Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34:572–586, 2011

Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online
DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2011.578552

Conflict-Induced Displacement and Violence

in Colombia

JENNIFER S. HOLMES
SHEILA AMIN GUTIÉRREZ DE PIÑERES
School of Economic, Political, and Policy Sciences
University of Texas at Dallas
Richardson, TX, USA

Recent work in the refugee literature finds that both insurgents hiding in camps and aid
to refugees may increase violence. This article assesses whether this theory applies to
Conflict Induced Displaced People (IDPs). Specifically, it asks if the arrival of IDPs
increases leftist violence in Colombia. Colombia has high numbers of IDPs, significant
insurgent violence, and available sub-national data to enable an examination of IDP
flows on leftist violence. In the Colombian case, the arrival of conflict induced displaced
people is not associated with increased leftist violence.

Many aid agencies face an apparent dilemma about whether or not to aid refugees. Re-
cent research suggests that humanitarian aid to refugee camps may inadvertently increase
conflict. The refugee literature theorizes that refugee flows can increase non-state violence
in four ways.1 First, there could be easy recruitment from within the refugee population.
Second, there may be insurgents hiding within the refugee flows. Third, Lischer finds that
international humanitarian aid may prolong a conflict and lead to increased violence under
certain circumstances, especially “indiscriminate humanitarian assistance” to a potentially
militarized refugee population.2 Finally, the miserable conditions in these camps may radi-
calize the refugees. There is scant theory linking conflict induced internally displaced people
(IDPs) to conflict, despite a well-developed literature of refugees and conflict. This article
examines the impact of the internally displaced on political violence. Colombia is a good
choice for isolating the effects of IDPs from refugees since refugee counts to neighboring
states are low, while IDP numbers are the second highest in the world as measured by the
United Nations. This article, using Colombia as a case study, asks whether or not the appli-
cation of this refugee theory to the internally displaced is appropriate. Specifically, it asks
if conflict-induced displacement flows are associated with increased leftist violence. This
question is of crucial importance for both aid organizations and the 26,000,000 displaced
people in fifty-two countries worldwide.3
In Colombia, there are multiple types of political violence. Due to the potential conver-
gence or divergence of the goals of the different violent actors, different types of violence
are treated separately. Paramilitary violence is directed against leftist guerrilla violence,

Received 19 September 2010; accepted 21 November 2010.

Address correspondence to Jennifer S. Holmes, University of Texas at Dallas, GR31, 800 W.
Campbell Rd., Richardson, TX 75080-3021, USA. E-mail: jholmes@utdallas.edu

572
 Conflict-Induced Displacement and Violence in Colombia 573

instead of targeting the state. In contrast, in Colombia, leftist guerrilla violence opposes the
state. For decades, Colombia has struggled with varying levels of leftist guerrilla violence
from groups such as The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Na-
tional Liberation Army (ELN). This study attempts to identify whether displacement flows
impact levels of leftist political violence, as opposed to drug-related violence or paramil-
itary violence. Leftist violence is chosen for the following reasons. First and foremost,
within Colombia some, specifically paramilitary groups, accuse IDPs of being either guer-
rilla sympathizers or fighters. Specifically, some paramilitary groups have targeted some
IDPs and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) supporting IDPs because of this alleged
identification.4 Other reports characterize efforts by guerrillas and paramilitary groups to
recruit among marginalized urban populations, where IDPs tend to settle.5 Theoretically,
since IDPs tend to be poor and may pose a strain on local government resources, some
may presume a possible convergence between the arrival of IDPs and additional leftist
violence, similar to those links found in the refugee literature. The theorized link between
refugees and violence, alongside the actual allegations of complicity between IDPs and
leftist guerrilla violence in Colombia, justify an analysis to determine whether or not, or
under what circumstances, there is a relationship between IDPs and violence.

Refugees and IDPs: Similarities and Differences

In terms of international law, there are important distinctions between refugees and IDPs, in
terms of location, legal status, scope, and ability of the individual to assimilate. Basically,
a refugee crosses a national border while an IDP is displaced within a country. This
foundational difference is found in the 1950 UNHCR statute and 1951 UNHCR convention.
Refugees tend to be concentrated in camps together across national boundaries. However,
whether or not IDPs are concentrated in camps or dispersed among the general population
varies by country. In Colombia, the IDPs have resettled mainly within cities, often with
friends or family, but not in dedicated camps.6 However, many scholars have expressed
concern about IDPs due to the ambiguity among international organization as to the specific
rights of IDPS or the jurisdiction of a particular international organization that may create a
“protection gap” leaving them vulnerable.7 The differences between an IDP and a refugee
have been discussed relative to legal implications and political impact.8 Muggah points
out that “Recent attempts to link the concept of IDPs to refugees theoretically and legally
have only served to complicate the issue.”9 Despite this perceived “protection gap” and
lack of conceptual clarity, international organizations have often redefined their mission
to allow assistance to both refugees and IDPs. For instance, the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UNHCR have aided IDPs.10 The scope of humanitarian
challenge varies between refugees and IDPs. Whereas refugees by definition are people
who flee to another country due to fear of persecution, in general, internal displacement,
defined in the 1998 Guiding Principles, can be caused by armed conflict, generalized
violence, economic development, natural disasters, manmade disasters, ethnic persecution,
religious persecution, or other human rights violations.11 However, this definition does
not necessarily carry with it the specific legal protections that are afforded to refugees.
Finally, the ability of refugees or IDPs to assimilate is different. Refugees are unable to
make long-term economic decisions, since they are people without a country. IDPs remain
within their nation’s boundaries and have the opportunity to resettle and start a new life,
albeit under extremely difficult circumstances and often with discrimination from the local
community.
574 J. S. Holmes and S. Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres

Each country with IDPs has specific patterns of displacement and relevant legal def-
initions. In Colombia, displacement has been used as a strategy of war to clear out areas
and gain control of them.12 The harmful secondary effects of coca eradication also lead to
displacement since aerial spraying makes once productive land unproductive for growing
food and market crops.13 In the Colombian Pacific coast departments, development of new
palm oil farms can also cause development-induced displacement as people are forced off
the land to make room for new palm oil production.14 Finally, there is a specific legal defini-
tion of IDP related to the provision of government assistance. Colombian Law 387 of 1997
defined the displaced as someone who has been forced to migrate within the country and
abandon their home and profession due to threats to their life or personal liberty. This and
later Colombian Constitutional Court decisions have obligated the Colombian government
aid the internally displaced.

Refugees and Violence

The 2001 RAND report by Byman et al. examining case studies from Africa and the Mid-
dle East and Weiner’s theory of refugees and conflict find that refugee camps become safe
havens for rebel leaders. According to the RAND report, these leaders use the camps not
only to recruit new insurgents but also as a base from which to direct their operations. The
RAND report argues that “Refugee flows and insurgencies often feed one another: The
discrimination, violence, and misery that typically accompany civil wars often displace
populations that in turn contribute to and sustain the original conflict.”15 Lischer highlights
a dilemma faced by humanitarian organizations. Aiding refugees may have unintended side
effects of prolonging or even intensifying the conflict that created the refugees. Lischer
concludes that international humanitarian organizations provide the basic necessities leav-
ing insurgents more time and energy to fight. Additionally, insurgents and rebel leaders
send their families to refugee camps relieving them of these additional responsibilities. She
cautions that international donors, in their quest to maintain neutrality, suffer “unintended
negative consequences of a myopic humanitarian policy” because they ignore the political
and military contexts in which they operate.16
There are caveats that must be made clear before considering extending the theory
to IDPs in general and to Colombian IDPs in particular. First, in the case of Colombian
IDPs, rebel insurgents and leaders cannot leave their families in the camps for aid and
continue to direct operations in other areas. Colombian IDPs tend to be scattered among
the general population, instead of being settled in concentrated areas, such as the Roma
in Eastern Europe.17 Second, displacement in Colombia occurs for a number of reasons.18
The statistics in Colombia reveal that leftist guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries, or drug
traffickers are responsible for the vast majority of displaced, instead of the state. Estimates
vary. Paramilitaries were listed as responsible for 27–42 percent of the displaced, guerrillas
43–52 percent, public forces 1–5 percent, and other/DK/DA 1–29 percent.19 Third, in
domestic situations like Colombia, the government is less likely to suffer “unintended
negative consequences of a myopic humanitarian policy.” The main difference is that
international organizations aiding refugees typically attempt to maintain a neutral stance
between warring parties. However, the situation with IDPs is fundamentally different.
In contrast, here, the domestic government coordinating the aid from international and
domestic sources is not a neutral party on the scene, but an active participant or belligerent
to the conflict. Instead of neutrality, the government is actively working to shape the
political and military context to its advantage. Finally, since the displaced are citizens,
 Conflict-Induced Displacement and Violence in Colombia 575

Table 1
Conflict induced displacement

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

SUR (government registry) 29,213 330,296 374,818 423,589 219,935
CODHES (statistical algorithm) 288,000 317,375 341,925 412,553 207,607
CEC & CODHES 2006, 19,23,25.

there are unique internal dynamics when displaced persons are perceived to compete with
local residents or “traditional poor” for resources and employment.20

Conflict-Induced Displacement in Colombia

The Conferencia Episcopal de Colombia (CEC) estimates that one out of every forty
Colombians has been displaced due to violence since 1995. Although no one has precise
numbers of the displaced, there is little doubt it is a substantial figure. Table 1 presents
estimates of conflict-induced displacement in Colombia from two sources.
Moreover, the displaced tend to be among the poorest in Colombia. Approximately
90 percent of them earn less than 50,000 pesos a month (approximately 1800 pesos to
the dollar), averaged over the family. The average income is 35,000 pesos a month.21 The
typical displaced person lives below the Colombian poverty line, close to indigence, and
on less than a dollar a day. Moreover, many of these families have abandoned their land or
homes under duress. According to the statistics of the Conferencia Episcopal de Colombia,
between 30 and 67 percent of the displaced had to abandon land. La Consultorı́a para los
Derechos Humanos y el desplazamiento (CODHES) estimates 78 percent of the displaced
had to abandon land and 22 percent abandoned a home.22 Among the ethnic minorities,
displacement not only involves loss of communal lands, which makes reparation difficult,
but also may include loss of culture, language, and customs. Given the attention given
to poverty, inequality, and relative deprivation to explain leftist violence, insurgency, and
revolution, the often acute economic deterioration of the displaced, may cause some to
look to the displaced as a source of recruitment. However, the actor responsible for the
displacement (leftist guerrillas, paramilitaries, or government forces) will affect prospects
of recruitment for any non-state group.
The Colombian government has programs to assist the displaced. Law 387 of 1997
committed government assistance to the displaced. Law 812 of 2003 outlined plans to
assist the displaced in returning to their places of origin. The justice and peace law of the
paramilitary demobilization process (Law 975 of 2005) included provisions for reparations
to the displaced. Moreover, registration with the government also allows access to aid
from numerous International Government Organizations, such as the UNHCR (Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or ACNUR, the Spanish acronym),
international donors, and international aid agencies. The Colombian government then co-
ordinates the aid to increase efficiency and reduce redundancy.23 Additionally, numerous
NGOs and other organizations, such as the Catholic Church, are actively and independently
assisting the displaced population, whether or not they are registered.
576 J. S. Holmes and S. Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres

Causes of Leftist Violence

There is a large literature on the causes of leftist insurgent violence. Some highlight political
factors, such as state presence and repression. Others focus on economic factors, either as
a grievance, recruitment factors or as a struggle over resources. However, no study to
date has examined whether or not the internally displaced cause additional leftist violence.
This section provides a basic introduction to the main literature on leftist violence and its
application to Colombia.
According to Mueller “the key to the amount of . . . warfare in the world . . . is not the
degree to which there is hatred, grievance, or ethnic or civilizational cleavage, but rather
the degree to which governments function adequately.”24 Concern over a weak state is a
prominent theme in studies of Colombia.25 This article uses actual justice and security
spending (at the department level) to indicate state presence.
To explain levels of leftist guerrilla violence, it is also necessary to explain lev-
els of repression. In studies of general leftist violence, scholars such as Schock find
that semi-repressive regimes have higher levels of violence.26 Holmes found that in-
discriminate state violence undermined support for the government and may facilitate
rebel recruitment and operation.27 To account for this in Colombia, the article includes
paramilitary violence and government repression into the model to explain levels of guer-
rilla violence. Previous research by Holmes, Piñeres, and Curtin found that government
human rights violations and paramilitary violence increased leftist guerrilla violence in
Colombia.28
In addition to political factors, economic factors may encourage insurgency in general.
In the first place, economic factors may serve as a grievance for conflict. Secondly, economic
factors can provide both a funding basis and/or a protective motivation for conflict. This
article includes economic factors to understand both recruitment and resource aspects of
non-state violence. In the cross-national literature, some, such as Yang, Dixon, Muller,
and Seligson, have found a relationship between inequality and violence.29 Others, after
controlling for the level of economic development or poverty, find no relationship between
inequality and violence.30 In studies of Colombia, in squatter settlements, endemic poverty
can breed violence, as seen with the emergence of sicarios in Medellı́n.31 In general, Bottia
Noguera finds that the FARC expanded in areas of poor land quality, natural parks, and
rural poverty.32 An important early work linking poverty to violence was the Comisión
de Estudios sobre la Violencia.33 Wealth in Colombia ranges from a relatively wealthy
central Colombia, to poor peripheral departments, such as Amazonas, Vaupés, Guainı́a,
and Chocó. Interestingly, there is still a wide range of poverty rates in departments with a
lower to middle range of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Regardless of whether inequality and poverty are direct or indirect causes of the
Colombian conflict, GINI (Generalised inequality index) indices need to be included in
any analysis of violence. Land conflict has long been the primary driver of Colombian
conflicts.34 According to Richani, “If there is an epicenter, or flashpoint, that could have
set the process leading to the war system . . . it would be the conflicts that have surrounded
the distribution of land in Colombia ever since it became independent.”35 Moreover, this
conflict continues to intensify as commercial agricultural activity over the past half century
has aggravated preexisting conditions of unequal land ownership.36 Departments with severe
inequality include Nariño, Cauca, Chocó, Caldas, and Quindio. Interestingly, although these
departments have violence, they are not the most violent departments.
Rural conditions in Colombia can be particularly plagued with poverty, low economic
productivity, and the underutilization of resources including land37 and scholars such as
 Conflict-Induced Displacement and Violence in Colombia 577

Gonzalez38 have concluded that urban and rural social problems create an environment
favorable to violence. Guerrero Baron argues “there is consensus that great social inequality
and instability give rise to a dynamic that confers legitimacy on revolutionary projects
and violent alternatives.”39 Moreover, the lack of effective agricultural reform and the
criminalization of the peasant magnify preexisting violence in the context of the transition
from a rural agricultural economy, which is aggravated by a lack of successful land reform.40
One particular transformation—the orientation toward coffee cultivation—has increased
rural crisis among peasants due to declining world coffee prices, creating dissatisfaction
in the rural areas and conditions ripe for guerrilla recruitment.41 Trujillo and Bade find a
strong association between departments that grow coffee and violence.42 Because of this, in
the present authors’ statistical models, sectoral GDP of coffee is separated out to examine
the effect of the coffee economy on conflict. Coffee was a consistent predictor of violence
in Holmes, Piñeres, and Curtin.43 Dube and Vargas also find a relationship between falling
coffee prices and increased guerrilla violence in a similar period.44
In addition to poor economic conditions having the potential to foment conflict, eco-
nomic resources can provide power and the ability of government foes to mobilize and
operate. For example, in many cases, guerrillas offer better wages than those available
in other areas.45 In general, Collier finds “The factors which account for this difference
between failure and success are to be found not in the ‘causes’ which these two rebel organi-
zations claim to espouse, but in their radically different opportunities to raise revenue. . .”46
This prominent theory focuses on lootable primary exports and the onset of conflict. In
Colombia, scholars such as Arbelaez et al. have found onset of violence in areas “related
to the sudden development of primary products (gold, emeralds, oil, bananas, cocaine)”
especially in the context of low state presence or contested control of non-state actors.47
However, others have examined enclave production such as mineral extraction, instead
of the entire category of primary exports. Enclave production is theorized to be a fre-
quent target of looting for both personal rulers and predatory rebels. Even with looting,
enclave producers will continue to generate goods because of extreme asset specificity
and concentration.48 In Colombia, areas rich in primary goods are points of conflict and
power struggles.49 Other scholars have taken the theory beyond onset to explain magnitude
and persistence of conflict. Conflicts that begin in remote corners of failing states, which
are sustained by marketable natural resources (diamonds, crude oil, coca), are difficult to
bring to a conclusion. All too often, the perpetrators, both state actors and rebels, find the
chaos of war conducive to the accumulation of personal wealth. Ongoing conflict provides
opportunities for looting or the collection of protection money.50 In Colombia, the most
important enclave product is coca. Despite the general literature on lootable exports, this
article does not utilize the general category of primary exports. Numerous scholars and
government officials (both Colombian and the United States) cite the importance of coca
production in fueling the Colombian conflict and providing crucial financial resources to
non-state violent groups.51
This article extends the analysis of insurgent violence to include the impact of the
arrival of the internally displaced on the level of violence in the receiving area. Given the
large numbers of IDPs in Colombia it is only natural to ask whether or not they too could
potentially augment insurgent violence in receiving areas. The authors test the following
hypothesis derived from the refugee literature:

H1 : Displacement flows augment leftist guerrilla violence, after controlling for other eco-
nomic and political factors.
578 J. S. Holmes and S. Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres

Research Design: Sub-National Level of Analysis

A national aggregated model would not have sufficient variation to allow examination of
violence and displacement; therefore, a sub-national analysis is more appropriate given the
fragmented history of the Colombian nation-state. Since refugees move in mass to another
country, often to camps, the unit of analysis is the nation. Yet, because displacement is
internal, sub-national geographic flows must be examined. In order to study the patterns of
displacement and violence over time the authors examine differences among the thirty-two
mainland departments to be able to leverage the significant variation. The departments are
the sub-national geographical unit for which most demographic, economic, and political
data are collected and maintained. Moreover, as part of President Gaviria’s apertura and
the 1991 constitution, more power and responsibility was devolved from the national
government.52 Colombia does not have homogeneous patterns of development, security, or
demographics throughout the country. Moreover, these rich and complicated patterns are
not new, as Thoumi says. “Since colonial times Colombia has been a collection of diverse
regions with little communication and trade among them. Physical barriers are so great
that many regions remained very isolated and self-sufficient.”53 The sub-national analysis
allows a more rigorous examination of the interactions among political, economic, and
violent factors within the country over time.54

Data and Methodology

This original dataset is compiled from numerous Colombian government agencies and
NGOs. The time period selected (1996–2003) is determined by data availability and data
quality. Unfortunately, the definition of justice spending changed in 2004, making a con-
tinuation into the contemporary time period inappropriate.55 During this time period, there
is much departmental variation within the country. Variables are included to capture inci-
dents of violence, political aspects, demographic characteristics, and economic statistics.
All statistics reported are yearly departmental figures.
The main violence variables are compiled from Centro de Investigación y Educación
Popular in Bogotá, Colombia and its Banco de Datos sobre Derechos Humanos y Violencia
Polı́tica.56 These are incidents of human rights violations against non-combatants. Any
injuries resulting from clashes among combatants are not included. The human rights vio-
lations from CINEP include a spectrum of activity, ranging from threats to killings. Leftist
guerrilla violence includes violence from the FARC, ELN, and other groups identified as
leftist guerrillas who are not identified by group name. The combined total ranges from
0–275 (from CINEP). The article also controls for the rightist, paramilitary violence that is
private, non-state violence oriented toward fighting the leftist violence. These paramilitary
violations range from 0–358. The authors also add government human rights violations to
this paramilitary estimate to capture general effects of repression and retaliatory violence.
These count measures allow one to see the escalation or de-escalation of violence57 across
departments and through time.
Measures of displacement vary in this time period. There are two main data sources
for displacement in Colombia. First, there are the official statistics of the Colombian
government, the Red de Solidaridad Social/Acción Social.58 In 2000, the database was
renamed RUPD as data collection was expanded. In 2004, SURWEB was created as data
collection was again expanded to include variables such as disability status, ethnic minority,
health status, illiteracy, and level of schooling. These dynamic statistics of individuals and
families record both the original location and the site of the eventual relocation of the
 Conflict-Induced Displacement and Violence in Colombia 579

displaced. There are a few characteristics of these data that should be noted. First, this
is a registry of individuals and families who have been recognized by the government
as displaced and who are enrolled in government aid programs. “These statistics are not
estimates or approximations, they simply reflect the real data of people who have registered
with the government for status as displaced people.”59 The data used in this analysis were
released in 8 November 2006. The range people identified as displaced, in thousands, by
the Colombian government ranges from 0 to 79 from 1995 to 2003. Second, the main NGO
serving the displaced is la Consultorı́a para los Derechos Humanos y el desplazamiento.60
CODHES data are readily available from 1999, although they have preliminary estimates
from earlier years. CODHES only reports arrival location, and not origin. Unlike the
government data, CODHES uses statistical approximations. It is not an actual register of
individuals but an estimation based on an algorithm designed by CODHES.61 CODHES
notes that to be counted as displaced by the government, individuals, and families need
to present themselves to the authorities. This may not occur, given the suspicion or fear
that many of the displaced have of the government, especially given the general lack of
security and/or confidence in the state. The range of thousands of displaced, as estimated
by CODHES, from 1999 to 2003, ranges from 0 to 56. There is significant variation when
analyzed sub-nationally and annually. Correlations of the Colombian government registry
of the displaced and COHDES estimates of displaced individuals range from a low of .69
in 2000 to a high of .74 in 2002.
The Colombian National Statistical Center (DANE—Departamento Administrativo
Nacional de Estadı́stica) collects and publishes departmental level data, including key
demographic and economic indicators. Gross domestic product per capita provides an
indication of the general level of development and a control for the overall level of economic
development by department. Yearly estimates in millions of 1994 pesos are provided at the
department level, ranging from 461 to 7,483. Sectoral GDP of coffee in billions of 1994
pesos ranges from 0 to 4.58. Poverty, as measured by the percent of the population with the
insufficient provision of basic needs, ranges from a 13 to 91.5 percent. GINI coefficients
range from .54 to .82 (0 = perfect equality and 1 = perfect inequality). An important political
factor, state presence, is assessed by justice and security spending. Municipal justice and
security spending (aggregated to the department level) are indicators of government police
and military capability. These figures are provided by the Departamento Nacional de
Planeación (DNP), in thousands of 1998 constant pesos per capita with a range from 0 to
313. Coca cultivations numbers, in thousand of hectares from the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime range from 0–66.

Model Specification and Analysis

The negative binomial model for estimation is utilized since the dependent variable, the
annual total of leftist human rights violations, is an event count. The negative binomial
model is particularly appropriate when there is heterogeneity among units. As discussed
earlier, Colombia is not internally homogeneous. There are many significant internal dif-
ferences in terms of security, development, geography, and other factors that reflect this
internal heterogeneity. The distribution of this dependent variable is highly non-normal
and violates the assumptions of an ordinary least squares regression analysis. Furthermore,
other count models, such as Poisson-based models, would be inappropriate for the follow-
ing reasons. First, the events are not independent. Departments with violence may have a
higher chance of further violence compared to departments without violence. Second, there
is overdispersion in the dependent variable, leftist violence.62 In other words, five of the
580 J. S. Holmes and S. Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres

Table 2
Negative binomial regression of total leftist violence

Model 1 (SUR) Model 2 (SUR) Model 3 (CODHES)

Political Factors
# of Displaced (lagged −.0052 (.0075) −0.0014 (0.0085) −0.0046 (0.0121)
1 yr)
H.R. Violations by .0105∗∗∗ (.0019) 0.0119∗∗∗ (.0023) 0.0082∗∗∗ (0.0024)
Public Forces &
Paramilitaries (lagged
1 yr)
Justice and Security −0.0021† (.0011) −.0030∗∗∗ (.0005) 0.0033 (0.0092)
Spending (lagged
1 yr)
Economic Factors
GDP per capita −0.0002∗∗∗ (0.00005) −.0002∗∗∗ (.00005) −.00019∗∗ (.00007)
Poverty (lagged 1 yr) .0074 (.0054) 0.0137† (.0075)
Gini (lagged 1 yr) .6461 (1.362) −0.0798 (1.756)
Coffee (lagged 1 yr) .2902∗∗ (.1036) .3640∗∗∗ (.1010) .3921∗∗ (.1421)
Coca Cultivation 0.0056 (0.0092) 0.0012 (0.0064) −0.0023 (0.0149)
(lagged 1 yr)
Constant 2.029∗ (0.902) 2.648∗∗∗ (0.1737) 2.499∗ (1.206)
/ln alpha −.1409 (.1123) −.1511 (0.1003) −.1253 (0.1655)
Alpha .8685 (.0976) 1.163 (0.1166) .8821 (0.1459)
N 223 254 112
Wald Chi2 162.64 142.14 90.76
Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood −901.11 −987.77 −480.16
Time period 1996–2003 1996–2003 1999–2002
∗∗∗
= p < .001; ∗∗ = p < .01; ∗ = p < .05; † = p < .10 (two tailed test).
GDP per capita is reported in millions of 1994 pesos. Sectoral GDP is in billions of 1994 pesos.
Coca cultivation is in thousands of hectares. Justice and security spending per capital is in millions
of 1998 pesos. Displacement estimates are in thousands. All models report robust standard errors.
Departments dropped due to missing data: San Andrés in all models, Vaupés, Guainia, Vichada and
Guaviare in models 2 and 3.

thirty-two departments did not report any leftist human rights violations in 2003, while the
overall mean was 15 and one department had 113 incidents that year alone. Third, negative
tallies of human rights violations are not possible, making the choice of a Poisson model
inappropriate. Finally, the study used robust standard errors (see Table 2).
The hypothesis from the refugee literature is applied in order to determine if dis-
placement flows augment leftist guerrilla violence.63 There exists substantial controversy
surrounding government versus CODHES data estimating the number of displaced. How-
ever, both suffer from different types of selection bias. Government data represents those
who register with the government to receive aid but does not reflect all displaced, while
CODHES’s data contain a broader estimate that potentially includes those who chose not to
register with the government and/or those who are not accepted by the government into the
program. Some individuals, including those who may have a reason to hide, those who feel
disenfranchised, and frustrated with the government, may not register with the government
 Conflict-Induced Displacement and Violence in Colombia 581

yet are captured in the CODHES data. It is worth noting that only those who register with the
government receive official aid. In order to test the robustness of the results and to account
for any potential sample bias between the two estimates of IDP flows, the model is estimated
using both the Colombian government (RUPD/SUR) and CODHES estimates of the arrival
of IDPs. Regardless of which displacement indicator is included, the arrival of internally
displaced people is not associated with increased leftist violence. These results suggest that
theories linking refugees to increased violence are not appropriate to apply to IDPs.
In addition to displacement, the authors include control variables that the literature
typically identifies as causes of leftist violence. In terms of political factors, the authors
examine the potentially inflammatory character of paramilitary and government human
rights violations and the effects of the government presence. Paramilitary and state human
rights violations show a clear and consistent positive relationship with leftist violence across
all three models. Consistent with the literature,64 increased justice and security spending
should result in a more stable environment with less leftist violence. Justice and security
spending is negative and significant in models 1 and 2.
In terms of economic factors that increase violence, some evidence of economic based
grievance is seen. In accordance with dominant theories, per capita gross domestic product
is negatively associated with leftist violence. Areas with a higher GDP per capita have less
leftist violence. Poverty should be positively related to leftist violence. Although poverty
and inequality are insignificant in model 1, areas with coffee production are clearly plagued
by higher levels of leftist guerrilla violence, as demonstrated in all models. This is consistent
with the difficulties that small rural farmers and workers encounter in the coffee industry.
One would expect to find more leftist violence in coca producing areas, which provide
lucrative sources of illicit income and can fund non-state violent groups even if there is
a lack of popular support. However, consistent with previous research,65 coca production
is insignificant in this time period. They found that coca did have an inflammatory effect
on leftist violence on an earlier time period. One possible interpretation is that previous
conflict over controlling coca cultivation had been settled. Another is that coca cultivation
alone is not a predictor of violence.
To provide substantive interpretation, the authors have predicted the amount of leftist
violence, selecting values for certain independent variables while holding the rest to their
means. For example, if poverty (NBI) were 0, the model would predict only 13.6 incidents
of leftist human rights violations, compared to the prediction for a department with the
highest rate of poverty (91.5) of 26.8 events of human rights violations by leftist groups.
The poorest department, in terms of GDP per capita (461), has a predicted number of
human rights violations by leftist groups of 23.5, compared to the wealthiest (7482), which
generates a prediction of 7.6. A department without any coffee production would have an
average of 17 incidents, while a department with the maximum coffee production (4.5)
would predict 64. A department without justice and security spending generates a predicted
value of 19.6, while the highest amount of spending (313) would predict 10. Departments
without paramilitary or public forces human rights violations would predict 14.5, while
those most afflicted by paramilitary or public forces human rights violations (358) would
predict 615 incidents.
Conclusion
This article asks whether conflict induced displacement augments leftist political violence.
It tested this using a sub-national analysis of Colombia. Leftist violence is examined includ-
ing traditional control variables and the number of displaced received by the department.
Both the Colombian government and CODHES, a leading NGO, collect displacement data.
582 J. S. Holmes and S. Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres

Government data measures those who officially register with the government and receive
aid while CODHES’s data is an estimate of all displaced, including those who may not be
receiving government aid. Neither the model show a relationship between the arrival of dis-
placed people and violence levels.66 These results suggest that governments and aid agencies
should not treat aid to IDPs the same as refugees. Despite studies that find that aid to refugees
tends to have the negative externality of augmenting violence, in the Colombian case, there
is no risk that providing humanitarian aid to IDPs may inadvertently worsen conflict.
Aid to IDPs should not be treated the same as aid to refugees. The two differ in signif-
icant ways other than just whether or not they have crossed a national border while fleeing
violence. In Colombia, the IDPs are dispersed as opposed to being concentrated in camps.
Despite difficulties at reintegration, IDPs have a better chance of successful assimilation
than refugees since they are citizens. Finally, the authors recognize that agencies providing
aid for IDPs do not operate suffer from the myopia caused by an attempt to maintain
neutrality in the political and military context. In contrast, in the Colombian case, even
when aid is provided by international agencies, the Colombian government coordinates the
distribution of that aid. Additionally, the Colombian government directly provides aid to
IDPs who are successfully entered into its registry of IDPs. In sum, the Colombian case
does not support the expectations of the refugee literature. In fact, this analysis suggests
the opposite effect. Dispersed IDPs are not associated with any increase in conflict. Given
these contrary conclusions, more work is needed to replicate and extend this analysis in
other countries with large internally displaced populations, such as Sudan, Iraq, Uganda,
and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Specifically, further research will clarify whether
or not it is the aid to the displaced that prevents any radicalization, if concentration in camps
increases the likelihood of radicalization, or if both factors are important.

Notes
1. Myron Weiner, “Bad Neighborhoods, Bad Neighbors: An Inquiry into the Causes of
Refugee Flows,” International Security 21(1) (1996), pp. 5–42; Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Dangerous
Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2005); Idean Salehyan, “Refugees and the Study of Civil War,” Civil Wars 9(2)
(2007), pp. 127–141; Assefaw Bariagaber, Conflict and the Refugee Experience: Flight, Exile and
Repatriation in the Horn of Africa (Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006); Aristide
Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in
the Developing World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
2. Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries.
3. The estimate of the total population of displaced people is from the 2008 report of the In-
ternal Displacement Monitoring Centre Norwegian Refugee Council Internal Displacement’s Global
Overview of Trends and Developments in 2007, p. 6.
4. For example, a 2008 threat against the organizers of a peace march contained the fol-
lowing statement: “SE CUBREN COMO DESPLAZADOS Y SON GUERRILLEROS POR ESO
LOS DECLARAMOS OBJETIVO MILITAR DE LAS AGUILAS NEGRAS Y LAS TALES O.NG.
ASOCIACIONES Y FUNDACIONES COMO MINGA, REINICIAR, FUNDIP, ASOPRON, AN-
DAS, ASDEGO, FENACOA, ASOMUJER, TAO, CODHES, CUT. Y OTROS” [You pretend to be
displaced but are guerrillas. For this, we declare organizations and foundations like MINGA, REINI-
CIAR, FUNDIP, ASOPRON, ANDAS, ASDEGO, FENACOA, ASOMUJER, TAO, CODHES, CUT
and others military targets of the Aguilas Negras].
5. United Nations System Thematic Group on Internal Displacement. Humanitarian Action
Plan 2002–2003 Colombia (United Nations, 2002). “The armed conflict in Colombia is having
a sustained impact on the civilian population. Armed bands have made the rural population, and
increasingly the population in marginal urban areas, a military target in the expansion of their
 Conflict-Induced Displacement and Violence in Colombia 583

struggle for territorial control, as well as control of illegal and legal businesses, and a source of
recruitment,” p. 9.
6. Andrés Quintero and Tegan A. Culler, “IDP Health in Colombia: Needs and Challenges,”
Forced Migration Review 33, pp. 70–71.
7. David Lanz, “Subversion or Reinvention? Dilemmas and Debates in the Context of UN-
HCR’s Increasing Involvement with IDPs,” Journal of Refugee Studies 21(2) (2008), pp. 192–209,
p. 193; Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, The Forsaken People: Case Studies of the Internally
Displaced (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998); Luke T. Lee, “Internally Displaced
Persons and Refugees: Toward a Legal Synthesis?” Journal of Refugee Studies 9(1) (1996), pp. 27–42;
Allehone Mulugeta Abebe, “Legal and Institutional Dimensions of Protecting and Assisting Inter-
nally Displaced Persons in Africa,” Journal of Refugee Studies 22(2) (2009), pp. 155–176; Martin
Evans, “The Suffering is Too Great: Urban Internally Displaced Persons in the Casamance Conflict,
Senegal,” Journal of Refugee Studies 20(1) (2007), pp. 60–85; Cathrine Brun, “Local Citizens or In-
ternally Displaced Persons? Dilemmas of Long Term Displacement in Sri Lanka,” Journal of Refugee
Studies 16(4) (2003), pp. 376–397.
8. N. Geissler, “The International Protection of Internally Displaced Persons,” Interna-
tional Journal of Refugee Law 11(3) (1999), pp. 451–478; OCHA (Office for the Coordina-
tion of Humanitarian Affairs), Internal Displacement Unit, No Refugee: The Challenge of In-
ternal Displacement (New York, United Nations, 2003); Christopher R. Duncan, “Unwelcome
Guests: Relations between Internally Displaced,” Journal of Refugee Studies 18(1) (2005), pp. 25–
46.
9. Robert Muggah, “Through the Developmentalist’s Looking Glass: Conflict-Induced Dis-
placement and Involuntary Resettlement in Colombia,” Journal of Refugee Studies 13(2) (2000), pp.
133–164, at 135.
10. Lanz, “Subversion or Reinvention?,” p. 193.
11. “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” (1998). Available at http://www.brookings.
edu/projects/idp/gp page.aspx
12. Ana Maria Ibáñez, El deplazamiento forzado en Colombia: un camino sin retorno hacia
la pobreza (Bogotá: Colombia. Universidad de los Andes 2008); Anastasia Moloney, “Displaced in
Colombia,” NACLA Report on the Americas 38(32) (2004), pp. 9–12.
13. Michelle Dion and Catherine Russler, “Eradicating Efforts, the State, Displacement and
Poverty: Explaining Coca Cultivation in Colombia during Plan Colombia,” Journal of Latin Amer-
ican Studies 40 (2008), pp. 399–421; Mike Ceaser, “Caught in the Crossfire of Colombia’s Civil
War” (29 January 2005). The Lancet World Report. Available at www.thelancet.com, pp. 365,
373–374.
14. Arturo Escobar, “Displacement, Development and Modernity in the Colombian Pacific,”
International Social Science Journal 55(175) (2003), pp. 157–167.
15. Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, Trends
in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), p. 61.
See also Weiner, “Bad Neighborhoods, Bad Neighbors.”
16. Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, p. 141.
17. See United Nations Development Programme Fast Facts, “At Risk: Roma and
the Displaced in Southeast Europe.” Available at http://europeandcis.undp.org/uploads/public/
File/rbec web/vgr/FastFacts At Risk report.pdf
18. For more on the causes of conflict-induced displacement see Jacqueline H Rubin and Will
H. Moore, “Risk Factors for Forced Migrant Flight,” Conflict Management & Peace Science 24(2)
(2007), pp. 85–104; Will H. Moore and Stephen M. Shellman, “Refugee or Internally Displaced
Person? To Where Should One Flee?” Comparative Political Studies 39(5) (2006), pp. 599–622;
Will H. Moore and Stephen M. Shellman, “Whither Will They Go? A Global Analysis of Refugee
Flows, 1955–95,” International Studies Quarterly 51(4) (2007), pp. 811–834; Sarah Kenyon Lischer,
“Causes and Consequences of Conflict-Induced Displacement,” Civil Wars 9(2) (2007), pp. 142–155;
Ibáñez, El deplazamiento forzado en Colombia; Escobar “Displacement, Development and Modernity
in the Colombian Pacific”; Moloney, “Displaced in Colombia.”
584 J. S. Holmes and S. Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres

19. Figures are CODHES then SUR in CODHES y Conferencia Episcopal de Colombia (CEC)
Desafı́os para construir nación: el paı́s ante el desplazamiento, el conflicto armado y la crisis
humanitaria. 1995–2005 (Bogotá, Colombia: CODHES, 2006), p. 73.
20. Because of this concern, some agencies and donors have advocated assisting the entire
community that hosts the IDPs, instead of giving only the IDPs aid and ignoring the traditional poor
in the community. Interview with USAID staff, Bogotá, Colombia, November 2009.
21. CODHES and CEC, Desafı́os para construir nación, p. 83.
22. Ibid., p. 73.
23. Interviews with officials from USAID, other aid agencies, and foreign embassy staff in
Bogotá, November 2009. For example, recipients who receive job training from one NGO are not
eligible to participate in programs from another NGO that has its aid coordinated by the government.
24. John Muller, “Policing the Remnants of War,” Journal of Peace Research 40(5) (2003), pp.
507–518.
25. Thomas Marks, “Colombian Army Counterinsurgency,” Crime, Law, & Social Change 40
(2003), pp. 77–105, at 96; Cynthia Watson, “Civil-Military Relations in Colombia: A Workable
Relationship or a Case for Fundamental Reform?” Third World Quarterly 21(3) (2000), pp. 529–548,
at 530; Jennifer S. Holmes, Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin Curtin, “A Sub-national
Study of Insurgency: FARC Violence in the 1990’s,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30(3) (2007),
pp. 249–265; Jennifer S. Holmes, Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin Curtin, Guns, Drugs,
and Development in Colombia (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008); Daniel Pécaut, Guerra
Contra la Sociedad (Bogotá, Colombia: Espasa, 2001), p. 33.
26. Kurt Schock, “A Conjunctural Model of Political Conflict: The Impact of Political Oppor-
tunities on the Relationship between Economic Inequality and Violent Political Conflict,” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 40(1) (1996), pp. 98–133.
27. Jennifer S. Holmes, Terrorism and Democratic Stability (Manchester: Manchester Univer-
sity Press, 2001).
28. Holmes et al., “A Sub-national Study of Insurgency: FARC Violence in the 1990’s” and
Guns, Drugs, and Development in Colombia. The model does not include formal military offenses
against leftist groups such as the FARC. It should be noted that both Pastrana’s Plan Colombia and
Uribe’s Democratic Security and Defense Policy contained statements of commitment to human
rights. Although some NGOs have expressed concerns about recent human rights violations by
government forces, in general, there has been increased professionalism in the government security
forces.
29. T. Y. Yang, William J. Dixon, Edward N. Muller, and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Inequality and
Political Violence Revisited,” American Political Science Review 87(4) (1993), pp. 977–994.
30. Melissa A. Hardy, “Economic Growth, Distributional Inequality, and Political Conflict
in Industrial Societies,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 7 (1979), pp. 209–227; Erich
Weede and Horst Tiefenbach, “Some Recent Explanations of Income Inequality,” International
Studies Quarterly 25(2) (1981), pp. 255–282; Erich Weede, “Some New Evidence on Correlates
of Political Violence: Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Economic Development,”
European Sociological Review 3(2) (1987), pp. 97–108; and Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of
Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy,” Washington, DC: World Bank Working Paper,
(2000), p. 9. For the debate about violence and inequality, see Lee Sigelman and Miles Simpson,
“A Cross-National Test of the Linkage between Economic Inequality and Political Violence,” The
Journal of Conflict Resolution 21(1) (1977), pp. 105–128; Edward N. Muller, “Income Inequal-
ity, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence,” American Sociological Review 50(1) (1985),
pp. 47–61; Edward Muller and Mitchell Seligson, “Inequality and Insurgency,” American Politi-
cal Science Review 81(2) (1987), pp. 425–451; Schock, “A Conjunctural Model of Political Con-
flict.” For a relevant discussion of the debate as it pertains to Colombia, see Francisco Gutiérrez
Sanı́n, “Crimen e impunidad. Precisiones sobre la violencia,” Revista de Estudios Sociales 3 (1999),
pp. 133–136.
31. Erna von der Walde Uribe, “La novela de sicarios y la violencia en Colombia,” Iberoamer-
icana 3 (2001), pp. 27–40.
 Conflict-Induced Displacement and Violence in Colombia 585

32. Martha Bottı́a Noguera, “La presencia y expansión municipal de las FARC: es avaricia y
contagio, más que ausencia estatal?” Documento CEDE 2003-03 (2003).
33. Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia (Bogotá, Colombia: Centro Editorial Universidad
Nacional, 1987).
34. See Miguel Ortiz Sarmiento, “Violencia polı́tica de los ochenta: elementos para una reflexión
historica,” Anuario Colombiano de Historica Social y de la Cultura 18 (1991), pp. 245–280. See also
Carlos Medina Gallego, Autodefensas, Paramilitares y Narcotráfico en Colombia: origen, desarrollo
y consolidación. El caso de Puerto Boyacá (Bogotá, Colombia: Editorial Documentos Periodı́sticos,
1990).
35. Nazir Richani, “The Political Economy of Violence: The War-System in Colombia,” Journal
of Interamerican Studies & World Affairs 39(2) (1997), pp. 37–45, 38.
36. Phillip McLean, “Colombia: Failed, Failing or Just Weak?” The Washington Quarterly 25(3)
(2002), pp. 123–134, at 125.
37. K. Heshusius Rodriguez, “Medicion del impacto de un programa de reforma agraria en
Colombia,” CEDE Documento 2005–28 (2005), p. 3.
38. Fernan Gonzalez, “Colombia entre la Guerra y la paz. Aproximación a una lectura geopo-
litica de la violencia colombiana,” Revista Venezolana de Economı́a y Ciencias Sociales 8(2)
(Mayo–Agosto 2002):, pp. 13–49.
39. Javier Guerrero Baron, “Is the War Ending? Premises and Hypotheses with Which to View
the Conflict in Colombia,” Latin American Perspectives 28(1) (2001), pp. 12–30, at 13.
40. Klaus Deininger, “Making Negotiated Land Reform Work: Initial Experience from Colom-
bia, Brazil, and South Africa,” World Development 27(4) (1999), pp. 651–672, at 655.
41. Richani, “The Political Economy of Violence.”
42. Edgar Trujillo and Martha Elena Bade, “Los Costos economicos de la criminalidad y la
violencia en Colombia: 1991–1996,” Planeación y Desarrollo 28(4) (1997), pp. 266–308, at 273–275.
43. Holmes et al., Guns, Drugs, and Development in Colombia.
44. Oeindrila Dube and Juan F. Vargas, “Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence
from Colombia,” Documentos de CERAC (2006).
45. Gonzalo Sánchez, “Colombia: Violencias Sin Futuro,” Foro Internacional 38(1) (1998), pp.
37–58, at 40.
46. Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy,” p. 9. See
also Paul Collier, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington, DC:
World Bank Group, 2003) for a more refined version of the theory, including probabilities of new
conflict onset relative to primary commodity dependence.
47. Maria Angelica Arbelaez, Juan José Echavarria, and Alejandro Gaviria, “Colombian Long
Run Growth and the Crisis of the 1990s.” Report submitted to Global Development Network/Inter-
American Development Bank Project on Economic Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean
(Inter-American Development Bank 2002), pp. 42–43.
48. David K. Leonard and Scott Straus, Africa’s Stalled Development: International Causes
and Cures (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), p. 15.
49. Sánchez, “Colombia: Violencias Sin Futuro,” p. 39.
50. Marilyn Silberfein, “Insurrections,” in Susan Cutter, Douglas Richardson, and Thomas J.
Wilbanks, eds., The Geographical Dimensions of Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2003), n.p.
51. James F. Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America (Boulder, CO: Lynne Ri-
enner, 2003); Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements; Daniel Pécaut,
“Presente, pasado y futuro de la violencia en Colombia,” Desarrollo Económico 36(144) (1997),
pp. 891–930; Patricia Bibes, “Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: Colombia, a Case
Study,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 17(3) (2001), pp. 243–258; Bottı́a Noguera,
“La presencia y expansión municipal de las FARC; Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, The Colom-
bian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001); Francisco E. Thoumi, Political Economy and Il-
legal Drugs in Colombia (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Fabio Sánchez, Ana Maria Diaz,
and Michel Formisano, “Conflicto, Violencia y Actividad Criminal en Colombia: Un Analisis
586 J. S. Holmes and S. Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres

Espacial,” Documento CEDE 2003–05 (2003); Holmes et al., Guns, Drugs, and Development in
Colombia.
52. Gustavo Bell Lemus, “The Decentralized State: An Administrative or Political Challenge,”
in Eduardo Posada Carbó, ed., Colombia: The Politics of Reforming the State (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1998).
53. Francisco E. Thoumi, “The Colombian Competitive Advantage in Illegal Drugs,” Journal
of Drug Issues 35(1) (2005), pp. 7–25, at 14.
54. For a discussion of the role of sub-national comparison in comparative research, see Arend
Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political Science Review
65(3) (1971), pp. 682–693; Richard Snyder, “Scaling Down: The Sub-National Comparative Method,”
Studies in Comparative International Development 36(1) (2001), pp. 93–110 or B. Guy Peters,
Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods (New York: New York University Press, 1998).
55. Beginning in 2004, the Sistema Penal Acusatorio is excluded from justice spending totals.
Departamento Nacional de Planeación. Juridicción Penal 1996–2007. Boletı́n Dirección de Justicia
y Seguridad. Cifras de Justicia. (Bogotá, Colombia: Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2008).
56. Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), “Sı́ntesis del Marco Conceptual,”
Noche y Niebla No. 22 (2001); Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), Descripción
general del sistema de información (Bogotá, Colombia: CINEP, 2000).
57. Nicholas Sambanis, “Expanding Economic Models of Civil War Using Case Studies,”
Perspectives on Politics 2(2) (2004), pp. 259–279.
58. Acción Social (Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y la Cooperación Internacional)
“Instructivo.” Available at http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/SUR/Instructivo.pdf
59. Acción Social (Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y la Cooperación Internacional)
Subdireccion de Atención a Población Desplazada, Registro Único de Población Desplazada, “Guı́a
de consulta salidas estadı́sticas pagina WEB,” Bogotá, Colombia versión No. 01 (14 June 2007).
Available at http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/documentos/Guia Consulta Web.pdf. “Las cifras que
aporta no son aproximadas, corresponden a conteos puros de los datos reales que se contienen su
sistema de información.” Author translation.
60. CODHES (Consultoriá para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento), “Construcción
de cifras e indicadores de desplazamiento forzado interno en Colombia” (2004).
61. Ibid. CODHES y Conferencia Episcopal de Colombia (CEC), Desafı́os para construir
nación: el paı́s ante el desplazamiento, el conflicto armado y la crisis humanitaria 1995–2005
(Colombia: CODHES, 2006).
62. See Joseph M. Hilbe, Negative Binomial Regression (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007) and Adrian Colin Cameron and P. K. Trivedi, Regression Analysis of Count Data
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) for a discussion of the negative binomial. Although
many departments do not have leftist violence, the zero-inflated negative binomial was not required.
The Vuong test was indecisive and zero inflation models did not yield additional information. More-
over, theoretically, there is no obvious reason why one would expect that some departments will not
have a chance of experiencing violence. Thus, there is no theoretical separation into at risk and not at
risk departments that would indicate the need for a zero-inflated negative binomial model.
63. If the models are estimated with errors clustered by department instead of robust standard
errors, there is no substantive difference in the results. Similarly, the inclusion of a lagged dependent
variable does not result in any substantive changes.
64. James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political
Science Review 97(1) (2003), pp. 75–90. See also Macartan Humphries, “Natural Resources, Conflict,
and Conflict Resolution,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(4) (2005), pp. 508–537.
65. Holmes et al., Guns, Drugs, and Development in Colombia.
66. Future research will include another source of primary data and survey work to assess what
kind of assistance and from what source to further test the robustness of the models and extend the
time series of the models.
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