INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, 2000, 35 (2), 126± 135

Justice and Social Con¯ ict

Gerold Mikula Michael Wenzel

University of Graz, Austria University of Jena, Germany

This article analyzes possible effects of ideas of justice, perceptions of injustice, and the use of justice arguments on the
emergence, course, and resolution of social con¯ icts. Four functions of justice are identi® ed: (1) ideas of justice and
perceptions of injustice can elicit or evoke social con¯ icts; (2) justice arguments and rhetorics can be used to support one’s
own position in a dispute; (3) the basic value and the principles and rules of justice can restrict social con¯ icts and help to
generate ways of con¯ ict resolution; (4) the labelling of con¯ ict resolutions as just can increase the acceptance of the
resolution. The analysis is illustrated by making reference to a recent case of international con¯ ict and diplomatic
controversy.
Cet article analyse les effets possibles des ideÂes de justice, les prceptions d’injustice et l’utilisation d’arguments juridiques
sur l’e mergence, le deÂveloppement et la reÂsolution de con¯ its sociaux. Quatre fonctions de la justice sont identi® eÂes: (1) les
ideÂes de justice et les perceptions d’injustice peuvent deÂclencher ou raviver des con¯ its sociaux; (2) les arguments juridiques
et la rheÂtorique peuvent eÃtre utiliseÂs pour appuyer sa propre position dans une dispute; (3) la valeur fondamentale de justice
ainsi que ses principes et reÁgles peuvent limiter les con¯ its sociaux et servir aÁ geÂneÂrer des solutions au con¯ it; (4) eÂtiqueter la
solution d’un con¯ it comme juste peut augmenter l’acceptation de cette solution. Cette analyse est illustreÂe par un cas
reÂcent de con¯ it international et de controverse diplomatique.

Social con¯ icts are ubiquitou s in human life. This holds
true for the most intimate personal relationship s as much
as for large-scale relations between national states and
between supra-national associations. Certainly, con¯ icts
in these various contexts do have their peculiarities and
unique aspects. However, there are also important in-
variances and, on some level of abstraction, general
processes that all con¯ icts share. In this article, we will
analyze social con¯ icts from the point of view of social
justice research. More speci® cally, we will analyz e the
possible effects of ideas of justice, perceptions of injustice,
and the use of justice arguments on the emergence, course,
and resolution of social con¯ icts. We regard distributive
and procedural justice as equally relevant for this analysis
and will not distinguish between these two forms of justice
in the following discussion because most of the arguments
hold for both of them. The analysis is meant to hold
equally well for interpersonal con¯ icts and intergroup
con¯ icts of the largest scale. Yet, throughou t this paper
we will refer to a recent case of internationa l con¯ ict and
diplomatic controversy, and we will try to illustrate crucial
points of our discussion by referring to some actual details
and some hypothetica l possibilitie s of that con¯ ict.
In December 1997, at the summit in Luxembourg, the
European Union (EU) reached a landmark decision on
its extension. The candidate countries for joining the EU
in the near future were decided on, namely the Czech
Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and
Slovenia, with whom negotiations would shortly be
initiated. Turkey was not considered as a candidate,
although it has been associated with the EU since 1964,
has repeatedly applied for membership, and has a long
tradition of economic relations with the EU; most
recently it agreed on a tariff union with the EU in
1996. The vast majority of the Turkish people wanted
and hoped for a membership in the EU. These hopes
were additionally fuelled when Germany’s previous
Chancellor, Kohl, in September 1997 said that Turkey
would, in the long run, belong to the EU. The EU
decision thus led to huge disappointment for the Turkish
public and to harsh criticisms from high-ranking Turkish
politicians. In particular Germany, considered the most
important partner in the EU, and Chancellor Kohl were
held responsible for the decision. They were strongly
criticized and accused of pursuing an expansionis t policy
not unlike Nazi Germany’s ``Lebensraum-Strategie’’

Requests for reprints should be addressed to Gerold Mikula, Department of Psychology, University of Graz, A-8010 Graz, Austria (Tel:
+43 316 380 5113; Fax: +43 316 3809 807; E-mail: Gerold.Mikula@kfunigraz.ac.at).
We would like to thank Julie Peard for her help with the manuscript preparation.

q 2000 International Union of Psychological Science


(Turkey accuses Kohl on EU policy, 1998).1 Hence, the
EU decision led to considerable diplomatic con¯ ict and,
at least temporarily, a decline in the quality of relations
between Germany and Turkey. Turkey felt the decision to
be unjust. Meanwhile, the whole con¯ ict has cooled
down, without actually having been solved. The con¯ ict
was loaded with justice arguments, and thus may be a
proper illustration for our discussion of the relation
between justice and con¯ ict.
Despite the intuitive relevance of justice and con¯ ict
for each other, there has been surprisingly little research
and theorizing on the relationship of the two concepts
(Hegtvedt & Cook, 1987). Some con¯ ict researchers have
discussed justice as a means to avoid, limit, or negotiate
con¯ icts (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Pruitt & Carnevale,
1993). Pruitt and Carnevale, for instance, point out that
norms of distributive justice can prevent con¯ icts by
making opponents’ claims compatible (e.g. the owner-
ship rule). Rules of procedural justice can regulate the
con¯ ict behaviour, for instance, by referring to principles
of fair ® ght or competition. Finally, distributive and
procedural rules can also provide options for solving
given con¯ icts. However, Pruitt and Carnevale stress
that norms of justice may also fuel con¯ icts, and lead
to escalations, when they prescribe harsh reactions or
when the parties disagree about which norms are applic-
able to their situation. In addition , because norms are
perceived as morally right, they may lead to rigid percep-
tions of one’s own entitlements, and to hostile reactions
when entitlements are perceived to be violated.
In this article, we will argue that issues of justice can
in¯ uence social con¯ icts in different ways and in different
phases of the course of con¯ icts. These different ways
may be understood as different functions of justice for
the emergence, development, and resolution of social
con¯ icts. We will discuss four different functions of
justice for social con¯ icts. First, the trigger function
means that ideas of justice and perceptions of injustice
can elicit or evoke social con¯ icts. Second, the argument
function describes how justice arguments and rhetorics
can be used to support one’s own position in a dispute.
Third, according to the resolution function, the basic
value as well as the principles and rules of justice can
restrict social con¯ icts and help to generate ways and
means of con¯ ict resolution. Fourth, the acceptance func-
tion means that the labelling of con¯ ict resolutions as just
can help to increase the acceptance of the resolution. In
agreement with Pruitt and Carnevale (1993), we propose
that considerations of, and references to, justice are both
helpful and potentially detrimental to the limitation and
1
It was felt to be an additional affront against Turkey that the
EU considered Cyprus as a potential member. Cyprus is divided
into the Republic of Cyprus inhabited by Greeks, and a northern
part that is occupied by Turkey. The fact that the EU offered
negotiations to the government of the Republic of Cyprus can be
considered as an affront against Turkey because this act acknow-
ledged internationally the government of the Republic of Cyprus as
the only legitimate government of Cyprus.
JUSTICE AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 127
the resolution of con¯ icts. This proposition is already
re¯ ected in the different functions we have just intro-
duced, and it will be repeatedly highlighted when we
discuss these functions in detail in the remainder of this
article.
Before going into details, it seems important to
emphasize that we are dealing here with a genuinely
psychological analysis of justice, conceptualizing justice
as a subjective perception. We will not propose any
notions of justice to be more or less right, nor even to
be more or less conducive to con¯ icts or their resolution.
Rather, we are interested in the way that perceptions, and
arguments, of justice shape the occurrence and course of
con¯ icts. Our emphasis of the subjectivity of justice
judgements may appear trivial. However, justice is often
referred to as if it were an objectively de® nable quality.
Politician s and social activists try to convince people
again and again that there is something like objective
justice, and they, of course, know what it is. Justice,
however, can be unambiguously and objectively de® ned
only at an abstract level. Let us consider two examples of
such abstract de® nitions. The philosopher Perelman
(1963, p. 16) de® ned formal, or abstract, justice as ``a
principle of action in accordance with which beings of
one and the same essential category must be treated in
the same way.’ ’ According to a de® nition that is common
among social psychologists, justice means that people get
what they are entitled to through who they are or what they
have done (cf. Cohen, 1986a; Lerner, 1991). It is immedi-
ately apparent that these abstract de® nitions allow a
diversity of different translations into concrete terms.
Thus, judgements of justice and injustice are always
subjective judgements. The judgements may be socially
shared, that is, there may be a consensus among the
members of given social systems. But such a consensus
does not change the basic subjective nature of ideas and
judgements of justice and injustice.
PERCEPTIONS OF INJUSTICE AND THE
OCCURRENCE OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS
According to one of the standard de® nitions of con¯ ict,
``con¯ ict means perceived divergence of interest, or a
belief that the parties’ current aspirations cannot be
achieved simultaneously’ ’ (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994,
p. 5). The perception of injustice is thus no necessary
condition, because social con¯ icts can emerge without
any perceptions of injustice when the divergence of inter-
ests results from incompatible desires or wishes without
any legitimate entitlement. However, social con¯ icts
frequently follow from perceptions of injustice, and per-
tinent divergent views of the existence of an injustice.
According to the de® nition of justice provided earlier,
the perception of injustice presupposes the existence of
certain ideas of entitlement or deserving, and the obser-
vation that someone’s entitlements have been violated.
We will brie¯ y discuss a theoretical conceptualization of
127
128 MIKULA AND WENZEL
perceptions of injustice that may be considered helpful
for the further analysis.
Entitlement Beliefs
People have ideas about what they and others deserve, or
are entitled to, according to who they are or what they
have done. These ideas derive from various sources; from
principles of justice, from laws or contracts, from
customs, and from abstract social values (Furby, 1986;
Wenzel et al., 1996). Some of these sources of entitlement
beliefs (e.g. principles of distributive justice) directly
imply comparison processes; for instance, people deserve
to be treated the same as others who are like them in a
certain respect. Other notions seem to contain rather
absolute standards. For instance, ``Everybody has the
right to life, liberty and security of person’ ’ (Article 3,
Universal Declaration of Human Rights), independent
of whether or not other people are treated in that way.
At a more abstract level, entitlement beliefs involve
categorizations of people according to who they are or
what they have done, that is, categorization s that are
based upon ascribed and achieved characteristics (Folger,
1994; Furby, 1986; Lerner, 1991; Major, 1994; Mikula,
1993; Steil, 1994). These categorization s de® ne the kinds
of people to whom the respective entitlements apply.
Examples of such categories are all human beings,
citizens (vs. foreigners), unemployed people, high-
performance workers (vs. low-performance workers)
etc. Thus, it is possible to conceptualiz e entitlement
judgements in terms of categorization processes (Wenzel,
1997, 1998, in press). Indeed, categorizations at different
levels of abstraction may be involved. A ® rst categoriza-
tion refers to the recipient unit, which indicates the level
of aggregation of the social entities that are regarded as
potential recipients (Eckhoff, 1974). For example, var-
ious countries may be considered for membership in the
EU, but not individua l persons. A second categorization
refers to the range of social entities that are considered as
potential recipients, as opposed to those that are per-
ceived as nonrecipients (Cohen, 1991; Walzer, 1983).
For example, only European countries are potential
members of the EU, but not non-European countries.
This so-called primary categorization de® nes the bound-
aries of the justice problem. (This type of categorization
has some resemblance to the concepts of moral commu-
nity and moral exclusion, which refer to the perception
of who belongs to and who is excluded from the social
category within which moral values and rules of justice
and fairness apply; cf. Opotow, 1990.) A third categor-
ization refers to the differentiation and subcategorization
of potential recipients on relevant dimensions that are
regarded as prototypical, or de® ning, features of the
primary category. For example, candidates for member-
ship in the EU may be differentiated with regard to their
respecting of human rights, market-economy orientation,
and other dimensions which may be perceived to de® ne
``Europeanness.’ ’ All these categorizations should be the
subject of controversy between observers who differ in
their perspectives and social identities (Wenzel, 1998).
Perceptions of Injustice
The observation that somebody’s entitlement has been
violated is clearly the basic element of perceptions of
injustice (Lerner, 1991; Major, 1994). However, the
perception of violations of entitlement is not the only
element. Not every violation of entitlements is necessar-
ily perceived as unjust. Two further important elements
are the identi® cation of an agent who is responsible
for the violation, and perceived lack of justi® cation
for the violation of entitlements (Crosby, Muehrer, &
Loewenstein, 1986; Folger, 1986, 1987; Mikula, 1993;
Montada, 1991). If no agent is identi® ed who is respon-
sible for a given violation of somebody’s entitlements
and/or the violation is suf® ciently justi® ed, the state of
affairs will not be regarded as unjust. Perceptions of
injustice are thus based on the perception of entitlements
being violated (as a results of an action or omission of
some agent), the attribution of responsibilit y to an agent,
and the perceived lack of justi® cation for the violation of
entitlement (Mikula, 1993)2.
The Trigger Function: Divergent
Perceptions of Injustice Can Elicit
Social Con¯ icts
Social con¯ icts and disputes frequently result from the
perception that a distribution, procedure, or treatment is
unjust. The critical factor that leads from the perception
of injustice to a dispute and open con¯ ict is the lack of
consensus between different parties in their assessment
of a given situation. The subjective nature of judgements
of justice and injustice makes it very likely that different
people will evaluate one and the same situation differ-
ently. Divergent assessments and evaluations, and con-
sequent disputes, are even more likely as people do not
simply differ in their views, but they differ in a systematic
way, depending on their respective identities, roles, and
perspectives.
Three different perspectives can be distinguishe d with
respect to the perception of injustice: the perspective of
the victim, that is, the individua l who suffers from the
injustice; the perspective of the causal agent, actor, or
2
From this perspective, judgements of injustice can be con-
ceived of as a particular instance of blaming, that is, blaming an
agent for violating the entitlement of a person or a group (Mikula,
1993). The attribution of blame implies the attribution of responsi-
bility for a negative incident and lack of suf® cient justi® cation. The
attribution of responsiblit y implies that the violation of entitlement is
perceived to be caused by an action or omission by an agent who
was able to foresee the consequences of his conduct, had control
over his or her behaviour (i.e. he or she could have acted otherwise),
and behaved intentionally.

perpetrator, that is, the individua l who caused the situa-
tion in question; and the perspective of an observer who
perceives the critical situation without being personally
affected. (A fourth possible perspective is that of the
possible pro® teer, which may coincide with the perspec-
tive of the causal agent or be independent of it.)
There is much empirical evidence showing that people
holding different roles or perspectives in relation to social
transgressions, such as aggression and injustice, differ in
their views and evaluations of that incident. Actors typic-
ally regard their own conduct as appropriate and justi® ed,
and refer to external mitigating circumstances of their
own negative behaviour. Victims of social transgressions
regard the incidents as more serious and unjust than
actors do themselves, and attribute more responsibility
and blame to the actors (Baumeister, Stillwell, &
Wotman, 1990; Stillwell & Baumeister, 1997; Mikula,
1994; Mikula, Athenstaedt, Heschgl, & Heimgartner,
1998; Mummendey, Linneweber, & LoÈschper, 1984;
Mummendey & Otten, 1989; Otten, Mummendey, &
Wenzel, 1995). Much of this research has been done
with interpersonal relationships, but it is likely that
similar evidence can be obtained in intergroup contexts
(cf. Otten et al., 1995). Con¯ icting groups generally
regard their own actions as more appropriate and legit-
imate than the actions of the respective other group
(Blumenthal, Kahn, Andrew, & Head, 1972; Reicher,
1996).
Mikula et al. (1998), who studied perspective differ-
ences in the evaluation of injustice in close personal
relationships, found that the perspective differences
between the evaluations by victims and actors were
moderated by the quality of the relationship between
the partners. The described differences were less likely
to occur among partners with high-qualit y relation-
ships. High relationship quality seems to promote
people’s willingness to refrain from self-serving inter-
pretations and to cope with potentially destructive
relationship problems in ways conducive to a good
climate between the partners. Putting it in less instru-
mental terms, high relationship quality may imply a
stronger common identity of the partners and, thus,
the sharing of values and perspectives, so that there
would be less divergence in their appraisals of the
situation.
In our discussion of the entitlement concept, we
argued that the perceivers’ identities and perspectives
have an impact on their social categorizations and
corresponding perceptions of entitlement. Concerning
the Turkish-German con¯ ict introduced at the begin-
ning, Wenzel (1998, Study 3) asked German participants
whether they regarded the EU decision not to grant
Turkey membership in the EU as just. Beforehand,
respondents were asked to rate Turkey, Germany, and
Europe on a series of dimensions potentially relevant to
that question. On the basis of these pro® les, Germany’s,
relative to Turkey’s, prototypicality for Europe was cal-
culated. Respondents also indicated the extent of their
JUSTICE AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 129
identi® cation as Germans. It was found that Germany
was perceived to be more, and Turkey less, relatively
prototypical of Europe, the stronger the respondents
identi® ed with Germany. In turn, the EU decision was
regarded as more just, and Turkey’s entitlement to
membership as lower, the more Germany, rather than
Turkey, was regarded as prototypical of Europe. Hence,
the entitlement judgement depended on the understand-
ing or de® nition of the primary category, Europe, and on
the perceived prototypicalit y of potential recipients for
the primary category thus de® ned. By extrapolation, it
can be assumed that Turks who identify strongly with
Turkey would de® ne Europe (being the primary
category) differently and consider different dimensions
as important; they would regard Turkey as more
relatively prototypica l for Europe and thus as more
deserving. Hence, con¯ icts may easily evolve from these
different perceptions that imply divergent views on
entitlements.
Referring to our discussion of perceptions of injustice,
entitlements are not the only aspect on which parties may
have divergent views. Turkish politicians, for instance,
accused the German government of being mainly respon-
sible for the EU decision. Germany might have repu-
diated blame by pointing out that it was an EU
decision in which its own vote was only 1 next to 14
others; Germany would not be any more responsible
than the other 14 members. Again, the divergence could
have resulted from different identities and corresponding
perceptions of the situation. Germany might have felt
itself solely to be a member of the EU and did not feel
any other obligation s than to act as a member of that
category. Turkey, however, might have felt itself to be
Germany’s partner as it traditionally had good relations
to Germany. Accordingly, it expected Germany to make
every effort to convince other EU members to grant
Turkey membership. Interestingly, judgements of
responsibility may thus, in some contexts, be related
to other secondary judgements of entitlement and
obligation.
It was previously stated that perceptions of injus-
tice are not necessary preconditions for social con-
¯ icts. It should be added now that they are also not
suf® cient for the elicitation of social con¯ icts. No
social con¯ ict will arise out of the perception of
injustice as long as the perception of injustice is not
overtly expressed in some way. There are a number of
different ways in which people can react behaviourally
to the perception of injustice (Mikula, 1987; Tedeschi
& Nesler, 1993; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo,
1997). People may do nothing, claim or demand
action by the agent, punish the agent, or leave the
relationship or group. An open social con¯ ict will
only emerge in two of these cases, namely when per-
sons perceiving an injustice make a claim for restora-
tion or compensation, or when they punish the actor
in some way. In these cases, perceptions of injustice
trigger a social con¯ ict.
130 MIKULA AND WENZEL
JUSTICE EVALUATIONS AND JUSTICE
ARGUMENTS IN THE COURSE OF
SOCIAL CONFLICTS
On the Course of Injustice-based Social
Con¯ icts
When persons who perceive an injustice claim restoration
or compensation, or when they punish the actors, the
further course of the con¯ ict will depend on the reactions
of the former actor. Figure 1 depicts possible courses of
social con¯ icts that result from perceptions of injustice.
Let us consider punishment ® rst. Punishment may be
used by victims or observers of injustice in order to
restore justice by retaliation or as a means of deterring
further offences (Tyler et al., 1997). When the former
actors perceive their actions as appropriate, and it is
very likely that they will do so, they will perceive any
punishment as unjusti® ed and feel unjustly treated.
Hence, the punishment leads to perceived injustice and
the same process starts again but, from the actors’ view-
point, with reversed roles. That is, the former actors are
now the victims and have the same range of options; not
improbably, they may punish the punisher, thus retaliat-
ing in some form. Since the former victims or observers
of injustice regarded their punishment as justi® ed, they
will regard the former actors’ retaliation as unjusti® ed
and retaliate themselves. Obviously, such a sequence of
reactions, elicited by the use of punishment, leads to an
escalation of the con¯ ict. Punishment may terminate the
con¯ ict only if the former actors perceive their own
FIG. 1. A process model of possible consequences of perceived injustice.
initial action as inappropriat e and accept their punish-
ment as being deserved.
The course of events following a claim for restoration
or compensation also depends on what the former actors
do in response to the claim. Basically, they have four
different options to react (cf. McLaughlin , Cody, &
O’Hair, 1983; SchoÈnbach, 1990; Scott & Lyman, 1968).
First, they can make concessions , that is, admit to have
violated some norm and accept responsibility for the
transgression (and perhaps apologize). Second, they
can provide justi® cations, that is, accounts that accept
responsibility for the act in question but provide reasons
why the action was legitimate and the correct, or at least
necessary, thing to do in that situation. Third, they can
provide excuses, that is, accounts that concede the viola-
tion of a norm but deny responsibility for the negative
event due to lack of foreseeability, control, or intention.
Finally, they can react through various forms of refusals,
for instance, by denying that any injustice has occurred,
or denying their involvement in the event and thus their
blameworthiness.
If actors acquiesce to the claim and concede their
transgression, and perhaps additionally apologiz e for it,
the victims or observers of injustice may very likely for-
give them, and the con¯ ict will be settled. The con¯ ict
may also be resolved if actors provide an account that
excuses the actor or justi® es the event and the victims or
observers accept the accounts and absolve the actor from
blame. If the actors’ accounts are not accepted by the
victims or observers, they may either insist on their
claim, or punish the actor, and the con¯ ict will continue.

Similarly, if the harmdoer rejects the claims of the per-
ceiver of injustice, the con¯ ict will go on.
Differences in Justice Evaluations
According to our conceptualization of perceptions of
injustice described earlier, disputes between con¯ icting
parties about justice and injustice can refer to different
aspects, namely, the nature of the entitlements of certain
persons, the violatio n of existing entitlements, the
responsibilities of various agents, and the availabilit y of
suf® cient justi® cations (Mikula, 1994). First, disputes
may focus on the perception of entitlements. The parties
may disagree whether or not a person, or a group, actu-
ally deserves a certain kind of treatment or outcome.
Second, even if the parties agree on the nature of the
entitlements, they may disagree whether any entitlements
have been violated or not. Third, even if both parties
accept that certain entitlements have been violated,
they may disagree on who is responsible for the negative
event. As discussed earlier, research shows that actors
who committed a social transgression frequently deny
personal responsibility for what happened while victims
(and unaffected observers) of the transgression attribute
personal responsibility to the actor. Finally, the parties
can disagree on the availabilit y of suf® cient justi® cations
for the action in question. Actors may provide reasons
why the action was the correct, or at least necessary,
thing to do in that situation, while victims and observers
may reject any justi® cations for what happened.
To illustrate these points, we may refer again to the
example of Turkey being denied membership in the EU.
Turkey regards itself as a victim of injustice and perceives
Germany to be the main agent of that injustice. It was
stated earlier that the two parties probably have different
views on whether or not Turkey is entitled to member-
shipÐ in particular, from the perspective of members
who strongly identify with their respective group. In
another respect, however, both Turkey and Germany
may actually agree on Turkey’s entitlement, namely that
Turkey, being (at least partly) a European country, has
the right to apply for membership in the EU and is
entitled to serious consideration of whether or not it
meets the criteria for membership. Turkey belongs to
the primary category Europe and should thus be treated
like any other member and applicant for membership
(that is, it has in this sense an entitlement to consistency,
a principle of procedural justice; Leventhal, 1980). How-
ever, whereas Germany may acknowledge this entitle-
ment but consider Turkey not to meet the relevant
criteria (respecting human rights, respecting the
sovereignty of other states, etc.), Turkey’ s (former) Prime
Minister Yilmaz claims that Turkey was denied equal
treatment (equal to the treatment of those other Middle
and Eastern European countries that were granted
candidature). According to him, Turkey was simply
kept out of Europe and thus, we could add, morally
excluded (``Bittere EnttaÈuschung’ ’ [Bitter disappoint-
ment], 1998). Hence, both parties would agree on
JUSTICE AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 131
Turkey’s entitlement, but Turkey would feel this entitle-
ment was violated, whereas Germany would not. With
regard to the third point (divergent views on responsi-
bility), we indicated earlier that Turkey regards Germany
as mainly responsible, whereas Germany may reject this
by pointing out that the decision was made by all 15 EU
members. As an illustration of the fourth point
(divergent views on justi® cations), an interesting, but
seldom overtly discussed, reason for the EU decision is
that inclusion of Turkey, and thus an extension of the EU
towards the borders of Syria, Iraq and Iran, would seem
to exceed the EU’s current capabilities of integration and
thus jeopardiz e the whole European project (Buhbe,
1998). Whereas Germany and the EU might want to
justify their decision with the argument that the success
and survival of the EU has priority over Turkey’s
entitlements, Turkey would certainly be less prone to
accept it.
The Argument Function: The Use of
Justice Appeals in Order to Support
One’s Position
Independent of whether or not social con¯ icts have been
elicited by perceptions of injustice, con¯ icting parties
frequently use justice arguments in their dispute to
strengthen and support their case. Justice is used as an
argument to legitimize one’s own actions and claims
(Mikula, 1984; Reis, 1984), and portrayals of injustice
are used to discredit the opponent’s position. Reference
to justice when justifying actions and decisions stresses
the actors’ impartiality and transfers the responsibility
for the action from the actor to the impersonal authority
of norms of justice. Using appeals to justice when
making a claim imbues the claim with greater legitimacy
than referring to personal wants; saying that one
deserves, or is entitled to, something is more than saying
that one wants it. Finally, labelling an action or decision
as ``unjust’ ’ simultaneously stresses the objectionabl e
character of what happened, and strengthens requests
for a change or a compensation.
In our example of Turkey and the EU, both parties
may have referred to justice, although for different pur-
poses, after the EU decided not to consider Turkey as a
candidate. The representatives of the EU may have used
justice as an argument to legitimize the decision to deny
Turkey membership in the EU. The representatives of
Turkey may have referred to injustice to emphasize the
objectionable character of the decision.
In the case of con¯ icts between opponents with
unequal power, the question arises of whether those in
power or the powerless would use appeals to justice more
frequently and be more successful with these appeals.
Since normative arguments represent the only means of
the powerless to support their position, they are likely to
resort to this means more frequently. However, the more
powerful may be more successful in using appeals to
justice (Cohen, 1986b; Walster & Walster, 1975).
132 MIKULA AND WENZEL
Justice arguments can help to support one’s position
in disputes because justice is a generally accepted social
value. However, their effects are limited in several
respects. They are only useful as long as the opponent
does not come to believe that the appeal to justice is
only made for tactical purposes. The effects are further
limited to social con¯ icts between opponents who
regard each other as belonging to the moral community
within which moral values and rules of justice apply.
Moral exclusion abolishe s the argument function of
justice.
JUSTICE AND THE RESOLUTION
OF CONFLICTS
The Resolution Function: How Notions
and Rules of Justice Can Promote
Con¯ ict Resolution
Justice can help to resolve social con¯ ict only if there is a
minimum level of readiness to cooperate between the
con¯ icting parties (Deutsch, 1975). The opponents
must perceive each other as being members of the same
moral community, each of whom is entitled to be treated
justly. Justice plays no role in the resolution of con¯ icts
when the opposing party is not perceived to belong to
one’s moral community. In this case, appeals to justice
will be made only, if at all, as a tactical means to justify
one’s own actions and claims3.
When both parties are perceived to belong to a shared
moral community or (with a slight change in meaning) to
a common primary category (Wenzel, 1997), justice has
the potential to promote con¯ ict resolution due to its
status as an accepted social value. Justice does not
provide one particular just solution but, in principle, it
sets limits to self-interests. Justice implies shared criteria
for people’s actions and claims and, due to the shared-
ness of these criteria, the reference to justice commits the
con¯ ict parties to work out a shared understanding of the
situation and the primary category. This implicit com-
mitment de® nes the limits on one’s conduct. Thus,
although justice presupposes some common moral
community and identity, it is achieved only by further
specifying, and agreeing on, the meaning of that
common identity. In a similar vein, Eggins (1997) argues,
on the basis of self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg,
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), that con¯ ict resolu-
tion requires a rede® nition of the common superordinat e
category, which has meaning for the de® nition of the
con¯ icting subgroups and their relationship to each
other, so that it reconciles (but does not conceal) the
3
Here, the con¯ ict will only be resolved when the proposed
resolution is to the advantage of both parties (i.e. leads to better
outcomes for both parties), as compared to a nonresolution. This
is because material interests and the maximization of outcomes
should be the only criteria for one’s con¯ ict behaviour when the
parties do not share a moral community and thus justice does not
matter.
differences between the parties (see also Stephenson,
1984). Hence, justice and con¯ ict resolution presuppose
an inclusion in a superordinate category which, then,
needs to be consensually de® ned.
On a more pragmatic level of analysis, rules of justice
provide a variety of possible solutions that the parties
may consider and discuss in their search for a resolution
of the con¯ ict. For instance, as Messick and co-workers
have shown (Allison & Messick, 1990; Messick, 1993;
Samuelson & Allison, 1994), the equality rule serves as
a prominent decision heuristic in many complex decision-
making situations and, thus, can also facilitate con¯ ict
resolution. If no agreed-upon distributive principle could
be found, agreement might be possible on procedures
regarded as fair by the con¯ icting parties, such as, for
instance, giving the parties a chance to present their
views. Tyler et al. (1997, p. 250) suggest that notions of
procedural justice, which seem in general to be shared
and less in¯ uenced by cultural and ethnic backgrounds,
should be crucial for ``bridging across con¯ icts in
normative belief systems.’ ’
Research and practice of con¯ ict resolution and nego-
tiation informs us that talks between con¯ icting parties
can contribute, in multiple ways, to de-escalating and
resolving con¯ icts. Making reference to justice may
also be useful here. First, if the search for a solution is
guided by concerns about justice on both sides, the
observation that the opponents subscribe to similar
social values can promote mutual trust 4. Second, the
explicit discussion of the individua l parties’ ideas of
justice can help to de® ne the range of negotiation by
excluding solutions that are unacceptable to one or
both sides, and by identifying acceptable solutions.
Third, and possibly most important, in explicitly discuss-
ing their justice notions, the parties have a chance to
recognize the subjectivity and perspective dependency
of ideas of justice and entitlement. If they do so, they
may become more ¯ exible in their own views and take the
entitlement claims of other parties as being as equally
legitimate and relevant as their own ones. Simultan-
eously, they may experience that their own entitlement
claims are recognized by their opponents. Both processes
should help to reach a shared understanding of the situa-
tion and come to an agreement about a shared view of
justice. Alternatively, and perhaps more probably, the
parties, having recognized the partiality of their views
of justice and entitlements, would perceive them to be
equally valid from their respective perspectives and try to
work out a compromise. Such a compromise need not be
understood as a betrayal of essential values and prin-
ciples, but rather as a commitment to one’s own values
and the simultaneous acknowledgment of others having
4
However, if the parties realize during these discussions that
they actually do not share the most basic social values, appeals
to justice may be detrimental as they may turn a con¯ ict of
interests into a dispute on world views, lead to rigidity, and deepen
the divide between the parties (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; see
above).

different values. Although such a compromise would not
be fully satisfactory, because each party would have
thought of a solution more favourable to themselves,
the justice discussion would have helped to make the
compromise solution acceptable.
The Acceptance Function: Labelling a
Resolution as Just Can Promote its
Acceptance
As mentioned before, the reference to justice to justify
actions and make claims can be used to stress one’s
impartiality and transfer part of the responsibility to
the impersonal authority of the justice norm (Mikula,
1980, 1984). Due to the status of justice as a social
value, calling a decision just can imbue it with greater
signi® cance and legitimacy and, consequently, promote
its acceptance. We refer to this as the acceptance
function of justice. Consensually labelling a con¯ ict
resolution that has been jointly achieved by the con-
¯ icting parties as just can increase the level of com-
mitment to the solution, advance its strict translation
into action, decrease the likelihood of sabotaging the
resolution, and thus promote a de® nite termination of
the con¯ ict.
For the latter two functions of justice for con¯ icts, the
resolution and the acceptance function, the Turkish-German
con¯ ict following the denial of the EU membership to
Turkey seems a rather weak example. One has the
impression that no constructive talks to settle the con¯ ict
actually occurred. Political authorities were instead
rather preoccupied with expressing indignation and
counter-indignatio n and issuing defamations. Only one
unilateral action of the EU may be interpreted as an
(unsuccessful) attempt to limit the con¯ ict that was
anticipated to follow the decision on the circle of candi-
date countries. At the same Luxembourg summit, the EU
also decided to establish a ``European Conference’ ’ that
would include all EU members and all European coun-
tries considered as potential candidates for membership.
Turkey was also invited to this conference, but refused to
take part and did not want to accept this ``consolation
prize.’ ’ Inviting Turkey may have been a means of
demonstrating that the EU did not want to (morally)
exclude Turkey and that the EU acknowledged Turkey’s
entitlement to apply for membership and to serious
consideration of its application. Turkey, however, felt
this invitation to be an empty placatory gesture. Perhaps
the justice implications of the EU action were not clear
enough to successfully avoid Turkey’s impression of
being (morally) excluded. A more explicit re¯ ection of
each parties’ justice notions might have contributed to a
less emotional, and more constructive, debate. The
con¯ ict cooled down meanwhile; but with respect to
the acceptance function we pointed out earlier, it may
be feared that, due to the insuf® cient discussion of justice
notions, a residual con¯ ict could easily lead to new
tensions in future.
JUSTICE AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 133
CONCLUSION
The present discussion has shown that justice has
multiple functions for the emergence and resolution of
social con¯ icts. Perceptions of injustice and divergent
views about what is just and unjust can evoke social
con¯ icts. Disputes about individua l entitlements and
their violation, about the responsibilitie s of various
agents, and about the availabilit y of justi® cations, are
the subjects of discussion and negotiation between
opposing parties and shape the course of social con¯ icts.
Appeals to justice that are made by the con¯ icting parties
to support their respective positions can be conducive or
detrimental to the achievement of jointly agreed-upon
resolutions. The subscription to justice as a social value,
and the rules of distributive justice and fair procedures,
can help con¯ icting parties to come to an agreement that
is acceptable to all participants. Finally, the conviction of
former con¯ icting parties that an eventually achieved
resolution is just may ensure adherence to the agreement
over time.
Thus, the notion of justice can be helpful for, but also
detrimental to, the limitation and resolution of social
con¯ icts. To be helpful, it presupposes that the con¯ ict-
ing parties share the basic value of justice and regard
each other as belonging to the moral community within
which moral values and rules of justice and fairness
apply. In addition, the parties have to reach a shared
understanding of the situation and a shared view of their
entitlements. Alternatively, they at least have to recognize
the existence of differing but equally legitimate and valid
views of justice. Common views are more likely to emerge
among con¯ icting parties who share a common identity.
Many internationa l con¯ icts, however, seem to exist
between groups or parties who do not share a common
identity and do not regard each other as belonging to a
common moral community. If this was the case, justice
would lose any worth for con¯ ict resolution. The parties’
rigid ideas of justice, and their ® rm convictions that their
own view is the only objective and true one, would rather
hinder con¯ ict resolution. Con¯ ict may only be resolved
in this case if there is a resolution that leads to better
outcomes for both parties as compared to a non-
resolution. In other cases, the parties may actually
belong to, or commonly refer to, some (multinational )
inclusive body (e.g. the United Nations, EU). However,
quite often this inclusive category is ill-de® ned and the
parties disagree on its essence. Such divergent concep-
tions of the common inclusive category instead breed
con¯ ict between the parties and form the basis for
perceptions of social discrimination (Mummendey &
Wenzel, 1999). Con¯ ict resolution would require the
parties to ® rst come to terms with each other with respect
to a shared understanding of a common superordinate
category.
The present discussion illustrated the main points of
our analysis by making reference to a recent example of
international con¯ ict and diplomatic controversy. In
134 MIKULA AND WENZEL
spite of this focus on international con¯ icts, the argu-
ments of the analysis are meant to hold likewise for
intergroup con¯ icts on a smaller scale and interpersonal
con¯ icts. Social justice research clearly contributes to our
understanding of the basis, the dynamics, and the possi-
ble resolutions of social con¯ icts. It also helps us to
understand why con¯ ict resolutions are often so dif® cult
to achieve.
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