TAN vs SABANDAL, February 24, 1992

On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of law filed against respondent
Sabandal and accordingly denied the latter's petition to be allowed to take the oath as member of the Philippine
Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, all of which were either
denied or "Noted without action." The Court, however, on 10 February 1989, after considering his plea for mercy
and forgiveness, his willingness to reform and the several testimonials attesting to his good moral character and
civic consciousness, reconsidered its earlier Resolution and finally allowed him to take the lawyer's oath "with the
Court binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit
of the Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legal profession" (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989,
170 SCRA 211).

However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking, complainants Tan, Dagpin and Boquia each filed
separate motions for reconsideration of the Resolution of 10 February 1989. These were acted upon in the
Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder quoted, in part, for ready reference:

On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and Complainant Moises Boquia in
SBC No. 609 also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution allowing respondent to take
his oath. They alleged that respondent had deliberately and maliciously excluded them in his
Petition of 28 June 1988. That, of course, is without merit considering that in his Petition of 28
June 1988, respondent had discussed said cases quite lengthily.

On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that Complainant Benjamin Cabigon in BM
No. 59 and Complainant Cornelio Agnis in SBC No. 624, had passed away so that they are in no
position to submit their respective Comments.

One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing respondent to take his oath, was
a testimonial from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, dated 29 December 1986, certifying that
respondent was "acting with morality and has been careful in his actuations in the community."

Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed only by the then President of the
IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, without authorization from the Board
of Officers of said Chapter; and that Atty. Angeles was respondent's own counsel as well as the
lawyer of respondent's parents-in-law in CAR Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached to
Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration was a Certification, dated 24 February 1989, signed by
the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas, stating that "the
present Board of Officers with the undersigned as President had not issued any testimonial
attesting to the good moral character and civic consciousness of Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."

In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989, respondent states that the IBP
testimonial referred to by Complainant Tan must have been that signed by the former IBP
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, addressed to the Chief Justice,
dated 29 December 1986, and that he himself had not submitted to the Court any certification
from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter Board of Officers of 1988-1989.

Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require the present Board of Officers of
the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, to MANIFEST whether or not it is willing to give a
testimonial certifying to respondent's good moral character as to entitle him to take the lawyer's
oath, and if not, the reason therefor. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Norte is likewise required to submit a COMMENT on respondent's moral fitness to
be a member of the Bar.

Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from notice.

Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4 August 1989, and received on 25 August 1989, pertinently
reading:
 The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the respondent, is not aware of any
acts committed by him as would disqualify him from admission to the Bar. It might be relevant to
mention, however, that there is Civil Case No. 3747 entitled Republic of the Philippines, Represented
by the Director of Lands, Plaintiff, versus Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del
Norte and Rural Bank of Pinan, (Zamboanga del Norte), Inc., for Cancellation of Title and/or
Reversion pending in this Court in which said respondent, per complaint filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of
land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition
under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc. The mortgage
was later foreclosed and the land sold at public auction and respondent has not redeemed the land
until the present. (Emphasis Supplied)

The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification, dated 2 February 1990, signed by its
Secretary Peter Y. Co and attested to by its President Gil L. Batula, to wit:

This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court—
Municipal Trial Court in the City of Dipolog; Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte and the
Office of the Provincial and City Prosecutors, Mr. Nicolas E. Sabandal has not been convicted of
any crime, nor is there any pending derogatory criminal case against him. Based on the above
findings, the Board does not find any acts committed by the petitioner to disqualify him from
admission to the Philippine Bar.

We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP Certification and to reply to Executive Judge
Pelagio Lachica's comment in our Resolution of 15 February 1990.

On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement objections of complainants Tan (in BM 44) and
Boquia (in SBC 616) and the Certification by Executive Judge Lachica, dated 4 August 1989, that there is a
pending case before his Court involving respondent Sabandal, this Court resolved to DEFER the setting of a date
for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and required Judge Lachica to inform this Court of the outcome of the
case entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747), pending before his "Sala" as soon as resolved.

In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another Comment, dated 13 March 1990, by complainant
Herve Dagpin in SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and describing his
actuations in Civil Case 3747 as manipulative and surreptitious. This comment was Noted in the Resolution of 22
May 1990.

In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990, complainant Tan in Bar Matter 44, informed
the Court that her relationship with Sabandal has "already been restored," as he had asked forgiveness for what
has been done to her and that she finds no necessity in pursuing her case against him. Complainant Tan further
stated that she sees no further reason to oppose his admission to the Bar as he had shown sincere repentance
and reformation which she believes make him morally fit to become a member of the Philippine Bar. "In view of
this development," the letter stated, "we highly recommend him for admission to the legal profession and request
this Honorable Court to schedule his oath-taking at a time most convenient." This letter was Noted in the
Resolution of 2 October 1990, which also required a comment on Tan's letter from complainants Boquia and
Dagpin.

Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their comment, dated 5 November 1990, stated thus:

Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private personal disposition which raises the
question whether personal forgiveness is enough basis to exculpate and obliterate these cases. On
our part, we believe and maintain the importance and finality of the Honorable Supreme Court's
resolutions in these cases. . . .

It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and discretion of any party to change or
amend said final resolutions which are already res judicata. Viewed in the light of the foregoing
final and executory resolutions, these cases therefore should not in the least be considered as
anything which is subject and subservient to the changing moods and dispositions of the parties,
devoid of any permanency or finality. Respondent's scheming change in tactics and strategy could
not improve his case.

The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.

In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico M. Garcia, Regional Trial Court Judge of
Branch 8, Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded Judge Pelagio Lachica, the latter having availed of optional
retirement on 30 June 1990) submitted to this Court, on 17 December 1990, a copy of the "Judgment," dated 12
December 1990, in Civil Case 3747, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal et al" for
Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion, which, according to him, was already considered closed and terminated.

Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October 1990, had been reached between the
principal parties, approved by the Trial Court, and conformed to by the counsel for defendant Rural Bank of
Pinan.

Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate of Title under Free Patent in Sabandal's
name and the latter's mortgage thereof in favor of the Rural Bank of Pinan; provided for the surrender of the
certificate of title to the Register of Deeds for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land
covered by the aforesaid Certificate of' Title with defendant Sabandal refraining from exercising acts of possession
or ownership over said land; caused the defendant Sabandal to pay defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of
P35,000 for the loan and interest; and the Rural Bank of Pinan to waive its cross-claims against defendant
Nicolas Sabandal.

Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were NOTED in our Resolution of 29 January
1991. In the same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpin were required to comment on the same.

Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990, was sent by Executive judge Jesus Angeles of
the RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that Sabandal has no pending case with his Court and that he has no
cause to object to his admission to the Philippine Bar. This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 26 February 1991.

Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in a Motion dated 8 June 1991.
In our Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action on the aforesaid Motion pending compliance by the
complainants with the Resolution of 29 January 1991 requiring them to comment on the letter of Judge Pacifico
M. Garcia.

To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution by submitting a Comment, dated 29 August
1991, stating that the termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is "proof of Sabandal's sincere reformation, of his
repentance with restitution of the rights of complainants he violated," and that "there is no more reason to oppose
his admission to the Bar." This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 24 September 1991.

In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his plea to be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath.

His plea must be DENIED.

In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take the oath, ten (10) years having elapsed from
the time he took and passed the 1976 Bar examinations, after careful consideration of his show of contrition and
willingness to reform. Also taken cognizance of were the several testimonials attesting to his good moral character
and civic consciousness. At that time, we had not received the objections from complainant Tan to Sabandal's
taking the oath nor were we aware of the gravity of the civil case against him.

It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal" was instituted by
the Government in 1985 and was brought about because of respondent's procurement of a certificate of free
patent over a parcel of land belonging to the public domain and its use as security for a mortgage in order to
obtain a loan. At that time, Sabandal was an employee of the Bureau of Lands. He did not submit any defense
and was declared it default by order of the RTC dated 26 November 1986. The controversy was eventually settled
by mere compromise with respondent surrendering the bogus certificate of title to the government and paying-off
the mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall further expenses of litigation incurred by defendants" (Rollo, Judgment
in Civil Case No. 3747). The Office of the Solicitor General interposed no objection to the approval of the said
amicable settlement and prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, "as the amicable settlement
may amount to a confession by the defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must also be stressed that in 1985, at the time
said case was instituted, Sabandal's petition to take the lawyer's oath had already been denied on 29 November
1983 and he was then submitting to this Court motions for reconsideration alleging his good moral character
without, however, mentioning the pendency of that civil case against him.

In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its termination, the Court now entertains
second thoughts about respondent's fitness to become a member of the Bar.
It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment
facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over property which he could not but have known was public
land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of
gross dishonesty while in the public service, which can not be erased by the termination of the case filed by the
Republic against him where no determination of his guilt or innocence was made because the suit had been
compromised. Although as the Solicitor General had pointed out, the amicable settlement was tantamount to a
confession on his part. What is more, he could not but have known of the intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet he
took advantage of it by securing a bank loan, mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure of
the mortgage and the sale of the land at public auction, he did not lift a finger to redeem the same until the civil
case filed against him was eventually compromised. This is a sad reflection on his sense of honor and fair dealing.
His failure to reveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period
that he was submitting several Motions for Reconsideration before us also reveal his lack of candor and
truthfulness.

There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these were confined to lack of knowledge of
the pendency of any criminal case against him and were obviously made without awareness of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the Government against him. Those testimonials can not,
therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack of good moral character.

That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619) have not
submitted any opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment. They have already expressed their
objections in their earlier comments. That complainant Tan has withdrawn her objection to his taking the oath
can neither tilt the balance in his favor, the basis of her complaint treating as it does of another subject matter.

Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character:

The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard for the
legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training as well as in honesty and fair
dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high
standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble
profession only those persons who are known to be honest and to possess good moral character. .
. . (In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230).

Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least
common honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil.
399 [1928]). It has also been held that no moral qualification for bar membership is more important than
truthfulness or candor (Fellner v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a member of the BAR, this Court's Resolution,
dated 10 February 1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

ATTY. LUIS V. ARTIAGA JR vs ATTY. ENRIQUE C. VILLANUEVA, July 29, 1988

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on April 2, 1978, Atty. Luis V. Artiaga Jr. sought the disbarment of
Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva for alleged unethical practices.

By a resolution dated May 24, 1978, this Court required respondent Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva to answer the
complaint. To the answer of respondent dated July 5, 1978, complainant Atty. Luis V. Artiaga Jr. filed his reply of
July 31, 1978.

After considering the answer of respondent, this Court resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. The solicitor General forwarded to the Court his Report and
Recommendation dated May 4, 1988 with the finding that respondent was guilty of misconduct and with the
recommendation that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of at least six (6) months.

The complaint for disbarment arose from four (4) separate cases and several incidental cases with Juliano
Estolano, client of complainant Atty. Artiaga, Jr. and Glicerio Aquino and/or Florentina Guanzon, clients of
respondent Atty. Villanueva, as adversaries in all of these cases involving the same property.
The factual background of these cases is summed up in the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
SP06600 dated November 16, 1977, a petition for certiorari and prohibition, an offshoot of Civil Case No. 183-C
for Recovery of Possession filed by Estolano against Aquino and Guanzon before the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, Branch VI on June 11, 1974. Quoted hereunder are pertinent portions of the Court's decision:

There were three parcels of land involved herein. All continuos and adjoining to each other and
located in Bambang, Los Banos, Laguna. The first covered an area of 2.6793 hectares; the second,
an area of one hectare; and the third, an area of one-half hectare. On July 20,1950, petitioner
Juliano Estolano was issued original Certificate of Title No. P-286 in his name over the first parcel.
There is no controversy, therefore, in respect of this first parcel, the dispute being confined to the
second and third parcels.

The second and third parcels were the object of Revocable Permit Applications by Paciano
Malabayabas and Canuto Suyo, both filed on March 31, 1951. On June 12, 1956, Canuto
transferred his right over the third parcel to petitioner. On March 4, 1958, Malabayabas also sold
his rights over the second parcel to petitioner. On May 15, 1958, petitioner filed Insular
Government Property Sales Application No. 1772 (New) covering the second and third parcels.

On November 7, 1958, Glicerio Aquino, private respondent, filed his Revocable Permit Application
over an area of 8,000 square meters, which was later found to cover a part of the first parcel
already titled in favor of petitioner and of the third parcel transferred to him by Suyo. On
December 29, 1958, private respondent Florentina Guanzon, Aquino's sister-in-law, also filed
Revocable Permit Application over the second parcel.

Eventually, the conflicts were taken cognizance of by the Bureau of Lands (B.L. Conflict No. 3-953,
and B.L.O. Conflict No. 236). On May 21, 1962, the Director of Lands rendered a Decision against
private respondents, as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is ordered that the Revocable Permit Application No. V-14105 of

Glicerio Aquino be, as hereby it is, rejected, forfeiting in favor of the Government
whatever amount has been paid on account thereof. The Revocable Permit
Application No. V-14142 of Florentina Guanzon shall remain, as it is, rejected.
Glicerio Aquino and Florentina Guanzon shall vacate the land within sixty (60)
days from their receipt of a copy hereof The new Insular Government Property
Sales Application of Julian Estolano shall be given due course after the survey of
the land covered thereby.'

Private respondents moved for the reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision, and the Director of
Lands, in an Order of August 13, 1962, amended his previous Decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, our decision of May 21, 1962, is hereby modified by awarding to

protesting Glicerio Aquino preferential right to that area actually occupied and
cultivated by him, indicated as portion "K" in the sketch drawn on the back hereof,
and amending the Insular Government Property Sales Application (New) of Juliano
Estolano so as to exclude therefrom the said portion. With this modification, the
decision stands confirmed.

Petitioner and private respondents appealed the amended Decision of the Director of Lands to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who, in a Decision dated September 9, 1963,
dismissed the appeals of private respondents, set aside the Order of the Director of Lands dated
August 13, 1962, and affirmed the latter's Decision of May 21, 1962. Respondent Guanzon moved
for the reconsideration of the Secretary's Decision but said Motion was denied.

Respondent Aquino appealed the Decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
to the Office of the President of the Philippines, which likewise affirmed the Decision appealed
from.

The Decision of the Director of Lands having become final, an order of Execution thereof was
issued on January 4, 1967, but this notwithstanding, private respondents remained in possession
of the subject property. For failure to obtain possession thereof, petitioner filed, on June 15, 1974,
the principal case, (Civil Case No. 183-C) in the lower court which eventually gave rise to the
proceedings now challenged in this Petition." (pp. 3-7, Decision in CA-G.R. No. Sp-06600)
The restraining order issued in Civil Case No. 183-C on October 27, 1976 enjoining the Director of Lands from
enforcing the Order of Execution was set aside by the Court of Appeals and the writ of prohibition prayed for by
petitioner Estolano was granted.

Meanwhile, on April 13, 1974, respondent's clients, Aquino and Guanzon, filed a complaint for forcible entry
against complainant's client, Estolano, in the Municipal Court of Los Banos Laguna docketed as Civil Case No.
192. This case was dismissed by the Municipal Court on January 5, 1977. On appeal to the Court of First
Instance (CFI), the order of dismissal was affirmed on November 4, 1979 in Civil Case No. 386-C. No appeal was
interposed from this decision, thus it became final.

The third case for annulment of Estolano's title over the same land was filed by respondent's client, Aquino, with
the CFI on May 15, 1974 docketed as Civil Case No. 179-C which was dismissed on April 23, 1976. On appeal to
the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 62576-R, the dismissal by the trial court was affirmed
on June 25, 1981. On October 21, 1981, the case was remanded to the trial court for execution.

Finally, while their petition for certiorari and prohibition over Civil Case No. 183-C was pending before the Court
of Appeals, respondent's clients, Aquino, filed a complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) at San
Pablo City docketed as CAR Case No. 7043 against Estolano and the Director of Lands on July 1, 1977. On July
2, 1977, the CAR issued an order requiring Estolano to respect Aquino's possession. On May 18, 1979, the CAR
dismissed the case and on appeal, its dismissal was affirmed in a decision of the Court of Appeals dated February
5, 1981 in CA-G.R. No. 11635-CAR.

Respondent Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva is charged with the following unethical practices: (1) That respondent had
caused his client to perjure himself; (2) That he lacks candor and respect toward his adversary and the courts;
and (3) That he had been abusive of the right of recourse to the courts.

We find respondent Atty. Villanueva guilty as above charged.

Anent the first charge, the complaint and amended complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 192 filed by
respondent's client are clear proofs that respondent had indeed caused his client Glicerio Aquino to perjure
himself as to the date he lost possession of the subject property so as to place the case within the jurisdiction of
the court.

Paragraph 5 of the original complaint filed on April 18, 1974 reads:

5. That sometime in the early part of 1960, defendant Julian Estolano was able to dispossess
plaintiffs spouses Glicerio Aquino and Lorenzo Magpantay of a portion of the above-described
parcel of land ... (Emphasis supplied.) 1

Paragraph 5 of the Amended Complaint dated June 19, 1974 reads:

5. That sometime in the early part of June, 1973, defendant Julian Estolano and Segundo de los
Santos unlawfully dispossessed and/or deprived or turned out plaintiffs Sps. Aquino and
Magpantay thru stealth, strategy, force and intimidation of and/or possession over a certain
portion (now caused by defendant Segundo de los Santos to be planted to bananas now of less
than a year old as of the filing of the original complaint) located on the southern portion of their
above-described landholding . .... (Emphasis supplied. )2

In the original complaint, respondent's client alleged that he was dispossessed of the subject land in 1960, while
in the amended complaint, he alleged it was in June, 1973. Clearly, this was a ploy concocted by respondent to
enable the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case since a forcible entry case must be filed within one year from
the accrual of the cause of action under Rule 70, Section 1.

Such action of respondent counsel is a clear violation of his oath that "he will do no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in court." 3 A legal counsel is of course expected to defend his client's cause with zeal, but not at the
disregard of the truth. 4 The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor cannot be overemphasized. 5 His
high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in doing justice
and arriving at correct conclusions. He violated his oath of office when he resorted to deception. 6 Worse, he had
caused his client to perjure himself thus subjecting the latter to criminal prosecution for perjury brought before
the Municipal Court of Los Banos, Laguna. 7 Instead of safeguarding the interests of his client as his
responsibility dictates, he did exactly the opposite by causing his client to commit a felony.

From the foregoing, the lack of candor of respondent counsel towards the court is evident. This lack of candor and
honesty to the courts and his adversary is further demonstrated by other acts of respondent.

In Civil Case No. 192, respondent's clients were restored to the possession of the 2-1/2 hectares of the untitled
portion of subject property by virtue of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the court on May 21,
1974 upon filing of a property bond by respondent. Upon the dismissal of the case on January 5, 1977, the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction was dissolved and respondent's clients were ordered to restore possession of
subject property to complainant's client Estolano. However, respondent blocked the order by filing an urgent ex-
parte motion seeking clarification as to whether the dispositive portion of the order of January 5, 1977 was
immediately executory and asking the court to allow his clients to remain in the meantime in the premises. Before
the court could even resolve the motion, respondent perfected his appeal from the order of January 5, 1977 on
January 25, 1977. Thus, when the court's order affirming its previous order came out on January 26,1977, the
Provincial Sheriff of Laguna refused to implement the orders of January 5 and 26, 1977 until the appeal has been
finally disposed of. On appeal, the CFI of Laguna, affirmed the questioned orders of the Municipal Court. When
the decision of the CFI became final because respondent failed to appeal, his clients refused to abide by the Order
of Execution issued by the Municipal Court.

Consequently, Estolano filed an ex-parte motion asking that the Provincial Sheriff be authorized to forcibly evict
respondent's clients. On the date set for the hearing of the motion, respondent did not appear and instead filed
his "Opposition/ Manifestation" informing the court of a petition for certiorari filed against the presiding judge
before the Court of First Instance of Laguna. In deference to this petition, the Municipal Court resolved to hold in
abeyance the ex-parte motion of Estolano until resolution of said petition.

Indeed, the manner in which respondent counsel handled the forcible entry case filed against the client of
complainant shows his total lack of candor and respect for the courts and the rights of his adversary. He had
employed every step necessary to forestall complainant's client from taking rightful possession of subject
property. He has shown utter disregard of the proper rules of procedure to suit his purpose. While he filed his
urgent ex-parte motion for clarification, he chose not to wait for its resolution and instead perfected his appeal to
the Court of First Instance. When finally the decision became executory because of his failure to appeal to the
Court of Appeals, he filed a petition for certiorari against the decision of the CFI which petition is obviously
frivolous and a mere tactic to delay enforcement of the court's decision. In the meantime, the clients of
respondents refused to obey the order of execution.

A lawyer should obey all lawful orders and rulings of the court. 8 He should have counseled his clients to submit
to the order of the court instead of encouraging them to resist such order. The actuations of respondent of
employing dilatory tactics by filing a clearly frivolous case amounts to obstruction of the administration of justice
which constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him. 9

Respondents counsel further demonstrated his questionable motive by filing another case, this time for
annulment of the title of complainant's client to the other 2-1/2 hectares of subject land with the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, Branch VI. This case was dismissed on the ground of res judicata and prescription.
Respondent appealed this ruling to the Court of Appeals where it was pending resolution at the time the instant
complaint for disbarment was filed. The decision of the trial court was affirmed and remanded to the lower court
for execution.

Not satisfied with the above-mentioned appeal, respondent counsel brought another case against complainant's
client this time before the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR Case No. 7043) for determination allegedly of who had
a better right over the subject property when he was well aware e of the absence of any tenancy relationship
between the parties.

An examination of the records shows that respondent did not disclose before the Court of Agrarian Relations
(CAR) prior law suits and decisions rendered relative to the subject land. As a result, respondent was able to
secure ex-parte from the CAR a restraining order against the Director of Lands and Estolano on July 2, 1977. So
when the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Civil Case No. 386-C affirming the decision of the
trial court in the forcible entry case No. 192 was rendered on November 4, 1977 ordering the immediate
restoration of subject land to Estolano, because of the restraining order issued by the agrarian court, the
execution of the said decision cannot be fully satisfied, To make matters worse, respondent even filed a criminal
complaint against complainant and his client, among others, for alleged violation of P.D. 316 and the restraining
order issued by the Court of Agrarian Relations in CAR Case No. 7043. 10 The CAR dismissed this case and on
appeal, the dismissal was affirmed.

We also note that after respondent filed the case with the CAR on July 1, 1 977, he filed on July 5, 1977 in Civil
Case No. 179-C before the CFI of Laguna, a motion to dismiss the present action without prejudice to his clients'
right to prosecute their present action with the Court of Agrarian Relations. The lower court denied the motion
since it had already dismissed the case on some other ground and their appeal was already perfected without
plaintiffs' manifesting that they are abandoning their appeal. Thus, respondent was able to elevate two (2)
separate appeals--CA-G.R. No. 62576-R re: annulment of title (Civil Case No. 179-C) and CA-G.R. No. 11635-CAR
arising from the CAR Case No. 7043, before the Court of Appeals over the same issues involving the same subject
property titled to Estolano.

The cause of respondent's clients is obviously bereft of merit. Respondent was aware of this fact so he resorted to
forum shopping, continuously seeking the court where he may possibly obtain favorable judgment, thereby
adding to the already clogged dockets of the courts with the unmeritorious cases he filed. He grossly abused his
right of recourse to the courts by filing multiple petitions or complaints for a cause that had been previously
rejected in the false hope of getting some favorable action, somehow, thus, obstructing the administration of
justice.11 He was derelict in his duty as counsel to maintain such actions or proceedings only as appears to him
to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.12 He had thus
prostituted his office at the expense of justice.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain standards of mental and moral
fitness. 13 For a counsel who has been sworn to assist in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of
law, respondent has miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar. Instead of
assisting in the speedy disposition of cases, he made a mockery of our system of justice, thus deserving to be
censured and penalized by this Court. No doubt, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct in office.

WHEREFORE, the respondent is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law from date of notice
until such time that he can demonstrate to the court that he has rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume
the practice of law. Let this decision be noted in the bar records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION, A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously
adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent
from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the
Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP,
which reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly
inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall
deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by
registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to
above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due
from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's
comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and
necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however,
objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance
with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of
the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra),
whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which
reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as

the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may
hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and
inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the
conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman
Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution
ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made
the unanimous pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar
is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the
Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in
carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or
under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to
be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the
requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and
public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration
imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The
practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and
to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice
— as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege
must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S.
Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the
equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through
its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution
of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by
fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public
necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus
populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the
rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not
be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726).
It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some
freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of
the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of
Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in
order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and
looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary
power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the
said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require
him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even
to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable
interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a
ready a member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program —
the lawyers.9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar,
such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional
power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges —
from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed
as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law
is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do
not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary
powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of
this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from
its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a
disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of
Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court
is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has
limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother
member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed
only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public
from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused
or prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court
the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a
member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A.
Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of
the Court.

GUEVARRA vs EALA, August 1, 2007

Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment1 before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala
(respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced
respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with
whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had
been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you,"
or "Meet you at Megamall."

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the
following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied
that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second
occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and
respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the
venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.

Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face,
which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene,
reading:

My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you
that you may find meaning in what you're about to do.
 Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal
pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for
the two of us?

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to
love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent
together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in
me is gone and until we are together again.

Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always
remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!" 2

Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila
where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that
when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was
pregnant.

In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter was
handwritten.

On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended
social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the couple attended
the launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B
at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24
September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was
captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.4
(Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous
relationship" supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged
in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile
and known only to the immediate members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as far
as the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.5
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or
neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his
membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of
paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on the very day of her
wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together again," as now they are. 6 (Underscoring
supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding his
adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to
keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not
under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in
fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special friendship
with Irene.

xxxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the
institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter
to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to
the formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution
regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec.
2).9

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer,
has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's wife, he mocked
the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits
adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being that
under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low profile
special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to
grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named
respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply, as Annex "A," a
copy of a Certificate of Live Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father of her daughter
Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.

Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003 from
respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the
complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by
complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against respondent
and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer were
adopted as his testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine complainant.17

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.

The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility reading:
 Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring
supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly
reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936

Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of
merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original)

Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 139 22 of the
Rules of Court.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word
Resolution shows.

Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no evidence against
him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item published in
the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying
on an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which
support the accusation of complainant against respondent.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel made the
following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that]
their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective families . . . ,
and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that
under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile
relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct . . ."

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a "special"
relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate
of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed
an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha".
In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that complainant's wife Irene
supplied the information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the
respondent admitted his special relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would
lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored that
respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene, "adultery"
being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married woman who shall have
sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to
be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is
having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile and known only to the immediate
members of their respective families."

In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not
squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an
implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the
substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and
the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the
qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha
Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent – a "lawyer," 38 years old
– as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE AND
PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate 28 with her signature
on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as
the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit 30 which
he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the
child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer.31

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more
than clearly preponderant evidence – that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible
than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other 32 – which is the quantum of
evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary;
in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that is
required.33 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not, under
Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ─ A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground
for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence
of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.34

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase "grossly
immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances
is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have
sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit
with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods.

x x x x,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.

"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances." 35 The case at bar
involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial
whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v.
Rongcal:36

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary
sanction. We disagree.

xxxx

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried
adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect
to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable
under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution
and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous
marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been
carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders
him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license
confers upon him.39 (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear
that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution
and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision,
obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support."40

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon
7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law."

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP
Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for
nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based on the
same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ),
on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for
Review reads:

Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review, we are
inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000,
which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same
at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though no
appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The
acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should
be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven
otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene
prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent
himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his
unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state
that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had
already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ
Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the
Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both
respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates
with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's frequent phone
calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous
on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married to
complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual
abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only
served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent
by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few
blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital vows with complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of
Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala
asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala
and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence.
For one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout
after her separation from complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair
that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby
hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable
fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father.
This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the
respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside
 the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala
is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ
no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene
were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not
have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative]
proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an
entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case 47 (Italics in the original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of
office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.