remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court;
and second, the petitioners have no locus standi to question its
1. AQUINO III vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010
Facts:
This case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and
declared as unconstitutional, RA 9716 entitled "An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the 1st and 2nd Legislative Districts in the province of Camarines
Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District from such Reapportionment."
This act has divides the existing four districts, and apportioned districts shall
form additional district where the new first district shall be composed of 176,383
population count.
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval
of the Bill by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City,
which was a part of the former second district from which the municipalities of
Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new second district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by RA 9716, runs
afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of
250,000 for the creation of a legislative district under Sec. 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution. It was emphasized by the petitioners that if population is less than that
provided by the Constitution (250,000 or only 176,383), it must be stricken-down for
non-compliance with the minimum population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by
law.
The respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the
reapportionment of districts in province and therefore seek the dismissal of the
present petition based on procedural and substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are
guilty of two (2) fatal technical defects: first, petitioners committed an
error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of RA 9716 via the
constitutionality.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent
distinction between cities and provinces drawn by Sec. 5(3), Article VI of
the Constitution. The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000
population condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the
questioned provision will show that the same has no application with
respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces. Rather, the
250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a
legislative district in a city.
Issue:
Whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional
requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
Ruling:
NO.
Population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the
composition of the additional district.
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000
minimum population that must compose a legislative district.
Petitioners rely on the 2nd sentence of Sec. 5(3), Article VI, coupled with
what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a
minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district. That sentence, succinctly
provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a
city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the
other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing
mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000
in order to be similarly entitled.
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at
least two hundred fifty thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the
Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the provisions of
Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be
appended to the final document. The Ordinance is captioned
"APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES
AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such
records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used for
the 1986 nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among
provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population
figure was used to determine how many districts a province, city, or
Metropolitan Manila should have.
Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be
the determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as
an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at
issue, in the determination of the precise district within the province to which,
through the use of the population benchmark, so many districts have been
apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole, though it was among, several
determinants.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Sec. 5, Article VI can, the petition
find support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the
provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of
250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative
district in a province, whose population growth has increased beyond the 1986
numbers.
second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821
in 2007 is ─ based on the formula and constant number of 250,000 used by
the Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts
among provinces and cities ─ entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the
four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner
Aquino concedes this point.4 In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly
written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for the Province of
Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the
protests and complaints against strict conformity with the population standard,
and more importantly based on the final districting in the Ordinance on
considerations other than population, the reapportionment or the
recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is valid
even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as
insisted upon by the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264,
were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped
municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the
discussion from the reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the
redistricting of Districts One and Two.
The Supreme Court does not say that in the reapportionment of the first and
resulting additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that population is
not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the
additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution
and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on
the exact issue presented by this petition.
2. Aldaba vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010
Facts:
This case is an original action for Prohibition to declareunconstitutional, R.A.
9591 which creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly,
the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative
district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in
Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act through House
Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City
had a population of 223, 069 in 2007. House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification,
as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III
Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030
by the year 2010. Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing
to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to
meritrepresentative in Congress.
Issues:
(1) Is R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos,
Bulacan” constitutional?
(2) Is the City of Malolos entitled to a legislative district?
(3) What makes a projected demographic data valid for purposes of legislative
district qualifications?
Held:
(1) No
R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must
have at least 250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda
issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was declared
without legal effect because the Regional Director has no basis and no authority to
issue the Certification based on the following statements supported by Section 6 of
E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:
(2) No
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative
district only in the “immediately following election.” In short, a city must first attain
the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such
city shall have a district representative. There is no showing in the present case that
the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual
or projected, before the 10 May 2010 elections. Clearly, there is no official record
that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected,
prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately following election after the
supposed attainment of such population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to
have a legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
(3) Authorized Issuance of demographic data and population projection
correctly dated as mid-year data
The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are
declared official by the Nat’l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not
stated whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB. The
certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is
unauthorized. The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which
in this case, the Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated. It was also
computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the
Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as
of August 1, 2010. It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court
 ruled that the aim of legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and
voting power among districts.
3. ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 206952 October 22, 2013
The Facts
ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant
fanners and fisherfolks, and was registered under the party-list system. It participated
in the May 2010 elections, but failed to obtain the number of votes needed for a seat
in the House of Representatives.
On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513,2 which, inter alia
required previously registered party-list groups that have filed their respective
Manifestations of Intent to undergo summary evidentiary hearing for purposes of
determining their continuing compliance with the requirements under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 79413 and the guidelines set forth in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. COMELEC.4
On August 9 2012, the COMELEC issued a Resolution, which set the summary
evidentiary hearing of previously registered party-list groups. The COMELEC
scheduled three (3) dates for the summary hearing of ABANG LINGKOD's
Manifestation of Intent to enable it to show proof of its continuing qualification under
the party-list system. ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC's
August 9, 2012 Resolution, filed with the COMELEC pertinent documents to prove
its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941.
After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Banc in a Resolution dated November 7
2012, cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party list group. The
COMELEC En Banc pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track
record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely
offered photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010
elections. The COMELEC En Banc further opined that ABANG LINGKOD failed to
show that its nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented or that they
have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.
ABANG LINGKOD then filed with this Court a petition5 for certiorari alleging that
the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling its registration under the
party-list system. ABANG LINGKOD, was able to obtain status quo ante orders from
this Court.
On April 2, 2013, the Court, in Atong Paglaum Inc. v. Commission on Elections,6 laid
down new parameters to be observed by the COMELEC in screening parties,
organizations or associations seeking registration and/or accreditation under the
party-list system. The Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously
registered party-list groups, including that of ABANG LINGKOD, to determine
whether they are qualified under the party-list system pursuant to the new parameters
laid down by the Court and, in the affirmative, be allowed to participate in the May
2013 party-list elections.
On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued the herein assailed Resolution,7 which, inter
alia affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration under the party-
list system. The COMELEC issued the Resolution dated May 10, 2013 sans any
summary evidentiary hearing, citing the proximity of the May 13 2013 elections as
the reason therefor.
ABANG LINGKOD filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65
of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution1 dated May 10, 2013 issued by the
Commission on Elections COMELEC) En Banc in SPP No. 12-238 PLM}, which,
alia, affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list
group.
The Issues
1. whether ABANG LINGKOD was denied due process when the COMELEC
affirmed the cancellation of its registration under the patiy-list system sans
any summary evidentiary hearing; and
 2. whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG
LINGKOD’s registration under the party-list system.
The Court's Ruling The petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Due Process . NO, ABANG LINGKOD was not denied due process.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, an opportunity to explain one s side or
an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal
or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements
are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of
notice or hearing.10
In the instant case, while the petitioner laments that it was denied due process, the
Court finds that the COMELEC had afforded ABANG LINGKOD sufficient
opportunity to present evidence establishing its qualification as a party-list group. It
was notified through Resolution No. 9513 that its registration was to be reviewed by
the COMELEC. That ABANG LINGKOD was able to file its Manifestation of Intent
and other pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the
requirements under R.A. No. 7941, which the COMELEC set for summary hearing
on three separate dates, belies its claim that it was denied due process.
The records also disclose that ABANG LINGKOD was able to file with the
COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 10, 2013,
negating its claim that it was denied due process. As it has been held, deprivation of
due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given a chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration.
Second Issue: Cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD’s Registration
However, after a careful perusal of the factual antecedents of this case, pinned against
the new parameters in screening party-list groups laid down in Atong Paglaum the
Court finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the
registration of ABANG LINGKOD under the party-list system.
The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration on
the ground that it declared untruthful statement in its bid for accreditation as a party-
list group in the May 2013 elections, pointing out that it deliberately submitted
digitally altered photographs of activities to make it appear that it had a track record
in representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Essentially, ABANG
LINGKOD's registration was cancelled on the ground that it failed to adduce
evidence showing its track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented.
The flaw in the COMELEC's disposition lies in the fact that it insists on
requiring party-list groups to present evidence showing that they have a track
record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
Track record is a record of past performance often taken as an indicator of likely
future performance.13 As a requirement imposed by Ang Bagong Bayani for groups
intending to participate in the party-list elections, track record pertains to the actual
activities undertaken by groups to uplift the cause of the sector/s, which they
represent.
R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list system
to submit proof of their track record as a group. The track record requirement was
only imposed in Ang Bagong Bayani where the Court held that national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations seeking registration under the party-list system must
prove through their, inter alia track record that they truly represent the marginalized
and underrepresented.
In Atong Paglaum the Court has modified to a great extent the jurisprudential
doctrines on who may register under the party-list system and the representation of
the marginalized and underrepresented. For purposes of registration under the party-
list system, national or regional parties or organizations need not represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector; that representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented is only required of sectoral organizations that represent the sectors
stated under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their nature, economically
marginalized and underrepresented.
There was no mention that sectoral organizations intending to participate in the party-
list elections are still required to present a track record.
Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as
ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track
record, i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the
sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the
ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the
sector/s, which they represent..
In the case of sectoral organizations, although they are still required to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, they are likewise not required to show a track
record since there would be no reason for them to feign representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented as they can just register as a national or regional
party or organization. Thus, the Court, in Atong Paglaum stated that, for purposes of
registration under the party-list system, it is enough that the principal advocacy of
sectoral organizations pertains to the sector/s they represent.
There is thus no basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist that groups
seeking registration under the party-list system still comply with the track record
requirement. Indeed, nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is it mandated that groups seeking
registration thereunder must submit evidence to show their track record as a group.
It must be stressed that the COMELEC cancelled ABANG LINGKOD s registration
solely on the ground of the lack of its track record -that it falsely represented, by
submitting digitally altered photographs of its supposed activities, that it had a track
record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented. The existence of
ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group per se and the genuineness of its
representation of the farmers and fisherfolks were never raised in the proceedings
before the COMELEC. It would thus be the height of injustice in the Court, in this
certiorari action, would scrutinize the legitimacy of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-
list group and the genuineness of its representation of the farmers and fisherfolk, and
affirm the cancellation of its registration, when the issue is limited only to the track
record of ABANG LINGKOD.
Considering that track record is no longer a requirement, a group’s misrepresentation
as to its track record cannot be used as a ground to deny or cancel its registration -it is
no longer material to its qualification under the party-list system. In this case,
ABANG LINGKOD s submission of digitally altered photographs cannot be
considered material to its qualification as a party-list group.
5. COCOFED-PHILIPPINE vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. No. 207026 August 6, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) is
an organization and sectoral party whose membership comes from the peasant sector,
particularly the coconut farmers and producers. COCOFED manifested with the
COMELEC its intent to participate in the party-list elections of May 2013 and
submitted the names of only two nominees.
The COMELEC conducted a summary hearing to determine whether COCOFED had
continuously complied with the legal requirements. However in its November 2012
resolution, the COMELEC cancelled COCOFED’s registration and accreditation as a
party-list organization on the ground that COCOFED submitted only two nominees,
then it failed to comply with Section 8 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 that requires
the party to submit to COMELEC a list of not less than five nominees.
To comply with the requirement COCOFED submitted three names of additional
nominees. It also questioned the COMELEC’s cancellation of its registration and
accreditation before this Court. By reason of the status quo ante order issued by the
Court, COCOFED’s name was included in the printing of the official ballots for the
May 13, 2013 elections.
The Court remanded all the petitions to the COMELEC to determine their compliance
with the new parameters and guidelines set by the Court in the case of Atong
Paglaum1
Still the COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of COCOFED and
REMOVED it from the registry of party-list groups and organizations.
ISSUE: WON the issue of registration is rendered moot and academic by the
subsequent happening of the election.
COURT’S RULING: Negative. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to
present a justiciable controversy because of supervening events so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value.
While the COMELEC counted and tallied the votes in favor of COCOFED showing
that it failed to obtain the required number of votes, participation in the 2013
elections was merely one of the reliefs COCOFED prayed for. The validity of the
COMELEC’s resolution, canceling COCOFED’s registration, remains a very live
issue that is not dependent on the outcome of the elections.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC indeed gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
assailed resolution.
COURT’S RULING: Negative. Failure to submit the list of five nominees before
the election warrants the cancellation of its registration. The law expressly requires
1
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the coming 13
May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued its assailed resolution, maintaining its earlier ruling cancelling
COCOFED’s registration and accreditation for its failure to comply with the requirement of Section 8 of RA No. 7941,
i.e., to submit a list of not less than five nominees.
The COMELEC noted that all existing party-list groups or organizations were on notice as early as
February 8, 2012 (when Resolution No. 9359 was promulgated) that upon submission of their respective
manifestations of intent to participate, they also needed to submit a list of five nominees. 10 During the hearing on
August 23, 2012, the COMELEC pointed out to COCOFED that it had only two nominees.
the submission of a list containing at least five qualified nominees pursuant to Section
8 of RA No. 7941.2
Under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941, violation of or failure to comply with laws, rules
or regulations relating to elections is a ground for the cancellation of registration.
However, not every kind of violation automatically warrants the cancellation of a
party-list group’s registration. Since a reading of the entire Section 6 shows that all
the grounds for cancellation actually pertain to the party itself, then the laws, rules
and regulations violated to warrant cancellation under Section 6(5) must be one that is
primarily imputable to the party itself and not one that is chiefly confined to an
individual member or its nominee. Since COCOFED’s failure to submit a list of five
nominees, despite ample opportunity to do so before the elections, is a violation
imputable to the party under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941.
Notes:
Maintenance of registration: A party-list group’s previous registration with the
COMELEC confers no vested right to the maintenance of its registration. In order to
maintain a party in a continuing compliance status, the party must prove not only its
continued possession of the requisite qualifications but, equally, must show its
compliance with the basic requirements of the law.
Publication requirement: Information Department of the COMELEC shall cause the
immediate publication of the list of at least five (5) nominees in two national
newspapers of general circulation.
The publication of the list of nominees does not only serve as the reckoning period of
certain remedies and procedures under the resolution. Most importantly, the required
publication satisfies the people’s constitutional right to information on matters of
public concern. The need for submission of the complete list required by law becomes
all the more important in a party-list election to apprise the electorate of the
individuals behind the party they are voting for. If only to give meaning to the right of
the people to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment, then
2 Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later
than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it
obtains the required number of votes.
the party-list group must submit a complete list of five nominees because the identity
of these five nominees carries critical bearing on the electorate’s choice. A post-
election completion of the list of nominees defeats this constitutional purpose.
Vacancy: Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list
representatives, the vacancy shall be automatically filled by the next representative
from the list of nominees in the order submitted to the COMELEC by the same party,
organization, or coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is
exhausted, the party, organization coalition concerned shall submit additional
nominees.
Change of names or to alter the order of nomination: After the submission of a list
of nominees to the COMELEC, the party itself has no discretion to change the names
or to alter the order of nomination in the list it submitted. While there are instances
when a change of name or alteration of the order is allowed, these circumstances
focus on the nominee himself, whether voluntary (the nominee withdraws in writing
his nomination) or involuntary (the nominee dies or becomes incapacitated). To allow
COCOFED to complete the list of its nominees beyond the deadline set by the law
would allow the party itself to do indirectly what it cannot do directly.
wphi1The party-list system is a constitutional innovation that would expand
opportunities for electoral participation to those who cannot hope to win in the
legislative district elections, but who may generate votes nationwide equivalent to
what a winner in the legislative district election would garner. In short, the party-list
system operates on the theoretical assumption that a party-list group has national
constituency whose interests, concerns, or ideologies call for representation in the
House of Representatives.
Disqualification: While under the 6th parameter in Atong Paglaum, the Court said
that the disqualification of some of the nominees shall not result in the
disqualification of the party-list group "provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified," the Court largely considered that – petitioners' nominees who
do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they
may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-
sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector.
Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees
failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As
discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such
circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
6. ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD) v.
COMELEC
Facts
The COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution canceling petitioner’s Certificate
of Registration and/or Accreditation on three grounds. First, petitioner ANAD does
not belong to, or come within the ambit of, the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors enumerated in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7941 and espoused in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v COMELEC. Second, there is no proof showing
that nominees Tariman and Labandria are actually nominated by ANAD itself, in that
the Certificate of Nomination, subscribed and sworn to by Balang, shows that ANAD
submitted only the names of Alcover, Balangauan and Salva. It necessarily follows,
that having only three nominees, ANAD failed to comply with the procedural
requirements set forth in Section 4, Rule 3 of Resolution No. 9366. Third, ANAD
failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007
National and Local Elections as required by Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166.
In the assailed Resolution, the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of petitioner’s
Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation and disqualified it from participating
in the 2013 Elections, holding that while ANAD can be classified as a sectoral party
lacking in well-defined political constituencies, its disqualification still subsists for
violation of election laws and regulations.
Issues and Ruling
Did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion in promulgating the assailed
Resolution without the benefit of a summary evidentiary hearing mandated by the
due process clause?
NO.
It is to be noted that ANAD was already afforded a summary hearing on August 23,
2013, during which Balang, ANAD’s president, authenticated documents and
answered questions from the members of the COMELEC pertinent to ANAD’s
qualifications.
ANAD, nonetheless, insists that the COMELEC should have called for another
summary hearing after this Court remanded the case to the COMELEC for re-
evaluation in accordance with the parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v.
COMELEC . This is a superfluity. In re-evaluating ANAD’s qualifications in
accordance with the parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC , the
COMELEC need not have called another summary hearing. The COMELEC could,
as in fact it did, readily resort to documents and other pieces of evidence previously
submitted by petitioners in re-appraising ANAD’s qualifications. After all, it can be
presumed that the qualifications, or lack thereof, which were established during the
summary hearing continued until election day and even there after.
Did the COMELEC err in finding that ANAD submitted only three nominees and
that it failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures?
NO.
As found by the COMELEC, ANAD, for unknown reasons, submitted only three
nominees instead of five, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7941.
Compliance with this Section is essential as the said provision is a safeguard against
arbitrariness. It rids a party-list organization of the prerogative to substitute and
replace its nominees, or even to switch the order of the nominees, after submission of
the list to the COMELEC. As held by the Court in Lokin v. COMELEC:
“The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part
of lawmakers. The COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list
that the list reflects the true will of the party-list organization. The COMELEC will
not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the real intended nominees of
the party-list organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass all the
requirements prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the
nominees will be published in newspapers of general circulation. Although the people
vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-list system of election, not for the
individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of any
particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list
nominees in newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people,
enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed choices. In contrast, allowing the
party-list organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of their
nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the submission of the list of
nominees circumvents the voters’ demand for transparency. The lawmakers’
exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of such
circumvention.”
Moreover, ANAD failed to comply with the submission of the Statement of Election
Contributions and Expenses as the exhibits submitted by ANAD consisted mainly of
a list of total contributions from other persons, a list of official receipts and amounts
without corresponding receipts, and a list of expenditures based on order slips and
donations without distinction as to whether the amounts listed were advanced subject
to reimbursement or donated. This factual finding was neither contested nor rebutted
by ANAD.
In any event, the official tally results of the COMELEC show that ANAD garnered
200,972 votes. As such, even if petitioner is declared qualified and the votes cast for
it are canvassed, statistics show that it will still fail to qualify for a seat in the House
of Representatives.
7. REYES V. COMELEC
FACTS:
Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Bane Resolution finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. Petitioner prayed for
the Honorable Court to affirm the jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and exclusively
pass upon her qualifications and to set aside the COMELEC Resolutions for having
denied Petitioner her right to due process and for unconstitutionally adding a
qualification not otherwise required by the constitution." Petitioner averred that she is
the duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the
House of Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner
who is duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional
district of Marinduque
RULING:
No. In addressing the issue, the Court En Banc passed upon the issue of whether or
not there was basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013.
Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on
18 May 2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise
baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and effective
assumption of office.
The Court has clearly stated in its Resolution of 5 June 2013 that:
"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy – that before
the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already
finally disposed of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship and
residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was,
before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications to
run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives. x x x As the point
has obviously been missed by the petitioner who continues to argue on the basis of
her due proclamation, the instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the
undeniable fact we here repeat that the proclamation which petitioner secured on 18
May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY BASIS.
Four (4) days BEFORE the 18 May 2013 proclamation, or on 14 May 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc has already denied for lack o merit the petitioner's motion to
reconsider the decision of the COMELEC First Division that CANCELLED
petitioner's certificate of candidacy. On 18 May 2013, there was already a standing
and unquestioned cancellation of petitioner's certificate o candidacy which
cancellation is a definite bar to her proclamation. On 18 May 2003, that bar has not
been removed, there was not even any attempt to remove it.
Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET which
has exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the House of
Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives is
a written constitutional provision. It is, however unavailable to petitioner because she
is NOT a Member of the House at present. The COMELEC never ordered her
proclamation as the rightful winner in the election for such membership.5 Indeed, the
action for cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is
the indispensable determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation, was correctly
lodged in the COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and
was finally decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14 May 2013, there was nothing
left for the COMELEC to do to decide the case. The decision sealed the proceedings
in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's ineligibility as a candidate for Representative
of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to petitioner's proclamation. The bar
remained when no restraining order was obtained by petitioner from the Supreme
Court within five days from 14 May 2013.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took
cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on
and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of
Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of
Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right to due
process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question and present
controverting evidence.
Her contentions are incorrect.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the
technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure shall be liberally construed in order x x x to
achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every
action and proceeding brought before the Commission. In view of the fact that the
proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are
summary in nature, then the newly discovered evidence was properly admitted by
respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was
given every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October
2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division
rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence.
Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the
party be given the opportunity or right to be heard.
It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the
HRET insofar as the petitioner s being a Representative of Marinduque is concerned.
The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner s certificate of candidacy, and its due
course or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that determines who can
be legally proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a
continuation of the proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an
original action before the Court grounded on more than mere error of judgment but on
error of jurisdiction for grave abuse of discretion. At and after the COMELEC En
Bane decision, there is no longer any certificate cancellation matter than can go to the
HRET. In that sense, the HRET s constitutional authority opens, over the
qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes so only upon a duly and legally based
proclamation, the first and unavoidable step towards such membership. The HRET
jurisdiction over the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives is
original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings
in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET proceedings
is a regular, not summary, proceeding. It will determine who should be the Member
of the House. It must be made clear though, at the risk of repetitiveness, that no hiatus
occurs in the representation of Marinduque in the House because there is such a
representative who shall sit as the HRET proceedings are had till termination. Such
representative is the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the terminated case of
cancellation of certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner is not, cannot, be
that representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute between the parties:
who shall sit in the House in representation of Marinduque, while there is yet no
HRET decision on the qualifications of the Member.
As finale, and as explained in the discussion just done, no unwarranted haste can be
attributed, as the dissent does so, to the resolution of this petition promulgated on 25
June 2013. It was not done to prevent the exercise by the HRET of its constitutional
duty. Quite the contrary, the speedy resolution of the petition was done to pave the
way for the unimpeded performance by the HRET of its constitutional role. The
petitioner can very well invoke the authority of the HRET, but not as a sitting
member of the House of Representatives.8
8. SANDOVAL vs HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 190067. March 9, 2010.*
Remedial Law; Appeals; Courts; Electoral Tribunals; It is hornbook doctrine that
the Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is
exercised only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the
tribunal; Definition of Grave Abuse of Discretion.—It is hornbook principle that this
Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised
only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal. Absent
such grave abuse of discretion, this Court shall not interfere with the electoral
tribunal’s exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion has been
defined in Villarosa v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 340 SCRA 396
(2000) as follows: Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, in other words, where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; Where opportunity to be heard, either through
oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due process.—Such
action of the HRET was not a denial of petitioner’s right to due process. In Villarosa,
it was held, thus: The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit evidence in support of one’s defense. To be heard does not mean verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to
be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
due process.
Election Law; Electoral Tribunals; The 2004 Rules of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal mandates the parties to complete the presentation of their
evidence within a period of (2) months, which shall begin to run from the first date
set for the presentation of the party’s evidence.—Note that the 2004 Rules of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal provide for a definite period of time
within which a party should complete or terminate his presentation of evidence. The
rule cannot be any clearer that parties are mandated to complete the presentation of
their evidence within a period of two (2) months, which shall begin to run from the
first date set for the presentation of the party’s evidence.
Same; Same; Procedural rules in election cases are designed to achieve not only a
correct but also an expeditious determination of the popular will of the
electorate.—In Hofer v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 428 SCRA 383
(2004) a case that is closely analogous to the instant petition, the Court emphasized
that “[p]rocedural rules in election cases are designed to achieve not only a correct
but also an expeditious determination of the popular will of the electorate.” Thus, the
time limit set by the rules is not something to be taken lightly, for it was stressed in
the same case that “the observance of the HRET Rules in conjunction with our own
Rules of Court, must be taken seriously.”
FACTS:“On 19 May 2007, after the canvass of votes,the Board of Canvassers of the
Legislative District of Malabon City-Navotas proclaimed protestee Sandoval [herein
petitioner] the winning candidate for the Office of the Member of the House of
Representatives [OMHR] with (71,490) votes as against protestant Lacson-Noel who
obtained the second highest number of votes with (1,159) votes. Refusing to concede
defeat in the election for the OMHR, protestant Lacson-Noel filed the instant Petition
of Protest on 29 May 2007 and alleged in substance that “the results [of the election]
do not reflect the true will of the voters as they are but products of various fraudulent
and illegal acts, schemes and machinations employed by [protestee] Sandoval, his
agents and supporters, with the connivance or conspiracy of the Board of Election
Inspectors (BEIs), which defrauded and deprived [her] of lawful votes cast at the
precinct level.”
On 29 September 2008, the Hearing Commissioner of the instant case set additional
hearing dates for the reception of protestee Sandoval’s evidence—2, 13, 27, 28, 29
and 31 October 2008 and on 3 November 2008. From the record of the case, though,
except for the hearing scheduled on 3 November 2008, it appears that no hearings
were held on the dates aforestated in view of the unavailability of the counsel of
protestee Sandoval.
On the last scheduled hearing, or on 11 November 2008, protestee filed another
motion—Motion for Leave (to Present Additional Witnesses) with Request for
Subpoena. Protestee Sandoval wanted to present expert witnesses. On 12 November
2008, protestant Lacson-Noel opposed the preceding motion on the ground that the
same was merely another dilatory move to delay the resolution of the instant election
protest case.
Despite the opposition, in Resolution No. 08-342 issued on 24 November 2008, the
Tribunal resolved to grant protestee Sandoval’s motion with the necessary warning
that no further extension shall be given. Accordingly, an additional period of ten (10)
days was set within which to present his additional evidence. In granting the prayer
for additional time, the Tribunal took into consideration the provision of the HRET
Rules where, in the interest of justice and meritorious grounds, it may grant an
extension of ten (10) days for a party to present his evidence.
On 18 December 2008, despite the warning issued by the Tribunal that “no further
extensions will be given,” protestee Sandoval once more prayed for leave to present
an additional expert witness.
On 22 January 2009, in Resolution No. 09-009, the Tribunal denied protestee
Sandoval’s motion for suspension of the period to file formal offer of evidence, and
considered him to have waived the completion of the presentation of his evidence.
Protestant Lacson-Noel and protestee Sandoval filed their respective Memoranda on
11 and 16 February 2009, respectively. On the same day he filed his Memorandum,
or on 16 February 2009, protestee Sandoval also filed a Manifestation and Motion for
Partial Reconsideration. Essentially, he moved that he “be allowed to formally offer
his documentary pieces of evidence” based on the argument that “to prevent [him]
from formally offering his documentary pieces of evidence would be tantamount to
depriving him of the right to due process as this would in effect strip him of all the
necessary pieces of evidence, leaving him with nothing to amplify his cause.”
The HRET declared protestant Lacson-Noel as the duly elected Representative of the
Lone District of Malabon City-Navotas in the election.
1. Did the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by not admitting petitioner’s formal offer of evidence,
thereby denying him due process.?
No.
It is hornbook principle that this Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of
electoral tribunals is exercised only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion
committed by the tribunal. Absent such grave abuse of discretion, this Court shall not
interfere with the electoral tribunal’s exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction.5 Grave
abuse of discretion has been defined in Villarosa v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal6 as follows:
“Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, in other words, where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.”7
Petitioner mainly assails the Tribunal’s denial of his pleas for an additional period of
time within which to make his formal offer of evidence. However, a review of the
proceedings will reveal that the HRET acted in accordance with its rules of procedure
and well within its jurisdiction.
2. Was the action of the HRET a denial of petitioner’s right to due process.
Petitioner commenced presentation of his evidence on September 2, 2008. Further
hearings were scheduled for September 15, 18, 23 and 25, 2008. He was able to
present evidence on September 15, 18, and 25, 2008, but the hearing set for
September 23, 2008 was canceled upon motion of petitioner. On September 29, 2008,
the Hearing Commissioner set additional hearings for October 2, 13, 27, 28, 29 and
31, 2008 and November 3, 2008, for reception of petitioner’s evidence. However, due
to unavailability of petitioner’s counsel, no hearings were held on the dates set for the
whole month of October. Hearings only resumed on November 3 and 11, 2008 and,
on the latter date, petitioner moved that he be allowed more time to present additional
witnesses. Despite opposition from respondent Lacson-Noel, the Tribunal issued
Resolution No. 08-342 dated November 24, 2008, granting petitioner an additional
period of ten (10) days within which to present evidence, with the warning that no
further extension shall be given. The Hearing Commissioner notified the parties that
further hearings will be held on December 10 and 11, 2008. Said hearing dates were
utilized by petitioner.
Nevertheless, in utter disregard of the Tribunal’s warning, petitioner again filed on
December 18, 2008 a Manifestation and Motion (with Prayer for Suspension of the
Period to File Protestee’s Formal Offer of Evidence), praying for more time to present
more witnesses, and that he be allowed to file his Formal Offer of Evidence upon
completion of presentation of his evidence. Respondent Lacson-Noel opposed said
motion, pointing out that the additional period of ten (10) days granted to petitioner
lapsed on December 24, 2008. Thus, on January 22, 2009, the Tribunal issued
Resolution No. 09-009, pointing out that despite the additional period of ten days
granted to him and the lapse of more than three (3) months reckoned from September
2, 2008, petitioner had not completed the presentation of his evidence. Since the last
day of the extension granted to him was on December 23, 2008 and said period lapsed
without petitioner completing presentation of his evidence including formal offer
thereof, he was deemed to have waived the same.
“The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
evidence in support of one’s defense. To be heard does not mean verbal arguments in
court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due
process.”9
It is quite clear from the foregoing narration of how the proceedings were conducted
that petitioner was given all the opportunity to be heard. So many hearing dates were
set for his presentation of evidence, but he merely wasted a good number of those
days. He was granted an extension of time so he could file his formal offer of
evidence, but he still failed to fulfill his responsibility.
Note that the 2004 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal provide
for a definite period of time within which a party should complete or terminate his
presentation of evidence, to wit:
“Rule 59. Time Limit for Presentation of Evidence.—Each party is
given a period of twenty (20) working days, preferably successive, to
complete the presentation of his evidence, including the formal offer
thereof. Unless provided otherwise, this period is terminated within
two (2) months, which shall begin to run from the first date set for the
presentation of the party’s evidence, either before the Tribunal or
before a Hearing Commissioner. Once commenced, presentation of the
evidence-in-chief shall continue every working day until completed or
until the period granted for such purpose is exhausted. Upon motion
based on meritorious grounds, the Tribunal may grant a ten-day
extension of the period herein fixed.
The rule cannot be any clearer that parties are mandated to complete the presentation
of their evidence within a period of two (2) months, which shall begin to run from the
first date set for the presentation of the party’s evidence. In this case, petitioner’s
presentation of evidence should have been terminated by November 2, 2008. It was
petitioner’s and/or his counsel’s duty to always have the foregoing rule or time limit
in mind in planning and scheduling the presentation of his testimonial and
documentary evidence. Petitioner had actually been accorded leniency because on
November 24, 2008, which was already beyond the two-month time limit under Rule
59, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 08-342 granting him an additional ten days for
presentation of evidence including a formal offer thereof. Petitioner had been
sufficiently warned that that would be the last extension, but he chose not to heed
such warning and failed to use the additional time wisely. Only petitioner deserves to
be blamed for the woes that befell him.
From the foregoing, it is quite clear that the Tribunal acted in the best interest of the
electorate, ensuring the determination of the latter’s will within a reasonable time. In
sum, there is absolutely nothing in this case that would justify a finding that the
HRET gravely abused its discretion by not granting petitioner an extension of time to
present additional evidence and formally offer the same.
9. LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO vs. HRET
G.R. No. 201350. January 22, 2013.*
Facts: Liwayway Vinzons-Chato (Chato) renewed her bid in the May 10, 2010
elections as representative of the Second Legislative District of Camarines Norte with
a total of 205 clustered precincts. She lost to Elmer E. Panotes (Panotes) who was
proclaimed the winner on May 12, 2010. Chato filed an electoral protest before the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) assailing the results in all the
160 clustered precincts in four (4) municipalities. Pursuant to Rule 37 of the 2011
Rules of the HRET, Chato designated forty (40) pilot clustered precincts, equivalent
to 25% of the total number of protested clustered precincts, in which revision of
ballots shall be conducted. The initial revision of ballots, conducted on March 21 -
24, 2011, showed a substantial discrepancy between the votes of the parties per
physical count vis-a-vis their votes per election returns in certain precincts. Panotes
lost no time in moving for the suspension of the proceedings in the case, and praying
that a preliminary hearing be set in order to determine first the integrity of the ballots
and the ballot boxes used in the elections.
Consequently, in its Resolution, HRET directed the copying of the picture image files
of ballots relative to the protest. After the initial revision of the pilot protested
clustered precincts, Chato moved for the revision of ballots in all of the protested
clustered precincts arguing that the results of the revision of 25% of said precincts
indicate a reasonable recovery of votes in her favor, but was denied by HRET. HRET
issued the assailed Resolution directing the continuation of the revision of ballots in
the remaining 75% protested clustered precincts, or a total of 120 precincts.
Expectedly, Panotes moved for reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of HRET in ordering the
continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining 75% of the protested clustered
precincts?
Ruling: None. The Constitution mandates that the HRET "shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of its members. By
employing the word "sole", the Constitution is emphatic that the jurisdiction of the
HRET in the adjudication of election contests involving its members is intended to be
its own – full, complete and unimpaired. The Tribunal, thus, unequivocally asserted
its exclusive control in Rule 7 of the 2011 HRET Rules, as follows:
Rule 7. Exclusive Control of Functions. – The Tribunal shall have exclusive control,
direction, and supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and operation.
Contrary to Panotes' posturing, there existed legal and factual bases for the revision of
the remaining 75% of the protested clustered precincts. Rule 37 of the 2011 HRET
Rules clearly provides that, after post-revision determination of the merit or
legitimacy of the protest, the Tribunal may proceed with the revision of the ballots in
the remaining contested precincts. It should be pointed out, however, that the
provision in question is couched in the permissive term "may" instead of the
mandatory word "shall." Therefore, it is merely directory, and the HRET is not
without authority to opt to proceed with the revision of ballots in the remaining
contested precincts even if there was no reasonable recovery made by the protestant
in the initial revision.
At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive prerogative of the HRET as the
sole judge of election contests involving its members, the Court cannot substitute its
own judgment for that of the HRET on the issues of whether the evidence presented
during the initial revision could affect the officially proclaimed results and whether
the continuation of the revision proceedings could lead to a determination of the true
will of the electorate.
10. LIMKAICHONG vs. COMELEC,
G.R. Nos. 178831-32 April 1, 2009
FACTS:
After limkaichong filed her COC, petitions for her disqualification against her were
instituted before the COMELEC alleging her lack of citizenship requirement. It was
alleged that the naturalization of her Father, Julio Ong Sy never attained finality and
her parents were chinese citizens at the time of her birth.
The petition remained pending until the day of the election, May 14, 2007.
Limkaichong emerged as winner of the election against Paras. Thus, on may 15, Paras
filed with the COMELEC a Very Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
Suspend the Proclamation of Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong as Winning Candidate of the
First District of Negros Oriental.
On May 17, COMELEC issued a joint resolution disqualifying Limkaichong as
candidate. When PBOC received such resolution, it suspended the proclamation of
limkaichong. But on May 18, COMELEC en banc issued a resolution adopting the
policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidate with
pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of
the hearing and resolution of the involved cases.
On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Joint Resolution of May 17, 2007 and Urgent Motion to Lift
the Order Suspending Proclamation. Thereafter, or on May 30, 2007, Paras filed with
the COMELEC a Petition to Nullify and/or Annul the Proclamation of Jocelyn Sy-
Limkaichong as First District Representative of Negros Oriental in relation to the
May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division.
On July 3, 2007, Limkaichong filed in the disqualification cases against her
a Manifestation and Motion for Clarification and/or To Declare the Petitions as
Dismissed in Accordance with Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. She contended that, with her proclamation, her having taken her oath of
office and her assumption of the position, the COMELEC was divested of jurisdiction
to hear the disqualification cases.
On August 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc ruled on Limkaichong’s manifestation
and motion for clarification, holding that all pending incidents relating to the
qualifications of Limkaichong should now be determined by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal in accordance with the provision of the
Constitution.
Thus, Paras has instituted before the Court a Petition for Quo Warranto, Prohibition
and Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Issues:
1. Whether the proclamation of Limkaichong by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Negros Oriental is valid;
2. Whether, upon Limkaichong's proclamation, the HRET, instead of the
COMELEC, should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.
Ruling:
Whether Limkaichong’s proclamation was valid.
The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division
rendered its Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong
timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as
for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of
the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the May 17,
2007 Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was
suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the
winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides: Sec. 2.
Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration.—A motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the
promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution for
implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.
Whether, upon Limkaichong's proclamation, the HRET, instead of the
COMELEC, should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the
proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over
matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his
qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET,
the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member
of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter’s election, returns and
qualifications. The use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the
Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.
The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to
have been tainted with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction. The
Court has shed light on this in the case of Vinzons-Chato, 520 SCRA 166 (2007), to
the effect that: In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already
been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of
Representatives (Thirteenth Congress); hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it
had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato’s petition. The issues raised by
petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity
of respondent Unico’s proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed to the
sound judgment and discretion of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation that
respondent Unico’s proclamation is null and void does not divest the HRET of its
jurisdiction: x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a
winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as
congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this
ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction
between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people’s mandate. Further, for
the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato’s election protest against respondent
Unico would be to usurp the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET. In
fine, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the
HRET from assuming jurisdiction over all matters essential to a member’s
qualification to sit in the House of Representatives.
After the proclamation of the winning candidate in the congressional elections, the
remedy of those who may assail one’s eligibility/ineligibility/qua-
lification/disqualification is to file before the HRET a petition for an election protest,
or a petition for quo warranto, within the period provided by the HRET Rules. In
Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections, 228 SCRA 36 (1993), we ruled that where
the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the
remedy of petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives.
Additional notes: (not included in the digest)
The PBOC proclaimed Limkaichong as the winner on May 25, 2007. Thus,
petitioners should have filed either an election protest or petition for quo warranto
within ten days from May 25, 2007. But they did not. In fact, to date, no petition of
protest or petition for quo warranto has been filed with the HRET. Verily, the ten-day
prescriptive period for initiating a contest against Limkaichong has long expired.
However, the said ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not
apply to disqualification cases based on citizenship. Under the 1987 Constitution,
Members of the House of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at
the time of their election but during their entire tenure. Being a continuing
requirement, one who assails a member’s citizenship or lack of it may still question
the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding.
In resolving the disqualification cases, the COMELEC Second Division relied on the
entries in the docket book of the OSG, the only remaining record of the naturalization
proceedings, and ruled on the basis thereof that the naturalization proceedings of Julio
Ong Sy, Limkaichong’s father, in Special Case No. 1043, were null and void. The
COMELEC Second Division adopted Villando and Camero’s arguments that the
OSG was deprived of its participation in the said case for it was not furnished copies
of the following: (a) the July 9, 1957 Order of the Court of First Instance (CFI)
granting the petition for naturalization; and (b) the September 21, 1959 Order of the
CFI declaring Julio Ong Sy a Filipino citizen. Thus, when the latter took his oath of
allegiance on October 21, 1959, it was exactly 30 days after his declaration as a
naturalized Filipino, or one day short of the reglementary period required under
Sections 11 and 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473. Such defects were fatal to the
naturalization proceedings of Julio Ong Sy and prevented the same from gaining
finality. The COMELEC Second Division concluded that since Julio Ong Sy did not
acquire Philippine citizenship through the said naturalization proceedings, it follows
that Limkaichong remains a Chinese national and is disqualified to run as candidate
and be elected as a Member of the House of Representatives. We cannot resolve the
matter of Limkaichong’s citizenship as the same should have been challenged in
appropriate proceedings as earlier stated.
11. Guingona vs Gonzales –
-HRET’s Composition – Rounding Off
Facts: This is a Petition to prohibit Romulo and Tanda from sitting and assuming the
position of members of Commission on Appointments and prohibits Neptali
Gonzales, the Senate President and ex-officio chairman from allowing the respondent
to sit as members of the Commission on Appointments (CA).
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP
senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN
senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in
the CA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a
political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a
formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members
for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN.
When applying the Tolentino Compromise Formula agreed to by the members of
the CA, we get the following result:
- LDP – 7.5 members
- NPC – 2.5
- LAKAS-NUCD – 1.5
- LP-PDP-LABAN - .5
Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party
because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should
represent the same party to the CA. This is also pursuant to the proposition
compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the CoA
should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-
NUCD. Despite the fact that LP-PDP-LABAN should not have received a place, it
was filled for the reason that the Senate believed that all 12 seats should be filled.
The actual appointments were as follows:
- LDP – 8 members
- NPC – 2
- LAKAS-NUCD – 1
- LP-PDP-LABAN - 1
Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged
that the compromise is against proportional representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of Sen. Romulo (the 8th member of the LDP)
and Wigberto Tanada (LP-PDP-LABAN) was in violation of Sec18 Article VI of the
Constitution?
RULING: YES, IT WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION particularly
Section 18 Article VI because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that
membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the
political parties. Their nomination and election by the LDP Majority by sheer force of
superiority in numbers during the Senate organization meeting of August 27, 1992
was done in grave abuse of discretion. Where power is exercised in a manner
inconsistent with the command of the Constitution, and by reason of numerical
strength, knowingly and not merely inadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of
authority granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly found to exist.
This Court has ruled that, under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution providing
for a multi-party system, entitlement to proportional representation in the
Commission on Appointments requires a minimum membership in each house. The
Supreme Court in the subsequent case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr. made this clear
where it ruled that proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments
requires a minimum membership of a party in each house. The mere presence of one
Senator belonging to a political party does not ipso facto entitle such a party to
membership in the Commission on Appointments.
The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character
and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or
disregard the rule on proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a majority
representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can by sheer force of
numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a proportional
representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a
check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power.
No party can claim more than what is entitled to under such rule. To allow it to elect
more than its proportional share of members is to confer upon such a party a greater
share in the membership in the Commission on Appointments and more power to
impose its will on the minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution of its
rightful membership in the Commission.
This interpretation finds support in the case of Tañada vs. Cuenco, where this Court
held that the constitutional provision makes mandatory the election of the specified
number of Senators to the Commission on Appointments but also ruled that they
should be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties. In
case of conflict in interpretation, the latter mandate requiring proportional
representation must prevail. Such interpretation is the only correct and rational
interpretation which the court can adopt in consonance with its solemn duty to uphold
the Constitution and give effect the meaning intended by its framers to every clause
and word thereof.
It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a
fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each
of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the
Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with
the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in
the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one
senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one
other party’s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s
representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional
representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no
longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based
on the proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator
Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one
political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1
seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CA. Where there are more than
2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot
constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with
each other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one
party may have affiliations with the other party.
.
RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENT THAT THE OLDER TANADA’S CASE
SHOULD APPLY
It is a matter of record that in the political ventures of the late Senator Lorenzo
Tañada, he had his Citizens Party coalesce with the Nationalista Party and got himself
elected as Senator under the banner of the latter party. His election to the Commission
was principally due to the alliance of his Citizens Party with the Nationalista Party
and not because he was elected thereto on the strength of his being the lone
representative of the Citizens' Party. The election of the late Senator Lorenzo Tañada
to the Commission on Appointments does not reflect any practice or tradition in the
Senate which can be considered as a precedent in the interpretation of the
constitutional provision on proportional representation in the Commission on
Appointments. No practice or tradition, established by a mere tolerance, can, without
judicial acquiescence, ripen into a doctrine of practical construction of the
fundamental law. In the absence of judicial confirmation of the constitutionality of
the challenged legislative practice the repeated erroneous legislative interpretation of
a constitutional provision, does not vest power on the legislature.
RE: 12 SEATS
The Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 Senators be elected
to the membership in the Commission on Appointments before it can discharge its
functions and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission. The
overriding directive of Article VI, Section 18 is that there must be a proportional
representation of the political parties in the membership of the Commission on
Appointments and that the specification of 12 members to constitute its membership
is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under the
Constitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the
mandate of proportional representation of the parties even if it results in fractional
membership in unusual situations like the case at bar.
Who decides the question of proportionality? The power to choose who among
them will sit as members of the Commission on Appointments belongs to the Senate.
The number of senators is fixed by the Constitution to twelve, but the numbers of
senators to be chosen must comply with the rule on proportional representation. The
question of who interprets what is meant by proportional representation has been a
settled rule — that it belongs to this Court. The acceptance by the Senate of Senator
Tolentino's formula to settle temporarily the impasse concerning the membership in
the Commission on Appointments by leaving the final decision to the Supreme Court
is a Senate recognition that the determination of proportional representation under
Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution is a function of this Court. The Court
serves as a check on the unbridled use of power by the legislative majority to silence
the minority. Democracy may breed but it will not sanction tyranny by force of
numbers.
12. Pimentel Jr. vs Ermita
FACTS:
While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their
respective departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only. Senator
Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against the
appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such appointment
without the consent of the Commission on Appointment; that, in accordance with
Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, only the undersecretary
of the respective departments should be designated in an acting capacity and not
anyone else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the
president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to
issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session.
Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary designation to an
officer in the civil service provided that the temporary designation shall not exceed
one year.
During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad
interim appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.
RULING:
Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the
safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the provision that the
temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a year after
the initial appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in recess, GMA
issued the ad interim appointments – this also proves that the president was in good
faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president.
The choice is the president’s to make and the president normally appoints those
whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained to choose the undersecretary. She
has the option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a
position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should
be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in
session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. That person
may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it
expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
Anent the issue that GMA appointed “outsiders”, such is allowed. EO 292 also
provides that the president “may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an
office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting
capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems
that person competent.
13. Manalo v. Sistoza
Facts:
RA 6975 was enacted by Corazon Aquino, creating the DILG. Sections 26 and 31
thereof state that the PNP Chief, Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director General ,
and Director General are to be appointed by the President, subject to the confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments. The President through Executive Secretary
Drilon promoted the 15 respondent officers and appointed them to the PNP in a
permanent capacity without confirmation of the Commission. Thereafter, the
Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador Enriquez
III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments. The petitioner
brought before this petition for prohibition, as a tax payer suit to the SC to assail the
legality of subject appointment and disbursement thereof.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the appointment of the senior officers of the PNP is valid even
without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
a. Whether or not RA 6975 is a valid law that duly requires confirmation of
the appointments of officers from the rank of senior superintendent and
higher by the Commission on Appointments.
b. Whether or not PNP officers are akin to the AFP, whose positions need
CA confirmation
Ruling:
1. YES. Because:
a. Sec 26 and 31 of Ra 6975 are unconstitutional.
Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of
officers of the government to be appointed by the President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first
group require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The
appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first category, need not be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Sec 26 and 31 cannot supersede the
Constitution.
b. The PNP is not akin to the AFP and therefore directors and chief
superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers,
do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
 The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces
of the Philippines. Article 4 sections 4 and 6 set forth that the AFP shall be composed
of citizen armed force while the police force is civilian in character. Furthermore,
Congress enacted Republic Act 6975 which states in part that the police force is
civilian in character and no element of the police force shall be military nor shall any
position thereof be occupied by active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
16. ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. ERMITA
G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005
These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of Sections 4,5
and 5 of R.A. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 respectively of the NIRC.
The amending sections impose a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, on
importation of goods, and on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These
provisions also contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective
January 2006 after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
a. VAT collection as a percentage of the GDP of the previous year exceeds 2
4/5%; or
b. National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year
exceeds 1 ½%.
Arguments raised: (1) The law is unconstitutional as it violates Article VI, Section
28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which gives Congress exclusive authority
to fix tax rates; and (2) the increase of the VAT rate violates the due process clause of
the Constitution as it imposes an unfair and additional tax burden on the people.
ISSUE: Whether the bicameral conference committee has strictly complied with the
rules of both houses.
RULING: One of the most basic and inherent power of the legislature is the power to
formulate rules for its proceedings and the discipline of its members. Pursuant to this
inherent constitutional power to promulgate and implement its own rules of
procedure, the respective rules of each house of Congress provided for the creation of
a Bicameral Conference Committee. In the event that the Senate and the House of
Representatives disagree on the amendment to any bill or joint resolution, the
differences may be settled by the conference committees of both chambers. Congress
is the best judge of how it should conduct its own business expeditiously and in the
most orderly manner. It is also the sole concern of Congress to instill discipline
among the members of its conference committee if it believes that said members
violated any of its rules of proceedings. Even the expanded jurisdiction of this Court
cannot apply to questions regarding only the internal operation of Congress, thus, the
Court is wont to deny a review of the internal proceedings of a co-equal branch of
government.
ISSUE: Whether there was a necessity for a conference committee.
RULING: Yes. A comparison of the provisions of House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 on
one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, reveals that there were indeed
disagreements with regard to (1) what rate of VAT is to be imposed; (2) whether only
the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies
should not be passed on to consumers, as proposed in the Senate bill, or both the VAT
imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies and the
VAT imposed on sale of petroleum products should not be passed on to consumers,
as proposed in the House bill; (3) in what manner input tax credits should be limited;
(4) and whether the NIRC provisions on corporate income taxes, percentage,
franchise and excise taxes should be amended.
There being differences and/or disagreements on the foregoing provisions of
the House and Senate bills, the Bicameral Conference Committee was mandated by
the rules of both houses of Congress to act on the same by settling said differences
and/or disagreements. The term "settle" is synonymous to "reconcile" and
"harmonize." To reconcile or harmonize disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral
Conference Committee may then (a) adopt the specific provisions of either the House
bill or Senate bill, (b) decide that neither provisions in the House bill or the provisions
in the Senate bill would be carried into the final form of the bill, and/or (c) try to
arrive at a compromise between the disagreeing provisions.
 In the present case, the changes introduced by the Bicameral Conference
Committee on disagreeing provisions were meant only to reconcile and harmonize the
disagreeing provisions for it did not inject any idea or intent that is wholly foreign to
the subject embraced by the original provisions.
All the changes or modifications made by the Bicameral Conference
Committee were germane to subjects of the provisions referred to it for reconciliation.
Such being the case, the Court does not see any grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Bicameral Conference Committee.
In the early case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, the Court held that it is within
the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision
that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can
propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it
cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the
nature of a substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the
bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval
of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department.
ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution
on the “No-Amendment Rule.”
RULING: No. Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution, states: No bill passed by
either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days,
and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three
days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading
of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
The aforementioned provision must be construed as referring only to bills
introduced for the first time in either house of Congress and not to the conference
committee report. The “no-amendment rule” refers only to the procedure to be
followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said
respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence
or amendment. To construe said provision in a way as to proscribe any further
changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead to absurdity as this would
mean that the other house of Congress would be deprived of its constitutional power
to amend or introduce changes to said bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the
Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the Bicameral
Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in
bills that have been acted upon by both houses of Congress is prohibited.
ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution on
the exclusive origination of revenue bills.
RULING: No. In the present cases, petitioners admit that it was indeed House Bill
Nos. 3555 and 3705 that initiated the move for amending provisions of the NIRC
dealing mainly with the VAT. Upon transmittal of said House bills to the Senate, the
Senate came out with Senate Bill No. 1950 proposing amendments not only to NIRC
provisions on the VAT but also on other kinds of taxes. The introduction by the
Senate of provisions not dealing directly with the VAT, which is the only kind of tax
being amended in the House bills, is still within the purview of the constitutional
provision authorizing the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to a revenue
bill that originated from the House. As held in the Tolentino case, it is not the law –
but the revenue bill – which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively"
in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute – and not only the
bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the
law – must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the
Senate’s power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose
amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two
houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing
revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills
and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the
theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other
hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same
problems from the national perspective.
Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the
House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to
introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill
No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes.
Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or
limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to
the House revenue bill.
ISSUE: Whether there was an undue delegation of legislative power.
RULING: No. Petitioners allege that the grant of the stand-by authority to the
President to increase the VAT rate is a virtual abdication by Congress of its exclusive
power to tax because such delegation is outside the authority of the President to fix
tariff rates, and import and export quotas, among others, provided for in Section 28
(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-
delegation of powers. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. Nonetheless, the general
rule barring delegation of legislative powers is subject to the following recognized
limitations or exceptions:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article
VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of
Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
However, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid, if the law
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public
agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected.
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms
and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the
judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. The legislature may
delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to determine certain facts or
conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a statute is,
by its terms, made to depend, but the legislature must prescribe sufficient standards,
policies or limitations on their authority. While the power to tax cannot be delegated
to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise
of such power may be left to them, including the power to determine the existence of
facts on which its operation depends.
The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply
a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of
the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation
of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or
condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual
matters outside of the control of the executive.
No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence
of discretion is the fact that the word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of
the word shall connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. Where the law is clear and
unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no
choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12%
rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty
which cannot be evaded by the President. Inasmuch as the law specifically uses the
word shall, the exercise of discretion by the President does not come into play. It is a
clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
The time of taking into effect of the 12% VAT rate is based on the happening of a
certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions
by a person or body other than the legislature itself.
17. BELGICA vs. EXEC SECRETARY OCHOA
FACTS:
In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of American-English origin) has been
commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the
Legislature (“Congressional Pork Barrel”). However, it has also come to refer to
certain funds to the Executive. The “Congressional Pork Barrel” can be traced from
Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local Development Projects
during the Marcos period, the Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas
Development Fund and later the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under the
Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority Development Assistance Fund under the
Joseph Estrada administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the
present Benigno Aquino III administrations.
The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya
Fund and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special
fund under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand
Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to
the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to
economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title
IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential
Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and
administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the President
provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the
regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR.
Over the years, “pork” funds have increased tremendously. In 1996, an anonymous
source later identified as former Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed that huge
sums of government money went into the pockets of legislators as kickbacks. In
2004, several citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004
General Appropriations Act for being unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition. In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
began its probe into allegations that “the government has been defrauded of some P10
Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of
lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.” The
investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers who declared
that JLN Corporation – “JLN” standing for Janet Lim Napoles – had swindled
billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects” using no fewer than 20
dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade. In August 2013, the
Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation
covering the use of legislators’ PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3)
years of the Arroyo administration.
As for the “Presidential Pork Barrel”, whistle-blowers alleged that “[a]t least P900
Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project intended for
agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy [NGO].”
ISSUE: WON certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional
oversight.
RULING: YES, various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies public
accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members.
Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, states that "public office is a public
trust," and this is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government
should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the
Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people‘s trust. The notion of a
public trust connotes accountability, hence, there various mechanisms in the
Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public officers.
Among which the proper expenditure of public funds may be checked is the power of
congressional oversight. As mentioned in Abakada, congressional oversight may be
performed either through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to
ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any
matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; or (b)
investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on
congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment
roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become
disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the
implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight
would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority,
would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also,
it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization
runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally
appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or
quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly,
be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during
his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation – a matter before another office of government – renders them
susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
In sum, as the post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate
Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability,
the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar
nature are deemed as unconstitutional.
 The issue on presidential veto is integrated in my digest regarding this case on
checks and balances (no. 12- INTRO Folder) since connected man sila. Please
refer to it nlng. Thanks! 
18. Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima,
G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008 , 562 SCRA 251
Facts:
RA 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005) was enacted by Congress to optimize the
revenue-generating capability and collection of the BIR and BOC. The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions. The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC
and CSC were tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations
of RA 9335 to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for
such purpose.
Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the
ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. They contend that while
the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment
and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee
permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the creation of the congressional oversight
committee under the law ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as
a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the executive and
implementing agencies.
Issue:
WON the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee by RA
9335 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se. It neither necessarily
constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor
undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks
and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even
enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the
executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment beyond the
legislative sphere, the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on
Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either
executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must
follow the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures” specified
under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws and
presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be
limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be
confined to the following:
1. scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the
budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask
heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation; and
 2. investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant
to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of
a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a
"right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect.
As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in
the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash
(other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by
law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of
the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in
enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy.
It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the
responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those
standards. In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and
conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. Thus, what is left for the
executive branch or the concerned administrative agency when it formulates rules and
regulations implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or
ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-
making). Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass
upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the
calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion
to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they
conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto
itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
19. Atong Paglaum V. COMELEC
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and
BANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on
Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for
not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back
to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which
abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new
guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following
parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not
need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register
under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and
underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns
of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined
political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent
the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies”
 must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or the lower house.
organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be
represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must understood to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their
their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations. Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still
if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political
nominee who remains qualified. constituencies” as they are ideologically marginalized.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the
practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no
constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide
sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list
elections will encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to
the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined
political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the
Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all
parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is
pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will
of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people,
in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for
the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT
RESERVED for the “marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack
“well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is
also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined
political constituencies”. The common denominator however is that all of them
cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or
sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in
a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the
system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in