improve not only airline and airport secu-
rity, but also beef up, coordinate, and revamp security measures
in the postal system, on national borders, and in seaports. By
many measurements, the Administration succeeded in securing
the skies, but with regard to port security, the President did not
keep his promise.
Ports remain some of the most vulnerable points in the coun-
try’s national security. The final 9/11 Commission Report asserts
that “opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in mari-
time or surface transportation” than through aviation.1 American
ports handle approximately 20 percent of the world’s sea trading
through over 300 ports and 3,700 terminals
for passengers and cargo.2 A successful
terrorist attack on this system could prove
catastrophic, and could come in a number
P ing commercial ships, then board and inspect
orts remain some of the the vessels if they deem it necessary. Second,
most vulnerable points
of forms. Cruise ships and ferries are vulner-
able to attacks with biological or explosive in the country’s national
agents, and could be subject an IED (Impro- security.
vised Explosive Device), which while small,
may cause serious harm to the ship and its
passengers. These strategies have been used before; in 2000 a
suicide bomber detonated an IED as he approached the U.S.S.
Cole which resulted in the death of seventeen soldiers.
In addition, Cargo ships are at risk of unintentionally trans-
porting arms or weapons of mass destruction into the United
States, or could hold a dirty bomb set to detonate at a seaport
(possibly triggered by a GPS system). The consequences of such
a dirty bomb or other device would be the most economically
dire of the possible methods of attack at a park as it may cause
temporary embargoes or halting of imports. Similarly, if terrorists
eventually obtain a nuclear weapon and they intend to attack the
U.S., it is quite possible that it will pass through or detonate in an begun to regulate container dimensions. Since then, containers
American port.3
In response, Congress and the Bush Administration have pro-
posed and implemented new port counterterrorism measures,
including the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT), the Container Security Initiative (CSI), and the Transpor-
tation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), as well as a plan
for selling the ownership of U.S. ports to the United Arab Emir-
ates’ Dubai Ports World company, all of which this paper will ex-
amine. All of these policies and proposals suffer from problems
of coordination, implementation, and accountability that do not
exist in the post 9/11 airport security measures. The Bush Admin-
istration pursued a successful nationalization in airport security,
but left port security in its ineffective and privatized state.
This paper will focus on the threats to maritime cargo ship-
ping, which could cause widespread economic damage, rather
than the threats to cruise ships or ferries, which would likely be
deadly, but isolated incidents. I will first examine how ports, un-
like airlines, are still the Achilles heel of homeland security. Sec-
ond, I will discuss the successes and failures of the Bush Admin-
istration’s post-9/11 policies and policy proposals with regards to
Defense & Diplomacy
port security. Lastly, this paper will explore the Administration’s
likely motivations behind these counterterrorism policies that
emphasize airline security over port security.
While the Council on Foreign Relations gave airport security
average ratings of B’s, port security has been consistently poor
according to the counterterrorism report cards. Stephen Flynn
of the Council on Foreign Relations states that until 2004, port
Economic Development
security measures were a failing F. He concedes that there has
been at least a minimal level of progress, raising the rating to a
D+.4 The poor grades primarily reflect the fact that virtually all
shipping containers still enter the United States unchecked5; at
best, experts estimate that about 2 percent of incoming cargo
receives a physical examination.6
Today, port security falls under the jurisdiction of three ma-
jor groups. First, the U.S. Coast Guard has the responsibility
of monitoring ships that enter American waters, at which point
Coast Guard officers assess the risk of incom-
the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
Education
is in charge of inspecting the crew, cargo, and
passengers of the ships.7 The Coast Guard and
CBP are both under the Department of Home-
land Security. Finally, the port owners, opera-
tors, and their privately contracted security
personnel stand as the last line of defense.8 The Coast Guard
and CBP almost never physically inspect incoming cargo, leav-
Energy & Environment
ing the private employees of the ports virtually helpless if ter-
rorists manage to smuggle a weapon of mass destruction, small
arms, or even fighters onto the American mainland.
It is important to note that the logistics of global shipping
make security measures difficult. During the 20th century, indus-
tries around the world began to move towards containerization,
which increased shipping efficiency and now 90 percent of the
world’s cargo moves through these standardized containers.
By 1968, the International Organization for Standardization had
have been able to fit together like 40’ x 8’ x 8’ puzzle pieces
Equal Justice
on ships. These containers can be loaded and unloaded without
ever breaking the puzzle; this increases efficiency, but makes se-
curity measures all the more inefficient. Additionally, it is difficult
to search any given container because it may be part of the box
chain or buried under a mountain of containers, and there are
often only a few inches separating the boxes.9
This standardization and widespread use of containers that
enter the U.S. each day renders any plan to inspect every con-
tainer impossible. In his book, America the Vulnerable, Stephen
Flynn describes this dilemma. Because 18,000 standardized con-
Health Care
tainers enter the country through the ports of Los Angeles and
Long Beach each day, Flynn writes that “if every box were unload-
ed and inspected, meeting the proposed 100 percent inspection
mandate would translate into 270,000 man hours per day.” Flynn
then explains that those 270,000 hours of labor “would require
three times the customs inspection manpower that currently ex-
ists nationwide,” and implementing such a 100-percent inspec-
1
 tion plan could cause more problematic “global gridlock” than a
terrorist attack, itself.10
Defense & Diplomacy
The dilemma of not being able to inspect every container
caused the U.S. Government to develop a system to inspect the
potentially riskier containers over “trusted” ones. Currently, the
Automated Targeting System of the National Targeting Center
gives each container a rating, based on the shipper’s history and
the shipment’s point of origin and stops along the way. Contain-
ers from politically unstable regions or from unknown shippers
are more likely to be searched.11
Economic Development
Bush Administration Policies and Problems for Port Security
Although there are these inherent difficulties related to port
security, security in domestic ports remains privatized and leaves
the United States insecure. The overall policy of “trusting” cer-
tain senders and carriers is inherently flawed. Terrorists as crafty
as those in al-Qaeda are unlikely to smuggle a dirty bomb inside
a container originating from an unknown source in the hills be-
tween Afghanistan and Pakistan. Instead, they could attempt to
somehow hijack a shipment or hide a weapon of mass destruc-
tion inside a trusted, uninspected container.12 This uninspected
container would then arrive at the port, with the port owner
and his private security contractors. The consequences of mis-
Education
trusting just one container could be dire; overlooking just one
container could lead to dire consquences. Modern threats ne-
cessitate a port security system that does not simply “trust” any
particular container without verifying that it is benign.
In November 2001, the U.S. Customs and Boarder Protection
(CBP) began its C-TPAT program, one of the three main port
security initiatives since 9/11 that the SAFE Port Act of 2006
codified into law. This supply chain security policy offers expe-
Energy & Environment
dited and sparser customs searches to firms that follow a list of
security protocols, and today, over 9,000 companies participate
in the program.13 Because it would be against national interests
to inspect every incoming shipping container, a system like this
one to designate higher and lower-risk containers is theoreti-
cally cost-efficient and beneficial, as long as even the low-risk
containers are not given a complete free pass through security
measures, since they could be hijacked in transit.
However, the C-TPAT program is currently ineffective and un-
dermines national security. A May, 2008 Government Account-
ability Office study concluded that Customs and Border Protec-
Equal Justice
tion rarely inspects the overseas shipping companies to ensure
that they have met the security criteria for participation in the C-
TPAT program. Customs officials are not required to follow up to
make sure a particular company has made the security improve-
ments necessary for the C-TPAT program. The international firms
have no incentive to truly comply with regulations of the C-TPAT
as company can be eligible for C-TPAT before it even takes the
measures requested by Customs and Border Protection.14
Aside from C-TPAT, another major port security change after
9/11 was the Container Security Initiative (CSI), implemented in
Health Care
2002 and also officially signed into law in the 2006 SAFE Port
Act. The CSI program contains four major elements: 1) Improving
intelligence and coordination to find riskier containers; 2) Pre-
screening the risky containers before they are loaded on U.S.
ships or enter American waters; 3) Using new screening technol-
ogy, like X-ray scanners and radiation detectors; and 4) Utilizing
newer containers that make tampering more apparent.15 These
2
four security measures in the CSI are all logical and attempt to
improve upon important areas in prior policies.
The CSI program has been largely successful in including
many of the world’s busiest ports in the partnership, and has
been more effective than the C-TPAT program. Currently, 58
foreign ports participate in the program, which make up about
85 percent of cargo that is destined for the United States.16
These foreign ports can thereby hopefully designate the riskier
containers farther from American shores, and, with their newly
improved security technology and infrastructure, prescreen
them. As previously mentioned, the entire system of recognizing
trusted shippers and origins is flawed, but updating port security
technology and increasing cooperation throughout the global
shipping system can only help the situation.
Like the C-TPAT program, there have been problems institut-
ing the CSI policies. Currently, almost all of the ports that par-
ticipate in the CSI program are in industrialized countries, and
many of them are “megaport” conglomerates. Of the 58 ports in
the partnership, only two are in Africa (one in Egypt and one in
South Africa), and Israel and the United Arab Emirates hold three
of the five Middle Eastern CSI ports.17 Many of the ports and
governments of developing countries cannot afford the required
scanning technology, as each “non-intrusive inspecting device”
(NII), such as a gamma imaging system, costs millions of dollars.18
The CSI streamlines security measures for trusted CSI partici-
pating ports, and slows down shipments from higher-risk ports,
which tend to be smaller and situated in developing countries.
Thus, the CSI program distorts the market against the countries
that truly need increased economic integration and opportunity.
Finding some way to assist smaller Third World ports in purchas-
ing security technology and joining the CSI is critical, especially
because increased international trade could help stabilize politi-
cally volatile regions in Africa and the Middle East.
The 2006 SAFE Port Act created the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC), a TSA and Coast Guard pro-
gram under the Department of Homeland Security that had al-
ready begun testing and implementation in 2002. Like the C-
TPAT and CSI programs, the TWIC initiative is a good idea on
a theoretical level. Currently, a number of large American ports
require their port and maritime personnel to have a tamper-re-
sistant TWIC card in order to work on sensitive areas of ships or
enter restricted areas alone, and by April, 2009, all workers who
need access to restricted areas will, by law, need a TWIC.19 A
port or maritime worker obtains a TWIC by providing the TSA
with fingerprints and biographical information, as well as passing
a simple security test (the details of which are confidential).20
A coordinated security credential, to ensure that workers with
access to vulnerable areas do not pose a threat, seems like an
important step for the privatized port security system, but again
there are serious issues of implementation with the TWIC pro-
gram.
First, in 2002, the Department of Homeland Security attempt-
ed to make the TWIC cards comply with Federal Information
Processing Standard 201 for federal identification cards, mean-
ing port and maritime workers would have to scan the cards
in a reader upon entrance to a secure location. However, the
shipping industry believed that the scanners would not work
properly in the salty air around ports and ships, so the TWIC
cards essentially went unused until 2006.21 By then, the debate
had shifted to the cards’ encryption techniques because The
Department of Homeland Security, under the Federal Informa-
tion Processing Standard 201, requires that federal identification
cards be encrypted. If the card’s digital information is encrypt-
ed, meaning it is transferred to coded language, someone must
have the encryption key software to unscramble the information
back from code. The National Maritime Security Advisory Com-
mittee (NMSAC), established in 2002, is meant to be a bridge
between the Department of Homeland Security and industries
that are involved in maritime activity, and NMSAC has consis-
tently opposed using encryption According to the co-chair of
NMSAC’s TWIC group, Lisa Himber, the encryption would cause
a number of problems. It would require more processing time for
shipments, costs would increase, and there would be occasional
glitches that cause delays. Additionally, NMSAC is concerned
about the encryption keys. It is unclear who in ports and on ships
would oversee them, and who would be held liable if the security
of a key were to become compromised.22
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) published
a review of the TWIC initiative in September of 2006, mostly
criticizing the TSA for failing to enroll enough maritime work-
ers and implement the new card readers by the original dead-
lines.23 In response, the TSA expanded their TWIC-related staff,
began monthly reviews of the initiative’s progress, and gave the
Lockheed Martin Corporation a $70 million contract to enroll the
770,000 transportation workers that will ultimately require TWIC
credentials.24 Nevertheless, in April of 2007, Norman J. Rabkin,
the Managing Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues
in the GAO, issued a testimony before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation that echoed the 2006
GAO report and addressed additional upcoming problems for
the TWIC program. Rabkin advised that the TSA and its new
contractor, Lockheed Martin, would have to make sure that the
TWIC technology would function properly in a “maritime envi-
ronment,” and that there needed to be more effort to educate
port and maritime workers about the TWIC requirements and
enrollment. Rabkin’s main criticism, was in his words, the “TSA
and its enrollment contractor [Lockheed Martin] need to tran-
sition from limited testing of the TWIC program to successful
implementation of the program on a much larger scale covering
770,000 workers at about 3,500 maritime facilities and 5,300
vessels.”25
The Solution: Port Security Nationalization
The most famous policy proposal related to port secu-
rity occurred in February of 2006, when the Bush Administration
proposed selling six U.S. ports, then under the ownership of the
British P&O Company, to Dubai Ports World, a company based
in the United Arab Emirates. Almost immediately, pundits and
politicians began commenting on and criticizing the deal. A size-
able debate ensued, as both the left and the right were split on
the issue. On the left, Hillary Clinton and John Kerry opposed
the deal, whereas Jimmy Carter and Washington Post editori-
als supported it. On the right, Bill O’Reilly and Rush Limbaugh
supported the deal, but Sean Hannity and Michael Savage op-
posed it. Supporters argued that the UAE was a valuable ally
in the War on Terror and hinted that those who opposed could
be anti-Islamic or anti-Arab. Opponents cited the UAE boycott
on Israel and claimed that the U.S. would no longer fully control
its own security in such vital ports.26 The proposal soon died in
Congress, but the debate shed a new light on the issue of for-
Defense & Diplomacy
eign ownership of vulnerable domestic infrastructure.
The entire debate missed the point, though. Few made the
connection that another corporation from beyond our shores,
the United Kingdom’s P&O Company, owned the ports at the
time, rendering many of the anti-foreign arguments fallacious.
Most importantly, though, the debate missed the fact that if the
Bush Administration had nationalized domestic port security in
the way it had with airport security, it would not matter who has
the deed of ownership of the ports. With federally trained secu-
Economic Development
rity officers patrolling and inspecting the ports’ restricted areas
and incoming cargo, one could be more confident that the agen-
cies of the Department of Homeland Security would be aware of
any terrorist activity related to American ports. However, if Dubai
Ports World had purchased the ports, the corporation would
have made a deal with a private security firm or firms to contract
security personnel. The privatized system, of course, is less co-
ordinated with the Department of Homeland Security agencies.
It would also not ensure that the security officers have the most
up-to-date training and intelligence to counter the constantly
changing terrorist threats.
Overall, the three implemented policies, CSI, C-TPAT, and
Education
TWIC, have all had implementation problems. In particular, the
TWIC and C-TPAT programs show a lack of communication and
coordination between the public and private sectors, problems
that could be remedied through the nationalization of port secu-
rity forces. In the same way, the Administration’s Dubai proposal
would have been acceptable if port security was completely un-
der the jurisdiction of the TSA, like airport security is. The Bush
Administration missed a vital opportunity to nationalize domes-
Energy & Environment
tic port security in a similar manner to airport security, instead of
leaving it to the private port owners. Although the Department
of Homeland Security, Coast Guard, and Customs and Border
Protection technically oversee port security, the domestic port
security system remains remarkably privatized. The port opera-
tor (who is a private owner) manages the day to day security
issues. This owner hires all of the private security personnel, in
contrast to airport security, in which the Transportation Safety
Administration employs federal security personnel.
This privatized nature of port security contributes to the
country’s vulnerability in a number of ways. First, one cannot
Equal Justice
be sure that the private security employees, whether hired by
the port operator or by a firm under contract to the owner, are
trained in the same stringent and standardized fashion as fed-
eral employees. Second, through Congress and presidential
elections, American voters can hold a federal administration, like
the Department of Homeland Security, accountable for security
failures. When a private port operator hires his own port security
personnel, Americans have little say in the matter, even if the
security is ineffective. Third, there is more coordination of intel-
ligence among parts of the same federal agency or between the
Health Care
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the Coast Guard,
than there is among disparate port owners and their private se-
curity workers. Nationalizing our last line of defense is crucial,
especially with the disastrous lack of oversight of the C-TPAT
program and the failure to include the ports of developing coun-
tries in the CSI partnership. The TWIC program has consistently
seen its coordination with private port security personnel break
3
 down. Nationalization would conform, standardize, and simplify
the TWIC program for the officers, since they would be federal
Defense & Diplomacy
employees and under the authority of a single agency, rather
than separate corporations. A nationalized security team would
more quickly help to coordinate military and rescue workers if a
situation of terrorism were to call for it. Fourth, the foreign own-
ership of U.S. ports is problematic as long as they contract their
own security forces. Nationalizing the security workers would
mean that the U.S. Government has complete control over its
own security policies and procedures in such vulnerable sites.
Economic Development
Conclusion
A significant, if not the most significant factor in the dispar-
ity between airport and seaport security is the fact that airport
security is nationalized under the authority of the TSA. Many of
the problems of the C-TPAT and TWIC initiatives and the Dubai
Ports World proposal stem from cracks in the partnership be-
tween the private security contractors at the ports and the De-
partment of Homeland Security and its agencies. Port security
personnel should be nationalized into federal employees in or-
der to make the security forces in the United States’ most vulner-
able areas work as a coherent body under the guidance of the
Department of Homeland Security.
Education
This nationalization of port security would not be difficult to
implement. Port owners already contract private security firms;
it would be more effective to spend that money in a tax to pay
for the federal security officers. The new system could be even
easier, simpler, and potentially even cheaper for the port own-
ers than the current system, since the U.S. Government would
be in charge of their security, and they would no longer have to
spend time or money reviewing and contracting private firms or
Energy & Environment
employees. The owners would not have to deal with the logistics
of the TWIC program, or any of the other convoluted security
requirements from the Department of Homeland Security. Of
course, it is possible that the federal employees will earn more
than the private contractors did, and their pensions will almost
certainly be larger. However, the U.S. Government is already
spending heavily on port security; In the 2009 budget, the Sen-
ate Appropriations Committee and the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Homeland Security allocated $400 million for
port security grants, expanding the post-9/11 total to $1.5 billion
in grants to ports.27 With this much funding going directly to
Equal Justice
port owners to implement regional security plans and improve
security as they see fit, nationalization seems within the Govern-
ment’s means.
However, with the rise of terrorist networks with advances in
communication and globalization, the U.S. Government should
put its full effort into its last line of defense—security person-
nel—in areas as vulnerable to catastrophic attacks as airports
and seaports. The overarching key to counterterrorism is strong
intelligence, and that should not be ignored. That means elimi-
nating the problems of coordination and implementation that
Health Care
come with separate private security contractors by nationalizing
port security in the same way the Bush Administration did with
airport security.
4
De-emphasizing the nuclear missions of B-52s in the U.S.
Global Strike Command
Shree Awsare and Eric Rosenberg
In light of recent nuclear tests by North Korea and fears
over an Iranian nuclear program, maintaining a clear nuclear de-
terrent has been deemed necessary by the United States federal
government and its allies.1 However, despite the potential sa-
lience of the United States nuclear weapons arsenal today, there
are signs of over-reliance on these weapons that may prove to
be detrimental. One area in which the prioritization of nuclear
weapons has come under scrutiny is in the context of the B-52
Stratofortress, which is “a long-range, strategic heavy bomber
capable of dropping or launching the widest array of weapons
in the US inventory.”2 Although emphasizing the nuclear option
for B-52 bombers may seem like a way to flex our military muscle,
it is likely to compromise the United States’ overall deterrence.
By eliminating the nuclear missions for all but 25% of the B-52
squadrons, the United States can face the security challenges
of a nuclear world without reducing the credibility of its robust
deterrent.
Following President Obama’s optimistic promises of a nuclear
weapons free world in his April 2009 speech, the debate over
the future of the United States nuclear weapons arsenal has
been re-ignited.3 With the negotiation of the US-Russia Strate-
gic Arms Reduction Treaty Follow-on (START I Follow-on) and
the publication of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), 2010 has
been identified by policymakers as a critical year for changes in
the United States’ nuclear posture. Additionally, the controversy
surrounding our nuclear capability has surfaced in the public eye
after President Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in
part for his firm commitment to downsize United States nuclear
weapons. On the other hand, Pentagon and Department of De-
fense officials have levied a strong resistance against this stance,
citing the need for modernization of the nuclear weapons arse-
nal to ensure an advantage over emerging powers and adver-
saries. These developments call into question the salience of
the nuclear arsenal to United States security and their role in a
post-Cold War era.
Despite President Obama’s rhetoric that calls for “dramatic
reductions in the [nuclear weapons] stockpile” and reflects “an
end to Cold War thinking”, the policy changes he has advocated
are far from transformational.4 Though the Nuclear Posture Re-
view calls for large cuts in the size of the United States arsenal,
it does not maintain that the sole purpose of the United State
nuclear arsenal is deterrence, which leaves open the possibility
of using nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack against
our homeland or our allies. This symbolizes the “significant niche
role” that the nuclear arsenal continues to play in the national
security strategy of the Obama Administration.5
The Air Force’s policies surrounding the future of B-52 bomb-
ers reflect the emphasis placed on nuclear weapons by the
American policymakers and the military. Recently, all B-52 bomb-
ers were transferred from the direction of the Air Combat Com-
mand to the authority of a new Global Strike Command, which
calls for a primary focus on the Prompt Global Strike Mission.6
This mission allows the military to use its B-52s to strike high-
value, time-sensitive targets across long distances. Further-
more, Air Force leaders have declared that B-52 missions involv-
ing nuclear weapons will play the central role in the Command.
These two facts point to the greater role that nuclear weapons
will play in United States military strategy, and are informed by
a position that assumes that showcasing
our offensive nuclear capabilities (such as
nuclear prompt global strikes) are vital
in maintaining a robust deterrent. While
T he United States Air Force
should eliminate the nuclear
this conclusion may have some merit, it
missions for all but 25% of the world.15 While United States hegemony
provokes questions about how the B-52
bomber squadrons will manage its addi- currently B-52 squadrons under and power projection may have its faults, it
tional commitments on top of their salient the Global Strike Command.
conventional missions. Analyzing how
emerging security threats in the 21st Cen-
tury perceive our overall deterrence shows how over-emphasiz-
ing the role of nuclear weapons for B-52 squadrons by having all
of them simultaneously satisfy nuclear and conventional missions
is detrimental to the dependability of our deterrent.
First, our adversaries may not perceive the threat posed
by the prioritization of our B-52’s nuclear capabilities because
of the unreliability of the Air Force in this context. Empirically, B-52 bomber squadron active under nuclear missions would en-
studies from the Vietnam War indicate that B-52 squadrons suf-
fered more personnel errors when handling both nuclear and
conventional weapons.7 Although times may be different, recent
Air Force blunders with nuclear weapons prove that forcing B-52
squadrons to fulfill a dual commitment to nuclear and conven-
tional missions continues to be problematic today. In 2006, the
Air Force carelessly made an unauthorized shipment of nuclear
fuses to Taiwan, nearly disrupting US-China relations.8 Moreover,
in 2007, B-52 bombers from Minot Air Force Base were mistak-
enly loaded with a W-80 nuclear warhead, and flown over United
States airspace to Barksdale Air Force Base without authoriza-
tion.9 Nuclear mishaps like the ones above do not bode well for
the United States’ ability to project its offensive nuclear capabil-
ity, as they make our nuclear deterrent seem insecure and unreli-
able.
Second, focusing on United States B-52 bombers’ nuclear ca-
pabilities may undermine our nuclear deterrent. In the context
of a Prompt Global Strike operation, the United States is unlikely
to use nuclear weapons on high-value, time-sensitive targets
because it would break the nuclear taboo, draw in other major
powers into conflicts, and tank its international credibility and
soft power.10 Hence, nuclear threats that are made by the United
States in the status quo are not taken seriously by both our al-
lies and our enemies because they are too ambiguous and are
generally perceived of as bluffing.11 These empty threats would
reduce the reliability of our nuclear deterrence, which is partially victims were permanently blinded, their eyes having burst out
based on our ability to make credible threats against emerging
enemies.
Third, General Kevin Chilton, the Commander of the United
States Strategic Command, has indicated that our emphasis on
the nuclear option for B-52s has undermined our capacity to
control the escalation of conflicts by neglecting the capabilities
of our conventional bomber-based deterrence.12 The placement
of B-52 bombers under the Global Strike Command requires
them to be re-assigned to regional commanders each time there
is a conventional mission, which creates a time trade-off.13 Since
prompt global strikes using conventional weapons are often
used in the Middle East and in other wartime situations against
Defense & Diplomacy
time-sensitive targets, the time tradeoff would be devastating to
its effectiveness. The effects of our waning conventional capa-
bility would be significant because the United States is currently
considered to be the world’s unipole, and a significant change
in its hard power could weaken its ability
to maintain the world order.14 Hence, main-
taining United States conventional superi-
ority is vital to continue its role as a guard-
ian of peace in an increasingly hostile
Economic Development
has successfully prevented any great pow-
er wars in recent history, and has proven
itself to be vital in the modern age.16
In order to prevent current policies from having detrimental
effects, the United States Air Force should eliminate the nuclear
missions for all but 25% of the current B-52 squadrons under
the Global Strike Command. This would ensure fewer person-
nel failures and maintain the credibility of both United States
conventional as well as nuclear deterrence. Keeping 25% of our
Education
sure all of the advantages of having a nuclear option but would
not compromise our overall deterrence.
In his Prague Speech on Nuclear Weapons, President Obama
assured the world of “America’s commitment to seek the peace
and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”17 While his
remark reflects a utopian vision of global disarmament, some
of the policies his Administration has pursued ironically over-
emphasize the usefulness of nuclear weapons to our overall de-
Energy & Environment
terrence. The United States must make every effort to strike
a balance between total disarmament and maintaining a Cold
War-like importance to our nuclear weapons arsenal in order to
keep our overall deterrent effective in the short term.
Securing Our Chemical Facilities
Isaac Lara
Introduction
Equal Justice
This year marks the 25th anniversary since the worst industri-
al disaster in history. On December 3, 1984, a tank at a UCIL pes-
ticide plant in Bhopal, India discharged a toxic cloud of gas into
the atmosphere, immediately killing 8,000 people and severely
sickening 150,000. Another 12,000 people died soon afterwards
from long-term exposure to the toxic methyl isocyanatae.1 Some
of their sockets; others’ lungs had melted upon contact with the
toxic gas. Autopsies later revealed degeneration of the liver, in-
flammation of the small intestine, and excess water in the spaces
Health Care
between the brain and the skull.2
The nightmare though never ends for victims and their fami-
lies. Even today thousands of survivors still suffer from ailments
associated with exposure to the gas, such as chaotic menstrual
cycles and searing headaches. Worse, they continue to have chil-
dren and grandchildren born with brain damage and horrible
deformities.
5
 Although speculation still exists over whether the Bhopal Di-
saster was caused by accident or foul play, the tragedy clearly
Defense & Diplomacy
illustrates the dangerous risk an insecure chemical plant poses
to the public. However, this is not an Indian or a third-world prob-
lem. In the U.S., more than 15,000 chemical plants and other facil-
ities store large amounts of hazardous materials at their sites.3 In
New Jersey, the most densely populated state with a huge pet-
rochemical industry, one chemical company’s 180,000 pounds of
chlorine or sulfur dioxide could form a cloud that would threaten
12 million residents and cause them to suffer a fate not unlike
Bhopal.4 Some experts worry that jihadist extremists might actu-
Economic Development
ally transform these facilities into impromptu weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) the same way that 9/11 hijackers used com-
mercial airliners as missiles to attack Americans.
So what is currently being done to protect chemical sites
from terrorist attack? No law today exists to regulate or install
permanent national safety standards at chemical facilities.5 For
years chemical companies have actually blocked legislation to
increase security at these facilities in order to save costs and
preserve profit margins. Their efforts, along with the public
perception that America is more vulnerable to hijackings and
nuclear weapons attacks than an explosion at an industrial site,
ignore the threat terrorists pose to chemical facilities, and places
Education
millions of Americans in grave danger.
This paper will identify the threat that chemical facilities with because the media tends to report on incidents involving high
security lapses pose to the American public, as well as explore
current legislation that seeks to address this urgent problem.
It draws on information from an interview I conducted with Dr.
Stephen Flynn, the author of America the Vulnerable, and a lead-
ing security expert at the Council of Foreign Relations. This pa-
per also includes my personal recommendations for the federal
Energy & Environment
government to establish safety standards at chemical facilities
throughout the nation in order to prevent another devastating
terrorist attack. Otherwise, if no action is taken to safeguard our
nation’s chemical facilities, the next attack might very well be our
last.
Emerging Trends in Terrorist Tactics
As globalization continues to transform world markets and
spread ideas, terrorists have responded by developing new
tactics to target their victims. Evidence of these changes first
emerged in 1995, when members of the cult Aum Shinrikyo un-
Equal Justice
leashed sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system, killing 12 and injur-
ing more than 5,000 people.6 This attack ushered a new era in
terrorism dubbed, “catastrophic terrorism,” since
it marked the first time extremist groups had ac-
quired and deployed highly toxic materials to at-
tack large numbers of civilians.7 Not only did this ...A lready been inci-
incident demonstrate that terrorists were no lon- dents in which terrorists difficult because terrorists fear mishandling
ger restricted to using conventional methods like have infiltrated facilities these materials and injuring themselves
hijackings or small explosives, but they could now and stolen chemical mate- prior to carrying out their attack. For ex-
acquire WMD that broadened their targets and
rials to attack civilians. fell ill while attempting to create some
Health Care
inflicted more casualties than ever before.
Most shocking is that America’s greatest con-
temporary enemy - Al Qaeda - has also recently become part of
this growing trend and sought chemical weapons. Immediately
following the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda released a statement that it
was attempting to procure chemical weapons in future attacks
against the U.S. This threat became substantiated in December
6
2001 after US officials recovered 64 videos at the group’s aban-
doned training camp in Afghanistan depicting several men ex-
perimenting with lethal chemicals. In one segment, masked men
test an unidentified nerve agent on three defenseless dogs, kill-
ing all of them before fleeing the scene. Officials at the camp
also discovered copies of American chemical trade publications
as well, as well as formulas to synthesize sarin gas.8
Because of worrisome findings like these, many experts today
speculate as to why terrorists seek chemical weapons in the first
place. Technological advancements in manufacturing processes
partly explain this question since they have helped scientists cre-
ate deadly chemical agents, which terrorists seek to acquire in
order to maximize the damage they inflict to a civilian popula-
tion. Since the invention of dynamite in the 19th century, terror-
ists have stayed abreast of new inventions so they can use them
in their methods for achieving their political objectives.9 Terror-
ists specifically desire chemical weapons because of their op-
erational advantages, their ability to garner international media
attention, and their psychological impact on victims.
Operational advantages to using chemical weapons include
its ability to cause a high number of casualties in a single strike,
which could exceed modest expectations depending on how
weather conditions affect dispersion. Chemical attacks also are
more likely to attract publicity and shine light on the attackers
numbers of American casualties. This may be due to the novelty
of the scheme since few cases of chemical terrorism have been
recorded.10 Finally, terrorists also want to exploit the psycho-
logical effects that a chemical attack would inflict to a civilian
population. The possibility of an attack indiscriminately killing
thousands, perhaps millions of people at unpredictable times
or places conjures fear and suspicion among ordinary citizens,
which helps terrorists transmit the message to their target so-
cieties that everyone is a possible victim until their objectives
are met.
However, fortunately for Americans today, several obstacles
prevent groups from acquiring these weapons and enjoying
their advantages. First, terrorists often lack sufficient knowledge
and expertise to synthesize a lethal substance. Few extremist
groups are able to attract the support of the educated chemical
engineers who enabled Aum Shinrikyo to produce sarin gas in
its attacks. Second, the materials required to develop a chemical
weapon are expensive. Several organizations are hard-pressed
to fund large-scale operations, let alone purchase the neces-
sary ingredients for a chemical bomb from
rogue states or arms dealers that charge
exorbitant prices.
Third, acquiring a chemical weapon is
ample, a few members in Aum Shinrikyo
of the early versions of the sarin gas that
they would later release in the Tokyo subway system.11 Because
of such challenges, many groups instead might turn to stealing
chemical materials from nearby industrial plants in order to cre-
ate chemical bombs.
The Risk Industrial Plants Pose to Communities life could easily equal that which occurred on Septem-
Terrorists pose a significant risk to industrial facilities by either ber 11, 2001 – and might even exceed it by an order of

Defense & Diplomacy

stealing chemical substances from industrial facilities, or worse, magnitude or more…19
exploding a chemical plant that releases toxic materials into the
atmosphere. There have already been To further illustrate the loss of life
incidents in which terrorists have in- and damage that could result if terror-
filtrated facilities and stolen chemical
materials to attack civilians. For ex-
ample, one of the chief conspirators
B esides Loss of Life
damage, such an attack could also
and physical
ists
plant,
a
were to compromise a chemical
take the worst-case scenario of
chlorine gas leak. The Department of
behind the 1993 World Trade Center have devastating economic repercus- Homeland Security (DHS), for example,
Bombing, Nidal Ayyad, used his job estimates that an attack on any chlorine
sions. A chemical facility meltdown

Economic Development
at a chemical facility to steal power- storage tank in America could release
ful chemicals. Security was so lax at could cripple the national and local toxic gas into the atmosphere, and,
the plant that other employees failed business by disrupting major portions depending on wind conditions, cause
20 Traveling
to realize anything was amiss, and at of the country’s rail lines, oil stor- more than 17,500 fatalities.
one point Ayyad was even able to or- age tanks, and refineries, pipelines, ten miles in two minutes, chlorine gas
der more dangerous substances us- could potentially kill citizens living with-
air traffic, communications net-
ing company letterhead. 12,13 He would in a 20-mile radius.21
later use these materials to develop works, and highway systems. Besides loss of life and physical dam-
and explode a bomb in the basement age, such an attack could also have
at the towers, which killed six and in- devastating economic repercussions. A
jured 1,042 people. chemical facility meltdown could cripple the national and local
Ayyad also later revealed to investigators that he and his ter- business by disrupting major portions of the country’s rail lines,

Education
rorist collaborators had originally planned to steal cyanide and oil storage tanks and refineries, pipelines, air traffic, communi-
14 cations networks and highway systems. Government authorities
release it in the ventilation system at WTC. Such an attack
would have wreaked havoc on the office workers in the towers, would require hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars for
demonstrating the extent to which terrorists had planned to use cleanup efforts, insurance, and recovery. Emergency patients
chemical weapons against civilians. and trauma victims would flood into health clinics and over-
Chemical companies also store valuable technology like mi- whelm the system. With dire scenarios like these in mind, many
crofilters that if terrorists were to possess would unleash a wave experts, especially Dr. Stephen Flynn at the Council of Foreign
of destruction. Microfilters are miniature hand-held devices that Relations, have alerted the federal government to security vul-

Energy & Environment

produce small quantities of chemicals on short order. While com- nerabilities and have urged Washington to take swift action to
panies typically use this technology to mass-produce chemical protect chemical facilities from terrorism.
products, if terrorists somehow infiltrate chemical facilities and In January 2001, Flynn, who at the time was a member of the
steal these machines, they could actually produce some of the U.S. Commission of National Security, submitted a report warn-
15 ing Congress that America was vulnerable to a terrorist attack
world’s most dangerous nerve agents, such as VX and sarin.
Besides stealing, terrorists can also strike industrial plants by on its own turf. Flynns’s advice went ignored, and eight months
either launching a projectile at the site or detonating an explo- later, 9/11 occurred. Since that day he has continued to write
sive near a storage tank containing dangerous chemicals. This extensively on domestic security, publishing several books and
attack has the potential of releasing toxic gases into the atmo- newspaper articles on the subject and identifying security lapses
sphere or causing a chemical spill that threatens the environ- at industrial sites, transportation hubs, and ports.
ment, wildlife, and the lives of countless numbers of residents The 9/11 Commission was another early whistleblower that has

Equal Justice
in the affected area. Nearly 100 chemical facilities store enough called attention vulnerabilities of chemical facilities. Members
material to each kill one million people if released by a terrorist have consistently recommended that the U.S. allocate homeland
16 security funds to private and public sector organizations based
operation. One plant in New Jersey is located along a stretch of
road that FBI experts have dubbed, “most dangerous two miles on risk, vulnerabilities, and potential consequences of a terrorist
in America.”17A gas leak here could endanger the lives of more attack on a chemical facility, which the federal government has
18 neglected to do. For this and other reasons, the Commission
than 12 million people living in the metropolitan area. Such an
attack could transform facilities like this one in New Jersey into established a report card with letter grades A-F to evaluate the
weapons of mass destruction much like how Jihadist extremists progress the federal government has since made on implement-
had converted commercial airlines into WMD on 9/11. ing the Commission’s suggestions. The Bush Administration
Former White House advisors recently described how a received an “F” for not distributing homeland security monies
Health Care

simple attack on a chemical facility could possibly inflict enough
casualties to even dwarf the destruction on 9/11:
A cleverly designed terrorist attack against a TIH (toxic
inhalation hazard) chemical target would be no more
difficult to perpetrate than was the simultaneous hijack-
ing of four commercial aircraft by 19 terrorists…the loss of
according to infrastructure vulnerabilities or risks it may pose if
a terrorist attack were to occur; a “C” for developing inadequate
preparedness standards for private companies; and a “D” for de-
veloping insufficient procedures to determine vulnerabilities at
chemical facilities.22
The government is not the only one ignoring the peril into
which chemical facilities place communities. Often times, com-
7
 panies are also complacent with security at their facilities. Ac-
cording to 2002 survey administered by the Council on Com-
Defense & Diplomacy
petiveness, 92% of executives did not believe terrorists would
attempt to attack their companies, while only more than half of
these respondents claimed their companies had made increased
security spending following the 9/11 attacks.23 These statistics
underscore the private sector’s oversight of the threat that ter-
rorists pose to chemical plants.
Because of government’s disregard to heed the warnings of
the 9/11 Commission and Flynn, along with the complacent na-
ture of Big Business, chemical sites remain insecure today. Basic
Economic Development
measures such as posting warning signs, fencing, and maintain-
ing access control and twenty-four hour surveillance are only
required for 21% of the 15,000 sites that store large quantities
of hazardous materials.24 More than 90% of the most dangerous
chemical facilities in the country ship or receive their highest-
hazard chemical via truck or railcar, which move unescorted
through heavily populated urban centers, like Capitol Hill in
Washington, D.C.25 Chemical barges that navigate the nation’s
waterways also move unmonitored. If terrorists were to target
them as they sat in harbor or passed underneath a bridge, they
could disrupt maritime traffic. The shortcomings are best sum-
marized as follows:
Education
The federal government has the authority to regulate
the security of chemicals as they are being transported
on roads, railways, and waterways. With only one minor
exception, the administration has not exercised this au-
thority in any substantial way since Sept. 11. There has
been no meaningful improvement in the security of these
chemicals moving through our population centers.26
Energy & Environment
Because the government has ignored these problems for so
long, chemical facilities are easier to target and infiltrate than
ever before. Evidence of this includes the discovery of illegal
immigrants working at various chemical sites throughout the
country that store hazardous material. The Immigration and
Customs Enforcement bureau (ICE) conducted one sting opera-
tion in 2005 that resulted in the arrest of nearly 65 illegal aliens
who had worked at seven petrochemical facilities, one pipeline
facility, and other industrial sites.27 Such a security lapse demon-
strates chemical companies’ failure to conduct even rudimentary
Equal Justice
background checks on their employees, many of who had access
to chemical materials.
Past Attempts at Reform
Despite few experts downplaying the risk, enough whistle-
blowers have convinced Congress this is a pressing problem.
For this reason, there have been several attempts to reform se-
curity at chemical plants. Six months after 9/11, former Senator
Jon S. Corzine originally introduced S. 1602, otherwise known
Health Care
as the Chemical Security Act of 2001, which sought to identify
vulnerabilities at chemical plants, create security plans for at-risk
facilities, and also grant authority to either the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) or Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to approve these plans.
Senator Corzine’s bill made special inroads towards security
reform because it included Inherently Safer Technology (IST).
8
IST refers to modifications in chemical manufacturing processes
to neutralize or reduce the potential for a hazardous chemical re-
lease. These steps includes minimizing the amount of toxic mate-
rial used, decreasing the temperature and pressure required to
create chemical materials, and replacing a hazardous substance
with a less dangerous substitute.28 An example of IST imple-
mentation is the conversion of Washington, DC‘s main sewage
treatment plant from chlorine to safer chemicals just eight weeks
after 9/11.29
Eventually Democrat Frank Pallone (D-NJ) and Republican
Marge Roukema (R-NJ) introduced H.R. 5300, which was a
nearly identical bill modeled after Corzine’s draft. This was done
so that legislative efforts for reforming security at chemical fa-
cilities did not rely solely on Corzine’s bill, lest it fail in debate.
Soon the Corzine bill reported out of the Environment and Pub-
lic Works Committee, whereas its House analogue, having been
introduced late in the session, stalled in the Energy and Com-
merce Committee.
Whereas Corzine’s bill represented greater government con-
trol over security at chemical facilities, Senator James Inhofe’s
plan, S. 994, sought to preserve the business interests of the
chemical industry. A self-proclaimed neoconservative, Inhoffe
introduced the “Chemical Facilities Security Act of 2003,” which
required owners of selected chemical facilities to conduct secu-
rity vulnerability assessments (SVA) while limiting the access that
DHS had to such information. Regardless, the Department was
not adequately staffed to handle a high volume of SVAs anyway.
Inhoffe’s bill also granted all regulatory authority to the DHS,
whereas the Corzine bills had assigned the EPA the lead role
and the DHS merely a consultative role. The difference between
both bills’ delegation of regulatory power to agencies repre-
sents different perspectives of looking at the same problem. Be-
cause Corzine’s bill would have granted more power to both the
DHS and EPA, it acknowledged chemical facilities as posing a
threat not only to America’s homeland defense, but also to wild-
life, flora, and air and water quality. In this sense, it resembled an
environmental bill. On the other hand, Inhoffe’s plan was similar
to standard homeland security bills since it delegated all regu-
latory power to the DHS and designated human beings as the
only stakeholders in an attack on chemical facilities. Therefore
the legal orientation of Inhoffe’s plan demonstrates its failure to
completely account for all the possible ramifications of an attack
on a chemical facility, including the environment.
Chemical Companies Resist Changes
The most glaring oversight in Inhoffe’s bill is its failure to re-
quire chemical companies to implement IST if they are deemed
vulnerable targets. IST is the single most critical component of
any viable piece of chemical security legislation since it does
not merely just help companies avoid a terrorist attack, but ac-
tively reduces the threat of it occurring by replacing dangerous
chemical materials. Regardless of the obvious benefits to IST,
both Corzine and Inhoffe’s bills were defeated in Congress due
to political squabbling over IST and the costs chemical compa-
nies may incur as a result. Corzine blamed the rejection of his bill
on greedy, profit-hungry corporations when he said “My bill was
crushed by the American Chemistry Council. It was crushed by
those who were looking after their private interests and not the
public interest.”30
 Trade associations such as the American Chemistry Council
(ACC) represent over 135 companies with 2,000 facilities. They
vehemently opposed Corzine’s bill, arguing that safety measures
like IST placed companies at a competitive disadvantage and
cost them profits. To help win political support for their position,
the ACC even launched a television campaign, wrote newspa-
per editorials, and donated over $5,464,089 to the Republican
National Committee and President George W. Bush’s reelection
campaign in 2004. There is no surprise then why seven Republi-
can members of the Environment and Public Works Committee
who had originally supported Corzine’s proposal later rejected
it in 2002.31
In some sense, chemical executives still have legitimate
reasons for opposing Corzine on this issue. If a company that
spends money on security does not believe others are willing
or able make similar investments, then it faces the likelihood of
losing market share in an industry with already few competitors.
As a result, a tragedy of commons arises since other companies
follow the same logic and are similarly discouraged from pursu-
ing safety measures.32
Other valid explanations for resisting chemical security re-
form include companies’ fear of exposing too much information
about their business practices to the DHS. They worried that the
DHS could leak trade secrets about critical processes and man-
ufacturing, and subsequently compromising companies’ market
position and reducing profits. Besides their doubts about DHS
competence, company executives also opposed security reform
because many are unsure about the exact amount they should
invest in security measures like IST. At some point, security mea-
sures follow the rule of diminishing returns, which means that
additional security investments purchase gradually less security.
Before executives decide how much money to invest in security
at their facilities, they usually require more information about
the threat terrorists pose to their chemical sites. However, today
in the post-9/11 era defense intelligence is typically controlled
by the federal government and lacks specificity. Sometimes this
information is even withheld from chemical facilities, leaving
the private sector unable to adequately assess the threat level
against chemical facilities and determining the appropriate secu-
rity measures it should take.33
Responsible Care
Companies that object to government regulations, along
with others that prioritize security but cannot act on it due to
fears of government mismanagement, have created Responsible
Care as a government regulation alternative. Responsible Care
is a voluntary program created by the chemical industry and de-
signed to implement industry-wide safety standards at chemical
facilities while also protecting profit margins. It has members in
52 countries whose combined chemical industries account for
nearly 90% of the world’s chemical production.34 Companies
that opt into the program pledge to perform security audits on
their facilities, identify vulnerabilities, and implement reforms
commensurate to security risks.
The most significant problem with this program is that it is
completely voluntary. Chemical companies have little to no in-
centive to join Responsible Care other than to assure communi-
ties that their facilities do not pose a threat to civilian popula-
tions. For that reason, more than half of all chemical plants under
Responsible Care do not participate in the program at all, which
means they refuse to abide by any industry-wide safety stan-
Defense & Diplomacy
dards.35
Another flaw in Responsible Care is that it permits companies
to independently assess risks at their facilities using methods
designed by an industry-funded research group, the Center for
Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). This group was created by
another professional organization, the American Institute for
Chemical Engineers (AICE), which typically supports actions
that preserve profits for their employers, chemical companies.36
This further illustrates how incapable chemical companies are
Economic Development
to meticulously assessing risks at their facilities because of busi-
ness interests that cloud their judgment.
Moreover, Responsible Care also requires companies to re-
cord security management procedures and file documents prov-
ing they have taken necessary actions to safeguard their facili-
ties. The problem is that none of this information is required to
be sent to federal or state agencies for appraisal because com-
panies worry that their trade secrets could be disclosed and cre-
ate competitive disadvantages. This action further restricts the
public sector’s role in security management.
However, Responsible Care claims to offer opportunities for
the public sector to be involved with security practices at chemi-
Education
cal facilities. Its guidelines, which are called the Security Code
of Management Practices (SCMP), demand that signees report
plausible security infractions to authorities on a need-be basis
Companies take physical and cyber-security threats
very seriously. In the event of such threats, companies
promptly will evaluate the situation and respond. Real
and credible threats will be reported and communicated
Energy & Environment
to company and law enforcement personnel as appro-
priate.37
Despite its promise to report security breaches to law en-
forcement, Responsible Care fails to explain exactly what consti-
tutes a “a real and credible threat.” Without a clearer definition,
some chemical companies could report suspicious persons to
local authorities while others may merely offer a stern warning to
offenders before letting them go.
For example, Carl Prine, an investigative reporter at the
Pittsburg Tribune, infiltrated the Neville Chemical Plant outside
Equal Justice
downtown Pittsburgh and stood next to a tank filled with the
toxic gas, anhydrous ammonia. When guards finally caught him,
the journalist only received a citation for trespassing, which in-
cluded a $25 fine, plus court costs.38 Typically, however, trespass-
ing on certain chemical companies’ property typically amounts
to a felony offense. This is just one instance out of many in which
confusion has arisen over chemical companies’ interpretation of
a real and credible threat.39
One of the worst shortcomings of Responsible Care is its
failure to mandate that all companies invest in IST. The SCMP
Health Care
merely identifies IST as an option for companies that implement
security measures instead of requiring them to do so.40 Such
corporate complacency places civilian populations in severe
danger in the event of a chemical spill or gas leak.
Besides the risk it poses to communities, chemical companies’
inaction could be self-damaging in the long run. Stephen Flynn
argues that chemical companies’ have several financial incen-
9
 tives to make appropriate security investments. In the event of a
terrorist attack, those facilities that refused to implement safety
Defense & Diplomacy
measures could face drastically higher costs – possibly hundreds
of millions of dollars - in recovery, victim compensation, and
clean-up.41 Moreover, negligent companies also face a public
relations nightmare and run the risk of permanently damaging
their reputation among consumers. Some states have utilized
these consequences to force companies to reform their security
practices.
New Jersey is a fine example. Arguably the state with the
strongest safety standards in the country, the Garden State
Economic Development
gives companies the choice to opt out of IST under the condi-
tion that they be held liable in the event of a chemical release.42
This provides companies with strong financial incentives to make
the necessary security adjustments.
SECTION 550 AND CFATS
Despite the flaws in Responsible Care, the chemical lobby
still attempted to hinder other legislative efforts to improve se-
curity at chemical facilities. Finally, during the 109th Congress,
lawmakers compromised with chemical companies by incorpo-
rating security reform as a sunset provision within a larger bill
like the DHS Appropriations Act of 2002 rather than creating
Education
one stand-alone bill. As a result, Section 550 was born, closely
resembling Inhoffe’s bill to appease chemical lobbyists while still
directing the DHS to establish risk-based security standards.
Congress also decided to establish Section 550 as a sunset pro-
vision, meaning it would expire on October 3, 2009.43
Section 550 guidelines first require facilities to conduct secu-
rity vulnerability assessments (SVA) and then submit to the DHS
site security plans (SSP) that address any security weaknesses
Energy & Environment
they found. The DHS can either approve or reject a facility’s SSP
at its own discretion depending on if they determine such facili-
ties to be dangerous risks to the public; however, it cannot man-
date any particular security measure. Institutionally, Section 550
charges the DHS with assessing and evaluating SVAs and SSPs,
leaving it up to the Department whether they should consult the
EPA.44
Section 550 also instituted mandatory security measures
called the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS)
for any facilities that possess chemicals of interest (COI) at or
above specific Screening Threshold Quantities (STQ). If the
Equal Justice
amount of facilities’ COI go beyond STQ, they must submit a
“Top Screen” report, which is a tool the DHS uses to decide
which facilities are enough of a liability to require SVAs and
SSPs. Companies that submit an SSP are quizzed as to how they
would deter or avoid a terrorist attack, secure their facility’s pe-
rimeter from terrorist attack, protect from infiltration, and moni-
tor suspicious persons.45 Serious problems lie with the current
CFATS regulations. One is that they prohibit DHS from requiring
companies to use IST to reduce the consequences of a terrorist
attack on a chemical facility. CFATS also do not cover COI inside
Health Care
railroad facilities and long-haul pipelines.46 Both these are seri-
ous government oversights.
Where We Are Today
Congressman Bennie G. Thompson (D-MS) introduced the
Chemical and Water Safety Act in June 2009 to address vulner-
10
abilities at chemical facilities and water treatment plants. How-
ever, only Title 1 of this act will be discussed, which addresses se-
curity at chemical facilities. Title I of the act for the first time ever
not only codifies CFAT regulations that DHS created in 2007,
but also requires facilities to implement IST if safety assessments
reveal security vulnerabilities. Moreover, it authorizes the DHS to
distribute nearly $900 million in funds from 2011-2013 to high-risk
chemical facilities to help defray the costs of switching to IST.
However, the main problem with this provision is that it may
underestimate the costs for switching to IST. Depending on num-
ber of chemical facilities declared to be high-risk targets and
required to switch to IST, which could be hundreds, $900 million
may not be enough to cover all these costs. In which case, the
chemical sector should foot the remainder of the bill.
Title I of the Chemical and Water Safety Act also establishes
an Office of Chemical Facility Security at the DHS to enforce the
bill’s provisions. It specifies various criteria that the DHS Secre-
tary should use in order to select an appropriate Director of the
Office of Chemical Facility Security. These credentials include:
…Professional qualifications and experience necessary for effec-
tively directing the Office of Chemical Facility Security and car-
rying out the requirements of this title, including a demonstrated
knowledge of physical infrastructure protection, cyber-security,
chemical facility security, hazard analysis, chemical process engi-
neering, chemical process safety reviews, or other such qualifica-
tions that the Secretary determines to be necessary.47
Although Section 2114 also claims that the next Director
should be chosen “from among a group of candidates that is
diverse with respect to race, ethnicity, age, gender, and disability
characteristics,” it neglects to proscribe religion as a disquali-
fying factor. In the post-9/11 era, many Muslims vying for work
routinely suffer employee discrimination because of stereotypes
that cast them as terrorists. Without a stipulation prohibiting re-
ligious discrimination during the hiring process for this position,
Muslim candidates could be discriminated against and denied
the opportunity to be seriously considered as a Director of the
Office of Chemical Facility Security. This legal oversight is a civil
rights violation waiting to happen.
Section 2116 finally recognizes the community as an equal
stakeholder in security reform by formulating the groundwork
for citizen enforcement of the bill. According to this stipulation,
ordinary citizens can file civil suits against the DHS Secretary
for failing to carry out his or her obligations to security reform.
They can also petition DHS to investigate certain safety viola-
tions at chemical facilities that they identify as private citizens.
These measures help hold the DHS accountable for its actions.48
The bill also authorizes the DHS Secretary to regulate back-
ground check processes on all employees at affected chemical
facilities, as well as create “measures designed to identify people
with terrorist ties.” The DHS Secretary may choose the type of
employees to be hired to work at chemical facilities, as well as
specify which offenses require termination. Moreover, this sec-
tion includes a special “savings clause” that still keeps the entire
law intact even if one provision were deemed illegal by a court
of law. This may have been included because of the possibil-
ity of some employers challenging the constitutionality of the
provision.49 After all, it essentially authorizes the DHS Secretary
to choose the qualifications for private sector chemical facility
employees, which infringes on free market practices. A savings
clause protects the entire law, however, even if the provision is
deemed inappropriate.
Thompson’s bill also prohibits the federal government from
stripping states, cities, or municipalities of their authority to de-
vise stricter regulations that surpass minimum federal homeland
security requirements. DHS officials had originally opposed this
provision, arguing in vain that it forces it to impose federal fines
on facilities that violate state and local laws. Despite the Depart-
ment’s outcry, this provision was kept intact within Thompson’s
bill, and represents a major victory for many states that already
hold chemical companies to strict safety standards. New Jersey,
for example, has some of the toughest security guidelines in
the country so it vigorously opposed any attempt to prohibit it
from creating tougher chemical security standards than federal
guidelines permitted. It even threatened legal action against
Secretary Napolitano if it passed.
Most recently, the House of Representatives passed the
Chemical and Water Safety Act and sent it to the Senate on No-
vember 9, 2009. No specified timetable has yet been announced
while it awaits debate.
Recommendations For a President Obama
I recommend that President Obama fulfill many of the prom-
ises he made to American citizens to keep them safe. While he
was a U.S. Senator, Obama introduced legislation with Senator
Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) addressing chemical security. In one
speech, he even acknowledged the numerous obstacles the
chemical lobby had posed to any security reform. However, it
appears as if those same special interests are preventing Obama
from accomplishing this important objective. Many skeptics, in-
cluding Steven Flynn and myself, believe he does not have the
political capital to tackle chemical security while juggling health-
care reform, troop surges in Afghanistan, and a massive financial
overhaul.50
During his electoral campaign, however, Obama often drew
distinctions between himself and the Bush Administration by
making promises that facility security would become a priority
in his administration. However, there is no mention of it on the
current White House website. The only allusion he makes to it is
still located on his transition website today, and all it says is that
Obama pledges to “work with all stakeholders to enact perma-
nent federal chemical plant security regulations.”51
The time for empty promises and halfway assurances is over.
If the Obama Administration is serious about the threat terror-
ists pose to America industrial facilities, then rather than sending
more troops overseas, it would make more sense if it poured
the equivalent amount of financial resources into pressuring
the chemical lobby and Congress to budge on this vital issue.
President Obama should first declare IST an unconditional re-
quirement for all chemical facilities in order to avoid imitating
the Bush Administration’s dangerous tendency to put chemical
security on the backburner. Perhaps he could “go public” and
travel across the U.S. to rally citizen support for chemical security
reform, just as he did already for healthcare reform and the bank
bailout.
Pass the Chemical and Water Security Act of 2009
I urge Congress and the Obama Administration to act quickly
on constructing national safety standards at chemical facilities.
The first step would be to make facility safety a priority by pass-
ing the Chemical and Water Security Act of 2009 this year. De-
Defense & Diplomacy
spite the shortfalls I have identified earlier in this paper, this bill
would for the first time create uniform measures that all facilities
would be required to follow if they stored hazardous materials
above legally established levels. Moreover, it also mandates that
chemical companies use IST if the DHS deems they pose enough
of a threat based on their SVAs and SSPs.
Mandate Inherently Safer Technology
Regardless whether Congress or President Obama heed
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my advice and pass the Chemical and Water Facility Act, I still
recommend that the federal government require all chemical fa-
cilities to employ IST by the end of 2011. Without IST, chemical
companies will continue to use hazardous materials in their man-
ufacturing processes, which could kill exponentially more people
in the event of a terrorist attack on a facility. Chemical lobbyists
must be silenced. As in many cases when the national interest is
at stake, capitalism and even civil rights have been compromised
to protect the lives of American citizens. Chemical companies
must finally acknowledge that government regulations ultimately
serve their interest by protecting their customers and prevent-
ing any type of public scrutiny that may fall upon them in the
Education
event of a chemical spill.
Employ Universal CFATS Requirements
All chemical companies - not just those with large amounts
of hazardous materials - should be required to submit SVAs and
SSPs to DHS for review. The reason being that many of the ma-
terials which experts previously have proclaimed to be safe if
accidentally released to the public may have unknown long-term
Energy & Environment
health effects. Lead and mercury are a few examples. For this
reason, in order to protect communities from potential harm, the
federal government should acknowledge that scientific consen-
sus on the safety of many chemical substances is variable and
force all chemical companies to abide by this same precaution.
Requiring all chemical companies to submit SVAs and SSPs re-
gardless of whether they contain hazardous materials would also
help level the playing field since all would have to pay the costs
of assessing their security practices. For example, the facility that
stores toxic chlorine gas would incur the same costs identifying
vulnerabilities as the facility that stores harmless graphite. Be-
Equal Justice
cause both companies must pay the costs for preparing these
SVAs and SSPs, neither would have a competitive disadvantage
over the other. Such a measure not only keeps communities safe
but also business practices fair.
CFATS regulations should also cover COI in transit. Currently,
this is not the case, which means terrorists could explode railcars
or vessels carrying dangerous substances like hydrochloric acid
or acetone. Applying CFATS regulations in this regard would
help companies identify vulnerabilities within their transporta-
tion procedures and address them accordingly.
Health Care
Expand the EPA’s Jurisdiction
I recommend that the EPA take a stronger role in regulat-
ing safety standards since the Chemical and Water Security Act
does not acknowledge this agency as an equal stakeholder. Cur-
rently it mandates the DHS to consult with the EPA on issues
it chooses at its own discretion, even though in the event of an
11
 emergency any chemical spill would no doubt devastate the en-
vironment.52
Defense & Diplomacy
Today President Obama ignores this important fact by main-
taining the previous Bush Administration’s policies confining
the EPA’s regulatory authority to only “drinking water and wa-
ter treatment systems.”53 Limiting the EPA’s reach in this manner
actually pushes the country’s 15,000 chemical plants under the
jurisdiction of the DHS, which has too few resources to properly
oversee all of them.54 The Act’s framework also permits more
avenues for the DHS to strain its resources because of its vague
definition of what constitutes an actual terrorist attack. It identi-
Economic Development
fies a “chemical facility terrorist incident” as “the release of a sub-
stance of concern from a chemical facility.”55 Such ambiguous
terminology does not preclude chemical spills caused by cor-
porate negligence or natural catastrophe, forcing DHS to treat
chemical spills as if they were terrorist attacks. While chemical
accidents may be potentially dangerous, they do not properly
justify why DHS should again waste its precious resources on
costly security mechanisms that do not fulfill its original purpose,
which is to respond to the threat that terrorists pose to chemical
facilities. Therefore it only makes sense to assign authority to the
EPA over incidents in which accidental spills may occur. Doing
this would allow the DHS to refocus on the threat that terrorists
Education
pose to chemical facilities, rather than on any type of industrial
emergency that accidentally releases chemicals into the atmo-
sphere and overextends the Department.
Change Training Procedures
The government should ensure that employees are ade-
quately trained to identify security vulnerabilities and address
them appropriately by requiring them complete a counterterror-
Energy & Environment
ism awareness program. A similar program is already required in
New Jersey, but is limited to only petro-chemical facilities.56 For
this reason, I recommend that this program be required through-
out the entire chemical industry, including water treatment, sew-
age treatment and pesticide plants.
I also suggest that union officials be trained by third-party of-
ficials to teach this course just like in New Jersey. Currently, the
bill in Congress only states that company supervisors or facility
operators lead the training courses even though they might at-
tempt to skew employee security practices in order to cut costs
and preserve profits. That’s why third-party officials who have no
Equal Justice
personal or financial interests in the issue, such as security ex-
perts from research institutions like Columbia University, should
lead training programs because they would ensure impartiality.
As for funding, the Department of Labor (DOL) should be re-
sponsible for constructing a grant program for training rather
than the DHS, as is currently stipulated in the bill in Congress to-
day. After all, DOL includes the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, which is responsible for worker safety at all plac-
es of employment. Because the DHS could err and unnecessar-
ily prioritize community interest above worker safety, it makes
Health Care
sense that the DOL be responsible for providing money for lead-
ership training. Moreover, if the DHS provides money for this
initiative, it runs the risk of overextending its financial resources.
The DHS may also provide annual supplemental security training
on a need-be basis.
12
Require GPS Devices
In accordance with Stephen Flynn, I recommend that GPS
devices be placed on all trucks, railcars, and boats that ship
chemical materials to and from industrial plants.57 However, DHS
should not fund or help to fund such a measure since it could
become a strain on financial resources. After all, most of the De-
partment’s $900 million chemical security allocation is meant to
help facilities subsidize the cost of switching from hazardous sub-
stances to safer ones in manufacturing processes, which is criti-
cal. Instead, Congress should require all chemical companies to
purchase GPS devices as part of its required security practices.
This would relieve DHS officials from having to perform unneces-
sary monitoring so it can devote its resources elsewhere, such as
reviewing companies’ SVAs or conducting site inspections.
Ensure Physical Security
Even if chemical companies do not pursue comprehensive
remedies to safeguard their plants, they should at least ensure
physical security. Plants must completely fence off their entire
property, purchase surveillance cameras, and employ capable
and vigilant guards. Companies must also be mandated to con-
duct annual internal reviews. Third party officials should also
conduct unannounced site inspections at facilities.
Improve Intelligence Sharing Between Government
and Business
There should be greater communication between the pub-
lic and private sectors. Despite skeptics’ assumptions, some
chemical companies do actually want better security reform at
their facilities. Whether it is because they sincerely care about
their resident communities, or because they merely want to fi-
nancially protect themselves, it does not matter. The fact is that
these companies are unable to accurately estimate the amount
of financial resources to independently invest in security reform
without national safety standards and without adequate informa-
tion about terrorists in general. I propose that the government
provide chemical companies with more intelligence about active
extremist groups in the U.S. and abroad, as well as recent trends
in terrorism, so that these chemical companies
Moreover, the federal government should also communicate
what actions it has taken to deter terrorists from attacking the
U.S., even if that means revealing some information about Ameri-
can troops’ actions overseas in Iraq or Afghanistan. This would
ensure that chemical companies are not responding to a threat
that no longer exists because it was already neutralized.
Guarantee Confidentiality
The federal government must ensure that all information
about companies’ business practices remain secret. Chemical
executives have a legitimate excuse to avoid granting too much
information to the DHS because of the Department’s spotty re-
cord of mismanaging data. The most recent Department embar-
rassment occurred when the Transportation Security Agency
accidentally released secret passenger screening documents to
the public, which could have provided terrorists with methods
about bypassing airline security.58 The DHS must take appropri-
ate actions to ensure that incidents like these never occur again;
otherwise, the private sector will continue to mistrust the De-
partment and lobby against security reform.

Develop Adequate Enforcement Mechanism
There should finally be some kind of oversight capability to
ensure that the aforementioned recommendations and safety
measures are actually being implemented. Without an enforce-
ment mechanism, many chemical companies will not budge on
this vital issue. During my discussions with Flynn, he proposed
that we include well-trained third party inspectors who are moni-
tored by adequately staffed government inspectors. He argues
that without an adequate enforcement mechanism, honest com-
panies that want to sincerely keep communities safe will suffer
financial losses if other companies willingly avoid regulations
because they believe they will not be caught.59 I agree with his
suggestion since it
T
holds companies
accountable to the he U.S. must take precau-
government. How- tionary measures to prevent
ever, I would sug-
terrorists from converting
gest adding that
third-party inspec-
one of its chemical plants
tors also include into an American Bhopal.
ordinary citizens
who are trained by
government inspectors as well. It is important to note that the
communities which would be affected in the event of a terrorist
attack be counted as an equal stakeholder in the issue at-hand.
For this reason, companies should not bow to the government,
but also the very citizens their facilities would endanger if an
emergency gas leak or security lapse were to occur.
Conclusion
Today the U.S. faces an extraordinary challenge. Because our
enemies are not uniformed armies but rather elusive and shad-
owy extremist groups, the federal government is tasked with bal-
ancing offensive and defensive national security strategies. To a
certain extent, President Bush’s plan to launch overseas opera-
tions in Iraq and Afghanistan to avoid fighting terrorists at home
is valid because it shields American citizens from the brunt of
violence. However, it is dangerous for the U.S. to believe that
solely an aggressive offense in the War on Terror is sufficient to
eliminate the risk of an attack on a chemical facility. Any meth-
odology to protect American lives should not preclude a strong
defense. The U.S. must take precautionary measures to prevent
terrorists from converting one of its chemical plants into an
American Bhopal that could endanger the lives of thousands, if
not millions of innocent lives. Only after the federal government
begins regulating safety standards, performing site inspections,
and exposing vulnerabilities in security paradigms at our nation’s
chemical facilities, will Americans truly be safe in this Age of Ter-
ror.
Defense & Diplomacy
International Determination and Strength Can End
Genocide in Darfur
Shelby B. Layne
The government-sponsored genocide in Darfur–the west-
ern region of Sudan–now continues raging for the eighth year.
As most accurately updated in 2007, 400,000 people were es-
Economic Development
timated dead and another 5,000-10,000 dying monthly. Clearly,
the Sudanese authorities are not hesitant to support such egre-
gious violence and defy the standards of what is considered
internationally acceptable, for the government continues to
support and fund the Janjaweed militia to carry out their mur-
derous and rapacious acts.1 The violence originally began in Dar-
fur when a Darfuri rebel force called the Sudan Liberation Army
(SLA) struck out against the Khartoum government. The SLA was
seeking justice after the government had ignored pleas of black
African Darfuris to end the lack of government representation,
protection, marginalization, and development in South Darfur.2
When individual countries or organizations have condemned
Education
Sudan for its heinous violence, the government has failed to re-
spond. It does not feel any direct danger posed to the sanctity
of their government or position of control from these weak ver-
bal attacks. However, it appears that an end to this genocide is
indeed plausible due to the fact that the Khartoum government,
as well as other governments that have committed genocide, do
respond to accusations and threats when they are in the form
of intense, widespread, and international demands. When the
Energy & Environment
legitimacy and sanctity of the government is directly threatened,
only it will then act.
Thirty-eight million deaths occurred during the twentieth
century alone as a result of genocide.3 Therefore, when viewing
the past success of such methods of pressure in ending various
genocides and instances of violence—such as in South Africa and
Kosovo—and the failed attempts when it is not utilized, one can
have faith in the success of such a technique. Although these
examples were not pronounced decisive instances of genocide,
like the genocide in Sudan, they too brought into question the
level of tolerance the world would retain while atrocious viola-
Equal Justice
tions of human rights were taking place. An example of intercon-
tinental condemnation includes the arrest warrant for Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court
(ICC), which has sent the Khartoum government into a scramble
to try and find a different government leader to turn over in-
stead.4 When such action is taken, the pressure must absolutely
threaten the stability of a government’s survival in order to make
it to comply with the requests for justice. Thus, as a result of such
debilitating and penetrative action, it appears the genocide in
Darfur can indeed come to an end.
Health Care
Although several attempts have been made to end or dimin-
ish the violence occurring in Darfur, usually only individual coun-
tries or single international organizations have backed these ef-
forts. Such labors have failed mainly because they have either
been weak and unthreatening to the sanctity of the Khartoum
government or not well supported by a multitude of interna-
tional players. One such example of failure includes the efforts
13
 of the African Union (AU). In 2006, the African Union had only
7,000 troops in Sudan trying to protect the people of Darfur
Defense & Diplomacy
as a part of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). These
efforts were also disappointing because the AU was frightened
into submission by the threats of the Khartoum government. The
government had asked, or perhaps threatened, the AU not to
request United Nations (UN) troops to be brought into Darfur
for reinforcement.5 This fact makes it clear that the AU efforts
were weak, and that the AU stood alone as a single organization
without outside support. The AU did add a few thousand more
troops, however, even when a much larger force was later add-
Economic Development
ed, their unilateral efforts proved incapable and too apolitical to
make a substantial difference. Because of the AU’s weak influ-
ence in the region, it has not received significant moral, financial, One such example is the way in which the Apartheid in South
or material support from others and ultimately withdrew. In addi-
tion to increased support, the AU would also need to drastically
transform its efforts into a larger force with a more focused goal
on protection of civilians.6
The UN has also failed in many ways to pro-
vide safety and support for the people of
Darfur. For example, the UN Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1706 is the only example in the
U nited international
efforts from all across to torture, kill, or commit acts of violence in pur-
history of a UN peacekeeping mission that the globe are needed to suit of their duties) were carried out in a different
Education
was approved and never deployed until just
recently, when troops were finally autho- bring an end to this
rized.7 Ultimately, UN efforts have proven horrific genocide.
how the United Nations is merely a con-
glomeration of individual nations that has
thus far failed to work together as a powerful, unified interna-
tional force. Ending something like genocide—especially the one
in Darfur with an array of countries both directly and indirectly
Energy & Environment
involved—necessitates cooperation amongst nations and, most
of all, compromise. Even Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon agrees
that such stubbornness needs to be bypassed, and “[t]he inter-
national community needs to help organize…efforts, working with
the Sudanese government as well as the host of international
aid agencies and NGOs.”8Only with unity stemming from within
the United Nations—thereby acting as a prominent role model—
can efforts beyond the UN prevail. This further emphasizes how
united international efforts from all across the globe are needed
to bring an end to this horrific genocide.
In contrast to such lacking efforts, others have been more
Equal Justice
successful, resulting in wider international support to hold the
Sudanese government accountable for its actions and thus di-
rectly threatening the cohesiveness of the Sudanese govern-
ment. For example, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has
charged President al-Bahir for committing crimes against hu-
manity. Because ICC members have volunteered to be a part
of the court, they work together for the same goal—to bring
justice, through legal action, to places where unjust crimes are
taking place. To ensure the ICC does not get caught up in the
political selfishness that often plagues the UN, and to guarantee
Health Care
conformity and agreement will indeed occur, the ICC requires
member countries to fully comply with their prosecutions and
investigations.9 The international statement of the ICC against
the actions of the Khartoum government—by preparing to ar-
rest its main leader—has put Sudan under increased pressure to
diminish the violence in Darfur. This pressure is increased by the
fact that the ICC is pursuing al-Bashir with international pros-
14
ecutors, which has caused the Khartoum government to alter
its current methods of operation. The government of Sudan
has even attempted to hand over a government minister in al-
Bashir’s place out of fear of what losing their President would
mean for the government and its stability.10 By weakening the
strength of the overall government powers and jurisdiction, its
efforts for the genocide in Sudan will be harder to maintain; if a
stable leader cannot even be selected, murderous organization
will much more difficult to coordinate.
By looking at the termination of past genocides and instanc-
es of violence, one can see how the formerly mentioned meth-
ods used by the international community taking decisive action
against a harmful government have proven to be successful.
Africa came to an end. A South African domestic agency called
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) later discovered
the reality of the atrocities, murders, and disappearances that
had occurred at the hands of the South African government dur-
ing the time of Apartheid.11 Even though some of
the abuses resulting from the Indemnity Act of
1961 in South Africa (that allowed police officers
manner than the were the raping and pillaging
in Darfur, there still remains decisive overlap re-
garding the violence that took place in each lo-
cation. For example, both Darfur and South Af-
rica faced horrific atrocities that resulted from an
abuse of government power coupled with racial or ethnic based
violence.12 What ultimately brought such injustice of race-based
segregation and discrimination to an end was the efforts of the
United States and Britain—two powerful nations—who imposed
specific methods of economic pressure, such as sanctions, to
help bring an end to Apartheid there. As a direct result of such
a strain on their economy, the South African government finally
responded by abolishing the “pass” laws in 1986, which had re-
quired blacks to carry passes with them at all times to indicate
the status of their employment.13 This step went beyond elimi-
nating the possession of a mere piece of paper. This signified a
major leap towards justice; no longer could one’s race be reason
enough for denied access to major areas of these citizens’ home-
land. In the case of South Africa, the world took both notice and
action against the unjustifiable violence and hatred occurring
there. Also looking at the violence that took place in Kosovo,
one can see how intense international demands had an undeni-
able impact on the situation there. The widespread diplomatic
intervention in the crisis in Kosovo included increasing attention
to the situation by the United Nations, the Organization for Se-
curity and Co-operation in Europe, the European Union, and the
Contact Group made up of France, Italy, Russia, Germany, the
United States, and Great Britain in late 1997.14
Based on the prior examples, as well as current successful
steps towards ending the genocide in Darfur, it appears that
with intense, international, political, and economic pressure, al-
Bashir and the Khartoum government can be forced into com-
pliance and the violence can come to an end. Since Sudan is
currently incapable of remedying its own problem after violence
has persisted for seven years, countries ought to use the power
of numbers to work together to end the genocide by imposing
sanctions, holding individuals accountable for their genocidal ac-
tions, introducing an effective number of troops to protect Dar-
furis from violent Janjaweed fighters, and making these efforts

Defense & Diplomacy

a top priority to ensure they are all fulfilled.15 Based on Article
2 of the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNGC), the violence in
Darfur is undoubtedly genocide.16 With this knowledge in mind,
it is pertinent that countries take immediate action before more
women and girls are raped, more families are torn apart, and
more murders are committed. However, only when the world
learns to work together to take decisive, forceful, and threaten-
ing actions will this horrific genocide finally come to an end.

Economic Development
Education
Energy & Environment
Equal Justice
Health Care

15
 Economic Development

The Economic Development Policy Center promotes discussion and analysis of

domestic and international economic issues in order to create and advocate for
effective policy solutions on issues of concern to many economic systems. The
essential role of government in the creation of an economic atmosphere condu-
cive to healthy growth is assessed by the center through a variety of proposals
that show the importance and reach of economic policy. These proposals aim
to increase economic opportunity and equity by assessing the ongoing financial
crisis and putting forth policy proposals that would increase the robustness and
reach of financial markets and show the potential of public policy in mitigating
the impact of economic downturns.
 of insurance for one party and the buyer of insurance of the
A Clearinghouse System for Credit Default Swaps other. In effect, the clearinghouse stands between buyers and

Defense & Diplomacy

Parinitha Sastry
The recent financial crisis has catalyzed a movement for
revamping the credit derivatives market. At the end of 2007, the
United States found itself in a paradoxical situation; the very in-
dustry that existed to facilitate domestic production was in fact
draining resources from the real economy. Credit default swaps,
interest rate swaps, collateralized debt obligations and other
sellers to reduce each firm’s exposure to counterparty risk, and
decreases both risk and capital losses by its ability to net pay-
ments and exposures.
Moreover, the clearinghouse would be subject to inspections
and oversight from the SEC. A clearinghouse reduces the set-
tlement risk and increases efficiency by offsetting transactions
between multiple counterparties, by providing objective and in-
dependent valuation of trades and collateral, and also by moni-
toring credit worthiness of firms involved

Economic Development
credit derivatives helped entities achieve in the trade. With more than two-thirds of
short-term financing in a manner that unfor-
tunately masked risk and promoted tragically L credit default swaps being collateralized, the
arge credit-default swap need for an independent valuation source is
unsafe bets. While many propose that all such exposures increase systemic obvious.
derivatives be banned in favor of a more nar- risk, including the risk of In order for the clearinghouse to effectively
row banking system, such a task will deprive concentrate the risk of default and settle-
corporations of a much-needed revenue
the collapse of an entire
ment failures into itself, it must be properly
stream. Rather, the Securities and Exchange financial system managed and capitalized. Given that clear-
Commission (SEC) should oversee the cre- inghouses will be managed privately with
ation of a clearinghouse for credit default government oversight, a set of best practices
swaps to reduce systemic risk as well as promote greater trans- must be followed. The clearinghouse must also have enough of
parency in the Credit-default Swap (CDS) market. a capital buffer to withstand a significant adverse event, such as

CDS’s were first created in the mid-1990s to provide protec-
tion against the default of firms, sovereign nations, mortgage
payers, and other borrowers. Credit-default swaps are bilateral,
over-the-counter contracts in which a firm or individual seeking
protection agrees to pay a periodic fee or an upfront payment in
exchange for a payment from the insuring agent in the case of a
particular credit event (such as a bankruptcy). By April of 2009,
there was an estimated $28 trillion of CDS outstanding. By the
Education
the defaulting of a large firm. Firms which choose to become
members will contribute capital to the clearinghouses’s guaran-
tee fund. In the event of a settlement failure, the clearinghouse
will be poised to draw on its fund to settle trades on behalf of
the failed clearing fund, providing more market stability. In this
manner, the clearinghouse reduces the risk of a member firm
failing to honor its trade settlement obligations.

Energy & Environment

end of 2007, there was over $26.4 trillion of outstanding CDS’s
in the United States alone. Globally, credit-default swaps make
up an estimated $60 trillion, making them the most widespread,
unregulated forms of credit derivatives on the market.
Because of the enormous size of the CDS market and the
vulnerability of CDS payoffs to economic conditions, large cred-
it-default swap exposures increase systemic risk, including the
risk of the collapse of an entire financial system. With volumes
of trade in this market exploding, systemically important institu-
tions like AIG and Fannie-Mae became vulnerable to devastat-
ing losses when they took large, unhedged CDS positions. Firms
Green Detroit: The Way Forward for the America’s
Auto Industry
Sophia Rogers
Introduction
Michigan has the highest unemployment rate of all the
states: in March 2010, one in seven people were officially unem-
ployed.1 Detroit’s brutal combination of a deficit growing out of
control—predicted to be as high as $466 million—and a shrinking

who bought CDS from such exposed firms did not properly
question whether their counterparties could pay out insurance.
Consequently, the biggest financial firms in the world contin-
ually purchased insurance from companies like AIG despite the
fact that AIG had sold $440 billion in CDS contracts, more than it
could afford to cover when collateral prices plunged. Currently,
CDS losses are estimated at $150 billion worldwide. The failure
of large participants in the CDS market overwhelmed the finan-
cial system and forced all counterparty firms to incur significant
losses. The prospect of other unknown “AIGs”, sellers of CDS
Equal Justice
tax base threatens to bankrupt the city.2 Sick with joblessness,
concentrated poverty, physical decay of buildings, and racial iso-
lation, the city has been radically transformed from what it once
was. Because of Detroit’s auto-industrial complex that fueled
postwar U.S. growth In the 1940s, it was a boomtown, and home
to the highest-paid blue-collar workers in the United States. But
beginning in the 1970s, the industry gradually lost shares to new
foreign competitors because it resisted upgrade, and missed
entirely the new “green” consumer market. Even before the re-
cession of 2008, Detroit was hemorrhaging money and market
Health Care

without the capital buffer to honor obligations, is very real. There share. The recession finally kicked the industry off the edge.
needs to be a way for firms to see how exposed an institution is. While Ford was reasonably healthy, GM and Chrysler faced im-
CDS are currently arranged over-the-counter rather than on ex- minent bankruptcy and had to be bailed-out by the federal gov-
change, meaning that they are negotiated privately between the ernment. The industry remains in crisis and as a result, the city is
two counterparties. With a clearinghouse system, purchasers of a desolate urban sprawl spotted with empty factories and poor
insurance do not negotiate directly with the sellers; rather, the neighborhoods of unemployed people.
clearinghouse mediates each transaction by acting as a seller In order to understand the relationship between Detroit and
17
 the auto industry, we can start by examining its historical roots.
These can be characterized as mismanagement of the auto pro-
Defense & Diplomacy
ducers, a failure in union strategy, and the failure of the national
government to address vast unemployment. Though each of
these patterns has the potential to be turned around, they per-
sist today as they have for decades.
History of the Detroit’s Auto Industry
The devastating bust of the 1950s that followed the war and
postwar boom caused thousands to become unemployed; De-
troit lost 134,000 manufacturing jobs from 1947-1963 though the
Economic Development
working-aged population increased.3 Laid-off workers lowered
consumer demand in the city, which reduced buying power and
drove local business to suffer or fail. The gap between job seek-
ers and job opportunities continued to grow beyond this period.
Federal postwar highway construction made central location
less necessary to industry, facilitating the flight of industry that
resulted in instability of jobs in Rust Belt cities.
Conflict arose in the 1960’s between unions and business that
further contributed to relocation of many plants out of Detroit
and other Rust Belt cities and into suburban and rural areas.
Overly aggressive labor disputes over automation and the use
of overtime (which were themselves factors that decreased the
Education
number of available jobs) motivated employers to build plants
outside of the Rust Belt cities. While the big firms moved plants
out of Detroit in pursuit of cheaper land, modern factories, bet-
ter tax incentives, and illegal nonunion labor, small firms in the
industry that could not afford to pay the standard union wage
lacked the capital to leave the city, and failed.
For all that can be said about the problems that workers had
in Detroit after the postwar bust, racial discrimination exagger-
Energy & Environment
ated those problems for Detroit’s black workers, who struggled
with persistent unemployment and dislocation.
Because of pervasive racial discrimination and
violence, blacks were limited to living in black
sub-communities within Detroit.4 Policy mak-
D etroit has the poten-
tial to be the next Silicon government. The federal government must
ers have addressed the issue of racial discrimi- Valley.
nation in the past, though inadequately; pres-
sure from unions and civil rights groups won
Michigan a state-wide anti-discrimination bill, the Fair Employ-
ment Practices Act of 1955, but that bill failed to have a serious
impact on the lives of black workers. Industry continued to leave
Equal Justice
the city and black workers continued to lack the means and will
to follow.5
Auto producers, along with other traditional producers, failed
to adapt to changing international markets in the 1970s and ‘80s.
Can we bring back the Motor City itself, and with it the domestic
car industry? Silicon Valley persisted throughout the economic
downturn of the 80s and went on to flourish. If we compare
Silicon Valley to Detroit we can determine what it would take to
rebuild Detroit.
Health Care
Comparison: Silicon Valley
From 1986-1990, the aggregate market value of all the compa-
nies in Silicon Valley actually increased by twenty-five billion dol-
lars.6 The major innovations of Silicon Valley were region-based
networks with structuring of firms that encouraged horizontal
communication within firms as well as between firms, promot-
ing collective learning and flexible adjustment among specialists
18
and producers of related technologies.7 The geographic prox-
imity of firms created dense social networks. These social net-
works made open labor markets, which in turn then encouraged
experimentation and entrepreneurship by rewarding risk-taking
and tolerating failure.8
Solution
Detroit has the potential to be the next Silicon Valley. There
is a lot of green industry action in Michigan already; In Detroit,
there’s interest in community and industry sustainability coming
from many sources including the Mayor’s Office, the LISC (Local
Initiative Support Corporation), and the Kresge Foundation. In
Michigan statewide, Governor Jennifer Granholm has focused
on creating alternative energy jobs. Further, the federal govern-
ment owns GM and Chrysler so policy-makers have the rare op-
portunity at this moment to enact enormous change. The auto-
producing and auto-related firms in and near Detroit already
have the benefit of clustering geographically the same way as
the high-tech firms in Silicon Valley, which allows for dense net-
works and flexible job adjustment. Add to the mix the same fac-
tors that were provided in Silicon Valley—teaching and training
provided by universities in the area, federal funds, smart regula-
tions and taxes, and a restructuring of business based around
horizontal networks—and Detroit has a good shot for survival and
success.9 The serious problem of racial discrimination stands as
the most challenging barrier between Detroit and Silicon Valley.
The equal rights of workers issue must be enforced for Detroit
to have any hope of survival.
To revive Detroit, the auto industry must be rebuilt in a way
that ensures its survival and prosperity while providing work
for engineers, scientists researching green energy, and for
blue-collar workers. This will require the collaboration among
business, labor, scientists and engineers,
non-profit and philanthropic organizations,
city and state government, and the federal
step up to provide federal research grants
to universities and research institutions that
are doing promising work in the direction of
green cars. The government should act as an agency between
researchers and committed automakers to connect research
with business. Companies that commit to producing greener
cars should get help in hiring labor via a tax break that takes
into account the salaries each company pays workers whose job
relates to making cars more fuel-efficient. The city of Detroit
should facilitate restructuring of the companies legally and coor-
dinate contracting between labor and management.
Mayor Dave Bing promises to be a major asset to the city.10
He knows that the city’s infrastructure is too large for the shrink-
ing population.11 In order to regenerate city, he knows that he
must first shrink it to a smaller size from which base it can grow.
The administration has begun to demolish unusable buildings
and aims to tear down 10,000 buildings by the end of 2014.12
Reducing the size of the city is a first step in the direction of
rebuilding it in a way that will enable it to survive.
Rebuilding the industry would not only save the city but it
would help shrink the carbon footprint of the entire country and
improve the economic independence of the United States. The
people of Detroit need it and the people of the nation need it.
Detroit is the best place to rebuild the industry because its con-
centration of plants create the ideal climate for dense networks

Defense & Diplomacy

and flexible job adjustment, the federal government owns two of
the Big Three, and the interest in green energy already present
in Michigan. It is time to acknowledge that we are all stakehold-
ers in the auto industry and that the best way to save it is by
rebuilding Detroit.

Economic Development
Education
Energy & Environment
Equal Justice
Health Care

19
Equal access to a quality education is a closely held progressive value. Our center desires to
promote discussion on issues of education reform from expansion of school choice to univer-
sal pre-kindergarten. Our perspective on education reform is one that strives for greater op-
portunities through education, and holds that an education system where no students are left
behind should be a central goal of a progressive society. This year, our center has researched
pieces on teacher evaluations and early childhood education.

Guaranteeing a Better Tomorrow Through Early
Childhood Education
Travis Alvarez
Introduction
Assuring education for all Americans is the most certain
way to guarantee the preservation of America and the Ameri-
can Way. However, there are many different elements involved
in governance, so crafting an economically efficient educational
system, based on the newest scientific research, should be the
ultimate goal of policy makers. Unfortunately, this is not the state
of affairs currently in America.
As time goes by, overwhelming evidence points to one por-
tion of our education system that could have astronomical affects
on the developmental improvement of our youth: early child-
hood education. What can be done to put an emphasis on early
childhood education without adding billions of more dollars to
the state budget, especially during such economic dire straits?
Certainly, as countries like China and India grow and surpass
America, particularly with math and science, this country needs
a solution to this problem before falling too far behind. As the
world passes us in nearly every category, we must turn to novel
and creative solutions rather than offer the same generic prom-
ises and failed policies time and time again. Necessary change
must take place and soon.
Simply stated, what I propose is enacting a 12-step program,
pushing forward the acceptable age by one month perennially
so that after 12 years, children will be entering Kindergarten one
full year earlier. This shift will not affect the fundamentals of how
this system is organized—the taxpayers will still only be respon-
sible for K-12 education—but it will allow for an earlier start for
all American children. This will get children into the classroom,
learning and reading, at a much younger age, allowing for their
minds to develop while their functional brains are more mallea-
ble and ready to discover new and interesting aspects of the
world.
Status Quo and Stakes
Currently, according to The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the United States ranks 18
out of 36 nations viewed for their research. Countries like South
Korea, who top the list, have a 93% high school graduation rate
while the United States continues to hover around 75%.1 Accord-
ing to the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA),
the United States is underperforming in the areas of math and
science literacy among a large sample size of children 15 years
of age.2 The Center for Labor Market Studies at Northeastern
University and the Alternative Schools Network collaborated
and recognized a continuing and downward trend for American
students, something that they called a, “high school dropout cri-
sis.”3 On top of these rather novel predicaments with education,
there are still problems with the ever-lingering achievement gap,
which even though evidence shows that minimal improvement
has been made over the passed 15 years, the crisis still exists,
allowing White Americans to continually attain more impressive
test scores than their Black and Hispanic counterparts year in
and year out.4
These statistics, along with numerous other reports, prove
that there is no question whether or not Americans need change
in the education system. Not only would we want to improve
Defense & Diplomacy
our graduation rates and test scores for the good and future
of America, because smarter Americans almost guarantees a
successful society, but in a continually globalizing market, if we
do not improve these scores, the consequences could be disas-
trous. No longer are Americans merely competing against other
Americans, but against a global field of eager and better-pre-
pared individuals who are looking for the best paying jobs the
world can offer. When Americans fall far behind and no longer
have sizeable influence in the global economy, America loses.
Economic Development
Without education reform, this may happen sooner rather than
later.
Early Childhood Education
On the website of the current President of the United States,
Barack Obama, it states, “One of the most critical times to in-
fluence learning in a child’s life is the period before he or she
reaches kindergarten.”5 Obama and his administration proclaim
the relevance of the new science and realize that when children
learn earlier, they have a greater chance to succeed.
The facts on early childhood education have become so ac-
cepted and wide spread that it has become a political talking
Education
point, regurgitated any time a discussion on education arises.
The OECD reports that participation in early childhood educa-
tion, “is associated with stronger academic, economic, and social
outcomes.”6 According to an article in The American Prospect,
“the middle class faces the dilemma of the poor: not enough time
both to earn a living and care for one’s children.” This is one of
the major issues facing Americans today, and with an opportu-
Energy & Environment
nity for children to enter a classroom at an earlier age, the youth
will be hearing more words, learning how to read, and doing ba-
sic skills while they would have been doing very little inside the
classroom to foster their minds. Scientists have found that the
development of language areas in the brain is expanded due to
the constant exposure to words and such as a child. Therefore,
if a child is exposed to the breadth of language proliferated in a
classroom setting that would not have had the same experience
at home, because of working parents and things of that nature,
that child is greatly enhancing their capacity to learn for years
to come.7
Economically, investment in early childhood education is sim-
Equal Justice
ply logical. When viewing the rate of return on invested dollars
on education and age, it is exponentially more efficient to fund
younger children. The efficiency is derived from rate of return—
the younger a child is exposed to education, the more valuable
the investment is for the long-term, for them personally and for
American society as a whole. The cry for more money to finance
early childhood education programs is beginning to be heard
throughout the United States, as some say that, “America needs
to set itself on a course to publicly invest in early childhood at
the same rate we invest in K-12 education.” 7 However, can there
Health Care
be a simpler, more efficient solution?
Plan
The plan consists of very little change to the overall structure
of the current system, for the basic K-12 structure will remain in-
tact. This is not an overhaul of American education as we know it,
21
 but instead, a single alteration in order to broaden opportunities
and improve the test scores and general intelligence of Ameri-
Defense & Diplomacy
can youth to continue competing against a constantly expanding
pool of competitors.
Currently, the education system has cut off dates for who is
allowed to be in which grade, for example, anyone born from
September 1989 to September 1990 was allowed into the High
School graduating class of 2008 in Bergen County New Jersey.
All states and districts have different variations on the same ex-
act law, forcing kids within a certain range to be admitted into
Kindergarten. In order to make early childhood education avail-
Economic Development
able for all students, this public policy would call for a 12-year
program, where in each successive year the age in which some-
one is allowed to be in a specific grade changes by one month.
To make is somewhat clearer, using the example of the afore-
mentioned graduating class, if they were in the second year of
the program, the cut off dates for ages would be from October
1989 until October 1990 and if that grade were in the twelfth
year of the program, the cut off would be from September 1990
until September 1991, successfully shifting the education system
by one full year. The reason why this plan must take 12 years
is due to the influx of students—if all done in one year, a small
district may expect to have to divide an extra 150 Kindergarten-
Education
ers among 6 teachers, which would absurdly add 25 students
into every classroom. If the plan is spread
out among 12 years however, about 2 extra
children will be in every classroom, which
any Kindergarten teacher knows is difficult,
E arly intervention strate-
gies for young learners will
but indubitably manageable. Due to this
modification, most Americans would begin
yield academic gains in terms of students into colleges—forwarding the
Kindergarten at age 4 and graduate High school performance.
Energy & Environment
School at age 17.
The main question that arises is the un-
certainty of whether or not 4-year-olds are prepared for Kinder-
garten material. Two things should be made clear when thinking
about this dilemma: one is that Preschool currently is very similar
to Kindergarten in many respects, teaching basic elements of
reading along with fundamental social and critical thinking skills.
This is done, essentially, because many do not have the opportu-
nity to join a Preschool, already creating an education gap before
any higher learning begins. There will not be sweeping changes
to Kindergarten programs but certainly, due to the difference
Equal Justice
in age, each teacher must make key adjustments to their lesson
plans, slowing down and paying close attention to the retention
of information for these very young children. Two is that it may be
slightly disingenuous to still call this curriculum “Kindergarten”
based on the modern conception of the word, because what will
truly be offered, free of charge for every American child, is a top-
of-the-line Preschool program where more children will begin at
the same, youthful age, inevitably creating a more level playing
field for all Americans.
Will this plan be implemented in both private and parochial
Health Care
schools? One must understand that first and foremost, these
schools are privately owned and cared for, making their own
rules concerning age limits. The government cannot technically
enforce any age limits on these districts, but one could easily as-
sume, due to the fact that essentially all private schools currently
hold a model set by public schools, that these private institutions
would follow suit if this plan were initiated. But if private schools on high school students. If students are still forced to stay in
22
thought that it would be financially beneficial for them to remain
with their current policies for one reason or another, that is their
prerogative.
Implementation and Benefits
An evident predicament arises upon simple observation of
the plan: this causes one month a year to only have the oppor-
tunity to join exclusively in one educational year. Next year, chil-
dren born in September 2004 until September 2005 will have
access to a free Kindergarten education, but if the plan is im-
plemented, the next year, parents that may have had a choice
with their child in the past will no longer have the capability to
hold them back because the next year’s cut-off will be October
2005 until October 2006. In order to assure that parents will
not have any confusion over the changing dates of availability,
myriad public resources will be used for promulgation, such as
noticeable signs in public buildings—town hall, the library, the
post office, etc.—announcements at public assemblies such as
Board of Education and Town Hall meetings, an official written
report to be sent by mail to every citizen of each town, mass
e-mail messages (if possible), and what is arguably the most af-
fective method, word of mouth. Through all of these elements,
confusion should be held at a minimum, but even if a problem
arises, a child will never be denied a public education due to the
unscrupulousness of their parents.
Colleges will also have to be well
aware of the potential influx of students.
Although much will be done in order to
mitigate such a large scale entry of new
gap year and such—nothing can truly be
done to guarantee these colleges that
there will not be more children applying
during this 12-year period. Fortunately, all of these institutions
will have 13 years to prepare for these incoming students, allow-
ing for more than enough time to change policies or promote
new ideas for the structure of the college or university.
There are evident immediate and potentially long-term ben-
efits as a direct consequence of this program. Presently, billions
of dollars are spent, through state budgets, on the subsidization
of preschool education. With the implementation of this pro-
gram, one would expect that those billions would be reallocated
into the education system, allowing for greater funding for many
more public school districts. With more of the educated youth
beginning on the same level, the difficulty involved in teaching
children of drastically different levels in elementary schools will
be alleviated, which would consequentially create financial sav-
ings in terms of remediation, for there would be less need to
have extremely elementary classes in Middle School and be-
yond. The money spent on remedial education will be lessened,
which will also allow for the circulation of more funds through-
out school districts. As aforesaid, early intervention strategies
for young learners will yield academic gains in terms of school
performance and the achievement gap because more children
will begin formal education at an equivalent age. Students who
were previously completely unexposed to schooling prior to age
5 will now have exposure to early childhood education.
There are also apparent changes when looking at the affects
school under 16 years of age, that places them in their Junior ity to implement lessons that advance student progress, officials
Year of High School, the most important year when viewing the lack the tools necessary to make important personnel decisions

Defense & Diplomacy

landscape of a child’s potential. Although the fact that they are and determinations on professional development. Currently,
forced into attending Junior Year makes no guarantees, many tenure is still granted virtually automatically and other employ-
more students will likely opt into taking standardized tests to see ment decisions, such as teacher assignment, are made with the
if they are prepared for tertiary education merely out of curios- idea that one teacher with the proper credentials is identical to
ity. This could fundamentally change the mindset of high school another.
students: now that they are only one year from completion of These assumptions have real consequences for schools and
their secondary education, the chance to graduate becomes students. Teacher quality is the most important contributing
more palatable. Additionally, assuming that this program will in- factor to student achievement. A student who learns from a
deed lessen the achievement gap, this will call for fewer reten- teacher in the top 25% of the teaching pool will learn on av-

tions because more children will be performing within their peer
group, which would save money for the school districts overall.
With more children on the average track for graduation, those
students who would traditionally dropout will gather the con-
fidence needed to propel them to completing their secondary
education.
Currently, with more graduating seniors wanting to take a
year off for travel and Senior Year programs for vocational edu-
cation expanding, students could enter college at 18, as modern-
ly expected, even after taking a year off from schooling. This gap
year could be a great resume booster as well; students could
choose to take the year off for constructive purposes towards
Economic Development
erage one-third more material in a school year than a student
who learns from a teacher in the bottom 25%.3 This disparity
not only negatively impacts individual classrooms of students,
but also becomes compounded in the nation’s poorest schools,
both urban and rural, widening the achievement gaps between
white and minority students, affluent and economically disadvan-
taged students. By one measure, the black-white achievement
gap, measured at 34%, could potentially be erased in four years
through proper allocation of high quality teachers.4
Currently, however, officials in New York State are among
those without any meaningful way to identify those high qual-
ity teachers and their lower-performing counterparts who are in

Education
their future profession. need of the targeted professional development that meaning-
ful evaluations can inform. Thus, New York

O
Conclusion State’s current teacher evaluation require-
When creating an image of the future fficials lack the tools ments constitute a barrier to raising student
of society, education must always be taken achievement. New York State should de-
into account. Without the continual educa-
necessary to make important sign, fund, and implement a comprehensive
tion of humans, we remain stagnant as a personnel decisions and de- statewide teacher evaluation instrument
society with no hope to surpass up-and- terminations on professional that makes effectiveness as an instructor, as

Energy & Environment

coming global powerhouses. With the exe- development. determined by observations and objective
cution of this plan that focuses on the most measures of student learning, the central
important scientific consensus concerning criterion of evaluation. Each district should
schooling, early childhood education, this policy will spar a new, be required to use the state evaluation system, which should be
vibrant, and successful group of Americans ready to lead in a funded at least partially by the state. The New York State Board
international marketplace. of Regents is already exploring creating statewide teaching
standards.5 These should be developed with a focus on class-
room effectiveness and then serve as a foundation for the state-
Towards a Better System of Teach Evaluation in wide evaluation system. Overall, the implementation of such an
New York State evaluation system would reduce inequalities in teacher effective-
Maddy Joseph ness and student achievement across districts in New York State.

Introduction
Recent research has discredited the current credential-
based system of identifying and labeling teachers that is exem-
plified in No Child Left Behind (the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act - ESEA). This system relies on standardized tests
and course credits among other measures when rating teach-
ers.1 In fact, President Obama’s proposal for the reauthorization
of ESEA transitions from rating teachers “Highly Qualified” to
Equal Justice
The Status Quo
New York State law calls for an “annual professional perfor-
mance review” of each teacher.6 Performance review plans are
developed by individual districts within state guidelines and
then are approved by the state. The state outlines eight crite-
ria, including classroom management, content knowledge, and
delivery, which though seen in high-quality teachers, do not au-
tomatically correlate to increased student achievement. Though
districts are not limited to these guidelines, the current criteria
Health Care

rating them “effective.”2The false assumption that a master’s de-
gree and mastery of subject material will automatically lead to
teaching that improves student achievement provides a partial
explanation for the lack, in most districts in the United States, of
teacher evaluation systems that constitute a real measure of a
teacher’s ability in the classroom. Without evaluations that truly
recognize instructional effectiveness, defined as a teacher’s abil-
represent only subjective, or observable, measures of teacher
effectiveness. For example a teacher should, “demonstrate
knowledge of student development” and show that she “imple-
ments assessment techniques” and “utilizes analysis of available
student performance data.”7
Furthermore, according to the National Council on Teacher
Quality, by preventing districts from using student achievement
23
 data in making tenure decisions, “the state sends a powerful
message to districts that the state does not support its use.”8
Defense & Diplomacy
Thus, the state effectively excludes the use of objective mea-
sures of instructional effectiveness, especially student test data,
in evaluating teachers. Moreover, New York does not mandate
an annual observation for non-probationary teachers, which
means that the vast majority of teachers in New York State are
being evaluated, but potentially without being observed.9 In
fact, since most teachers in New York are granted tenure vir-
tually automatically after the mandatory three-year wait period,
there is the potential that a teacher could be in the classroom
Economic Development
from hiring to retirement having been observed only three times
and having never been evaluated by any objective measures of
students’ achievement.
The State and Federal Role in Evaluations
Control over education in the United States has shown a gen-
eral trend away from local control. The federal government’s
role has expanded greatly in the Twentieth Century spurred
by battles over desegregation and the 1983 report A Nation
at Risk.10 As the federal government has expanded its role, the
state role in education has expanded as well, as many federal
education policies come in the form of mandates to states, as in
Education
NCLB.
In the area of evaluating teachers, the state role has been
limited, and the federal role almost non-existent. Though RTT
prompted many statewide changes in evaluations, in 2009, be-
fore much of the state legislation was passed, twenty states took
no role in teacher evaluation systems. Where states did have
a role, it was usually to provide districts with varying levels of
guidelines for designing evaluations. In 2009, only nine states
Energy & Environment
had a single statewide instrument for evaluating teachers.11
The two states that were awarded grants in the first round of
RTT were Delaware and Tennessee, both of which were widely
praised for their strong teacher evaluation proposals.12 For ex-
ample, Delaware has a statewide teacher evaluation system seen
as a model because it is based on statewide standards of teach-
ing and because it makes growth in student achievement a nec-
essary component of receiving a satisfactory evaluation. Before
recently, however, no state had taken on evaluation on such a
wide scale and many of the most innovative evaluation programs
were to be found in individual districts or in charter schools.
Equal Justice
Current state and federal policies on teacher evaluations follow
a general trend in education and point to an increase in the state
and federal role and a decrease in the individual district role.
A Comprehensive Statewide Instrument
The possibility for teacher evaluation systems to improve
education is currently a hot topic in education policy. Though
there have been many reports on the inadequacy of the current
systems of teacher evaluation, the most comprehensive, and per-
haps the best known, is The New Teacher Project’s The Widget
Health Care
Effect, which concluded: “A teacher’s effectiveness – the most
important factor for schools in improving student achievement –
is not measured, recorded, or used to inform decision-making in
any meaningful way.”13 If we send children to school in order for
them to learn, it seems obvious that the professional review sys-
tems for those charged with guiding that learning would mea-
sure to what extent children are learning; however, currently, in
24
New York State, it is possible for a teacher to earn a satisfactory
rating on an evaluation without having demonstrated that he or
she advanced student learning. If New York State’s goal is to im-
prove student achievement, it needs a way to measure the varia-
tions in effectiveness of teachers in reaching that goal. Thus, a
new statewide evaluation system must make effectiveness in the
classroom the central criterion for evaluation.
A variety of models exist and a variety of specific structures
have been proposed for effective evaluation systems, but most
recent studies have recommended, most broadly, that evalua-
tions be based on defined standards of what it means to be an
effective teacher and that evaluations take into account both ob-
jective and subjective measures of classroom ability. Obama’s
ESEA Blueprint, for instance, reflects this research14 in that it
mandates that states develop a definition of “effective teacher”
on which to base evaluations. The New York State Board of Re-
gents is currently developing state teaching standards. These
two elements might, in combination, form the foundation for an
improved, and more legitimized, evaluation instrument.
Effectiveness as an instructor can be measured in a variety
of different ways, but a meaningful evaluation system should
include both observable criteria and objectively measured
ones. The statewide evaluation instrument should require that
a school administrator observe all teachers at least twice annu-
ally. The more time an administrator is able to spend observing
the teacher, the more informed that administrator’s evaluation
of the teacher will be, but in setting the number of required
observations, the state should take into account the increased
burden being placed on already taxed principals and vice prin-
cipals. Administrators should be properly trained to implement
the evaluation system so that they are fair and consistent in their
evaluations and so that they are able to give meaningful feed-
back to teachers on how to improve their lessons and delivery.
There are challenges to developing a rubric for observation that
measures a teacher’s effectiveness in the classroom, but any ru-
bric should aim to meet two goals: (1) to provide an assessment
of whether the teacher has designed and implemented a lesson
that meets the state teaching standards (2) to supply informa-
tion that can be used for targeted professional development. It
must be recognized that the observation measure is subjective
by nature but is at the heart of the ability to use evaluations as
tools for professional development. Subjective measurements
are able to provide insights about a professional’s teaching that
objective measures, such as data analysis of student test scores,
cannot. An administrator’s assessment of ability in the classroom
provides critical information about strengths and weaknesses
that can inform the most targeted and best professional devel-
opment possible, which in turn creates more effective teachers,
and higher student achievement.
While New York State does not require observations for most
teachers, it outright forbids the use of student achievement data
in making tenure decisions. The use of objective measures of
student achievement is more controversial than the use of sub-
jective measures, but certainly no less important. The most com-
monly discussed objective measures of teacher effectiveness are
student test data. While recent studies and recent federal and
state policies (many spurred by Obama’s grant program, Race
to the Top - RTT) trend towards an increase in the use of value-
added methods in evaluations (where the change in student
test scores over one year is analyzed), there are other ways to
measure learning objectively. For instance, some schools and
districts have used assessments of student work tied to selected
standards or portfolio-type assessments such as the Beginning
Educator Support and Training Program (BEST) used in Con-
necticut.15 In fact, these other methods of analyzing teacher
effectiveness objectively might have to be incorporated into
any comprehensive evaluation system considering that student
test data is not available for every teacher in every grade level
and every subject. Regardless of this limitation, there is strong
evidence that taking into account student achievement data
through a value-added approach can distinguish the teachers
who improve students’ achievement the most and the least. In
addition, many reformers praise value-added methods because
they provide a level playing field for each teacher (regardless
of where students started, as long as they show improvement a
teacher is deemed effective) and because data analysis methods
allow for the possibility to control for factors such as poverty and
for the aggregation and analysis of data over many years, which
strengthens trends. Value-added methods are not perfect and
have yet to be implemented on a large scale other than in Ten-
nessee, though programs exist in many cities including Hous-
ton, Chicago, and New York City and more states are moving
towards using value-added methods as a result of the guidelines
of the RTT competition.16
In New York State, unfortunately, the prospects for value-add-
ed methods are mixed. Through its current process of collecting
test scores, New York already has the technological infrastruc-
ture to implement a value-added system on a state level yet cur-
rent New York State law bans the use of student test data in
tenure decisions.17 The ban does not apply to non-probationary
teachers and the whole provision is set to expire in July 2010,
but the ban both sends the message to districts that they should
not use student test data and obviously prevents the use of
data in making a critical employment decision. Ideally, the new
statewide instrument would incorporate the use of value-added
methods as suggested not only in the RTT guidelines but also in
Obama’s ESEA Blueprint.
Evaluations, when meaningful, have two
central uses. First, they can be used forma-
tively to create more targeted professional
development. Second, they can be tied to N ew York State should
personnel decisions such as granting tenure, adopt and fund a comprehen- dents, and teachers that good teaching
hiring and firing, making school assignments, sive statewide instrument for looks the same in the challenged districts
and, eventually, setting pay. Tying teacher
evaluating teachers.
evaluations to human capital decisions such as
these both strengthens the evaluation system
by making its findings of consequence, but further will create
schools were excellence in teaching, instead of sonority or cre-
dentials, is most valued.18
Solution: A Statewide Instrument
New York State should adopt and fund a comprehensive
statewide instrument for evaluating teachers. A single state
system that is funded primarily through the state will decrease
inequalities among districts and schools in two ways (1) by en-
suring an evaluation framework that is fair, credible, and consis-
tent across districts and (2) by promoting transparency that puts
pressure on individual schools, individual districts, and the state
to improve failing schools.
That there is an achievement gap between high-poverty and
Defense & Diplomacy
low-poverty schools is well known. While a variety of factors
including funding contribute to this inequality, it certainly stems
at lease in part from a gap in teacher quality. Students in high-
poverty schools are, by a variety of different measures that are
positively correlated to teacher effectiveness, almost twice as
likely as students in low-poverty schools to have an ineffective
teacher.19 Problems of recruitment, selection, and retention are
compounded in high-poverty districts so that fewer good teach-
ers come, more leave, and fewer who do come and stay are able
Economic Development
to improve to reach the highest levels of effectiveness.20 Mean-
ingful systems of teacher evaluation, if correctly implemented,
would have the biggest impact in the lowest performing dis-
tricts, which are the most likely to lack the resources necessary
to design and implement a meaningful system of evaluation on
their own.
This inequality of effective teachers, and thus student achieve-
ment, is especially present between districts, which is one of the
reasons that a statewide instrument would potentially be most
effective in decreasing inequalities.21 The current evaluation
system that mandates that districts design their own evaluation
systems could be seen as encouraging inequality. Though the
Education
state must approve all districts’ professional performance review
plans, inequalities in wealth among districts ensure that, even if
the evaluation plans meet basic state standards, there are as-
suredly still differences not only in design but more notably in
implementation, of which there is no oversight. A statewide
instrument of evaluation would hold each district’s teachers to
the same statewide standards of teaching, assessed by the same
rubric by administrators trained in the same way. Naturally, all
Energy & Environment
inequalities cannot be removed. The quality of administrators
might still differ among districts, for example. But, there is cer-
tainly strong potential for a reduction in inequality under an eval-
uation system that is standardized for poor and wealthy districts
across the state.
Great benefits would certainly be derived from having a
single set of teaching standards on which all professionals are
evaluated. With a single statewide instru-
ment for evaluating teachers based on
a single set of statewide teaching stan-
dards, the state is saying to parents, stu-
Equal Justice
of the Bronx as it does in wealthy West-
chester. When all teachers are held to
the same description of what it means to
teach well, expectations for teachers would be held to a higher
standard in districts where ineffective teachers are concentrat-
ed. Second, for example, the current New York State guidelines
for evaluations do not require an annual observation for tenured
teachers. This leaves room for vast disparities between districts
Health Care
in the quality of evaluations: Some teachers may be observed
several times while others are observed not at all, providing the
possibility that some receive vastly more meaningful feedback
than those who are rarely if ever observed. One single evalua-
tion system assures that all teachers are being held to the same
standards of effectiveness and are being given meaningful feed-
back on their instruction not just in wealthy districts, but across
25
 the state.
Potential inequalities aside, at a most basic level it is evident
Defense & Diplomacy
that a statewide evaluation instrument that includes distribution
of state funds would reduce inequality by improving the poorer
districts. A majority of money for education comes from the local
district, though state and federal funds are available.22 Districts
where many families live in poverty have less money and fewer
resources than those with wealthy families and high property
values. These poor districts would have less money to devote
to developing and implementing teacher evaluation programs.
Moreover, this lack of ability to develop meaningful evalua-
Economic Development
tions compounds existing inequalities. Less effective teachers
are already concentrated in high poverty areas, while more ef-
fective teachers are usually to be found in higher income areas.
High attrition in low-income schools and the lack of meaningful
ways to measure teacher effectiveness are just two things that
hamper professional development initiatives in high poverty ar-
eas.23 The lack of professional development not only decreases
the possibility that less effective teachers will become highly ef-
fective but also increases attrition, which makes the situation in
low-income schools even more dire.24 Teacher evaluations are
not a panacea. However, the creation of a single, comprehensive
statewide system of teacher evaluation would decrease inequal-
Education
ity among districts in New York State by creating the same stan-
dards for teachers and their evaluation and by decreasing the
likelihood of a compounding of inequalities in high-poverty dis-
tricts that lack the resources and tools (such as comprehensive
evaluation systems) to develop and implement effective profes-
sional development programs.
The second method by which a single state instrument for
evaluation will decrease inequality among districts is that states
Energy & Environment
will benefit from having data on teacher effectiveness that can
be compared and reported across districts. Transparency about
a lack of effective teachers will push districts and schools to work
harder to improve teacher quality, will encourage parents to ad-
vocate for reform, and will generally place increased pressure
on districts and the state to improve educational outcomes. A
report by the New Teacher Project making recommendations
about states’ RTT applications goes so far as to state, “Greater
outcomes will result from mandating the public reporting of
teacher effectiveness data rather than mandating specific strate-
gies.”25 If transparency leads to reform, complete transparency
Equal Justice
of teacher effectiveness data that is easily compared across dis-
tricts across the state, then reform will disproportionately oc-
cur in the high-poverty districts whose teaching forces will not
compare well.
Funding
In 2008-2009, New York State had a budget shortfall of $1.7
billion.26 Deficit reduction proposals for 2009-2010 have includ-
ed decreases in funding to education, including related pro-
grams like a grant program that provides Teacher Centers for
Health Care
professional development within districts. Also as part of Gov-
ernor David Paterson’s 2010 budget, which has yet to be passed
by the legislature, is a commitment to eliminate unfunded educa-
tion mandates to districts.27 This proposal would constitute an
unfunded mandate, and thus a major obstacle to passage would
be the location of funds.
Though this approach would be difficult, it is possible that
26
funds could be made up in the current state budget through
cuts in other programs. A second approach to finding funds is
through the federal grant program RTT. New York State was one
of 16 finalists in the first round of RTT. It was denied money, but
a majority of the grants will be handed out in the second round,
as roughly $3.5 billion remains to be distributed. New York State
would have to move quickly to pass the evaluation proposal in
order to make it part of its Phase 2 application, which would be
due June 1. RTT grant money could go towards implementing a
statewide evaluation system. The Obama administration might
create other competitive grant programs with relevant missions,
from which New York could draw funds for this proposal. A third
avenue for funding might become available in the next two years
after Obama pushes the passage of the renewal of the ESEA.
This could not only increase funding to states, but might in fact
provide special funds for states to create evaluation programs
like this one.
Conclusion
Funding and implementing a comprehensive statewide in-
strument for evaluating teachers in New York State would con-
tribute to narrowing the achievement gap within districts, but es-
pecially among districts. Though proposals to incorporate into
evaluations objective measures of instructional effectiveness
such as student achievement data might receive push back from
important and powerful stakeholders such as teachers unions, a
comprehensive evaluation system is worth the fight. No evalu-
ation instrument is perfect – it is extremely difficult to measure
instructional effectiveness with total accuracy. However, an
evaluation system, when tied with professional development and
personnel decisions, that at least attempts to achieve the ele-
ments outlined will constitute a vast improvement over the cur-
rent patchwork of evaluations in New York State.
Supporting Student Loan Schemes in Developing
Countries through USAID
Pooja Reddy
Proposal
The peer-to-peer lending site Vittana has helped further the
reach and efficacy of financial markets in developing countries
by supporting student borrowers in short vocational programs
or college students in their last year before commencement with
small loans. These microfinance initiatives have allowed many
students in countries with little to no financial support for higher
education to obtain an essential education. While the agency
cannot engage in microfinance loans since it operates under a
directive specifically to not “award profit under assistance instru-
ments,” USAID could initiate the creation of a similar model to
support needy students on a larger scale through loan guaran-
tees. While a USAID pilot program with similar goals in Kyrgyz-
stan exists, an increase in its scope and its replication for other
nations is pivotal to the needs of rapidly developing economies
facing shortages of skilled workers. By partnering with local or-
ganizations and regional banks to initiate a student loan scheme
with a USAID loan guarantee, this public-private partnership le-
verages the knowledge of the specific needs and cultural back-
ground of the country in order to create a viable solution to a
pressing socioeconomic need.
The existing USAID program in Kyrgyzstan has a budget of
$150,000 and has been in existence for only a year. It seeks to
partner with local organizations in order to create a student
loan scheme for needy borrowers. USAID provides a fifty per-
cent loan guarantee and technical assistance while local part-
ner organizations identify needy students and reliable higher
education institutions that qualify for assistance so that they may
screen student candidates for borrowing at regional banks. This
unique public-private partnership aims to increase the number
of qualified graduates to fill labor demands in Kyrgyzstan’s grow-
ing economy and does so through a relatively small budget.
A cost-benefit analysis from this initiative shows large socio-
economic gains. In Kyrgyzstan, as in many developing countries
around the world, the costs of education are such that a USAID
program with a limited budget could make a significant impact.
The average cost of tuition and fees at a private university in Kyr-
gyzstan ranges from $800 to $2,000 per year, while tuition at a
public university is an average of $800. In vocational schools tu-
ition rough ranges between $25 and $300 annually. Because av-
erage per capita income in Kyrgyzstan is $1,300, this makes such
an investment extremely taxing on the average family and nearly
impossible for a needy family. Studies in Chile have shown,
however, that graduates of vocational or professional programs
earn 1.6 to 2.8 times as much as a high school graduate while this
number increases to four times as much for a four-year college
graduate. A 1982 study in Barbados shows that 65% of student
borrowers earned more than their families’ average incomes af-
ter completing their studies.
Such statistics are similar for developing countries around
the world, necessitating the replication of such a model to other
countries with small or non-existent student loan schemes (over
half the countries in which USAID currently operates). In addi-
tion to replication, the scheme must also increase its scope. The
current USAID program only allows funding for college students
enrolled in four year colleges. Expanding this to students of
vocational schools would go a long way in decreasing income
inequality and increasing productivity in vital domestic sectors
such as services and agriculture. Such a scheme has a three-
fold impact: it reduces poverty and income inequality, increases
labor productivity, and creates an environment within which the
free market (through the financial system) can reach the most
needy. This proposal outlines the need for such a scheme and
the framework for replicating this scheme in other countries
based on a comparative analysis of existing successful student
loan programs.
Introduction
Development economics has long been concerned with the
quality and quantity of schools in developing economies. In
the early years of post-colonial self-governance most emerg-
ing economies stressed primary and secondary education with
relatively little importance (as measured through public fund-
ing) given to tertiary education. Many international organiza-
tions such as the World Bank supported this approach, implying
that, due to diminishing returns to higher education, university
education was not as essential to the creation of productive hu-
man capital. Many developing countries today, however, face a
severe paucity of skilled workers qualified to meet the demands
of an increasingly complex and expanding economy. In addition,
Defense & Diplomacy
the relatively young demographic makeup of most developing
countries means that a much larger percentage of its population
demands access to higher education.
As a result of the financial pressure that the combination of
rapid expansion and demographic makeup exerts on public bud-
gets, governments of developing nations are seeking to increase
public-private partnerships to make access to higher education
a possibility for a larger percentage of its population. Loans are
both efficient and equitable and, in the education sector, allow
Economic Development
for socioeconomic development with large externalities on pro-
ductivity and governance through the creation of an informed
citizen base.
Although national student loan programs were introduced as
early as the 1950s and 1960s (Cambodia and India both set up
their loan programs in the 1950s), relatively few developing na-
tions have expanded these to reach significant portions of their
populations. Many loan schemes have become defunct since
then due mainly to ineffective administrative policies and low
loan recovery rates that led to increasing financial dependence
on state treasuries. The problem garnered so much attention in
the1980s that both the World Bank and the Commonwealth Sec-
Education
retariat published guidelines outlining effective design mecha-
nisms for student loan programs in the developing world.
Objectives
The primary goal of a student loan scheme would be its fi-
nancial efficacy or self-sustainability. In order to establish such a
scheme or replicate its success elsewhere, it must be managed
effectively, a goal best accomplished through public-private part-
Energy & Environment
nerships. A comparative analysis of successful student loan pro-
grams in various countries have shown that this requires three
widely-defined pillars. First, there must be a rigorous legal infra-
structure in order to ensure loan recover. Second, sound target-
ing criteria to enable the program to reach needy students must
be instituted. Finally, minimizing default through changing the
design mechanism of the student loan must be a priority.
Problems
The first impediment is reliance on government; In addition to
financial pressures on public budgets, state-owned loan schemes
Equal Justice
have failed due to the way in which they disincentivize both loan
collection and loan repayment. Excessive dependence on gov-
ernment revenue dwindles funding for such schemes and does
not allow private organizations with effective screening and col-
lection mechanisms already in place to take advantage of their
specialized expertise.
The second impediment is high default rates; High student
loan defaults have been a persistent feature of loan programs
from Africa and Latin America to Asia. Low student loan recov-
ery ratios caused the governments of Indonesia and Sri Lanka
Health Care
to void their loan schemes while cost savings in other countries
such as India have been dismally low. Due to the administrative
cost of disbursing loans, this has essentially made loans more
expensive than grants and scholarships.
The third impediment is hidden subsidies; Not entirely inde-
pendent in causing high default rates is the low interest rates at
which government loans in developing economies are offered.
27
 While high interest rates increase student debt burdens and the mencement and rise quickly thereafter, tying loan repayments
probability of default, below-market interest rates that do not to income can effectively ease the burden of the loan. The 1989
Defense & Diplomacy

take into account expected post-graduation income of the stu- reforms to Sweden’s loan scheme implemented such a struc-
dent borrower act as a hidden subsidy that adds to the financial ture and drastically increased the financial efficiency of the pro-
burden of the government. gram. In addition, income contingent deferrals which exempt
The fourth impediment is unrestricted the borrower from payments in cases of

A
domain; Ineffective targeting has, in many unforeseen unemployment or when his
cases, allowed all students, regardless of public-private part- or her income falls below a certain mini-
financial need or ability, to take advantage mum threshold might be considered. It
of loan schemes. While the extremely low
nership such as this would
is important to note, however, that inter-
rates of loan disbursements in many devel- increase the feasibility, ef- est would continue to accrue in these
Economic Development

oping countries (over 10/40 had less than 1%) ficiency, and equity of loan instances. Sweden and Hong Kong, two
imply that selection mechanisms to minimize schemes. countries with the lowest loan default
risk were in place, this raises concerns about rates, include deferment clauses in their
equity. loan agreements.
In order to make this program both pragmatic and palatable
Proposed Solutions to lenders, methods must be made to decrease evasion. While
In order to remedy the problems enumerated in the last sec- countries differ in their definition of default, a distinction must
tion, I propose to implement limited access, ability restrictions on be made between students who do not have the means to pay
credits, changing repayment structures, decreasing evasion, and and students who evade paying. While restructuring payment
optimal loan guarantees. Limited Access will achieve the primary schemes can go a long way in minimizing default in the former
goal of financial efficiency; Access to loans should be limited to group, two methods have been shown to effectively decrease
needy students, as determined by personal or family incomes evasion. First, hiring external collection institutions can be piv-
Education

that fall below a pre-specified income threshold. In developing otal to recovering payments through locating students and col-
countries, however, annual income often does not allow one to lecting payments. Second, increasing charges for attempts to
determine means. By taking into account parameters such as so- evade payment should be implemented. In Colombia, adding
cial status and assets, loan schemes can more effectively target additional fees reflecting the cost of hiring external collectors
needy students. are passed on to the student.
Credit rating systems are not a feature of many developing The final implementation must be that of, optimal loan guar-
countries and even in those countries in which they are in ef- antees. In government programs, guaranteed budgets for loan
fect, they would not accurately allow one to determine the fiscal schemes have been shown to decrease incentives for institutions
Energy & Environment

responsibility of a needy student with little hitherto interaction to seek collection. In Indonesia for example, federal loans were
with the financial system. Other determinants of the student guaranteed to almost 100% of their value and saw relatively low
borrower’s likelihood to pay then must be fashioned to fit the repayment rates. The Honduran government, by privatizing the
environment of the loan scheme. Existing loan programs with public student loan institution, Educredito, saw default rates re-
high rates of success have done this in two ways through abil- duced from ninety percent to under ten percent.
ity restrictions by analyzing students’ previous performance and
using peer-to-peer lending. Studies have shown however that
weak students have a much higher likelihood of dropping out Conclusion
and defaulting on loans. A report on the loan program in the Do- While USAID has supported and initiated numerous initiatives
minican Republic, for example, stated that “loan defaults occur to improve both the quality and quantity of schools in developing
almost exclusively among students who leave school before… nations, it could go a long way in furthering its goal in expand-
Equal Justice

[finishing] the course.” In Colombia, a country with a large-scale ing the reach of free markets by providing loan guarantees to
successful loan scheme, student eligibility is decided partially by needy students looking for educational funding. Although the
performance on the national secondary school exam. Given this risk of default on student loans has been high in the past, creat-
information, student performance in secondary school or com- ing effective mechanisms to decrease this risk can reduce this
pleted college coursework can be an indicator of the borrower’s considerably. A public-private partnership such as this would
commitment to education and, therefore, expected utility from increase the feasibility, efficiency and equity of loan schemes and
the loan. Peer-to-peer lending sites such as Vittana restrict stu- free up public resources for other critical sectors of develop-
dents to those in their final year of coursework in order to gauge ment. Even though they have not always worked well, student
commitment and lower risk of default. This however, restricts loans, reformed through the pillars outlined in this paper, can
funding to those already in college and could deter those with contribute to increased welfare through effective management.
Health Care

no means to fund the first few years of education. Education is a unique and long-term investment that has wide-
Another change that must be implemented is in the way that ranging externalities. Given its critical importance, especially in
repayment structures are created. Even in the case of heavily democratic societies, USAID public-private partnerships to pro-
subsidized loans, students may be forced to default because ini- vide loans and increase its affordability is vital to the growth of
tial payments in the year after graduation take up an unreason- emerging economies.
ably large percentage of their earned income. Since student
borrower’s incomes are at their lowest immediately after com-
28
 Energy and the Environment

The Energy and Environment Center at the Roosevelt Institute consists of

forward thinking undergraduate policy writers. Our focus is the creation
of dynamic policy ideas that attempt to answer the major environmental
questions of the 21st Century using technological and sustainable propos-
als. These proposals involve both the adaptation of successful local ini-
tiatives to a national framework, as well as direct government initiatives.
The Energy and Environment Center’s contributions include work on adapt-
ing cities’ infrastructures to support changes that may result from climate
change, and well as suggestions as to how to increase energy efficiency of
data servers.
 national mandates.5
An Analysis of City Adaptation Plans for Climate- Most of the world’s largest cities are situated along the coast,
Defense & Diplomacy

Induced Sea Level Rise and Increased Precipitation
Angela Wong
The global community has taken a long time to accept that
the occurrence of climate change is real and now faces the chal-
lenge of managing the manifold human-induced consequences.
Within the next decades, average temperatures will climb, hur-
ricanes will increase in intensity, sea level will rise and the ocean What we know: climate projections
Economic Development
exposing much infrastructure to the impacts of sea level rise.
In addition, with more than half of the world’s population con-
centrated in cities, water resources will be strained by drought
or declining drinking water quality as precipitation patterns
change. In this report, we analyze to what extent cities are re-
sponding to these vulnerabilities through case studies of New
York City, Seattle, Hamburg and Hong Kong.

will become more acidic, resulting in costly damages to ecosys-
tem services, infrastructure, agriculture and other sectors that
humans depend on daily.
The two proactive response strategies to these impacts ei-
ther seek to mitigate the extent of climate change through re-
ducing greenhouse gas emissions or to adapt to actual or ex-
pected impacts. While more mitigation will lower the severity of
the impacts thus resulting in less to adapt to, fewer resources
remain for adaptation and damages may be higher.1 Countries
thus far have been pressured mainly to work towards mitigation
because of the global benefits. However, effective climate poli-
cies must balance the trade-offs between mitigation and adapta-
Education
A range of projections exists because the actual extent of
warming strongly depends on the level of mitigation that coun-
tries commit to. According to the IPCC, average temperatures
will increase 2 to 6°C by 2100, much greater than the rise of
0.74°C within the past 100 years.6 Here we focus on adaptation
schemes for increased sea level and shifts in precipitation. These
effects will inevitably lead to severe impacts and costly damages
as the world warms.
Water expands as it warms, leading to a projected 18 to 60
cm rise in sea level by 2100.7 In addition, it is possible ice sheet
melt from Greenland and Antarctica will also impact sea level
rise.8 However, the magnitude and speed of melt will depend

tion so that both types of plans are developed concurrently. As on uncertain factors such as temperature, ice sheet flows and
policies for adaptation begin to take the sliding of ice sheets into the ocean.

shape, science must guide them to en-
sure that the plans for the unconfirmed
future are practical. An analysis of how
the scientific facts are applied in exist-
ing adaptation proposals serves as one
indicator of a city or nation’s level of
Energy & Environment
I
Further understanding of these dynam-
mplications are clear: rising ics will increase the sea level rise esti-
9
waters will flood infrastructures mate. The IPCC offers three strategies
in adapting to sea level: protection,
and residences in low-lying lands, accommodation and managed retreat.
storm surges will be more intense Protection is the construction of coastal

preparedness. and increased runoff from more barriers such as dikes and sea walls, ac-
The United Nations Framework intense precipitation events will commodation is the consideration of
Convention on Climate Change (UN- affect ecosystems, water resources the sea level in the modification or plan-
FCCC) requires its 192 parties to re- ning of buildings and other structures
lease impact assessments specific to and agriculture. and managed retreat is the prevention
each country. Although these state- of development and planned abandon-
ments acknowledge climate change consequences and rec- ment of structures.
ommend actions, most countries have not yet formed well-de- Warming will also cause more evaporation, affecting the
veloped adaptation plans for implementation. The cost of not hydrologic cycle. Wet areas will experience more intense rain
adapting to climate change is approximately equivalent to losing events because there is more water available in the air. Arid ar-
5% of global GDP and four times this value when environmen- eas will also face less frequent and more intense precipitation
Equal Justice

tal and health impacts are considered.2 Despite this, national
decision makers direct attention to mitigation because some
strategies such as increasing energy efficiency can be widely
implemented. There is also fear that planning for adaptation will
imply that mitigation efforts have been fruitless and are there-
fore being abandoned.3 In addition, it is possible that a country
may have low adaptive capacity because a lack of resources or
political stability serves as financial, technical or bureaucratic ob- water resources and agriculture. Given these scientific facts and
stacles.4
In some cases, cities have been quicker to develop response
Health Care
events but will generally become drier. The projected shift of
precipitation patterns varies considerably because of spatial and
seasonal variability.
Despite these uncertainties, the implications are clear: ris-
ing waters will flood infrastructures and residences in low-lying
lands, storm surges will be more intense and increased runoff
from more intense precipitation events will affect ecosystems,
recommendations, we will examine the role of scientific evidence
in guiding the development of adaptation plans in the four cities.

strategies than many countries, even the developed. Local gov-

ernments are generally better suited to draw up adaptation plans
which are frequently very location-specific, as risks differ based
on resources, geographic locations and stability of current infra-
structure. The deliberate countrywide policymaking process is
prompting cities with high vulnerabilities to move ahead before
30
New York City, New York
Of the five boroughs in New York City, four are on islands,
giving New York City a total coastline of 578 miles and exposing
more land to sea level rise. From 1900 to 2005, the annual aver-
age temperature in the city increased by 1.1°C, the annual aver-
age precipitation increased by 10.7 cm (a 9.9% increase), and sea
level rose by almost 30 cm.10 By 2080, temperature is projected
to increase 3.2°C, precipitation to rise 8.6% and sea level to in-
crease 41.9 cm, almost half a meter.11 Like other coastal cities, it
will face costly damages due to flooding and storm surges.
The city has several offices dedicated to acting against cli-
mate change. The Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustain-
ability, established in 2006, plans and implements initiatives to
ensure habitable qualities for future generations of this city. The
Office commissioned the creation of the Climate Change Ad-
aptation Task Force, comprised of members from approximately
40 various city and state agencies and private companies, to de-
velop strategies to protect the infrastructure and resources.12
They are advised by local scientists, engineers and lawyers from
the New York City Panel on Climate Change.
The Task Force is highly involved in the adaptation policy pro-
cess. Their suggestions in response to flooding from sea level
rise include raising the elevation of water sensitive facilities,
construction of watertight doors and windows to protect critical
equipment and control rooms and investment in additional back-
up emergency management equipment. These accommodative
measures are low-cost and can be done without need for further
studies, while protective strategies require more research and
planning. It is unclear which agencies will have jurisdiction over
construction of local protective barriers such as dunes, riprap, or
sea walls and large tidal gates for regional protection. The Task
Force is also considering gradual retreat from the most vulner-
able coastlines and using the land for other purposes to mini-
mize damage.13
In addition to focusing on adapting to sea level rise, the Task
Force has also investigated impacts of increased precipitation.
Increased rainfall and higher temperatures will change the ecol-
ogy of reservoirs and increase erosion, altering the water sup-
ply and quality. The DEP is working to prevent New York City’s
watershed from undergoing expensive filtration improvements
through managing land use and forests around it that serve as
natural filters.14 Excessive rain will also lead to overcapacity in
drainage systems and inland flooding of streets and basements.
The Task Force recommends improving the capacity of the
stormwater collection system through augmentation and clean-
ing of its pipes and promotion of the use of green roof technol-
ogy to reduce and reuse stormwater.15
Working with Columbia University’s Center for Climate Sys-
tems Research (CCSR) and the Goddard Institute for Space
Studies (GISS), the Task Force is committed to obtaining the
most accurate scientific climate findings. These research insti-
tutes applied regional data to General Circulation Models rec-
ognized by the IPCC and 3 emission scenarios to understand
specific impacts to the New York City area under different pos-
sible futures.16 The Task Force is also working to further reduce
uncertainty by utilizing its research partnership to run Regional
Circulation Models for finer climate details, analyzing additional
data and monitoring stations and continuing to follow develop-
ments in climate change science.17 Through its participation in
the Mayors Climate Protection Center and major national and
international conferences, New York City is also active in sharing
its climate policy ideas around the world.
King County, Washington
King County, twice as large as the average county in the US in
Defense & Diplomacy
terms of area, is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change due
to its location on the Puget Sound. Despite the many mitigation
policies that distinguish Seattle as one of the United States’ most
prominent green cities, the global nature of climate impacts
means Seattle must adapt as well. In King County, sea level is
expected to rise 15 cm by 2050, 34 cm by 2100 and a maximum
of 128 cm by 2100.18 Precipitation in the region is projected to
increase during winters and decrease during summers, but the
precipitation changes will be small and depend on decadal vari-
ability.19
Economic Development
Actions against climate change were officially taken in 2006
with King County’s Executive Orders on Global Warming Pre-
paredness. It required various county departments to collabo-
rate and submit a Global Warming Mitigation and Preparedness
Report every year.20 This climate change team works closely with
scientists at University of Washington’s Climate Impacts Group
(CIG) and plans to utilize the Science Section of the County’s
Water and Land Resources Division to translate technical infor-
mation from other sources as well.21
Plans have already been implemented to address sea level
rise vulnerabilities. A King County Flood Control District was
designated and the property tax from that area will provide over
Education
$300 million over 10 years for the repair and maintenance of the
over 500 levees and revetments in the county.22 There will also
be construction to replace over 50 small, aging bridges with new
ones designed to allow more floodwater to flow under them.23
Realizing that water demands will increase because of pop-
ulation growth while supply will decrease because of climate
change, the county is also implementing an adaptation plan to
Energy & Environment
address this. Advanced technology was added to the filtration
process of Brightwater, a new wastewater treatment plant, at
only 2% of the total construction cost. The wastewater, seven to
ten times cleaner than from conventional treatment processes,
can be reclaimed for irrigation and industry, thus reducing de-
mand of clean freshwater from these sectors.24 Construction of
the Brightwater Tunnel to channel the reclaimed water to poten-
tial customers prepares for higher demand in the future (Wolf
2009; Lowe et al. 2009; King County Executive Office 2008).
A combination of cleaner wastewater and reduced stormwater
will decrease pollution in the Puget Sound and other rivers and
Equal Justice
streams in the county. To reduce stormwater flooding, the team
will consider promoting revisions of building codes for collection
of stormwater for reuse and develop strategies to reduce sewer
overflows.25
King County’s team partners with University of Washington’s
Climate Impacts Group (CIG), a Regional Integrated Sciences
and Assessments (RISA) team supported by the National Oce-
anic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), to better assess
impacts on water resources, aquatic ecosystems, forests, and
coasts. In an effort to protect its facilities, the County’s Waste-
water Treatment Division (WTD) worked with CIG to determine
Health Care
whether the infrastructure will be at risk to sea level rise. The
project resulted in the development of a Geographic Informa-
tion System (GIS) Vulnerable Facilities Assessment Tool and was
made available to other climate change impact groups.26 The
team will also continue to monitor lakes and model river flows
to determine climate change impacts to water quality.27 Even
31
 New York King County
Defense & Diplomacy

Population 8.3 million 1.9 million

Projected sea level 41.9 cm by 2080 34 cm by 2100
rise
Projected precipita- 8.6% by 2080 N/A
tion increase
Government agencies NYC Climate Change Task Force King County climate change team
working towards
adaptation
Economic Development

Plans or proposals - raise elevation of water sensitive facilities - repair and maintenance of the over 500
for adaptation to sea - construction of watertight doors to protect equip- levees and revetments over the next 10 years
level rise ment and control rooms - replacement of over 50 aging bridges to
- construction of local protective barriers (e.g. sea allow more floodwater to pass under
walls)
- gradual retreat from the most vulnerable coastlines
Plans or proposals - reduce flooding through improving the capacity of - reduce flooding through preventing sewer
for adaptation to the stormwater collection system overflows
increased precipita- - reduce stormwater through the use of green roof - reduce stormwater through the use of
tion technology green roof technology
- maintain drinking water quality through managing - use of cleaner reclaimed water will lessen
Education

land use and forests around it that serve as natural the strain of the freshwater supply for
filters drinking water

though the team, comprised of members from five county de-
partments, works with many outside agencies, it recognizes that
effective response to climate change depends on extensive co-
ordination among the government at every level, business lead-
Energy & Environment
changes in ocean circulation.29 As seen in all four cities, local
research centers can make better projections of the local and
global processes that affect sea level rise and precipitation. It
is more practical for local policymakers to seek help from local

ers, and residents.28 Like New York City, King County is also an
active participant in national conferences and groups including
Mayors Climate Protection Center and ICLEI - Local Govern-
ments for Sustainability.
Discussion
Some local governments are more prompt in taking actions to
address climate change than their national governments. How-
ever, the initiatives are just recently developed; the two most
proactive cities in this study, New York and King County, estab-
lished task forces dedicated to this issue as recently as 2006.
Equal Justice
scientists and whether applying adjustments to GCMs, such
as those of the IPCC, or using RCMs, these researchers have
the ability to better account for dynamics specific to their area.
Analyses of impacts from scientists constrain the range of mea-
surements made by the IPCC to provide policy makers with
more specific levels to adapt to. Beyond this, New York and King
County are examples in which researchers and engineers, when
asked to collaborate with the government task forces, serve as
consultants that help identify possible adaptation strategies and
develop proposals specific to the region.
The degree that climate science guides policy reveals the

While these groups have already implemented dozens of plans
for mitigation, the responses to adaptation are not as numerous.
Besides the installation of advanced technology in the Brightwa-
ter plant, designation of a Flood Hazard Zone and replacement
of bridges in King County, the options for adaptation actions
are presented only in proposal form. The next step is to identify
which are to be seriously considered and develop the plans and
timelines for implementation. It is recommended to not prolong
doing so because although the gradual increases in sea level
and precipitation are insignificant over a short period of time,
their implications such as storm surges and floods can happen
Health Care
soundness of the adaptation strategies. For example, tidal gates
must exceed sea level by a certain amount to protect against
storm surges and sewers must have sufficient capacity to avoid
stormwater flooding. A compromise between waiting for un-
certainties from local studies to be resolved and starting costly
construction is building adaptable infrastructure. For example, if
King County were to build a sea wall, it must be tall enough to
protect against the projected 15 cm rise by 2050 and be adjust-
able for the 34 cm increase by 2100 as well as for greater in-
creases caused by ice sheet melt. Cities can be better prepared
for climate change by collaborating with research centers, vital

unexpectedly.
As local climate policy makers direct more attention to plans
for adaptation, they must decide between waiting for exact
changes to be understood before implementing strategies or
carrying out costly constructions in the face of scientific uncer-
tainties. Sea level rise is not uniform globally because of regional
land movement and variations in temperature and salinity from
32
resources in influencing the speed and accuracy with which ad-
aptation plans are developed.
Collaboration between government agencies on climate
change is also an effective use of available resources. The ef-
fects of climate change are so numerous that it will influence
policies that range from affecting where people can live to how
much they will pay for electricity. With expertise from various de-
partments, the comprehensive task forces are better equipped
to formulate policies that address these various issues. For ex-
ample, the New York City Task Force is comprised of members
from the Department of Environmental Protection, Transporta-
tion, Sanitation and other stakeholders. This is especially impor-
tant since adaptation demands planning from the public sector
whereas mitigation requires placing regulations on the private
sector (Sanchez-Rodriguez et. al 2008).
Interdisciplinary task forces are also more adept in identi-
fying and managing unintended consequences that may arise
from adapting to complex systems. In the case of Brightwater,
the improved filtration process is aimed to meet increased wa-
ter demand under conditions of decreased supply, but also has
the ancillary benefit of decreasing pollution in the Puget Sound.
However, other plans may cause deleterious impacts that will not
be realized by policymakers who only specialize in one topic. A
science advisor who can translate the technical details for policy
consideration, especially to fully utilize the information from the
research centers, is an example of an important component to an
interdisciplinary task force.
Cities that wish to adapt face another obstacle of having few
resources for crafting strategies because anthropogenic climate
change of this magnitude has not been experienced before.
Even at the national level, there is limited guidance; the IPCC
Technical Guidelines for Assessing Climate Change Impacts
and Adaptations written in 1994 provide generic strategies and
focuses more on assessment rather than adaptation strategies.
Global collaboration between cities can represent a network to
communicate problems being dealt with and possible strategies.
Associations such as Local Governments for Sustainability and
the Mayors Climate Protection Center easily share information
that task forces can use to reevaluate or strengthen aspects of
their agenda. For example, of the four cities, only New York iden-
tified altered drinking water quality as an impact of increased
rainfall and higher temperatures and disseminating this climate
change issue through the networks will present other cities with
impacts they might have overlooked. Similarly, solutions to prob-
lems can be made readily available, such as the GIS Vulnerable
Facilities Assessment Tool developed by King County.
Despite the availability of research centers and global as-
sociations for local governments, adapting to new situations
requires institutional change to take place. New York City and
King County have established local offices to take responsibil-
ity for policies against climate change, but Hamburg and Hong
Kong have not done so yet. Accountability must be delegated
because the various impacts fall under the jurisdiction of several
departments and it is not clear which one should take initiative.
However, local governments may not have to develop plans if
their countries are small and proactive about climate change.
With the federal IWP and Hamburg-specific KLIMZUG-NORD,
this German city is increasing its preparedness without a des-
ignated local government department. Germany is smaller in
area than the state of California, making it easier for the federal
government to administer comprehensive adaptation strategies
than larger countries such as China or the U.S. Despite this, cit-
ies under national adaptation plans still must be equipped with
the knowledge and resources such that they have high adaptive
capacity.
Conclusions
Among other effects, global warming will cause sea level rise
Defense & Diplomacy
and shifts in precipitation patterns. Sea level rise will encroach
on low-lying lands, damaging property and infrastructure, espe-
cially from storm surges. Changes in precipitation will alter drink-
ing water supply and quality, and more intense rains will cause
street flooding and landslides. Although cities have generally
taken action quicker than countries in response to this phenom-
enon, their proposals still need to be enhanced with deadlines
for implementation. New York City proposed strategies for ad-
aptation to both effects, and King County started construction
Economic Development
on infrastructure to address some aspects of both.
A combination of better understanding, monitoring, plan-
ning and warning is important for adaptation and collaboration
between agencies is the most effective strategy to achieve this.
Local scientists under the instruction of local policymakers can
lower the uncertainty in intensity of impacts. Teamwork between
existing government departments allows for more comprehen-
sive adaptation strategies. Finally, strong social networks be-
tween cities open communication that can be used to improve
plans. For cities without an office dedicated to climate change,
indirect adaptation is possible especially through the last option.
Education
Big Data and Computer Server Energy Efficiency: the
Need for a Rigorous, Scalable,
and Universal Standard
Adrian Soghoian
The Issue
Energy & Environment
Increased digital data use is driving a surge in data center
reliance and a correspondingly steep climb in energy consump-
tion. Although energy efficiency is a historic industry trend, the
rate of construction and spread-of-use vastly overshadows im-
provements in infrastructure and management protocol. Studies
from the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department
of Energy estimate that without energy efficiency measures in
place, energy use from data centers will double from 2006 to
2011 to over 120 bn kWh/year.1 This is over $8 bn in costs and by
some estimates would rise to 2% of our national energy usage.
Furthermore, some industry analysts (link) maintain that these
Equal Justice
estimates are low and that the expected flood of “big data”
threatens to overly strain the national grid with unexpected peak
loads.2
The Current State of Affairs
Industry experts estimate that, to a first-order approximation,
cooling and operational costs of data servers are proportional
to the energy they consume. Hence, improvements in energy
efficiency directly translate into lower Total Costs of Owner-
ship for data server center administrators2. Fortunately, market
Health Care
forces have motivated more efficient server technology, such as
energy proportional computing, which addresses the mismatch
between operating modes and efficiency regions. Although
many large companies, such as Google, have been responsible
for driving much of the innovation in energy efficiency technol-
ogy, legislation is required to effectively bring down consump-
tion across the country.
33
 In 2007, the EPA drafted a report to Congress entitled, “Re- ing will increase to 72.
port to Congress on Server and Data Center Energy Efficiency 4. From 2022 to 2026, the mandatory compliance rat-
Defense & Diplomacy

Public Law 109-431”. In this report, the EPA outlined energy con- ing will increase 80.
sumption trends and made policy recommendations. This graph-
ic, taken from the report, shows projected data center growth. The rational for the four year increments is that data servers
often have life spans between three and four years. If the compli-
ance rating were to increase every year, or every two years, this
would force server owners to constantly retrofit their infrastruc-
ture. Four-year intervals are more accommodating.
What I am essentially proposing is a phase-out of inefficient
data servers and data centers. In 2007, the Energy Independence
Economic Development

and Security Act (Pub.L. 110-140) did the same thing for incandes-
cent light bulbs. Specifically, the Act stated that general-purpose
light bulbs that produce 310-2600 lumens of light be 30% more
energy efficiency. This efficiency standard will eventually phase
out incandescent bulbs.

Conclusions
Energy efficiency increases are often described as a “low
hanging fruit”, since they require little initial investment and gen-
erally provide savings for the investor. The McKinsey Global In-
stitute projects that we can cut projected global energy demand
growth to 2020 by at least half by capturing opportunities to
Education

The growth is exponential. An efficiency standard must be in increase energy productivity . I believe efficiency standards have
place soon before this growth overwhelms the grid. the potential to eventually bring us to a carbon stabilized future,
and data centers present a ripe (and virtually untouched) oppor-
Which Standard? How Do We Measure Efficiency? tunity to cut consumption, costs, and carbon footprints.
Measuring data server energy efficiency is a controversial
process. In January 2010, industry leaders met to agree on en-
ergy efficiency measurements, metrics, and reporting conven-
tions. They agreed on three technical “guiding principles” to
Energy & Environment

help the EPA Energy Star Program establish an efficiency metric.

Roughly, this metric will use the total energy of the data center
divided by the IT energy consumption to supply a Power Usage
Effectiveness (PUE) rating . The PUE will be used, with slight
modifications for different types of servers, as the basic defini-
tion for energy efficiency.
Although the EPA is close to establishing an energy efficiency
rating, they have not yet finalized what they have. However, they
promise that such a rating is forthcoming – specifically before
2011. Despite the absence of any official rating, I propose a piece
of legislation that would take effect upon the completion of the
Equal Justice

rating.

Proposal
I propose mandatory compliance with a “sliding scale” Ener-
gy Star rating. The EPA has stated that the efficiency rating will
be on a scale from one to 100, with the average server ranking
around 40 and top-notch, efficient servers at 70. My proposal
has several steps:

1. By 2012, every server in the United States must

Health Care

meet a rating of at least 40 (or whatever the national

average is at the time of the establishment of the rat-
ing). Every server completed after January 2011 must
also match this standard.
2. From 2012 to 2016, the mandatory compliance rat-
ing will increase to 55.
3. From 2016 to 2022, the mandatory compliance rat-
34
 Equal Justice

Equal Justice is an exceptionally broad center, no doubt because almost anything

can become an issue of equality or justice. Living with realization that President
Obama’s campaign promises might not immediately materialize, this year’s group
discussed what this second year might mean for “change” in a variety of issues,
from net neutrality to drug sentencing to gay marriage to detention practices in
Iraq and Afghanistan. This year’s writers ended up writing primarily on issues of
electoral justice and good governance in the United States. The center looks for-
ward to the implementation of a truly progressive agenda and the rapid reversal
of inequities and injustices that continue to plague the nation.
 provide a few privileged members of Congress with notification
Executive Authority and Congressional Intelligence of the executive’s intelligence-related activities.6 It was, in that
Defense & Diplomacy

Oversight sense, a stopgap measure that gave Congress more oversight

Phillip Verma and Jill Marcellus
Background
As senior Democrat on the Intelligence Committee, in the
wake of the September 11 attacks, Nancy Pelosi faced an impos-
sible decision. The C.I.A. notified her that President Bush had
approved unprecedented powers of surveillance and detention,
Economic Development
than they would have had otherwise. After the Church hearings,
the Gang of Eight provision was established, rendering Gang
of Four notifications legally obsolete. The executive has upheld
the precedent in spite of this fact. One of the main problems
with the Gang of Four notification procedure is that it is given
orally and requires an oath of secrecy from the congresspeople
notified. They are not allowed legal counsel or professional ex-
perts during the briefings, meaning that they essentially take

then ignored her objections, and forbade her to tell anyone else.
She considered her options – should she break her oath and
make a public statement? Could she appeal to the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court? Without even an aide to consult, she ul-
timately decided to put her objections into classified writing and
wait for a change of administration.1
The question of what Nancy Pelosi knew is meaningless next
to the question of what she could do. Congressional notification
serves no purpose if it does not entail active oversight, allowing
the legislature to challenge executive overreach. For the most
sensitive intelligence information, Congress lacks any substan-
tial oversight mechanism. As Nancy Pelosi lamented, “no letter
Education
the president at his word—hardly a check on executive author-
ity. In contrast, Senate Resolution 400 requires the executive to
give a signed copy of the covert action being considered to the
Gang of Eight, a measure that ensures accountability for both
branches of government.7 The executive needs to follow Senate
Resolution 400 and notify both intelligence committees in the
non-covert cases, and the Gang of Eight in especially sensitive,
covert cases.
The model of Congressional intelligence oversight employed
by the Bush and Obama administrations is both vaguely defined
and legally nebulous. C.I.A. Director Leon Panetta blames a lack
of oversight “consensus” between the executive and legislative

could change” legally dubious policies, so “we had to change branches for the current “atmosphere of declining trust, grow-
2 ing frustration and more frequent leaks of properly classified
the leadership in Congress and in the White House.” Now that
8Arguing that certain information was too sensitive
the leadership has changed, we must change the oversight pro- information.”
cess – or risk continued breaches of civil for a leak-ridden Congress, the Bush ad-

C
liberties. ministration repeatedly under-notified the
The current system of oversight grew ongressional notification intelligence committees. Panetta himself
out of investigations into President Rich- serves no purpose if it does not had to race to Capitol Hill last June to dis-
ard Nixon’s abuse of executive surveil- close, eight years and millions of dollars
Energy & Environment

lance powers in the Watergate scandal. entail active oversight, allow- too late, that the agency had developed
In 1976, following the Church Commit- ing the legislature to challenge a training program for teams of mercenar-
tee hearings, Congress passed Senate executive overreach. ies to assassinate foreign leaders. Though
Resolution 400, establishing the House never fully implemented, it was also, un-
Permanent Select Committee on Intelli- der Vice President Dick Cheney’s orders,
gence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and re- kept entirely hidden from relevant congressional panels.9 The
quiring the intelligence community to notify the new committees executive considers accidental public disclosure a risk, but dis-
3 closure can also be part of Congress’s legal response to notifica-
of their activities. The proposal was not altogether successful;
President Jimmy Carter failed to notify Congress of covert ac- tion. Senate Resolution 445 created a procedure by which the
tions taken in the 1979 Iran hostage crisis, citing concerns about full Select Committee could vote to disclose information to the
leaks, a problematic justification that has plagued the oversight public, in consultation with Majority and Minority leaders. This
Equal Justice

system ever since. In response, Congress amended the process
with the 1980 “Gang of Eight” statute, which limited notification
in highly-sensitive cases of covert action. The “Gang of Eight” in-
cludes the chairs and ranking members of the intelligence com-
mittees, in addition to the majority and minority leaders of both
chambers of Congress. In cases of non-covert action, the execu-
tive branch is still supposed to notify the whole committees; this
4 use secrecy as an excuse to bypass Congressional notification.
currently entails fewer than 40 members of Congress. Many
consider “enhanced interrogation” a type of non-covert intelli-
gence collection, thus requiring the notification of the full com-
Health Care
oversight mechanism could play into the executive’s fear and
disregard of notification laws, and the common but legally base-
less practice of notifying only the Gang of Four. When only four
members are notified, it is impossible for Congress to take any
action without illegally disclosing classified information. As long
as the threat of public disclosure remains Congress’s primary
means of opposing covert operations, the executive branch will
Legislative notification is not enough. Four, eight, or even
thirty-three members of Congress do not have any viable way to

5 block the executive’s action. If the informed members of the in-

mittees. Needless to say, this has not been the practice.
The current practice of the executive branch has been to in- telligence committees are concerned about the action’s legality,
form only the chairs and ranking members of the House Perma- they should have some means of recourse. Recognizing that na-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select tional security does sometimes have a “now-or-never” element,
Committee on Intelligence, a group collectively known as “the it would be unreasonable to delay executive action by requiring
Gang of Four.” There is no statutory basis for notifying the Gang legislative approval. Indeed, under Senate Resolution 400, the
of Four; rather, it is precedent that was used before Church to President is not bound to seek Congressional approval, but rath-
36
er to inform them of ongoing action. There are broadly two ways
in which the intelligence committees can regain oversight of
covert and non-covert intelligence actions: through Congress’s
budgetary powers or through judicial oversight. The former has
been proposed a number of times by legislators with little suc-
cess; there are also a number of security concerns with such a
proposal. Judicial oversight, through a national security court,
could block ongoing activities if deemed illegal, or establish a
precedent preventing the executive from repeating such actions
in the future.
The proposed “power of the purse” solution attempts to
reconcile the concerns of both branches of government while
ultimately solving neither. Currently, although Intelligence Com-
mittee members advise the Appropriations Committee, con-
gressional oversight panels do not have direct control over intel-
ligence agencies’ budgets. The 9/11 Commission recommended
that the Intelligence Committees gain the power of the purse,
a reform that would grant them greater leverage to oppose ex-
ecutive actions. Although this recommendation might be ef-
fective for programs disclosed to the full committees, it would
not address the specific problems posed by covert activities and
highly sensitive information. If the full committees controlled
the budget, the Gang of Eight would still lack direct budget-
ary control over the administration’s most secretive programs.
The government might then use this as a loophole to escape
oversight, directing all notifications to the Gang of Eight. During
the Cold War, there were a number of notable congressional
amendments designed to restrict defense spending on covert
actions; notable examples include the 1976 Clark Amendment
on Angola and the 1982 Boland Amendment on Nicaragua, both
of which were subverted through executive loopholes.13 Lastly,
the administration’s concerns about security leaks are not wholly
frivolous; Representative Peter Hoekstra, ranking Republican on
the House Intelligence Committee, has accidentally disclosed
classified information numerous times, including U.S. email sur-
veillance of radical Yemeni cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, to the media.10
Restricting notification of covert action to the Gang of Eight,
rather than including the full congressional committees, is there-
fore necessary in certain cases. With that accepted, the budget-
ary solution would not work.
Moreover, Congressional budgetary authority would be sub-
ject to prohibitive political pressure and maneuvering. It seems
unlikely, especially in such a climate of fear as followed 9/11, that
any member of Congress would be willing to vote against fund-
ing a program that the President insists is necessary for national
security. With the never-ending election cycle, it is in a Con-
gress member’s self-interest to support executive security action
and to avoid taking any position that could be characterized as
defunding the military or being “soft” on terrorism. Any congres-
sional opposition to an executive intelligence program would
almost necessarily be politicized – either scaring members away
from such a stance or opening the process up to public postur-
ing and damaging delays. With approval of executive appoint-
ments now used as bargaining chips for unrelated programs, for
example, there is no guarantee that intelligence funding would
not suffer similar procedural delays. Since the establishment of
official congressional oversight in 1976, hardly a Congress has
graduated without some attempt to reform the rules, all with
little success.
The most recent proposal, of two bills being passed indepen-
dently in the House and the Senate, would constitute progress
Defense & Diplomacy
but not a comprehensive solution. The two bills are House Reso-
lution 2701 and Senate Resolution 1494: Intelligence Authoriza-
tion Acts for Fiscal Year 2010. Both bills eliminate the exception
to legislative notification currently included in the National Secu-
rity Act of 1947 and the House bill even abolishes the restricted
Gang of Eight notifications. They require the executive branch
to inform the intelligence committees of their covert operations
and their legal grounds for doing so,11 all of which are steps in
the right direction. Both resolutions also propose using the Gov-
Economic Development
ernment Accountability Office (GAO) and its director, the Comp-
troller General, as the primary means of intelligence oversight.
GAO audits are a tempting solution for a number of reasons.
First, the Comptroller General is appointed to a fifteen-year
term, which ensures continuity and reliability, and second, the
GAO is designed to conduct audits of ongoing governmental
activities. However, the proposed solution is not strong enough
and President Obama has threatened a veto. Peter Orszag, di-
rector of the Office of Management and Budget said widening
the notification circle would “undermine the president’s author-
ity and responsibility to protect sensitive national security infor-
mation.”12 Given leaks in the past, this concern is a relevant one.
Education
Furthermore, although the GAO is supposed to be above
party politics, it has the potential to be a politicized body; in-
terparty conflicts in Congress have left the agency without a
real director in two years.13 Such conflicts would only grow if the
Comptroller’s position were expanded to include intelligence
oversight. Finally, both bills grant the Director of National Intel-
ligence the right to not provide the intelligence information to
the committees so long as they inform the committees they are
Energy & Environment
doing so.14 Once again, the legislature has given the executive
branch a way of evading oversight, all in the name of national se-
curity. If the intelligence committees are not properly briefed on
covert operations, then the entire oversight mechanism—includ-
ing the GAO audits—are rendered useless. The administration’s
unwillingness to submit to GAO oversight, the politicization of
the agency, and the persistent loophole afforded to the execu-
tive make Congress’ current solution an imperfect one.
Solution
A better solution to the problem of oversight is to give ju-
Equal Justice
risdiction to a national security court, hereafter called the Intel-
ligence Oversight Court (IOC). The IOC would be modeled
after the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), estab-
lished in 1978, also in the wake of the Church hearings. Under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that established
FISC, the executive must obtain a warrant from the court before
proceeding with its covert surveillance activities, such as wire-
tapping.15 Like the FISC, the IOC would be housed in the execu-
tive branch and staffed with federal district judges appointed
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Rather than serv-
Health Care
ing as the executive branch’s first point of contact, however, the
IOC would only adjudicate cases sent to it by Congress. First,
the executive would notify the relevant members of Congress—
either the entire committees or the Gang of Eight, depending
on the circumstances—about the action being taken. If, and only
if, the congresspeople were concerned about the executive’s
plans, they would notify the security court, who would review
37
 the constitutionality of the executive branch’s program. As with
the FISC, the federal executive would be the sole petitioner in
Defense & Diplomacy
this court, presenting its case to the judges. Unlike the FISC, this
court would not be an authorization court, issuing warrants for
the government to carry out covert action. National security con-
cerns make such proceedings prohibitive and senseless. Instead,
the court would establish precedent delineating the extent and
limitation of executive authority in intelligence and counterter-
rorism activities. If the program is ongoing, an IOC ruling against
it would force the executive to end its operations.
This plan addresses the current lack of oversight without rais-
Economic Development
ing the problems posed by a budgetary solution. Most impor-
tantly, it gives Congress a realistic way of voicing their concern
over executive action without compromising sensitive informa-
tion through leaks or threats of disclosure. Judges, unlike con-
gresspeople or even GAO employees, are supposed to be con-
fidential and trustworthy. As a result, using a judicial mechanism
sidesteps the president’s stated security concerns. This proposal
also prevents a partisan and intransigent Congress from block-
ing the executive’s activities or GAO appointments for political
reasons, an issue of exceptional importance when dealing with
time-sensitive, covert activities. Finally, because this court
is not an authorization court, the executive branch may
a competing views in our legislatures, de-
Education
continue its activities until a judge rules against it. This
option balances the concerns of the executive about na- behind most Western try in the world”: why is this? And what
tional security with those of the Congress regarding le- democracies in many
gality and oversight and maintains the balance of power
among the branches of government.
statistical measures
of voter participation. problems, and suggest a solution which
Conclusion
A comprehensive plan for national intelligence over-
Energy & Environment
sight is necessary to prevent the abuse of civil liberties of citi-
zens and non-citizens at home and abroad. The government has
repeatedly used questionable practices to achieve its goals in
fighting terrorism, including torture at Abu Ghraib, waterboard-
ing at Guantanamo, the secret black jail at Bagram, and plans to
assassinate American citizens abroad, none of which were dis-
closed in any meaningful way to the congressional intelligence
committees. Aside from the detrimental effects such policies
have on the United States’ national image, they have made try-
ing ostensible terrorists in court virtually impossible. Unrestrict-
ed and unmonitored executive power is harmful to the country’s
Equal Justice
national security and its legal system, and must be accountable
to another branch of government. The current model is clearly
dysfunctional; it leads to both security breaches and abuses
of power, thus confirming the worst fears of both branches of
government. The climate of distrust and miscommunication ad-
dressed by Panetta is a direct result of the flawed and piecemeal
intelligence oversight system currently in place. After Presi-
dent Nixon abused his surveillance powers, Congress held the
Church hearings to repair American citizens’ faith in their gov-
ernment, and established intelligence oversight committees to
Health Care
prevent future abuses of executive power. The imbalance in po-
litical power under the Bush and Obama administrations proves
that those committees’ resolutions are no longer sufficient, and
that the oversight system requires overhaul on the scale of 1976.
38
Mixed-Member Proportional Representation: Fixing
the “People’s House” 1
William Organek
The United States is the world’s oldest extant constitutional
representative democracy, and the many of the initial democratic
reforms which spread throughout the world in the 19th and early
20th century were based on innovations pioneered in America.
For these and other reasons, pundits on both sides of the po-
litical spectrum often claim that America is the most democratic
country in the world. Yet, the problems which plague America’s
democracy are well-known: abysmally low turnout, incredibly
polarized parties, the replacement of discourse by mudsling-
ing, legislative policy which often does not reflect the will of the
majority, a legislature which is far behind America’s transformed
demographics, and the ever-present cry of voters who feel that
their representatives do not represent them. America falls far
behind most Western democracies in many statistical measures
of voter participation, minority repre-
sentation, and the inclusion of many
merica falls far spite being “the most democratic coun-
can we do to fix it? This essay will dis-
cuss how our flawed electoral system
causes or contributes to many of these
could remedy these issues.
A. Winner-Take-All and its Discontents
The answer lies in our “democracy technology” – the set of
laws, practices, and institutions that dictate how we elect our
representatives.2 In the US, almost all elections follow either a
legislative or an executive paradigm. For the executive (mayoral,
gubernatorial, and even Presidential elections), there is one indi-
visible office, and only one winner is possible.3 However, for leg-
islative elections, in which there are multiple people who each
have the job of being a Senator or Representative, our demo-
cratic technology is so ingrained as to make thinking of alterna-
tives quite difficult: each election pits two (or sometimes more)
competitors against one another for a single seat, and “[c]ome
Election Day, one – and only one – victor will emerge because
one – and only one – seat has been contested.”4 That is, if two
candidates are competing in a given House race, the candidate
who receives the most votes wins – even if the contest is 50.1% to
49.9%. This zero-sum pattern of winner-take-all (WTA) is repeat-
ed in every state and federal legislative election in the country,
thus making alternatives almost unheard-of in the American ex-
perience. And, with such a simple and intuitive system, why think
of alternatives? Unfortunately, the price of this simplicity is quite
steep indeed, for reasons I will discuss presently.
The WTA system, by forcing candidates to square off for a
single seat – for the chance at holding 100% of the representa-
tion from a given district – causes a host of electoral ills which
are not immediately apparent, and their insidiousness makes
fundamental reform all the more necessary. To begin with, the
WTA system leads to a lack of competition in elections: geo-
graphical districts have been routinely drawn to create majori-
ties for either one party or the other5, thus making many elec-
tions essentially a sham. In fact, in 2000, a full 41% of elections for
state legislatures were only contested by one of the two major
parties, making these elections little more than shows; nation-
wide, the statistics are arguably worse, as 90% of incumbents
are routinely re-elected, even while Congress’ approval ratings
are perpetually well below 50%.6 If most of the country does not
like Congress, how do the vast majority of individual members
keep getting elected? At a state-wide level, in 2000 fourteen
states had single-party monopolies in Congress, while another
eleven states were one Representative shy of a monopoly, for
a total of half of the states; today, that figure stands at fifteen
one-party states, with again eleven one shy of a monopoly.7 This
lack of competition is troubling enough, but the truly unfortu-
nate aspect is a direct consequence of the WTA system: for the
residents of a one-party state who do not support that party,
they are not represented when issues fall along ideological lines.
“[T]o obscure the disenfranchising nature of Winner Take All, it
has been necessary to construct a truly odd notion that defies
even second-grader logic: that a legislator represents you just
because he or she sits in the chair – even if he or she is diametri-
cally opposed to your point of view, and even if you in fact voted
for someone else.”8
Such “orphaned voters” have nobody to speak for them, and
cannot be blamed for becoming apathetic in light of this disen-
franchisement – why should a New York Republican or a Wyo-
ming Democrat bother to vote?9And, when they do bother to
vote, the “representational ripoff” – the difference between the
percentage of the vote that a party gets and the percentage
of seats that said party gains in the legislature – is significant.
For example, in Massachusetts in 2000, “35% of voters pulling
R in the presidential race won only 14% of state House seats,
a huge representation ripoff of 21%.”10 The equation of 50% of
the vote with 100% of the representation in a given district cre-
ates one-party swathes of the country, disenfranchising millions
and discouraging them from voting in the future, while denying
representation to those that did bother to vote. At the extremes
of this ripoff, the electoral oddities of WTA can create “manufac-
tured majorities,” which occur “when election procedures give a
party that receives less than 50 percent of the vote more than
50 percent of the seats in the legislature.”11As an example, if, in a
three-way race, if party A won 40% of the vote, party B 35% and
party C 25%, then party A would win 100% of the representation
from that district, even though it won far less than 100% of the
vote.12 This example can play itself out nationwide, to great and
damaging effect: in the 2000 House election, Republicans won
47.96% of the vote (compared to Democrats’ 47.94%), but won
50.8% of the seats – and thus, 100% of the powerful Congres-
sional committee chairs, and unimpeded majority status, in spite
of the fact that the majority of the country did not vote for the
Republicans!13 WTA is responsible for these flaws, and reform-
ing this system would go a long way towards fixing them.14
In addition to leaving a huge proportion of the electorate
unrepresented, and disillusioning another significant part of
the electorate, the WTA system adds insult to injury by claim-
ing that the only important dimension of representation is geo-
graphic location. By creating a WTA system that is based on
arbitrarily-drawn lines,15 it denies voters the ability to determine
the characteristics that they consider to be most important in
Defense & Diplomacy
their representative. For instance, some voters might consider
race or gender to be more important than geographic location.
Yet, these minority voters would, by definition, fall in the minority,
and therefore be unable to secure representation in the WTA
system.16
While not every minority would vote for a candidate of his
or her group simply because the candidate is a member of that
minority, there is a very visceral sense of fairness which would
dictate that minorities be represented in the legislature in pro-
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portion to their presence in the overall population; however,
this is manifestly not the case in the United States. For instance,
in the House only 14% of its members were female, although
slightly more than half of the country is female; similarly, African-
Americans in 2002 made up 12.9% of the population, equating
to 56 seats in the House, while only actually having 37 seats, and
Hispanics fared even more poorly, with only 4.4% of the House
in 2002 compared to their sizable 12.5% of the population, and
other minorities fare even worse.17 Today, those statistics are only
marginally better: women make up 17% of Congress; while Afri-
can-Americans, at approximately 13% of the country, comprise
9.5% of the House, and hold only one (appointed, not elected)
Education
seat in the Senate; and Hispanics, the fastest-growing large im-
migrant group, comprising almost 14% of the population, hold a
paltry 3 seats in the Senate and 5% of the House.18 These minori-
ties – some with very specific, narrowly-focused problems and
policy ideas – cannot hope to gain the acceptance of the major-
ity by definition; therefore, in our WTA system, they are denied
representation entirely. How can a majority white and male leg-
islature – in “the People’s House,” no less – claim to speak for our
Energy & Environment
diverse, multiracial society, or solve the issues that are particular
to one of these minorities?19 As we will see below, a proportional
representation-based system would ensure that minorities and
women would be represented in the legislature in proportion to
their presence in the population.
But, supporters of the WTA system might retort, people with
views outside of the mainstream, or still have opportunities for
representation, through the election of third-party candidates.
In fact, by some measures third-parties are as strong as they
have ever been in the US: fully one-third of the electorate does
not identify with either party, and movements like the Tea Party
Equal Justice
would be an example of working within the system to have other
views represented. Surely, they will be able to have their views
represented, right? Unfortunately, for all of the energy and en-
thusiasm of the Tea Party, political scientists have understood for
decades that this will likely not translate into large electoral wins
for Tea Partiers. The reason for this – known in the academic lit-
erature as Duverger’s Law – and the associated issues of wasted
votes, spoiler candidates, and the interminable quest for ‘swing
voters’ make it all but impossible for the Tea Party to make elec-
toral gains, in spite of their large and growing support base. Ac-
Health Care
cording to Duverger’s Law, two-party systems “are the product
of single-member plurality systems,” because the requirement to
win such a large portion of the vote (50% + 1 vote) provides huge
disincentives for an interest group (such as environmentalists)
that is likely only to gain a small part of the vote to remain its own
party.20 Instead, it would be best for them to become part of a
larger party (such as the Democrats), and this process continues
39
 until only two parties remain.21 Our WTA system necessitates that their views are not represented by legislators in either party,
two-parties, limits representation and choice, and thus discour- and this is not simply the talk of extremists, but that of many
Defense & Diplomacy

ages voting – any other behavior by smaller parties, larger par-
ties, or voters would not make sense.
In addition to the more insidious problems of underrepresen-
tation, disenfranchisement, and a lack of women/minority rep-
resentation, this two-party system leads to a host of familiar ills discussed above, significantly impact the impetus that a voter
such as wasted votes, spoiler candidates, and lesser-of-two-evils
choices, each of which are both perilous for the health of our
democracy and easily remedied. As a result of Duverger’s Law,
the two-party system is an inherent part of WTA, imprinted into
Economic Development
voters with what would internationally be considered quite main-
stream views, but who have no corresponding representation in
Congress. This unfortunate consequence of the two-party sys-
tem, combined with the distortionary effects of the WTA system
has to vote. Why would someone vote if they cannot vote for the
candidate that they want most to win, for fear of electing their
least-favored candidate? Why vote if neither of the candidates
from the two major parties expresses views that accord with

the very DNA of our “democracy technology.” As a result, when
presented with more than two choices on the ballot – all but
two of which will come from a third party – a voter who might
not agree with the positions of either major party is presented
with a common choice: do they vote with their hearts, selecting
the candidate that they know will not win; or, do they vote with
their heads, and select a candidate other than their preferred
candidate?22
The negative ramifications of this dilemma manifest them-
selves in numerous ways: if they vote for their preferred candi-
date, their vote is wasted because it cannot possibly help that
candidate over the 50% + 1 hump. Worse still, such a decision
Education
my own? Why should a Democrat vote in a heavily-Republican
area, or vice-versa? Why, even, should Democrats or Republi-
cans bother to contest these elections? For this question, there
is a simple answer: they do not contest many elections, and in
2008, 12% of House races went uncontested.24 The reasons for
voter apathy and low voter turnout in the US are manifold and
extensively studied, and there is likely no “silver bullet” solution.
But, reforming the WTA system would go a long way towards
fixing it.
The WTA system, it would seem, exacts more than a pound
of flesh for its supposed simplicity. To begin with, a lack of com-
petition within elections subdues turnout and turns elections

could actually help a candidate they prefer least to get elected:
voters who voted for Ralph Nader in 2000, it is fair to assume,
certainly preferred Al Gore to George Bush, but in fact their
vote helped Bush get elected. Similarly, voters in the 2009 spe-
cial election in New York’s 23rd Congressional district (many of
whom were Tea Party supporters), in splitting their vote between
Scozzafava and the more conservative, Tea Party-supported
Hoffman, helped to elect Owens, a Democrat who would have
Energy & Environment
into somewhat of a formality for much of the country. Next, WTA
creates “orphaned voters” – voters without a representative to
speak for them – with the ironic result that, the closer an election
gets, the more people go unrepresented, and the larger num-
ber of votes that simply do not count. Vote dilution is another
problem, often leading to a significant “representational ripoff,”
as the percentage of voters who vote for a specific party is often
much higher than the percentage of seats that said party eventu-

been their last choice of the three. In both of these situations,
the third-party candidate turned out to be a “spoiler”, enabling
the election of the candidate that was not only the least ideo-
logically-preferred by the electorate, but also one that was the
least-preferred candidate for those that, in the end, ensured
their election.23
ally gets in the legislature. On the other side of the ripoff, some-
times parties which win less than 50% of the vote can gain more
than 50% of the seats, leading to a seemingly unfair situation in
which a party which did not win a majority holds majority status,
along with all of the associated legislative perquisites. The WTA
system also fails to represent minorities and

T
Alternatively, a voter might see this inevi- women effectively, and thus implicitly claims
tability, and thus choose a candidate that is that women’s and minority issues could be
he two-party mo-
less preferred by them in order to have their solved more effectively by an overwhelmingly
vote count; however, such a predicament is nopoly, combined with white and male legislature. Finally, because of
unfair to the voter, and this lesser-of-two-evils the distortionary effects the inescapable logic of Duverger’s Law, the
Equal Justice

choice is completely unnecessary. Yet, even of WTA, leads to lower two-party system is completely entrenched in
ignoring the worst-case spoiler scenarios, it voter turnout and voter our “democracy technology,” and thus prob-
is obvious that anyone who voted for a losing lems such as spoiler candidates, wasted votes,
apathy.
candidate wasted their vote, for the reasons and lesser-of-two-evils choices are inevitable.
explained above. Everyone who voted for WTA’s discontents, it would seem, are extreme-
the Democrat in a race where a Republican won, or vice-versa, ly significant. What can be done to address them?25
gains nothing from their vote, even if the race was decided by
only one vote. Clearly, such an outcome is unfair to the whole B. Proportional Representation – the Simple Answer
electorate, and in particular to those who voted for the third- As bleak as the picture may seem, all is not lost. There ex-
party or losing candidate; just as clearly, however, this does not ists an established method which has been tested by dozens of
Health Care

need to be the case. countries over the past sixty years, with almost perfect success:
Finally, it is important to see how the two-party monopoly, proportional representation (PR). PR is a system based on a dif-
combined with the distortionary effects of WTA, leads to lower ferent theory of representation from WTA, and as a result both
voter turnout and voter apathy. The two parties in our system uses different procedures and ensures different outcomes from
occupy a relatively small part of the political spectrum – in other the ones common to the WTA system. In this way, PR manages
countries, areas of the political spectrum which are covered by to produce governments which more fairly represent, reflect,
smaller parties are not represented in the US. Voters often feel and govern the people which they serve.
40
 The philosophy supporting the WTA system is one where
representation takes a backseat to the logic of needing to
win just over 50% of the vote, and therefore can be summed
up quite succinctly: “If you have representation, then I don’t.”26
Representation, according to this philosophy, is not something
that everyone deserves; rather, it is a prize to be won, at the
expense of those unfortunate others who share your (arbitrary)
district. More than the unfortunate mathematical effects of two
choices – as discussed above – and even more than the policy
ramifications of binary politics27, the WTA system explicitly de-
nies that representation in a democratic government is a fun-
damental right. Once the gravity of such a statement is fully
comprehended, it is not difficult to see how anti-democratic it is:
whether we subscribe to the most cutting-edge views on politi-
cal pluralism, or the intellectual ideas of the post-war democratic
consensus, or even the ideas of the Framers to discuss repre-
sentation, all agree that the representative assembly “should be
in miniature an exact portrait of the people at large,” and there-
fore all should be represented by it – not just those who won.28
This idea speaks to the fundamental belief that minority rights
should be protected from a “tyrannical majority,” a belief that
we are taught the American government was founded on. As
important is the different answers that WTA and PR provide to
the following question: “who will do the governing and to whose
interests should the government be responsive when people are
in disagreement?”29 The WTA system posits “the majority” as the
answer; the PR system, more satisfactorily, suggests that the an-
swer is “as many people as possible.”30 By what mechanism does
PR include as many people as possible?
PR, as its name suggests, allocates seats in a legislature ac-
cording to the percentage of the vote that a given party won.
In order to do this, it is necessary to depart from our current
system in which each district is represented by a single legislator
(known in the literature as the single-member district approach),
and embrace a system where multiple members can be elected
in a district (a multi-member district). Then, in an election, seats in
the legislature are meted out according to the proportion of the
vote that a given party won, rather than only to the winners. To
prevent electoral instability and the presence of too many small
parties (a common attack on PR systems), an electoral threshold
is set, mandating that a party attain at least a certain percentage
of the vote in order to gain seats in the legislature.31 Once these
simple changes are made, the effects on representation can be
startling.
As an example, imagine a state with ten Representatives, and
imagine that statewide Republicans comprise 60% of the elec-
torate, while Democrats comprise 30%, and a third party cap-
tures the final 10%, and that these voters are distributed evenly
within the state. The different outcomes that the WTA system
and a PR system would precipitate, given the same exact elec-
torate, can be seen in Figure 2.32 In the WTA system, in each
district the vote split would be 60% R, 30% D, and 10% I, leading
to a Republican victory in each election, and thus giving Repub-
licans victories in all ten seats, as well as control of the entire
legislature. This unfairly boosts Republican representation to
the detriment of almost half of the electorate, and places no dis-
senting voices in the legislature. Democrats and Independents
would have to watch idly as “their” representatives did exactly
the opposite of what they would want.
Now, compare these results with those from the PR elections.
Because PR allocates seats in the legislature based on percent-
Defense & Diplomacy
age of the vote, rather than on simply winning, and because the
district has more than one member, the legislative seats can be
distributed more fairly. PR systems anticipate that each party
will be able to win at least one, if not multiple seats, and thus
nominate many candidates to run for seats in a given district.
Usually, candidates for an election are placed on an ordered list
on the ballot, called a closed party list: if a party wins five seats
in a district, the first five candidates from this party list go to the
legislature. Other countries use a system called an open party
Economic Development
list, where the party nominates candidates but allows the vot-
ers to choose the order in which they are selected to go to the
legislature. The open party list system is similar to the US primary
system, in that it allows voters to choose which candidates are
selected by each party; however, it does this with a system that
is far less distortionary than the primary system, for reasons dis-
cussed below.
In this election, even though the Republicans again took 60%
of the vote, they are given 6 seats in the legislature – not too
many, but just the right amount. The Democrats, too, are treated
more fairly: rather than being excluded entirely, they are given
3 seats in the legislature. And, in an event almost without prec-
Education
edent in the US, the Independent is also given a seat. The party
only attracted 10% of the vote – but, that does not matter. Rather
than being shut out entirely from political representation, they
are accorded representation in proportion to their electoral
strength.33 Like a Goldilocks of Elections, each party has not too
many seats nor too few, but the amount that is “just right,” and
nobody is shut out of the system.
This simple example shows the differing philosophies of WTA
Energy & Environment
and PR in action. Rather than giving Republicans too much rep-
resentation, to the detriment of 40% of the electorate, PR gives
voters exactly what they ask for. “In a stroke, [PR allows] views
and voices that are usually suppressed to receive representa-
tion, broadening the effective political spectrum” and thus in-
creasing the likelihood that many more citizens will vote.34 It also
prevents the insidious effects of the WTA system: voters would
not need to worry about spoiler candidate, their votes would
almost never be wasted, and since a smaller proportion of the
electorate would be necessary to elect a candidate, minority and
women candidates would be much more electable. In short, PR
Equal Justice
would facilitate the goal of achieving fair and accurate represen-
tation for everyone.
But, PR is not perfect. For PR to work properly, multi-member
districts are critical – without them, it would be impossible to
distribute representation equitably to all parts of the electorate.
And, for reasons that are too mathematically complicated for this
paper,35 the more members elected from a given district, the
more accurately voters’ preferences can be translated into the
composition of the legislature. Political scientists agree that a
multi-member district, to be effective, should elect at least five
Health Care
representatives; but, in the US, where each single-member dis-
trict currently contains over 650,000 people – oftentimes with
very distinct local needs – creating districts with over 3.25 million
people could reasonably be suspected to dilute representation
in an important fashion. It is important to realize that a multi-
member district with five representatives and 3.25 million people
would still have the same ratio of legislators to constituents as
41
 a single-member district with 650,000 people – this is not the
sense in which local representation would be diluted. Instead,
Defense & Diplomacy
it is America’s unique system of local governance – in the sense
that a voter has one distinct representative whom he or she can
contact with grievances – which could be placed at jeopardy if a
pure PR system were implemented. For each district to have 3.25
million people, entire cities, regions, and at times whole states
would need to be combined into a single district. People who
currently believe that they have a close tie to “their legislator”
would be hurt by this proposal. While this may be the best solu-
tion to WTA’s obvious ills, such a dissolution of local governance
Economic Development
may be too much to ask for. In a country with over 10,000 school
districts, thousands of elected officials at all levels of govern-
ment, and fiercely independent hamlets, towns, villages, and cit-
ies, subordinating the local to the national, or even state level
– even if it is to fix such grievous electoral ills as our WTA system
causes – may simply be asking for too much. It goes against 200
years of traditionally local governance, and for this reason it may
simply be politically untenable. Fortunately, a pure PR system –
one which completely eliminates single-member districts, local
representation, and a reasonable claim on the part of the voter
to “my representative” – is not the only way to address these ills.
A better kind of system exists, one which combines the best of
Education
both worlds.
C. Mixed-Member Proportional Representation: The Com-
plete Solution
If single-member districts and WTA causes huge, unaccept-
able problems, while pure PR goes against too much tradition
and custom, then a solution which operates on both principles
would seem to be ideal. Fortunately, such a system exists: mixed-
Energy & Environment
member proportional representation, also known as MMP. In
this ingenious system, the legislature is elected by two parallel
systems, with one part coming from traditional single-member
districts, and being elected in the familiar WTA fashion; mean-
while, the other part of the legislature is elected from larger,
multi-member districts, utilizing the fairer PR system. This system
allows each voter to claim a single representative as his or her
own, since they directly represent his or her district; at the same
time, this voter can be sure that his or her views are accounted
for at a national level, by the party which adheres most closely to
his or her personal views. Such a system allows a voter to make
Equal Justice
an educated decision about what is best both for the country
and for his or her individual district, without needing to sacrifice
one for the other, or place the provincial above the national, or
vice-versa.
To explain the mechanics of MMP, Figure 336 contains a
sample MMP ballot. Each voter has two votes: one which goes
towards the voter’s representative from that district, and one
which goes towards the national parties. For the district elec-
tion, the candidate with the most votes wins, and each district
is represented by only one representative – this part, in other
Health Care
words, is exactly the same as our current system, with all of its
flaws.37 But, as discussed above, the flaws of such a system are
accepted in light of the perceived positives of this method of
election: “providing the geographical representation and close
constituency ties of single-member plurality voting.”38 In order
to overcome these deficiencies, however, a second part of the
ballot exists, where the voter votes for a party, and the seats
42
for this part are allocated proportionally. One crucial feature is
that the candidates on these two sides are different: it would be
entirely possible to elect a Republican from one’s district, and
yet cast one’s party-side ballot for the Democrats. This gives the
voter a significant amount of flexibility: if he or she believes that
environmental policy is important nationally, but believes that a
specific party, or even a specific candidate, would be best for his
or her personal district, he or she can split his ticket effectively,
potentially securing the election of both candidates. In the sam-
ple ballot in Figure 3, if a voter prefers Lintz as a candidate, but
believes that the New Party will be best nationally, he or she can
vote in that manner; or, if he or she thinks that the Independent
will be best equipped to “bring home the bacon” to his or her
district, but prefers the fiscal austerity of the Libertarians nation-
ally, that is a viable option as well – the possibilities for choosing
the most important factors in electing a candidate, whether it
be political ideology, personality, race, gender, capability, or any
other quality, allows the voter to make the best decision pos-
sible. With this system, no longer will a voter need to decide
between a good candidate with bad policies or a bad candidate
with good policies – now, the voter can have both.
One additional characteristic of MMP merits mention: the
party-list votes (on the right side of the ballot) “determine the to-
tal portion of the 100-seat legislature that each party deserves.”
39 For instance, if the Democrats won 40% of the vote on the
right side of the ballot, then they would be entitled to 40% of the
total legislature. If, for example, in a 100-seat legislature, 28 Dem-
ocrats had already been directly elected from the left side of the
ballot from 28 districts around the country, then the Democrats
would be entitled to an additional 12 seats in the legislature, and
these candidates would come from the party side of the bal-
lot.40 This not only ensures, as already discussed, that each party
gets seats in the legislature proportionate to its vote share, but
it also allows the voter to vote for both local and national issues
simultaneously, expressing different preferences for each if the
voter so chooses. And, while MMP retains some of the structure
– and hence some of the flaws – of the WTA system, it rectifies
those in part through the additional use of a PR system, while
still retaining the few good parts of the WTA system. MMP is
a compromise between the merits of these two systems which
combines the best of both systems, while fixing, in part, the flaws
of both systems.
D. Implementing MMP – Barriers and Solutions
As we have seen, MMP is a system which could transform
American elections: they could quickly become more repre-
sentative, more equitable, and more open; they could almost
instantaneously shed some of the worst problems of the WTA
system, including wasted votes, misrepresentation, and a lack of
electoral competition; and all of this could be done with both
“the relative diversity promoted by PR and the relative stability
offered by SMP.”41 How would MMP be implemented in the US?
What would have to change, and what could not change?
The easiest way for MMP to be implemented in the US would
be for the House of Representatives exclusively to adopt it. The
Senate could not easily be part of this process, since the Consti-
tution clearly mandates that “[t]he Senate of the United States
shall be composed of two Senators from each State” – multi-mem-
ber districts and would be impossible without a Constitutional
amendment, and because of the constraints that Article 5 places reforms – and so they do not. Fortunately, the initiative process
on the amendment of this clause, it would require the agreement in many states can counteract the self-interested nature of politi-

Defense & Diplomacy

of every state to alter the equal-representation formula of the
Senate, something which would be almost impossible.42 Schol-
ars agree, on the other hand, that “there is no constitutional re-
quirement or demand of democratic theory that requires” single-
member districts in the House.43 There is, however, “one federal
law passed in 1967 – ironically enough to support the […] Voting
Rights Act’s efforts to elect more racial minorities – that man-
dates single-seat districts in US House elections.”44 For MMP
to be implemented, this law would need to be repealed, so that
cians, and allowing the electorate to vote on these beneficial re-
forms could allow these reforms to pass at the state level – with
the hope that enough public pressure would mount nationwide
to force politicians to vote for these reforms at the federal level.
But, why will voters approve such measures when they already
can hardly be bothered with going to the ballot box, and espe-
cially in the face of what would surely be a virulently negative
campaign against the MMP reforms? Overcoming voter apathy,
misinformation, and general lack of knowledge will be the most

Economic Development
states could begin to pass laws and constitutional amendments difficult part of implementing these reforms, but current events
allowing for the use of multi-member districts. can allow one to be hopeful for the future of these reforms. The
Next, multi-member districts would need to be created. This, Tea Party has shown that the American electorate, even in the
of course, poses a problem for the twelve states which only have face of daunting challenges and startling inequities, can still mo-
one or two Representatives, as it would be bilize for a cause. The most likely place for
impossible to create multi-member districts in pressure to build for reform “would be within
these states45; however, the reason that these
states have so few Representatives – and the
reason that the House of Representatives has
S disaffected or underrepresented factions of
ystemic reform hits at the existing parties,” as it is these factions
the core of every politi- which would gain most from these reforms.47
the second-worst ratio of citizens-to-legislators cian’s prime motivation: The Tea Party on the right and Progressives
in the world – is because of Public Law 62-5 self-preservation on the left, seeing their efforts to gain rep-
(1913), which mandated that the House of Rep- resentation thwarted time and again, would

resentatives be frozen at 435 members, regard-
less of population increases.46 If this law were
repealed, and replaced by a measure which provided states with
more representatives, then this problem, too, could be avoided.
With these two laws repealed, the vast majority of states could
experiment with multi-member districts, laying the foundation
for MMP.
Yet, while many Americans have not heard of the MMP sys-
Education
be prime targets for teaching the virtues of
PR systems generally, and MMP in particular.
Hopefully, these groups would teach their constituents and mo-
bilize them, prompting reform across the country.
A final and pernicious obstacle to the implementation of
MMP in the US is institutional inertia. Unbeknownst to most peo-
ple, the US actually has a long history of PR voting, and “[d]uring
the first half of the twentieth century, two dozen American cities

Energy & Environment

tem, Germany has been using it since 1949, and PR systems have used for a time” a form of proportional representation.48 Cities
been widespread around the world for decades. Additionally, across the country, from West Hartford, CT to Boulder, CO, and
while there are hurdles to the implementation of MMP, its pas- back to the largest, New York, utilized this form of PR to great ef-
sage is far from impossible, and in fact would only require a ma- fect. As an example, “in the last pre-PR election in New York City,
jority of Representatives (and sixty Senators) to vote for it. Why, the Democrats won 95.3 percent of the seats on the Board of
then, have US policymakers, politicians, or citizens not picked Alderman with only 66.5 percent of the vote,” but only five years
up on the flaws of WTA and urged implementation of an MMP after this PR system was implemented, it “gave the Democrats
system? Three main reasons explain this: elected officials’ self-in- 65.5 percent of the seats on 64 percent of the vote,” while being
terest, apathy and misinformation, and institutional inertia. Each beneficial for Republicans and three smaller parties.49 Minority
of these, fortunately, has a reasonable solution, and thus none candidates of all stripes were elected, wasted votes were signifi-
pose an insurmountable problem to the adoption of MMP. cantly reduced, and additional parties found it easier to gain rep-

First, it must be understood that while electoral reform is
often discussed, radical reforms which would fundamentally al-
ter our system are rarely discussed by those in power. This is
because such systematic reform hits at the core of every politi-
cian’s prime motivation: self-preservation. While allowing more
competition would be good for voters, it would be bad for poli-
ticians who up until this point have had an easy time of being
re-elected. Currently, politicians are used to the typical two-step of PR “often played upon two of the most basic fears of white,
of running towards the party base during the primary, and then
back to the center during the main election. A politician’s en-
Equal Justice
resentation, although the record on increased voter turnout was
mixed. Yet, these systems were eventually almost all repealed,
coming under attack “from the politicians and parties who lost
power and privileges.”50 Additionally, PR was at times so suc-
cessful that it scared the public – unprepared to have minorities
and politicians with “non-mainstream” ideas, many people voted
against these changes because they were too successful. Critics
middle-class Americans: communists and African-Americans” –
and were fantastically successful in this endeavor.51 Institutional
Health Care

tire career is defined by this campaign logic, including raising
money to prevent primary challengers, mastering the negative
campaign tactics and vague election promises typical of WTA
elections. Multi-member elections and viable challenges from
third parties would throw a wrench into the whole system, mak-
ing a politician’s re-election that much more questionable. A cur-
rently-elected politician would need to be crazy to vote for such
inertia – the fear that something is too successful, too quickly
– combined with the effective repeal campaigns of those freshly
out of power – were the undoing of PR in the US, with the end
result that only one city in the entire country still uses PR – Cam-
bridge, MA. Institutional inertia of this sort will be difficult for
pro-PR and pro-MMP reformers to combat, but national norms
today are hopefully different and tolerant enough from those of

43
 the 1940s that MMP would not be repealed simply because it
was effective.
Defense & Diplomacy
Implementing MMP would not be easy: voters would need to
be informed and persuaded; politicians would have to go against
their most basic instincts; and as the history of PR in the US has
shown, simply winning would not be enough – reformers would
need to keep fighting for years after the initial reforms passed.
However, in our broken electoral system, where many go unrep-
resented, where most views go without a voice in the halls of
power, and where polarization and the gladiatorial aspects of
WTA threaten to tear the country apart, such reforms could help
Economic Development
reunite the country, bringing its policies closer to the will of the
people and once again making the House of Representatives
worthy of the title of “the People’s House.”
Congress and War Powers
Sarah Scheinman
Background Information
Congress has delegated significant war-making authority
to the President since September 11th. Eleven months into his
Education
first term, President Barack Obama has thus far sustained the
expansions of executive war powers made by President George
W. Bush. While Congress has utilized other tools in its arsenal
to hold the president accountable to the legislature, Congress
remains disinclined to use its formal war powers. Through an
evaluation of the relationship between the executive and the
legislature since the beginning of President George W. Bush’s
tenure in the White House to President Barack Obama’s today,
Energy & Environment
I will argue Congress has willingly relinquished its authority to
declare war throughout the Global War on Terror as a result of
both the partisan alignment of Congress and the legislature’s
attempt to avoid blame for unpopular wars. Furthermore, I will
argue that President Obama is willing to continue the precedent
of executive authority established under his predecessor when
dealing with Afghanistan.
The Problem
Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives
Equal Justice
Congress the power to declare war.1 Since 1789, that power has
been invoked on five occasions, most recently in World War II.2
James Madison wrote in his Letters to Helividius, “In no part of
the constitution is more wisdom to be found than in the clause
which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature,
and not to the executive government.”3 Alexander Hamilton
echoed Madison’s sentiments in the Federalist Papers; he said
the title of Commander-in-Chief was merely a nominal gesture,
not a prescription for presidential war-making authority.4 Con-
gressional authority in military matters has fluctuated over the
Health Care
past century. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was the first
to increase executive war making authority as he sought to es-
calate the powers of the presidency during World War II. In re-
sponse to such claims of executive power Congress reclaimed
its authority during President Richard Nixon’s tenure by passing
the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which “reassert[ed] congressio-
nal prerogatives over foreign policy making.”5 Yet, there is little
44
evidence to suggest that in the thirty-six years since the War
Powers Resolution was enacted, Congress has actually restrict-
ed the authority of the president. Given the trend of presidents
claiming war powers has continued unabated, and it has been
particularly evident in the past decade.
Politicians in both Congress and the White House are ratio-
nal actors and “single-minded seekers of re-election,” according
to David Mayhew.6 Congress is not a black box, and there are
certain norms members of Congress adhere to. For instance, it is
in Congress’ best interest to assert less authority in military mat-
ters because there are few upsides for success yet significant
potential for blame if a war becomes unpopular. While it seems
counterintuitive that Congress would want to diminish its power,
by allowing the president to assume authority in military actions,
Congress may maintain distance from an unpopular president
or an unpopular war. Even for popular presidents, members of
Congress can support the president through appropriations and
leniency with oversight without having to formally declare their
support of the Commander-in-Chief’s agenda. Furthermore, if a
constituency is moderately anti-war, it is not in a member’s best
interest to wade deeply into military decision-making because
doing so could hurt his/her re-election prospects by alienating
single-issue constituencies.
Just as representatives are single-minded seekers of re-elec-
tion, first term presidents are mindful of electoral strategy when
determining foreign policy. The continuation of executive lead-
ership in times of war has been a convincing argument for re-
election and could factor into presidential assertions of military
action without congressional approval.
From January of 2001 until January of 2007, President George
W. Bush governed alongside a Republican majority in Congress.
Because the executive and legislative branches were controlled
by the same party, under a system of ‘unified government,’ Con-
gress was likely to defer to the president on military matters es-
pecially because congressional support increases the ability of
the president to govern both at home as well as internationally.
In fact, presidents exercise 45% more major military force and
are more willing to incur the risks associated with military ac-
tion when they enjoy strong partisan support within Congress.7
Congressional support for popular presidents from their party is
significantly important when explaining why Congress deferred
to President Bush on military matters during his first six years of
in office.
When a president has vast popularity in a system of unified
government, as President Bush did post-September 11th, Con-
gress becomes significantly more likely to legislate according to
the desires of the Commander-in Chief. Given President Bush’s
86% approval rating, he was able to easily push the Authoriza-
tion for Use of Military Force through Congress just seven days
after September 11th.8 This legislation stated, “that the president
is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against
[terrorists]” and thereby surrendered some congressional au-
thority. This authorization was approved in a 98-0 vote in the
Senate and a 420-1 in the House of Representatives.9
In the months and years that followed, President Bush con-
tinued to increase the powers of his office. The PATRIOT Act
was proposed in October of 2001 to expand the abilities of law
enforcement to investigate threats after an attack on the United
States. The legislation passed by a vote of 98-1 in the Senate in
and 357-66 in the House.10 As Bush’s popularity waned to 68%,
the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolu-
tion of 2002 passed by smaller margins: 77-23 in the Senate and
296-122 in the House.11 The legislation provided the president
with the authority to use the “armed forces of US as he deter-
mines to be necessary and appropriate… against the continuing
threat posed by Iraq.”12 As Republicans united behind President
Bush and the War in Iraq, Democrats remained divided, creating
a political environment favorable to the president’s agenda to
expand the war-making authority of the president.
While President Bush sought to expand his power, Congress
was doing little to thwart a potential breach of the separation of
powers out of fear of undermining a popular president in a time
of war. Even if Democrats wanted to increase oversight, “During
Republican rule, critical hearings on Iraq were rare, [there were]
50 hearings from March 2003 to March 2006 and almost 10%
were informally held by Democrats.” Furthermore, the “Republi-
can committee chairs successfully blocked further investigations
into potentially embarrassing questions about the administra-
tions conduct of the war and military strategy.”13 The Bush Ad-
ministration welcomed the absence of congressional oversight,
but according to the president’s lawyer, John Yoo, Congress is
powerless to prevent the president from doing whatever he be-
lieves to be necessary to win a war.14 And as it turns out Con-
gress is also powerless to prevent the president from starting
a war. President Bush received unequivocal support from Con-
gress during a period of unified Republican rule.
However, as President Bush’s popularity decreased to 50%,
the 2006 elections, in which Democrats reclaimed a majority in
Congress, dealt a blow to the administration’s goal of further ex-
panding presidential powers.15 The legislature sought to reclaim
its authority in military matters. Because different parties led the
executive and legislative branches, the relationship between the
legislature-executive was best described as a system of ‘Presi-
dent Party Power.’ “When the President’s party is relatively small
and divided, the opposition party is larger and more unified, the
president’s freedom to use force abroad should decline,” Howell
explained.16 From the moment Democrats claimed majority of
the legislature, oversight of the president and the war began
and grew. “In their first fifteen months in power, Congress man-
aged to hold more than 65 investigative hearings on the war.”17
For the first time since President Bush was sworn in to office
a congressional majority stood in opposition to the executive,
and they were well-equipped to offer a rebuke to the president’s
policies.
The first major challenge to executive authority occurred in
the spring of 2007, when the Democratic majority amended a
supplemental war-funding bill. Democrats sought to mandate
a phased redeployment of American troops from Iraq within
six months and set a goal for withdrawal by March 2008. Con-
gress did not employ its war-making authority to bring an end
to the war in Iraq; rather, the legislature exercised its power of
the purse. Senate Democrats, short of the 60 votes needed to
break a filibuster, were forced to cave into the President’s stipu-
lations that the bill must not include a timetable for withdrawal,
an indication of how difficult it can be for the majority party in
Congress to override the president. Despite the best intentions
of the Framers, congressional institutions “make it all but impos-
sible for Congress to pass legislation compelling a recalcitrant
president to redirect a war effort.”18 In the end, Congress voted
Defense & Diplomacy
for the appropriations bill without the timetable and accepted
the president’s surge in Iraq. However, this signaled a shift in the
war dynamic. For the first time in President Bush’s tenure, the
legislature did not accept his military policy out of hand.
President Barack Obama took office on January 20th, 2009
under a system of ‘Unified Government,’ with Democrats con-
trolling both the White House and Congress. The first indica-
tion of Obama’s military policy came into public discourse over
decisions regarding troop deployment in Afghanistan, an exten-
Economic Development
sion of the Global War on Terror that began in September 2001
under President Bush’s leadership. In a speech at West Point on
December 1st, 2009, President Obama announced his decision
to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan in order to fight Al-
Qaida and the Taliban proving his compliance with Bush’s poli-
cies and his disregard for Congressional input.19
President Obama’s decision regarding Afghanistan is an ex-
ample of a president unilaterally setting the military agenda and
the legislature responding to the policy set forth. In prepara-
tion of his decision, President Obama spoke extensively with his
generals and bureaucrats, but left Congress out of his delibera-
tions.20 Obama’s exclusion of Congress implied he was confident
Education
the plan would receive congressional consent, perhaps because
as “single-minded seekers of re-election” getting involved in an
unpopular war would not have served the legislature’s agenda.
Furthermore, Congress acknowledges that presidents and gen-
erals have significantly more information at their disposal on
military matters, enabling them to make better-informed deci-
sions.21 Given the current partisan alignment in Congress and
the legislature’s avoidance of the issue of Afghanistan, it is thus
Energy & Environment
understandable that Congress would be willing to relinquish mil-
itary authority to the president. Key Congressional Democrats
publicly objected to Obama’s plan for troop build-up and though
influential Congressional Republicans have responded favorably
to the troop build-up, they have voiced concern for the July 2011
timetable for withdrawal Obama has proposed, however none
were willing to publicly battle the president.22 Popularity for the
war in Afghanistan stands at a 57% in favor, a number that spiked
9% after President Obama announced his deployment propos-
al.23 Congress continues to indulge Obama’s plans out of fear of
getting in too deep.24 While Congress is on a path to approve
Equal Justice
President Obama’s escalation, despite being shut out of the de-
cision-making process, some observers have used his decision to
draw parallels with previous unpopular wars like Vietnam. CNN
Contributor, Julian Zelizer writes, “Both [Presidents Obama and
Johnson] entered the war despite the fact that many top ad-
visers in Congress strongly warned against escalation.”25 While
President Obama’s decision to increase the number of forces in
Afghanistan is not universally popular, withdrawing troops could
hurt President Obama when he seeks re-election.
Congressional acquiescence during President Bush’s tenure
Health Care
and in the beginning of President Obama’s can be explained
if it is assumed that Congress wants to maintain its popularity,
both in the media and constituents. Publicly battling a popu-
lar president in the media on military decisions could deliver
a blow to any individual member’s chances at re-election be-
cause the media can influence public support and the positions
of constituents. During the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq, the
45
 Bush Administration waged a media campaign to convince the The Solution
public that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Much emphasis on congressional authority in military mat-
Defense & Diplomacy

first story in the press regarding WMD in Iraq surfaced on Sep- ters has been based in the War Powers Clause, but Congress
tember 13, 2002, and it included no opinion to counter to the has other means to demand oversight and accountability of the
administration’s claim. In the absence of congressional opposi- President’s military decisions. Appropriations have been a tool
tion in the press, the American public for Congressional input especially dur-

R
easily bought the Bush Administration’s ing years of divided government. In-
assertions. Furthermore, 49.6% of lo- formally known as the power of purse,
cal stories on Iraq featured members
epresentatives engage in a poten- Congress maintains its authority, “To
of the Bush Administration, whereas tially dangerous cycle: Congress raise and support armies,” “To provide
members of Congress appeared in 21% looks to media and public opinion and maintain a navy;” and “To provide
Economic Development

of the local stories, despite their long- for guidance on how to behave re- for organizing, arming, and disciplin-
33 While congressio-
founded relationships with constitu- garding military action, but neither ing, the militia.”
ents and local news outlets.26 Inequity nal institutions can make it difficult for
in media appearances created a sense
the media nor the public are Congress to end wars, the legislature
of congressional complacency among well-informed on matters involving could theoretically stop funding them.
the American public during the delib- the use of force. For example, “as of spring 2008, Dem-
erations on the war in Iraq. ocrats had approved less than 10% of
When evaluating the behavior of the administration’s requested $189 bil-
Congress in military pronouncements, it is important to under- lion in that year’s supplemental appropriation for Iraq,” an act of
stand what congressional influence amounts to in the public dis- defiance directed at an unpopular president.34 Congressional
course. Since the president sets the foreign policy agenda in the investigative powers are another means of legislative oversight
media, Congress must decide if the president’s case will receive derived from the McGrain v. Daugherty decision in the U.S. Su-
Education

‘a free pass’ or if the legislature will investigate the president’s
claims. A study by Matthew Baum and Timothy Groeling demon-
strated how “support for the president in the wake of a military
deployment coincided with the tenor of congressional rhetoric
reported in the mass media.”27 Researchers further tested the
influence of Congress on public opinion. In one study, respon-
dents were offered three situations in the fictional country of
Energy & Environment
preme Court.35 Mayhew argued congressional investigations or
“Publicity probes,” draw in the media and public opinion, provid-
ing Congress with an opportunity to hold the president account-
able.36 Military appropriations and congressional investigations
have become key instruments wielded by the United States Con-
gress for military decision-making. These tools allow members of
Congress to signal to constituents whether or not they support

Ecretia, modeled after Iraq: the president says there are WMD, the president’s foreign policy agenda without forcing the repre-
the president says there are WMD and Congress disagrees, and sentatives to take an active role in military action and potentially
the president says there are WMD and Congress agrees. In these receive the blame for unpopular military misadventures.
scenarios, 24.3%, 19.9% and 29.9% of respondents supported the To ensure re-election, members of Congress have taken
28 an indirect approach to American foreign policy, going so far
invasion, respectively. The study, coupled with past research,
demonstrated how Congress has sway over media coverage as as to surrender their constitutional authority to declare war to
29 the President of the United States in an effort to avoid blame
well as public support for a president’s military agenda. Con-
gress has authority in military situations, but often does not take for unpopular military matters. President Barack Obama is cur-
up the War Powers mantle, for fear of alienating constituents. rently reaping the benefits of the congressional relinquishment
Representatives engage in a potentially dangerous cycle: of war-making authority to the Commander-in-Chief. If Presi-
Congress looks to media and public opinion for guidance on dent Obama’s plan for Afghanistan and the manner in which he
how to behave regarding military action, but neither the media reached the current proposal is any indication for how Obama
Equal Justice

nor the public are well-informed on matters involving the use of plans to treat the United States Congress in the future, Ameri-
30 cans can expect retention of executive authority for military ac-
force. Congressional fear of falling out of favor with constitu-
ents over potentially unpopular military action can prevent repre- tion. President Obama treated Congress as an afterthought in
sentatives from asserting their constitutional authority to declare the first large-scale military decision of his presidency, and Con-
war and engage in war-making activities. Mayhew described the gress accepted this treatment, because the legislative branch
‘public sphere,’ as the “realm of shared American consciousness overwhelming fears alienating constituents.
in which government officials and others make moves before an
attentive stratum of the public, in which society’s preference for-
Automatic Absentee Voting
mation, politics, and policymaking all substantially take place.”31
Aditya Mukerjee
In the Iraq War, Congressional position taking and popular opin-
Health Care

ion within this ‘public sphere’ have complimented one another.32

These assessments suggest Congress is more willing to wade
into military matters when the public supports them, but as sup- In the 2008 presidential elections, the United States saw
port for the Global War on Terror, or what is now referred to as record levels of voter turnout, particularly among youth voters
the War in Afghanistan, wanes, Congress has remained willing to (voters between the ages of 18 and 25 years old). In general, vot-
hand over decision-making authority to the president. ers aged 18-25 years old are significantly less likely to vote than
the general population. In New York state, there was a 30% dif-
46
ference in voting turnout between citizens aged 18-25 and citi-
zens aged 25 and above.1 Compared to the national average,
New York State youth were 2% less likely to vote in the 2004
election.2 A number of factors may contribute to this relative
lack of participation, such as absence due to college, or a de-
creased level of awareness of civic affairs. Both factors are even
more salient in local elections, which typically gather little, if any,
coverage outside the home district or state.
Currently, New York State law permits a voter to request an
absentee ballot only for a few specific reasons, such as expected
absence from the polling district on the day of the election, reli-
gious duties, or admission to a hospital. Any citizen who does not
fall under one of these categories must vote at the polling loca-
tion on Election Day. Requests for absentee ballots must be filed
within the month before the election. Youth who attend college
in another state or who do not keep track of election dates may
easily miss this window, especially for local and special elections.
Establishing automatic no-excuse absentee voting as an op-
tion during voter registration will increase voting turnout and
civic awareness among youth. Under this policy, voters would
be allowed to submit a standing request for an absentee ballot.
Voters who utilize this option would automatically receive an ab-
sentee ballot in the mail, thus saving them the trouble of remem-
bering to request an absentee ballot for each individual election.
These voters will never forget or miss an election date, as receiv-
ing an absentee ballot will serve as a de facto reminder of the
upcoming election. To enable this program, the existing laws sur-
rounding absentee ballots should be changed to allow voters to
request absentee ballots without specifying a qualifying reason.
This would allow a voter to request an automatic absentee ballot
even if he is not sure that he will be away (whether traveling or
at college) on every future election date. These benefits would
particularly impact youth voter turnout, as college students are
likely to be absent from their home district on election dates and
may not be aware of elections in time to request an absentee
ballot.
In addition, automatic
no-excuse absentee vot-
ing will increase civic A utomatic no-excuse
absentee voting will
awareness among par-
ticipating voters. Voters increase civil aware-
in the program will never ness among partici-
be confronted with an un-
familiar name in the vot-
panting voters.
ing booth, as they will be
able to research all candi-
dates before mailing back the absentee ballot. This will increase
knowledge of local, state, and federal civic matters. Because this
program will significantly benefit youth voters, this program is an
ideal way to increase civic awareness among youth voters.
Washington State has successfully implemented this exact
program. In Washington, voter registration forms allow the op-
tion of requesting an automatic absentee ballot for all future
elections during voter registration, and there are no special re-
quirements for requesting an absentee ballot. Due to the popu-
larity of this option, several counties now conduct all elections
through the mail alone, though state law still allows both mail-in
voting and in-person voting. Youth turnout in Washington is 5%
higher than the national average.
In Oregon, the success of a different vote-by-mail program
has led the state to conduct all elections exclusively by mail.
Defense & Diplomacy
Youth voter turnout in Oregon is 8% higher than the national av-
erage. In addition, this voting system has saved the state millions
of dollars since its inception.
When Oregon moved to “mail-only” voting, the costs of run-
ning elections decreased by 20%,3 because the state and coun-
ties no longer had to maintain polling stations on Election Day.
In the first presidential primary held after the switch, the cost of
the election was $583,791 less than the estimated $3,396,272 that
would have been spent.4
Economic Development
Under automatic, no-excuse absentee voting, polling stations
would still be necessary, unlike in Oregon. However, if this pro-
gram is enacted and achieves sufficient popularity with voters
who currently vote in person, the number of polling locations in
some districts may be reduced, which will lower the total costs
of holding elections.
As shown, this program would increase youth voter turnout,
increase youth civic awareness, and lower the costs of holding
elections. An automatic, no-excuse absentee voting program
could be easily enacted with a single, two-part bill. First, the
special requirements for requesting an absentee ballot should
be eliminated, so that any registered voter is able to vote by
Education
absentee ballot for any election. Second, New York State voter
registration forms should be amended to include an option to
request an absentee ballot for all future elections. 

Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones for
New York State
Philip Verma
Energy & Environment
Since 1977, there have been 6,143 incidences of violence na-
tionwide against abortion providers, including eight murders.
There have also been 156,961 incidences of disruption, and 763
incidences of clinic blockades.1 Abortion is protected under fed-
eral law, as upheld by the 1973 landmark Supreme Court deci-
sion Roe v. Wade, which affirmed a woman’s freedom of choice
in these matters. However, women seeking access to abortion
clinics are frequently obstructed by protestors, who claim their
actions are protected by the First Amendment. Protestors have
Equal Justice
been known to block clinic entrances and aggressively harass
patients and staff.2 Patients and their chaperones sometimes
react to the protestors’ provocations, which can lead to violent
altercations outside clinics. In order to protect a woman’s right
to choose and to prevent violence around the clinics, the state
of New York should implement buffer zones both around clinic
entrances and around patients.
Federal protection of clinics already exists under the 1994
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE), which pro-
hibits threats and violence against individuals obtaining or pro-
Health Care
viding reproductive services. However, as events like the recent
murder of Dr. George Tiller show, the provisions of FACE are
not enough. New York should create buffer zones around facil-
ity entrances wherein certain acts of protest are restricted. As
of 2010, three states have done this: Massachusetts, Montana,
and Colorado, as well as a number of cities, notably New York
and Chicago. Regulations usually involve some combination
47
 of “fixed” buffers around clinic entrances and “floating” buffers restriction on free speech is not content-neutral, and therefore
around individuals seeking to enter. There have been three ma- not constitutional. By crafting a narrowly-tailored law that limits
Defense & Diplomacy

jor Supreme Court decisions on no-protest zones around clinics: speech somewhat without becoming content-specific or unnec-
Madsen v. Women’s Health Center (1994), Schenck v. Pro-Choice essarily restrictive, New York can protect the rights of women
Network of Western New York (1997) and Hill v. Colorado (2000). seeking or exploring the possibility of abortion. The concerns of
In Madsen and Hill, the court upheld most of the injunctions protestors on both sides should be taken seriously but prevent-
on protesting, while it struck down the ing continued violence and harassment
floating bubble provision in Schenck.
Together, the three cases adapted the
strict scrutiny test for free speech viola-
S trikes the best balance be-
tween two constitutionally
is strongly in the interest of the state,
and thus supersedes it. Even the ACLU,
which often breaks with other liberal
tion to the issue of clinic buffer zones. In groups on issues of free speech, has de-
protected rights: the right to
Economic Development

order to pass constitutional muster, the fended buffer zones as necessary and
prohibitions had to be strongly in the free speech and the right to have constitutional.8
state’s interest, relatively content-neu- an abortion New York is a state where clinic buf-
tral, and less restrictive than the state’s fer zones could be exceptionally helpful.
interest, in this case, abortion. The state at present does not have any
New York should implement both types of buffers, following provision like this, although its three largest cities—New York,
the legal parameters accepted by Supreme Court in Hill v. Colo- Buffalo, and Rochester—all have some form of buffer.9 New York
rado, its most recent decision on the issue. Colorado’s statute is a state with more abortion clinics than most, and not simply by
created an 8-foot buffer around patients within a 100-foot ra- virtue of its large population.10 60 percent of New York counties
dius of an entrance. Floating buffers like these around patients have abortion providers, compared with only 13 percent of coun-
are necessary to prevent protestors from forming a blockade at ties nationally; furthermore, those New York counties contain
the fixed distance from the clinic entrance. The 8-foot distance 97 percent of the state’s female population. This policy would
Education

used in Colorado is sufficient to allow conversation but prevent therefore be very useful in New York, especially in the western
intimidation; in contrast, the distance in Schenck was 15 feet.3 part of the state, where violence has historically been more of
Furthermore, the law in Colorado is for all medical facilities, and a problem.11 The New York Assembly and Senate should there-
is therefore relatively content-neutral; it could even apply to anti- fore work with local governments and police forces to create
abortion alternatives, such as pregnancy crisis centers. Finally, and monitor buffer zones. These buffer zones will help protect
the statute only affected intentional approach; if a patient came patients and chaperones seeking abortion services and the doc-
within 8 feet of a stationary protestor, the protestor was not pun- tors and staff that provide them. They will also give the police a
Energy & Environment

ished.4 clearer policy for enforcement than granted by FACE and relieve
Although anti-abortion advocates have used the First Amend- them of continually breaking up conflict at clinics. Finally, it will
ment as a defense for their protests, this claim does not stand protect protesters from reprisal. Some anti-abortion advocates
closer scrutiny. Restrictions on free speech are to be avoided have expressed concerns that due to a chilling effect, people
whenever possible but when there is a compelling state inter- will stop protesting altogether.12 This seems unlikely given the
est—here the protection of abortion rights—the right to speech character and behavior of these protestors, but it is a possibil-
can be limited. Furthermore, there is significant precedent to ity. Therefore, free-speech groups like the ACLU and pro-choice
such restrictions in other political and social arenas. Polling plac- groups like NARAL and Planned Parenthood should work with
es, government offices, and labor strike locations were all histori- protest organizations to let them know what speech and protest
cally sites of violence and confrontation, which led to restrictions activities remain within their rights. Finally, for the first five years
against campaigning and protesting at said places.5 In Burson v. after implementation, data should be gathered about violation
Freeman (1992), the Supreme Court ruled that there was a com- and enforcement rates in the state to determine the policy’s ef-
Equal Justice

pelling state interest in regulating campaigning around polling fectiveness.

places on Election Day, and extensively cited past incidences of Under federal law, women have the right to get an abortion
violence in its decision. The buffer distance upheld in Burson was but more importantly, they have the right to choose, to make the
100 feet, equal to Colorado’s statue and far greater than those decision of their own free will. Violence and aggressive intimida-
6 tion take away this choice by denying women the opportunity to
of Montana and Massachusetts. Following the court’s logic in
Burson, a 100-foot restricted-speech zone is absolutely neces- even consider the procedure as a possibility. There are enough
sary, considering that today, violence against staff and patients stigmas and dangers involved with abortion as it is; women
at abortion clinics is significantly higher than against voters and should be allowed to at least explore the option of abortion
7 without intense intimidation and physical harassment. Protesters
election officials at polling places.
Even though the clinic buffer laws are less onerous than their should still be allowed to hold signs and distribute literature but
Health Care

counterparts in labor, election, and government circles, they in order to prevent violence at and around abortion clinics, they
have been subjected to far more scrutiny and criticism. This must keep a safe distance. The clinic buffer zone strikes the best
is primarily because the right to an abortion remains a highly balance between two constitutionally protected rights: the right
controversial issue in the United States and abortion opponents to free speech and the right to have an abortion.
want to protest. If these protestors truly believe that protest
restrictions are illegal, then they should similarly advocate end-
ing the other types of restrictions mentioned. Otherwise, the
48
 Health Care

The passing of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, by Congress and
signed by President Obama in March of 2010, is a long-overdue step in the direc-
tion of increased equity, access, and affordability in the American health insur-
ance system. However, behind all of the hyperbolic talk of socialism and “govern-
ment takeovers,” scholars of health policy understand that this bill lacks a number
of important provisions, some of which were even included in Richard Nixon’s
proposed 1974 reform. The legislation lacks a public option to drive down insur-
ance prices; it does not reach fully universal coverage; it will not cover undocu-
mented immigrants; many provisions do not begin until 2014. The time is thus still
ripe for innovative local, statewide, and national solutions that increase access
to and lower the rise in our country’s spending on medical care. In this journal,
students tackle the issues of access and affordability with articles about rape
and domestic violence classifications in insurance, electronic health records, and
the finances of reproductive labor.

The Limits of “Fair Discrimination”:
Defense & Diplomacy
Rape and Domestic Violence Classifications in
Health Insurance
Ihotu J. Ali
Introduction: Public cases of denied coverage to abuse sur-
vivors raise the alarm
The story of Christine Turner surfaced in early 2009, as health
insurance reform debates began in Washington, D.C. Turner, 45,
Economic Development
appeared on dozens of internet sites to explain how, after being
drugged, raped, and left on the roadside in Fort Lauderdale, she
followed medical advice to take medication to prevent against
the small possibility of HIV transmission.1 However, when Turner,
a former insurance underwriter herself, lost insurance months
later and sought a new policy, she was denied due to suspicions
of having HIV. Another rape victim in New Jersey encountered
problems when her insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield, and associ-
ated managed care organization, Magellan, delayed and even-
tually denied her mental health treatment to recover from the
trauma.2 In Pennsylvania, a 25-year-old woman garnered media
attention and public outrage with her story. After her husband
Education
shoved her into some furniture during an argument and injured
her hip, two insurance companies denied her health, life, and dis-
ability coverage.3 Cases of “abuse classifications” used to deny
insurance coverage continue to grow public, sparking concern
that this issue is rather a chronic problem across the insurance
industry.
These women’s stories question the fairness of insurance poli-
Energy & Environment
cies regarding the traumatizing experience of rape and domestic
violence. Even months and years after the incident, survivors4
find themselves struggling a second time to receive full insur-
ance coverage and support for the services necessary for their
long-term recovery. However, many survivors do not even know
the reason for their insurance denial, since companies are not re-
quired to disclose their reasons for refusing coverage. Rape and
domestic violence are silent tragedies that affect thousands of
women each year, and their trauma often goes unspoken as well
as untreated, which health insurance policies only exacerbate.
Just as doctors diagnose and prescribe, insurers classify, rate,
and estimate. Before offering a new health insurance policy, each
Equal Justice
insurance company reviews the overall health, “high risk” activi-
ties, and medical and family history of the applicant. This paper
will explore rape and domestic violence as health risk classifica-
tions under such review, and the role they should play in health
insurers’ underwriting decisions. I ask the question: Should insur-
ance companies be allowed to consider patient medical histories
of rape and domestic violence as grounds for denying coverage?
Background: History of abuse classifications in government
and the industry
Health Care
Abuse classifications such as “history of rape” or “history of
domestic violence”5 have been used in insurance underwriting
criteria for decades, particularly stemming from an increased
public awareness of abuse in the 1980s. The classifications have
not been used uniformly across health insurers; however, the
practice is widespread and accepted at many insurance compa-
nies. Among those identified by women’s advocacy groups and
50
congressional surveys include Aetna, Nationwide, Allstate, State
Farm, Metropolitan Life, The Prudential, and the Principle Finan-
cial Group.6 New York Senator Charles Schumer conducted a
survey of 16 major New York-based health insurance companies
in 1996, finding half of which considered domestic violence a
legitimate underwriting criteria on which to consider denial of
coverage.7 Another survey of life, health, and accident insurers
in Pennsylvania found that, out of 437 companies, 28% (22% of
health insurers) used domestic violence as a criterion in their de-
cisions to provide coverage.8 Thus making sexual and domestic
abuse a “pre-existing condition.”
As explained by U.S. Representative Constance A. Morella (D-
MD) to a Senate committee hearing in 1996: “Insurance com-
panies, it appears, have refused to cover victims of domestic
violence – as one company representative last year said, on the
grounds that covering battered women is like ‘covering diabetics
who refused to take their insulin.’”9 Chronic diseases like diabe-
tes require multiple sources of specialized medical care, which
becomes very expensive. If such a disease develops while an
individual is under a single insurance policy, the insurer is obli-
gated to pay for the increased costs and absorb this risk. How-
ever, when an individual already diagnosed with chronic disease
applies for a new policy, her chances of finding a reasonable
policy are slim. Many individuals with pre-existing conditions are
charged exorbitant premiums, offered policies that cover few
costs, or in most cases, are denied coverage entirely.
These issues are not new, to insurance companies or to
state and federal legislative bodies. The feminist movement and
women’s health advocates succeeded in raising the public con-
sciousness around rape and domestic violence as a major public
health concern in the 1980s, triggering abuse screening in hospi-
tals and encouraging doctors to provide appropriate treatment
and document abuse in medical records as proof for obtaining
orders of protection or legal compensation. However, as abuse
advocates made strides in the medical and legal realm, insurance
companies took note as well and adopted abuse classifications
in order to deny specific benefits or coverage altogether for indi-
viduals with any single history of abuse. Insurers could review in-
dividuals’ medical records as well as police reports, court, credit,
and employment records, and were never required to disclose
the reasons for denial. Thus, for many years survivors and advo-
cates did not know and could not prove if they had been denied
based on abuse history.10
A public debate called into question the “fairness” of deter-
mining insurance policies on certain classifications. A Supreme
Court ruling declared on the basis of Title VII of Civil Rights Act
of 1964 that race, religion, sex, and national origin were prohibited
as classifications, but only in certain employer-sponsored plans.
All fifty states enacted some form of limit on the personal char-
acteristics used in insurance classifications.11 In the mid-1990s,
Senator Paul Wellstone (D-MN) introduced AMA-endorsed
legislation that would prohibit insurers from raising premiums,
denying coverage, or classifying as pre-existing conditions any
abuse-related injuries. However, such legislation has never suc-
ceeded at the federal level. Instead, the states acted. Several
states approved legislation to regulate insurance companies’ use
of abuse status, abuse-related conditions, and histories of abuse-
related claims in the underwriting process. In last decade, how-
ever, the issue of abuse classifications went largely silent, until
the 2008 presidential campaigns and a renewed focus on health
insurance reform. The voting records of Republican candidates
John McCain and Sarah Palin were exposed and criticized for
their lack of support for comprehensive reproductive health
services for women and sexual abuse survivors.12 Then under
health insurance reform, bills in the House of Representatives
and Senate have each debated amendments regarding rape
and domestic violence and appropriate means for survivors to
receive health care. Public pressure mounted on ten Republican
Senators when advocacy groups exposed their votes against a
bill in 2006 that would have forced insurance companies to com-
ply with state laws banning the use of abuse classifications.13 The
reform bill passed recently by the House of Representatives in-
cludes a provision banning several “unfair” classifications, specifi- sive coverage, someone would still have to pay the additional
cally including domestic violence. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi
describes the impact of this provision, if
D
passed by the entire Congress: “Think of
this. You’ve survived domestic violence, omestic violence is the lead- premiums relatively low.
and now you are discriminated [against]
in the insurance market because you
ing cause of injury to women in
have a pre-existing medical condition. the United States, affecting 4
Well, that will all be gone.”14 million victims and costing over plained: “Under the cold logic of the in-
Today, eight states still allow domes- $31 billion
tic violence as a pre-existing condition
and comprehensive services (particularly
mental health treatment) continue to be denied to abuse survi-
vors across the nation. While the nation is on the verge of dra-
matic health insurance reform, the supporters and opponents
make their case to the legislators who may very well change the
landscape of this issue in the months and years to come.
Supporters: “Fair discrimination” and industry-wide accept-
ed practices
As health insurance reform looms closer, everyone is waiting
to see the final product after months of debate in Congress and
across the nation. The few, yet powerful supporters of abuse
classifications includes several Republican Senators, health in-
surance executives, and particularly managed care organizations
concerned about the “bottom line.” As proponents of the finan-
cial stability of the insurance industry, they espouse a point of
view often called the “fair discrimination perspective.”15
They may have little knowledge or intention of “re-victimizing”
the survivors; however, they are concerned about the reality of
medical costs and actuarial estimates of risk. Survivors of rape
can require long-term services, and emergency contraceptives,
rape kits, and HIV and STI prophylaxis can be expensive. Ex-
tended mental health services are also costly, and are often not
reimbursed fully by or included in basic health insurance plans.
Domestic violence is the leading cause of injury to women in
the United States, affecting 4 million victims and costing over $31
billion in abuse-related medical treatment each year. Domestic
violence is estimated to cost employers up to $5 billion and ac-
16
count for a total cost of $67 billion nationwide. In his defense of
legislation to prohibit abuse classifications, Senator Paul Well-
stone declared the bill as necessary “to correct an abhorrent
practice” of denying coverage which perpetuated “plain, old
fashioned discrimination,” “profoundly unjust and wrong.” Yet in
the same press release, the Senator went on to describe do-
mestic violence as an enormous cost to the health industry, as
“more common than auto accidents, muggings, and rapes by a
stranger combined” and “the number one reason that women
Defense & Diplomacy
go to emergency rooms.”17 With this conflicting information, sup-
porters continue to see survivors as being at “high risk” of need-
ing ongoing medical services and financially straining insurance
companies.
Insurance executives have also been using pre-existing con-
ditions and “risk rating” since the inception of private health
insurance as an acceptable means of limiting costs amid an in-
creasingly expensive health care system. They likely consider
survivors to be a small amount of the general population, and a
Economic Development
relatively small public relations price to pay in order to avoid tak-
ing on additional risk. Even if survivors were offered comprehen-
costs, therefore removing high risk beneficiaries such as abuse
survivors from the insurance pool avoids
cost shifting and keeps everyone else’s
The logic of abuse classification pro-
ponents is often criticized as inhumane,
as the Huffington Post’s Ryan Grim ex-
surance industry, it makes perfect sense:
If you are in a marriage with someone
Education
who has beaten you in the past, you’re
more likely to get beaten again than the average person and
are therefore more expensive to insure. In human terms,” he
continues, “it’s a second punishment for a victim of domestic
violence.”18 Nevertheless, supporters of “fair discrimination” see
their policies not as an intentional lashing out against abuse sur-
vivors, but an unfortunate and yet necessary step in order to stay
Energy & Environment
in business and provide fair coverage to all.
Opponents: Statistical evidence, true fairness, and cost-ef-
fective prevention
On the other hand, opponents of abuse classifications include
most Democrats in Congress, reproductive health advocates,
battered women’s groups, survivors themselves and the unin-
sured, as well as potentially all women. This group is known for
their “antidiscrimination perspective” that individuals shouldn’t
be held accountable for health risks outside of their personal
control, and for their concern for the overall health and human
Equal Justice
rights of the individual survivor over profit-margins and business
practices.19
First, the pre-existing condition policy makes an unfair as-
sumption of guilt on the part of the survivor and requires her to
pay the penalty of more expensive insurance policies (if she can
receive coverage at all) or shoulder additional expenses on her
own if the insurer refuses to pay. All 50 states prohibit the use
of race as a classification, despite well-known differences in life
expectancy based on racial background and pre-disposition to
certain diseases.20 Gender, however, is not uniformly prohibited
Health Care
as a classification and current estimates report that women pay
up to 50% more for health insurance than men, not including
maternity costs.21 According to the antidiscrimination perspec-
tive, an individual should be no more accountable for her history
of abuse than for race or gender.
In addition, other victims of violent crimes such as stabbings
or shootings are fully covered for their recovery, while sexual
51
 violence – a potentially more traumatizing crime – may be de-
nied under the same context. The American Bar Association has
Defense & Diplomacy
spoken out against abuse classifications for over a decade, with
the explanation of its President: “We don’t hold victims of crime
responsible for their injuries. Insurance companies do not deny
coverage for an individual who has been shot or stabbed by a
stranger. They should not revoke coverage when the attacked
is a spouse.”22 As opposed to a reckless driver or diabetic who
refuses to take his insulin, an abuse survivor who is denied cover-
age is not only effectively blamed for someone else’s crime, but
is treated with an inappropriate level of discrimination given her
Economic Development
circumstances.
Members of the insurance industry may counter this argu-
ment with the fact that risk rating is an accepted practice, and
that all applicants are subject to the same review of their medi-
cal histories. Pisano of the insurance trade group expressed a
concern that “it’s important to point out that health plans are not
denying coverage based on the fact that someone was raped,
but [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder] could be a factor in denied
coverage.” However, a staff attorney at the Women’s Rights Proj-
ect at the American Civil Liberties Union disagrees. “That might
not be a discriminatory action, but it certainly would seem to
have a discriminatory impact,” she says. “Insurance discrimina-
Education
tion against rape victims will only further discourage them from
coming forward to law enforcement and seeking medical help.”23
Opponents of the abuse classification take issue with the policy
of abuse classifications (and the concept of profit-driven classifi-
cations in general) because of its “overly burdensome” effect on
survivors in practice.24
However, even under the business logic of health insurance
Energy & Environment
companies, this constituency opposes abuse classifications due
to a lack of solid evidence identifying abuse survivors as “high
risk” beneficiaries. From any single incident of unprotected sex,
including rape, the probability of contracting HIV lies between
1% and .01%, or one in 1,000 cases.25 Although chances are
small, medical professionals agree that preventive medication be
taken as soon as possible following the incident and regular test-
ing occurs in order to prevent further related health care costs.
Peg Echols, Assistant Counsel of Federal Affairs for State Farm
admitted this assumption made by insurers, saying that “there is
insufficient data available to measure costs associated with insur-
ing victims of [domestic violence].” Deborah Senn, Washington
Equal Justice
State Insurance Commissioner, has also said there is no “bona
fide evidence that the victims of abuse are a greater risk” draw-
ing from insurance pools.26 Although the total costs of abuse
have been roughly estimated, there is no scientific evidence that
an applicant, with no prior conditions except for the status as
an abuse survivor, will necessarily require more costly treatment
in her recovery. Part of the explanation may come from an in-
creasingly efficient system of treating survivors such as using the
model of trained volunteer crisis counselors in New York City
emergency rooms. Another explanation may lie in preventative
Health Care
care.
Estimates suggest that over 90% of survivors choose not to
come forward and receive physical and mental treatment due
to the obstacles mentioned in this paper and stigma around the
incident.27 However, this may actually be contributing to the high
cost of abuse in the health industry. If insurance companies were
to encourage more survivors to seek immediate and cost-effec-
52
tive services, they could avoid later, more severe physical and
especially psychological debilitating conditions such as PTSD,
clinical depression or anxiety disorders that would require more
chronic and specialized care.
American Medical Association trustee Dr. Timothy T. Flaherty
testified in front of the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Hu-
man Resources in July 1996, expressing: “The AMA has strived
to facilitate the reporting and diagnosis of domestic abuse in
an effort to identify and help the problem before it goes too
far. Recent insurance company practices threaten to impede our
valuable progress in this area.”28A representative from the Penn-
sylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence has also said that
“not being able to obtain health, automobile, or homeowner’s
insurance because of domestic violence means a mother can’t
afford to take her kids to the doctor, can’t provide for her kids
in the event of her disability or death, can’t own a car, or own or
even rent a home – all critical factors in establishing a life free of
violence.”29 Survivors may not necessarily be as “high risk” bene-
ficiaries as insurers often assume, and the prohibition of an abuse
classification in insurance may actually help to reduce their risk
in exposing them to efficient medical and mental health treat-
ment to prevent the need for lifelong care.
Although rape and domestic violence are very different cases
each with unique types of health care costs and statistical risk,
but if abuse survivors are truly less of a risk than previously as-
sumed, it is in the interests of both women’s advocates and in-
surers to rectify this actuarial error. This would encourage the
survivor to access comprehensive and preventative treatment,
while also allowing the insurer to offer competitive rates and
policies to “good risk” beneficiaries and enhance the viability of
the insurance pool.30
Recommendations against abuse classification: State Regula-
tion and Disclosure
I stand with the opponents of rape and domestic violence
as health insurance classifications for both moral and actuarial
reasons. First, I believe in following a public health and human
rights model in hopes that insurance agencies, despite being ob-
ligated to the “bottom line,” will acknowledge the societal impact
of their policies and weigh the value of their increased profit
with the amount of undue trauma inflicted on vulnerable indi-
viduals. However, I also believe that private insurers and women’s
advocates can find common ground in the possibility that the
exclusion of abuse survivors from coverage is neither fair, nor
profitable. In fact, effective models of care and early treatment
may be a strategy both sides can agree upon and work toward
a best-case scenario.
The battle of insurance for survivors also degenerates into
debates over physical health versus mental health, definitions of
“accidental” injuries, and the definition of “medically necessary”
treatment. Research indicates that physical and mental health
are both critically important to an individual’s overall functional-
ity, however, mental health services are consistently questioned,
devalued as “medically necessary,” and are often limited (if cov-
ered at all) under basic health insurance plans. If victims of some
crimes are given full coverage of their injuries, the same principle
should be equally applied to victims of all crimes, including sex-
ual abuse crimes. Moreover, I believe the decision of “medically
necessary” treatment should be left to trained physicians, not
the managed care organization staff who have taken over this
role in the name of “reducing costs.”
Finally, I would be remiss not to mention the impact of ste-
reotypes in framing the national debate around survivors of rape
and domestic violence. One in six women are sexually assaulted
nationally, and domestic violence rates in New York City alone
are estimated at over 3.9 million, or 7 percent.31 These crimes
affect women, men, children, heterosexuals, homosexuals, the
wealthy, the poor, and even the elderly and the disabled. Yet
despite the statistics, public opinion often suggests that these
incidents strike only the more “undesirables” of our society – the
undeserving poor, prostitutes, drug users, or “loose” women –
and that abused women may have lied about the nature of sex or
have even instigated the attacks on themselves. Ultimately, there
is a weak imperative that services be appropriately accessible
for survivors. This gap in accessible services is a major flaw in an
advanced health care system; it is unacceptable that some of the
most egregious and traumatizing health concerns (which can be
easily and inexpensively treated) are minimized and allowed to
go untreated.
Since the states have traditionally regulated insurance com-
panies and have prohibited other insurance classifications be-
fore, they should take the lead in this policy arena. I recommend
that the remaining eight states adopt legislation to ban the use
of domestic violence as a pre-existing condition, however, all
states should also take a more active role in determining the
definition of “medical necessity,” particularly in regard to men-
tal health services, and states should mandate insurance com-
panies to disclose their reasons for denying coverage. Insurers
should offer coverage at least to battered women who have left
their abusers, as they need not be continually penalized for hav-
ing fully left the dangerous situation, and to women who are in
counseling and attempting to reduce their exposure to harm.32
In addition, government insurance programs such as Medicare
or Medicaid with higher capacities to cover potentially high-risk
individuals should consider extending eligibility to abuse survi-
vors. Finally, the federal and/or state governments should also
consider negotiating down mental health costs and promoting
mental health parity, to assist both insured and uninsured survi-
vors of domestic violence and rape with access to needed care.
Conclusion: A call for common ground and cost-effective
models of care
Although the chasm between supporters and opponents of
abuse classifications may seem wide, I believe progress is on the
horizon. Regarding the case of the 25-year-old Pennsylvania sur-
vivor mentioned earlier, First Colony Life Insurance Vice Presi-
dent David H. McMahon refused to speak publicly about the
fact that his First Colony had denied her benefits, however he
mentioned that the company was “participating with the Ameri-
can Council of Life Insurance and the [NAIC] to try to come up
with model legislation that will address this industry-wide prob-
lem and meet the needs of the public and insurers.”33 There is a
need for honest discussion, accurate data, and a spirit of coop-
eration on both sides of this issue to devise workable policy solu-
tions. Even if national health insurance reform doesn’t provide a
comprehensive solution, the time is ripe for states and insurers
themselves to act for the health and prosperity of all.
Financial Compensation and the Commodification of
Defense & Diplomacy
Women’s Reproductive Labor
Carla Palacios
Introduction
The American Society for Reproductive Medicine officially
defines oocyte donation as the “donation of an ovum by one
woman to another who attempts to become pregnant by in vitro
Economic Development
fertilization.”1 Currently in the United States, women have the
opportunity to donate certain forms of reproductive labor in ex-
change for financial compensation, through oocyte donation, an
opportunity previously non-existent. Oocyte retrieval is current-
ly in high demand and has various uses including female fertility
treatment, human embryonic research, and stem cell research.
Rules regarding financial compensation are non-existent in the
United States, and there is no current legislation on the sale of
oocytes.2 This paper will describe the current state of commodi-
fication of women’s reproductive oocytes, as well enumerate the
reasons why commodification is both detrimental to potential
recipients and potentially even the health of donors. This paper
Education
will also suggest the creation of a standard or limit for financial
compensation that follows the model that the FDA has created
for clinical trials.
Background on Oocyte Donation
In the United States alone, there are between three and sev-
en million infertile couples trying to conceive.3 Thus, oocyte do-
Energy & Environment
nation has been increasingly prevalent and will continue to grow
as an idustry. Oocyte retrieval is a relatively new technology, with
the first successful in vitro fertilization in 1978 and subsequently,
the first recorded pregnancy in 1983.4 This procedure is general-
ly used for three types of reproductive problems: women with a
history of severe genetic disorders, women without functioning
ovaries, and women with failed attempts of in-vitro fertilization.
In recent years, there has been a correlation with the demand
for egg donation and the increasing age of woman trying to con-
ceive. There is approximately a fifty percent chance that an egg
donation will result in a birth.5 Due to this large percentage,
oocyte donators are compensated generously.
Equal Justice
The process of oocyte donation is both time-consuming and
laborious. It is a complicated procedure that causes extreme
discomfort to both the donating and receiving parties. Both the
donor and the recipient receive repeated hormone treatments.
If fertilized eggs result, they are placed in an incubator and then
two to four of these “pre-embryos” are placed in the woman’s
uterus and a pregnancy may result.6 The process of oocyte has
both short and long term effects on the women involved in the
procedure. Since donors are given a large amount of hormone
treatments, these women often suffer physical and mental side
Health Care
effects. The increased levels of hormones, as well as the fertil-
ity drugs, may also cause long term effects, such as decreased
fertility, ovarian hyper-stimulation, and increased risks of uterine,
ovarian, and breast cancer. Women may disregard the effects the
procedure may have on their health due to the financial compen-
sation.7
53
 The average price of an egg is about five thousand dollars,
but the price ranges up to fifty thousand dollars.8 One of the
Defense & Diplomacy
best-known examples of the commercialization of egg dona-
tion is Ron Harris’s website, www.ronsangels.com, which offers
models as egg donors. They are auctioned online to “would-be
parents willing to pay to one hundred and fifty thousand dollars
in hopes of having a beautiful child”.9 Clearly the women on the
website have exceptional market access; that access is denied to
others, raising issues of distributive economic justice.
The ethical issues surrounding financial compensation for
oocyte donation are very controversial in the United States. In
Economic Development
France, bioethics laws prevent the sale of any organs or prod-
ucts of the human body, including gametes. The United King-
dom limits financial compensation for oocyte donation to fifteen
pounds and is only available in clinics that existed previous to
this mandate. The issue of financial compensation is currently
unresolved in the United States and while the payment for organ
donation is strictly prohibited, there is no current legislation on
the sale of gametes.10 In their guidelines, the American Fertil-
ity Society states that “donors should be compensated for the
direct and indirect expenses associated with their participation,
their inconvenience and time, and to some degree, for the risk
and discomfort undertaken.”11 Thus, in the United States, there
Education
is a large amount of ambiguity surrounding financial compensa-
tion for oocyte donation since there is no distinction between
reasonable compensation and incentive for donation.12 In addi-
tion, the qualities and characteristics of the donor are taken into
account as a reason for different pricing of oocytes.
The lack of regulation regarding financial compensation en-
ables human embryos to be objectified as commodities. One
Energy & Environment
argument is that human embryos are undeniably human and
therefore should be treated as persons with full moral standing.
The eggs are “intimate connection to [our] personhood”13 and
therefore should not be commodified. However, others believe
that an egg is not life till after conception; and the egg itself
should not have full moral standings. Therefore the egg needs
to be commodified in order to incentivize donors to donate. “feminist for money” argument citing the certain emergence of a
To date, because of the lack of regulation or standardiza-
tion, physicians, researchers, and private institutions have been
forced to formulate their own policies and ethical standards re-
garding egg donation. Instead of instating policies that estab-
lished an ethical standard for egg donation, the United States
Equal Justice
encourages women to undergo the process through other
means, for example by offering tax deductions.14 According to
the Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine, two ethical issues arise from financial compensation
for oocyte donation: “[1] recruitment practices incorporating re-
muneration sufficiently protect the interests of oocyte donors,
and [2] does financial compensation devalue human life by treat-
ing oocytes as property or commodities?”15 Increasing attention
has been given to these two major ethical issues as the demand
for oocyte donation has increased and financial compensation
Health Care
becomes more routine part of the process.
The most common type of financial compensation is paid to
women who undergo the process for the sole purpose of do-
nation. Since financial compensation ranges anywhere between
five thousand and in some extreme cases a hundred or more
thousand, women may agree to undergo this procedure due to
financial needs. Because monetary compensation is such a driv-
54
ing power in some cases, some women may refrain from disclos-
ing imperative background information that may result in the
devaluing of their compensation.
The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproduc-
tive Medicine argues that financial compensation for “the time,
inconvenience, and discomfort associated with oocyte retrieval
can and should be distinguished from payment for the oocytes
themselves.”16 The committee further argues that once this dis-
tinction is made, financial compensation of this matter can be
similarly viewed as compensation for “employment and other
situations in which individuals are compensated for activities de-
manding stress, physical effort, and risk.”17 This argument would
hold true if there was a standard financial compensation across
the board that each donor was given upon completion of the
procedure.
Compensation solely for the inconvenience and danger to
the donor, rather than for oocytes would reduce the likelihood
of ethical complications not only with disclosure by donors, but
also with recipient valuing the oocytes of one race or ethnicity
more than another. Currently, oocyte recipients provide a larger
financial compensation for certain character traits such as hair
color, eye color, SAT scores, etc. Aside from the obvious ethi-
cal implications of the ability increase or decrease the value of
an oocyte based on the characteristics of the donor, distributive
justice becomes an issue because financial compensation and
continual increase in prices of oocytes may result in potential
recipients finding the process prohibitively expensive.
Solution
Despite negative connotations, financial compensation for
oocyte donation can be justified within certain realms of modi-
fication. Given the time consumption and physical burden of
the donation process, it is highly unlikely that women would
agree to free donation. Since financial compensation increases
the number of donors, it should not be completely eliminated.
In fact, one argument in favor of financial compensation is the
black market for oocytes if donation were to be banned, which
would cause so many more negative effects to the donor than
commodification itself. Given today’s increased demand for egg
donation, there is no doubt that a black market would arise if it
were banned altogether. Many women would be coerced into
donating their oocytes by either a middleman, who is motivated
by the possibility for a large profit, or by the recipient herself,
who wants to be able to conceive her dream child. Thus, a wom-
an’s autonomy or her right to donate her oocytes on her own
accord would scarcely be taken into consideration.18
The American Society of Reproductive Medicine emphasizes
that the establishment of donor’s rights is also crucial in justify-
ing financial compensation. If the compensation reflects the time
and physical/mental burdens of the donor, which it should, then
a donor would be more likely to withdraw from the process if
previous medical problems or other issues arise, because she
will still be compensated for her previously invested time. Given
the nature of the process, even with proper informed consent,
the donor may feel uncomfortable with continuing with the pro-
cess. The donor should have the right to withdraw from the pro-
cess at any point and thus the recipients should be warned that
there is a possibility the donor might withdraw.
 The level of financial compensation for oocyte donation, how-
ever, should be limited to a sufficient and reasonable amount to
eliminate hasty actions of the donor and
thus increase informed consent. This com-
pensation should be seen as renumerance
for the donor’s inconvenience, rather than T his will... allow
more people, while diminishing
commodification of her oocytes. In this
manner, oocyte donation would be com- the likelihood of donor
pensated in the way that clinical trials are dishonesty.
compensated.
At a minimum, an egg donation cycle
costs approximately twenty thousand dollars; however only ap-
proximately five thousand dollars is likely to go to the egg donor
and the rest of the money goes to the clinic, as well as to paying
various other administrative fees.19 If there were stricter guide-
lines, more women would have market access rather than deny-
ing others the same opportunity. Therefore, financial compensa-
tion based on the number of oocytes, the quality of oocytes, and
characteristics of the donor (ethnicity, age, hair color, eye color,
etc.) should be forbidden, as it limits the diversity of women who
would have access to the market of oocyte donation and makes
this process both unfair to recipients who find the prices exorbi-
20
tant, as well morally and ethically questionable.
One possible method for setting a standard financial com-
pensation would be to equate it to the compensation received
for sperm donation. For example, in 2000, sperm donors were
compensated between $65 and $70 for a procedure that takes
place over the course of an hour. Given these statistics and the
knowledge that the entire process of oocyte donation requires
about fifty-six hours, the justified compensation for oocyte dona-
21
tion would range from $3,360- $4,200. While there is argument
about how a standard amount of compensation should be set,
the Ethics Committee of the American Society of Reproduc-
tive Medicine agrees that there should be limitations. Once the
financial compensation becomes excessive, which the commit-
tee defines as exceeding ten thousand dollars, and then it can
no longer be viewed as compensation for the donor’s inconve-
22
nience, but rather payment for her oocytes.
Implementation
While there is extensive public policy enacted around clinical
trials that can be used to create a new foundation for reproduc-
tive technology regulation. For instance, the FDA has consider-
able guidelines for the correct implementation of a clinical trial
that can be serve as a starting point for more formal egg and
23
sperm donation regulation. Fortunately, despite the minimal
federal regulation presented in the United States on egg and
sperm donation, it is still administered through the FDA. This
means that the FDA could have the power to classify oocyte
donation in the same manner as it classifies organ donation, thus
leading to standardization on the national level.
The process for advertising for clinical trials should be closely
regulated and avoid the emotional pleas and bloated financial
promises made in the current egg donation ads. In fact, when
egg donation was being developed at the University of Califor-
nia Los Angeles, in the 1970s, it was treated as a clinical trial.
The human donors were compensated fifty dollars a day for their
time and expenses.24 Though the payment would undoubtedly
be higher now, the same structure could be utilized. The FDA
states that, “the amount of compensation [for a clinical trial] is
determined by the amount of time you will be required to dedi-
Defense & Diplomacy
cate to the trial, and to the level of dis-
comfort that might be associated with
access
to
medical or surgical procedures related
directly to the study.”25 Under this sys-
tem, recipients would not be able to pay
for eggs of a “higher caliber,” similar to
the system used in the United Kingdom.
This will lower current prices faced by
couples seeking infertility treatment in
Economic Development
the United States and allow access to more people, while dimin-
ishing the likelihood of donor dishonesty.
Are Electronic Health Records a Deterrent to
Patients Seeking Medical Care?
Lauren M. Anderson
Introduction
Americans believe that Electronic Health Records (EHRs)
Education
have value, but they also have serious concerns about privacy.
A poll by National Public Radio, the Kaiser Family Foundation
and the Harvard School of Public Health reported that three-
quarters of Americans polled said, “it was very important or
somewhat important for doctors and hospitals to use electron-
ic records instead of paper. But nearly the same amount said
they were not confident that their computerized records would
remain safe from prying eyes.”1 Similarly, an eHealth Initiative
Energy & Environment
telephone survey reported that more than 80 percent voiced
strong and consistent support for EHRs and that they believed
an electronic exchange would enhance quality and efficiency of
the healthcare system. This approval was articulated regardless
of political affiliation, age, education or socioeconomic status.2
A Markle Foundation survey reported 56 percent of surveyed
population were very concerned and 18 percent somewhat con-
cerned about potential abuse by employers. However, Markle
respondents were also eager to reap the benefits of Internet
technology. Most of the medical community shares the public’s
optimism about the potential benefits, but not their fear of secu-
Equal Justice
rity failures. The Forrester Research survey found that 52 percent
were “very concerned” or “somewhat concerned” that informa-
tion might be used by an employer and limit their job opportuni-
ties.3 While employment threats are frequently sited, this paper
will attempt to tease out some other implications by looking spe-
cifically at the illegal immigrant and transgender communities in
the United States and ways in which EHRs can be shaped to as-
suage specific populations’ concerns and address public fears of
safety more broadly. This paper will look at background informa-
tion regarding electronic health records, illegal immigrants and
Health Care
the transgender community. This will be followed by an analysis
concerned groups and individuals, and security measures. Lastly,
this paper will also address some policy recommendations to ad-
dress any legitimate concerns.
Background: Electronic Health Records
In 1968 Dr. Larry L. Weeds introduced his concept problem-
55
 oriented medical records, which incorporated the symptoms, di-
agnoses, treatment and progress notes pertaining to a patient’s
Defense & Diplomacy
diagnosis.4 Although the idea may not be novel, it was depen-
dent upon the advancement of computers to make electronic
records in every practice and hospital feasible. Electronic Health
Records (EHR) and Electronic Medical Records (EMR) have
slightly different implications; Both EHR and EMR are electronic
records of patient health information generated by one or more
encounters in care delivery setting. They can include informa-
tion on patient demographics, progress notes, problems, medi-
cations, vital signs, past medical history,
Economic Development
M
immunizations, laboratory and radiology
data.5 The difference between the two ost of the medical commu-
is whether or not they are Health and
Human Services (HHS)-certified. HHS- nity shares the public’s optimism Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
certified records are able to exchange about the potential benefits, but IV estimates that roughly 1 in 30,000 as-
information through interoperability; if not their fear of security
a record is interoperable other provid- failures
ers could view it as well. An EHR can
exchange information interoperably, and
an EMR cannot. The industry is moving toward electronic health
records that have recognized standards for interoperability,
HHS-certification.6
Education
Former President George W. Bush and President Barack
Obama promised that every American would have the benefit of
an EHR. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(ARRA) is historic health care legislation in that it provides fund-
ing, allocating $19 billion to promote health information technol-
ogy (HIT) and EHRs. The Office of the National Coordinator of
Health Information Technology (ONCHIT) was also created by
Energy & Environment
ARRA to implement a strategic plan for EHR adoption. Starting
in 2011, $17 billion of that provision will be applied to financial in- reported that transgendered persons frequently encounter pro-
centives for doctors and hospitals to adopt and upgrade EHRs.7
The National Health Care survey reported in 2003 that EHRs
were in use in 17% of physicians’ offices, and 29% of hospital out-
patient departments.8
Background: Illegal Immigrants
The illegal immigrant population in the United States is es-
timated to be about 11.2 million people.9 According to a Pew
Hispanic Center report, in 2005, 57% of illegal immigrants were
from Mexico, 24% were from other Latin American countries (pri-
Equal Justice
marily from Central America), 9% were from Asia, 6% were from
Europe and Canada, and 4% were from the rest of the world.10
What little is known about access to health care by unauthor-
ized immigrants suggests that access is poor. Immigrants are
much less likely to use primary and preventive medical services,
hospital services, emergency medical services, and dental care
than are citizens, even after controlling for the effects of race/
ethnicity, income, insurance status, and health status. Researcher
Don Villarejo published a survey of California farm workers in
2000 that found that only one-sixth were offered employer-
Health Care
sponsored health insurance, and one-third of those receiving
offers of coverage could not afford the insurance offered. One-
third of the females and half of the males had not seen a physi-
cian in the past two years. This is due to several factors including
language barrier and the fact that immigrants are often unin-
sured and out-of-pocket health care costs are higher than those
paid by the insured.11
56
Illegal immigrants do take advantage of “safety net provid-
ers” like the Federally Qualified Health Center (FQHC). FQHCs
are a benefit under Medicare that became effective October 1,
1991 and include; community health centers, public housing, pro-
grams funded by the Indian Health Service, and programs serv-
ing homeless and migrants.12
Background: Transgender Community
Reliable statistics on the prevalence of transsexualism do not
exist. The statistics that exist are based on the number of sex re-
assignment surgeries, which is not reflec-
tive, because not all transgender individu-
als pursue this treatment. The American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and
signed males and 1 in 100,000 assigned
females seek sex reassignment surgery in
the United States.13 An estimate gener-
ated from the Amsterdam Gender Dys-
phoria Clinic, gives figures of 1 in18,000 assigned males and 1
in 54,000 assigned females seeking gender reassignment sur-
geries13. Using these more conservative estimates applied to US
census data from 2006-2008 would imply that there are 6,475
transgendered persons in the United States (1,528 per assigned
female plus 4,947 per assigned male)14 are likely to have pursued
gender reassignment surgery.
The Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Health Access
Project (GLBT HAP) commissioned JSI Research and Training In-
stitute, Inc. to conduct focus groups addressing the health care
needs and experiences of transgendered people. Their study
viders who will not treat them and experience a lack of sensitiv-
ity such as the unwillingness to address transgender people by
their preferred pronoun. It is important to note that transgen-
dered individuals have unique set of health care needs such as
issues related to hormone use, gynecological care, HIV preven-
tion counseling, or other concerns related to sexuality.15
Security Concerns and Security Measures
First this paper will look at the basis for security concerns in
these communities and more broadly, what preventive measures
exist and if their concerns are founded. Not only are individuals
concerned, but also health organizations share their fear. “Con-
cern that medical records will fall into the wrong hands is great-
est among groups representing people with disabilities, HIV or
mental health problems, who already face stigmatization.” If con-
fidential information is accessed electronically their members
could face greater discrimination. A poll of more than 200 orga-
nizations worldwide, including almost 50 in England, by Health
and Social Campaigners News International (HSCNI) found that
despite enthusiasm about the electronic health records technol-
ogy, 64% of the groups in England said they were worried that
patients would suffer a loss of confidentiality and privacy.16 A
survey by Pricewaterhouse-Coopers on Canadians’ views about
electronic medical records demonstrated a generational differ-
ence in concern. “Canadians aged 15 to 24 were most willing to
have their personal health records stored centrally, while those
65 and older were least willing.”17 Younger people already accus-
tomed to disclosing personal information online, such as bank-
ing and credit card information, are perhaps more inclined to
believe in the potential benefits.
Illegal immigrants may not utilize health providers to the
extent of native-born citizens, but standardized electronic re-
cords could present another barrier for them. “Because some
public health care facilities inquire about immigration status, im-
migrants believe that seeking treatment at such facilities could
lead to problems with immigration officials.”18 As a result, some
immigrants turn to black-market sources of health care, such as
unlicensed health care providers. They also purchase prescrip-
tion drugs that have been smuggled into the United States18.
FQHCs, the safety net providers, are actively trying to adopt
EHRs. Under ARRA national coordination is supplemented by
regional extension centers that “aim to provide assistance and
education to all providers in a region but shall prioritize any di-
rect assistance first…” to FQHCs and other specified safety net
providers.19
There is no evidence to lead to the conclusion that improved
health care for illegal immigrants would attract more immigrants
to the United States. Better quality of health care is already an
appeal to immigrants by the current standard American health-
care. Mexico has an estimated infant mortality rate of 18.42 in-
fants under one year old per 1,000 live births in 2009 compared
to a mortality rate of 6.26 in the United States.20 Should the ille-
gal immigrant population rise, they have limited negative impact
on the health care system and economy. A study by Dr. Sarita
Mohanty, based on data from the late 1990s, found that, “per
capita, medical expenditures for immigrants were about 55 per-
cent lower than those of US-born individuals. Expenditures for
uninsured and publicly insured immigrants were also approxi-
mately half those of their US-born counterparts.”21
Fear of discrimination and stigma kept many in the gay, les-
bian, bisexual, and transgender (GLBT) community from seeking
care for themselves or their families. Additionally, once in care,
GLBT members withheld personal information that their health
care providers needed.22 Transgender individuals who disclosed
information to a trusted single provider, such as a primary care
doctor, may be concerned that sensitive information will now be
accessible by all health care providers with whom the person
may interacts. “Providers frequently refer to trans issues in unre-
lated health care situations such as setting a broken bone, filling
a cavity or treating a cold.”23 This is disrespectful and may fur-
ther deter GLBT persons from seeking care given the interoper-
able nature of EHRs.
Security Measures
Certified EHRs are compliant with the Health Insurance Por-
tability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996. HIPAA creates
standards for the security and privacy of an individual’s health
information. HIPAA regulates the activities of several “covered
entities”, which includes health care providers who rely on elec-
tronic health care transactions. Information subject to HIPAA is
called protected health information (PHI). PHI includes; at the local level.”28 Even though there are limits to the effective-
individually identifiable health information” transmitted
or maintained in any form or medium. This individually
identifiable information includes health and personal in-
formation that either identifies or can be used to identify
an individual and relates to the physical or mental health
condition of the individual, the provision of health care
Defense & Diplomacy
services to the individual, or the payment for health care
services…a covered entity generally may not use or dis-
close PHI without the individual’s authorization, except
for treatment, payment, or health care operations or as
otherwise in compliance with HIPAA’s requirements.24
States have the power to determine if they want to be an “opt
in” or an “opt out” state. If the state decides to become an “opt
in” state, patients in that state would have to designate that their
Economic Development
information could be incorporated into the electronic system. If
the state decides to become an “opt out” state, its patients would
be incorporated unless the patient explicitly refuses. Although
most patients may be unaware of their rights to “opt out,” health
information is still only passed on to another provider, such as a
specialist, at the patient’s authorization or possibly in the case of
emergency care, in some states. “Patients ultimately have control
over who sees their data.”25
Paper records have also presented similar problems for these
communities in terms of fears of being deported and discrimi-
nated against, and in some ways are less secure than their elec-
tronic upgrade. When unauthorized people try to gain access
Education
to electronic health records, computers are programmed to ask
them to explain why they are seeking the information and warns
electronic intruders: “Be aware that your user ID and password
have been captured.” Thus a paper trail is created that shows
who tried to access a patient’s record is a legally punishable of-
fense. And unlike paper records, which do not have viewing logs,
if there’s an unauthorized viewing of an electronic health record,
a patient will be informed. William Straw, 59, a Los Altos, Calif.,
Energy & Environment
family physician, said about his EMR, “Nothing is 100% private,
[but] Electronic medical records are probably more secure than
the paper record we used to have, which could be sitting around.
…With our [electronic] records we can trace who had access.”26
Policy Recommendations
If illegal immigrants fear being deported and transgender
individuals fear more discrimination, these are concerns that ex-
tend beyond just loss of employment. The danger is that some
patients are so fearful that they will make decisions that inhibit
them from getting appropriate medical care, thus endangering
Equal Justice
their health. “One in eight respondents in a survey last fall by the
California HealthCare Foundation said they had tried to hide a
medical problem by using tactics like skipping a prescribed test
or asking the doctor to ‘fudge a diagnosis.’”27
Fear has been a barrier for illegal immigrants and educa-
tion can fix that. Some illegal immigrants are eligible for Med-
icaid benefits, but are too concerned about becoming a public
charge and thus ineligible for citizenship. “These fears remain
despite Department of Justice clarifications that have reiterated
that Medicaid and SCHIP coverage are not to be used in public
Health Care
charge determinations and outreach work by community groups
ness of outreach and educational campaigns, there is evidence
to suggest that it would be a valuable initiative. A report pre-
pared by Westat for the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality (AHRQ), suggests that American consumers are in need
of education about health information technology. The report fo-
57
 cuses on how patients do not realize the more active role they
will be able to play in their medical care, but this identified de-
Defense & Diplomacy

gree of ignorance suggests the average consumer is unaware

of the safety provisions in place for their medical care.29 Any
educational campaign should be geared toward the aging popu-
lation, who are more concerned about health technology and
stand to benefit the most from increasing health needs.
The incorporation of EHRs is not going to change or encour-
age already existing prejudices. This paper is not intended to
address provider sensitivity, but whether this health evolution
will affect individuals’ fears of discriminatory activities. This is a
Economic Development

concern that has been shared by the mental health community.

Several EHRs implementations, spurred on by community men-
tal health departments and advocacy groups, are considering a
two-tiered system with regards to information for mental health
patients. One tier would pertain to PHI information and another
tier of highly sensitive PHI would require “informed consent.”30
Essentially ensuring that there is an “opt in” criteria for more sen-
sitive information.
The transgender community is fairly small and the illegal im-
migrant community is larger, but does not utilize health care
providers as frequently as native-born citizens. Their concerns,
however, are analogous to other individuals, such as those with
Education

sensitive sexual diagnosis information. Provisions such as two-

tiers for PHI criteria could help to assuage some of those fears,
but provisions are useless unless patients are informed of their
existence. The problems associated with paper records, as a bar-
rier and source of discrimination, will carry over into electronic
records, but the safety measures and provisions patients can uti-
lize can bring solutions to those concerns as well.
Energy & Environment

Conclusion
There is evidence that suggests that EHRs are ineffective and
could, in fact, increase health care costs. Advocates of electronic
health records, however, say they will result in the elimination of
redundant tests, prevent prescribing conflicting medication, and
better-prepare doctors who can get a more complete picture by
having their patients’ entire medical history in one place in front
of them on their computer.31 Studies of EHR adoption have also
found associations between adoption and increased efficiencies,
and less expensive health care.32
Although some day in the United States, as in other devel-
Equal Justice

oped countries, perhaps EHRs will be the standard, the United

States is currently in a state of transition. Joy L. Pritts, a health
policy analyst at Georgetown University, said the government
seemed to assume that it could “tack on privacy protections
later… [but][i]f you don’t have the trust of patients, they will with-
hold information and won’t take advantage of the new system.”33
To facilitate that future ONCHIT and state governments should
consider two-tier provisions and implement educational cam-
paigns. One thing that will ensure that EHRs are ineffective is if
patients don’t trust them.
Health Care

58
Notes
Notes

Endnotes
Privatized Port Security: Leaving America Vulnerable
* For the purposes of this paper, I will refer to the entire Executive Branch
of the Federal Government, including the agencies under the Department of
Homeland Security, for example, as the Bush Administration.
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2. These numbers are based on the Kheel-Kormanoff Plan’s internal analysis
and are included with the Balanced Transportation Analyzer.
3. Michael D. Greenberg, Peter Chalk, Henry H. Willis, Ivan Khilko, and
David S. Ortiz. Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability. Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2006, p29.
4. Ibid. xix
5. Stephen E. Flynn. America the Vulnerable : How Our Government Is Fail-
ing to Protect Us from Terrorism. 1st ed. New York: HarperCollins, 2004, p84.
6. John F. Frittelli, Martin R. Lee, Jonathan Medalia, Ronald O’Rourke, Ra-
phael Perl. Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues. New York: Nova
Biomedical, 2003 p2.
7. Ibid. 6
8. Stephen E. Flynn. America the Vulnerable : How Our Government Is Fail-
ing to Protect Us from Terrorism. 1st ed. New York: HarperCollins, 2004, p88.
9. Ibid. 82
10. Ibid. 87.
11. Ibid. 90
12. Ibid. 92
13. C-Tpat Overview. Customs and Border Protection, December 13, 2007
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14. Mike Nizza. Inquiry Finds Port Security Lacking New York Times, May 27
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com/2008/05/27/inquiry-finds-port-security-lacking/.
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16. Container Security Initiative Ports. Department of Homeland Security,
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gov/xprevprot/programs/gc_1165872287564.shtm.
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18. Nicholas Hughes Allen. “The Container Security Initiative” p442.
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www.budget.state.ny.us/pubs/archive/fy0910archive/eBudget0910/fy0910little-
book/DeficitReduction.html
27. ibid
Supporting Student Loan Schemes in Developing Countries through
USAID
“About USAID in Central Asia.” USAID.gov. 4 Oct 2007. 14 March 2010.
<http://centralasia.usaid.gov/page.php?page=article-566&from_t= >
Albrecht, Douglas and Adrian Ziderman. “Student Loans and their Alterna-
tives: Improving Performance of Deferred Payment Programs.” Higher Educa-
tion. 23.4 (1992): 357-374. SpringerLink. Web. 15 April 2010.
Larrain, Christian and Salvador Zurita. “The New Student Loan System in
Chile’s Higher Education.” Higher Education. 55.6 (2007): 683-702. SpringerLink.
Web. 15 April 2010.
Psacharopoulos, George, et al. “Financing Education in Developing Coun-
tries: An Exploration of Policy Options.” World Bank Reports. International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, Washington, D.C.: 1986.
“Request for Applications (RFA) No.: HE116-09-004.” USAID.gov. 2 Feb
2009. n.d. 10 March 2010. <www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting.../RFA-
OAA-10-000001.pdf>
“USAID and Kyrgyz Investment and Credit Bank (KICB) Jointly Launch
Student Loan Program.” USAID.gov. 28 May, 2009. 14 March 2010. <www.usaid.
gov/our_work/cross-cutting.../RFA-OAA-10-000001.pdf>
“Vittana: FAQ” Vittana.org. n.d. 14 March 2010. <http://www.vittana.org/faq>
Woodhall, Maureen. “Student Loans in Developing Countries: Feasibility,
Experience and Prospects for Reform.” Higher Education. 23.4 (1992): 347-356.
JSTOR. Web. 18 March 2010.
An Analysis of City Adaptation Plans for Climate-Induced Sea Level Rise and
Increased Precipitation
1. Tol, R. S. J. The double trade-off between adaptation and mitigation for
sea level rise: an application of FUND. Mitig Adapt Strat Glob Change (2007)
12:741–753
2. Stern, N., Peters, S., Bakhshi, V., Bowen, A., Cameron, C., Catovsky, S.,
Crane, D., Cruickshank, S., Dietz, S., Edmonson, N., Garbett, S.-L., Hamid, L.,
Hoffman, G., Ingram, D., Jones, B., Patmore, N., Radcliffe, H., Sathiyarajah, R.,
Stock, M., Taylor, C., Vernon, T., Wanjie, H., & Zenghelis, D. (2006). Stern review:
the economics of climate change. London: HM Treasury.
3. Pielke, R., Prins, G., Rayner, S., & Sarewitz, D. (2007). Lifting the Taboo on
Adaptation. Nature 445: 597–8.
4. IPCC, 2007: Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulner-
ability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani,
J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, UK, 976 pp
5. Tol, R. S. J. The double trade-off between adaptation and mitigation for
sea level rise: an application of FUND. Mitig Adapt Strat Glob Change (2007)
12:741–753
 6. IPCC, 2007: Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulner-
ability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani,
J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, UK, 976 pp
7. Ibid
8. Ibid
9. Ibid
10. Dücker, P., Glindemann, H., Witt, H.-H., Thode, K. 2006. Concept for a
sustainable development of the Tidal Elbe River as an artery of the metropoli-
tan region Hamburg and beyond. http://www.tideelbe.de/pdf/Strategiepa-
pier_Tideelbe_eng.pdf.
11. Ibid
12. Lowe, A., Foster, J., Winkelman, S. Ask the Climate Question: Adapting
to Climate Change Impacts in Urban Regions. Center for Clean Air Policy. June
2009. http://www.ccap.org/index.php?db=pages&e-edit=1&id=166
13. Dücker, P., Glindemann, H., Witt, H.-H., Thode, K. 2006. Concept for a
sustainable development of the Tidal Elbe River as an artery of the metropoli-
tan region Hamburg and beyond. http://www.tideelbe.de/pdf/Strategiepa-
pier_Tideelbe_eng.pdf.
14. Ibid
15. Ibid
16. Ibid
17. Ibid
18. Mote, P., Petersen A., Reeder, S., Shipman, H., and Whitely Binder, L.
2008. Sea Level Rise in the Coastal Waters of Washington State. Report
prepared by the Climate Impacts Group, University of Washington, Seattle,
Washington, and the Washington Department of Ecology, Lacey, Washington.
19. Salathé, E.P. 2006. Influences of a shift in North Pacific storm tracks on
western North American precipitation under global warming. Geophysical
Research Letters 33, L19820, doi:10.1029/2006GL026882, 2006.
20. King County Executive Office. 2007 King County Climate Plan. Febru-
ary 2007. http://www.kingcounty.gov/exec/globalwarming.aspx
21. Ibid
22. Wolf, K. Adapting to Climate Change: Strategies from King County,
Washington. American Planning Association. March 2009.
23. Ibid
24. Ibid
25. King County Executive Office. 2007 King County Climate Plan. February
2007. http://www.kingcounty.gov/exec/globalwarming.aspx
26. Wolf, K. Adapting to Climate Change: Strategies from King County,
Washington. American Planning Association. March 2009.
27. King County Executive Office. 2008 King County Climate Plan. January
2009. http://www.kingcounty.gov/exec/globalwarming.aspx
28. King County Executive Office. 2007 King County Climate Plan. February
2007. http://www.kingcounty.gov/exec/globalwarming.aspx
29. Ibid
Big Data and Computer Server Energy Efficiency: the Need for a Rigorous,
Scalable, and Universal Standard
1. L. A. Barroso and U. Hlzle. The Case for Energy-Proportional Computing.
IEEE Computer, 40, 2007.
2. US Environmental Protection Agency, “Report to Congress on Server
and Data Center Energy Efficiency: Public Law 109-431”; www.energystar.gov/ia/
partners/prod_development/downloads/EPA_Datacenter_Report_Congress_Fi-
nal1.pdf
Green Jobs through Vocational Education
1. Maddow transcript: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29394872/
2. http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=news-000003118085
3. With “intelligence activities” defined in Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th
Congress as “(1) the collection, analysis or use of information which relates to
any foreign country, or any government, political group, party, military force,
movement, or other association in such foreign country, and which relates to
the defense, foreign policy, national security, or related policies of the United
States; (2) activities taken to counter similar activities directed against the
United States, (3) covert or clandestine activities affecting the relations of the
United States with any foreign government, political group, party, military force,
movement or other association; and (4) the collection, analysis or use of infor-
mation about activities of persons within the United States whose political and
related activities pose, or may be considered by any department, agency, bu-
reau, office, division, instrumentality, or employee of the United States to pose,
a threat to the internal security of the United States, and covert or clandestine
activities directed against such persons.”
4. Alfred Cumming, “Gang of Four Congressional Intelligence Notifications,”
Congressional Research Service (January 29, 2010): 3.
5.Vicki Divoll, “Congress’s Torture Bubble,” New York Times, May 12, 2009,
Opinion Section.
6. Alfred Cumming, “Gang of Four Congressional Intelligence Notifications,”
Congressional Research Service (January 29, 2010): 1.
7. Ibid 6-7.
8. Panetta press release: https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releas-
es-statements/congress-and-the-cia-time-to-move-on.html
9. http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/nation/6579615.html
Christopher Pyle and Richard Pious, The President, Congress, and the Consti-
tution: power and Legitimacy in American Politics (New York: The Free Press,
1984): 384-85.
10. Marc Ambinder, “Did Hoekstra Compromise a Sensitive Intelligence
Program,” The Atlantic (Nov 12, 2009) http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2009/11/did-hoekstra-compromise-a-sensitive-intelligence-pro-
gram/30033/
11. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, HR 2071, 111th
Congress. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, SR 1494, 111th
Congress.
12. Walter Pincus, “White House threatens veto on intelligence activities
bill,” Washington Post, March 16, 2010.
13. “Desperately Seeking Watchdog,” New York Times, April 5, 2010, Opinion
section.
14. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, HR 2071, 111th Con-
gress, Section 321. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, SR 1494,
111th Congress, Section 332.
15. Elizabeth B. Bazan, “The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Over-
view of Selected Issues,” Congressional Research Service (July 7, 2008): 2-3.
Mixed-Member Proportional Representation: Fixing the “People’s House”
1. The author would sincerely like to thank the following people, without
whom this paper would have been impossible: Rob Richie and the rest of the
FairVote organization, for their dedication to ensuring fair representation for
all, and for taking me under their wing and teaching me about these issues;
Professor Raymond Smith, for his helpful and informative comments on recom-
mendations for improving this paper; and the Roosevelt Institute at Columbia,
for giving me the opportunity to grow as a person, a writer, and an informed
citizen over the past 4 years.
2. Hill, Steven. Fixing Elections: The Failure of America’s Winner Take All
Politics. New York: Routledge, 2002, p. ix.
3. There are many problems with our current executive election paradigm,
and many of these could be fixed by solutions outside of the scope of this
paper, such as Instant Runoff Voting (IRV). For discussion on these topics, see
Real Choices/New Voices, Ch. 10.
4. Smith, Raymond. Importing Democracy: Ideas from Around the World
to Reform and Renew American Democracy. Praeger Publishers: Westport, CT,
2010, ch. 1, p. 1.
5. For many districts, these lines are truly arbitrary - a few relatively
insignificant changes could easily flip a safe-Democrat district Republican, or
vice-versa.
6. Amy, Douglas. Real Choices/New Voices: How Proportional Represen-
tation Elections Could Revitalize American Democracy. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2002, p. 6.
7. Hill, Steven. Fixing Elections: The Failure of America’s Winner Take
All Politics. New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 45. Moreover, this trend is getting
worse: there is today not a single Republican representative from New England,
while many other states are ruby red.
8. Ibid., p. 45.
9. Ibid., p. xii.
10. Ibid., p. 15.
11. Amy, Douglas. Real Choices/New Voices: How Proportional Represen-
tation Elections Could Revitalize American Democracy. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2002, p. 37.
12. Ibid., p. 37.
13. Ibid., p. 39.
14. These flaws, which are characteristic of WTA, are even more apparent
in the Electoral College, where the WTA nature of the election in each state,
combined with the decision that 100% of a state’s EV go to the winner of the
contest (the so-called “unit rule”), produces immense distortions in the outcome
of presidential elections.
15. The problem of gerrymandering is significant and unfair, though its
actual effects are small when compared to the structural inevitability of WTA
leading to disenfranchisement and poor representation; therefore, solutions to
gerrymandering are not addressed here, though much literature exists on the
65
subject.
16. There are solutions, such as Cumulative Voting, which have been sug- 33. As long as the electoral threshold was set at or below 10%, the Inde-
gested by scholars like Lani Guinier, which have been implemented in some pendents would get a seat. If it was set higher, they would not get a seat – an
locales to increase the election of minority candidates. However, these solutions important factor to keep in mind when discussing electoral thresholds.
are imperfect – in part because they are versions of semiproportional represen- 34. Smith, Raymond. Importing Democracy: Ideas from Around the World
tation – and thus can be improved by implementing a fully proportional system. to Reform and Renew American Democracy. Praeger Publishers: Westport, CT,
Cf. Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority, and Amy, Real Choices, p. 219-25. 2010, ch. 1, p. 8.
17. Amy, Douglas. Real Choices/New Voices: How Proportional Represen- 35. For a discussion on district magnitude, cf. Real Choices, New Voices,
tation Elections Could Revitalize American Democracy. New York: Columbia ch. 231-3.
University Press, 2002, p. 109, 126. 36. Figure 3
18. With Hispanics, it is important to note that their proportion of the elec-
torate is much smaller than their proportion of the total population, due to the
large number of non-citizen Hispanics and Hispanics who are here illegally.
19. Many attempts have been made to remedy this, most of which have
centered around so-called “racial gerrymandering”, where a district will be
redrawn so that a majority of the population in a given district belongs to a
given minority, in order to ensure the election of a candidate of that minority.
However, in addition to forcing the minority population to vote specifically on
the grounds of race to get a minority candidate elected, as well as disenfran-
chising those in that district that are not members of that minority, in locations
such as diverse cities (like New York City) it is impossible in many areas to draw
a district that is both large enough to obviate 14th Amendment challenges
(requiring approximately 650,000 people/district) and homogenous enough to
ensure the victory of a specific candidate.
20. Smith, Raymond. Importing Democracy: Ideas from Around the World
to Reform and Renew American Democracy. Praeger Publishers: Westport, CT,
2010, ch. 2, p. 8.
21. This helps to explain some of the awkward coalitions that are found in
US political parties: environmentalists and labor unions are both represented by
Democrats, and libertarians and social conservatives are both represented by
Republicans, even though their interests are diametrically opposed.
22. This is a well-studied dilemma, known in the literature as “sincere vs.
sophisticated voting.”
23. By “the least ideologically-preferred”, what is meant is that, on a
political spectrum, the voters who voted for Nader or Scozzafava were closer
ideologically to Gore or Hoffman, respectively, than to the eventual winners.
Also, while it turned out that Hoffman, the third-party candidate, received more
votes than Scozzafava, the Republican, it was the presence of both in the race
that caused Owens to be elected.
24. “Dubious Democracy 2008.” FairVote. Accessed at http://www.fairvote.
Adapted from Douglas Amy’s Real Choices, New Voices: How Proportional
org/dubious-democracy-2008.
Representation Could Revitalize American Democracy, p. 21.
25. Due to space constraints, I have limited the examination of fairness to
37. One potential way to correct these flaws on the district side of the
almost purely mathematical notions of representation; however, WTA causes
ballot would be to implement Instant-Runoff Voting on this side of the ballot.
or contributes to many more problems than these, including low-quality and
Doing so would eliminate the spoiler effect, wasted votes, and would give a
negative campaigns, legislative policy which is unrepresentative of the will
third-party candidate a chance of winning if he or she was the second-choice
of the electorate, unnecessary obstructionism, increased pork-barrel politics,
of a significant portion of the electorate. It could, however, overly complicate
geographic polarization, and the placement of narrow and provincial interests
an already somewhat complicated voting procedure. Cf. Real Choices, New
above those of the country at large. For a more in-depth discussion of these
Voices, p. 215-19.
issues, see Fixing Elections, ch. 12-15, and Real Choices, ch. 7-8.
38. Amy, Douglas. Real Choices/New Voices: How Proportional Represen-
26. Hill, Steven. Fixing Elections: The Failure of America’s Winner Take All
tation Elections Could Revitalize American Democracy. New York: Columbia
Politics. New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 43. (Italics original).
University Press, 2002, p. 20.
27. See Figure 1.
39. Ibid., p. 20.
28. Adams, John. “Thoughts on Government.” Accessed at http://www.
40. Due to some mathematical quirks, this can at time require additional
liberty1.org/thoughts.htm.
seats in the legislature, known as “overhang” seats. While the mathematical for-
29. Amy, Douglas. Real Choices/New Voices: How Proportional Represen-
mulae used to determine if, when, and how many overhang seats are created,
tation Elections Could Revitalize American Democracy. New York: Columbia
the function of such seats is to ensure that each party is given representation in
University Press, 2002, p. 169.
accordance with its vote share.
30. Ibid., p. 169-70.
41. Smith, Raymond. Importing Democracy: Ideas from Around the World
31. This electoral threshold is a critical number, as setting it too low can
to Reform and Renew American Democracy. Praeger Publishers: Westport, CT,
lead to instability, while setting it too high can block out minor parties. Many
2010, ch. 2, p. 6.
successful PR systems set a threshold of around 5%; Italy and Israel, as two
42. US Constitution, Article I, Section 3, Clause 1. Accessed at http://www.
examples of failed PR systems, set their thresholds extremely low, at around 1%.
law.cornell.edu/anncon/html/art1frag17_user.html#art1_sec3cl.
32. Figure 2
43. Smith, Raymond. Importing Democracy: Ideas from Around the
World to Reform and Renew American Democracy. Praeger Publishers:
Winner Take All Proportional Representation Westport, CT, 2010, ch. 1, p. 7. Also, cf. Hill, p. 294.
44. Hill, Steven. Fixing Elections: The Failure of America’s Winner Take
10 seats in 10 Districts 10 Seats in 1 District All Politics. New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 294. This law was passed to
60% R, 30% D, 10% I 60% R, 30% D, 10% I eliminate at-large elections, which were an even worse form of “democracy
technology” commonly used in the South to prevent African-Americans
Legislative Composition: Legislative Composition: from winning elections.
r: 10 Seats r: 6 Seats 45. For states with one Representative, it is obvious why this is the case.
With two Representatives, even if one district with two members is created,
D. 0 Seats D. 3 Seats each member would need to win 50% of the vote – leading to the same
I: 0 Seats I: 1 Seats problems as WTA.
 46. Hastings Letter. FairVote Program for Representative Government. Ac-
cessed at http://www.fairvote.org/?page=866.
47. Smith, Raymond. Importing Democracy: Ideas from Around the World
to Reform and Renew American Democracy. Praeger Publishers: Westport, CT,
2010, ch. 1, p.9.
48. Amy, Douglas. Real Choices/New Voices: How Proportional Represen-
tation Elections Could Revitalize American Democracy. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2002, p. 267. This form, known as the single transferable vote
(STV, also known as Instant Runoff Voting), allows voters to rank their choices
on a ballot, preventing spoiler candidates, severely limiting wasted votes, and
making third-party candidates viable alternatives.
49. Ibid., p. 269.
50. Ibid., p. 272.
51. Ibid., p. 273.
Culture without Bias, Diplomacy without Propaganda
1. The Constitution of the United States,” Article 1, Section 8, Clause 11.
2. “Learn About Congress: The Role of Congress Q&A.” Center on Con-
gress at Indiana University.
3. Madison, James, “Letters of Helvidius, No. II,” In The Letters of Pacificus
and Helvidius, 1845.
4.Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist #60,” in The Federalist Papers
5. Howell, William G. While dangers gathers. Princeton, N.J: Princeton 2007,
Page 4.
6. Mayhew, David R., Congress: The Electoral Connection, New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University, 1974.
7. Howell, 66, 65, 96
8. Gallup Poll and USA Today/Gallup Poll. “Bush: Job Ratings (1). PollingRe-
port.com/
9. Authorization for Use of Military Force- Sept. 18, 2001.” FindLaw | Legal
News & Information.
10. “Legislation & Records Home Votes Roll Call Vote.” U.S. Senate. We
11. Gallup Poll and USA Today/Gallup Poll.
12. Howell, 170-1
13. Dodd and Oppenheimer, 326
14. Yoo, John. “President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military
Operations.” United States Department of Justice, September 25, 2001.
15. Gallup Poll and USA Today/Gallup Poll.
16. Howell, 61
17. Dodd and Oppenheimer, 326
18. Dodd and Oppenheimer, 312, 313, 315, 316
19. President Barack Obama. “Escalation in Afghanistan.” West Point Acad-
emy. 1 Dec. 2009. Speech.
20. “Obama discusses Afghanistan troop surge with general,” CNN.com
21. Howell, 64
22.“CNN Political Ticker: Members of Congress react to Obamas Afghani-
stan decision.” CNN.com
23. “Skeptical Congress Clears Obama Afghanistan Plan - cbs13.com.”
CBS13/CW31: Web. 09 Dec. 2009.
24. “Poll: Approval for War Strategy Jumps After Obama’s Speech - CBS
News.” 09 Dec. 2009.
25. Zelizer, Julian. “Obama should heed the lessons of Vietnam - CNN.com,
26. Howell, 158, Table 6.1
27. Dodd and Oppenheimer, 219
28. Howell, Table 7.4
29. Dodd and Oppenheimer, 213-214
30. Howell, 161
31. Mayhew, American Congress, Actions in the Public Sphere
32. Dodd and Oppenheimer, 330
3. United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 8
35. Dodd and Oppenheimer, 314
36. “McGrain v. Daugherty, U.S. Supreme Court Case Summary.” The Oyez
Project.
Automatic Absentee Voting
1.CIRCLE: The Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning &
Engagement. “Youth Voter Turnout in the States during the 2004 Presidential
and 2002 Midterm Elections.” Web. 31 Jan. 2010. Common Cause. Getting It
Straight for 2008. Common Cause, 2008. Print.
2. Ibid
3. Vote By Mail. FairVote. Web. 31 Jan. 2010.<http://archive.fairvote.org/
turnout/mail.htm>.
4. Common Cause. Getting It Straight for 2008. Common Cause, 2008.
Print.
Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones for New York State
1. “Violence and Disruption Statistics,” National Abortion Federation, http://
www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/downloads/about_abortion/
violence_stats.pdf.
2. David L. Hudson, “Abortion Protests and Buffer Zones,” First Amend-
ment Center, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/assembly/topic.
aspx?topic=buffer_zones
3. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York 519 U.S. 357, 117
S.Ct. 855 (1997).
4. David L. Hudson, “Abortion Protests and Buffer Zones,” First Amend-
ment Center, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/assembly/topic.
aspx?topic=buffer_zones
5. Rachel Entman, “Picket Fences: Analyzing the Court’s Treatment of Re-
strictions on Polling, Abortion, and Labor Picketers,” Georgetown Law Review
9, no 8 (August 2002), 2583.
6. “State Policies in Brief,” Guttmacher Institute (January 1, 2010), http://www.
guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PAC.pdf.
7. Rachel Entman, “Picket Fences: Analyzing the Court’s Treatment of Re-
strictions on Polling, Abortion, and Labor Picketers,” Georgetown Law Review
9, no 8 (August 2002), 2588.
8. “ACLU’s Role in Stopping Clinic Violence,” American Civil Liberties Union,
http://www.aclu.org/reproductive-freedom/aclus-role-stopping-clinic-violenc
9. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York 519 U.S. 357, 117
S.Ct. 855 (1997). “Clinic Access Bill Pases,” NARAL Pro-Choice New York (2009),
http://www.prochoiceny.org/instate/clinicaccess.shtml
10. “State Facts about Abortion: New York,” Guttmacher Institute (2008),
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/pdf/new_york.pdf.
11. Michael Fletcher, “Sniper Kills Abortion Doctor Near Buffalo,” Washington
Post, October 25, 1998, A1.
12. “New Chicago ordinance targets 40 Days for Life, tramples pro-life
Americans’ free speech rights,” 40 Days for Life, http://www.40daysforlife.com/
news.cfm?selected=releases&release=35
The Limits of “Fair Discrimination”:
Rape and Domestic Violence Classifications in Health Insurance
1. Ivory, Danielle. “Rape Victims’ Choice: Risk AIDS or Health Insurance.”
Huffington Post. November 9, 2009.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/21/insurance-companies-rape-
_n_328708.html
2. Ivory 2009.
3. Shelton, Deborah L. “Twice a Victim: Battered women find getting insur-
ance is the second hurdle to pass.” 23 Human Rights 26. Winter 1996.
4. “Survivors” is meant to be inclusive of anyone who has experienced rape
or domestic violence, which may include men as well as women, children, and
people of all ages. However, for the purposes of this paper, I will refer to “survi-
vors” or to women, as they comprise the majority of victims of these crimes.
5. It is important to note that rape and domestic violence are related, but
distinct conditions which elicit slightly different responses from insurers. Rape
is a one-time incident of unwanted, forced sexual intercourse that may leave
the survivor with severe emotional trauma as well as relatively small chances
of contracting HIV, STIs, and pregnancy. She may be medically advised to take
medications to prevent the pregnancy and diseases and to attend longer-term
counseling to alleviate psychological trauma. Domestic violence is, by nature,
more chronic and potentially more costly as the abuse of an intimate partner
tends to be repetitive and increasingly violent over time. Domestic violence
also involves a severe power imbalance, where the victim of abuse is made
financially, socially, emotionally, and in many ways dependent on the abuser.
Thus, although the majority of women in abusive relationships understand the
danger of their situation for their health and their children’s health and many
attempt to leave their abuser, however few succeed.
6. Tchijov, Maria. “Rep. Kucinich has opportunity to question insurance.”
SEIU.org. September 15, 2009.
7. Shelton 1996.
8. Shelton 1996.
9. Shelton 1996.
10. Shelton 1996.
11. Mullikin, Sheri A. “A Cost Analysis Approach to Determining the Reason-
ableness of Using Domestic Violence as an Insurance Classification.” 25 Journal
of Legislation 195. 1999.
12. O’Keefe, Ed. “Planned Parenthood Hits McCain, Palin on Rape
Record.” Washington Post. October, 1, 2008. http://voices.washingtonpost.
com/44/2008/10/01/planned_parenthood_hits_mccain.html
13. Tchijov 2009.
67
 14. Silverleib, Alan. “Democrats vow to ban domestic violence as ‘pre-
existing condition.’” CNN. October 6, 2009. http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLI-
TICS/10/06/domestic.violence.insurance/index.html
15. Mullikin 1999.
16. Mullikin 1999.
17. Senator Paul Wellstone, Press Release, Mar. 19, 1996, available in 1996 WL
8784532. Taken from: Hellman, Deborah S. “Is Actuarially Fair Insurance Pricing
Actually Fair? A Case Study in Insuring Battered Women.” 32 Harvard Civil
Rights – Civil Liberties Law Review 355. 1997.
18. Terkel, Amanda. “House Health Reform Bill Outlaws Treating Domestic
Violence as a Pre-Existing Condition.” Think Progress. October 29, 2009. http://
thinkprogress.org/2009/10/29/house-bill-domestic/
19. Mullikin 1999.
20. Hellman 1997.
21. Estimates come from the National Women’s Law Center. Taken from:
Brown, Jennifer. “Women pay up to 50% more for health insurance premiums.”
The Denver Post. October 25, 2009.
22. Shelton 1996.
23. Ivory 2009.
24. Hellman 1997.
25. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, HIV Frequently Asked Questions.
March 20, 2006. http://www.hiv.va.gov/vahiv?page=ptfaq-2006-03-20
26. Mullikin 1999.
27. Estimates come from a 1994 survey by Louis Harris and Associates, con-
ducted for the Commonwealth Fund. Taken from: Shelton 1996.
28. Shelton 1996.
29. Shelton 1996.
30. Hellman 1997.
31. Estimates come from a 1994 survey by Louis Harris and Associates, con-
ducted for the Commonwealth Fund. Taken from: Shelton 1996.
32. Hellman 1997.
33. Shelton 1996.
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1. American Society of Reproductive Medicine. 2006. Guidelines for Oocyte
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2. Sargent, Michelle. 2007. Regulating Egg Donation: A Comparative
Analysis of Reproductive Technologies in the United States and United King-
dom. Michigan Journal of Public Affairs(4): 4-6
3. McLeod, Carolyn. 2007. For Dignity of Money: Feminists on the Com-
modification of Women’s Reproductive Labor. The Oxford Handbook of Bioeth-
ics. Ed. Bonnie Steinbock. Oxford University Press: New York p. 262
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sisted Procreation: Reflections on an Open Market and Anonymous Donation in
Human Sperm and Eggs. Law & Society Review. (36.2):257-283.
5. Sargent, Michelle. 2007. Regulating Egg Donation: A Comparative
Analysis of Reproductive Technologies in the United States and United King-
dom. Michigan Journal of Public Affairs(4): 4-6
6. Steinbock, Bonnie. 2004. Payment for Egg Donation and Surrogacy. The
Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine. (71):255-265.
7. Fuller, Michael F. 2000. Donor or Vendor: The Commodification of Hu-
man Eggs. Current Surgery. (57): 151
8. Hopkins, Jim. March 15, 2006. Egg Donor Business Booms on Campuses.
USA Today. http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/2006-03-15-egg-
donors-usat_x.htm (Accessed December 12, 2009)
9. Goldberg C. 1999. On Web, Models Auction Their Eggs to Bidders for
Beautiful Children. The New York Times
10. Sargent, Michelle. 2007. Regulating Egg Donation: A Comparative
Analysis of Reproductive Technologies in the United States and United King-
dom. Michigan Journal of Public Affairs(4): 4-6
11. American Fertility Society. 1993. Guidelines for Oocyte donations. Fertil-
ity and Sterility. (59): 55-75.
12. Fuller, Michael F. 2000. Donor or Vendor: The Commodification of Hu-
man Eggs. Current Surgery. (57): 151
13. Holand, Susan. 2001. Contested commodities at both ends of life: Buy-
ing and selling gametes, embryos, and body tissues. Kennedy Institute of Ethics
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14. Sargent, Michelle. 2007. Regulating Egg Donation: A Comparative
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dom. Michigan Journal of Public Affairs(4): 4-6
15. American Society of Reproductive Medicine. 2007. Financial Compen-
sation of Oocyte Donors. Fertility and Sterility. (88): 305
16. Ibid
17. American Society of Reproductive Medicine. 2006. Guidelines for
68
Oocyte Donation. Fertility and Sterility. (86): 43
18. McLeod, Carolyn. 2007. For Dignity of Money: Feminists on the Com-
modification of Women’s Reproductive Labor. The Oxford Handbook of Bioeth-
ics. Ed. Bonnie Steinbock. Oxford University Press: New York p. 262
19. Steinbock, Bonnie. 2004. Payment for Egg Donation and Surrogacy. The
Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine. (71):255-265.
20. American Society of Reproductive Medicine. 2007. Financial Compen-
sation of Oocyte Donors. Fertility and Sterility. (88): 305
21. Ibid
22. American Society of Reproductive Medicine. 2006. Guidelines for
Oocyte Donation. Fertility and Sterility. (86): 43
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