494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Taneo unless otherwise provided by law.
G.R. No. 87236. February 8, 1993. * Same; Same; Same; In   the   absence   of   evidence   to   show   any
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   plaintiff­
appellee, vs.VICTOR   TANEO   y   CAÑADA,   alias   OPAO,   a
certain BEBOT ESCOREAL and a certain ROY CODILLA,
accused.
Criminal   Law; Evidence; Credibility   of   witnesses; When   the
issue of credibility of a witness is concerned, the appellate court
will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court.—At the
outset,   it   is   to   be   observed   that   at   the   bottom   of   the   assigned
errors is the issue of the credibility of witnesses Herminia Sia and
Victor Taneo. Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence and amply
supported by an impressive array of cases is the rule that when
the   issue   of   credibility   of   a   witness   is   concerned,   the   appellate
court   will   generally   not   disturb   the   findings   of   the   trial   court,
considering   that   the   latter   is   in   a   better   position   to   decide   the
question,   having   heard   the   witness   himself   and   observed   his
deportment   and   manner   of   testifying   during   the   trial,   unless
certain facts of substance and value had been plainly overlooked
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.
Same; Same; Same; The   mere   pendency   of   a   criminal   case
against a person does not disqualify him from becoming a witness.
—Appellant insists that Victor Taneo's credibility is questionable
because  the  latter  had  earlier  been   charged  in  two  (2)   criminal
cases  for  robbery;   the  former  admits,   however,   that   these  cases
were dismissed for failure to prosecute. Section 20, Rule 130 of the
Rules   of   Court   provides   that   except   as   provided   for   in   the
succeeding sections, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving,
can   make   known   their   perception   to   others,   may   be   witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case or
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not
be a ground for disqualification. Clearly, the mere pendency of a
criminal   case   against   a   person   does   not   disqualify   him   from
becoming a witness. As a matter of fact, conviction of a crime does
not   disqualify   such   person   from   being   presented   as   a   witness
reason   or   motive   why  witnesses   for   the   prosecution   should   have
testified falsely, the logical conclusion is that no improper motive
existed and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.—
At
__________
*
 THIRD DIVISION.
495
VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 8, 1993 49
5
People vs. Taneo
his arraignment, Victor Taneo  voluntarily pleaded guilty to
an information which charges conspiracy. He was not discharged
as a state witness—a sure guarantee of acquittal—and he did not
impute criminal responsibility solely on the appellant. Thus, if he
were to testify falsely against the latter, he must have been moved
by a strong, improper and ulterior motive. That motive must have
been   established;   appellant   failed   to   do   so.   In   the   absence   of
evidence   to   show   any   reason   or   motive   why   witnesses   for   the
prosecution should have testified falsely, the logical conclusion is
that   no   improper   motive   existed,   and   that   their   testimony   is
worthy of full faith and credit.
Same; Same; Res Gestae; Court a quo correctly considered the
statement given by the victim Landa Robert to Herminia Sia as
part   of   the   res   gestae.—The court a   quo correctly   considered   the
statement given by the victim, Landa Robert, to Herminia Sia as
part of the res gestae. Landa's declaration that it was the appellant
who struck her was given while she was still at the ground floor of
the   Perpetual   Succour   Hospital   awaiting   to   be   admitted   for
treatment. She was rushed to the said hospital immediately after
the incident in question and was operated on for four (4) hours
starting at 8:00 o'clock that evening until 12:00 midnight. She died
five (5) days later.
Same; Same; Same; Before evidence of the res gestae may be
admitted, three (3) requisites must concur.—The following three (3)
requisites   must   concur   before   evidence   of   the res   gestae may   be
admitted:   (1)   the   principal   act,   the res   gestae, be   a   startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the
occurrence   in   question   and   its   immediately   attending
circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; Same; No uniformity as to the interval of
time that should separate the occurrence of the startling event from
the making of the  declaration.—The cases  are not  uniform  as  to
the   interval   of   time   that   should   separate   the   occurrence   of   the
startling   event   from   the   making   of   the   declaration.   What   is
important   is   that   the   declarations   were   voluntarily   and
spontaneously made "so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the
presence of the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and
were made under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the
idea of design or deliberation.
Same; Same; Alibi; It is a fundamental  judicial  dictum  that
the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of
the accused.—Since the appellant had been identified, his defense
of   alibi   must   fail.   It   is   a   fundamental   judicial   dictum   that   the
defense of alibi
496
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
96
People vs. Taneo
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused.
APPEAL   from   the   decision   of   the   Regional   Trial   Court   of
Cebu. Cañares, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff­appellee.
Vicente   A.   Torres   &   Mildred C. Duero, Quisumbing,
Torres, Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista counsel de officio
for accused­appellant Roy Codilla.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The   above­named   accused   were   charged   with   the   crime   of
Robbery with Homicide by Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O.
Solima of Cebu City in an Information  filed on 29 December
1
1986   with   the   Regional   Trial   Court   (RTC)   of   Cebu,   the
accusatory portion of which reads:
"That on or about the 22nd day of December, 1986, at about 5:30
P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of   this   Honorable   Court,   the   said   accused,   conniving   and
confederating   together   and   mutually   helping   with   one   another,
armed   with   bottle   (sic)   of   beer   grande   and   RC   Cola,   with
deliberate  intent   and   by  means   of   force  upon  things,   to  wit:   by
entering the inhabited house of one Herminia Sia y Sy and once
inside, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent
of said Herminia Sia y Sy, the owner thereof, did then and there
take, steal and carry away the following:
one (1) sharp cassette valued at.................................... P3,500.00
one (1) Denonet Karaoke valued at.................................... 7,000.00
one (1) Sony cassette recorder.................................... 1,000.00
Fifty (50) pcs. of cassette tape.................................... 2,000.00
one (1) casio calculator.................................... 100.00
TOTAL.................................... P13,600.00
valued in all (sic) at P13,600.00, belonging to said Herminia
Sia y Sy, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the
amount of P13.300.00, Philippine Currency; and with intent
to kill, did then and there
___________
 Original Records, 1­2; Rollo, 8­9.
1
497
VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 8, 1993 497
 People vs. Taneo
attack, assault and used personal violence upon Linda (sic)
Aglipa Robert, maid of Herminia Sia y Sy, owner of the said
house,   who   was   the   only   person   inside   the   house   at   that
time,   by   hacking   said   Linda   (sic)   Aglipa   Robert   with   said
bottle   of   beer   grande   and   RC   Cola   at   her   head   and   face,
thereby inflicting upon her the following physical injuries:
     'CARDIO RESPIRATORY ARREST
     MASSIVE PNEUMONIA BL
     CEREBRAL CONTUSSION
     OPEN DEPRESSED COMMUNIATED FX FRONTAL
     AREA   (R)   MULTIPLE   LACERATIONS   ON   THE
FACE'
as a consequence of which said Linda (sic) Aglipa Robert
died instantaneously.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Only   accused   Victor   Taneo   y   Canada   and   Roy   Codilla
were apprehended. Accused Bebot Escoreal has remained at
large   and   an   alias   warrant   for   his   arrest   issued   on   9
February 1987 had been returned unserved for the reason
that he is not known in his given address. 2
On   9   February   1987,   Roy   Codilla,   assisted   by   counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty while Victor Taneo voluntarily
pleaded   guilty.  In   view   thereof,   the   trial   court  issued   an
3 4
Order   finding   the   latter   guilty   as   charged   and   sentencing
him   to   suffer   the   penalty   of reclusion   perpetua. The
dispositive portion of the order reads:
"WHEREFORE,   finding   accused   Victor   Taneo   y   Canada   guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide as
charged and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance
of   plea   of   guilty,   he  is  hereby  sentenced   to  suffer RECLUSION
PERPETUA.
It   appearing   that   the   articles   stolen   were   recovered,   no
pronouncement as to indemnity." 5
____________
 Original Records, 247.
2
 Original Records, 14.
3
 Per Judge Leonardo B. Cañares.
4
 Original Records, op. cit., 14­15.
5
498
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Taneo
Trial   on   the   merits   against   Roy   Codilla   then   ensued.   The
witnesses   who   testified   for   the   prosecution   were   Dr.
Herminia Sia, accused Victor Taneo, Pat. Enrico Ministerio
and Dr. Jaime Perez, and those who testified for the defense
were   accused   Roy   Codilla,   Police   Cpl.   Jovito   Roa,   Lolit
Cabriana and Felicidad Pareño. The evidence for the parties
is summarized by the trial court as follows:
"Dr. Herminia Sia, an Optometrist, is a resident of Saint Michael
Village at Banilad, Cebu City. Her clinic is located at Junguera
Street, Cebu City. Two years ago, sometime in 1984 when she lost
two big cassette recorders in her residence, she decided to hire the
services of a guard. A Sgt. Codinas and an armyman named Bros,
recommended accused Roy Codilla to her.
Employed on a daily basis, accused Codilla spent most of his
time   in   securing   the   Banilad   residence.   There   are   (sic)   times
though that he would guard the Junguera clinic for a few hours.
On one occasion at the clinic, Codilla introduced to Dr. Sia Bebot
Escoreal as his friend.
When Codilla started bringing his friends to the house of Dr.
Sia,   the   latter   felt   peeved   because   Codilla's   friends   were   of
questionable and suspicious­looking characters (sic). She was told
by Codilla that his  companions were jeepney dispatchers in the
downtown area. Not being at ease with such situation, she fired
Codilla.
Almost   two   years   later,   at   5:30   o'clock   in   the   afternoon   of
December 22, 1986, Dr. Sia's neighbors Nicky Padriga and Ricardo
Ferrer went to her clinic and informed her that some persons who
burglarized her house were apprehended by them and that they
brought the injured maid, Landa, to a hospital.
At the Mabolo Police Station, she saw Victor Taneo, a young
boy—Arnel Go and Jose Robert—her houseboy and brother of her
maid, Landa Robert. She inquired from Jose why he was at the
police station and the latter replied that after Taneo and Go were
arrested, he was brought along by the police for questioning. Jose
further disclosed that he was invited by Roy Codilla for a round of
beer drinks at a small store behind Dr. Sia's residence and that
when he returned to the house, his sister was already injured. The
young boy, Arnel, explained that Roy invited him to go to Dr. Sia's
house. Victor Taneo, claimed that it was Roy Codilla who told him
to go along with him (Codilla) to the house of Dr. Sia to get some
valuables, like cassette recorders. She saw blood­stains inside her
house   splattered   in   the   kitchen,   on   a   beer   bottle   and   on   the
telephone set.
At the groundfloor of Perpetual Succour Hospital, the severely
injured and bloody maid managed to reveal to her (Dr. Sia) in the
499
VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 8, 1993 499
People vs. Taneo
presence   of   Corazon   Gonzales   and   Patrolman   Lopez,   that   Roy
Codilla was the who (sic) struck her.
Co­accused Victor Taneo, alias Opao (Kalbo) testified that he is
a   jeepney   dispatcher   (barker).   Bebot   Escoreal,   another   accused
herein who has remained at large, is his long­time friend who is
also a barker at Juan Luna Street, Cebu City.
On December 22, 1986 at 11:00 o'clock in the morning, he saw
Bebot Escoreal talking to a person. He approached Escoreal and
the latter introduced him to the person who turned out to be Roy
Codilla.   After   knowing   each   other,   the   conversation   continued
with Codilla saying that he (Codilla) planned to rob the house of
his former employer, Dr. Sia, as his revenge. Codilla then told him
(Taneo)   to   procure   money   to   be   used   in   entertaining   Dr.   Sia's
houseboy, Jose Robert. They were briefed by Codilla that in the
house of Dr. Sia are a maid and houseboy. Codilla stated that after
the   robbery   has   been   pulled   (sic),   Codilla   will   bring   them   to
Manila.   With   his   P20.00   they,   Codilla,   Arnel   Go,   Escoreal   and
himself, boarded a jeepney towards the place of Dr. Sia.
While   houseboy   Jose   Robert   and   househelper   Landa   Robert
were cleaning the yard, Codilla entered the Sia premises for the
purpose   of   inviting   Jose   Robert   outside.   Codilla   told   his
companions to stay behind at the corner street and to wait for his
signal. Later, he saw Codilla placing his arm around the shoulder
of   Jose   proceeding   towards   the   store   where   the   houseboy   was
offered some drinks. After the agreed signal of Codilla, placing his
right   hand   on   the   right   side   of   his   head,   they   went   inside   the
house of Dr. Sia. Leaving behind Jose at the store, Codilla joined
them.   Escoreal   stayed   outside   as   lookout.   Once   inside,   Codilla
boxed the maid hitting her in the midsection of the stomach. The
maid fell on the floor and Codilla ordered them to finish her off as
she can identify them. He and Codilla got coke bottles under the
dining   table   and   struck   the   maid   on   her   forehead,   head   and
mouth. They took from a room Sony (sic) Cassette Recorder, Sharp
(sic) Cassette Recorder and some tapes, while Arnel Go in another
room, gathered some calculators.
Outside the house with the loot, Codilla directed him and Arnel
Go to pass out one way while Codilla and Escoreal will proceed to
the main road. Along the way, he and Arnel were arrested and
were brought  back to the house of  Dr. Sia.  There they saw  the
neighbors carrying the body of the maid who was still alive and
moaning. Later, the houseboy arrived.
In   jail   (BBRC)   Codilla   offered   him   P2,000.00   to   save   him
(Codilla) because he has a wife and children.
At the outset he refused, but the wife of Codilla forced him to
receive the money with her plea that I (sic) save her husband for
the
500
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Taneo
sake of their family. Every visit of the wife of Codilla to the jail, he
was given money by Mrs. Codilla which totalled all in all P400.00.
In Court, he pointed at the wife of Codilla. His mother paid Roy
Codilla   P400.00   because   she   bulked   (sic)   at   the   idea   of   saving
Codilla. And even if he were given the promised sum of P2,000.00,
he still would take the witness stand considering that he landed in
jail because of Codilla.
Arresting officer Rico Ministerio declared that in response to a
phone call, he and some police companions went to the house of
Dr.   Sia   and   took   custody   of   Taneo   and   Arnel   Go   who   were
captured en (sic) flagrante by the civilians of St. Michael Village.
The   following   day,   they   arrested   Roy   Codilla   at   the   Duty   Free
Shop at Lahug, Cebu City.
Dr. Jaime Perez testified that on December 22,1986 he treated
Landa Robert for multiple lacerations in head (sic) and face caused
by   a   blunt   object.   Five   hours   later,   the   patient   died   due   to
compression   (sic)   of   vital   brain   centers.   He   issued   the
corresponding death certificate (Exh. "A").
For the Defense:
Police   Cpl.   Jovito   Roa,   a   guard   at   BBRC   testified   that   on
November  23,   1987,   he  caught   two  persons   digging  a  tunnel   at
BBRC  and one  of  them  was  Victor Taneo.  Upon  inquiry,  Taneo
told   him   that   actually   Roy   Codilla   has   nothing   to   do   with   the
robbery­homicide in Dr. Sia's residence. He cannot recall, though,
who the  other inmate was.  Neither  can  he  recall  until   now   the
name of the BBRC investigator at that time. Taneo told him that
the   reason   why   he   (Taneo)   implicated   Codilla   was   because   the
complainant (referring to Dr. Sia) promised him P300.00 but only
P200.00 was given to him.
Accused Codilla, testified that in 1982 he was enlisted in the
Philippine Army. He was discharged in 1984 fro (sic) having gone
AWOL. In April, 1984, he was hired by Dr. Sia as security guard
of   her  residence at  St.  Michael  Village,  Banilad,  Cebu City.  On
May, 1985, Dr. Sia terminated his services.
He   denied   the   charge   that   he   and   Taneo   committed
robberyhomicide in Sia (sic) residence at 5:30 P.M. of December
22, 1986 because on that day he was in the house of Jose Robert,
his friend, who just arrived from Manila and went home at 10:30
o'clock in the morning of said say, passing first in his aunt's house
at Camp Lapulapu.
He came to know co­accused Taneo only after he was arrested
by the police on December 25, 1986.
During his employment as guard, he sleeps (sic) in the bedroom
501
VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 8, 1993 501
People vs. Taneo
of Dr. Sia since there are two beds—one for her and the other for
him. Dr. Sia used to call him whenever she counts (sic) her money
and deposit (sic) them in the safe inside her room. There were two
instances when she let him count a sizeable sum of money. He has
never taken any valuable thing from the Sia residence.
Dr. Sia instigated Taneo to implicate him because at one time
that Dr. Sia hired somebody to lob a grenade in the house of the
wife   of   her   boyfriend,   he   stopped   her.   (A   picture   of   the   alleged
boyfriend Eliezer Magdales was produced by him in Court Exh.
"1"). That is the only reason why Dr. Sia wanted him to be jailed.
On cross examination, he testified that while employed by Dr.
Sia,  he  has   (sic)  good  relations   with  her.   Dr.   Sia even  at   times
gave him T­shirts aside from his pay. Living in the Sia house are
the  doctor   herself,   her   four   children,   houseboy   Jose  Robert   and
maid   Landa   Robert.   He   was   ordered   by   Dr.   Sia   to   throw   a
handgrenade at the house of her (Sia's) boyfriend which (sic) he
relented. As a result, she scolded him and then he left for Manila.
In November, 1986, he returned to Cebu and went to the house of
Dr. Sia but houseboy Jose told him that the doctor was not there.
On   December   22,   1986,   at   10:00   A.M.   he   returned   to   Dr.   Sia's
house to say hello because it was Christmas time and besides, the
houseboy invited him to a drinking spree. He found out that the
persons in the Sia residence were only the houseboy Jose, maid
Landa and Pableo, the water­gatherer. When he, Jose and Pableo
went to the liquor store, only the maid was left in the house. After
partaking one bottle of beer grande at 11:00 A.M. he proceeded to
the house of his brother at Hipodromo where he stayed until 4:00
P.M. From there he went home to Camputhaw, Lahug.
 He meet (sic) co­accused Taneo only at the prison cell at Mabolo revenge,"  and considering the statement given by Landa to
8

Police   Station.   There   Taneo   told   him   that   he   (Taneo)   does   not Dr. Sia at the hospital—that she, Landa, was struck by Roy
know  him.  He  only  knew   Bebot   Escoreal.   He  was  picked  up  by
Codilla—as   part   of   the res   gestae,9 the   trial   court,   in   its
some policemen near his home. Before his arrest, he did not know
Decision   dated   and   promulgated   on   14   December
the arresting officers, thus, he has no quarrel or misunderstanding
with them.
1988,  found   the   accused   Roy   Codilla   guilty   beyond
10

Mrs.   Lolit   Cabriana,   a   volunteer   worker   in   the   jail   ministry
testified that she met Taneo in jail and he told her that he killed
the maid of Dr. Sia in St. Michael's Village at Talisay, Cebu using
an empty beer bottle. His companion at that time was only Bebot
Escoreal. She knows Roy Codilla and she asked him why he was in
jail and the latter answered that he was not in the house of Dr.
Sia when the crime was committed. Codilla told her that he was
then in his house at Lahug and in his brother's house at Mandaue
City.
Later,   on   cross­examination,   she   declared   that   for   the   four
years of her missionary work in BBRC jail she did not have an
occasion to talk to Codilla because he is not under her bible class.
reasonable   doubt   of   the   crime   charged.   The   dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE,   finding   accused   Roy   Codilla   guilty   beyond
reasonable   doubt   of   the   crime   of   robbery   with   homicide,   he   is
hereby   sentenced   to   suffer   the   penalty   of reclusion   perpetua, to
indemnify   jointly   and   severally   with   accused   Victor   Taneo   the
heirs of the deceased Landa Robert the sum of P30,000.00, and to
pay the costs.
The Sentence on accused Taneo contained in the Order dated
February 9, 1987 insofar as indemnification is concerned is hereby
modified."
SO ORDERED." 11

502 The trial court rejected Codilla's defense of alibi because his
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED residence   in   barangay   Camputhaw,   the   place   where   he
People vs. Taneo claims
Felicidad Pareño of Camputhaw, Lahug, Cebu City testified that ______________
she   is   a   neighbor   of   accused   Codilla.   Her   house   is   two   houses
6
 Original Records, 230­233; Rollo, 25­28.
away.   Her  closeness   to   the   mother   of   Codilla  is   such   that   they 7
 Id., 233.
treat each other like sisters. 8
 Original Records, 234.
In the afternoon of December 22, 1986, she was in the Codilla 9 Id.

residence for their prayer meeting and she saw for the first time 10
 Per Judge Leonardo B. Cañares; Id., 229­235; Rollo, 24­30.
accused Codilla at past 4:00 o'clock that afternoon viewing TV in
11 Id., 235; Id., 30.

503
the second floor of their house. She went home at about that time
VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 8, 1993 503
also and never saw Codilla anymore." 6

People vs. Taneo

Giving full faith and credit to the prosecution's version of the
to have been at the time of the robbery, "is only less than an
incident, particularly to the testimonies of Dr. Sia, which it
hour by jeepney to the Sia residence in Banilad . . . It was
describes   to   be   "straightforward,   without   hesitation   and
therefore not physically impossible for Codilla to be at the
concise,"  and   that   of   Victor   Taneo   who   "[V]ividly   in
7

scene   of   the   crime   when   the   crime   was

detail, . . . disclosed how he met Codilla" and how the latter
"laid his plan to 'hit' the house of his former employer for
committed." Moreover,   Codilla   was   positively   identified   by
12
Taneo who had no motive to perjure his testimony.
Accused   Roy   Codilla,   hereafter   referred   to   as   the
Appellant, seasonably filed his Notice of Appeal, manifesting13
therein   that   he   is   appealing   the   decision   to   the   Court   of
Appeals. In view of the penalty imposed, the appeal should
have   been   elevated   to   this   Court.   On   the   other   hand,   for
obvious reasons, accused Taneo did not interpose an appeal.
The records of the case were erroneously transmitted to
the Court of Appeals which, however, forwarded them to this
Court on 10 March 1989.  This Court accepted the appeal on
14
20 September 1989. 15
In   his   Brief,   the   appellant,   through   his   counsel de
oficio who were appointed as such by this Court due to the
16
death   of   his   counsel de   parte,  submits   the   following
17
assignment of errors:
1. "I.The   Trial   Court   erred   in   considering   the   alleged
statement of the victim, Landa Roberts (sic), as part of res
gestae.
2. II.The Trial Court erred in giving weight to the testimony
of appellant's co­accused, Victor Taneo.
3. III.The   Trial   Court   erred   in   declaring   that   accused­
appellant's identity was established." 18
In support of the first assigned error, appellant claims that
the alleged statement of Landa Robert could have been made
at least four (4) hours after the occurrence of the incident—a
considerable lapse of time. Hence, per People vs. Roca,  it 19
________________
 Id., 234.
12
 Original Records, 238.
13
 Rollo, 2.
14
 Id., 41.
15
 Atty. Vicente A. Torres and Atty. Mildred C. Duero.
16
 Rollo, op. cit., 56.
17
 Brief for Appellant, 4.
18
 162 SCRA 696, 703 [1988].
19
504
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Taneo
cannot   be   said   that   the   declarant   did   not   have   the
opportunity to concoct or contrive her statement. Neither can
such statement qualify as a dying declaration because it does
not concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's   death   and   that   at   the   time   it   was   made,   the
declarant was not under the consciousness of an impending
death. As a matter of fact, it is doubtful if Landa did indeed
make the statement considering that as testified to by the
doctor who had treated her, she had impaired consciousness;
besides, Mrs. Sia's companions, one Corazon Gonzales and a
policeman named Lopez, were not presented to corroborate
Sia's testimony.
Anent the second assigned error, appellant contends that
in   view   of   the   first   error   and   the   inadmissibility   of   the
statement   of   Landa   Robert,   the   prosecution   was   left   with
nothing   save   for   the   testimony   of   Victor   Taneo   which,
however, is weak and does not constitute sufficient basis for
the appellant's conviction. In the first place, Taneo admitted
to Pat. Ministerio that he (Taneo) and Bebot Escoreal were
the   ones   who   manhandled   the   maid.   Secondly,   Taneo's
credibility as a witness is questionable; he had twice been
apprehended for robbery under P.D. No. 532, and had twice
been   prosecuted   therefor   in   Criminal   Case   No.   CBU­5871
and Criminal Case No. CBU­5881 before Branches XVI and
XIV   of   the   Regional   Trial   Court   of   Cebu.   Both   cases,
however,   were   dismissed   on   the   ground   of   failure   to
prosecute.   Appellant   then   pontificates:   "From   a   hardened
soul like Victor Taneo's, it is very difficult to elicit truth."  In 20
addition   thereto,   appellant   alleges   that   Taneo's   testimony
would   indicate   that   the   same   was   for   sale   as   the   latter
claimed that he was asked by Roy Codilla to testify in his
favor   for   the   amount   of   P2,000.00,   but   that   Codilla's   wife
could only raise P400.00.
The third assigned error is premised on the assumption
that   the   appellant's   conviction   is   based   solely   on   the   bare
allegation   of   Mrs.   Sia   that   the   victim,   Landa   Robert,   had
identified   Codilla   as   her   mauler,   and   on   the   testimony   of
Victor   Taneo   which,   as   claimed   in   the   first   and   second
assigned   errors,   is   inadmissible   and   weak.   Appellant   then
faults   the   prosecution   for   not   presenting   Jose   Robert   who
could have attested to the
__________________
 Brief for Appellant, 13.
20
505
VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 8, 1993 505
People vs. Taneo
appellant's presence and participation in the crime or shed
light on Taneo's claim that (a) the appellant went to the Sia
house ahead of the rest to distract Jose Robert's attention by
inviting him to a drinking spree and (b) the appellant left
Jose at the sari­sari store and went back to Sia's house.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
At the outset, it is to be observed that at the bottom of the
assigned   errors   is   the   issue   of   the   credibility   of   witnesses
Herminia   Sia   and   Victor   Taneo.   Deeply   embedded   in   our
jurisprudence and amply supported by an impressive array
of  cases  is  the  rule that  when the issue of credibility of a
witness is concerned, the appellate court will generally not
disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the
latter is in a better position to decide the question, having
heard the witness himself and observed his deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial, unless certain facts of
substance and value had been plainly overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. 21
We have painstakingly examined the records of this case
and   the   transcripts   of   the   stenographic   notes   of   the
testimonies   of   the   witnesses   and   find   no   cogent   reason   to
disregard the rule and give way to the exception. The full
faith and credit given by the trial court to the testimonies of
Herminia   Sia   and   Victor   Taneo   are   supported   by   the
evidence.  In  fact,  the tenor of the assigned  errors  and the
arguments   summoned   to   support   them   betray   the
appellant's realization of the infirmity of his stand. Were it
not  for  the gravity  of the  offense charged  and   the penalty
imposed, this conclusion could have written an early finisto
the   appeal.   But   then,   We   are   called   to   squarely   meet   the
issues raised by the assigned errors.
1.   The   court a   quo correctly   considered   the   statement
given by the victim, Landa Robert, to Herminia Sia as part of
______________
 See, for instance, People vs. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440 [1979], citing several
21
cases; People   vs.   Bautista, 92   SCRA   465 [1979]; People   vs.   Abejuela, 92
SCRA   503 [1979]; People   vs.   Arciaga, 98   SCRA   1 [1980]; People   vs.
Marzan, 128 SCRA 203 [1984]; People vs. Alcid, 135 SCRA 280[1985]; People
vs.   Sanchez, 199   SCRA   414 [1991];   and People   vs.   Atilano, 204   SCRA
278 [1991].
506
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Taneo
the res gestae. Landa's declaration that it was the appellant
who struck her was given while she was still at the ground
floor   of   the   Perpetual   Succour   Hospital   awaiting   to   be
admitted for treatment. She was rushed to the said hospital  Citing People   vs.   Nartea, 74   Phil.   8 [1942]; People   vs.
29

immediately after the incident in question and was operated Cuevas, supra.;People   vs.   Quianzon, 62   Phil.   162 [1935]; People   vs.

Portento, 48 Phil. 971[1924]; U.S. vs. Macuti, 26 Phil. 170 [1913].
on   for   four   (4)   hours   starting   at   8:00   o'clock   that   evening 507
until 12:00 midnight. She died five (5) days later. VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 8, 1993 507
The   following   three   (3)   requisites   must   concur   before People vs. Taneo
evidence of the res gestae may be admitted: (1) the principal nearly   contemporaneous   as   to   be   in   the   presence   of   the
act,   the res   gestae, be   a   startling   occurrence;   (2)   the transaction   which   they   illustrate   and   explain,   and   were
statements   were   made   before   the   declarant   had   time   to made under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the
contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the idea of design or deliberation . . ." 30

occurrence   in   question   and   its   immediately   attending In the instant case, We find the interval of time between

circumstances. 22 the   robbery   and   the   infliction   of   the   injuries   upon   Landa
In People   vs.   Ner,  this   Court,   speaking   through   Chief
23 Robert,   and   her   making   of   the   statement,   which   the
Justice Concepcion, held: appellant claims to be four (4) hours or more, to be sufficient
"x   x   x   All   that   is   required   for   the   admissibility   of   a   given and   adequate   to   bring   such   statement   to   be   so   nearly
statement as part of the res gestae, is that it be made under the contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction
influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who made or occurrence which it illustrated or explained. Landa was
the   declaration  before   he   had   time   to   think   and   make   up   a
24 brought   to   the   hospital   where   she   made   the   statement
story,  or   to   concoct   or   contrive   a   falsehood,  or   to   fabricate   an
25 26
immediately   after   the   commission   of   the   crime.   Given   her
account,  and without any undue influence in obtaining it,  aside
27 28
condition at that time—she was hovering between life and
from referring to the event in question or its immediate attending death—she could have hardly been expected to conjure up a
circumstances." 29
story or concoct and contrive a falsehood by falsely imputing
The   cases   are   not   uniform   as   to   the   interval   of   time   that upon the appellant responsibility for her injuries. There is as
should  separate the occurrence of  the  startling  event  from well   no   doubt   that   the   principal   act   in   question   was   a
the making of the declaration. What is important is that the startling   occurrence   upon   which   Landa's   statement   about
declarations were voluntarily and spontaneously made "so her assailant relates to. In short, all the requisites for the
________________
admission   of   such   statement   as   part   of   the res   gestae are
 People vs. Ricaplaza, 23 SCRA 374 [1968]; Ilocos Norte Electric Co. vs.
22
present.
Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]. Appellant's claim that Landa could not have uttered the
 28 SCRA 1151, 1161­1162 [1969].
23

 Citing People   vs.   Cuevas, 97   Phil.   963 [1955]; Air   France   vs.

24
incriminatory   words   because   she   had   "impaired
Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 [1966]. consciousness,"   as   testified   to   by   the   doctor,   is   pure
 Citing People vs. Avila, 92 Phil. 805 [1953].
25
speculation.   She   gave   her   statement   while   she   was   still
 Citing People vs. Alban, 1 SCRA 931 [1961].
26
awaiting treatment in the hospital. There is no evidence on
 Citing People vs. Ruzol, 100 Phil. 537 [1956],
27

 Citing People vs. Durante, 53 Phil. 363, 371 [1929].
28
record to show that at the time she did so, she was in no
condition   to   speak,   utter   a   word   or   answer   questions.
Moreover,   appellant's   counsel   failed,   on   cross­examination,
to   extract   from   the   doctor   any   admission   that   "impaired
consciousness" would include inability to speak or answer a
question,   or   that   such   a   condition   existed   for   some   time
before   he   had   been   or   examined   the   patient.   Neither   was
expert   testimony   introduced   to   prove   that   the   injuries
sustained   by   Landa   rendered   her   unconscious   upon   their
infliction or sometime thereafter—specifically, when she had
reached the hospital.
_________________
30
 People vs. Ner, supra., at page 1161, citing Lousville N.A. & C.Ry. Co.
vs. Buck, 19 NE 453, 458.
508
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Taneo
As   to   the   appellant's   insinuation   that   Mrs.   Sia   may   have
fabricated   her   testimony   regarding   Landa's   statement,
suffice it to restate what We had said earlier: The full faith
and   credit   accorded   by   the   trial   court   to   her   testimony   is
supported   by   the   evidence   and   its   observation   of   her
demeanor. Declared the lower court:
"The   Court   painstakingly   scrutinized   the   testimonies   of   the
witnesses   of   both   sides   including   close   examination   of   the
demeanor of those who took the stand.
The   testimony   of   Dr.   Sia   was   straightforward,   without
hesitation and concise." 31
While   it   may   be   true   that   Dr.   Sia's   companions,   Corazon
Gonzales and a policeman (a certain Lopez), could have been
presented   to   corroborate   her   testimony,   such   non­
presentation   did   not   affect   the   probative   value   of   such
testimony   for,   as   even   the   appellant   candidly   admits,   the
testimony of the companions could only be corroborative. As
such,   therefore,   their   testimonies   were   properly   dispensed
with and their non­presentation did not imply suppression of
evidence and did not prove to be fatal to the prosecution's
case.  Besides, if the appellant was honestly convinced of the
32
falsity   of   Sia's   testimony   and   the   fact   that   none   of   her
companions   would   corroborate   her   story,   he   should   have
availed of the compulsory process to have them produced as
his own witnesses, or even as hostile witnesses. 33
2.   Appellant   insists   that   Victor   Taneo's   credibility   is
questionable because the latter had earlier been charged in
two   (2)   criminal   cases   for   robbery;   the   former   admits,
however,   that   these   cases   were   dismissed   for   failure   to
prosecute.   Section   20,   Rule   130   of   the   Rules   of   Court
provides   that   except   as   provided   for   in   the   succeeding
sections,  all persons who can perceive,
34
________________
 Decision, 5; Original Records, 233; Rollo, 28.
31
 People   vs.   Capulong, 160   SCRA   533 [1988]; People   vs   Tangliben, 184
32
SCRA 220 [1990]; People vs. Vocente, 188 SCRA 100 [1990].
 People vs. Fernandez, 209 SCRA 1 [1992].
33
 Sections 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25, Rules of Court.
34
509
VOL. 218, FEBRUARY 8, 1993 509
People vs. Taneo
and perceiving, can make known their perception to others,
may be witnesses. Religious or political belief, interest in the
outcome of the case or conviction of a crime unless otherwise
provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
Clearly,   the   mere   pendency   of   a   criminal   case   against   a
person does not disqualify him from becoming a witness. As
a   matter   of   fact,   conviction   of   a   crime   does   not   disqualify
such   person   from   being   presented   as   a   witness   unless
otherwise   provided   by   law.  At   his   arraignment,   Victor
35
Taneo   voluntarily   pleaded   guilty   to   an   information   which
charges conspiracy. He was not discharged as a state witness
—a   sure   guarantee   of   acquittal —and   he   did   not   impute
36
criminal  responsibility  solely   on  the  appellant.  Thus,  if  he
were to testify falsely against the latter, he must have been
moved   by   a   strong,   improper   and   ulterior   motive.   That
motive must have been established; appellant failed to do so.
In the absence of evidence to show any reason or motive why
witnesses   for  the prosecution  should  have   testified  falsely,
the logical conclusion is that no improper motive existed, and
that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
3. Since the appellant had been identified, his defense of
alibi must fail. It is a fundamental judicial dictum that the
defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification
of the accused. 38
P50,000.00 to conform with the present policy of this Court,
the said decision must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE,   the   appealed   decision   of   14   December
1988  of Branch 10  of  the Regional  Trial  Court  of  Cebu  in
Criminal   Case   No.   CBU­10135   is   hereby   AFFIRMED,
subject   to   the   above   modification   on   the   indemnity.   As
modified, the indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00.
Costs against the appellant.
37
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., (J., Chairman), On leave.
Decision affirmed with modification.

The  prosecution's   failure  to  present  Jose  Robert—a   fact
capitalized upon by the appellant in his third assigned error
—was not fatal. At best, Robert's testimony would have been
merely corroborative.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, We find the appealed
_______________
Note.—The positive identification of the accused by the
prosecution   witnesses   as   to   his   participation   in   the   crime
cannot be overcome by his mere denial (People vs. Bocatcat,
Jr., 188 SCRA 175).
——o0o——

 In   our   jurisdiction,   the   law   provides   that   a   co­accused   cannot   be

35
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All
discharged   as   a   state   witness   if, inter   alia, he   has   at   any   time   been rights reserved.
conviction   of   any   offense   involving   moral   turpitude.   (Section   9,   Rule   119,
Rules of Court).
 Section 10, Rule 119, Rules of Court.
36

 People vs. Macalindog, 76 Phil. 719 [1946]; People vs. Borbano, 76 Phil.
37

702 [1946]; People vs. Simon, 209 SCRA 148 [1992].
 People   vs.   Mercado, 97   SCRA   232 [1980],   citing   a   long   line   of
38

cases; People vs. Clores, 184 SCRA 638 [1990]; People vs. Arceo, 187 SCRA
265[1990]; and People vs. Beringuel, 192 SCRA 561 [1990].
510
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Palagpag vs. NLRC
decision of the trial court to be in accordance with the facts
and   applicable   laws   and   jurisprudence.   Except   for   the
indemnity   which   is   hereby   increased   from   P30,000.00   to
 VOL. 233, JULY 6, 1994 679
People vs. Balanon
G.R. Nos. 85248­49. July 6, 1994. * Same; Same; Same; Inconsistency in testimony of the witness
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff­appellee, vs.SGT.
JERRY BALANON, accused­appellant.
Criminal   Law; Witness; Testimony; Alibi; Appellant’s   alibi
cannot stand in the face of his clear and positive identification by
Acasio who, appellant even admitted, had no ill will to implicate
him.—In the present recourse, accused­appellant basically raises
factual   issues.   He   stresses   his   presence   at   the   SOUTHCOM
headquarters in the morning of 3 November 1980, contrary to the
testimony of prosecution witness Rogene Acasio, also an inmate,
that   he   was   drinking   liquor   with   Balanon   and   the   victims.
Appellant’s alibi cannot stand in the face of his clear and positive
identification by Acasio who, appellant even admitted, had no ill
will to implicate him (Balanon) in the crime. Moreover, there is no
compelling reason to depart from the assessment of the credibility
of the witnesses made by the trial judge who, unlike the reviewing
court, had the occasion and opportunity to observe their demeanor
and   detect   any   badge   of   fabrication.   But   even
granting arguendoappellant’s   claim   to   be   true,   this   does   not
contradict the testimonies of other prosecution witnesses that he
shot the victims to death.
Same; Same; Same; Remedial   Law; Conviction   of   a   crime
unless   otherwise   provided   by   law   shall   not   be   a   ground   for
disqualification of witnesses.—Appellant faults the trial court for
giving   credence   to   the   testimony   of   Acasio   who   was   not   only
probably drunk, but was a convicted hijacker and falsifier of public
documents   as   well;   hence,   apt   to   fabricate   his   testimony.   But,
probability is not evidence, and even if Acasio took alcohol, it does
not   follow   that   he   was   drunk.   Moreover,   a   drunk   person   is
competent   to   testify   on   what   he   sees   or   experiences,   however
limited or hazy his perception may be. In the same way, a hijacker
or a falsifier is not necessarily a liar. Under the Rules of Court,
conviction of a crime, unless otherwise provided by law, shall not
be a ground for disqualification of witnesses.
is too trivial to affect the straightforward account of the shooting of
the victims by appellant.—Ms. de la Cruz could be referring to two
instances when accused came close to Ms. Sinsuan, i.e., when the
latter was
_______________
 FIRST DIVISION.
*
680
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
80
People vs. Balanon
already inside the bus and when she was still boarding the
bus, and the follow­up question of the prosecutor referred to the
instance when the witnesses were still boarding. But even if we
consider as inconsistent this portion of Ms. de la Cruz’ testimony,
this   is   too   trivial   to   affect   their   straightforward   account   of   the
shooting of the victims by appellant.
Same; Murder; Treachery; There is treachery when the victims
were   shot   unexpectedly,   and   were   not   in   a   position   to   defend
themselves.—The   qualifying   circumstance   of   treachery   is   not
disputed since the victims were suddenly shot, unexpectedly, and
were not in a position to defend themselves.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of 
Zamboanga City, Br. 13.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff­appellee.
     Emmanuel C. Paras for accused­appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 3 November 1980, at about three o’clock in the afternoon,
Roberto   Laino   and   Gregorio   Santillan,   both   trustee
inmates  of   San   Ramon   Penal   Farm,   were   exchanging   fist
1
blows   along   the   national   highway   in   Labuan,   Zamboanga
City.   Accused   Sgt.   Jerry   Balanon,   an   enlisted   man   of   the
Philippine   Army   assigned   at   the   Southern   Command
Headquarters   (SOUTHCOM),   Camp   Navarro,   Calarian,
Zamboanga   City,  was   standing   nearby.   As   the   fight
2
progressed, Sgt. Balanon left for a nearby store.
Ms. Maria Luningning Sinsuan and Ms. Elsa de la Cruz,
both   teachers   in   the   Labuan   Barangay   High   School   were
seated on a bench in the house of Alim Usman some three
feet away from the road waiting for a bus to take them to
Zamboanga   City.   They   were   twenty   to   twenty­five   meters
away from the protagonists. One of them shouted for help so
Ms.   Sinsuan   went   near   to   pacify   them   saying, “Tama   na
yan.” One of them retorted, “Alam mo
_______________
1
 Inmates assigned as guards in the penal farm; Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Zamboanga City, Br. 13, p. 9.
2
 RTC Record, Crim. Case No. 1227 (4706), p. 22.
681
VOL. 233, JULY 6, 1994 681
People vs. Balanon
Ma’am . . .,” but was cut short when Balanon went to Ms.
Sinsuan, walked her five meters away and then told her not
to   interfere.   Then   he   went   back   to   the   two   quarreling
inmates,   pulled   a   gun   suddenly   from   his   waist,   and   shot
them  one after another twice. A fifth shot was supposedly
fired but the trial court did not consider the same as it has
not been sufficiently established in the record. Fearing that
Balanon was running amok, Ms. Sinsuan ran back to where
she was previously sitting. Ms. de la Cruz, who was then six
months   pregnant,   remained   seated   on   the   bench   as   the
startling occurrence unfolded before them. The shaken tutors
then proceeded on their way to the City.
Later   at   six   o’clock   in   the   evening,   Sgt.   Balanon   was
picked   up   by   some   ten   members   of   the   36th   Infantry
Batallion   in   connection   with   the   killing   of   Laino   and
Santillan. Subsequently, Balanon was charged with murder
on two counts, both qualified by evident premeditation and
treachery.
Sgt.   Balanon   set   up   the   defense   of   alibi   and   mistaken
identity.   He   claimed   he   was   “delivering   information   to   an
intelligence community.”
On   31   October   1985,   Judge   Carlito   A.   Bibna   of   the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Br. 13, convicted
Sgt. Balanon of the crime charged qualified by treachery and
sentenced   him   to   two   terms   of reclusion   perpetua, to
indemnify   the   heirs   of   the   victims   at   P30,000.00   for   each
case, and to pay the costs. As a detention prisoner, he was
credited in full for the period of his detention. 3
The   crux   of   the   decision   leaned   on   the   credibility   of
witnesses—
As   compared   to   the   testimonies   of   the   prosecution   witnesses,
particularly   Luningning   Sinsuan,   Elsa   de   la   Cruz   and   Rogene
Acasio   who   testified   in   straightforward,   spontaneous   and   frank
manner and has answered consistently even on cross­examination,
the   vacillating   and   evasive   answers   of   the   accused   Sgt.   Jerry
Balanon during the course of his testimony does not inspire belief
and reliability. 4
_______________
3
 Art. 29, The Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6127 and E.O.
No. 214, prom. 10 July 1987; see RTC Decision, p. 29.
4
 RTC Decision, p. 27.
682
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 People vs. Balanon
The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was
not   appreciated   against   Sgt.   Balanon   as   “[t]here   is   no
evidence   on   record   to   show   when   the   plan   to   kill   the
deceased­victims was hatched by the accused x x x x” 5
In the present recourse, accused­appellant basically raises
factual issues. He stresses his presence at the SOUTHCOM
headquarters in the morning of 3 November 1980, contrary
to the testimony of prosecution witness Rogene Acasio, also
an inmate, that he was drinking liquor with Balanon and the
victims. Appellant’s alibi cannot stand in the face of his clear
and   positive   identification   by   Acasio   who,   appellant   even
admitted, had no ill will to implicate him (Balanon) in the
crime.   Moreover,   there   is   no   compelling   reason   to   depart
from the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses made
by the trial judge who, unlike the reviewing court, had the
occasion   and   opportunity   to   observe   their   demeanor   and
detect   any   badge   of   fabrication.   But   even
granting arguendoappellant’s claim to be true, this does not
contradict   the   testimonies   of   other   prosecution   witnesses
that he shot the victims to death.
Appellant faults the trial court for giving credence to the
testimony of Acasio who was not only probably drunk, but
was a convicted hijacker and falsifier of public documents as
well; hence, apt to fabricate his testimony. But, probability is
not   evidence,   and   even   if   Acasio   took   alcohol,   it   does   not
follow   that   he   was   drunk.   Moreover,   a   drunk   person   is
competent to testify on what he sees or experiences, however
limited or hazy his perception may be. In the same way, a
hijacker   or   a   falsifier   is   not   necessarily   a   liar.   Under   the
Rules   of   Court,   conviction   of   a   crime,   unless   otherwise
provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification of
witnesses. 6 visible x x x x Scars decrease in size after time in an adult, but
Appellant’s   assertion   that   the   victims   being   prisoners
could not have left the Penal Colony without the permission
of   the   warden,   is   completely   irrelevant   for   they   were
admittedly shot and killed outside the prison walls.
While   appellant   denies   having   ordered   a   certain
handicraft  product  from  Acasio,  by  reason  of which  Acasio
7
claims to have
_______________
 Id., p. 29.
5
 Sec. 20, par. (2), Rule 130.
6
 As he claims he ordered the handicraft product from a certain
7
683
VOL. 233, JULY 6, 1994 683
People vs. Balanon
known him, appellant nonetheless admits that most of the
living­out prisoners knew him there because he used to pass
by   that   place.  The   distinction   sought   to   be   made   by
8
appellant is too trivial to affect the testimony of Acasio. After
all, he (Balanon) does not deny that Acasio knows him.
Appellant contends that he is not the assailant described
by prosecution witness Sinsuan since he does not have any
wound or stitches  as confirmed by the prosecutor who “was
9
not able to see any scar” behind his ears.  It may be worth
10
noting that—
x x x x Sometimes in the course of time a scar may apparently
disappear—that is to say, not be noticeable to the casual observer
—but it is always there, to be found by him who looks carefully. By
compressing the surface where the scar is suspected, so as to expel
the blood supply and then releasing it suddenly, the blood rushing
back will generally show an old scar very plainly, where before it
could not be noticed. Thus also, where a person has been branded
as well as where a scar has become invisible, by slapping the part
several   times   or  by  rubbing  it,   the scar  or   brand  may  be made
increase in size in a child x x x x 11
As observed by the Solicitor General:
x   x   x   it   was   only   in   June   1985   that   appellant   showed   his
longhaired  head   for  a  cursory  look,   to  the  prosecuting   fiscal,   or
almost five (5) years after the commission of the crime. The Sworn
Statement of Mrs. Luningning Sinsuan was taken on November
18, 1980. Appellant was already under investigation at the time.
Why did he not claim at once that he had no scar, and instead
alleged it for the first time after almost five (5) years? Why did he
not let a doctor examine his head and certify as to the presence or
absence of a scar? The answer is obvious, his scar would have been
very obvious at that time, even to an untrained eye. 12
_______________
Muslim.
 Appellant’s Brief, p. 11, citing TSN, 19 June 1985, p. 6.
8
 Appellant’s   Brief,   p.   12,   citing   Sworn   Statement   of   Ms.   Luningning
9
Sinsuan dated 18 November 1980, p. 2.
 Id., p. 13, citing TSN, 19 June 1985, p. 16.
10
 Herzog, Alfred H., Medical Jurisprudence (1931), pp. 211, 213.
11
 Brief for the Plaintiff­Appellee, p. 18.
12
684
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Balanon
In her Sworn Statement, Luningning simply described the
assailant as “tall about 5'7" above, medium or little slim, fair
complexion, slit eyes, plain long hair (minus haircut  along
the wound with stitches,”  and nothing was categorically said
13
about   the   location   of   the   wound.   Since   Luningning   was
describing appellant’s hair when she took exception to a then
visible   haircut   bordering   a   wound,   said   wound   could   have
been on appellant’s pate or head which, when the prosecutor
took a look behind appellant’s ears, could have been hidden
by his long hair.
But   even   granting arguendo that   Luningning   made
incorrect   statements   about   the   wound,   this   pales   in
comparison with her and De la Cruz’ positive identification
of appellant on the stand.
Appellant also discredits  prosecution witness Elsa de la
Cruz   by   highlighting   her   alleged   inconsistent   statements,
i.e., she allegedly averred  that  she got  a  close view of  the
accused when she was still boarding the bus, but on cue from
the prosecutor, she said she was already on board the bus, to
wit,
Q x x x x What was the basis for your identification of the accused Jerry
Balanon?
A I identified him because when we already boarded the bus with Mrs.
Sinsuan he went near Mrs. Sinsuan and Mrs. Sinsuan was stepping
one step (on) the bus and he was very near Mrs. Sinsuan.
Asst. City Fiscal Yu:
Q How far was he when you saw him when you were about to board the
bus?
A Very near.
Court:
Q How many meters?
A If Mrs. Sinsuan was stepping then I am at the back of Mrs. Sinsuan. 14
Ms.   de   la   Cruz   could   be   referring   to   two   instances   when
accused came close to Ms. Sinsuan, i.e., when the latter was
already inside the bus and when she was still boarding the
bus, and the follow­up question of the prosecutor referred to
the
_______________
 See Note 2, p. 3.
13
 Appellant’s Brief, p. 16, citing TSN, 13 January 1982, pp. 24­25.
14
685
VOL. 233, JULY 6, 1994 685
People vs. Balanon
instance when the witnesses were still boarding. But even if
we consider as inconsistent this portion of Ms. de la Cruz’
testimony, this is too trivial to affect their straightforward
account of the shooting of the victims by appellant.
 While   it   may   be   unnatural   for   a   person   who   has   just
committed   a   grave   felony   to   walk   back   and   forth   and
approach   bystanders   amiably   instead   of   fleeing,   criminal
acts  are  aberrations  and  criminals  are  not expected to act
naturally,   especially   in   this   case   where   the   crime   was
committed in front of several witnesses.
Appellant   tries   to   revitalize   the   testimony   of   defense
witness   Rolando   Daño   who   claimed   not   to   have   seen   any
teacher   nor   heard   shots   at   the   scene   of   the   crime,   which
account the trial court disregarded because he admitted that
he did not know all the teachers of Labuan Barangay High
School and that he went to the scene only after the shooting
was   over.   But   appellant   takes   exception   to   the   damaging
parts of Daño’s testimony, especially the statement that he
saw   the   accused   Sgt.   Jerry   Balanon   coming   out   from   the
Orellano store in Labuan at three o’clock in the afternoon
and stood there akimbo, explaining that Daño could not have
15
been precise in stating the time because—
Sgt. Daño was not wearing a watch on that particular day. Hence,
when he testified under oath that he did not hear the shots x x x
the only plausible explanation was that he was not in the vicinity
of   the  crime scene  at  the  time  the killings   were  committed.   He
only became aware of the crime after everyone else in the locality
knew of the same x x x x Undoubtedly then, his estimate of the
time   that   he   saw   Balanon   come   out   of   the   Orellano   store   was
wrong.   Yet   the   falsity   of   the   testimony   itself   was   never
established. He did in fact see Balanon at the scene after the crime
was committed. This, however, should not be used as a basis to
totally   discredit   Balanon’s   testimony.   Balanon   himself   was   not
wearing a watch on that day. Consequently, his estimate of the
time he reached Labuan could likewise be wrong. 16
Since the testimony of defense witness Daño did not do any
good to appellant’s cause, the latter now belabors to justify
every unfavorable statement made by said witness. But even
if we
_______________
 RTC Decision, p. 26.
15
 Accused­Appellant’s Brief, p. 19.
16
686
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Balanon
totally disregard the statements of Daño, appellant himself,
as pointed out by the Solicitor General, admitted at one point
that   he   left   the   SOUTHCOM   at   about   one   o’clock   in   the
afternoon,  contrary to his statement that he never left the
17
SOUTHCOM   until   four­thirty   in   the
afternoon.  Interestingly,   since   appellant   admitted   that   he
18
and his witness Daño could not be expected to be precise in
their   estimates   of   the   time,   it   naturally   follows   that
appellant could not also state with precision that at about
three o’clock that afternoon he was not at the scene of the
crime.
The qualifying circumstance of treachery is not disputed
since   the   victims   were   suddenly   shot,   unexpectedly,   and
were not in a position to defend themselves.
While   the   victims   were   using   their   bare   fists   to   settle
their   differences,   the   accused   used   a   deadly   firearm   to
silence   them.   Appellant’s   guilt   having   been   established
beyond reasonable doubt, the affirmance of his conviction is
imperative.
WHEREFORE,   the   decision   of   the   court a   quo finding
accused­appellant   SGT.   JERRY   BALANON   GUILTY   of
Murder   on   two   (2)   counts   qualified   by   treachery,   and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua in each case, and to pay
the   costs,   is   AFFIRMED   with   the   modification   that   the
indemnity   for   the   death   of   each   victim   is   increased   to
P50,000.00, or a total of P100,000.00 for the two (2) victims,
in   consonance   with   existing   jurisprudence.   Costs   against
accused­appellant.
SO ORDERED.
     Cruz (Chairman), Davide,
Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Appealed decision affirmed with modification.
Notes.—Treachery   is   present   in   case   of   sudden   attack
even if the victim was able to parry first hacking with a wood
marker (People vs. Sacayan, 113 SCRA 199).
Minor inconsistencies in the narration of a witness do not
detract from its essential credibility as long as it is on the
whole
_______________

 TSN, 19 June 1985, p. 17.
17

 TSN, 19 July 1985, p. 9.
18

687
VOL. 233, JULY 6, 1994 687
People vs. Carizo
coherent and intrinsically believable (People vs. Ansing,196
SCRA 374).

——o0o——

© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All

rights reserved.
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Baid
G.R. No. 129667. July 31, 2000. * the basis of mental handicap alone.
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   plaintiff­
appellee, vs.ERIC BAID Y OMINTA, accused­appellant.
Words   and   Phrases; “Schizophrenia”; Explained.—
Complainant is suffering from schizophrenia, a psychotic disorder
of   unknown   etiology,   characterized   by   disturbance   in   thinking
involving a distortion of the usual logical relations between ideas,
a separation between the intellect and the emotions so that the
patient’s   feelings   and   his   or   her   manifestations   seem
inappropriate to his or her life situation, and a reduced tolerance
for the stress of interpersonal relations so that the patient retreats
from   social   intercourse   into   his   or   her   own   fantasy   life   and
commonly   into   delusions   and   hallucinations,   and   may,   when
untreated or unsuccessfully treated, go on to marked deterioration
or regression in his or her behavior though often unaccompanied
by further intellectual loss.
Witnesses; Mental   Illness; Schizophrenia; It   has   long   been
settled   that   a   person   should   not   be   disqualified   on   the   basis   of
mental handicap alone; It is established that schizophrenic persons
do not suffer from a clouding of consciousness and gross deficits of
memory.—Notwithstanding   her   mental   illness,   complainant
showed   that   she   was   qualified   to   be   a   witness, i.e.,   she   could
perceive   and   was   capable   of   making   known   her   perceptions   to
others.   Her   testimony   indicates   that   she   could   understand
questions   particularly   relating   to   the   incident   and   could   give
responsive answers to them, x x x Though she may have exhibited
emotions inconsistent with that of a rape victim (“inappropriate
affect”) during her testimony, such as by smiling when answering
questions,   her   behavior   was   such   as   could   be   expected   from   a
person suffering from schizophrenia. Otherwise, complainant was
candid,   straightforward,   and   coherent.   Furthermore,   aside   from
the testimony of Dr. Salangad on complainant’s consciousness and
memory, it is established that schizophrenic persons do not suffer
from a clouding of consciousness and gross deficits of memory. It
has long been settled that a person should not be disqualified on
Criminal   Law; Rape; Lust   is   no  respecter   of   time   and   place
and   the   crime   of   rape   can   be   consummated   even   when   the
malefactor and the victim are not alone.—In the case at bar, the
rape of complainant occurred in a room where other patients were
sleeping.   This   circumstance,   it   is   argued,   is   antithetical   to   the
possibility of the commission of rape. As this Court
_______________
 SECOND DIVISION.
*
657
VOL. 336, JULY 31, 2000 657
People vs. Baid
has repeatedly said, lust is no respecter of time and place and
the crime of rape can be consummated even when the malefactor
and the victim are not alone.
Same; Same; Witnesses; In the absence of bias, partiality, and
grave abuse  of discretion on the part of the presiding judge, his
findings as to their credibility are entitled to utmost respect as he
had   the   opportunity   to   observe   their   demeanor   on   the   witness
stand.—The plausibility of an allegation of rape does not depend
on the number of witnesses presented during the trial, so much so
that,   if   the   testimonies   so   far   presented   clearly   and   credibly
established   the   commission   of   the   crime,   corroborative   evidence
would only be a mere surplusage. In this case, the trial court gave
credence   to   the  testimonies   of   the  prosecution  witnesses   on   the
basis of which it adjudged accused­appellant guilty. In the absence
of bias, partiality, and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
presiding judge, his findings as to their credibility are entitled to
utmost   respect   as   he   had   the   opportunity   to   observe   their
demeanor on the witness stand.
Same; Same; The absence of spermatozoa  in  the genitalia of
complainant does not destroy the finding of rape since ejaculation
is never an element thereof.—Nor does the absence of spermatozoa
in the genitalia of complainant destroy the finding of rape since
ejaculation is never an element thereof. What consummates the
felony   is   the   contact   of   the   penis   of   the   perpetrator,   however
slight, to the vagina of his victim without her consent. Neither is it
required that lacerations be found in the victim’s hymen. We have
held   that   a   medical   examination   is   not   a   requisite   for   a   rape
charge   to   prosper   as   long   as   the   victim   categorically   and
consistently declares that she has been defiled. In this case, aside
from complainant’s positive testimony, the medical examination of
the   complainant   showed   an   abrasion   on   her   labia   minora,
indicating that she had recent sexual intercourse. That the deep
healed lacerations found on the complainant’s genitalia may have
been caused seven days prior to December 22, 1996 is immaterial
and irrelevant considering that she is a non­virgin.
Witnesses; Expert  Witnesses; The  accused  cannot   question  in
his appeal the qualification of one presented as expert witness if he
did not raise any objection to his qualification in the trial court—
objections   not   timely   raised   are   deemed   waived.—Accused­
appellant   questions   in   this   appeal   the   qualifications   of   Dr.
Salangad as an expert witness. However, he cannot do this now as
he did not raise any objection to Dr. Salangad’s qualifications in
the trial court. On the contrary, he even cross­examined her on the
matters on which she testified. In accordance with Rule 132, §36,
objections not timely raised are deemed waived.
658
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
58
People vs. Baid
Same; Same; The fact that an expert witness was hired by the
family of the complainant to give expert testimony does not by that
fact alone make her a biased witness and her testimony unworthy
of   consideration;   The   problem   of   the   credibility   of   the   expert
witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion
of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the
absence of an abuse of discretion.—The fact that Dr. Salangad was
hired by the family of complainant to give expert testimony as a
psychiatrist did not by that fact alone make her a biased witness
and   her   testimony   unworthy   of   consideration.   As   has   been
said:   .   .   .   Although   courts   are   not   ordinarily   bound   by   expert
testimonies,   they   may   place   whatever   weight   they   choose   upon
such   testimonies   in   accordance   with   the   facts   of   the   case.   The
relative  weight  and  sufficiency  of  expert   testimony is   peculiarly
within  the  province  of   the  trial   court   to  decide,   considering   the
ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness
stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has
supported   his   opinion,   his   possible   bias   in   favor   of   the   side   for
whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative
opportunities   for   study   and   observation   of   the   matters   about
which   he   testifies,   and   any   other   matters   which   deserve   to
illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be
arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all
the   facts   and   circumstances   in   the   case   and   when   common
knowledge   utterly   fails,   the   expert   opinion   may   be   given
controlling   effect   (20   Am.   Jur.,   1056­1058).   The   problem   of   the
credibility   of   the   expert   witness   and   the   evaluation   of   his
testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling
thereupon   is   not   reviewable  in   the  absence   of   an   abuse   of   that
discretion.
Criminal   Law; Rape; Words   and   Phrases; “Deprived   of
Reason”   Explained; To   warrant   a   conviction   for   rape   under
paragraph   (2)   of   Art.   335,   a   woman   need   not   be   proven   as
completely insane or deprived of reason.—To warrant a conviction
for rape under paragraph (2) of Art. 335, a woman need not be
proven   as   completely   insane   or   deprived   of   reason.   The   phrase
“deprived of reason” has been construed to include those suffering
from   mental   abnormality   or   deficiency   or   some   form   of   mental
retardation, those who are feeble­minded although coherent.
Same; Same; Where the rape victim is feeble­minded, the force
required   by   the   statute   is   the   sexual   act   itself.—That   the
complainant was suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the
rape   is   shown   by   the   fact   that   she   was   in   the   clinic   precisely
because of such illness and by her behavior at the trial, during
which she would smile for no reason at all while answering the
questions. Though she may not have totally lost her memory, it
was shown that she was suffering from an impairment of
659
VOL. 336, JULY 31, 2000 659
People vs. Baid
judgment, which made her incapable of giving, an intelligent
consent to the sexual act. It has been held that where the rape
victim   is   feebleminded,   the   force   required   by   the   statute   is   the
sexual act itself.
Same; Same; Sexual intercourse with an insane, deranged, or
mentally deficient, feeble­minded, or idiotic woman is rape, pure
and simple.—Even assuming then that the complainant consented
to have sexual intercourse with accused­appellant, the copulation
would fall under the third paragraph of Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code in view of the fact that complainant was mentally ill.
Sexual   intercourse   with   an   insane,   deranged,   or   mentally
deficient,   feeble­minded,   or   idiotic   woman.   is   rape,   pure   and
simple.
Same; Alibi; Requisites.—Accused­appellant   invoked   alibi   in
his defense. He claimed that, at the time of the incident, he was in
his quarters at the Holy Spirit Clinic sleeping. For the defense of
alibi to be believed, the following requisites must be met: (a) his
presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the
offense must be proven; and (b) it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime.
Same; Same; The   defense   of   alibi   is   unavailing   where   the
accused was identified by the victim herself who harbored no ill
motive   against   him.—Accused­appellant’s   testimony   itself
demonstrates the untenability of his alibi. First, his declaration
that   he   was   in   another   room   of   the   clinic   is   uncorroborated.
Second, the room in which he said he was sleeping at that time of
the incident was only a few meters away from the patients’ room
where   complainant   was   confined.   Third,   he   admitted   that,   as   a
nurse­aide, he was allowed to enter the patients’ room anytime for
purposes of checking on the patients. Above all, his alibi cannot be
given   credence   because   complainant   has   pointed   to   him   as   the
culprit of the rape. In cases in which the accused­appellant was
identified by the victim herself who harbored no ill motive against
him, the defense of alibi was rejected.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of 
Quezon City, Br. 95.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for plaintiff­appellee.
     Salatandre   and   Associates   Law   Office for   accused­
appellant.
660
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Baid
MENDOZA, J.:
This   is   an   appeal   from   the   decision  of   the   Regional   Trial
1
Court,   Branch   95,   Quezon   City,   finding   accused­appellant
Eric Baid y Ominta guilty of the crime of rape against Nieva
Garcia   y   Saban,   a   mental   patient,   and   sentencing   him   to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim
the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The information against accused­appellant, based on the
complaint   filed   by   the   offended   woman   and   her   mother,
alleged—
That on or about the 22nd day of December 1996, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused by means of force and intimidation,
to  wit:   by   then   and   there  [willfully],   unlawfully   and   feloniously
undressing   one   NIEVA   GARCIA   y   SABAN,   a   mental   patient
suffering [from] schizophrenia and put himself on top of her, and
thereafter   have   carnal   knowledge   with   the   undersigned
complainant against her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
When   arraigned,   accused­appellant   entered   a   plea   of   not
awakened tried to separate the two, and, as she failed to do
so, she went out to call the two nurses on duty. The nurses
responded   but,   when   they   arrived,   accused­appellant   had
left, while complainant had already put on her pants. 4

guilty, whereupon trial of the case on the merits proceeded.
The   prosecution   presented   three   witnesses,   namely,   the
complainant, Dr. Herminigilda Salangad, the complainant’s
attending   psychiatrist,   and   Dr.   Emmanuel   Reyes,   the
Complainant was brought later during the day before Dr.
Emmanuel Reyes for medico­legal examination. She told him
what   happened.   Dr.   Reyes   reduced   her   narration   of   the
incident   into   writing  and   then   gave   her   a   physical
5

medico­legal officer who examined the complainant. examination. His report stated: 6

Complainant   is   a   27­year   old   single   woman,   who   was FINDINGS:

diagnosed as having suffered from schizophrenia since 1988.
In December 1996, she was confined at the Holy Spirit Clinic GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:
in  Cubao, Quezon City because of  a relapse  of her  mental
Fairly developed, and coherent female subject. Breasts are hemispherical
condition.  On   the   other   hand,   accused­appellant   was   a
3

with   pale   brown   areola   and   nipples   from   which   secretions   could   be
nurse­aide of said clinic. pressed. Abdomen is flabby and soft.
On   December   22,   1996,   at   around   3   a.m.,   accused­
appellant   sneaked   into   the   patients’   room.   He   woke   the GENITAL:
complainant up and offered her a cigarette, at the same time
There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex
touching her foot. Com­
and coaptated with the pale brown labia minora presenting in between.
_______________
On separating the same disclosed an abraided posterior fourchette and
 Per Judge Diosdado Madarang Peralta.
1
an elastic, fleshy­type hymen with deep healed lacerations at 3, 6 and 9
 Rollo, pp. 12­13.
2 o’clock.   External   vaginal   orifice   offers   moderate   resistance   to   the
 TSN (Dr. Salangad), pp. 5, 12, April 23, 1997.
3 introduction   of   the   examining   finger   and   the   virgin­sized   speculum.
661 Vaginal canal is wide with flattened rugosities. Cervix is normal in size,
VOL. 336, JULY 31, 2000 661 color and consistency.
People vs. Baid
CONCLUSION:
plainant   took   the   cigarette.   As   she   smoked   it,   accused­
appellant   caressed   her.   Apparently,   she   was   aroused, Subject is in non­virgin state physically.
because she afterward removed her pants. It turned out she _______________
was   not   wearing   any   underwear.   Accused­appellant   also 4
 TSN (Nieva Garcia), pp. 4­9, April 10, 1997; TSN (Nieva Garcia), p. 3, April
removed   his   pants   and   the   two   had   sexual   intercourse. 27, 1997; Exhibit D; Records, pp. 5­6.
Afterwards,   they   transferred   under   the  bed  and   continued 5
 Exhibit B­2.
6
 Exhibit A.
their sexual intercourse. Complainant said she felt accused­
662
appellant   had   an   orgasm.   A   female  patient   who   had   been 662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 People vs. Baid
There are no external signs of application of any form of violence.
REMARKS:
Vaginal   and   peri­urethral   smears   are   negative   for   gram   negative
diplococci and for spermatozoa.
Dr.   Reyes   said   the   fresh   abrasion,   located   at   6   o’clock
posterior   of   the   complainant’s   genitalia,   could   have   been
recently caused by a hard blunt object, such as an erect penis
during sexual intercourse, or by the insertion of a finger. Dr.
Reyes   found   that   complainant   was   suffering   from   mental
illness   and   that   she   had   lapses   in   the   course   of   her
interview. 7 People vs. Baid
Accused­appellant testified in his behalf. He stated that
he   had   been   a   nurse­aide   of   the   Holy   Spirit   Clinic   since
September   18,   1995.   His   job   was   to   watch   the   patients,
especially when they become violent. He also fetched them
from   their   homes.   He   admitted   that   he   knew   the
complainant but claimed he did not know the reason for her
confinement.   He   denied   the   allegations   against   him.   He
testified   that,   on   the   date   and   time   referred   to   by   the
complainant,   he   was   asleep   in   the   nurse­aide   quarters
located about ten meters from the room where complainant
was staying. He admitted, however, that to go to the patients
room, he did not have to pass by the nurses’ station. He said
he knew that, at the time in question, there were two nurses
on   duty   and   ten   patients   in   the   room.   He   described   the
patients’   room   as   having   an   area   of   about   eight   by   five
square   meters   with   wooden   beds   arranged   one   foot   apart
from each other. 8
Accused­appellant was questioned by the trial court. He
testified that on December 22, 1996, he was on duty from 4
p.m.   to   12   midnight.   He   was   a   stay­in   nurse­aide   of   the
clinic. He stated that the clinic consisted of two floors and
five   rooms.   The   room   where   complainant   and   the   other
patients   were   staying   and   his   quarters   were   both   on   the
ground floor of the building. He admitted that the clinic was
for   the   mentally   ill   and   that,   as   a   nurse­aide,   he   was
supposed to know the status of every patient and his job was
to watch them
_______________
 TSN (Dr. E. Reyes), pp. 2­8, March 17, 1997.
7
 TSN (Eric Baid), pp. 2­6, May 22, 1997.
8
663
VOL. 336, JULY 31, 2000 663
and pacify them whenever they become violent. He said he
was very well acquainted with the behavior of the patients
considering the length of time he had been working in the
clinic. He claimed, however, that he did not specifically know
from what ailment complainant was suffering, but only that
she was undergoing treatment because of mental deficiency. 9
On cross­examination, accused­appellant admitted that he
knew   it   was   prohibited   to   give   cigarettes   to   patients.   He
further  admitted   that,  as  a   nurse­aide,  he  could   enter  the
patients’ room anytime to check their condition and see to it
that the lights were turned off when they were not needed.
He further stated that he was not investigated by the police
when he was invited to their headquarters. 10
On   June   20,   1997,   the   trial   court   rendered   its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
11
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
Eric Baid y Ominta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape defined in and penalized by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Rep. Act 7659, and hereby sentences the said
accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused is
further ordered to indemnify the victim Nieva Garcia y Saban the 1. (1)delusions
amount of P50,000.00, as moral damages.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 2. (2)hallucinations
Accused­appellant   contends   that   the   trial   court   erred   in
convicting him of rape. 12
3. (3)disorganized   speech   (e.g.,   frequent   derailment   or
Complainant is suffering from schizophrenia, a psychotic incoherence)
disorder of unknown etiology, characterized by disturbance
in   thinking   involving   a   distortion   of   the   usual   logical 4. (4)grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior
relations between ideas, a separation between the intellect
and the emotions so that the patient’s feelings and his or her 5. (5)negative symptoms, i.e., affective flattening, alogia,
manifestations   seem   inappropriate   to   his   or   her   life or avolition
situation,   and   a   reduced   tolerance   for   the   stress   of
interpersonal   relations   so   that   the   patient   retreats   from Note: Only one criterion A symptom is required if delusions are
social bizarre or hallucinations consist of a voice keeping up a running
_______________ commentary on the person’s behavior or thoughts, or two or more
voices conversing with each other.
 Id., pp. 6­8.
9

 Id., pp. 8­n.
10
1. B.Social/occupational   dysfunction: For   a   significant
 Rollo, pp. 14­22.
portion of the time since the onset of the disturbance,
11

 Id., p. 42.
12

664
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Baid
intercourse into his or her own fantasy life and commonly
into delusions and hallucinations, and may, when untreated
or unsuccessfully treated, go on to marked deterioration or
regression   in   his   or   her   behavior   though   often
unaccompanied   by   further   intellectual   loss.  The   following
13
are the symptoms of schizophrenia:
1. A.Characteristic   symptoms: Two   (or   more)   of   the
following,   each   present   for   a   significant   portion   of
time during a 1­month period (or less if successfully
treated):
one or more major areas of functioning such as work,
interpersonal   relations,   or   self­care   are   markedly
below the level achieved prior to the onset (or when
the   onset   is   in   childhood   or   adolescence,   failure   to
achieve expected level of interpersonal, academic, or
occupational achievement).
2. C.Duration: Continuous   signs   of   the   disturbance
persist   for   at   least   6   months.   This   6­month   period
must include at least 1 month of symptoms (or less if
successfully   treated)   that   meet   criterion   A   (i.e.,
active­phase symptoms) and may include periods of
prodromal   or   residual   symptoms.   During   these
prodromal   or   residual   periods,   the   signs   of   the
disturbance   may   be   manifested   by   only   negative
 symptoms   or   two   or   more   symptoms   listed   in
criterion A present in an attentuated form (e.g., odd
beliefs, unusual perceptual experiences).
3. D.Schizoaffective   and   mood   disorder
exclusion:Schizoaffective disorder and mood disorder
with features have been ruled out because either (1)
no major depressive, manic, or mixed episodes have
occurred   concurrently   with   the   active­phase
symptoms; or (2) if mood symptoms, their
_______________
 WEBSTER’S   THIRD   NEW   INTERNATIONAL   DICTIONARY
13
(unabridged) 2030 (1993).
665
VOL. 336, JULY 31, 2000 665
People vs. Baid
1. total duration has been brief relative to the duration
of the active and residual periods.
2. E.Substance/general medical condition exclusion: The
disturbance   is   not   due   to   the   direct   physiological
effects   of   a   substance   (e.g.,   a   drug   of   abuse,   a
medication) or a general medical condition.
3. F.Relationship   to   a   pervasive   developmental
disorder:If  there   is   a  history   of  autistic  disorder  or
another   pervasive   developmental   disorder,   the
additional diagnosis of schizophrenia is made only if
prominent   delusions   or   hallucinations   are   also
present for at least a month (or less if successfully
treated). 14
Schizophrenia   is   classified   into   five   subtypes,   namely,
paranoid,   disorganized   (hebephrenic),   catatonic,
undifferentiated, and residual. 15
Dr. Herminigilda Salangad, the complainant’s attending
psychiatrist   and   consultant   at   the   Medical   Center   in
Muntinlupa,   the   Perpetual   Help   Medical   Center,   the
Philippine National Police, and the Holy Spirit Clinic, was
presented   as   an   expert   witness.   According   to   her,
complainant was, at the time of the incident, suffering from
an   undifferentiated   type   of   schizophrenia,   described   as
having   the   characteristic   symptoms   of   schizophrenia   but
does   not   fit   the   profile   for   paranoid,   disorganized,   or
catatonic   schizophrenia.   Dr.   Salangad   stated   that
complainant seemed to shift from one type of schizophrenia
to   another.   Complainant   was   catatonic   when   she   first
treated   her,   a   situation   where   the   patient   shows   waxy
flexibility   (e.g.,   when   a   limb   is   repositioned,   that   limb
remains in that position for a prolonged period of time as if
the patient  is  made of wax), mutism  or agitation, and  the
patient   mimics   words   and   actions   during   examination.
Later, complainant became paranoid, i.e., suspicious, hostile
and  aggressive. She  also  manifested a  behavior where she
mumbled and smiled to herself. 16
_______________
14
 2 A. TASMAN, G. KAY, & J. LIEBERMAN, PSYCHIATRY 930 (1997),
citing   THE   DIAGNOSTIC   AND   STATISTICAL   MANUAL   OF   MENTAL
DISORDERS by the American Psychiatric Association (1994).
15
 Id., pp. 931­932.
16
 Id.; TSN (Dr. Salangad), p. 8, April 23, 1997.
666
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Baid
It is contended that as complainant is a schizophrenic, her
testimony should not have been given credence by the trial
court. It is argued that: (1) there were serious inconsistencies  Rollo, pp. 42­49, 107­115.
17

 Rule 130, §§20­21.
18

between her sworn statement and her testimony in court; (2)
667
the prosecution failed to present witnesses to corroborate her VOL. 667
testimony;   (3)   complainant   failed   to   identify   accused­ 336,
appellant;   (4)   the   results   of   the   medico­legal   examination JULY
were   negative   for   spermatozoa;   (5)   the   healed   lacerations 31, 2000
showed that complainant had sexual intercourse seven days People vs. Baid
before the alleged incident; and (6) the probability was that name when asked, answered the name Eric Baid) and that
her allegations of rape were merely a product of her fantasy. 17
person is smaller than the person inside the courtroom was
We disagree. disturbing “kinakalabit” another person inside the room.
Notwithstanding her mental illness, complainant showed Q And what happened after that first man entered the room at the
that she was qualified to be a witness, i.e., she could perceive Holy Spirit Clinic?
A The girl was trying to avoid the other person because at that
and   was   capable   of   making   known   her   perceptions   to
time, the accused Eric Baid was entering the room.
others.  Her testimony indicates that she could understand
18

Q And what happened after Eric Baid entered the room?

questions particularly relating to the incident and could give A When Eric Baid entered the room as if he knew me already
responsive answers to them. Thus she testified: and he asked me, “Nieva, gusto mo ng sigarilyo?,” at the same
PROSECUTION: (to the witness) time, Eric Baid was touching my foot.
Q Miss Nieva Garcia, are you still confined at the Holy Spirit Clinic, ATTY. VENTURANZA:
Los Angeles St., Cubao, Quezon City? I would just want to manifest that the witness while testifying,
A Not anymore, sir. she was smiling.
Q On December 22, 1996, do you know whether you are at the Holy PROSECUTION: (to the witness)
Spirit Clinic, Los Angeles St., Cubao, Quezon City? Q And after he asked you whether you like a stick of cigarette
A Yes, sir. and touched your foot, what happened next, Madam Witness?
Q Why were you there, Miss Witness? A I said yes.
A My mother asked me if I want to be confined at the Holy Spirit Clinic Q And what happened next after you said yes, I liked the
and I chose to be confined at the Holy Spirit because during that time, cigarette?
I was then taking my medicine. A After that, he caressed me.
Q At around three o’clock in the morning of December 22, 1996, do you COURT: (to the witness)
know where were you? Q How did he caress you?
A Yes, I was lying on the bed inside the Holy Spirit Clinic. A He went on top of me.
Q And while lying on the bed, inside the Holy Spirit Clinic, do you COURT: (to the prosecutor)
know what happened then, Miss Witness? Go ahead.
A At that time, there was a person shorter than the person (witness PROSECUTION: (to the witness)
pointing to the person dressed in yellow t-shirt whose Q How about the other man who entered earlier, what happened
_______________
 him? COURT: (to the witness)
A The smaller person went in and out of our room twice, the first Q Why, was he able to insert his private organ into your privateorgan?
time that he went, he touched the other woman beside me on A Yes, your Honor.
the foot but the woman resisted and shouted. After that, the Q What did he do when he was able to insert his private organ into
second time, the other man went inside the room, he touched your private organ?
the other woman but the woman shouted and that smaller one A As if his orgasm suddenly appeared.
went outside of the room. Q Do you understand when you say as if his orgasm suddenly
Q When Eric Baid placed himself on top of you, where was that appeared?
other man? A They are like what they call, your Honor, as if “naiputok.”
A He was no longer there. Q And what did he do when according to you “naiputok”?
.... A As if it was okay for him.
PROSECUTION: (to the witness) Q You were wearing an underwear?
668 A None, your Honor.
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Q You were actually naked?
People vs. Baid A I was wearing pants but I have no panty.
Q When Eric Baid was already on top of you, do you know if the small Q But who removed your pants?
man entered again your room? A I was the one, your Honor.
A No, sir. 669
Q And then, what happened when Eric Baid placed himself on top of VOL. 336, JULY 31, 2000 669
you? People vs. Baid
A I agreed. Q What about Eric Baid, what was he wearing?
Q Agreed to what? A He was also wearing pants.
A I agreed to the sex. Q Who removed the pants of Eric Baid?
Q You mean to say that you and Eric Baid has sexual intercourse while A He was the one.19

on top of your bed? When   complainant   was   questioned   on   cross   and   redirect
A Yes, sir. examination,   she   explained   how   she   was   able   to   identify
Q And what happened during the sexual intercourse while both of you accused­appellant, to wit:
were on top of the bed? ATTY. SALATANDRE:
A Somebody was awakened and told me, “Hoy, asawa mo ba iyan? Q You said a while ago that when the sex affair happened it was dark
Kinukubabawan ka.” and I answered no. so all throughout you did not see the face of the accused?
Q And was Eric Baid, was he able to consummate that sexual int A During that time it was dark but the latter part when he opened the
ercourse, Miss Witness? light, I saw his face, sir.
A Yes, sir. Q When the light was opened, he was about to leave the room?
Q And more or less, how long did the sexual intercourse last, Miss A About to leave, sir.
Witness? Q He was already facing the door?
A Around three to five minutes. A Yes, sir.
Q And you were at his back left inside the room? A Yes, sir.
A No, sir. Q And when you said that room was dark, is it totally dark or was it
Q Where were you then? only a little dark?
A I was just inside the room in my bed not at his back, sir. A Little light, sir. It was a little bit dark and a little bit light. (medyo
Q You were already on your bed when he was about to leave the room? may ilaw)
A Yes, sir. Q So the time that you had sexual intercourse with the accused at that
Q At that time that sex affair transpired between you and the acc used, time, you can identify the face of this person?
you did not even know his name? A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir. COURT: (to the witness)
Q You were only told later on about this person? Q You said that medyo may ilaw, where was the light emanating at
A Yes, sir. about 3:00 in the morning?
ATTY. SALATANDRE: (to the Court) A From the window outside, the room can be illuminated through the
That will be all, Your Honor. window, Your Honor.
COURT: Q So when the light came from outside, was the source from the
Any redirect? moon, from the bulb of the Meralco post or from another light
PROSECUTION: coming from another building or house?
Yes, your Honor. A It is the light actually coming from the ceiling of the building of the
_______________ clinic which was outside the window, Your Honor. 20

Though she may have exhibited emotions inconsistent with
 TSN (Nieva Garcia), pp. 3­8, April 10, 1997.
19

670 that   of   a   rape   victim   (“inappropriate   affect”)   during   her

670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED testimony, such as by smiling when answering questions, her
People vs. Baid behavior   was   such   as   could   be   expected   from   a   person
COURT: suffering from schizophrenia.
Go ahead. _______________
PROSECUTION:
 TSN (Nieva Garcia), pp. 7­8, April 24, 1997.
20

Q You said that you were only able to identify the accused whe nhe put 671
on the lights, when he was about to leave the room, how far were VOL. 336, JULY 31, 2000 671
you from the accused? People vs. Baid
A This distance, sir. (parties stipulated a distance of four meters, more Otherwise,   complainant   was   candid,   straightforward,   and
or less)
coherent.
Q You said that you saw his face at that time?
Furthermore, aside from the testimony of Dr. Salangad on
A Yes, sir.
Q And before this incident of December 22, 1996, were there any
complainant’s   consciousness   and   memory,  it   is   established
21

other occasion that he had any sexual intercourse with you? that schizophrenic persons do not suffer from a clouding of
A None, sir. consciousness and gross deficits of memory.  It has long been
22

Q And you often saw him as attendant in that clinic?

settled that a person should not be disqualified on the basis
of mental handicap alone. 23
With   regard   to   the   alleged   inconsistencies   between
complainant’s sworn statement  and her testimony as to the
24
number   of   times   she   and   accused­appellant   had   sexual
intercourse and where they did the same, an examination of
the evidence for the prosecution, particularly complainant’s
sworn   statement   and   her   interview   with   the   examining
medico­legal   officer,   shows   that   accused­appellant   had
sexual intercourse with her in different positions at various
places   in   the   same   room.   When   complainant   testified,   she
stated that, aside from the fact that accused­appellant had
sexual intercourse with her on her bed, he made her transfer
later   under   the   bed.   Be   that   as   it   may,   complainant   has
consistently established in all of her statements that he had
sexual intercourse with her on her bed. Whether or not he
had sex with her near the window and while facing him is of
no   moment   and   does   not   negate   the   finding   of   rape.
Whatever may be the inconsistencies in her testimony, they
are   minor   and   inconsequential.   They   show   that
complainant’s testimony was unrehearsed, and rather than
diminish the probative value of her testimony, they reinforce
it.
25
In the case at bar, the rape of complainant occurred in a
room where other patients were sleeping. This circumstance,
it   is   argued,   is   antithetical   to   the   possibility   of   the
commission of rape. As this Court has repeatedly said, lust is
no respecter of time and
_______________
 TSN (Dr. Salangad), pp. 10 and 16, April 23, 1997.
21
 PSYCHIATRY, supra, 947­948.
22
 People   v.   Almacin, 303   SCRA   399 (1999); People   v.   Atuel, 261   SCRA
23
339 (1996).
 Exhibits D and D­1; Records, pp. 5­6.
24
 People   v.   Padilla, 301   SCRA   265 (1999); People   v.   Atuel, 261   SCRA
25
339 (1996).
672
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Baid
place and the crime of rape can be consummated even when
the malefactor and the victim are not alone. 26
The plausibility of an allegation of rape does not depend
on   the  number   of  witnesses   presented   during   the  trial,   so
much so that, if the testimonies so far presented clearly and
credibly   established   the   commission   of   the   crime,
corroborative evidence would only be a mere surplusage. In 27
this case, the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses on the basis of which it adjudged
accused­appellant guilty. In the absence of bias, partiality,
and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding
judge,   his   findings   as   to   their   credibility   are   entitled   to
utmost   respect   as  he  had   the  opportunity  to  observe   their
demeanor on the witness stand. 28
Nor does the absence of spermatozoa in the genitalia of
complainant destroy the finding of rape since ejaculation is
never an element thereof.  What consummates the felony is
29
the contact of the penis of the perpetrator, however slight, to
the vagina  of his  victim  without  her  consent. Neither  is  it
30
required that lacerations be found in the victim’s hymen. We
have held that a medical examination is not a requisite for a
rape charge to prosper as long as the victim categorically and
consistently declares that she has been defiled.  In this case, 31
aside   from   complainant’s   positive   testimony,   the   medical
examination of the complainant showed an abrasion on her
labia   minora,   indicating   that   she   had   recent   sexual
intercourse.  That the deep healed lacerations found on the
32
complainant’s   genitalia   may   have   been   caused   seven   days
prior   to   December   22,   1996   is   immaterial   and   irrelevant
considering that she is a non­virgin.
_______________
 People   v.   Yabut, 311   SCRA   490 (1999); People   v.   Lozano, 310   SCRA
26
707 (1999).
 People v. Gondora, 265 SCRA 558 (1996).
27
 People v. Dizon, 309 SCRA 669 (1999).
28
 People v. Yabut, supra.
29
 People v. Abuan, 284 SCRA 46 (1998).
30
 People v. Lacaba, G.R. No. 130591, Nov. 17, 1999, 318 SCRA 301.
31
 People v. Bation, 305 SCRA 253 (1999).
32
673
VOL. 336, JULY 31, 2000
People vs. Baid
Accused­appellant also claims that complainant could have
been   hallucinating   in   alleging   that   she   had   sexual
intercourse   with   him   on   December   22,   1996.   In   answer,
suffice   it   to   say   that   complainant   was   steadfast   and
consistent   in   stating   that   she   was   raped   by   accused­
appellant. She maintained her allegation of rape when she
was   physically  examined  by  the  medico­legal   officer,   when
she made her statement to the police and again when she
testified in court. 33
Accused­appellant assails the trial court’s finding of lack
of consent on the part of the complainant to the sexual act.
As   the   facts   show,   complainant   herself   admitted   that   she
agreed   to   have   sex   with   him   after   he   gave   her   a   stick   of
cigarette. However, it  should be stressed that complainant
was in no position to give her consent. As Dr. Salangad said
in her testimony:
COURT:
Q If you claim that the private complainant is suffering from this kind of
illness, schizophrenia, and manifests behavior to the effect that she
can not be active during lucid intervals now if she is suffering from
this kind or mental state, can she give an intelligent consent
considering that the private complainant is already above 20 years of
age?
A In her case, I would say no, Your Honor.
Q I will rephrase my question. Because when I asked to give an
intelligent consent, you might be referring to acts that are very
important to her like, for example, “do you want to eat?” of course,
she will give an intelligent consent. “Do you want to sleep?” of
course, she will give an intelligent consent?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q But things that would destroy her honor or reputation like for example
having sex with her, can she give an intelligent consent?
A No, Your Honor.
673 _______________
 The complainant’s medico­legal examination and her sworn statement
33
before the police were both done on December 22, 1996. Her direct testimony
was presented on April 10, 1997. The rest of her testimony was proffered on
April 24, 1997.
674
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Baid
Q In other words, she would not know the consequences of her
consenting to such a proposal to have sex?
A Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. SALATANDRE:
Q She can not give an intelligent consent to sex, your patient?
A Yes, sir.
Q Meaning she will just agree?
A She has said so when I asked her. She was just offered a cigarette.
Q Meaning if she opens her legs, she does not understand what she
was doing?
A She probably knew what she was doing but when we say an int
elligent consent, she has weighed the pros and cons on an action and
its future significance and also based on the upbringing, sir.
Q That she was on top of the bed, then the accused allegedly opened
the zipper of his pants and pulled down the pants up to his knees and
placed himself on top of the patient and tried to insert his organ to
 her organ and the girl said she agreed to it because she likes it, does
it mean all those things that transpired she does not know or
understand what was happening?
A She knew what was happening but there is a difference in her
judgment, in her discernment. A child can be asked to lie down and
knows that somebody was on top of him or her and that is the thing
of being aware. But the judgment of the consent its elf, the
significance, the effect, we all know that a normal person does not
do these unless he or she contemplates it.
Q I just do not know if I am correct, my interpretation about what you
are saying is that physically they are doing that, meaning the organ
of the accused was inserted into the organ of the patient allegedly
but the girl did not resist, the girl did not comment whatsoever
because she did not understand what is happening?
COURT:
No, she did not say that she did not understand what was happening,
she can not discern.
A Let me give you a little information. In the psychological state of
mentally ill patients, the basic instinct of a person is very prominent.
They respond, they eat and they can have sex, that is normal and
they are just responding on the level of their basic instinct. When
you are a mature person or a normal person
675
VOL.
336,
JULY 31,
2000
People vs. Baid
and you have attained maturity and clearness of mind, you
now, of course, try to put things into their proper perspective,
socially and morally, that is where upbringing and education
come in. I would say that the patient’s case, she is more
responding in an instinctual level without the use of intellect.
Accused­appellant questions in this appeal the qualifications
of Dr. Salangad as an expert witness. However, he cannot do
this now as he did not raise any objection to Dr. Salangad’s
qualifications   in   the   trial   court.   On   the   contrary,   he   even
cross­examined her on the matters on which she testified. In
accordance with Rule 132, §36, objections not timely raised
are deemed waived.
The   fact   that   Dr.   Salangad   was   hired   by   the   family   of
complainant to give expert testimony as a psychiatrist did
not by that  fact  alone make her a  biased  witness  and  her
testimony unworthy of consideration. As has been said:
.   .   .   Although   courts   are   not   ordinarily   bound   by   expert
testimonies,   they   may   place   whatever   weight   they   choose   upon
such   testimonies   in   accordance   with   the   facts   of   the   case.   The
relative  weight  and  sufficiency  of  expert   testimony is   peculiarly
within  the  province  of   the  trial   court   to  decide,   considering   the
ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness
stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has
supported   his   opinion,   his   possible   bias   in   favor   of   the   side   for
whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative
opportunities   for   study   and   observation   of   the   matters   about
which   he   testifies,   and   any   other   matters   which   deserve   to
illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be
arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all
the   facts   and   circumstances   in   the   case   and   when   common
knowledge   utterly   fails,   the   expert   opinion   may   be   given
675
controlling   effect   (20   Am.   Jur.,   1056­1058).   The   problem   of   the
credibility   of   the   expert   witness   and   the   evaluation   of   his
testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling
thereupon   is   not   reviewable  in   the  absence   of   an   abuse   of   that
discretion. 35
________________
 TSN (Dr. Salangad), pp. 8­9, 16­17, April 23, 1997.
34
 Espiritu   v.   Court   of   Appeals, 242   SCRA   362 (1995); Solomon   v.
35
Intermediate Appellate Court, 185 SCRA 352 (1990).
34
676
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Baid
It has not been shown in this case that the trial court abused
its discretion in appreciating the testimony of Dr. Salangad
so as to justify setting aside its findings.
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed.—Rape is committed
by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances.
1. (1)By using force or intimidation;
2. (2)When   the   woman   is   deprived   of   reason   or   otherwise
unconscious; and
3. (3)When   the   woman   is   under   twelve   years   of   age   or   is
demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
....
To warrant a conviction for rape under paragraph (2) of Art.
335, a woman need not be proven as completely insane or
deprived of reason. The phrase “deprived of reason” has been
construed   to   include   those   suffering   from   mental
abnormality   or   deficiency   or   some   form   of   mental
retardation, those who are feeble­minded although coherent.
That the complainant was suffering from schizophrenia at
the time of the rape is shown by the fact that she was in the
clinic precisely because of such illness and by her behavior at
the trial, during which she would smile for no reason at all
while   answering   the   questions.   Though   she   may   not   have
totally lost her memory, it was shown that she was suffering
from an impairment of judgment, which made her incapable
of giving, an intelligent consent to the sexual act. It has been
held that where the rape victim is feeble­minded, the force
required by the statute is the sexual act itself. 37
_______________
 People v. Almacin, 303 SCRA 399 (1999).
36
 Id.
37
677
VOL. 336, JULY 31, 2000 677
People vs. Baid
Even assuming then that the complainant consented to have
sexual   intercourse   with   accused­appellant,   the   copulation
would   fall   under   the   third   paragraph   of   Art.   335   of   the
Revised Penal Code in view of the fact that complainant was
mentally ill. Sexual intercourse with an insane, deranged, or
mentally deficient, feebleminded, or idiotic woman is rape,
pure and simple. 38
At   any   rate,   complainant   said   in   her   sworn   statement
that   she   was   afraid   of   accused­appellant   because   of   the
nature of his job as a nurse­aid. Thus she stated:
1. 28.Tanong : Ikaw ba ay natatakot kay Eric?
2. Sagot : Kaunti lang, dahil sa trabaho niya. 39
36
As Dr. Salangad explained:
ATTY. SALATANDRE:
....
Q Meaning that when she was asked on page 2 “Tanong 27 Q—Ikaw
ba ay tinakot o sinaktan ni Eric? S—Hindi naman po.” This is her
own answer, nobody threatened her at that time?
A Yes, sir, but may I add. There was no direct threat but in her situation
she was brought there for confinement and treatment and for
safekeeping. She is in a situation wherein the attendants and the
nurses are all authorities around her, who dictate what to do. I
believe that there was some kind of threat or force in that level,
although there was no direct threat in the action.
COURT:
Q In the mind of Nieva Garcia, who were those that might be
threatening to her?
A The accused somehow had made the threat. Because in their daily
activity, the attendants and nurses dictate the things to do, they
follow, they are bosses in the clinic, they are in that kind of situation
always, Your Honor.
Q That explains your presence during the investigation?
A To assist her in order that she is not afraid and in response to earlier
question of counsel if the patient was directly threat-
_______________
 People v. Atuel, 261 SCRA 339 (1996).
38
 Exhibit D­1; Records, p. 6.
39
678
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Baid
ened or intimidated during the act, I am giving you a general
situation in an institution, in this kind of institution. Sometimes they
are restrained if they go out of line, they are ones who restrain them,
the attendants and the nurses do these, Your Honor. 40
As   already   stated,   accused­appellant   invoked   alibi   in   his
defense. He claimed that, at the time of the incident, he was
in  his  quarters   at   the  Holy  Spirit   Clinic  sleeping.   For  the
defense of alibi to be believed, the following requisites must
be met: (a) his presence at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the offense must be proven; and (b) it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
Accused­appellant’s   testimony   itself   demonstrates   the
untenability of his alibi. First, his declaration that he was in
another   room   of   the   clinic   is   uncorroborated.   Second,   the
room in which he said he was sleeping at that time of the
incident was only a few meters away from the patients’ room
where complainant was confined. Third, he admitted that, as
a   nurse­aide,   he   was   allowed   to   enter   the   patients’   room
anytime for purposes of checking on the patients. Above all,
his alibi cannot be given credence because complainant has
pointed to him as the culprit of the rape. In cases in which
the   accused­appellant   was   identified   by   the   victim   herself
who harbored no ill motive against him, the defense of alibi
was rejected. 42
The trial court correctly awarded moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00, in accordance with our recent rulings
that moral damages may be awarded in rape cases without
any need of proof of moral suffering. However, in addition,
civil   indemnity   in   the   amount   of   P50,000.00   should   have
been   awarded   the   complainant   consistent   with   the   ruling
that rape victims are entitled to such an award without need
of proof except the fact of the commission of the offense.  On 43
the   other   hand,   the   plea   of   the   prosecution   that   the
indemnity should be raised to P75,000.00 cannot be granted
_______________
 TSN (Dr. Salangad), p. 18, April 23, 1997.
40
 People v. Magpantay, 284 SCRA 96 (1998).
41
 People v. Luzorata, 286 SCRA 487 (1998).
42
 People v. Capillo, G.R. No. 123059, Nov. 25, 1999, 319 SCRA 223.
43
679
VOL. 336, JULY 31, 2000 679
People vs. Baid
because such amount is awarded only in cases of qualified
rape.   In   this   case,   there   were   no   qualifying   circumstances
raising the penalty to death.” 44
41
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 95, Quezon City is AFFIRMED with the modification
that,   in   addition   to   the   award   of   P50,000.00   for   moral
damages   made   by   the   trial   court,   complainant   should   be
indemnified in the amount of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
     Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
     Bellosillo (Chairman), J., On leave.
 Judgment affirmed with modification.
Notes.—Where the woman appeared to have enjoyed the
sexual   adventures,   there   could   be   no   intimidation   which
deprived   her   of   reason.   (People   vs.   Canillo, 236   SCRA
22 [1994])
Although   schizophrenia   is   not   exempting   if   it   does   not
completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of his
acts,   it   may   nevertheless   be   considered   mitigating   under
Article 13(9) if it diminishes the exercise of his will power.
(People vs. Banez, 301 SCRA 248 [1999])

——o0o——

_______________

 People vs. Lasola, G.R. No. 123152, Nov. 17, 1999, 318 SCRA 241.
44

680
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All
rights reserved.
 SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing   (Chairperson),   Carpio­Morales,
Tinga andVelasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Note.—For   the   defense   of   alibi   to   prosper,   the
requirements of time and place (or distance) must be strictly
met. (People vs. De Guzman, 416 SCRA 341 [2003])
——o0o——
      G.R. No. 175945. April 7, 2009.*
[Formerly G.R. Nos. 153211­12]
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   appellee, vs. LOLITO
HONOR y ALIGWAY,   ALBERTO   GARJAS y EMPIMO,
NOEL SURALTA y PAñA, and PEDRO TUMAMPO yNAYA,
appellants.
Evidence;   Testimonial   Evidence;   Findings   of   facts   and
assessment of  credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the
trial  court  because  of  its  unique position  of  having  observed  the
witnesses’   deportment   on   the   stand   while   testifying,   which
opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. When the credibility
of the witnesses is at issue, appellate courts will not disturb the
findings of the trial court, the latter being in a better position to
decide   the   question,   having   heard   the   witnesses   and   observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial unless
certain   facts   of   substance   and   value   had   been   overlooked,
misunderstood   or   misappreciated   which,   if   considered,   might
affect the results of the case.—Findings of facts and assessment of
credibility   of   witnesses   is   a   matter   best   left   to   the   trial   court
because of its unique position of having observed the witnesses’
deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is de­
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
547
VOL. 584, APRIL 7, 2009 547
People vs.Honor
nied   to   the   appellate   courts.   When   the   credibility   of   the
witnesses is at issue, appellate courts will not disturb the findings
of the trial court, the latter being in a better position to decide the
question,   having   heard   the   witnesses   and   observed   their
deportment   and   manner   of   testifying   during   the   trial   unless
certain   facts   of   substance   and   value   had   been   overlooked,
misunderstood   or   misappreciated   which,   if   considered,   might
affect the results of the case.
Same;   Same;  Defense  of  Alibi;  The   positive  identification of
the assailant, when categorical and consistent and made without
any   ill   motive   on   the   part   of   the   prosecution  witnesses,   prevails
over   alibi   and   denial   which   are   negative,   self­serving   and
undeserving of weight in law. The defense of denial, like alibi, is
considered with suspicion and is always received with caution, not
only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because
it   can   be   fabricated   easily.—The   positive   identification   of   the
assailant, when categorical and consistent and made without any
ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses, prevails over
alibi and denial which are negative, self­serving and undeserving
of  weight in law. The defense of  denial, like alibi, is considered
with   suspicion   and   is   always   received   with   caution,   not   only
because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it
can be fabricated easily.
Same; Same; Same; The positive identification of the accused
is supported by the corroborating testimony of the medical officer
who   attended   the   victims   as   to   the   nature   and   location   of   the
wounds. This, coupled with the accused’s weak defense of denial
and   alibi,   amounts   to   proof   beyond   reasonable   doubt   that   the
accused   were   indeed   guilty.—The   positive   identification   of   the
accused is supported by the corroborating testimony of the medical
officer who attended the victims as to the nature and location of
the   wounds.   This,   coupled   with   the   accused’s   weak   defense   of
denial and alibi, amounts to proof beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused were indeed guilty.
Criminal Law; Treachery; There is treachery when the means,
methods and forms of execution employed gave the person attacked
no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and such means,
methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously
adopted   by   the   accused   without   danger   to   his   person.   What   is
decisive in an appreciation of treachery is that the execution of the
attack made it
548
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
48
People vs.Honor
impossible   for   the   victim   to   defend   himself.—The   killing   of
Nodalo and of Argallon, in our considered view, were attended by
treachery. There is treachery when the means, methods and forms
of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate; and such means, methods and forms
of   execution   were   deliberately   and   consciously   adopted   by   the
accused   without   danger   to   his   person.   What   is   decisive   in   an
appreciation of treachery is that the execution of the attack made
it   impossible   for  the  victim   to  defend   himself.   In  this   case,   the
victims   were  unarmed   and   on   their   way  home   when   they   were
suddenly   attacked   and   stabbed,   hence   they   were   helpless   and
without means of defending themselves.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  The Solicitor General for appellee.
  Public Attorney’s Office for appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On  appeal  is  the Decision1 dated September  28, 2006   of
the Court of Appeals in CA­G.R. CEB­CR­H.C. No. 00224. It
had affirmed with modification the guilty verdict rendered
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City, Branch 35
in   a   murder   case   against   appellants   Lolito   Honor   and
Alberto Garjas.
The facts in this case are as follows:
In an Information2 dated February 12, 2001, Lolito Honor,
Alberto   Garjas,   Noel   Suralta,   and   Pedro   Tumampo   were
charged with murder before the RTC of Ormoc City, Branch
35 as follows:
_______________
1 Rollo,   pp.   4­8.   Penned   by   Associate   Justice   Agustin   S.   Dizon,   with
Associate   Justices   Pampio   A.   Abarintos   and   Priscilla   Baltazar­Padilla,
concurring.
2 Records, pp. 2­3.
549
VOL. 584, APRIL 7, 2009 549
People vs.Honor
“That on or about the 3rd day of February, 2001, at past 9:00
o’clock in the evening, at corner Real and Aviles Sts., this City,
and   within   the   jurisdiction   of   this   Honorable   Court,   the   above­
named   accused: LOLITO   HONOR   y   Aligway,   ALBERTO
GARJAS y Empimo, NOEL SURALTA y Paña and PEDRO
TUMAMPO y Naya, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping and aiding one another, with treachery, evident
premeditation   and   intent   to   kill,   and   with   the   use   of   bladed
weapons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, stab and wound the victims herein, HENRY ARGALLON
and   NESTOR   NODALO,   without   giving   them   sufficient   time  to
defend   themselves,   thereby   inflicting   upon   said   Henry   Argallon
and   Nestor   Nodalo   mortal   wounds   which   cause[d]   their   death.
Medico­Legal Certificates are hereto attached.
In violation of Article 248, RPC, as amended by RA 7659.
Ormoc City, February 12, 2001.” 3
 Another Information dated February 12, 2001 charged the
abovementioned   accused   for   frustrated   murder   of   Randy
Autida on the same date and occasion, as follows:
“That on or about the 3rd day of February, 2001 at around 9:00
o’clock in the evening, at corner Real and Aviles Sts., this City,
and   within   the   jurisdiction   of   this   Honorable   Court,   the   above­
named   accused:   LOLITO   HONOR y Aligway,   ALBERTO
GARJAS y Empimo,   NOEL   SURALTA y Paña   and   PEDRO
TUMAMPO yNaya,   conspiring   together,   confederating   with   and
mutually helping and aiding one another, with treachery, evident
premeditation   and   intent   to   kill,   did   then   and   there   willfully,
unlawfully   and   feloniously,   with   the   use   of   a   bladed   weapon,
attack,   stab   and   wound   the   person   of   the   complainant   herein
RANDY AUTIDA, thereby inflicting upon the latter a “stab wound
2.5 cm. posterior axillary line at the level of T5­T6, penetrating
chest   cavity”,   thus   performing   all   the   acts   of   execution   which
would have produced the crime of murder but which did not, by
reason of causes independent of accused’s will, that is, by the able
and   timely   medical   assistance   given   the   said   Ran[d]y   Autida,
which   prevented   his   death.   Medico­Legal   Certificate   is   hereto
attached.
_______________
3 Id., at p. 2.
550
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs.Honor
In violation of Article 248 in rel. to Art. 6, Revised Penal Code.
Ormoc City, February 12, 2001.” 4
The   abovementioned   cases   for   murder   and   frustrated
murder were tried jointly.
Warrants   of   arrest   against   the   accused   were   issued   on
February 13, 2001.5 Only Lolito Honor and Alberto Garjas,
however,   were   apprehended.   Noel   Suralta   and   Pedro
Tumampo have remained at large.
During   arraignment   on   March   13,   2001,   Honor   and
Garjas   pleaded   not   guilty.6 Since   Suralta   and   Tumampo
remained at large, trial proceeded only against Honor and
Garjas.
The prosecution presented eyewitness Rey Panlubasan, a
farm   worker   of   a   sugar   plantation   in   Torrevillas   and   a
resident   of Brgy. Juaton,   Ormoc   City.   Panlubasan   testified
that the victims Nestor Nodalo, Henry Argallon and Randy
Autida   worked   under   his   supervision   in   said   sugar
plantation. On February 3, 2001, at about 5:00 p.m., after
receiving their wages, seven of them, including the victims,
went to Doris Videoke, a small tavern at the public market of
Ormoc   City.   Their   group   occupied   the   first   table   at   the
tavern   while   another   group   of   four   individuals—whom   he
later recognized as the accused Lolito Honor, Alberto Garjas,
Noel   Suralta   and   Pedro   Tumampo—occupied   the   second
table about 2  ½ meters away from them. There were only
two groups having a drinking spree then: their group and the
group of the accused. After having consumed 1 ½ gallons of
tuba, at  around 9:00  p.m. of the same day, Nestor Nodalo
accidentally   dropped   a   bottle   of   Mallorca   which   he   was
holding   near   the   table   of   the   accused.   The   group   of   the
accused   then   stared   at   them   angrily.   After   a   while,
Panlubasan’s   group   left   the   bar   to   go   home.   His   group
walked along Real Street towards Aviles
_______________
4 CA Rollo, p. 64.
5 Records, pp. 25­27.
6 Id., at p. 31.
551
VOL. 584, APRIL 7, 2009 551
People vs.Honor
Street. Panlubasan testified that he then saw the group of
the accused leave and follow them at a distance of 15 meters.
When   they   were   only   one   meter   apart,   the   group   of   the
accused suddenly attacked them. Panlubasan testified that
there was sufficient electrical light in the street for him to
identify   the   assailants   as   the   same   group   who   drank   and
occupied the other table at Doris Videoke. He testified that
the accused  Honor and Garjas were the ones  who stabbed
Nestor Nodalo, Henry Argallon and Randy Autida while the
other accused, Noel Suralta and Pedro Tumampo, verbally
instigated them by uttering “Follow them and kill them all.” 7
The   prosecution   also   presented   Dr.   Jesus   Castro,   the
attending   physician   at   the   Ormoc   District   Hospital.   Dr.
Castro testified that he treated the victim Nestor Nodalo at
around 11:45 p.m. on February 3, 2001 and that Nodalo had
a stab wound 2.5 cm. in size at the left posterior axillary line
which is at the back left side posterior penetrating Nodalo’s
chest cavity. He testified that the wound was fatal as it was
a penetrating wound causing massive blood loss and hitting
a vital  organ. He listed Nodalo’s  cause of death as  cardio­
pulmonary arrest due to hypovolemic shock. As per medical
certificate dated February 10, 2001, the victim Nodalo was
listed as dead on arrival at the hospital.
As for the victim Henry Argallon, Dr. Castro testified that
he attended to him on February 3, 2001 at around 10:30 p.m.
Dr.   Castro   recounted   that   Argallon   had   three   (3)   stab
wounds:  a   stab   wound  6   cm.  at  his   right   shoulder,   a  stab
wound 5 cm. at the right mandibular area, and a stab wound
2.5   cm.   at   the   left   side   of   his   neck   penetrating   the   chest
cavity   and   transecting   the   trachea.   He   listed   Argallon’s
cause   of   death   as   cardio­pulmonary   arrest   due   to
hypovolemic   shock.   Argallon  was   also   pronounced  dead  on
arrival at the hospital.
As for the third victim, Randy Autida, Dr. Castro testified
that he also attended to the latter on February 3, 2001 at
_______________
7 Id., at p. 101; TSN, June 5, 2001, pp. 7­46.
552
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs.Honor
around   11:45   p.m.   and   that   Autida   suffered   one   (1)   stab
wound   2.5   cm.   on   the   right   posterior   axillary   line
penetrating Autida’s chest cavity. Autida was still conscious
when attended to at the hospital and he was not confined.
His injury required medical attention for 15 days. Dr. Castro
testified,   however,   that   if   Autida’s   wound   was   left
unattended, infection could have set in and possibly result in
death.8
The prosecution also presented SPO4 Rodrigo Sano, the
police   officer   who   apprehended   and   brought   Honor   and
Garjas to the police headquarters where they were identified
as   the   ones   who   stabbed   Nodalo,   Argallon   and   Autida   by
witnesses.9
The defense presented as witnesses Lolito Honor and his
wife, Hilde Honor, and Alberto Garjas.
Lolito Honor testified that he knew his co­accused Garjas,
Suralta and Tumampo since they worked as extra laborers in
hauling   at   the   Agrivet   Breeders   Store   in   Ormoc   City   and
they   were   his   drinking   buddies.   He   testified   that   on
February 3, 2001, at about 7:00 p.m. after work, he went to
the public market to buy fish. He met his co­accused in the
market and they had a drinking spree at a tavern there. He
testified that he stayed with his drinking buddies for only
about 15 minutes. He stated that he could not recall if there
was a group of people in the tavern aside from them since he
was there only for a short time. He testified that he has no
knowledge   of   the   stabbing   incident   since   he   reached   his
home at around 8:30 p.m.10
Lolito’s   testimony   was   corroborated   by   his   wife,   Hilde.
Hilde   confirmed  that   her   husband,   Lolito,   arrived  at   their
home at around 8:25 p.m. on February 3, 2001.11
_______________
8  Records, pp. 100­101; TSN, May 31, 2001, pp. 5­15.
9  Records, p. 101.
10 Id., at p. 102; TSN, August 22, 2001, pp. 5­19.
11 Id.; TSN, September 18, 2001, pp. 7­8.
553
VOL. 584, APRIL 7, 2009 553
People vs.Honor
Alberto   Garjas   confirmed   his   friendship   with   his   co­
accused Honor, Suralta and Tumampo and that the four of
them met at the public market of Ormoc City on February 3,
2001. He testified that they were drinking at a tavern and
there   were   two   groups   drinking   then.   He   recounted   that
Honor   was   the   only   one   who   sang   among   them   and   that
Honor   left   soon   after.   Then   the   dropping   of   the   Mallorca
bottle from the other group of drinkers occurred. He testified
that   he   recognized   the   prosecution   eyewitness,   Rey
Panlubasan, as among that group. He stated Panlubasan’s
group   left   ahead   of   them   and   after   consuming   a   gallon   of
tuba, his group also left. He was left behind as he was still
paying   for   their   drinks   and   buying   cigarettes.   He   was
intending to take a ride home when he saw his companions,
Suralta and Tumampo, attack and stab the young persons
who were part of the other group in the tavern. He confirmed
that   the   place   was   well   illuminated   and   he   saw   his
companions Suralta and Tumampo walk away casually after
the melee. Then, he took a ride home and, as he did not want
to get involved, he did not report the incident.12
In a Joint Judgment13 promulgated on November 20, 2001,
by   the   RTC   of   Ormoc   City,   the   accused   Lolito   Honor   and
Alberto   Garjas   were   acquitted   in   regard   to   the   crime   of
frustrated murder. But the two were found guilty of murder
and   sentenced   to   suffer   the   penalty   of reclusion
perpetua. The   RTC   found   that   the   testimony   of   Garjas
virtually confirmed the testimony of prosecution eyewitness
Rey   Panlubasan   and   that   the   testimonies   of   Lolito   Honor
and  his   wife,   Hilde  Honor,   were  self­serving,   specious   and
made up. The RTC found that the element of treachery was
present in the killing because the suddenness of the attack
afforded the victims no opportunity to defend themselves.
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 102­103; TSN, August 23, 2001, pp. 6­17, 21­24.
13 Records,   pp.   98­104.   Penned   by   Presiding   Judge   Fortunito   L.
Madrona.
554
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs.Honor
The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
“Wherefore, after considering the foregoing, the Court finds the
accused Lolito Honor y Aligway and accused Alberto Garjas y
[Empimo] NOT GUILTY of the crime of Frustrated Murder as
charged   under   Criminal   Case   No.   6015­0   for   failure   of   the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
If   the   said   accused   are   detained,   they   should   be   discharged
from prison unless they are held for any other lawful cause.
As to Criminal Case No. 6016­0, the Court finds the accused
Lolito   Honor y Aligway   and   accused   Alberto   Garjas y Empimo
GUILTY   beyond   reasonable   doubt   for   the   crime   of   Murder   as
charged,   and   hereby   sentences   each   of   them   to   suffer
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and for accused Lolito Honor
to indemnify the offended party, for the victim Henry Argallon, the
sum of P50,000.00 and for accused Alberto Garjas to indemnify the
offended party for victim Nestor Nodalo, the sum of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.”   14
Honor and Garjas appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision   dated   September   28,   2006,   the   Court   of   Appeals
affirmed   with   modification   the   RTC’s   verdict   by   ordering
both accused Honor and Garjas to pay jointly and solidarily
the heirs of Nestor Nodalo and Henry Argallon P50,000 each
as   moral   damages.   The   dispositive   portion   of   the   decision
states:
“WHEREFORE,   the   assailed   Decision   is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that accused­appellants are ordered to pay
jointly   and   severally   the   heirs   of   Henry   Argallon   and   Nestor
Nodalo Php 50,000.00 each as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.” 15
In the instant appeal, Honor and Garjas seek a reversal of
the   Court   of   Appeals   and   RTC   rulings.   They   raise   the
following issues:
_______________
14 Id., at p. 104.
15 Rollo, p. 7.
555
VOL. 584, APRIL 7, 2009 555
People vs.Honor
I.
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED
IN   GIVING   FULL   FAITH   AND   CREDENCE   TO   THE
TESTIMONY   OF   LONE   WITNESS   REY   PANLUBASAN
DESPITE … ITS MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES.
II.
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED
IN   FINDING   ACCUSED­APPELLANTS   GUILTY   BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.   16
Appellants   argue   that   the   trial   court   and   the   Court   of
Appeals   erred   in   giving   full   faith   and   credence   to   the
testimony of eyewitness Rey Panlubasan, which was based
mainly   on   generalities,   without   going   deeply   into   and
analyzing the points and details of his testimony. They argue
that the posture of the lower court reveals its bias in favor of
the   prosecution   and   against   the   defense.   They   cite
inconsistencies   in   the   testimony   of   Panlubasan.   Thus,
Panlubasan  stated  in  his  direct  testimony  that   Honor and
Garjas   stabbed   Argallon   but   on   cross­examination,   he
pointed only to Honor as the one who stabbed Argallon. 17The
accused   argue   that   irreconcilable   and   unexplained
contradictions   in   the   testimonies   of   the   prosecution
witnesses cast doubt on the guilt of the accused. 18 They also
argue   that   the   lower   court   overlooked   the   fact   that
Panlubasan’s   reaction  during the  startling and   frightening
incident was inconsistent with the usual reaction of persons
in   similar   situations.   They   claim   that   Panlubasan   did   not
run away during the stabbing incident but instead opted to
stay with the victims.19 They also argue that although alibi is
an  inherently   weak  defense  which  cannot  prevail   over   the
positive identification of the accused, when the identification
of the accused is inconclusive, alibi assumes importance and,
_______________
16 CA Rollo, p. 56.
17 Id., at pp. 56­57.
18 Id., at p. 58.
19 Id., at pp. 58­59.
556
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs.Honor
although   alibi   is   not   always   deserving   of   credit,   there   are
times   when   the   accused   has   no   other   possible   defense   for
what could really be the truth as to his whereabouts.20
For   the   State   as   appellee,   the   Office   of   the   Solicitor
General (OSG) contends that the trial court correctly gave
credence to the testimony of Rey Panlubasan. It is a time­
tested doctrine, says the OSG, that a trial court’s assessment
of   the   credibility   of   a   witness   is   entitled   to   great
weight.21 Further,   the   OSG   argues   that   the   alleged
discrepancy in Rey Panlubasan’s testimony regarding “who
stabbed   whom”   does   not   necessarily   cast   doubt   on   the
identity of the assailants since conspiracy was alleged in the
information and each of the accused is liable not only for his
own act but also for the act of the other. 22 The OSG points out
that   Panlubasan’s   testimony   was   corroborated   by   other
evidence, notably the testimony of Dr. Castro on the nature
and location of the wounds sustained by the victims.23
Simply stated, the two issues for our resolution are: (1)
Did the RTC and the Court of Appeals err in giving credence
to the testimony of Rey Panlubasan? and (2) Was the guilt of
appellants proved beyond reasonable doubt?
As to the first issue, findings of facts and assessment of
credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court
because   of   its   unique   position   of   having   observed   the
witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying, which
opportunity   is   denied   to   the   appellate   courts. 24 When   the
credibility of the witnesses is at issue, appellate courts will
not disturb the findings of the trial court, the latter being in
a   better   position   to   decide   the   question,   having   heard   the
wit­
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 60­61.
21 Id., at p. 100.
22 Id., at p. 102.
23 Id., at p. 103.
24 People v. Sades, G.R. No. 171087, July 12, 2006, 494 SCRA 716, 724.
557
VOL. 584, APRIL 7, 2009 557
People vs.Honor
nesses   and   observed   their   deportment   and   manner   of
testifying during the trial unless certain facts of substance
and   value   had   been   overlooked,   misunderstood   or
misappreciated which, if considered, might affect the results
of the case.25
Minor variances in the details of a witness’ account, more
frequently   than   not,   are   badges   of   truth   rather
than indicia of falsehood and they often bolster the probative
value   of   the   testimony.26 Indeed,   even   the   most   candid
witnesses   oftentimes   make   mistakes   and   would   fall   into
confused   statements,   and   at   times,   far   from   eroding   the
effectiveness   of   the   evidence,   such   lapses   could   instead
constitute   signs   of   veracity.   If   it   appears   that   the   same
witness   has   not   willfully   perverted   the   truth,   as   may   be
gleaned from the tenor of his testimony and the conclusion of
the trial judge regarding his demeanor and behavior on the
witness   stand,   his   testimony   on   material   points   may   be
accepted.27
In this case, Panlubasan’s testimony positively points to
the accused as the ones who stabbed the victims. At the time
of   the   incident,   the   witness   may   have   been   under   the
influence of liquor; nonetheless, nothing in his testimony and
conduct during the trial appears to suggest total erosion of
his mental faculties that would negate his identification of
the accused.
 As to the second issue, we are in agreement that there is
proof   beyond   reasonable   doubt   concerning   the   guilt   of   the
accused.
The   positive   identification   of   the   assailant,   when
categorical and consistent and made without any ill motive
on the part of the prosecution witnesses, prevails over alibi
and denial which are negative, self­serving and undeserving
of   weight   in   law.   The   defense   of   denial,   like   alibi,   is
considered
_______________
25 People   v.   Malejana,  G.R. No.  145002,  January  24,  2006,  479   SCRA
610, 620.
26 People v. Sades, supra at pp. 725­726.
27 Id., at p. 726.
558
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs.Honor
with suspicion and is always received with caution, not only
because   it   is   inherently   weak   and   unreliable,   but   also
because it can be fabricated easily.28
In this case, the positive identification of the accused is
supported   by   the   corroborating   testimony   of   the   medical
officer   who   attended   the   victims   as   to   the   nature   and
location   of   the   wounds.   This,   coupled   with   the   accused’s
weak defense of denial and alibi, amounts to proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused were indeed guilty.
The killing of Nodalo and of Argallon, in our considered
view, were attended by treachery. There is treachery when
the means, methods and forms of execution employed gave
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and such means, methods and forms of execution
were   deliberately   and   consciously   adopted   by   the   accused
without   danger   to   his   person.   What   is   decisive   in   an
appreciation of treachery is that the execution of the attack
made it impossible for the victim to defend himself. 29 In this
case, the victims were unarmed and on their way home when
they were suddenly attacked and stabbed, hence they were
helpless and without means of defending themselves.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
“ART. 248. Murder.—Any person who, not falling within the
provisions   of   Article   246,   shall   kill   another,   shall   be   guilty   of
murder   and  shall   be  punished  by reclusion  perpetua, to  death  if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With   treachery,   taking   advantage   of   superior   strength,
with the aid of armed men, or employing means  to weaken the
defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck,
stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of
_______________
28 Id., at p. 727.
29 Id., at pp. 727­728.
559
VOL. 584, APRIL 7, 2009 559
People vs.Honor
an   airship,   by  means   of   motor   vehicles,   or   with   the  use  of   any
other means involving great waste and ruin;
4. On   occasion   of   any   of   the   calamities   enumerated   in   the
preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano,
destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity;
5. With evident premeditation;
6. With  cruelty,   by   deliberately  and  inhumanly  augmenting
the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or
corpse.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The   qualifying   circumstance   of   treachery   having   been
established,   the   crime   committed   by   the   appellants   is
murder in accordance with Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code   abovementioned.   Since   there   is   no   aggravating
circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty to
be   imposed   should   be   in   its   minimum   period   which
is reclusion   perpetua,   pursuant   to   the   abovecited   Revised
Penal Code provision.
Two deaths having resulted from the treacherous attack,
the   OSG   correctly   argues   that   the   accused   should   be
sentenced for two counts of murder. The Information dated
February 12, 2001 charged them for two distinct offenses of
murder on the persons of Nestor Nodalo and Henry Argallon.
Although under Section 1330 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
an   information   must   charge   only   one   offense,   the   accused
failed to file a motion to quash information and thus waived
their   right   to   be   tried   for   only   one   crime   under   one
information pursuant to Section 931Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court.
_______________
30 SEC. 13. Duplicity of the offense.—A complaint or information must
charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment
for various offenses.
31 SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefore.—
The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before
he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed
a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in
paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule. 
560
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs.Honor
Moreover, an appeal in a criminal case opens the wholecase
for   review   and   this   includes   the   penalty,   which   may   be
increased.32
As for damages, the accused should be made jointly and
severally liable for damages, conspiracy being attendant to
the killings.
When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be
recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the
victim;   (2)   actual   or   compensatory   damages;   (3)   moral
damages;   (4)   exemplary   damages;   (5)   attorney’s   fees   and
expenses of litigation, and (6) interest, in proper cases.33
The   award   for   civil   indemnity   is   mandatory   and   is
granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other
than the commission of the crime. Hence, based on current
jurisprudence,   the   award   of   civil   indemnity ex   delicto of
P75,000   in   favor   of   the   heirs   of   each   of   the   two   victims
Nestor  Nodalo  and   Henry   Argallon,  to  be  paid  jointly  and
severally  by  accused  Honor  and  Garjas  is   in order. 34 Moral
damages in the amount of P50,000 are also properly awarded
in view of the violent deaths of each of the victims and the
resultant grief to their respective families, 35 which damages
have   likewise   to   be   paid   jointly   and   severally   by   accused
Honor and Gajas.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 28, 2006 of
the   Court   of   Appeals   in   CA­G.R.   CEB­CR­H.C.   No.   00224
affirming   with   modification   the   Joint   Judgment   dated
November   20,   2001   of   the   Regional   Trial   Court   of   Ormoc
City,   Branch   35   is   AFFIRMED   with   MODIFICATION.
Appellants Lolito Honor and Alberto Garjas are each found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of MURDER
as de­
_______________
32 Obosa v. Court of  Appeals, G.R. No.  114350, January  16,  1997, 266
SCRA 281, 301.
 33 People v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA
727, 742.
34 Id.
35 Id., at p. 743.
561
VOL. 584, APRIL 7, 2009 561
People vs.Honor
fined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by
treachery   with   no   aggravating   circumstance   or   mitigating
circumstance.   For   each   count   of   murder,   the   sentence
of reclusion   perpetua is   imposed   on   each   of   the   appellants.
Appellants   are   further   ORDERED   to   jointly   and   severally
pay the heirs of Nestor Nodalo the amounts of P75,000 as
civil   indemnity   and   P50,000   as   moral   damages,   both   with
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annumfrom
this date until fully paid. The same amounts of P75,000 as
civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages shall also be
paid   jointly   and   severally   by   the   accused   to   the   heirs   of
Henry   Argallon,   both   with   the   same   legal   rate   of   interest
until fully paid.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio­Morales,   Tinga,   Velasco,   Jr. and Brion,   JJ.,
concur.
Judgment affirmed with modification. 
Note.—Well­settled   is   the   legal   principle   that   a
categorical and positive identification of an accused, without
any   showing   of   ill­motive   on   the   part   of   the   eyewitness
testifying   on   the   matter,   prevails   over   alibi   and   denial.
(People vs. Rentoria, 533 SCRA 708 [2007])
——o0o——
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may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may
be   served.   (Kimberly   Independent   Labor   Union   for
Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism [KILUSAN]­Organized
Labor   Associations   in   Line   Industries   and   Agriculture
[OLALIA] vs. Court of Appeals, 528 SCRA 45 [2007]; De Los
Santos vs. Vda. de Mangubat, 535 SCRA 411 [2007])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 180923. April 30, 2009.*
PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES,   appellee, vs. SALOMON
DIONEDA Y DELA  CRUZ a.k.a. SIMON  DIONEDA DELA
CRUZ, appellant.
Evidence;   Testimonial   Evidence;   Trivial   inconsistencies   and
inconsequential discrepancies on minor details in the testimonies
of witness do not impair their credibility. They could, in fact, be
badges   of   truth   for   they   manifest   spontaneity   and   erase   any
suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.—Forthright witnesses are not
immune from committing minor inaccuracies in their narration of
events. Trivial inconsistencies and inconsequential discrepancies
on minor details in the testimonies of witness do not impair their
credibility. They could, in fact, be badges of truth for they manifest
spontaneity and erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. As
long   as   the   inconsistencies   are   immaterial   or   irrelevant   to   the
elements of the crime and do not touch on material facts crucial to
the guilt or innocence of the accused as in the present case, these
are not valid grounds to reverse a conviction.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  The Solicitor General for petitioner.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
313
VOL. 587, APRIL 30, 2009 313
People vs. Dioneda
  Public Attorney’s Office for respondent.
CARPIO­MORALES,** J.:
On appeal is the January 31, 2007 Decision 1 of the Court
of   Appeals   in   CA­G.R.   CR­H.C.   No.   02096   which   affirmed
with modification the February 4, 2004 Decision of Branch
107   of   the   Regional   Trial   Court   in   Quezon   City   finding
Salomon   Dioneda y Dela   Cruz2 a.k.a.   Simon   Dioneda   Dela
Cruz   (appellant)   guilty   of   raping   six   year   old   AAA 3 in
Criminal Case No. Q­00­94913.
Appellant, by Information filed on August 29, 2000, was
charged for rape as follows:
“That on or about the 27th day of August, 2000 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above­named accused, a minor 17 years of age, by
means of force and intimidation, with lewd designs, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously put himself on top of
one   AAA,   a   minor   6   years   of   age,   and   thereafter   have   carnal
knowledge with said complainant against her will and without her
consent, to her damage and prejudice.
_______________
**  Acting Chairperson.
1 Penned   by   Associate   Justice   Vicente   Q.   Roxas   and   concurred   in   by
Associate Justices Josefina Guevarra­Salonga and Ramon R. Garcia; CA Rollo,
pp. 130­145.
2 The   assailed   Court   of   Appeals   Decision   noted   that   appellant   “uses   the
name Salomon Dioneda y Dela   Cruz   and   the   Information   identifies   him   as
bearing   that   name.   However,   his   birth   certificate   bears   the
name Simon Dioneda y Dela Cruz” (id., at p. 131, note 2).
3 Pursuant to Section 44 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known
as THE ANTI­VIOLENCE  AGAINST WOMEN  AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT  OF 2004, and
Section 63, Rule XI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 9262, the
real name of the victim is withheld to protect her privacy. Fictitious initials are
used instead to represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances or any other
information tending to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of
her family members shall not be disclosed.
314
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Dioneda
CONTRARY TO LAW.” 4 8  TSN, October 9, 2003, p. 4.
Through   the   testimonies   of   AAA,   her   parents   BBB 5 and
CCC,6 Dr.   Jaime   Rodrigo   Leal,   Eddie   Roque   and   SPO3
Violeta   Balanse,   the   prosecution   proffered   the   following
version:
At about 6:00 o’clock in the evening of August 27, 2000,
AAA, then six (6) years old, she having born on May 14, 1994
to BBB and CCC,7 went to her neighbor Ruth Dajao’s three­
storey house at Belen Street, Gulod, Novaliches, Quezon City
with   the   intention   of   playing   with   the   latter’s   son,   Iking
(Iking).8 On   reaching   the   first   floor,   AAA   met   appellant,   a
helper of the Dajao family who usually goes to her residence,
who told her that Iking was already asleep at the third floor.
AAA just the same went up the third floor of the house and
saw that Iking was indeed sleeping.9She thus went down and
decided to go home.
When   AAA   reached   the   first   floor,   appellant   prevented
her from leaving, saying “Sandali lang,” he telling her that
the   two   of   them   were   going   to   play.   She   refused   but
appellant held her arm, forcing her to return to the second
floor. Appellant caught up with her, however, made her lie
down on the floor and placed himself on top of her. He then
carried   her   to   a   double­deck   bed   where   he   laid   her   down,
removed her panties, undressed himself, went on top of her,
and inserted his penis into her vagina. She experienced pain.
He  then  wiped  her  vagina  and  warned   her  not   to tell   the
incident to anybody.
_______________
4 Records, pp. 1­4.
5 His real name is withheld for the same reason as stated in note 3.
6 Her real name is likewise withheld for similar reason stated in note 3.
7  Vide. Exhibit “A” (AAA’s Birth Certificate), Transcript of Stenographic
Notes (TSN), January 16, 2000, pp. 4­5; January 20, 2002, pp. 4­5.
9  TSN, May 25, 2001, p. 12.
315
VOL. 587, APRIL 30, 2009 315
People vs. Dioneda
She   stood   up,   put   on   her   panties   and   ran   straight   to   her
house crying.10
Her parents asked her why she was crying to which she
replied   that   her   vagina   was   aching   because   “Kuya   Jong,”
whom she identified as appellant, did something bad to her.
She   thereupon   showed   them   her   “kikay,”   referring   to   her
vagina, and her panties with bloodstains. 11 She related that
appellant   went   on   top   of   her   and   placed   his   penis   in   her
vagina. Furious, her parents stepped out of the house and
looked for appellant.12
On seeing appellant in Dajao’s house, BBB tried to attack
him but was restrained by CCC and several neighbors who
had   in   the   meantime   gotten   wind   of   the   incident.   AAA,
together   with   her   parents,   reported   the   incident   to   the
authorities who thereafter arrested appellant.13
Dr. Jaime Rodrigo Leal, the Medico­Legal Officer of the
Philippine   National   Police   (PNP),   Camp   Crame,   examined
AAA and found her hymen bruised and an abrasion in the
area surrounding the hymen and a 0.3 cm. fresh laceration
with blood clots at the posterior fourchette, indicating that it
occurred   within   24   hours   prior   to   the   examination.   The
doctor   opined   that   his   findings   on   AAA’s   genitalia   were
indicative of penetration and consistent with her disclosure
of sexual abuse.14
 AAA’s mother noticed that after the rape incident, AAA
had difficulty urinating and “kinikilig.”15
Denying   the   accusation,   appellant   gave   the   following
version: At around 6:00 to 7:00 o’clock that evening of August
27,
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 15­16.
11 TSN, January 10, 2001, pp. 6­7.
12 Id., at p. 7; TSN, February 20, 2002, pp. 8­12.
13 TSN, March 6, 2003, pp. 2­7.
14 TSN, July 17, 2002, pp. 7, 12; Exhibit “G” dated August 27, 2000 and
Exhibit “H”; Records, p. 166.
15 RTC Decision dated February 4, 2004, CA Rollo, p. 34.
316
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Dioneda
2000,   he   was   watching   television   at   the   first   floor   of   the
house of the Dajaos. He later gathered the clothes from the
clothesline and saw AAA outside the house holding her toys
and   playing   with   someone   he   did   not   know.   AAA’s   father
BBB   soon   appeared   and   shouted   at   him,   accusing   him   of
having   raped   her   daughter,   and   was   later   brought   to   the
police station where he was detained.
By Decision dated February 4, 2004, the trial court found
appellant   guilty   of   rape   as   charged   under   Article   266­A,
paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.
Considering, however,  that  appellant  was  only  17  years
old when he committed the crime on August 27, 2000, having
been   born   on   September   24,   1982   as   shown   by   his   birth
certificate,   he   was   credited   with   the   privilege   mitigating
circumstance of minority to lower the penalty by one degree
—reclusion perpetua.16 Thus the trial court disposed:
“WHEREFORE,   IN   VIEW   OF   THE   FOREGOING,   the
prosecution   having   established   the   guilt   of   the   accused   beyond
reasonable   doubt,   this   Court   finds   the   accused   SALOMON
DIONEDA   Y   DELA   CRUZ   a.k.a.   SIMON   DIONEDA   Y   DELA
CRUZ, guilty of the offense charged. He is hereby sentenced:
1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2. To   pay   the   private   complainant,   (AAA)   x x x   civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00;
3. To pay the x x x private complainant the amount of
P50,000.00 for exemplary damages;
4. To   pay   further   the   x x x   private   complainant   the
amount of P50.000.00 as moral damages; and
5. The accused is hereby ordered, upon his release from
detention, not to approach the private complainant in school,
in the church, in the malls or anywhere else; he shall never
contact   the   private   complainant   either   by   telephone,
cellphone   or   send   text   messages   or   with   the   use   of   any
electrical device or
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 42­43.
317
VOL. 587, APRIL 30, 2009 317
People vs. Dioneda
even letters, otherwise, the private complainant can seek the
assistance of this Court.
   SO ORDERED.” 17
The records of the case were forwarded to this Court on
appeal   of   appellant.18 Per People   v.   Mateo,19 however,   the
Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals by Resolution
of September 28, 2005.20
The   appellate   court,   by   Decision   of   January   31,
2007, affirmed the   factual   findings   of   the   trial   court
but modifiedthe   award   of   exemplary   damages   from
P50,000.00   to   P25,000.00,   consistent   with   prevailing
jurisprudence. It thus disposed:
“WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   the   February   4,   2004
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107,
in   Criminal   Case   No.   Q­00­94913,   is   hereby AFFIRMED   with
MODIFICATION in that exemplary damages are hereby reduced
to P25,000.00.
Pursuant   to   Section   13   (c),   Rule   124   of   the   2000   Rules   of
Criminal   Procedure   as   amended   by   A.M.   No.   00­5­03­SC   dated
September 28, 2004, which became effective on October 15, 2004,
this   judgment   of   the   Court   of   Appeals   may   be   appealed   to   the
Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of Court of
the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.” (Emphasis in the original)
In his Brief, appellant faulted the trial court
“…  IN   GIVING   FULL   WEIGHT  AND   CREDENCE   TO   THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.” 21
Appellant assails AAA’s credibility, citing her inconsistent
answers regarding the circumstances before the commission
_______________
17 Id., at p. 44.
18 Id., at p. 48.
19 G.R. Nos. 147678­87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
20 CA Rollo, pp. 127­128.
21 Accused­Appellant’s Brief, id., at p. 57.
318
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Dioneda
of   the   alleged   rape,   particularly   her   testimony   on   direct
examination   that   she   stopped   at   the second   floor of   the
Dajaos’ house where he allegedly told her to wait (“sandali
lang”) but that on cross­examination she stated that she met
appellant at the ground floor.
Appellant’s appeal is doomed.
The place where AAA met appellant when she was about
to   leave   the   Dajao   residence,   whether   on   the   ground   or
second floor is a trivial matter. AAA, a child of tender age,
could   not   be   expected   to   give   a   perfect   recollection   of   the
exact floor of the house where she met appellant.
Forthright   witnesses   are   not   immune   from   committing
minor   inaccuracies   in   their   narration   of   events.   Trivial
inconsistencies and inconsequential discrepancies on minor
details   in   the   testimonies   of   witness   do   not   impair   their
credibility. They could, in fact, be badges of truth for they
manifest spontaneity and erase any suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony.22 As long as the inconsistencies are immaterial or
irrelevant to the elements of the crime and do not touch on
material facts crucial to the guilt or innocence of the accused
as in the present case, these are not valid grounds to reverse
a conviction.23
Appellant’s   challenge   to   the   assailed   decision   having
failed, and no circumstance which creates reasonable doubt
on his guilt being extant, his conviction must be upheld.
WHEREFORE, the appeal  is  DISMISSED. The assailed
Decision   of   the   Court   of   Appeals   in   CA­G.R.   CR­H.C.   No.
02096 is AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
_______________
22 People v. Ortiz, G.R. No. 133814, July 17, 2001, 361 SCRA 274; People
v. Jamiro, G.R. No. 117576, September 18, 1997, 279 SCRA 290.
23 People   v.   Delmo,   G.R.   Nos.   130078­82,   October   4,   2002,   390   SCRA
395; People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 117406, January 16, 2001, 349 SCRA 67.
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